ML20129F174
| ML20129F174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/02/1990 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20129F106 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-94-208 NUDOCS 9610040068 | |
| Download: ML20129F174 (450) | |
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OFFICIALTRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 4
f
- MCUC7
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Diesel Generator Meeting
Title:
get een uRc ona Georgi, go e, 3
Docket No.
1 l
1 mpg Waynesboro, Georgia m Monday. April 2, 1990 PAGES:
1 - 60 I?f i /.
~
ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. !
1612 K St. N.W Suite 300 l Washington, D.C 20006 i
/< l (202) 293-3950 ;
9610043068 960827 E i PDR FOIA COLAPIN94-208 PDR 7
1 1 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
3 4 )
5 DIESEL GENERATOR NEETING )
6 BETWEEN NRC AND GEORGIA POWER )
7 )
8
-9 10 Main Conference Room 11' Administration Building 12 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
. 13 Waynesboro, Georgia 14 15 Monday, April 2, 1990 16 17 18 The meeting commenced at 8:45 a.m.
19 20 21 22 23 24 25
i 2 l 1
- 1 ATTENDEES: )
2 1
3 AL CHAFFEE TOM WEBB 4 WILLIAM LAZARUS KENNETH BURR !
l 5 ALAN HERDT RAY HOWARD ,
l 6 KEN BROCKMAN KENNETH HOLMES l l
7 RICK KENDALL JIM ROBERTS l 8 PAUL KOCHERY JOSEPH D'AMICO l
9 GEORGE BOCKHOLD GEORGE FREDERICK 10 WARREN LYON PHIL CUPP 11 PAUL DIETZ MARK BRINEY 12 E. A. TRAGER MICHAEL LACKEY 13 WILLIAM JONES VINCE STEWART 14 HERB BEACHER ERNEST TOUPIN 15 ROBERT JOHNSTON ALLEN MOSBAUGH 16 DONALD PESOUT MICHAEL HORTON i 17 SHELDON OWYOUNG JIMMY TAUL CASH 18 KENNETH STOKES INDIRA KOCHERY 19 CHARLES COURSEY
, 20 21 22 23 24 25
3
- 1 PROCEEDINGS 4
2 MR. CHAFFEE: It's April 2 and it's 8:45 in the 3 morning and we're here -- this is the IIT at Vogtle and 4 we're here to go over the information that exists at this 5 time on the problem with the diesel generator relative to 6 its tripping and what the troubleshooting has found and what 7 the machinery history has reviewed that is relevant to what 8 transpired in the event with the diesel generator tripping.
9 I don't know how we should do this. Do you just 10 want to have somebody kind of run through what you guys' 11 perception is on it?
12 MR. BOCKHOLD: You know, we, last night provided t 13 you a root cause that the critique team is -- you know, the 14 diesel team came up with this root cause and some key 15 lessons learned and recommendations and a statement about 16 diesel reliability and our analysis of it.
17 I think the key lesson learned -- and we have the 18 Calcon vendor on the way and he's supposed to be here today 19 -- is to go through the calibration procedures so we can 20 determine what is the best methodology for calibration. We 21 have some ideas, I'm sure he'll have some ideas, and look at 22 switch reliability. That's ongoing.
23 I don't know if you want me to read this for the 24 record's sake or that kind of stuff or you ask specific i
25 questions about the history.
1 4
1 MR. CHAFFEE: Why don't wd just ask some questions 1
2 then. I guess one question is in one of your lessons 3 learned you say that "The operator training should be 4 revised to ensure that operators realize that an emergency 5 reset will overrun the high jacket water trip." I'm not i 6 sure I understand what that means. Does that mean that you 7 can actually override that particular trip feature by 8 emergency resetting? !
9 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, I believe that's correct. And 10 Sheldon Owyoung is probably -- you know, the vendor expert 11 that identified that to us just recently.
i 12 MR. OWYOUNG: If you have a jacket water I
6 13 temperature trip, the engine will shut down on two out of 14 three. One you have a shutdown, it'll give you emergency 15 shutdown, the controls are set up such that when you reset 16 the emergency shutdown, the unit will start up again and 17 bypass that shutdown. That way, it's the opinion of the 18 operator or the experience of the operator to determine if 19 he's going into a safe plant or not. He has all the i 20 particular indications to indicate that it is a sensor 21 malfunction or if the jacket water temperature is actually 4
22 high.
23 MR. BOCKHOLD: So that gives us an additional 24 means to bypass'this particular trip.
- 25. MR. CHAFFEE: And I. guess up until yesterday, that l l J
i i
5 1 feature of this. design, as it applies to Vogtle, was 1
);
1 2 something that wasn't recognized.
3 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct, it was not 4 recognized by our operators. !
5 MR. KENDALL: Does that bypass the other three 6 emergency trips also?
7 MR. OWYOUNG: Well it bypasses the temperature
'8 trips and also the lube oil pressure trip. It does not ;
9 bypass the over-speed or differential.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: So of the four emergency trips, it 11 bypasses two of them?
12 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
13 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess what's running through my ,
14 mind right now is the design of the system and some of the 15 features it has are somewhat complicated. I'm not saying 16 that's good or bad but it sounds like there's a lot of l 17 things -- there's this one -- I'm saying a lot because the 18 first out enunciator was something that didn't seem to be 19 well understood by the operators. I guess one of the things 20 that's beginning to run through uy mind is that perhaps ,
21 there's a need to further define all the different features 4
22 that this system has to make sure that the operators are 23 aware of those features so that if they find themselves in a 24 scenario where things aren't working right, they're better 25~ able to capitalize on them. I guess the reason you're
i I
I l
6 i
1 bringing this one up is perhaps in this event this might 2 have been useful if the jacket water temperature had caused J
3 ths second trip as well.
4 itT . BOCKHOLD: That's correct, in this event that 5 would have been very useful if the jacket water -- the 6 jacket water pump was running, the jacket water temperature 7 was normal. And you know, we agree with you, we're going to 8 look at our training overall and make sure that the various 9 operators we have understand the local enunciator panel on 10 the diesel, but there are features that enable you to -- you 11 know, the normal trips are there for a surveillance type 12 start in case you had some problem, you would shut the l- , 13 machine down before you had any damage to the diesel. And 14 then when you go into the higher level events, you would 15 take out some of those trips because you definitely want the 16 engine to run and in the ultimate, even if the engine is not 17 running correctly, you would still want the engine to run.
18 I guess an analogy that I have, since I'm a pilot 19 and own a small airplane -- my engine doesn't have any 20 trips, it's just manual.
21 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess as far as the event goes, my 22 understanding is from your testing is that your belief is 23 that -- well maybe I should ask you guys. As far as, you 24 know, the first trip and the second trip, what is currently
~
25 your belief of what caused those trips and why do you
- 7 1 believe that? ,
1 2 .MR. KOCHERY: Because we could recreate the sama 3 scenario.
4 MR. CHAFFEE: So what do you believe caused the 1
i 5 first trip?
6 MR. CHAFFEE: What do you believe caused the first 7 trip?
8 MR. KOCHERY: Jacket water temperature.
9 MR. BOCKHOLD: You know, I would say what we know 10 is, we know we had a trip originally and we didn't capture 11 all the. enunciators because the people weren't there. We l
i 12 dispatched people and when we dispatched the people and got
( 13 their statements, you know, we have the anunciator l 1
14 indications and on the second trip what we believe caused the j 15 trip is jacket water. We believe we had one failed sensor 16 that later we got to reset. Okay? And we assume that one 17 of the other sensors failed. We had one failed sensor goiro 18 into that second start.
19 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Let me make sure I understand 20 this. The firrt trip was caused by high jacket water 21 temperature or low jacket water pressure?
22 MR. KOCHERY: We don't have enough information.
23 MR. BOCKHOLD: We don't have enough information.
'24' MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, let me try -- I understand
~
25 that what you learned in your testing was that -- if I'm
l 8
. 1 correct -- if you had two jacket water temperature sensors ;
2 in trip, that you find that the timer ran out, I believe it ,
3 was in 70 seconds or 72 seconds, is that right? l 1
4 MR. STOKES: 70-71 seconds.
5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, now as I understand it, the 6 first run of the diesel, it tripped 70 seconds after it 7 started, is that correct?
8 MR. STOKES: The first one?
9 MR. KOCHERY: The first one was at 80.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: And I understand the second one was 11 80 seconds, in the actual event.
12 MR. KOCHERY: The other way around, first one was g 13 80, second one was 70.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: Are you sure?
15 MR. KOCHERY: Yes.
16 MR. CHAFFEE: Is that right? I thought it was the l
. 17 other way around. I thought the shorter one was the first 18 one and it was longer the first time.
19 MR. KOCHERY: No.
20 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, well if you're right then --
21 so the longer run was the first one and that one you believe 22 was caused by the jacket water pressure being low?
i 23 MR. BOCKHOLD: We're not sure why the first trip 24 occurred because we can't capture all the enunciators. You I
25 know, the trips may have been different from the first one
i-
- i 9
4
- l' to the second one. We don't know, you know, that to be a 2 fact. I don't know, I guess I'd ask Ken or Sheldon to speak 3- up_about the difference in the first and the second. Maybe f 4 you can add something.
! 5 MR. ONYOUNG: Well without information on the 4.
4 6 first shutdown with the enunciation, I personally don't have ll
- 7 any idea what shut down the first unit because I haven't 3
l -8 gotten any feedback as far as what enunciator points were 9 showing on the first unit.
l 10 The second unit, we were told that they had a high 11 temperature jacket water shutdown, a low pressure jacket 12 water shutdown and a low turbo lube oil pressure shutdown
! 13 indication. So we target those particular anunciator points 14 and our testing proved out that if we have two temperature 15 shutdown trips for jacket water, that the system would 16 react, that it will shutdown on those two points and the 17 resulting fact that we will get the other two anunciator 18 points because the lines aren't being filled.
19 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, I see, so all four anunciations 20 were able to be reproduced by having two of the sensors 21- reject water temperature --
22 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: And those are what was observed in 24 the second trip?
I
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25 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes, and we repeated the test four
- ._ _ . . _ . - . ~ _ . . . . . _ . __ _ .. _ .._ _ _ _._
10
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l' times and got the same results. So we're very confident 2 that that was the shutdown on the second trip. I don't know 3 what shut down the first trip.
4 MR. CRAFFEE: I forgot when the first -- was there ,
1 l 5 any reports from anybody that they thought they say any t
i j 6 particular anunciators, or that was the second one?
i j 7 MR. OWYOUNG: It was the second one.
a l 8 MR. KOCHERY: The second one we have a list of
- 9. enunciators.
J-
$ 10 MR. CHAFFEE: Well okay, then --
l -
l 11 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah, when we went through it, we k
i 12 didn't have anything except for the second start. The f1 13 second start, we had clear consistent information from the ;
- 14 operators on what enunciation they had.
- 15 MR. CHAFFEE: And it was the second run that ran 16 80 second -- I mean 70 seconds?
i i 17 MR. STOKES: Yes, 70 seconds.
l 18 MR. CHAFFEE: And I guess what you found is when f
i' 19 you take two sensors out that the thing times out in 70 i
20 seconds?
l- 21 MR. OWYOUNG: Well with the proper response of our 22 group'2 lockout signal going out to the engine to shut the p 23 engine down and back to the panel giving an indication that 24 the engine is in the process of shutting down is about 72 l Le ..
[ 25 seconds.
_..-_.~____.-_.--.-.._....-.y b
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' 11 I
- 1 MR..CHAFFEE: Okay. So that all seems to make 1-
' ^
2 sense for the second trip. ,
<3 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
~!
4 'MR. CHAFFEE: Since the first trip, the thing ran
.5: for 80 seconds, does that tend to suggest that something I different occurred or is that close enough within tolerance l L6 7 that --
18 MR. OWYOUNG: I have no idea.
MR. KENDALL: Did you get, from one of the tests, j
10 a trip in about 80 seconds?
11 MR. STOKES: That was the same startup with jacket 12 water trip vented and we got about 79 seconds. ;
. 13 MR. KENDALL: That was with the jacket water 14 temperature vented? ,
[
15 MR. STOKES: Jacket water pressure. ;
16 MR. CHAFFEE: So just with jacket water pressure 17 vented, it took 80 seconds -- 79 seconds?
18 MR. ONYOUNG: What we did also is we wanted to see 19 if we tripped a low pressure jacket water sensor, would it 20 create a temperature indication, so we used another sensor.
21- Juut we ran one test and it did not indicate a high jacket i
22 water temp enunciation, which I expected that to happen. We 12 3 . needed to prove that out.
24 MR. CHAFFEE:
So again, it's just speculation, but ,
25 it's possible that the first' trip was just due to low jacket ;
I
,I ,;
_, _. ._ ~ _ .. _ ~ _ ._
. - . _ . . - ~ , - . _ _ . - _-_ - . .. . - . - - - - - . ..
$ 12 1 water pressure since the 80 seconds is close to the time it 1 2 ran?
j 3 Again this is all speculation but perhaps the 4 jacket water pressure caused the first trip, just the fact that the diesel tripped and started back up, then the second 5
l 6 time, the jacket water sensor -- since we found there is l l
l 7 some erracticness in their operation, perhaps they chose J l
8 that opportunity for both of them to fail and that brought l l
9 in all the enunciators.
10 I guess that sounds' plausible but it's not 11 necessarily what happened in terms of the first trip. ")o 12 you agree with that?
( 13 MR. KOCHERY: Based on the timing.
l 14 MR. CHAFFEE: But I guess what is true, the fact 15 that the first run was 80 seconds, that is a sufficient 2
16 enough difference in the time that it suggests that 1
17 something different occurred than what happened the second 18 time?
19 MR. OWYOUNG: I would say yes, because of the 20 timing, the four times that we recorded for the temperature 21 trips were somewhat within one or two seconds of each other.
22 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, okay, I guess I understand. Oh, 23 I see what you're saying -- and therefore, since the second 24 trip was due to jacket water temperature -- well why did the t
25 diesel start the. third time when they did the emergency
l 13 1 start? I mean this jacket water temperature could have very 2 easily prevented that start as well, couldn't it?
3 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes, it could have.
4 MR. CHAFFEE: So I guess you just lucked out --
5 it's just fortunate that I guess the jacket water l 6 temperatura probe must have fixed itself.
7 MR. OWYOUNG: Either it fixed itself or it really 8 had a high temperature and then it pulled down or whatever.
9 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh.
10 MR. OWYOUNG: I'm just speculating on that without 11 knowing what all the conditions are.
12 MR. CHAFFEE: So therefore, the point is that this 13 ability to emergency reset could have been very important if 14 it had turned out that the jacket water temperature probe 15 was going to prevent the next start.
- 16 MR. OWYOUNG as.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: I see -- oh, I see what you're 18 saying -- recognizing that the operators had indication of i
19 what caused the second trip, if they had known about this 20 feature, then the logical thing would have been to emergency 21 reset to have done the third start. Recognizing you were 22 trying to ensure you got a good start, people were carefully 23 monitoring everything.
24 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
25 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.
14 i 1 MR. JOHNSTON: You would have to do the emergency 2 stop reset after the third stop. You couldn't do it before 3 that.
~
4 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, you can't do emergency reset 5 until you've done an emergency start?
6 MR. JOHNSTON: Right.
7 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, okay, and therefore, the 8 scenario is that if the emergency start hadn't worked, they 9 would have had to emergency reset to have been able to get i 10 this out or they would have found that they couldn't 11 probably -- there's a possibility they wouldn't have been 12 able to get it started with the fourth or subsequent ones,
, 13 if they hadn't tried to do emergency reset.
14 Okay. Let's talk about the jacket water 15 temperature sensors themselves and their reliability and 16 what's possibly causing them to have problems. My guess is 1
17 in 3ooking at the history -- is there anybody here that can 18 describe the history and what it sort of tends to suggest 19 about reliability or what might be going wrong with these 20 sensors?
21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Well the way we summarized it was, 22 you know, we have problems, have had problems associated i 1
23 with these sensors during initial startup phases of the l 24 engine and during overhaul times, and we have not had j t
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25 problems in between overhaul periods of time. You know, i
l l
1 I
15 1 5
j 1 we've had reliable starts on the engines in between those !
" i 1
2 periods of time. So that's a general summary. !
I 3 MR. CHAFFEE1 Have you guys had -- you.know, we ;
i !
4- talked last night about the surveillance procedures and I j 5 haven't had a chance to take a look at those, I'm not sure l
. i 6 we've gotten them.
7 MR. BOCKHOLD: Herb, did Operations deliver some 8 surveillance procedures this morning?
9 MR. BEACHER: I do have a procedure from 10 Operations on my desk, I don't know the number, I can check I f
11 it.
5 12 MR. BOCKHOLD: I guess I see Jimmy Paul over l J
!, 13 there, he could talk to you about the normal diesel
< \
- 14 surveillance procedure. l J
15 MR. CHAFFEE: If you did the monthly surveillance, 1
! 16 and the diesel started and ran but you got a high jacket
! 17 water temperature sensor malfunction? l I
18 MR. CASH: We would write a work request tag on l l l 2
)
i i 19 that sensor malfunction and that would go into the system ]
I i
I 20 identifying the problem.
4 l 21 MR. CHAFFEE: Do they have a jacket water i
4 22 temperature sensor malfunction anunciator in the control 23 room?
24 MR. STOKES: Yes. l l -
25 MR. BOCKHOLD: Not in the control room. You don't j d
16 1
1 have any of that in the control room, that's local -- you i 2 do, jacket water?
3 MR. CASH: We have a complete duplicate panel, 4 local and in the control room.
i 5 MR. STOKES: Yes. t 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: It is complete?
7 MR. CASH: Yes, sir. ,
8 MR. CMAFFEE: It's interesting that --
9 MR. BOCKHOLD: You don't have -- the trip panel is 10 not the same.
11 MR. STOKES: It's the colors.
12 MR. BOCKHOLD: The colors are different? {
- 13 MR. STOKES
- Yeah, the colors are different, 14 that's all.
15 MR. CHAFFEE: Does the procedure require you to 16 take the action you just described or is that just common 17 sense?
18 MR. CASH: No, that's our standard policy.
19 KR. BOCKHOLD: We have an overall conduct of 20 operations policy, you know, and I believe it's written 21 there.
22 MR. CASH: This would be for any piece of 23 equipment that we ran and got an alarm in that was not 24 anticipated or expected or explained, ve would write a work i
25 request.
17 l i
. 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, that's very good.
2 The thing that's disturbing me though is like in 3 this most recent event as I understand it, they did the !
- 4 maintenance work on the 1-A diesel, they went through all 5 this testing and then it was declared operable, therefore l
- 6 indicating that it ought to be ready to go and that should l
1 7 be the condition that it's going to be monitored fer every 8 month thereafter on a monthly basis. YJt after that, the j l
9 avant occurred and the testing showed that jacket water 10 tamperature probes that were in place after the diesel was f 11 declared operable had a lot of problems associated with
- 1 i 12 them. So what I'm trying to figure out is why didn't you
,g 13 see some of that in your monthly testing -- why is it all of 14 a sudden miraculously some time after you start the plant 15 up, for the next year or so you see absolutely no 16 indications of these jacket water temperature sensors having 17 any problems? There seems to be an inconsistency in my mind 18 there. I don't understand why everything worked so well 19 month after month while you were in operation, yet when you 20 get down and you have your outages and you go through all 21 your operability terts and it's all ready to go, then you 22 find out after the fact no it's not ready to go. I'm 23 getting the impression that the jacket water temperature 24 sensors are not that reliable and I'm surprised you haven't
- i 25 seen that in some of your monthly testing. That's what I'm
18 1 being told and if that's true, then there's a discontinuity i 2 there that can maybe be used to figure out what's going on i
3 with these, I guess -- or maybe it makes me a little dubious l
4 that the monthly maintenances are as rigorous as you say, j
\
5 although I don't disbelieve what you're saying because it 6 makes sense, operators tend to do that. Do you see the i
7 dilemma I find?
8 MR. BOCKHOLD: The -- you know, working with the 9' vendor, we have some switches -- we received -- I think I 10 told you we received a switch in that he calibrated on 11 3/24/90 and we received it in and part of the repair process 12 is we recalibrated his switch and it failed. Okay, that i 13 switch is currently quarantined. We're going to take the 1
14 vendor with his switch and try to figure out if there is 15 some difference there, what the problem'is.
i But you know, the facts show that when we've come
~
16 17 out of overhauls basically associated with engine runs 18 around overhauls, we've had problems and we've replaced the 19 switches and we've gotten good switches in that have run 20 until the next overhaul. Those facts have shown that on the 21 four engines.
22 MR. CHAFFEE: Have you ever had either of the 23 units, when you've done your monthly surveillances, an 24 occurrence where the diesel was tripped, you know, for an i
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25 unexplained reason? I guess you've had in Unit 2 recently?
l I
1
19 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: We've got one of the Unit 2 diesels l
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2 that is in a weekly surveillance but it's failure causes 3 were not associated with jacket water, and Ken can speak to ,
4 that, i 5 MR. STOKES: Yeah, these were totally unrelated. l 6 The engine just rolls slowly and did not start. I think j l
7 this is one that I told you about during the first j 8 interview. It happened twice over a period of four starts t
9 and I think we tested it about ten times since that and }
10 nothing has shown up. l 11 MR. CHAFFEE: But you weren't able to determina j 12 why it didn't start? ;
i i 13 MR. STOKES: No. 1 14 MR. CHAFFEE: And when you say it wouldn't start, ;
15 what --
16 MR. STOKES: It just rolled slowly and -- it gets 17 the start signal for five seconds, rolls slowly and just l 18 didn't start. Normally it gets a pretty good kick and it 19 rolls fast and starts up in about six or seven seconds, but l 20 this time it just couldn't start and immediately -- I think i 21 both times after that, within ten or fifteen minutes, we did 22 another utart and it worked fine.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you have any experience with 24 that, the Cooper people? !
4 l
25 MR. JOHNSTON: We had a problem at the River Bend j i
j
~ _ , _ - . _ _ _ _ _
20 l 1 station where oil had accumulated and the pilot tubing from I
2 the starting air distributor that feeds the signal to open 3 air start valves and in our analysis of that situation, we 4 felt that problem was unique to the in-line engine. In some 5 conversations I had with our people back on the west coast 6 yesterday, we're evaluating it to see if that can also apply 7 to this engine, so that's under investigation. It's 8 possible there may be some oil accumulating in the pneumatic 9 lines that would cause that to occur. ,
l 10 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh. l l
11 MR. JOHNSTON: But again, this is unrelated to the 12 Calcon devices.
g 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, back on the monthly 14 surveillance, you understand why this confuses me that you I 15 could have all these problems in maintenance and do your 16 testing and stuff and then have what you're telling us is a 17 clean record for almost an entire year or so. That seems 18 inconsistent, so that's why I'm a little -- I can't help but 19 wonder if -- )
20 MR. BOCKHOLD: You know, the handling of these 21 switches -- and let's see, were you able to --
22 MR. CHAFFEE: No, no, they --
l 23 MR. BOCEROLD: They didn't make it over here with i 1
24 the probe? i i l 25 MR. BRINEY: It was delivered to Herb Beacher this
1 21 i l
1 morning. )
i 2 MR. BOCKHOLD: You know, I think handling of the ,
l 3 probe might have something to do with it. The tip of the l 1
4 probe is probably fairly sensitive and, you know, we can j 5 postulate and speculate and Item 1 on key lessons learned l l
6 and recommendations is to go attack that aspect of the ]
l 7 thing. We really can't come up with -- you know, we can ,
l I
8 speculate all day on what it might be, but we don't know 9 until we go look at it. l l
10 MR. CHAFFEE: Maybe what we're seeing is just the 11 fact that the same sensitivity the switch has that causes it 12 not to work also results in the fact that you fairly quickly l
. 13 after the fact find out they're not working and that of i
14 course forces you into fixing then right so that when you --
15 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah, we put a new switch in and 16 that kind of stuff. We'll pass you down the switch 17 assembly. ,
l 18 (The switch was handed to Mr. Chaffee.)
I 19 MR. BOCKHOLD: The rings on the -- you've got to i
20 take the shield off. I 21 MR. CHAFFEE: This silver part here?
22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah.
i
. 23 MR. CHAFFEE: Don't let me break this thing.
24 MR. BRINEY: There's a set screw in the side of l
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l 25 it.
I 1
22 r
- 1 MR. CHAFFEE: You have to take the set screw out i l
2 in order to -- I don't have an allen wrench.
3 MR. BOCKHOLD: If you take that --
4 4 MR. CHAFFEE: Can we get an allen wrench? ,
. l i 5 MR. BOCKHOLD: Sure. ,
! 6 MR. CHAFFEE: If you take it off, there's a bunch f 7 of little rings under there?
8 MR. BOCKHOLD: Well there's another probe, there's l
9 a thinner, solid probe. At the and is a bunch of rings. j f 10 I'll go to the board and draw it.
. 11 MR. KENDALL: When they're removed and installed 12 are they taken out of place with the well?
i 13 MR. KOCHERY: No, we don't take the well, just the 14 sensing device.
15 MR. KENDALL: So when you calibrate them, you just i
Ir unscrew them out of the well and with rings exposed and take 17 it to the shop?
18 MR. KOCHERY: That's right, and put it in another 19 well.
l 20 MR. CHAFFEE: So when you get it out of the j 21 warehouse and you do the cal test on it, do you take it just l
, 22 like this or do you take this shield off?
23 MR. KOCHERY: You have to take the shield off.
24 MR. CHAFFEE: You guys just asked that i
25 question.
l i
l 23
_ 1 MR. KENDALL: Yes. You have to loosen the set l 2 screw and then it just lifts out. ,
4 3 MR. CHAFFEE: Why do you have to do that, why 4 don't you just leave it intact? :
5 MR. KOCHERY: Because when you take the thermal 6 well you can leak.
. l j 7 MR. CHAFFEE: Say that again, I didn't understand ,
1 4 8 you. I 9 MR. KOCHERY: It's coming from the pipe, that 10 thing is screwed in.
11 MR. CHAFFEE: This thing is what you screw into 4
12 the pipe.
13 MR. KOCHERY: That's correct.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: Why don't you just take this whole 1 4
15 thing and put it in the thermal bath and do your test that 16 way?
17 MR. KENDALL: Because you've got the keep warm
- 18 pump and --
19 MR. KOCHERY: The system is filled, when you take 20 out, water comes out. i 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Al, if you take that metal shield 22 off, the thermal well off, you would find it's head with ,
l 1
23 inside another probe, another metal probe. And at the i 4
24 bottom of the probe if you looked at it, it looked like it 25 had kind of rings here. And if you could see inside that, i
i
24 l
1 there's a shaft and there's some springs up above and that i 2 kind of stuff, but the shaft actually ties onto the outer l 1
3 casing down here at the bottom.
4 As the device heats up, these rings expand at a 5 different rate than t5r center shaft. The center shaft 6 moves up and down -- well then this expansion moves this top 7 adjusting ring up and down and over here, there's some type 8 of air switch. So when this contacts the air switch it would 9 affect the sensor.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: Does -- so what you do, the reason 11 you take this thing out of the shield is because you don't l 12 use this specific shield --
( 13 MR. BCJKHOLD: That's right.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: -- you use the shield that's in d
^
15 place for this one.
16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Right.
l 17 MR. CHAFFEE: When the licensee calibrates, do 18 they calibrate this as an assembly, including the shield, or 19 do they calibrate the probe without the shield.
20 MR. BOCKHOLD: Calibrate the probe.
21 MR. CHAFFEE: You've checked on that.
T 22 MR. KOCHERY: Put in the thermal well.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: What I'm getting at is when they do 24 their calibration in the shop, do they treat this as a i l 25 calibrated component?
25
- 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: The way I've seen it done in the 2 shop is just the assembly.
3 MR. BRINEY: What he's asking I think, George, is 4 that do we need to calibrate the switch as an assembly with 5 its associated thermal well.
6 MR. CHAFFEE: Right, is there something about 7 this--
8 MR. BRINEY: The answer is no, we not have to do 9 it.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: You've talked to the vendor about 11 that?
12 MR. BRINEY: Yes. The vendor also -- we also had i 13 some experiments that showed that there was no significant 14 difference in calibration whether we used the well or not.
15 They recommended that we did because the tip of the probe is 16 somewhat fragile.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: But there's no close tolerances 18 inside here? I mean those little rings and stuff, they 19 don't come in close contact with -- I would assume that you 20 --
21 MR. BRINEY: There's an air gap between the actual 22 probe and the thermal well.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: But they'd want to minimize that 24 because the goal is to get the rapid heat transfer from the i
25 water to those little things, little rings, right?
i
)
26 1 MR. BRINEY: Right.
I 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Is the thermal well that's in the 3 plant, is there any rust or anything inside there that --
4 MR. KOCHERY: That's stainless steel.
5 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there -- I mean, there's no l
6 cleanliness problems, no nothing in them that's abnormal? l l
7 MR. KOCHERY: No.
I 8 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. And the vendor, when he does ;
i 9 his calibration, he doesn't calibrate it with the particular 10 thermal well that they send out, they just do the 11 calibration without?
12 MR. BRINEY: The vendor uses a thermal well, yes.
An9. that's the one that they send !
i 13 MR. CHAFFEE:
14 with the instrument?
15 MR. BRINEY: Not necessarily.
i 16 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, I see. So what ends up i
17 happen!ng is this part, the one that's in place -- I guess !
18 what you do is you unscrew the allen screw and you take this 19 thing and screw it down inside the thermal well and then put 20 the allen screw in? i 21 MR. BRINEY: It just slides into the thermal well, 1
22 it doesn't screw into the thermal well.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, and the allen screw just holds 24 it in place?
25 MR. BRINEY: Right. Once you unloosen the allen
l i
27 1 screw you can pull it straight out.
I 2 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there any way potentially the l
3 allen screw could impact the properties of the sensor or is !
4 it somehow located such that it can't have any impact on !
5 that?
1 6 MR. BRINEY: The sensitivity seems to be at the 7 end of the probe where the o-rings are, not up at the shaft.
I 8 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there any way attaching the allen 9 screw could cock the sensor such that it comes in contact 10 with the wall of the thermal well and that has an impact on I
11 those little o-rings? 1 l
12 MR. BRINEY: Not that we've seen, no.
, 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay.
14 MR. LYON: Can the air connection bring any air l
15 down into the system itself, into the instrument itself? '
l 16 M.t. OWYOUNG: I would say no. The air supply to 17 that particular device is dead-ended. If it vents, it vents 18 out through the exhaust port.
19 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. So I guess if you have not 20 found any problems with these jacket water temperature 1
21 probes between refueling outages, then it must be that 22 somehow the process of dealing --
23 MR. BOCKHOLD: -- with handling them or 24 calibrating them or, you know, maybe some of then aren't as 25 reliable as other ones. The ones we seem to get in there, i
1 l
28 1 you know, that we discard -- the ones we finally get in.
2 there are very reliable. The ones that we try to put in and 3 try to get calibrated during overhauls, we have a number of 4 problems and you know, the key element here is to -- when 5 the Calcon man arrives today, we're going to go through all 6 this and try to determine what those issues are, how come 7 we're having problems at the overhaul, time frame.
8 MR. CHAFFEE: And I guess along with that is 9 coming up with a methodology of ensuring what testing is l
10 necessary to ensure that once you declare the diesel 11 operable, you're not going to have any of these jacket water 12 temperature probes causing you any problems. l 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. I guess at this point, the !
l 15 hope is that on Unit 2, somehow you have -- 1 16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Unit 2 had a different calibration i
17 procedure and a special test procedure performed, associated 18 with raising jacket water temperature because of a heat 19 exchanger concern. And so we used a different procedure 20 there and we actually used the whole system and we haven't 21 had any failures on Unit 2. So the switches we have in 22 place, we feel are reliable and as I say, we actually use i
23 temperature to finally -- before the diesel was declared l 24 operable for fuel movement, some -- you know, beginning of a
~
25 '89, and I think you have in here that we changed out some i
1 1
29
-. 1 switches on Unit 2 in 12/8/88 -- I'm sorry, on 7/21/88, we i
2 changed some switches out and that's when -- that's j
3 basically six months ahead of when we needed to declare the l 4 diesel operable for fuel movement on Unit 2.
5 MR. CHAFFEE: But again, how they calibrated the ;
I 6 new ones that they put in --
7 MR. BOCKHOLD: Those were calibrated to a 8 different procedure at that time and a special test was run i
9 at that time, we believe that procedura yielded reliable ,
I 10 switches, and that special test, although it wasn't designed 11 specifically to handle the Calcon switch issue, verified 12 that those switches would be reliable and they have proved g
13 re.lable ever since then.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: Was the special test done after they 15 put the new switches in that needed to be calibrated or was 16 the calibration done as a result of the test where it turned 17 out the engine tripped at a lower temperature?
18 MR. BOCKHOLD: I don't know. Ken, do you remember 19 -- either of the Kens?
20 MR. BURR: We ran the engine and it tripped, so 21 therefore we took them out and recalibrated them and put 22 them back in and then they were okay.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: Then after you recalibrated them and 24 put them back in, how did you then ensure that you -- okay, 25 so you took them out, you recalibrated them and you !
i
30 1 recalibrated them to a procedure --
2 MR. BURR: Yes.
3 MR. CHAFFEE: That procedure that you used for 4 recalibrating them, is that different from what you've been 5 using over here in Unit 2 in terms of how you did it?
6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Unit 1.
7 MR. BURR: It's different from Unit 1, yes.
8 MR. CHAFFEE: How is it different?
9 MR. BURR: We used a different air pressure.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, rea2Ly? What was the air 11 pressure used on Unit 2?
12 MR. BURR: On Unit 1, we are required to reduce 13 the air pressure to 20 pounds. On Unit 2, we used 40.
i 14 MR. CRAFFEE: Oh, I see, the difference is how low 15 the pressure has to get to.
16 MR. DUkR: Yes.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: And Unit 1 is going to vent down to 18 20 pounds and Unit 2 down to 40 pounds?
19 MR. BURR: Yes. That at that time is how we 20 calibrated it.
21 MR. BOCKHOLD: The 40 pounds --
22 MR. BURR: That new procedure came after that time 23 period, so this procedure we used on Unit 1 is a later time 24 than what we calibrated Unit 2.
4
~
25 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh. So what that tends to suggest l
31 1 is that the calibration you're doing on Unit 1 where you've 2 got to demonstrate it can vent down to 20 pounds --
3 MR. BURR: I don't know what significance that 4 has, it's just that it's different.
5 MR. BOCKHOLD: The 40 pounds would tend to make 6 the switch --
7 MR. CHAFFEE: Less likely to trip.
8 MR. BOCKHOLD: -- less likely to trip, basically.
9 The logic card that sees the pressure has to get to 40 10 pounds for that logic card to actuate that trip. Do you see 11 the rings on it now?
12 MR. CHAFFEE: Yeah, and the tolerance in this
, 13 thing is more than I expected.
14 MR. BOCKHOLD: The tip is what's sensitive. If 15 you Icok at the tip, you'll see how that is connected.
16 MR. CHAFFEE: It looks like it's not a tight fit, 17 but it's a -- l 18 MR. 'OCKHOLD: It's got to be close, you can't 19 have a big . . gap because you don't want a big time delay 20 for temperature to be sensed by the probe.
21 MR. CHAFFEE: Wouldn't it be something if all you 22 were dealing with here is the tolerance of these rings and 23 your thermocouple and the fact that you're changing the 24 manufacturing design tolerances is enough to cause them to I
- 25 behave strangely and what you're really doing is you're
i i
l 32 1 going through enough probes until you find one that is I
2 within that tolerance no that it works properly once it's 3 put in.
4 On Unit 1, did you at one point historically 5 calibrate then down to 40 pounds and then changed to.20 6 pounds?
7 MR. BOCKHOLD: Have we got that kind of memory?
8 MR. BURR: I don't know.
9 MR. BRINEY: In 1988, we asked for information on 10 how to calibrate the switches. That information hasn't 11 changed since the outage of '88 and this date. This is on 12 Unit 1 switches.
13 MR. CHAFFEE: So the information you got in '88
(.
14 how to calibrate the Unit 1 switches, that included testing 15 them to-vent to 20 pounds?
16 MR. BRINEY: Correct.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: Prior to that.
18 MR. BRINEY: The reset was considered to be at 40 l 19 pounds. l 20 MR. CHAFFEE: Whereas in Unit 2, the trip point 21 has to be down to 40 pounds and they reset at some different 22 value?
23 MR. BRINEY: The supply air pressure is at 60 24 pounds. The way we calibrate on Unit 1, the supply air i ,
25 pressure was at 60 pounds, the switch was considered to trip l l
. . _ . . n -- _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
i l
I i
33 !
1
- 1 as it got to 20 pounds, it was considered reset as the t I 2 pressure built up to 40 pounds.
3 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, now what's the situation in 4 Unit 2? l l
5 MR. BOCKHOLC: Unit 2 was a startup test procedure 6 and -- do you remember?
7 MR. BURR: We basically used the 40 pounds.
8 MR. CHAFFEE: If they came down to 40 pounds, they 9 tripped, and what were they resetting it? If the pressure 10 is 60 pounds and they tripped at 40, do you have it reset at 1 i
11 59 or what?
i 12 MR. BURR: The reset issue was not an issue on
- 13 Unit 2.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: Does 40 pounds as being a trip point 15 for these sensors make sense?
16 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes, it does because we have a P-3 17 valve in there which trips off at 45 psi. Okay now --
18 MR. CHAFFEE: Well then is the 20 pounds 19 incorrect?
20 MR. OWYOUNG: I think there's a confusion of 20 a 21 pounds, 40 pounds and 45 pounds and what-have-you. l 22 Basically what we sent the utility is a generic calibration .
I' 23 procedure -- just a generic one. "in our normal system we 24 have an element, we call it a knock out element, in the !
l.-
25 circuitry and this particular element, this other logic
J 34 1 monitors the stroke and as the stroke heats up, it starts I
2 venting out air. And the way this particular logic element 3 is setup, at 20 psi with some tolerance, this element will 4 then fire, which would create a shutdown. As this element 5 here cools down and starts blocking the pressure, at 40 psi 6 this element will then stop this output signal. So that's 7 how we got the 20 and 40 psi increments.
.8 Now for this utility and other utilities that-will 9 install another device here, pressure device and that guy is 10 st a 45 psi falling, in addition to that. So that now when 11 this element falls down below 45 psi, this guy here goes to vent and also vents this line down. There's other circuitry 12 13 in here but in essence this right here goes to vent.
I 14 So that's where we're looking at 45 psi, so on the 15 second unit when these guys were calibrated, they were 16 shooting for the 45 psi falling level because it's five ,
17 pounds below this valve here.
18 MR. CHAFFEE: Is that design the same for Unit i 19 and Unit 2?
20 MR. OWYOUNG: It is the same for Unit 1. The .
21 procedure that they're using for Unit 1 as far as ,
22 calibration, again, is just a generic calibration.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: There's no reason for the procedures 24 to be different in the two units? ;
!~
~
25' MR. OWYOUNG: That's correct.
i I
- ,. . . , .,v.. -., c -- . _ , . - _ . , - . , _ .
35
_ 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Yet, in fact right now they are, is 2 that right?
3 MR. BOCKHOLD: They were done differently, they 4 would be done the same if we went to overhaul the Unit 2 5 engines.
6 MR. CHAFFEE: Is there any chance that the set 7 point that they're trying to calibrate for is having any 8 kind of impact on what is being seen here? In other words, 9 the fact that the switches keep acting -- there's been 10 occasions where they've acted a little erratic. In the 11 diesel start you did a couple of days ago, your sensor 12 failed and you puffed it with air, then it works fine for g
13 awhile. Who knows when that might occur again. Does the 14 calibration have anything to do with that? l l
15 MR. OWYOUNG: I don't know, I would just be l
16 speculating. There could have just been a little piece of 17 dirt in there, could have been almost anything.
18 MR. CHAFFEE: Could it simply be the fact that the 19 stickiness -- as the thing heats up, you know, the thermal 20 expansion and the tolerances in this thing is causing it to 21 stich?
22 MR. OWYOUNG: That could be also. That's why I 23 suggested to get the Calcon expert here, the expert of that 24 device.
I 25 MR. CHAFFEE: Yeah. Okay. Do you have any other
E 36 1 questions, Rick?
2 MR. KENDALL: No.
3 MR. CHAFFEE: So basically what we've heard is 3 4 that as far as Unit 2 goes, you did the calibration there --
5 I would assume that when you recalibrated them, you must J 6 have used the thermal bath type approach, but one difference ,
l 7 there is you considered to have tripped once you got to 40 ,
l 8 psi. I guess what's true when we watched you do the j i
9 calibration is that for that one that was sluggish, I guess j 10 the question remains in my mind, would that one that was 11 sluggish, would it have been considered to be sluggish, 12 considered to have tripped once it got to 40 pounds? I l
)
i 13 guess we saw it slowly -- it starts off at 60 pounds and 14 slowly bled off and then I guess -- what pressure was it, 15 when you do the calibrations, that it begins to drop fairly 16 quickly? It starts off very slowly and then goes very i
17 quickly -- about what pressure does it go over edge and 18 start going down quickly?
19 MR. BRINEY: Somewhere between 40 and 50 pounds, l
a 20 it depends on the switch.
21 MR. CHAFFEE: I wonder if there's some way that 22 having that different set point at 40 pounds would -- I 23 guess not. If anything, the 40 pounds seems to work better 24 than the 20 in terms of Unit 2.
25 MR. BOCKHOLD: Forty pounds tends, in my mind, to 4
37 1 raise the tr.8.p set point on these switches, therefore the
~
i 2 likelihood that these switches would cause an engine 3 shutdown is reduced. But, you know, we're going to work 4 with the vendor on the switches, especially the one that he 5 sent us that he calibrated on the 24th, and we tried to 6 calibrate and it didn't appear to calibrate correctly. It 7 might be a fluke, that one might be just bad.
8 MR. CHAFFEE: In that case what happened was ou 9 received that particular item like this and the calibration 10 that you did that said it wasn't workable was you took this 11 thing out and put it in a bath and found out that it 12 wouldn't work properly, is that correct?
(
13 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah, we used our standard i
14 procedure on it. I 15 MR. CHAFFEE: When you put it in the bath --
16 MR. BOCKHOLD: The standard procedure now is you 17 take that out and you put it in a bath and you raise -- you 18 know, you check its set point and it should be venting at 19 the appropriate point and then you raise and lower 20 temperature three times and you're tapping on it lightly to 21 simu' late the vibration of the machine. And that's our 22 current calibration procedure for the probes we have on Unit 23 1.
24 MR. CHAFFEE: When you actually do the calibration
- 25 in the bath, you actually take the probe and put it in the
38 1 bath without it being in a thermal well?
. 2 MR. BRINEY: No, we calibrate it in a thermal 3 well.
4 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, okay.
5 MR. BRINEY: We have performed some calibration of
]
6 some switches outside of the thermal well with the vendor ,
7 present and there was no significant difference in the 8 calibrations whether it was in the well or outside the well.
9 PGR. CHAFFEE: Okay, I understand. So the one the 10 vendor sent and said was fine, you took that component with j 11 the thermal well it came with, put it --
12 MR. BRINEY: Just like you have it in your hand.
, 13 MR. CHAFFEE: -- in anf. it turned out it didn't i
14 work.
15 MR. BRINEY: Correct.
16 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. I wonder how the vendor is l 17 going to explain that, that's interesting.
- 18 Have you guys done any kind of a QA source
!. ~ 19 inspection of Calcon to look at their QA program -- before I 20 ask that -- the Calcon jacket water temperature sensors that
- 21 we're talking about, those are Q-class components because 22 it's emergency?
23 MR. KOCHERY: (Nodding head affirmatively.)
i 24 MR. CHAFFEE: It is Q-class, okay, fine. Have you 1
25 had any kind of source inspections to see how good their 4
_. . _._ ___ _~ . _ . . . _ . _ _ . . _ . _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
39 2'
j' ,
1 calibration process.or whatever is in terms of -- t
- j. 2 MR. BOCKHOLD: George, do you know? ,
) 3 MR. FREDERICK: I'd have to research it, I don't ,
! 4 know offhand -- just sitting here, I don't know, I'd have to 1
5 go look. I should have the documente in my office.
j 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: We buy the switches directly from 7 7 Calcon or we buy the switches from who?
) 8 MR. FREDERICK: I don't'know that, Georgia.
) 9 MR. KOCHERY: There is a Part 21 on the calcon. '
i 10 MR. CHAFFEE: Say again?
11 MR. KOCHERY: There is a Part 21 report on Calcon.
12 MR. CHAFFEE: I noticed in this write-up here, 1
j l 13 there was a Part 21 here that seemed to talk about low -- I i
F 14 assumed from the way this was written'that it has to do with
! 15 low pressure lube oil. But is there another one for these i
i 16 temperature --
t
- 17 MR. KOCHERY
- Yes, and another one just for the 18 safety-related equipment.
! 19 MR. CHAFFEE: Safety related?
20 MR. KOCHERY: Yes.
21 MR. CHAFFEE: So there's a Part 21 for Calcon l 22 switches for safety-related equipment?
4 I
23 MR. KOCHERY: That's right.
24 MR. CHAFFEE: And it does address itself to 1
~
25 temperature sensors?
i l
40 ,
l
- 1 MR. KOCHERY: I don't know right now, I'm trying 2 to get it.
i 3 MR. CHAFFEE: You're trying to get it now? I 4 MR. KOCHERY: We've got it here, I don't know 5 exactly what it is. There is another Part 21 on the lube 6 oil press'are switch also. ,
7 MR. CHAFFEE: The Part 21 that's on safety- l 8 related Calcon switches --
9 MR. KOCHERY: That's right.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: -- do you know how old that is? Was ,
l 11 it just recently received or is it years old? l 12 MR. KOCHERY: I don't know. Ken, do you know how 13 old that Part 21 is?
14 MR. STOKES: (Nodding head negatively.)
15 MR. KOCHERY: It's a lot more newer, I believe --
16 okay, that's a number 89.
17 VOICE: 88.
18 MR. KOCHERY: 88? Okay.
19 VOICE: The work orders that were issued to 20 recalibrate the pressure switches, because of Part 21, are 21 1988 work orders.
22 MR. KOCHERY: No, I'm talking about the calcon 23 safety-related parts, Part 21 --
24 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah, but he's saying we responded 25 to it by a work order. We'd have to get the paper and --
l 41 l
1 MR. CHAFFEE: It sounds like what Paul says is
~
2 there's two Part 21's.
3 MR. KOCHERY: Yeah, there are two Part 21's, one 1
4 for the lube oil pressure switch alone and another one for -
5 - the Part 21 for the Calcon safety-related parts. There is 6 some problem with their QA problems.
7 MR. CHAFFEE: Can you have somebody pull those two l 8 Part 21's for us?
9 MR. KOCHERY: Yeah, I think can get them.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you happe member what the 11 Part 21 says about the safety-related -- is it focusing on -
12 -
g 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: He doesn't knol, he says --
l 14 MR. KOCHERY: I only know I have the number, I .
15 just looked this morning, I think it's 141.
16 MR. BOCKHOLD: These words here, and I'll read 17 them to you - "These items were manufactured by California l 18 Controls (Calcon). The report stated that the items in 19 service that have performed satisfactorily, were considered .
T 20 to be acceptable. A follow up report dated 5/12/88 l 21 identified aa additional problem with lube oil." l 22 It appears -- and I'm speculating now and we'd 23 have to get the paperwork -- but it appearn to have said ;
24 hey, maybe don't accept our calibration when it comes in i
25 because we've had some QA problems, do your own calibration.
I l
42
.. 1 If your own calibration is good, the switch is good. I 2 guess that's what -- just from these words is what I would 3 speculate and we'd have to see the information. Do you 4 think that's what it was, Mark?
5 MR. BRINEY: George, I didn't go through and 6 actually read the Part 21 report. The only thing I had to 7 go by is --
8 MR. BOCKHOLD: Is what the work order says, yeah, 9 and that's what I would speculate from what the work order j i
10 says. l l
11 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. So I guess we'll get the Part 12 21's to see what they say, and Calcon is coming out to see i 13 if they can shed some light on what's going on with these l 14 switches. There's a need to try to determine what has to be 15 done to make sure that once you declare operability on the 16 diesel, it's going to work. There's indication that in the 17 past --
18 MR. BOCKHOLD: We believe the diesels are operable 19 right now and we believe that we have -- from our history we 20 have -- the switches that are in the diesel are reasonably 21 reliable to perform their function.
22 MR. CRAFFEE: No, but what I meant was that in the 23 case of this outage, you went through the outage in the 1-A 24 diesel, went through the testing, declared it operable and i
25 then it failed.
43 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: That's correct.
2 MR. CHAFFEE: So there's something in the i 1
3 operability testing to date that didn't work completely. So !
4 shatever that flaw is needs to be flushed out.
5 MR. BOCKHOLD: We need to determine what the 6 problem is with the switches.
7 MR. CRAFFEE: Right. And -- right. So that you 8 can ensure that once you declare them operable, they --
9 there's not any concern about there being some hidden --
10 MR. BOCKHOLD: That the probability of two switch 11 failure is very, very remote. !
12 MR. CHAFFEE: Right. Okay, do you have any
( 13 thoughts or questions, Rick?
14 MR. KENDALL: (Nodding head negatively.)
15 MR. CHAFFEE: So as far as testing on the diesel 16 generators go -- I guess you finished the UV test and that 17 was -- was there any other problems encountered during the 18 testing? And the testing is now complete?
19 MR. BOCKHOLD: Since we changed out these 20 switches, how many starts did we do on the A diesel after 21 that? We did multiple starts?
22 MR. STOKES: Yeah.
23 MR. BOCKHOLD: A dozen?
24 MR. OWYOUNG: About a dozen.
25 MR. BOCKHOLD: About a dozen successful starts.
44 1 MR. CHAFFEE: You mean after you changed out these 2 jacket water temperature sensors?
3 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes, we've done what -- so you're 4 saying more than a dozen, 14, 15 starts?
5 MR. STOKES: Something like that.
l 6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Successful starts on that engine. I 7 MR. CHAFFEE: So basically on -- what was it, 8 Friday I think it was, is that when we started this test ;
9 sequence -- Saturday -- Friday I think it was.
10 MR. OWYOUNG: Friday I think it was.
11 MR. CHAFFEE: So that the first start -- at that 12 point, you've got a jacket water temperature sensor that
( 13 didn't work properly, that was the first start. Then you 14 pulsed it with pressure and -- now that particular sensor .
l 15 has been removed l 16 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes. ,
1 17 MR. CHAFFEE: And another was put in its place.
18 MR. OWYOUNG- That's right.
19 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, and also you put another one 20 in to replace the one that tripped?
21 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
22 MR. CHAFFEE: So wh&t's in there is two new 23 sensors plus the one that was originally there before you 24 started the test sequence?
25 MR. OWYOUNG: That's correct.
45 1 MR. BOCKHOLD: No, let me correct the sequence. I i
2 think -- and you guys correct me if I'm wrong -- we found 3 one that was tripped, okay? We found one that was venting 4 some.
5 MR. CMAFFEE: Right.
6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay, that one that was venting i 7 some may have worked perfectly well, but if they vent at all 8 we go ahead and pull them out of the engines and some of the r
9 history here on this thing that you have might be, gee, that ,
i i
little vent port there was venting, and venting some makes 10 11 our technicians reasonably nervous and I agree with them.
12 It's Just better to pull the switch and put a brand new one
- 13 in that's not venting at all.
14 MR. CMAFFEE: Is the one that was venting the one 15 that was 186 degrees set point earlier on? It was the other 14 one?
17 MR. OWYOUNG: At this time, I don't really know.
18 MR. BOCKHOLD: I think you're confusing B engine i
19 with A engine now.
20 MR. CHAFFEE: No, it was the -- well maybe, but I 21 was told that it was the A engine that they found that the 22 jacket water tesperature high was 186 degrees so they re-23 adjusted it.
24 You went into the testing with that one having 25 been re-adjusted and the otqer two, and it was those three
. _ _ . ._ = _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _
46 1 sensors that you found one of them was in trip, one of them was venting and we asked the question Saturday I think it 2
3 was, well was the one that was venting, was that the one 4 that was found at 186 degrees? Because we were saying 5 well, is it possible the venting was some sort of another 6 indication that that one was going to have a problem as well 7 as the 186 degrees indication. I guess maybe you haven't 8 been able to figure that out. The question is which one of 9 the sensors was the one that was 186 degrees?
10 MR. BOCKHOLD: Do we have that information?
11 MR. BRINEY: I've got the data down on my desk, l
12 George, I don't have it in my hand.
( 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: We can't answer that one without 14 that data.
15 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, I'd like to --
I 16 MR. KOCHERY: This is at the shop, venting at the 17 shop?
18 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah. No, what he said is after 19 the start, we went back to see what the calibration was on 20 those switches and we found one at 186 degrees. His 21 question is, is that switch -- was that switch venting, 22 because later on in the sequence of testing when we got back 23 to A diesel, the recent change out was one was in a tripped 24 configuration and one was venting. We changed the one out t
~
25 that was ventir.g just for not to take any chance.
47 1 MR. KOCHERY: Okay, that 186 switch was the one 1
2 venting when it was calibrated and when we put it back on 3 the engine, it was venting, but it didn't cause a trip or l l
4 alarm. j l
5 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, so that --
]
6 MR. KOCHERY: It's switch number 19112.
7 MR. CHAFFEE: The reason I was curious is I was 8 wondering if perhaps tha fact that the calibration had gone 9 out -- maybe there is some relation to the fact that it was 10 venting, maybe there's --
11 MR. BOCKHOLD: There may be, may very well be.
12 MR. CHAFFEE: So then you replaced the one that i
13 was venting, you replaced the one that was tripped and after j 14 you did that, then how many successful starts did you have?
l 15 Because that's what you currently have in place.
16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Right, about 14 -- 12?
l 17 MR. STOKES: I'm not sure precisely, but after l 18 actual replacement of the switches maybe -- l 19 MR. OWYOUNG: I know that when we were there we 20 started at least six times.
21 MR. STOKES: Yes.
22 MR. BOCKHOLD: Six times plus the under-voltage 23 test plus the operability test.
24 MR. STOKES: Maybe eight times.
25 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Now how about the jacket
- . _ . - . ~ . . . . - -
48 1 water pressure low, that didn't give you any problems at all 2 and that one was replaced before you started the test 3 sequence, wasn't it?
4 MR. KOCHERY: We didn't replace it, we calibrated 5 it and put it back, the same one. It was in calibration.
6 MR. CHAFFEE: Is that the same one that was --
7 MR. OWYOUNG: We checked the calibration, we 8 didn't calibrate it, we checked the calibration.
9 MR. KOCHERY: That's right, we checked the 10 calibration.
11 MR. CHAFFEE: Is that the one that was in place at 12 the time of the event?
l 13 MR. KOCHERY: After the event.
14 MR. CHAFFEE: So the one that was in place during 15 the event -- during the event on March 20th, is the one !
i 16 that's still in there?
17 MR. KOCHERY: Which one, pressure or --
18 MR. CHAFFEE: Pressure.
19 MR. KOCHERY: Yeah, same switch. It was in 20 calibration. When we checked the calibration, it was in 21 calibration, so we put it back.
22 MR. CHAFFEE: So if you have any strength in the 23 conviction that the first trip was caused by low jacket ;
24 water pressure -- to the extent that's a possible scenario, ;
I 25 you still have that instrument in place.
l
)
I
49 1 MR. KOCHERY: That's right, that instrument is in 2 place.
3 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess I would ask you whether or 4 not -- huma --
5 MR. BOCKHOLD: The low jacket water pressure comes 6 in any time you get the high jacket water temperature. The 7 second start proved that.
8 MR. OWYOUNG: Only if the two sensors are venting 9 during a start period.
10 MR. BOCKHOLD: Well --
11 MR. OWYOUNG: If the engine is running after the 12 group 2 lockout time has elapsed, so we're running for maybe
( 13 15 minutes and we have a high jacket water shutdown, that i
14 will be che only indication you will get. You'll get the I 15 three indications only during a startup period.
16 MR. BOCKHOLD: Okay, I understand what you're l 17 saying. l 18 MR. CHAFFEE: I don't. l l
19 MR. BOCKHOLD: Well that alarm on the first start 20 --
your question is that alarm on the first start could --
21 don't you have a concern about that alarm on the first 22 start. The answer to that question is we checked the ;
I 23 calibration of the switch, it was fine and on the second i 24 start, okay, we got that alarm also. So our logic should be
_ 25 that the root cause that we have identified here would cover I
50 1 that enunciator on the first start.
2 MR. CHAFFEE: Right, except the one thing that's 3 got me a little nervous is that you know, the first trip 4 occurred 80 seconds after start whereas the second one was 5 70 seconds but we said that tends to suggest that what 6 caused the first trip is different than what caused the 7 second trip, and to the extent that you believe that, then 8 as I understood it, the testing you did showed that 80 9 seconds is the time period you would expect to have if you 10 had the first trip caused by high --- low jacket water 11 pressure.
12 MR. OWYOUNG: No, the 80 seconds could also be if a 13 you had a vibration trip or if you had a turbo oil trip or 14 any of the other trips.
15 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, then it still exists. The )
16 thing that caused the first trip, whatever that was, may 17 still be in place.
18 MR. BURR: We don't know what caused the .tirst 19 trip and it could be the fact that it was just the first 20 trip and you're filling extra air lines. There's a lot of 21 possibilition. t i
22 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, let's assume it's part of i 23 that, maybe you're filling some lines and stuff. Now the 24 next question that would be of interest is the testing
~
25 you've done to date has included an air roll of the diesel. !
51
-- 1 Now is there a possibility that the next time you have a i
2 call upon for this diesel performance function as it has run 3 for 28 days, that you're going to find that low jacket water 4 precsure is going to cause the diesel to trip out? i 5 MR. BURR: I wouldn't think so. We've got nothing 1 6 pointing towards that.
7 MR. CHAFFEE: Except that the first trip may have i
8 been caused by that.
9 MR. BURR: It could be caured by other things l
10 also.
11 MR. CHAFFEE: Right.
12 MR. KOCHERY: Also we tightened the lines.
i 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: The key thing here though in this 14 discussion in my mind is lesson learned number 4, to go 15 ahead and bypass the non-essential engine trips on under-16 voltage start.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, so then I don't disagree with 18 that and if that's what you're going to do so that this 19 thing is not a problem before you declare the diesel fully ;
l 20 operable, I can understand, but that's going to be a study.
21 You're not going to do that today.
22 MR. BOCKHOLD: We plan to do that over the next I
23 week or two. The design mod is in process right now, the 24 design evaluations are supposed to be complete and on site i -
25 by Wednesday.
l 52 1 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. What you do with the jacket l 2 water pressure sensor in terms of making sure in your minds i
3 that it's operable is really between you and the Region, so 4 I guess I'll let you guys discuss that. What I'm hearing is 5 that what caused the first trip is not for certain known.
6 It's a possibility that it was caused by low jacket water 7 pressure and certainly the timing out of that would be i
8 consistent with that. I guess what we also don't know is --
f, do you know whether or not the 80 second run for the first 10 trip, would that be consistent with other trips or do you l l
11 need -- based on the testing you've done to date, are there 12 other specific trips that could cause trip to occur within 13 80 seconds? Do you have any tests to determine that sort of 14 thing?
15 HR. OWYOUNG: The jacket water temperature trip 16 goes -- and the lube oil pressure trip goes through a 17 different circuit than the other trips and my estimate is )
18 that the other trips going through a totally different 19 circuit has additional time delay.
20 MR. CHAFFEE: So then you're thinking any of the 21 other trips could have brought it in in 80 seconds?
22 MR. OWYOUNG: Possibly.
23 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess --
24 MR. OWYOUNG: And again, there's no indication of
~
25 that.
53 1 MR. CHAFFEE: What's true though is the first trip 2 was not probably the same scenario as the second one because 3 the time was different. Well then I guess the question is 4 to what extent do you need to go out and try to determine 5 what caused that first trip. It's fortunate that you got a 6 good reading on the second one, but how do you rationalize 7 not taking further action to identify what caused the first 8 trip? What do you hang your hat on?
9 MR. BOCKHOLD: We --
10 MR. CHAFFEE: I guess that's operability, but I 4
11 guess from the IT's perspective --
12 MR. BOCKHOLD: You know, we have checked all the I
! 13 sensors and we've done all the logic testing and we've done 1
14 under-voltage testing and we've started the diesel multiple 15 times, we have tightened air fittings and basically with a 16 team of engineers and technicians, the Operations people put 17 the A and the B diesel under a microscope and tested it as i
18 much as we could technically figure out how to test it and 19 basically brought both of those engines to what we feel is a i
j 20 state of readiness to run in an emergency.
j
- 21 We looked at and cannot get enough data to 1
22 definitely tell you why the engine tripped on the first j 23 trip.
24 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Then is there anything that
. 1 ;
i 25 can be done from the standpoint of going back and looking at d
l 54 1 the diesel and the configuration it was in at the time when 2 the diesel was called upon to perform its function that can 3 be used to hypothesize the most likely failure -- thing that 4 caused the failure, recognizing that one thing that is
, 5 different between the diesel at the time of the event and 6 all the testing you did is that it was in a state of being 7 secured for a much longer period of time than was the case 8 when you did your testing.
9 MR. BURR: We also have one additional thing that 10 has changed. We had several leaks in our tubing, the lines, 11 that we found after the incident. Those leaks have been
. 12 tightened and repaired so we do not have those leaks now.
13 MR. CHAFFEE: Do you believe that the leaks that f(
14 they found in all of this were significant enough that they 15 could have had any impact on the --
16 MR. OWYOUNG: I wasn't here to see what leaks were 17 tightened up.
18 MR. CHAFFEE: But what you've told us is you'd 19 have to have leaks on the order of the .006 orifice before 20 it could have any impact on the --
21 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
22 MR. CHAFFEE: Why don't you describe to him what 23 that -- I guess you guys know what that looks like -- are 24 there people here that understand what a .006 leak looks
-- 25 like and were involved in the leaks that were identified I
i 55 1 guess on the 23rd or something -- whatever the dates were --
f 2 to tell whether or not the leaks that was observed was ,
I 3 -significant enough to have an impact on the operability of 4 these --
5 MR. BURR: Not the operability but it may explain 6 the additional time that that first trip required. If you 7 have additional leaks, it will take a little longer to fill 8 lines.
9 MR. CHAFFEE: Yeah, but why wouldn't you have also l
10 seen it on the other one as well.
11 MR. BURR: Because the lines are pressurized, they l 12 haven't been sitting that long.
I 13 MR. CHAFFEE: Oh, I see what you're saying. Is l l
14 that possible? I l
15 MR. OWYOUNG: It's possible. I would have to i 16 analyze what lines are possibly filled and not filled.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: Well then maybe that could be an i
18 avenue to try to explain that. All I'm saying is I'm 19 requesting that you don't drop figuring out what happened to 20 the first trip. I understand that more testing isn't going 4
21 to help, I don't disagree with that, but I want to make sure 22 that you've exhausted trying to analyze the cause of the 23 first trip through things like this. I'm not sure what else 24 there is, but to the extent possible, I want you to try to 25 get a reading on that so that we can understand what caused
56 l 1 that first trip. If it turns out it's what you said, that's 2 great, then let's try to figure ther out and if that's the 3 case, then we'll know that and this phantom will cease to 4 exist.
5 MR. BOCKHOLD: All we can do is we can have the 6 team stay together today and postulate on what could l
7 possibly cause the first trip, with the prints out and that j 8 kind of stuff and I can commit to do that. And will commit 9 to go do that.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. I guess that's it then.
11 Anybody else have anything?
12 MR. DIETZ: One question. The circuitry for these
. 13 other trips is s different circuitry of the air system to 14 give you the trips.
15 MR. OWYOUNG: Yes.
16 MR. DIETZ: Is it worth putting one of those trips 17 in and measuring that time? I 18 MR. BOCKHOLD: They did. l I
19 MR. DIETZ: What did that end up being in time?
20 Is that close to the --
j 21 MR. BOCKHOLD: Ken.
22 MR. OWYOUNG: When we did the low pressure jacket 23 water trip, it was about 79.
f 24 MR. DIETZ: Which is close to the 80 thtc was seen 25 on the first trip. ,
1
i.
57 I
1 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yes. I think earlier we said that, i
2 you know, one of the other trips could have caused the first 3 engine trip and the question I think that was finally asked 4 was which one do you think is the most probable one. Okay?
5 And we'll look at the prints but we may at the end after we i
6 look at the prints and brainstorm it awhile, may only )
7 conclude that one of the other trips could have caused the 8 first trip.
9 MR. CHAFFEE: So basically where we're at is that 10 either the first trip was caused by the same thing, which is 11 the air filling up which would make sense, so really you 12 don't have another phantom sensor problem, or if that's not i 13 the case then with all the starts you've done, that tends to 14 suggest that the sensor is okay and that the problem was 15 somehow the diesel being secured for a longer period of i
16 time, somehow allowed it to be a problem in the first. If i
17 that's the case, then we have the phantom concern is well 18 the next time the diesel is called upon when it's been shut 19 down for several weeks, are you going to then see the
, 20 problem that resulted in the trip.
21 I hope that this explanation that you've come up 22 is the one that'll --
23 MR. KOCHERY: See, we don't have a.ny more leaks on I i
24 the pneumatic lines.
! 25 MR. CHAFFEE: So there's two things then.
]
i
1 58 1 Hopefully what's the case is the leaks in the lines combined
. 2 with the time it was -- oh, I see what you're saying --
3 hopefully the leaks in the line explain why the first trip 4 was 80 seconds instead of 70, because then there won't be i
5 any phantom sensor problem or there won't be a sensor 6 problem in the sense that maybe you'll see the problem the 7 next time the diesel has been shut down and not run for a 8 long period of time.
9 MR. KOCHERY: That's right.
10 MR. CHAFFEE: I'm with you.
11 MR. BOCKHOLD: George wants to say something. i
, 12 MR. FREDERICK: When we ran the UV test on the 1-A I
i 13 diesel, when ve started thic test sequence, I believe it was l 14 on the 29th, the first UV test we ran, that was almost the 15 exact amount of time the diesel had sat idle from the major 16 maintenance that we did until the 20th.
17 MR. CHAFFEE: Right, except that before you did 18 that test, didn't you roll it?
d 19 MR. FREDERICK: No. We tightened -- the only 20 thing that happened was we tightened the fittings and I 21 believe they replaced some lube oil pressure switches.
22 MR. BOCKHOLD: The air roll doesn't charge the 23 controls is what I've been told. The air roll does not 24 charge the controls so the controls were sitting in the same
'~
25 -- we air roll the machine to remove any condensation and
l l
i 59 l
1 where there's a concern about a jacket water leak into a l l
2 cylinder head and you'll damage the cylinder head unless you l l
3 air roll it. So we air roll it as a good practice for 4 engine integrity.
5 MR. CHAFFEE: But when you air roll it, doesn't --
6 MR. BOCKHOLD: Does not charg4 the control lines 7 with air, so the control system is sitting there in sort of 8 the same time frame as the first -- well as on the event I 9 day. l 10 MR. CHAFFEE: But does the --
i l
11 MR. KENDALL: And no fittings were tightened i 12 between the time?
t 13 MR. BOCKHOLD: No, we tightened fittings.
14 MR. KENDALL: So it's not exactly the same 15 condition necessarily -- close but not as much air may have 16 leaked out.
17 MR. BOCKHOLD: Yeah, you know, the fitting l 18 tightening.
19 MR. CHAFFEE: Does the air roll have any impact on 20 this jacket water low pressure, does it in any sense somehow i
21 pre-prime the jacket water -- not the pneumatics but the l 22 jacket water system itself such that the --
23 MR. BOCKHOLD: Let's ask Cooper that. Let me ask l
24 it and you correct me if your question is different. Does l f
25 the air roll with the shaft driven pumps cause a tesperature a
60 :
1 change or a pressure change that some of the sensors might 2 see something differently?
3 MR. CHAFFEE: You know, when it subsequently
]
4 started. )
1 5 Mx. OWYOUNG: I would say that the air roll is of 6 such short duration that you wouldn't see anything.
7 MR. JOHNSTON: I don't think you could measure <
l 8 anything.
i 9 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, well then what that would tend 10 to suggest is hopefully you're onto it,-which is that the 11 leaks that were in those lines are enough to account for the )
i 12 ten second difference and that the first trip is the same
' 13 thing that caused the second one. It'd be nice if it turned 14 out that way.
15- MR. BOCKHOLD: In our report we will put down what !
16 we consider as the most probable cause for the first engine )
17 failure or we will -- you know, we'll say that we can't say l 18 for sure but we postulate this scenario for the first engine 1
19 failure start.
20 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay. Is that it? Does anybody 21 else have anything?
22 (No response.)
23 MR. CHAFFEE: Okay, thank you very much.
I 24 (Whereupon, the meeting was concluded at 10:00
(
25 a.m.)
61 1 CERTIFICATE 1
2 ;
i 3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
5 Name: DIESEL GENERATOR MEETING l l
6 l l
7 Docket Number:
i 8 Place: Vogtle Nuclear Generating Plant, Waynesboro, GA l 9 Date: April 2, 1990 10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and,
~
i '13 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under my 14 direction, and that the transcript is a true and accurate 15 record of the foregoing proceedings.
16 17 Arn 0. sn /Ar
' ~
6(Q V 18 PEGGY J. WARREN 19 Official Reporter 20 21 Ann Riley & Associates 22 23 24
~
25
I ORE TR0v.~rMAN.
.sr SAND.ERS. LOCKERMAN &.AS.
AT T O R N CV S AT LAW CAmeLgm eveLosses, ovate e.oo ea r agace.regg eregge, n,g, enetsm e sansct o.a6 mww.am )
ATLANTA. GC0A04A 3c303 68:o ...... .ea.s Anf eeu m se, 00M 87 . .<ese.eeee
... ..... l l
l February 12, 1990 s
l Mr. A. L. Mosbaugh Georgia Power Company Nuclear Operations Department vogtle Electric Generating Plant P. O. Box 1600 30830 -
Waynesboro, Georgia Dear Allen This letter confirms and documents our agreement that this law firm represented you personally during an interview conducted on February 8, 1990 by the NRC Office of Investigations (Mr.
Craig T. Tate and Mr. Larry Robinson) concerning an al !
October 13, 1988.
As you know, this firm also represents Georgia Power Company '
in this matter and our fee in this matter will be paid by the Company.
At the time of your interview and at this time, there is no apparent conflict of interest for this firm to represent However, i
j both you personally and the Company in this matter, should it appear at any time that these two interests arewe will insed ;
! diverging,ill that you w have the opportunity to request separate counsel if
' you choose.
This firm will, in that event, continue to represent Georgia Power Company.
j If you have any questions, please let me know.
i very truly yours, Arthur'H. Domby i
AMD:njf .
! cc Mr. Charles McCrary -
SONOPCO Projoct f
- /
'b
\
/&w -
2 *d leloi 2 'e esici 06 51 00 A7e miA
- 3 a"m ' * *
- Interoffice Correspondence Georgu Pom b DATE: Narch 13, 1990 w w.nes iorc Af: O! Interview Suldelines Log: NOTS-00312
$8 C W bTI FROM: G. 80ckhold, Jr.
T0: GPC Plant Personnel It has come to ey attention that when investigations are being conducted by the Nuclear
, 0! investigators may contact you Regulatory at Cosmission's home or at work Office of Investigations to set up an interview. There wil (01)l be no restrictions pla Georgia Power Company on your communications with NRC personnel. The purpose of the following guidelines is to advise Georgia Power Company employees of their rights and ooligations in dealing with NRC invest'gations.
NRC Interview -
You de have the right to decline to be interviewed. Georgia Roguest Power discourages this action and encourages individuals to cooperate fully with the NRC.
If contacted off the job site or during off duty hours, individuals may postpone any interview until the next work day. The company will pay you for your time when the interview is onsite.
Management -
If contacted by NRC investigators at work, notify your Notification supervisor to arrange an interview. If contacted off the i jo6 site, Georgia Power Company suggests that you notify your supervisor to arrange an interview, however supervisory notification is str' etly on a voluntary basis. l
! Representation -
Georgia Power Company strongly recosmonds that you have i
! representation at any interview with NRC investigators. '
l -
You may demand to have a lawyer, coworker, or friend of youi choice at any onsite or offsite interview.
i - ,
You may request management to' arrange for a company lawyer '
l to confer with you before an interview and to represent you during the interview. This will be at no cost to you.
Recording the -
You any request ~to have the NRC tape record the interview.
Interview Georgia Power Company recosmonds that you request a copy of the transcript from tae NRC.
l Sworn -
You may be asked by the NRC for a signed, sworn statement.
Statemen*J If you provide such a statement, it should be reviewed very carefully and you should make any changes you wish so that the statement is correct and fully reflects your position.If you i
sign, you are entitled to a copy for your records, You may have a lawyer review or prepare your statec nt with you j for accuracy and legal effect.
temember, our policy is to be 'open, honast and to cooperate fully with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. / '
/g- -
& 7 ,
.x
P4QCEDUXE No. REVISION CS- 3 -) 8 - 9 0 PAGE No.
VEGP 00057-C 4 28 of 37
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- 2. EVENT DATA C0dECTION . . . . . .l . . . . . . . . . .
- 3. CHRONOLOGY. . ....................
4.** PERSONAL STATEMENTS . . .(Figure 2) . . . . . . . . .
"* 5.
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- 6. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING ITEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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FOR REACTOR TRIPS COMPLETE 10006-C, AND GIVE A COPY TO TEE EVENT REVIEW TEAN.
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- 8. PLANT CONFIGURATION 8.1
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9.1 L MANUAL ( ) N/A ( )
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- Sheet 5 of 10
! DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No.
9.4 I4 port: Page of DESCRIBE ANT OTHER MALFUNCTIONS NOTICED:. A/ mud i
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- 10. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 10.1
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DID TIE OPERATORS AND OTHER PERSONNEL BANDLE TIE EVENT CORR at s /
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VEGP 00057-C 4 33 of 37 l
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- v. DATA SHEET I SheeE 6 of 10 Event Report No..
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VECP 00057-C 4 28 of 37 4 Sheet 1 of 10 l DATA SHEET 1 Report: Page / of .J-f ;
1 i
i EVENT REPORT EVENT TITLE: LOSS OF OFF-SITE AW ON-SITE AC POWER (IE)
REPORT NUMBER: 1-90-003 i P DATE(S) OF EVENT: 3/20/90 EVENT CLASSIFICATION: 0 Names of j EVENT REVIEW TEAM MEMBERS KEN HOLES '.EADER j CHARLES COLRSEY JIM ROBERTS
_ JOE 0' AM100 J i>MY PALL CASf t PALL KOCERY A
IEIRA KOCERY TG4 EBB GLENN McCAR '
1 Signature of i EVENT REVIEW TEAM'LEADE N. e DATE COMPLETED 4 )(o!70 1
q MANAGEMENT REVIEW.AND AFFROVAL W I W PRB Review Required YES [] NO 7 h 4
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I PR5 Chairman Meeting No./ Date
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i 00
Interoffice Correspondence Georpa Poner b
,? n o' Jt-DATE: May 9, 1990 RE: Event Review Team Recort 1-90-03 NOT-01955 FROM: K. R. Holmes l
TO: Event Review Report 1-90-03 The Event Review Team covering the March 20, 1990 Loss of All i Offsite and Onsite Power conducted a thorough and comprehensive !
review of the events. The root causes and corrective actions !
recommended as a part of completing procedure 00057-C " Event I Investigation" were quite comprehensive. The scope included a broad I range, covering major items of a corrective nature to minor '
discrepancies of an' administrative flavor. These root causes and corrective actions are included in the even: report.
Due to the high level of interest in corrective actions r '
to prevent recurrence of this event, a team comprised of all Oc srtr.ent Mar. agers and the General Managers wrote a letter which Mr. Hairston will send to the NRC. This letter covers actions that have been taken or will be taken as a result of the event using the Event Review Team's root cause and corrective action recommendations as a basis. The actions discussed are not all inclusive and represent the major actions that will prevent recurrence of the events that occurred on March 20, 1990.
The letter that the Managers wrote is attached and is included in the Event Report to provide a continuity of actions between the Event Review Team and plant management.
W KRH:krh ATTACHMENTS xc: G. Bockhold (w/o attachments)
T. V. Greene (w
, J. G. Aufdenkam/o attachments) pe (w/o attachments)
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t/a 6 ng aco'ess ( k :" ' A } - ) . ! 40 inve' ness Center Parknay Pos:Off ce Bc.1295 B emag*am A'acama 3520 9 -J' l Towphone 205 868 5541 p g. j 3i r
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the sour e r ewN t,: - W. G. Hairston til i Se%Or VCe P'en "e*t l Naclear Ope'a' ors 1 May 14, 1990 ELV-01632 i 0379 ! Docket No. 50-424 50-425 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Gentlemen: Re: Correspondence ELV-01516, dated 4-9-90 VDGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY- , ; G u rgia Fower Company hereby submits a summary of the corrective actions i J resulting from the Site Area Emergency, as indicated in the referenced letter. ' l Should you have questions, please inquire. Sincerely, nl.J. W. G. Hairston, III WGH,III/NJS/gm Attachment xc: Georaia Power C-any Mr. C. K. McCoy Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. Mr. R. M. Odom Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory C-ission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle
i i d' f- /96-g
- 9) 4 / JM ATTACHMENT V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY On March 20, 1990, a Site Area Emergency was declared due to a loss of offsite power concurrent with a loss of onsite Emergency Diesel Generator capability. .
In accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Procedures, an Event Review Team has investigated the events leadino up to and following the Site Area Emergency. This review team identified four main issues associated with the event. These issues involved low voltage switchyard access controls, Diesel Generator failures, Emergency Plan implementation, and procedures for shutdown plant conditions. A summary of each issue and completed or planned corrective ' actions follows. i The cause of the event was a lack of attention on the part of the driver of the truck, compounded by inadequate procedural controls for access to the low voltage switchyard. Furthermore, while site procedures required a security officer to accompany the vehicle 5 the protected area, due to visibility j restrictions he was unable to assist the driver. , 4 T: ;:revent this type of initiating event from recurring, the following ; corrective actions have been, or are being, implemented. , 4 o The truck driver was disciplined for lack of attention and alertness in backing the truck when visibility was impaired. o Although the Vogtle site safety manual required the use of flagmen for backing large trucks, thir. requirement had not been incorporated into site procedures. A memo has been issued to site personnel to ensure understanding of this policy and site procedures have been revised to l incorporate this requirement. The use of flagmen will be added to the next l cycle of General Employee Training. Security officer training will be i revised to emphasize that officers have authority and responsibility to assist vehicle operators to assure safe vehicle operation. Specifically, security escorts will ensure that ground guides (flagmen) are used when large vehicles are maneuvered inside the protected area. This security training will be completed by 6-1-90. o Outage Area Coordinators have been instructed to stage welding machines and other materials on the east and west ends of the Turbine Du11 ding, whenever possible, to avoid unnecessary equipment and vehicle traffic in the low voltage switchyard. 1 l I 1
EE l 75 -] ! h 3* . lk ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED) V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY o Maintenance procedures will be revised to restrict staging of equipment in i the low voltage switchyard. The procedures will be revised by 6-15-90. j e h rriers were installed with signs which require authorization from the Unit ! Shift Supervisor for vehicle access to the low voltage switchyard, o Sensitive plant areas have been ident: fled and plant procedures have been ; revised to control vehicle access, hazardous materials and transient ; combustibles in these areas. Another issue involved the failure of Diesel Generator (DG) 1A to remain running to provide emergency power. The event review team, utilizing utility and vendor technical experts, reviewed the two sequential failures of the diesel engine. ; The cause of the first trip can only be postulated, but most likely is the same as the second trip. The ongoing investigation indicates the most likely cause of the second trip was intermittent actuation of the jacket water temperature switches. A problem with restarting the diesel occurred because the Engineered. Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) sequencer logic and dia.el generator, start logic (as designed) resulted in the diesel engine being locked out following the initial trip until the sequencer logic was reset. As a result of the event investigation, the following actions have been or are being implemented to ensure a high state of diesel generator reliability. i o The suspected switches were replaced and extensive diesel generator testing ! l was perfomed to ensure operability prior to return to service. 4
- o Investigation of the suspect temperature switches has been performed by an i independent testing laboratory and a formal report is expected by 5-18-90.
3 The investigation revealed that the temperature switches are sensitive to ! calibration techniques and foreign material within the switches. ] o Maintenance procedures for temperature switches will be revised by 5-15-90 . to include lessons learned from laboratory testing. All jacket water high temperature switches will be cleaned and calibrated using the revised _ procedure by 5-31-90. Other non-essential trip temperature switches will be ! cleaned and calibrated by the end of the next refueling outage for the associated unit. ~ o Vendor failure analysis of a low lube oil pressure switch is expected to be I completed by 6 30-90 and results of this analysis will be used to determine 4 f f procedure changes, cleaning or re-ca' ibration is necessary for various pressure trip switches on the DG. l 4 2
__ _ _ _.___ __ ~ _ ___ _ _ . -._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ .
. l l
loE l-?p.) l ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED) vv. / ,./ p .g V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY. o The Corporate Maintenance Support Department will review the diesel generator instrumentation. This review will include determining the feasibility of upgrading the existing pneumatic sensors to those of a different manufacturer or replacing portions or all of the entire system with either an electrical or electronic system. Corrective actions or improvements will be made if appropriate. This review, along with an implementation schedule, if required, will be completed by 9-1-90. o The Under Voltage (UV) diesel start was changed in both Units 1 and 2 to be similar to a Safety Injection emergency start.- This provides a higher degree of reliability for UV bus conditions. A broader review of diesel start and trip logic, to be completed by 7-31-90, will determine the need for any further changes. o Instructions on the emergency start and restart features of the DG have been provided to operators at shift briefings and have been incorporated into operating procedures. Additional training will be provided in the nomal operator requalification program by 9-15-90. . o A policy detailing guidelines for logging pertinent alams and indications to assist in evaluation of equipment or system malfunctions has been developed and applicable procedures have been revised. o After engine overhauls, functional diesel engine testing will be enhanced to include bubble testing to ensure any air logic system leakage is acceptable. o Trend program data is being reviewed to ensure DG component failures are adequately included. The data review will be completed by 6-5-90. ; i Notification of state and local government agencies was not timely due to a loss of power to the Emergency Notification Network (ENN). Communication inaccuracies, a lack of understanding of the source of the ENN power, and ; inadequate supervision of the notification process were also identified as ! Emergency Plan implementation issues. Information flow to the Corporate , Emergency Response Organization (ERO) resulted in some inaccurate infomation , (1. e., time of declaration of event and magnitude of RCS heatup) being provided to the media. There was some confusion among plant personnel concerning
~
assembly and accountability procedures. The following actions have been implemented. !' o The State of Georgia and Burke County have been added to the backup ENN circuit. , o The General Manager has issued menos to the plant staff to ensure proper understanding of:
- 1. Assembly and Accountability procedures.
l i ; b ,] ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED) h 'E JE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERGENCY
- 2. ENN Comunications procedures.
The following corrective actions will be implemented by the dates indicated. , o Battery backup power will be provided to the primary ENN in the control room by 9-1-90. o An evaluation will be performed to review and reconnend further improvements in notification systems. This evaluation will be completed by 6-1-90. , o A memo to all Emergency Directors (EDs) has been issued explaining the ! comunications duties and responsibilities of EDs. The Manager '>perations and the Manager Training and Emergency Preparedness will conduct further training for all EDs to review the role and responsibilities of the ED ! including lessons learned from this event by 8-1-90. j i o Control room comunicators and EDs have been informed by memorandum that I there are alternative means of making notifications in the event of a failure of the primary ENN circuit. These alternative means are the backtap ENN circuit, now extended to include all agencies, or the ENN in the TSC which has a different power supply. Control room communicators and EDs will receive additional training in the operation of and power supplies for emergency comunication equipment by 8-1-90. o The Emergency Preparedness group will establish a monthly test program to validate Emergency Response Facility (ERF) computer data by 6-15-90. o Tha Corporate ERO will be added to the ENN by 7-15-90 to provide another means of ensuring the transmittal of accurate information to the Corporate Office during emergencies. o The Corporate ERO will be re-trained in the use of available comunication systems to talk with the site by 6-15-90. o A full-scale assembly and accountability drill will be performed by 6 15-90, o A full-scale assembly and accountability drill will be included as a periodic emergency plan objective. Procedure 91602-C " Emergency Drills and Exercises", will be changed by 8-1-90 to reflect this comf taent. o Changes to Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in the Emergency Plan will be reouested from the NRC based on NUMARC's EAL report presently under review by the NRC. 4
M
- 0) }
ATTACHMENT (CONTINUED)
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V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SITE AREA EMERcENCY Plant procedures did not sufficiently address plant shutdown conditions encountered during the emergency. o The Abnormal Operating Procedure covering loss of Residual Heat Removal I (RNR) will be revised by 7-1-90 to include various Reactor Coolant System J (RCS) and containment conditions present during either an outage or a Loss j of Offsite Power (LOSP) event. I
- 1. A loss of power condition will be specifically addressed in the '
procedure.
- 2. The time-to-boil curves will be adjusted to address a 1100 degree F starting point for accidents. l l
o An evaluation will be performed for system lineups and power sources during planning for Unit outages. In addition, we will continue to monitor the industry issue of loss of AC power during shutdown modes and will take appropriate actions in response to regulatory initiatives arising from this issue. o A study of alternate means of feeding ESF busses has been performed and is being reviewed by management. Initial review of this stuuy indicates that a viable alternate power source is available by backfeeding using the main power transfonner and the Unit Auxiliary Transformers. This review will be 3 completed by 6-15-90. As appropriate, procedures will be revised by l 8-31-90. A copy of this report will be available at the site for NRC
- review.
o A study of alternate sources of cooling water to mitigate a loss of RHR j during reduced RCS inventory operation had been performed and included in 1 site procedures prior to this refueling outage. An additional study of i alternate sources of cooling water during a loss of all AC power event while e at reduced RCS inventory will be perfonned by 4-1-90. Any appropriate l procedure changes will be implemented prior to the next refueling outage. i 4 o A means of closing the equipment hatch without electrical power will be evaluated by the next refueling outage.
- 4
- o Senior Reactor Operators will receive training on reduced inventory boiling l and cooling mechanisms during the requalification cycle which will be l i completed by 9-15 90.
i l 4 i ) 5 1
. I i i l l
noceou-ano Levis on noe~o l VEGP 00057-C 4 29 of 37 Sheet 2 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Report: Page 9 of ;i, TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR EVENT REPORT NO. 1-90-003
- PAGE
- 1. REPORT NARRAT*VE (PER SECTION 4.6) . . . . . . . . .
- 2. EVENT DATA COLLECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 3. CHRONOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 4. PERSONAL STATEMENTS . . .(Figure 2) . . . . . . . . . ,
l
- 5. ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION (PER 00058-C). . . . . . . . l
- 6. ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING ITEMS,. . . . . . . . . . . . . , l
- ERTL TO NUMBER EACH PAGE OF THE REPORT AND ENTER APPROPRIATE PAGZ NUMBERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE ERTL WILL ENSURE THE EVENT RFPORT NUMBER APPEARS ON EACH PAGE OF THE REPORT..
** INFORMATION WILL BE PRESENTED ON THE INDICATED FIGURE. ,
i l 1 ou.s I
I Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page _jj__of 34 4 Report Narrative NOTE: All times in the Report Narrative are local EST unless otherwise noted.
- 1. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT 1.1 Power Level / Mode Unit I was in Mode 6 at an approximate power of 100 Counts per second. The reactor was shutdown on 2-23-90 for a 45 day scheduled refueling outage. The reactor core reload had been completed, the initial pass to tension the reactor vessel head studs was complete, and the outage team was awaiting permission from the control Room to begin the final tensioning. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) level was being maintained at Mid-loop (187'-11") with 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump in service for decay heat removal. RCS temperature was being maintained at approximately 90F degrees with' indication from two connected incore thermocouples. The Emergency Paration Water Source was the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST).
It was at 79% level (approx. 600,000 gallons) with a boron concentration of 2457 ppm. The Emergency Boration Flow Path was from the RWST through 1A Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) and the alternate charging flow path via 1HV-8147. Both 1A and 1B Safety Injection (SI) breakers were capable of being racked in and the pumps operated in the hot leg injection mode if needed. 1,2 Inoperable Equipment / Abnormal System Alignment Due to the refueling outage maintenance activities in progress, some equipment was out of service and several systems were in abnormal configurations.
"1B" Diesel Generator (DG) was out of service for a required 36 month maintenance inspection. "1B" Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) had been removed from service for an oil change. 1BA03, the "B" Train IE 4160 Volt switchgear, was being powered from "1A" RAT through its alternate supply breaker. All Non-1E switchgear was being powered from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer (UAT). 13417-1, " Main and Unit Auxiliary Transformer Backfeed to the 13.8KV and 4160V Non-1E Busses" was used to establish power to 1NA01, INA04, and 1NA05.
1B CCP was removed from service for various corrective maintenance work orders. The Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) letdown flowpath had been out of service for various maintenance activities and was being aligned for return to service.
I 1 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page // of 14( Report Narrative There were two RCS valves open inside Containment. The Accumulator
#4 Isolation Valve (HV-8808D) and the CVCS Normal Charging Check Valve (1-1208-U6-036) were disassembled for repair. All Steam Generator (S/G) Nozzle Dams had been removed, but only S/G's #1 and j
#4 had their primary manways secured. Maintenance sas in the t process of restoring the primary manways on S/G's 42 and #3. It l was necessary to maintain the RCS level at mid-loop for the valve repeirs and the S/G manway restorations. In addition the l pressurizer manway was removed to provide a RCS vent path.
- 2. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On March 20, 1990, at approximately 0917 a truck driver and security escort entered the protected area driving the fuel truck.
The driver's duties were to refuel air compressors and welding machines staged around the site for the outage on Unit 1. He has had these duties for the past three weeks. As this vehicle was n6t
= "daeignated vehicle" ,
it does not remain in the protected area, and a security escort was provided for the truck.
, The driver stated that in the past he had backed into the switchyard to fuel the machines in this area. On this morning he pulled straight in, he checked the welding machine that was in the ;
area, and found that it did not need fuel. He got back in the fuel ' truck and was in the process of backing up when he hit the support holding "C" phase insulator for the RAT 1A transformer, the insulator and line fell to the ground, and the transformer tripped. At 9:20, RAT 1A and 2B Hi Side and Low Side breakers tripped l causing a loss of off site power condition to Unit 1 Train A, Class l 1E, 4160V Dus (1AA02) and Unit 2 Train B Class 1E Bus (2 BA03) and 480V Busses supplied by 1AA02 and 2BA03. Unit 1 Train B, Class 1E, l 4160V Bus (1BA03) also lost power since RAT 1A was feeding both Trains of IE, 4160V Buss. However, the RAT 1B was out of service for planned outage work. During this time Non-1E busses for Unit 1 were energized through 230 KV Switchyard to step up transformers (step down in this case) to UAT to Non-class 1E busses 1NA01, INA04 and INA05. Unit 2 was in a normal electrical alignment. Unit 1 diesel generator 1A and Unit 2 diesel generator 2B started and sequenced the loads to their respective busses. Since this report is to provide a sequence of events for Unit 1, and Unit 2 ' functioned as needed, Unit 2 will not be further described in the report.
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: P4 9a /% of ff( , Report Narrative After DGIA started and sequenced the loads to 1E bus, i.e., 1 minute 20 seconds after the breaker closure, DG1A tripped. This caused an under voltage (UV) condition to IE bus 1AA02 again. The UV signal is a maintained signal, DG1A starting logic receives this signal and relays R-4A, TD2A and SOL-202-1A (activate shut-downs) Since DG1A was coasting 'dowr. from the trip, the energized. shutdown logic did not allow the D/G fuel racks or starting air solenoids to open and start the engine. This caused the engine i starting logic to lock up, a condition that existed until the UV l signal was reset and TD2A deenergized. For this reason DG1A did i not re-start by itself after it tripped. After the trip, operators were dispatched to the Engine Control Panel to investigate the cause of the trip. According to them, r they saw several annunciators lit and without fully evaluating, the ! operators reset the annunciators. On the generator panel, the ' , voltage balance relay (160) was also found to be actuat'ed. During this time, a Shift Supervisor (SS) and Plant Equipment Operator PEO 1 went to the sequencer panel to find out if any problems were ] present on 1A sequencer. The SS quickly pushed the UV reset 4 button. After pushing the reset button, the SS reset the sequencer by deenergizing and energizing the power supply to the sequencer. This caused the TD2A relay to deenergize and meet the permissive d for starting air solenoid to energize for another 5 seconds which .
- caused the engine to start. This happened 19 minutes after the DG j tripped for the first time. The engine started and the sequencer 3 sequenced the loads as designed. After 1 minute and 10 seconds the i breaker and the engine tripped a-second time. It did not start
- back due to starting logic being blocked as described above. At l this time Operators, Maintenance Foreman and the diesel generator l Vendor representative were in the DG room. The initial report was the jacket water pressure trip was the cause of the trip and also the Control Room observed a lube oil sensor malfunction alarm. The j
Maintenance Foreman and vendor representative observed the jacket water pressure at the gauge was about 12-13 PSIG. The trip set
- point is 6 PSIG and alarm is 8 PSIG.
Fifteen minutes after the 2nd DG1A trip, it was started i from the engine control panel using emergency start breakglass } button. This time the engine was started and loads were manually loaded. When the DG is started in emergency mode, all the trips , except four trips are bypassed. However, all alarms will be 4 annunciated. During the emergency run no trip alarms were noticed
- by tha personnel at the Control Room or at the engine control panel. The only alarms noted by the Control Room operator assigned ,
for DG run were lube oil pressure sensor malfunction and fuel oil
- level Hi/ Low alarm.
i i
, , . - - .m---.-.r- r- . .r--w-.-r------ - -
_ - . . . ~ -
_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ __ ~_ l l 4 Event Report No. 1-90-003 :
- Report
- Page 17 of .744 i '!
; Report Narrative !
I i DG1A ran until 1257 supplying power to 1AA02 4160 bus. At 1140 RAT s
; IB energized to supply power to IBA03, 4160V,' Class 1E Train B bus.
l At 1257 RAT 1B was tied to 1AA02 bus. l l Based on the initial information to recreate a similar starting I 4-i scenario, DG1A was started manually from the Control Room and tied ; to the bus and loaded to 6000 KW. During this time RAT 1A was : ready to energize. RAT 18 was disconnected from 1AA02 bus. RAT 1A ! was energized and tied to 1AA02 bus. The diesel Generator was tripped manually. Five minutes later, DG1A was again started, ran 1' for 5 minutes without timing to the grid and manually tripped. A third manual start was conducted after waiting for 5 minutes and DGIA ran for 5 minutes and manually tripped. During the above three starts and runs, the DG did not trip or show any malfunction. ! ? i i A Cite Area Emergency was declared at 0940 due to a loss of all off site and on site AC power for more than 15 minutes. The Emergency { Director signed the notification form used to inform off site i government agencies of the emergency at 0948. The ENN Communicator i j then attempted to notify off site agencies using the primary ENN to l Georgia and South Carolina. The primary ENN was inoperable due to i the less of power. The primary ENN receives power from A Train IE { I. buses which were de-energized due to the loss of electrical power event. The General Manager made an update to the notification form l at 0956 to state that power had been restored at 0956. The ENN Communicator then Wunt to the South Carolina backup ENN and established communications with South Carolina agencies (South Carolina Emergency-Preparedness Division (EPD), Savannah River Site i (SRS), Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell Counties) at approximately I i 0958. Initial notification of the emergency to these agencies was completed at approximately 1010. Georgia Emergency Management i Agencies'(GEMA) was contacted via commercial telephone, which is ' the designated backup to GEMA and Burke County EMA, at approximately 1015, however, no notification message was ; transmitted during this contact because of communicator confusion. At the time the Control Room ENN commtlicator contacted GEMA on the commercial telephone, the TSC ENN Communicator was confirming the operability of the' primary ENN to Georgia and South Carolina. The , ENN in the TSC was operable because it received power from the Security Diesel which was operating properly. The commercial l telephone contact between the control room and GEMA was terminated I because both parties assumed the notification would be transmitted }' via the'ENN. In fact, the TSC ENN Communicator did not have the l l j
i l l Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /4 of J4( Report Narrative l notification forms and could not pass the required information. l Attempts by GEMA to obtain the notification form information were successful at 1035 when South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division (EPD) sent GEMA the notification form'via facsimile. Vogtle established communications with GEMA at 1040 and passed the notification information successfully via commercial telephone line. Subsequent notifications were made without difficulty. The primary ENN in the TSC was used to transmit all messages after message #4 to all off site agencies. The initial notification to the NRC was made at 0958 by the Control ' Room on the ENS. Subsequent updates from the Control Room and TSC were performed without major problem except for a hardware problem on the NRC end which caused them to drop off the line occasionally. e i The primary means of notifying on site personnel is via the plant ! public address system (plant page) for personnel in the protected ' area and telephone calls to key buildings for personnel outside the protected area but in the owner controlled area. In general, these notifications were made successfully with a few minor exceptions. The plant page announcement of the site area emergency was made at 1001. It was heard in all areas of the protected area except { inside containment, on the turbine deck of the turbine building, and in the diesel building. Personnel in these areas were notified by informal means (word of mouth, supervisors, observing others leaving area, etc.) within approximately 10 minutes of the page announcement. Personnel in buildings outside the protected area were notified by telephone calls from security by 1017. The delay in making the plant page announcement from emergency declaration at 0940 to page announcement at 1001 caused emergency facility activation to be delayed on a minute for minute basis, i.e., 21 minutes. ' The plant was at mid loop when the event occurred. Several work orders were in progress at that time. Instructions were given to complete the following tasks prior to leaving containment, l l
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /7 ofg Report Narrative 4 1HV-8808D (MWO 18808316) was reassembled and the bonnet bolts were tightened down. valve. This is the SI Accumulator #4 isolation Complete installation of Steam Generators 92 and #3 manways (Maintenance Work Orders 18906589 and 18906588). Close the equipment hatch (MWO 18906592) and reinstall the interlocks on the personnel air lock (MWO 18906593). All work was accomplished and Maintenance personnel exited containment by 1 50. The supply breakers for IE buses 1AA02 and 1BA03 were moved so that RAT 1B could supply power. r Snortly after the Loss of Power, the Operation Shift Superintendent directed the Manager HP & Chemistry to evacuate containment in a controlled, orderly manner. He also directed the Outage and Planning Manager to " button-up" the mid-loop work. The pressurizer manway was to be left off to provide a RCS vent path. The Operation Shift Superintendent realized he had given conflicting instruction to the Manager HP & Chemistry and Manager Outage & Planning. The Operation Shift Superintendent called the Manager HP
& Chemistry back and informed him of the work that was to continue inside containment so that not all personnel would be evacuated. A communications error led the Manager HP & Chemistry to believe that all RCS openings, including the pressurizer manway which was not specifically discussed, should be secured. Power had been restored and RHR cooling reestablished when it was announced that the pressurizer manway was secured. The General Manager, who by now had assumed the ED Position, decided not to remove the manway because the plant was stable.
The announcement of the emergency stated a site Area Emergency had been declared and that all visitors and escorts repert to the Plant Entry Security Building (PESB); and all emergency rcsponse personnel should report to their emergency response facility. The prescr. bed section of the initial announcement from the emergency procedure concerning evacuation and assembly was purposely omitted; therefore, neither a total site evacuation nor assembly and accountability were conducted. The decision to omit this section by the ED was based on there not being any immediate radiological danger to the plant personnel. The omission of the evacuation and assembly announcement caused confusion on the plant
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /4 of J44 , Report Narrative site because there were no instructions for the nonescential personnel. Some personnel exited the protected area and assembled in the Administration building and parking lot area, some personnel stayed at their work location as instructed and approximately 200 personnel relocated to the recreation area. Another public address system announcement was made at approximately 1017 stating that the emergency had been downgraded ' to an Alert status and that all nonessential personnel were to assemble at the Administration Building parking lot. Some personnel already located in the Administration parking lot area did not hear this announcement due to public addres's system inaudibility. (Approximately 200 personnel reported) Therefore no other information was given to these people. Many personnel considered themselves essential and therefore reentered the plant protected area. 1 Once the event was down graded to an Alert, Security notified thE n::rcation Park via the Land Department. The Land Department personnel then told all personnel at the Recreation Area to go back to the site and return to work. Plant personnel returned to the PESB and entered the protected area. The Security Department at this time made two public address announcements for all non-essential personnel to exit the protected area and assemble in the Administration parking area. These announcements were made to aid in conducting accountability. l The Security Department heard the Site Area Emergency plant page announcement and tone at 1001. At approximately 1012, the initial I badge accountability report was obtained. It was determined that there were 197 persons inside the protected area (PA) who were not badged into one of the Emergency Response Facilities, the control Room, TSC and OSC. At about 1020 the second badge accountability report was initiated. Upon completion of this report there were 133 persons inside the protected area but not in one of the Emergency Response Facilities. At about 1040 the third badg accountability reisrt was initiated. Upon completion of this report there were 120 persons that were not accounted for. A fourth and fifth accountabilities were conducted at 1100 and 1230 with 97 and 49 persons not accounted for respectively.
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /7 of744 Report Narrative News media releases were made out of Georgia Power Corporate office
-in Atlanta, GA. with information supplied by the SONOPCO Project vifice in Birmingham, AL. The process that SONO?CO uses to release information to the media is as follows:
The SONOPCO public affairs personnel are notified upon activation of the General Office Operations Center (GOOC)by. the GOOC Manager. Upon notification they report to the GOOC. The GOOC Manager assists public affairs personnel by providing plant status information coupled with technical assistance as the PA personnel prepare draft press releases. The press releases are then approved by the Project Vice President or Corporate Duty Manager and transmitted to the Georgia Power Supervisor of Public Relations in Atlanta by telecopy. The Supervisor of Public Relations then transmits the press release to the site Public Relations Supervisor and to media personnel. Plant status to the GOOC was hampered by failure of the telephone bridge status loop to work properly. GoOC personnel established communications with the TSC thru a separate phone line to obtain plant status. The first press release contained two errors. The first error was in the time of declaration of the site area emergency. This occurred when the General Manager called the project Vice President and indicated that a Site Area Emergency had been declared. This was the first indication for corporate personnel that a site Area Emergency had been declared and the time of the call was approximately 0900 (CST). Previous notification by the site duty manager to the corporate duty manager did not indicate that activation of the emergency plan had occurred at 0840 (CST). GOOC personnel assumed the Site Area Emergency had been declared at 0900 (CST). The second error stated that "nonsssential personnel were evacuated" and should have stated that nonessential personnel were evacuated from the protected area to accomplish site accountability. This error resulted from a mis-communication between the plant and GOOC personnel. The second press release contained no errors and both press releases are attached. No further press releases were needed due to the press conference held in Atlanta.
r d Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page // of 544 Report Narrative By 1300, plant conditions had stabilized with off site power restored to Unit 1 and RHR established for core cooling. The Fmargency Director initiated a conference call with local government agencies (South Carolina, Georgia, Allendale, Barnwell, Burke County and SRS) to discuss termination of the emergency. The Emergency Director also discussed termination with the NRC. ; Agreement was reached with all parties that the emergency would ! be terminated. The emergency was terminated at 1347 and all agencies were notified at 1356.
- 3. CAUSE OF EVENT 3.1 Direct cause The direct cause of the loss of off site power was the fuel truck i hitting a pole supporting a 230KV line for RAT 1A, which caused $he loss of the off site power source.
This is cause Code A, Personnel Error, in procedure 00057-C. This personnel error is fully described in the description of event. The truck driver met all current site training and qualification requirements; however, in the root cause section of this report a recommendation is made to upgrade site requirements for truck drivers (they are less than state highway requirements). The direct cause of the loss of on site class 1E power was the failure of the operable DG, DG1A, to start and load the LOSP loads on bus 1AA02. This is Cause Code B, Component Failure / Malfunction. The failure and how it relates to the event is fully described in the . j description of event. There has been no previous failure of any DG i to respond to a UV signal. A summary of valid and non-valid DG failures is included in Section 6. 3.2 Root Causes Root cause and corrective uction for the loss of offsite power is included in Section 5 of this report. The root cause for the failure of DG1A has not been conclusively ! determined. The two trips that occurred during this event occurred ' at 1 minute 20 seconds and 1 minute 10 seconds after the DG tied to the bus. There is no record of the trips that were annunciated
j I i i . i Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page 10 of. 34
; Report Narrative I
l after the first trip. The cause of the first trip can thereforelikely has the same root cause a il only be postulated, but oost
- secsnd tri Me P assused sequenc~e~is that the jacket wafer' t'esperature
~
4'
/ tensors "t~f tpped below the required set point and that some elasped time 00 M,7
's nconds) during the diesel start was required to initiate the failure. Once i
tripped, the sensors did not reset and reeatned tripped. Failure to reset and ;
; tripping below the set values were observed failures during the coordinated j test plan. -
L% ~ ~ s The event review team worked with several on site and i vendor diesel generator experts to develop a detailed test plan. i The test plan is ir.cluded ir. section 6 of this report. While the i completed test plan provides significant evidence for the most j likely root cause of the second trip, further testing will be i conducted by the Ungineering Department to provide credibility for a postulated sequence of events that caused the first trip. e li The second trip occurred at the end of the timed sequence of the group 2 block logic. This logic provides for the DG to come up to
, operating conditions before the trips become active. The block . logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seconds. The i annunciators observed at the second trip included jacket water hi
- temperature along with other active trips. It is believed that the jacket water trip is the most likely cause of the second trip. In *
! conductiny the event review team's test plan, the trip conditions !
l that were observed on the second DG trip on 3/20/90 were l
- casantially recreated by venting 2 out of 3 temperature sensors, j claulating a tripped condition. The recreation duplicated both the l cnnunciators and the 70 second trip time. This most likely cause
- casumes jacket water temperature sensors with setpoints below thw ,
, normal trip level of 200F existed and resulted in the trip ' j condition. 1 This trip condition caused by the keep warm system and sensor i cetpoint variance could have existed on DGlA and did in fact exist cn DGlB at the coarletion of the 36 month DG outage. A jacket water l l keep warm system operates to maintain a jacket water temperature at the engine of about 165F. An immersion heater in a standpipe with a 4 i ceparate heater control element maintains the temperature. On DGlB the control range of the keep warm system combined with the actual cetpoint of the jacket water hi temperature sensors resulted in j these sensors being found in a tripped condition with DGlB in i , otandby during the maintenance outage. similar circumstances are l cuspected to have occurred on DGlA. l I
~
4 l l l ! Event Report No. 1-90-003
;- Report:-Page j a of 3 4 4
Report Narrative ' I- ) i l after.the first trip. The cause of the first trip can therefore j i only be postulated, but most likely has the same root cause c; the ,
- second trip. The event review team worked with several on site and j j vendor diesel generator experts to develop a detailed test plan. !
i I The test plan is included in section 6 of this report. While the l completed test plan provides significant evidence for the most ) i likely root cause of the second trip, further testing will be ; 1 conducted by the Engineering Department to provide credibility for i l T a postulated sequence of events that caused the first trip. I The second trip occurred at the end of the timed seguance of the )
- group 2 block logic. This logic provides for the DG to come up to ;
i operating conditions before the trips become active. The block l logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seconds. The ! f annunciators observed at the second trip included jacket water hi ; i temperature along with other active trips. It is believed that the ! jacket water trip is the most likely cause of the second trip. In ! conducting the event review team's test plan, the trip conditions ! that were observed on the second DG trip on 3/20/90 were t essentially recreated by venting 2 out of 3 temperature sensors, 1 simulating a tripped condition. The recreation duplicated both the ] annunciators and the 70 second trip. time. This most likely cause l assumes jacket water temperature sensors with setpoints below the normal trip level of 200F existed and resulted in the trip condition. l This trip condition caused by 'che keep warm system and sensor setpoint variance could have existed on DGlA and did in fact exist on DG1B at the completion of the 36 month DG outage. A jacket water j keep warm system operates to maintain a jacket water temperature at i the engine of about 165F. An immersion heater in a standpipe with a separate heater control element maintains the temperature. On DG1B i- the control range of the keep warm system combined with the actual setpoint of the jacket water hi temperature sensors resulted in these sensors being found in a tripped condition with DGlB in standby during the maintenance outage. Similar circumstances are suspected to have occurred on DGlA. The event review team's test plan did not duplicate this most likely root cause for two possible reasons. The UV test conducted 4 on 3/29/90 was preceded by an air roll of the diesel. This air roll, which also causes the engine's shaft driven jacket water pump ! to run, could have partially moved some of the relatively hot water from the bottom of the standpipe into the piping where it cooled as e the pre-start checks were being completed. The second possible difference is in the control of the jacket water heater element.
- The jacket water keep warm system cycles the heater off and on to E
4 l
._ . _ .- _ -. . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ - . , -l
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page e2 / of ig Report Narrative maintain temperature. The event of 3/20/90 could have occurred with the jacket water system at its highest temperature, and the UV test { 1 run at a lower jacket water temperature. Several recommended corrective actions in Section 5 address the sensors and air logic system. This 'eam recommends that those i actions that will provide greater assurance of the proper operation of the air logic trip system and setpoint calibration of the l sensors be completed as actions to prevent recurrence of this most ' likely root cause. Further testing is also necessary to validate the postulated sequence of events that caused the first DG trip. An additional action that could improve DG reliability is the implementation of Design Change Request No. 90-VlN0133 for a LOSP start to bypass the normal DG trips. If this option is implemented then it should be implemented for DGlA and DGlB during the outage, { and for Unit 2 diesel generators at the earliest appropriate r i opportunity. j A program to provide greater assurance of reliability should be implemented. This assurance should be through increased surveillance frequency or other appropriate means as approved by 1 site management. ' During this event numerous other problems occurred which were reviewed by this event review team. Causes and recommended corrective actions are included in Section 5. A critique of the event was held in each of the Emergency Response Facilities similar to that held during emergency plan exercises. Facility members completed critique forms at the termination of the event. These critique forms have been reviewed, compiled and recommended corrective actions for specific problems are included in Section 5. +
'$ . ANALYSIS OF EVENT Unit I was in MODE 6 approximately 25 days into refueling, with safety related Train "A" providing decay heat removal. The primary system was at approximately mid-loop a-d steam generator primary manways were being installed. The loss of offsite power to the Class 1E bus 1BA03 and failure of Diesel Generator (DGlA) to start and operate successfully, coupled with Diesel Generator 1B (DG1B) and Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 1B (RAT 1B) out of service for maintenance, resulted in VEGP Unit 1 being without AC power to both Class lE busses. With both Class IF busses de-energized, the
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page el of 344 Report Narrative Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System could not perform its required safety function. DG1A two was manually trips, started within approximately 36 minutes, after and Train "A" RHR, Component Cooling Water (CCW), and Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) were re-established. Based on a noted rate of rise in the RCS temperature of 16 degrees measured at the core-exit thermocouples over a fifteen minute period, the RCS water would not have been expected to begin boiling until approximately 1 hour and 50 minutes after the beginning of the event. Based on this RCS water temperature and a review of expected results of a loss of RHR flow, the fuel and equipment is expected to have remained well within design limits. The steam generator primary side manway installation and closure of the containment equipment hatch were completed after re-establishing RHR, both well within the estimated i hour 50 minutes prior to the projected onset of boiling in the RCS. A , review ofMonitoring Radiation information obtained System from the Process and Effluent (PERMS) and grab sample analysis indicated all normal values. As a result of this event, no significant increase in radioactive releases to either the containment or the environment is believed to have occurred. Additional systems were either available or could have been made available to ensure the continued safe operation of the plant: 1. The maintenance on RAT 1B was completed and the RAT returned to service approximately 2 hours into the event. 2. Offsite power was available to Non-1E equipment through the generator step-up transformers which were being used to "back-feed" the Unit Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) and supply the Non-1E busses. Class 1E busses 1AA02 and 1BA03 could have been powered by feeding through Non-1E bus 1NA01.
- 3. The Refueling Water Storage Tank could have been used to manually establish gravity feed through the RHR and/or Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), and Safety Injection (SI) to the RCS to maintain a supply of cooling water to the reactor.
Consequently, neither the health and safety of the public nor that of the plant staff was adversely affected.
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page AJ of J44 Report Narrative 4 A more detailed assessment of this event and an assessment of 7 potentially more severe circumstances will be performed by Corporate Support. The scope of the Corporate assessment was l provided by telex and is included in Section 6, along with the ; referenced letter VG-9011 of February 16, 1990. t SI .
\(. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l ff0 ;
4/ 3 /# Corrective actions are included in section 5 of this report. P i l 1 l l l 1 4
- _ _ ~_ . . . _ . _ _ _ ~ _ _- . - . -. . _ . . _ . - _ _ . _ . . . _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _
i i mOCEDULE NO EEVISION VAGE NO j VEGP 00057-C 4 30 of 37 ; i , Sheet 3 of 10 ! DATA SNEET 1 Event Report No. 1-90-003 EVENT DATA COLLECTION Report: Page 78 o f S' l 1. EVENT DESCRIPTION LOSP on Unit I due to loss of alA" RAT ; } EVENT DATE 3/20/90 UNIT One EVENT TIME 0820 DEFICIENCY CARD NUMBER l-90-0123 i (IF REQUIRED) l I i , ! 2. TYPE OF EVENT '
] A. REACTOR TRIP ( ) F. RADI0 ACTIVE SFILL/ l ! 3. FORCED REDUCTION ( ) UNCONTROLLED RELEASE ( ) ,
j C. PLANT TRANSIENT ( ) G. LIQUID INVENTORY LOSS ( ) 5. f
- D. ESFAS ( X) OTHER SIGNIFICANT EVENT ( ) t j E. PERSONNEL CONTAMIN ( ) .
l 3. EVENT REVIEW TEAM CALLED 007: TIME 1500 EST {. SAER INFORMED: TIME 1500 EST j CORPORATE DUTY MANAGER INFORMED: TIME 0930 EST l
\
j 4. DATA COLLECTION ASSIGIMENT Jimmy Paul Cath j l 5. DATA: FOR REACTOR TRIPS COMPLETE 10006-C, AND GIVE A COFT TO TEE EVENT REVIEW TEAM. FOR ALL OTEER EVENTS, COMPLETE THE SECTION 5 TEROUGH 16 ll AND PERSONAL STATEMENTS. ! STATEMENT 2 ACTIVITY PERPORMED ATTACRED SHIFT PERSONNEL AT TEE TIME OF TEE EVENT TES OR NA 2 i OSOS J. Hopkins Shift Superintendent NA ,1 SS R. Snider Unit SS y.s l 558 C. Christiensen Suonort SS NA l RO P. Vannier Reactor Ocarator NA
- P0 P. Humphrev Balance of Plant onarator Yme B. Snider STA Unit SS Yme OTHERS INVOLVED
+ i l
- 6. DATA TO RE COLLECTED (080$ TO CEECE ITEMS)
NOTE: REBENE TER DISE PACE AFTER A TRIP /SI. l PLANT CCMPUTER ALARM PRINTOUT ( ) PLANT COMPUTER EVENT LOGS ( ) , ATSI PRIIrf00T ( ) ERP COMPUTER EVENT LOGS ( ) FAULT RECORDER PRINTOUT () ERP COMPUTER TREND PRINTS ( X)
- CRART RECORDERS (LIST)
COPIES OF: NRC-CC WOTIFICATION WORESEEET ( ) SS LOGS (X) AUE BLDG OPERATOR LOG (X) 1 l TURSINE SLDG LOG (X) RWD LOG (X) CONTROL BLDG OPERATOR LOG ( X ) ELECTRICAL IAG ( ) OUTSIDE OPERATOR LOG (X) UNIT CONTROL (X) CREMISTRT RF t - 1610 ' 5
- -. . . . - - . - - _- .. - - - - - .. - . - . - __. _-. - . -. .- . . ~ . . . PROCEDUCE NO- QEVIS80N PAGE NQ VEGP 00057-C 4 31 of 37 Sheet 4 of 10 DATA SNEET 1 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page it,of 4
- 7. PLANT CONDITION WEEN APPROPRIATE MAXIMUM / MINIMUM l PRE-EVENT VALUE POST EVENT l l
MODE 6 6 / 6 6 , REACTOR POWER 100 CPS 100 / 100 100 CPS ! BORON CONCENTRATION 2457 2457 / 2457 2457 STEAM CENERATOR LEVEL 1* NA NA / NA NA
* . Use NR or WR, 28 NA NA / NA NA whichever le 3* NA NA / NA NA indicating 4* NA NA / NA NA GENERATOR OUTFUT NA NA / NA NA MWE PRESSURIZER LEVEL NA NA / NA NA
- 8. PLANT CONFIGURATION 8.1 0FF NORMAL STATUS OF FLANT SYSTEMS "18" RAT 00S for Oil Chanae "18" O/G OOS for Maintenance e 8.2 TESTS AND SURVIILLANCES IN PROCESS SSPS Train B. Time resaonse "24831-1"r "24625-1" RE-006 ACOT:
8.3 OTEER OPERATI0h5 IN PROGRESS AT TEE TIME OF TWE EVENT Varlous Maintenance Outaan ActIvitles
- 9. POR ESFAS ACTUATION OR FAILURE AUTOMATIC ( X) MANUAL ( ) N/A ( )
9.1 LIST CNANNEL ACTUATED / FAILED LOSP on Loss of 1A RAT l i EIFLAIN SYSTEN RESPONSE See Statements j 9.2 DID TWE ESFAS COMPOWENTS OPERATE CORRICTLY? YES ( ) NO ( X) WITBOUT UNDUE DELAY? TES ( ) NO ( X) j 9.3 EXPLAIN ANT ABNORMAL SYSTEM ESFAS RESPONSES. WRY? 1A D/G Trioned See Attached Statements 1 i 703ee6 -
d PROCEDUAE NO REvaS40N PAGE NO VEGP 00057-C 4 32 of 37
! Sheet 5 of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No. 1-90-003 !
Reports Page J4' of.'r 9.4 DESCRIBE ANY OTHER MALFUNCTIONS NOTICED: None d 4 APPARENT EVENT CAUSE WAS Losing a phase from lA RAT when a truck 9.5 backed into an insulator. . t 1 10. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 10.1 WHAT IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE EVENT? 1A D/G was manually -- nancv e tar +mit and 1B RAT was returned to service. 10.2 WHAT SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE IN PROGRESS AS A RESULT OF THE EVENT 7 IA RAT is beina recaired. . e i 1 ' l 10.3 WHAT FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE REColMEND E7 Return IB D/G to ; service and investicate cause.
- 11. LIST CORRECTIVE ACTION TAEEN FOR EACE ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE OR EQUIPMENT
, MALFUNCTION THAT ACCOMPANI E THE EVENT (STATE WEETHER COMPLET E , IN PROGRESS. OR PROPOS E). IA and IB RAT's have been returned to service, trouble shootino is in progress for 0/G IA. 4 4
- 12. WERI PROCDURES USD ADEQUATE 7 TES ( X ) NO ( )
WHY WOT7 4 l 13. DID THE OPERATORS AND OTHER PERSONNEL BANDLE THE EVENT CORRECTLY 7 EXPLAIN. DISCUSS CORRECTIVE ACTION TO DATE. Event was handled correctly.
W OCEDUAENO TEy:SiON eAGE NO. VEGP 00057-C 4 33 of 37 Sheet 6 Of 10 DATA SHEET 1 Event Report No. 4-90-003' Report: Page 2 of g
- 14. WAS AN EMERCENCY PLAN EAL REACHED 7 DESCRIBE LEVEL INVOLVED.(NOUE, ALERT, SITE AREA, CENERAL). Sita Aram on ioss of aii AC nower for greater than 15 minutes.
- 15. LIST LCO'S ENTERED LCO NO. DESCRIPTION INITIAL I-90-353 Both 1A & IB D/G inoo '
,e c '
- 16. LIST ANT SAFETT LDtITS EICIEDED. TECE SPEC AND DESCRIPTION No safety limits were exceeded. '
i j f I I. d 4 COMPLETED BY: Ao
- DATA ECTOR I
7-i l t
, vent Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page JP of )4 s Sequence of Events Chronology SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3/20/90 ES.T TIMELINE 0917 Fuel truck entered protected area 4 0920 Loss of 1A & 2B RAT due to switchyard accident because fuel truck backed into insulator support 120 Unit 2 Trip - Unit stable
, Unit 1 D/G-1A started, tripped 1 minute 20 seconds after . breaker closure. PEO dispatched to investigate D/G trip, j SRO dispatched to investigate sequencer. t j 0921 Security Diesel started and loaded properly. ' 0940 Site Area Emergency (SAE) declared due to loss of all 3 AC power to Unit 1. 0941 A train sequencer reset and D/G 1A Auto started and tripped 1 minute 10 seconds after breaker closure. 4 0945 Core exit T/C temperature was 118 degrees F, increasing
- approximately 1 degree per minute.
0956 Local start of D/G-1A - power to 1E Bus, NSCW and CCW pumps on A Train. Onsite power restored. 0957 Start initial notification of SAE using SC Backup ENN. 0958 NRC operations center notified of SAE. i 1000 Started A Train RHR pump and placed it in the shutdown cooling mode. At this time RNR inlet was 136 degrees F. 1001 Page announcement to site (Site Area Emergency Announcement). Security commenced accountability. 1002 1002 Security notified by ED via communicator. 1005 General Office Operations Center (GOOC), Birmingham activated. 1009 Visitors Center initial notification (Public Information) .
Event Report No. 1-90-003 , Report: Page 29 of 14s Sequence of Events Chronology SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3/20/90 i EST TIMELINE 1011 GPC Public Information in Atlanta notified by Ray Harris. l 1013 Completed initial notifications to Aiken, Allendale, Barnwell, SRS, S.C. (GEMA and BCEMA not notified). i 1013 TSC ENN communicator conducts roll call to test TSC l equipment. l 1015 Called GEMA on commercial phone numbers, did not transmit message due to confusion by communicators. r 1015 George Bockhold relieves John Hopkins as Emergency Director. #2 Emergency Notification form approved by ED. 1015 Site Area Emergency downgraded to Alert. Diesel Generator maintaining load. I 1016 Initial notification made to Burke County EMA on commercial telephone.
*1017 Alert Plant Page announcement made.
1020 OSC Activated 1022 EOF ENN communicator test ENN equipment from EOF. 1026 TSC Activated. 1030 Personnel dispatched to Met Tower to relay data. 1034 Steam generator Primary manways secured. 1035 EOF Standby Status. 1035 Message #3 started by communicator in Control Room (using BUENN) 1035 GEMA received notification message il " rom South Carolina EPD via FAX.
- Time not confirmed from available data
Event Report No. 1-90-003 4 Report: Page 30 ofJ4( 4 Sequence of Events Chronology . SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3/20/90 a
; EST TIMELINE 1038 Message #2 complete to all South Carolina Agencies.
1040 Initial Notification completed to GEMA. 1042 containment Equipment Hatch bolted. 1046 Met Data from MET Tower building 10 meter height, 8-9 mph; 340 degrees; 10-60 meter Delta T = -3.0.
- 1050 Radiation monitors information received from. PERMS; al) normal.
1050 Massage #2 completed to Georgia. 1050 Message #3 completed to all South Carolina agencies. 1055 ED departs Control Room to TSC. 5 1056 Message #2 and #3 completed to Burke County. ED at TSC and assumes duties and responsibilities. I 1059 Message #3 completed to Georgia. 1100 Briefing in TSC concerning accountability. PA announcement made for non-essential personnel to leave protected area and report to Admin Bldg parking lot. 4 1103 Containment Personnel hatch interlocks set. 1105 Message #4 initiated by ENN communicator in TSC using Primary ENN for both Georgia and South Carolina. 1112 Unit 2 in Mode 3. 1116' Message #4 completed to all agencies by TSC ENN communicator. O
- i Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report
- Page ]/ of 34(
Sequence of Events , Chronology ! SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3/20/90 EST TIKELINE 1129 Message #5 initiated by ENN communicator in TSC.
. 1130 Unit IB RAT has offsite power to hi-side.
1140 1BA03 energized from RAT 1B. f 1140 Pressurizer manway installed. : 1141 Message #5 completed by TSC communicator. P 1143 All buses off of 1BA03 energized. 1159 Train B NSCW started. 1203 Train B CCW pumps started. 1205 Message f6 initiated by TSC ENN communicator. 1212 Message #6 completed by TSC ENN communicator. 1222 TSC Briefing. 1225 Public Information Manager leaves EOF and returns to Visitor Center. 1229 TSC receives status of personnel accountability. 1231 Train B RHR pump started. 1235 Message #7 initiated by TSC ENN communicator. 123* RHR Train 8 place in shutdown cooling mode. RHR Train A placed in recire. 1241 Message #7 completed to all agencies by TSC ENN communicator. 1257 1AA02 alternate incoming breaker closed to supply powe from RAT 1B/ paralleled with D/G 1A.
l l Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page .71 of J4( Sequence of Events Chronology SITE AREA EMERGENCY 3/20/90 yST TIMELINE ! 1259 Message #8 initiated by TSC ENN communicator. 1310 ED conference call to local agencies to discuss termination of emergency. , 1313 Message #8 completed to all agencies by TSC ENN communicator. I 1313 Offsite power restored - plant in normal refueling configuration. , j 1 25 49 people unaccounted for by Security. 1347 Emergency Terminated ! 1350 Message #9 (Termination) initiated by TSC ENN communicator. 1356 Message #9 completed to all agencies by TSC ENN communicator. 1400 News Release concerning termination of emergency. 1426 Offsite power (from RAT 1B) supplying 1AA02 and 1BA03 ! with DGla shutdown. I 1430 Press Conference in Atlanta. l l 1545 Joint News Release to Media. 1630 Press Conference at Vogtle. i I
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page l of d Event Personal Statement Listing NAME DEPARTMENT PAGE NUMBER G. Bockhold, Jr. Management W. F. Kitchens Management Mike Lackey Management Jim Swartzwelder Operations Bill Burmeister Operations , R. Bruce Snider Operations , j l raul n. Hunt Operations Keith Pope Operations Phillip A. Humphrey Operations Sterling L. Whitman Operations Dewaine A. Deloach Operations Joey C. Jackson Operations John Acree Operations Stephen H. Chesnut Operations Pauline W. Jenkins Operations Teresa B. Jones Operations , Alberta Anderson Operations P7,evey H. Handfinger Management David Hawkins Maintenance Ray C. Howard Maintenance Michael R. Cagle Maintenance
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page m7f of5 4 Event Personal Statement Listing NAME DEPARTMENT PAGE. NUMBER l Douglas E. Adams, Jr. Maintenance Richard O. Berry Security ) N. Glenn Grimes, Sr. Security ) Patrick M. O'Neil Security Patrick L. Cross Cooper Industries P i l j d e v
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- VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 Event Report No. 1-90 003 l t
Report: Page & or g - EVENT PERSONAL STATENDff* 1 FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT TOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR l SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAEEN RASED ON INDICATIONS. ! A. ED A ! 9 2 P 1 2. DID ANT AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe) Y & $.u-c 4 & L, 24nucsn ca
/ '
I f 3. DID (Desertbe) TEfiIVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL IE4DEQUACIEST Y ei /
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T G FIGURE 2 EXAMFLE w i
-. - . . _ . -.. .. - . . . - . . - - .--._- - _ - __ __ _ ~ . . _ .
Fm NO- DEVIS80N PME NO.
. FIGP 00057-C 4 27 of 37
[ .- Event Report No. 1-90-003 Reports Page a or &
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD 700 DIFFERENTLY 7 A$u - ded D wLW %' w N
/ C
.f 5.
ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YO 3ELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe) CuTk k 2::m=vki ' eu
/ T C P
- 6. ColeSNTS:
i i 1 I 2 {
- 7 e
2 SIGRATURE TITLE DATE i SA l. For reactor trips the personnel statement form in Procedure g 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form.
- FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE 6
"dt.OCliDumE No I mEVl580N PAGE NQ VECP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 3 l l l Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page L or &
EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT j 1 FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, 1 SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. Prior 6 &. em.vsenev en 34 19o I was in lice.nsea onevdov va<ust +rainin a *1 the vuHe hainise
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I RHeti fe he f /4nf, and licard fks pd.c e aa n cN hteste n Y r l t k+ A Sile hea emseng was Jedned sa 1 p meeded c a
+e +he 7'sc h assume dah a1 Tsc Ma r.
bu>ssq fhe eveb ~ Set SkacNek los "fii> t[smlog afj dm Vs'pNon . , Amy 4. euen-f I eddlished an Evesd coHosu e. -k y he i Wlf I einevqes.es Jad en be.d Cet# sue fe F W[f 2 + k-ip . 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION? (Describe) i Inci kev da+a. not n ERF cmp de,y~ ksd le Verd I toe.t liv . 3. DID (Describe) TEIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES? l Core. damne, assessmed hard k J. win our 1pstedure. w i f4 new fue l in re a c to r. . I I FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE . M4. 1 1/3.s \*,o 1
' canal
. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ = _
a l 'PAOCE0umENo Afvis CN PAGE No ' i VEGF 00057-C 4 27 of 37 i i l 9 Event Report No. , I-90-003 Report: Page L or A
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?
5
@ fitsure. GEMA nef. Tied 3r mpfiq hv comm e rc.isi skene li n e. .
@ Zf Z ' Ws ve. O. sydsv savly d smissal av send all nort-essenligl
. vevssens.l 1e +he Adm,% Eld g . 7 eye annweacA on Als nud he more saecin'c lo allow neper a ce.anMil.*f v . 4 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU , BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe) 4 aheoc. See. //em P
- 6. COMMENTS:
Reseen s e. +o b:s fers +he, pla s + in a SAN : SlaLic csn d u u.r3 5 ,yevy o.c od . SIGNATURE TITLE DATI wT & ~750 manwee 3/ ail 90 For reactor trips the personnel statement form in Procedure l 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form. ) FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE
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'pmoCEDuma NO. mEves ON PAGE NO VECP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 Event R'e port No. *0' -
Report: Page & of if.J.,_ EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING AND AFTER THE EVENT, SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS.
Sitting in J. Surtzwider's office I noticed the Service 81da.11ahts go out, heard a page announcenent of a U2 trio. then r.oticed snoke i coming from 1A D/G Building stack. ! ir:saediately '.houaht of a nossible switchyard problem and proceeded to the yard. '.si.en I arrived I noticed i the dow line, truck and driver. I it:uaediately unt to the Control _ Room and informed the OSOS that A RAT would not be available for several hours until f t could be repaired. I also infonaed hin the work on RAT B had cor.aoleted and askeci J. Seasley to contact J. Born and verify and help obtain a switchina order for restoration of RAT B. I aTso called D. Adams of flaintenance and asked to have the Stean 0::n-:rator nanuays (Continued on attached sheet)
- 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR. EQUIPMENT MAIJUNCTION REQUIRE ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe)
Diesel Generator IA had to be started by an emergency manual start. i i ' i I ! 3. DID TE18 EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES? l i (Describe) i AOP for loss of all AC pour in modes 5 and 6 may be helpful. 1 i i i 4 1 1 FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE l
PMOCEDU-E No REVISCN PAGE NO VEGP 00057-C 4 27 of 37 Event Report No. '-1:~0)] Report: Page 47 or 1
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?
Improve assembly / accountable instructions and perfomance. 1
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING? (Describe)
Clarify evacuation / assembly reautrements. P
- 6. COMMENTS:
Excellent personnel response and detailed knowledae of sinikar events at other plants allowd the sitt'ation to be wil managed. l i l l SIG TITLE DATE !
<> 3 noes
- w!4 AP. z/21/90
( y3 i - i For reactor trips the personnel statement form in Procedure 10006-C may be used in lieu of this fom. ; FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE 1 me
i l CL ' D -p]
- 1. (Continued) O put on, W-8806D and the 36 charging check valve bonnets put back on immediately and ensure the pressurizer mantay tes physically off. I also asked for electrical support to move i the incoming feeder breakers for 1AA02 and 18A03 from the A RAT .
cubicle to the 8 RAT cubicle. At this time per J. Siertzwelder's I request, I proceeded to the 1A D/6 Buf1 ding to assist in the emergency start. When I arrived J. Acree had the situation mell in hand and successfully started, tied and loaded the diesel. At that time the Site Area Emergency tes declared and I proceeded to the EOF to assume the position of EOF Manager. Information on the reesinder of the event is contained in the EOF logs. , l l 4
. .. . . = . . - . _ . . _. _ _ . . . - _ - - . - . _ . _ . . _ - . - . . ~ - _-- ...
1 1 j PMOCEDURE NO. REVISION PAGE NO. VECP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 i j Event Report No./ *?-?!J
; Report: Page 41 or &
EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT
- I. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, l SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR 4
i SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. j First notification of difficultv wat hea rina naa. ---- --in-Unit 2 Reactor Trio. I i - diatelv ==nt tm th. ra=trai == r- y j office. Upon arrival (annrominat.1v an. minutal I ahnerved Unit 2 i j recoverine from a Reactor Trio and Unit 1 e-riencina a lost of vital AC power. Shift Sunerintendent J. D. Hankins (Jahn) informed me of the loss of "A" RAT. Actions wrw underu v at this time to . restart "A" DG which had trinned durino its initial start and inadina j after the undervoltaae condition. After a brief discussion with John and === their arrival J. P. Cash as assi--I to coordinate the restoration of the "B" RAT and W. L. Burmeister as assianed to l 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE t ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION? (Describe) i i h
- 3. DID TEIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES?
! (Describe) i 4 a FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE
l PROCEDunE NO. REyessoN PAGE NO. VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 e Event Report No. / 8016
; Report: Page to of 1 ; EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT <
1 4
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT,
; SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR
- SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS.
i review the EPIPs. John and I then assinn d St v. ch.ctnut in C00Miinate Containment closum_ John em11md nutano anA P1mmninn nr j Maintenance to bottle-un midkinnn herk artivitiet .Inha arr tem t 1 disnatched to the diesel asnerator and retth pan. ma t en thm l j ] senuence r. At annenmina tel v t h. --- tie. ( n1us or minus five minutes) l as the second start att==nt. which anain msulted in a ns trin . ecoarently from low _facket unter omssum. Bill Rumeister dierueced the Classification of the event with Jnhn and I_ Me enneurmd that the event should be classified as a Site Ama r= r w. Bill henan the paperwork for the ==sraency declaration and anha mad the decision l 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE i ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe) i 4 l l 1
- 3. DID TNIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES 7 I (Describe) i FICURE 2 EXAMPLE
=
< PROCEDURE NO RfvtssoN PAGE NO. !
VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 , i ' 4 i Event Report No. > 40 ..v i Report: Page S/ or . e , i ,
; EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT l i
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR j SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. ;
, to emergency start the DG while monitorina _facket uter nressure.
j d John asked Lee Mansfield for a minimm limit for incket uter , f pressure and Lee went to oet this value. Durina this entim time i frame incore T/Cs were beina monitored. Genram Backhnid arrived ! , l
- i in the Control Room while Bill as fillina nut the fanns tn < tart l
l notifications. The DG ms locall y ==arnancy started and eueretsfull y e i ~ M ded. RHR Train A ms niaced in service and enm t==aaratums henan . to decrease. Genrae miieved Jnhn as reernenew Directar mad the event 1 ms downaraded to an Alert since olant ennditinnt mm innrovina. ! The "B" vital AC but (RAD 31 me mstamd from the "R" RAT _ The ! 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE i ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe) i l l } I 1 l 3. DID TEIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES 7 , (Describe) i ! l l I J l - FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE
1 l 1 i PmoCEDURE No. Revis#ow PAGE No. VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 -- l i j Event Report No. / 9#->>J Report: Page 5; of g j e : , EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, 1 SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS.
1 remainder of the event ut enant an +h. - = + a-* + 4 - as + u una ajy :-d i j oettino the "A" wital hue taan,1 . _ w , _ + u
- a. syy .-g .3 i
j DG shutdown and in standhv. Af ter thi s activi tv i .e _ . "A" hue i 3 oowered fran "B" RAT. the amarnancy mz teminated 4 fl0TE: Hany of these events wre nerfar d in nar 11 1 ana +h. 1 chronoloav/seauence may not he svart. , i l 1 i i- . i J r i
- 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MAIJUNCTION REQUIRE i
I ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION? (Describe) ! 4 i Yes. DG was reauired to be locally amarannew startud. l l ] s 4 l i
- 3. DID TEIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIEST (Describe) l
! The event or condition did not have a dimet nrecedure and therefore the operators utilized a canbination of nroceduren. l - FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE ; 4
i WOCEDUKE NO- REVISsON PAGE NO- ! VEGP 00057-C 4 27 of 37 l Event Report No. /- U-SO l Report: Page g or &
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?
Operator response was good, however EPIP isolementation could have been smoother (on-site and off-site connunications) i l l
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe) lessons learned should come from overall evaluation of event critique 2
- team.
1
~
I I l 6. COMENTS: j l i 4 i 4 e TITLE i SIG DNt _. j
/ / Manager. Operations 3/30/90 j *
/For reactorDtrips the personnel statement form in Procedure
- 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form.
FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE ws
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page If of ?44 Event Personal Statement 0920 I was in my office at the time I heard a loud bang and subsequent announcement of Unit 2 Reactor trip. Loss of Service Building power also occurred. I was beeped to call X3005 (operations Duty Beeper) . I attempted to call the Control Room but could not because the phone system was down. On my way to the Control Room, I observed people headed for the Low Voltage Switchyard; therefore, I went to see what happened. I observed a downed transmission line (feeding lA RAT) and asked what had happened. Others present said that the. lube oil truck (still there) had backed into a transmission line support pole and knocked the line down. I asked if anyone was injured and the response I got wds the driver could not be located ( I assumed he abandoned the truck and area for whatever reason). At this time, I incorrectly assumed the damage was to to the feeder supplying the "B" Rat which I knew to be out of service. l Therefore, I presumed that the incident had no impact on Unit 1 and that the resulting electrical disturbance had resulted in some kind of generator trip on Unit 2. N0932 I entered Unit 2 Control Room area and observed that one ; RAT had been lost. P'toceeded to Unit 1 Control Room area and observed a complete loss of onsite and offsite AC. (Power was available to Non-lE buses through UAT backfeed). In conjuction with the 6hift Superintendent, assigned individual to make sure Containment was closed up (Personnel Lock & Equipment Hatch secured). Volunteered to fill out Emergency plan Notification forms. 0940 Determined plan classification level to be c. Site Area Emergency. Received concurrence from Operations Manager and Shift Superintendent. Completed notification form and submitted to Shift Superintendent (Emergency Director).
- l Event Report No. 1-El-003 Report: Page 5T of JVi i
Event Personal Statement l 1 Gave notification form to Shift Clerks for notification of offsite agencies. Requested individual to monitor core exit T/C's and obtain weather data from ERF (unavailable). 0956 Observed restoration of onsite power sources. 1003 Began filling out followup notification form for downgrade to Alert (based on DG being in service). Alert classification was used based on desire to maintain activation of TSC. ^/ 1010 Checked progress of notifications of offsite agencies. Shift Clerk reported that all had been contacted except GEMA and Burke County. She continued to contact. r 1015 General Manager relieved Shift Superintendent as Emergency Director. 1 Assisted TSC until 1200. f ~$-L1hu Bill Burmeister 3/20/90
i f I , i Event Report No. 1-90-003 f Report: Page is ofj4( i Event Personal Statement i
\
, When the fault occurred, the two (2) breakers feeding the 1A RAT and the RAT feeder to lAA02 tripped. The 1A diesel auto started and tied to AA02. NSCW pumps 2 and 4 started. The diesel then tripped. AOPs for loss of IE switchgear, loss of RHR, loss of NSCW and loss of CCW were entered. I did not notice a trip annunciator. The OSA was sent to the diesel. He reported that the only flag was a 160 relay. All A Train pumps were placed in PTL except NSCW. An SS went to the sequencer and found it locked up. l The 160 relay was reset, and the sequencer reset. The dia'el again auto started and tied on. The NSCW pumps started, and after the , time delay the discharge valves utarted opening. The diesel t'aen i tripped. The D/G 1A trip low press jacket water annunciator was j in. An SS was then sent to the diesel, and a RO to the sequencer.
- The NSCW pumps were placed in PTL. The diesel was placed in local, the sequencer reset (it was locked up again). The diesel was emergency local started with personnel monitoring indications for i i
jacket water and lube oil. The bus was energized, the 480 V busses
- energized, NSCW, CCW and RHR started.
The two (2) temporary core thermocouples were monitored the entire time. Temperatures rose from about 96 Degrees F to a maximum of 136 Degrees F. Also, Containment and RCS were bottled up (equipment hatch and air lock rostored, manways restored, etc.) and a site area emergency was declared. Later B RAT was restored, B train equipment (NSCW, CCW, & RHR) , started, and AA02 placed on B RAT until the A RAT was restored. i I
$ b~ b J .? f. pc R. Bruce Snider 3/22/90 j
+
'l l
Event Report No. 1-90-003 j Report: Page 17 of ff t Event Personal Statement The diesel generator was running about 1 1/2 hours, when the "high temp lube oil out" and " trip high temp lube oil" alarms came in at the came time. I checked the temperature on the D/G control panel and it was 170 Degrees F. agAmr Paul M. Hunt 3/22/90 e i
I t' i Event Report No. /-?.7-52 3 Report: Page Ar# of it s Event Personal Statement During Unit 1 LOSP, I observed the 1A D/G start and come to speed. The D/G loads were sequencing loads on properly. After some period of time, the D/G tripped (not sure why at this time). I asked the PEO's at D/G 1A if they had in protective lockouts actuated. They responded the only relay was the 160 relay (Voltage Balance) which should not have prevented the diesel from restarting. I then proceeded to see if there was possibly a sequencer problem. When I arrived at sequencer, the sequencer appeared to be " locked up" with the 3 under voltage signals in 2 HRS lights illuminated. I then down powered the sequencer and reenergized sequencer 1A (also reset all signals from under voltage). The diesel then restarted and the sequencer started its load shed sequence. When I arrived in the Control Room shortly thereafter, the D/G 1A stated the trip was on Low Jacket H2O pressure (a normal trip). After discussion with shift crew, it was
, decided to locally emergency start D/G 1A to bypass this normal trip. We were monitoring jacket water pressure during start to ,
O.: Ore jacket H2O pressure and temperatures were normal. Once the D/G was started locally, the D/G output breaker closed in automatically and the sequencer proceeded to reload under voltage equipment normally. An operator was dispatched to ensure sequencer was operating normally; which he reported it was. Further recovery operations were begun after D/G was carrying UV loads. Jacket H2O temperatures and pressures were verified normal while D/G 1A was running.
~
Okt fd Keith ' Pope 3/20/90 10 wO -)D % PhillfpA.Hu!1phrq}3/20/90
l Event Report No. 1-90-003
- Report
- Page 57
' of 344 l Event Personal Statement i 1 At approximately 0817 CST, Dewaine Deloach, Sterling Whitman
'oey Jackson were instructed to go to the Unit 1A Diesel Generator room to find the cause of the Diesel Generator trip and report findings to the Unit 1 Control Room. DeLoach was the first to arrive at the scene, and found on the Engine Control Panel that the annunciators and alarms in were, Diesel Not Running, DG Auto Start signal, Shutdown Systems Active, stopping Light Illuminated, and numerous alarms. He (DeLoach) depressed the silence, acknowledge, and reset buttons attempting to clear. Shortly afterward Sterling and Joe arrived at the scene, Sterling and Joey 3 arrived at the panel and noticed that the generator under frequency, (D6), low starting air pressure, and diesel day tank
, high/ low level (D7) alarms were in. These at this time are the only alarms noticed to be illuminated on the Engine Control Panel. On the Generator Control Panel the only thing that could be found was that Relay 160 (Voltage Balance Relay) flag was dropped. The Control Room was notified of the findings at this time. At this time Sam Hart arrived at the diesel. The stopping light was attempted to be reset per Procedure 13145-1, but would not extinguish. The flag on Relay 160 (Voltage Balance) was reset. The Control Room was notified or these actions. The Control Room attempted again to start the 1A Diesel Generator. The start lasted for approximately 45 seconds when numerous alarms started coming in. The ones that we can definitely remember are Low Pressure Lube Oil Trip (BS), Trip Low Pressure Jacket Water (C7), Trip High Temp. Jacket Water (CS), DG1A Under Frequency (D6), DG1A Trip High Temp. Lube oil (A5), and Day Tank High/ Low Level (D7) . The Diesel Generator then tripped and the Control Room was notified. The Diesel Generator was started successfully by Emergency Start / Break Glass and continued to run and accept load. These events are true to the best of our knowledge and the best we can reme er.
/?? .. x 0 E6terfi'ng ,. Whitma'n '3/20/96 AN A .
. 3 900d Dewaine A. DeLoach
~
' 3/40/90 (L WXL
" Joe? C. Jackson 3Ah ,
3/20/90
^
Event' Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page (3 of ff6 Event Personal Statement Upon arriving in the Main Control Room, Unit 2 status was , tripped with "B" Train IE being powered by D/G 2B. Unit I was in a ! loss of all AC. Minutes after my arrival, D/G 1A started and the i output breaker closed. Before loads could be placed on the D/G, it tripped. Reports were received from locally stationed PEOs that i the Diesel had tripped on Low Jacket Water Pressure. I suggested I to the Shift Superintendent that we perform a local manual emergency start to bypass this trip which may have been caused by the keep warm systems being S/D prior to start. I proceeded to D/G ,
"1A' and collected 11885-C Oper. Logs and 13145-1 to monitor D/G l
, parameters (Trip & Norm OPS) as we performed our emergency start. We stationed PEOs on the front standard and D/G 1A Control Panel. I unscrewed the Emergency Start Break Glass per Procedure 13145-1, Step 4.4.3.1, when directed by the Control Room. D/G 1A started, red starting lamp energized, green SI signal lamp energized. . Control Room personnel with major loads in PTL started NSCW. , Jacket H2O temperature never exceeded 154 degrees F. All p: ::.:ters normal. After restoration of BA03, Control Room directed us to XFER control to them for paralleling incoming source thru emergency incoming breaker to AA02. After doing so, we reset
- from LOCA and replaced glass on Emergency Start Button. I directed PEOs to water Sample Dry Tank and to perform Standby Readiness Checklists per 13145-1 after Control Room performed normal S/D of DG 1A 1
A- - Jo Acree 3/20/90 } l l i i I
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page 4/ of>4( Event Personal Statement i At approximately 0825 CST, I entered the Unit 1 Control Room ! after hearing the announcement of a Unit 2 Reactor trip. A few j minutes later John Hopkins, OSOS, directed me to close the Unit I l Containment Equipment Hatch. I took J. Clifton, PEO with me to get maintenance personnel to close the equipment hatch, and to restore the personnel airlock. David Seckinger and four Maintenance ; personnel were immediately dispatched. J. Clifton and two Maintenance personnel entered the Containment, while Seckinger, the other Maintenance personnel and I remained outside the Equipment Hatch to coordinate moving the interference to hatch closure. We immediately had the portable crane moved to the hatch area, removed the scaffolding, disassembled and removed railroad tracks and cart l which blocked the hatch. The interference was removed at ' approximately 0910 and the hatch began to be lowered into place. I , had previously directed the Maintenance personnel in the area working non-essential projects to report to their shops to wait , further announcements and directions. As the hatch was being i 10'..'O r d , I returned to the Unit 1 Control Room and was informed that the hatch bolting was completed at about 0935 and that the personnel air lock was restored after the last interlock l reinstalled at about 1000.
/M N j/ Stephen H. Chesnut 3/20/90 )
l I l l i i J
t a . t PpTICIPANTS Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page d of & CRITIQUE REPORT G9etl96 LOCATION VOCTLE ELECTRIC GEN, PLANT DATE _PBBCB 20. 1990 COP 9fENTS: CRITIQUE FOR SITE AREA EERGENCY Page 1 _ .,_W hen I leamed that the Control Room had a problem, I preceded to_go and offer , my assistance. l I waited to get the Notification Message from the Emergency Director. The report was given to me at approximately 9:48. The report stated that the Emergency was declared at 9:40. As I began to read the Notification, the Plant Manager asked l to see the report. He then wrote on the report that power had been restored at 9:56. I then started to do my Notificatfons. This is the secuence that I remember:
- 1. 8egan notifications and realfred the EM phone was desa, l
- 2. Went to the backup EM and got only the SC agencies.
- 3. Preceded to call GEM and turke Co. EM at approximately 10:12 A.M. I did not cet a response from either agency. I then tried to get them on the commercial phone line, at approximately 10:13. I could not get GEM on the first commerc14 i
number that was listed, so I tr16d the second neber listed. Contact still was not estab11shed. j' 4. At approximately 10:16, contact was made with SepteCounty EM.
- 5. On the second notification, by using the 99 number, only 1 South Carolina agency answered the call. This was Barnwell. (Done by Teresa Jones)
- 6. We then preceded to notify other agencies by using the individual numbers listed I for the backup EM phone.
Pauline W. Jenkins / Yeresa 8. Jones / Alberta Anderson Prepared By: Plant Extension 3789 i misc-A 4 4
o
- Event Report No. 1-90 003 P4RTICIPANTS
#' b ' M4 RITIQUE REPORT I,0 CATION V0GTLE ELECTRIC GEN. PLANT DATE ERQf 20. 1990 CRITIQUE FOR SITE AREA EE RGENCY Page 2 7.,_Then. we att_engted to notify GEM again on the commercial phone. At this time.
__ c.Qftleit_wR1_estabitshed and all of the notifications were given to them. ,e, W besan with #1 Sapproximatetly 10:40 and ended with #3 9 approximately 10:59.* ,, _ . . With as many people in the Control Room at the time and the time span between the rs;;:v beine declared, and given to the EM Ceuununicator, there would have been no way the notifications could have been made in 15 minutes (time allowed) with the nroblems we had with the telephones. e Recommendati'ons For Improvement
- 1. hen the Emergency is actually declared. Make sure that the necessary pape k is given directly to the EM Communicator.
- 2. Have only the very essential personnel giving orders (On Shift Supervision).
- 3. Have only very essential personnel in the Control Room.
- 4. Need to put GEM and Burke Co. EM on a backupr EM just like South Carolina.
- 5. Ensure that the paging system does not ground out communication on the
,s. . . >. m < p.. . ~. . . . . . . . w. . .... .. ... .
- backup EW.
- 6. Need a separate outside line for Burke County at another location in the j Control Roomt other than just the one on the 0$0$'s desk. One should be at 1
! the EM location with the other phones. This would eliminate the need for the ENN communicator free having to ' change locations to get to another phone.
- Prepared By
- Pauline W. Jenkins / Teresa B. Jones / Alberta Anderson j .
Plant-Extension 3789 . .
*(Done by Teress Jones) misc 1
PROCEDURE NO. AEVIS40N PAGE NO. , VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 Event Report No. 1-90-0o3 Report: Page 9 of 1 EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT ,
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. -
Prior to the event I was in a grievance meeting with George Bockhold. When the emergency was declared I assumed my function as OSC, f anager. I have attached a brief review of activities from the OSC. During the period of the emergency I noted non-essential personnel being allowed into the PA and standing around in the PA. After the event returned to shop to organize support for post event action. . e
- 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION? (Describe)
N/A
- 3. DID TBIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES 7 (Describe)
None that I was involved in. FIGURE 2 EX#RPLE cm
1 i PPOCEDURE NO REVISION PAGE NO. VEGP 00057-C 4 27 of 37 Event Report No. 1-90-003-Report: Page E or ja
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCORRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?
Clear all non-involved personnel from the PA. Have Security comb areas and assure personnel are out of PA. t
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (DescriNd Personnel in vehicles need to be instructed in vehicle orotocol.
Security personnel should be instructed when escortino vehicles that they assure vehicle safety. 1 1 6. COMMENTS: Comments and criticue forms were provided from the OSC to the Emeroency Planning Group. SIGNATURE TITLE DATE ffhhnrvey M. ynnger
/?l'.//4l 5&O'
- For reactor trips-the personnel statement form in Procedure 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form.
FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE aws
Ev:nt Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page L of C THIS IS NOT A DRILL 93/20/90 (TYPED FOR CLARITY)
*0900 SITE AREA DECLARED
*0930 TEAM #2
*0931 DOWNGRADED TO ALERT
)
*0940 HMH BRIEFED - STABLE
)
*0943 GET TWO FIELD MONITORING TEAMS
*0945 TEAM #1 TO HP CONTROL POINT
*0952 TEAM #3 - FIELD MONITORING TEAM (CHEMISTRY) CHANNEL 5
*0954 TEAM #4 - FIELD MONITORING TEAM
*0959 TEAM #2 AT MET TOWER
*0959 LUCOT CALLED IN
*1010 TEAM #5 - LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD
*1010 HMH BRIEFED
*1015 TEAM #6 - ELECTRICIANS - LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD e 1025 TEAM #7 - CHECK ELEVATORS !
1041 TEAM #6 RETURNED 1042 TEAM #8 - INTEGRATED LEAK RATE TEST DIESEL AIR COMPRESSORS TEAM #9 - ESCORT AUGUSTA DIVISION 1052 TEAM #8 RETURNED 1055 TEAM #7 RETURNED 1106 TEAM #9 - STEVE HOPKINS 1109 TEAM #10 UNIT 1 CONTROL ROOM 1117 TEAM #10 CALLED 1117 HMH BRIEFED - STILL ALERT 1135 HMH BRIEFED 1153 TEAM #13 - AUX. BOILER (CHANNEL 1) 1157 TEAM #13 ARRIVED AT AUX. BOILER 1200 HMH BRIEFED 1209 TEAM #14 - DUTSIDE BY SOUTH VALVE ROOM BREATHING AIR COMPRESSOR
! 1211 TEAM #10 RETURNED 1215 TEAM #13 RETURNCD 1230 HMH BRIEFED
- CHANGED TIME TO CENTRAL STANDARD FROM LOG y
. . .. ~ . - - - ~ . . - .-- ~ _. -- . . . . _ - . . - . . - . . - - - . . . - _ -
~
- j. ~PmoctDURE No. MEvessoN PAGE No
- j. VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 Event Report No. 1-90-o03 Report: Page g or &
EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT f 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, ] SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR j- SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. . i 1 was workino in "B" Train D/G when "A" Train D/G started automatically. Approximately 2 minutes after "1A" D/G started it trioned. I exited B I Train D/G Room as two (2) ooerators entered A Train D/G. I entered "A" i Train D/G room and walked to the Control Panel. One Operator had cleared J, the Danel and was talkina to Unit 1 Control Room by chone. the other l ) operator reset a flac on the Voltaae Balance relay. Head chone consnunication was established with Unit 1 Control Room While the operators were establishin ; i head-ohone communications. I checked the near train end. of the diesel .
- l There were no aooarent leaks of water or oil. I looked at the covernor
! i oil level which was at is crocer level and noticed that the soeed setting
- 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE i ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe) i
! It required operator intervention to eneraency start "1A" D/G. i i l l 3. DID TNIS EVENT RIVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES? (Describe) 4 Procedure should state that the D/G should be emergency started if the first local start fails. I FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE i
- em
. Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page g of y EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT ITEM 1 CONTINUED:
knob seal was broken and. it was set on 14.32. It had been left at 14.48 when "1A" diesel was set up following the required tear down and inspection. I reset the speed control to 14.48 and informed Ray Howard of the discovery. Operations attempted to start "1A" D/G in local mode again, it ran approximately 2 minutes before tr.;.,ing again. I was on the cat walk checking for any leaks, abnormal noises or any other problems when it tripped. All components seemed to be operating as designed. Operations personnel then decided to start "1A" D/G by removing r the glass and plunger from the emergency start button on the Control Panel. "1A" D/G started and ran as it should. Pat Cross, Ray Howard and I checked for any mechanical problems that could have caused this on the engine itself and found none. l l 1 1 l l l l l
i I J l 4 . . I REve5 SON ; PAGE NO l i PmOCEDURE NO VEGP 00057-C 4 27 of 37 l I Event Report No. 1-90-003 i Report: Page E or E j i < I j 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOtfLD YOU DIFFERENTLY? Go inmediately to the affected D/G rather than waiting until I heard it coasting down. ) I
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe) i No operations performed the required procedure as required.
! r
\
J ' I i 6. COMMENTS: , All Diesel Generators at Vogtie should be controlled by the Shutdown Signal i only when nonnal surveillances are being performed. When the Diesel l Generators are in standby mode. the only signal to shut it down should ! come from the operator af ter observing pressures and temperatures and ) determining if any alarms should be sufficient for shut down when this , piece of vital equipment is needed. TITLE DATE I SIGNATURE
,s,w _
% 26d d*
Liu n . David Hawkins
- For reactor trips the personnel statement form in Procedure 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form.
FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE
-~. ,
o i ( ! l PmOCEDURE No r:Evr$60N l WAGE No l l VECP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 l l a Event Report No. 1-90-003 ! l Report: Page '7e of 10 l EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT i t : 1
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT, I SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR [
SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. - l t ! SEE ATTACHED HEMO I f f
- 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe) )
Had to use the Emeraency Start Button. i l
- 3. DID TRIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES 7 (Describe)
No FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE
~u.s
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page 7, of JG EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT ITEM #1: I was hea'ded to B Train Diesel when I heard a blast and I heard A Train Diesel start. I went into B Train where I had men doing work. All the lights were out so I headed to A Train when I saw two operators headed to A Train. We checked the Control Panel and Generator Panels for alarms in and flags. We found one flag on the Voltage Balance Relay. One operator was on the phone talking to the Control Room. Pat Cross and I did not find any mechanical problems. Started Diesel again, started to load and Unit tripped again. I did not get to see if any alarms were in because I e was looking for item that could cause a trip. At this time operations , I said they were going to Emergency Start the Diesel. Operators were stationed at the front of the diesel to watch pressure gauges. Diesel j started, all pressure was normal. No alarms were noted at panel after Diesel was loaded. E i 4 i i
. _ . _ _ _ . _ - _ . _ . . . . _ . . . . _ . ~ . _ _ . _
- I l
mEvillON PAGE No ! PROCEDUME NO . 27 of 37 ! ' VEGP. 00057-C 4 t i d Event Report No. 1-90-o
- Report
- Page 2 of &g t
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?
Record at the time all'the annunications that are in at time of trip. i a i.
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe)
I l l 4 l 6. COMMENTS: 4 Can we set up the circurity to bypass the pemissives during'a LOSP and have a Emergency Start instead of a Local. 1' Need to have red lights in Diesel Room so persons will know that Site Alam or Fire Alam or any alam is in progress. You can not hear i anything in there. We did not know about the Site Alert until after I about 30 minutes. I TITLE DATE SI MATURE
/ c4 /#hY \
/$wA2'l w - 3-17-98 Ray /C. Howard
- For reactor trips the personnel statement form in Procedure 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form.
- FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE
.-se a
- ._. - . . . . _ . . .. . m_ . . _ . . __
i
)y ,- a, mm .,. s'ire s -ve . usun g f h* meveow paos wo. ! VEsp 00057-C 4 26 of 37 i Event Report No. 1-90-003 j Report Page 1 or L j EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT
- i i 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER TNE EVENT, d
SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR i t SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS.
; I l
4 See attached page 3 ' 1 i
- 1 P
4 i ! ) l ! 2. DID ANT AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE i ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTI0F? (Describe) i i Not to my knowledQe until after leaving Containment. i i
- 3. DID EV M REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL IR&DEQUACIES?
(De__ _ :) 1 j j I was not aware of any inadequacies in area in which l I wa workina. j FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE
n _. .. .
- p. y.~ mm EM N- N PAGENO.
. VEGF 00057-C 4 27 of 37 l l 1
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page 1 or & ;
- 4. IF S EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY 7 If I were directed t'o tssist in the emergency I would contact the Maintenance S;pervisor and request an approximate time span in order I j to help determine the amount of time available to do the best possible I
job.
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU l j BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe).
May need to check into a back-up system to aid in sealing the generators
! more rapidly.
P l l l
- 6. COMtElfrS:
1 } j rem. mu nhencom&4nne rho muone was handled in a logical ! and professional manner. 1 l E I ! SIGNATURE TITLE DATE M/ Supt / Engineer 3-23-90 i
- For reactor trips the personnel stateinent form in Procedure 10006-C may be used in lieu of this form.
i FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE
Event Report No. 1-90-003
**ne 3 of 3 Report: Page 7 r of pf :
l The crew and myself were preparing to tension the Steam l Generator manways. Approximatly 24 bolts were out of three manways and one had been tensioned to .007 of an inch. One j crew man and myself were removing the tensioner from Generator 1 One which was complete. The rest of the crew were installing stuas on the hot leg of Generator No.3 and on the hot and cold leg of Generator Two. 1 l 1 I was notified by HP to clear Containment. We came off the platform and removed our respirators and top layer PC's. MP cut the men out of their bubble suits. All men were out except one when we ! were notified by Keith Hodnett that Mr. Coursey and Mr. Adems had directed us to secure the manways. I called Phil Cheeks at QC and Charles Coursey at Maintance to notify them I was installing all remaining studs and tansioning to 12,000 pounds (short of tensjoning prerr"re). HP resulted the crew and one man started .,oving the air line and tensioner off the number One Generator. At this time we heard the status was Site Emergency. It was decided to incall the studs and use a slugger wrench to tighten them in order to speed securing the reanways and close the system to allow flood-up if needed. After completion, HP assisted us out and I notified Control Room using the pager system that the generators would hold water at this time. They responded to the page and I left "CI level. At Level One Step Off Pad I talked with David Seckinger who told me the pressurizer needed to be closed and asked what was needed to do so. He was given a list and the necessary supplies were available when the crew had finished closing the equipment hatch. When the hatch was secure, my crew and two maintance mechanics installed and secured the manways using the same techinque as was used on the generators. We exited chatainment at that time. HP was well organized and we had coverage at all times. I notified Mr. Coursey and Mr. Adams that the manways had been secured using the slugger wrench instead of tensioning due to the time element.
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- I macsouae wo. navism Paea no.
VECF 00057-C 4 26 of 37 1 4
- .- Event Report No. 1-90-003
; i 1
Report: Page 76 or m l EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT ) i I
- 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING, AND AFTER THE EVENT,
. SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR !
SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. ! l
, !L i i was . .s; mcor 6 s . 3am + 4e e.>.c mac 4. Sc.e cal ain,~/, l 4 i l A e l.'.,. l. r s u o r e:s co,~a , a s . ele er.an ws.vu r I;e : 1 lhl8httb uea m . :
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' i as L2 (Le ' A' Nc bc.a, exe.ble . The 1.d J s blicked al JL.3 se e l l s *J ' eO h shb A s.) Aw wo.s u t t aub M k 6 4 0.s k S YO!D OAMe $h0Cklt A E. Zoxled JLe I,me el 4he Ip.n lo be Anator. 9:15* ? Aw A re nu m a.ee ra
- ,~d. e n ted oa e u a u dwl .1 sacu shs .
w.s s L .q bedeu o s.,
- {SGE eu. T. S4L ETh
- 2. DID ANT AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE l
ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe)
\
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- 3. DID EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAI, INADEQUACIES? l 4
(De- . _ _) ! 4*> W e b d ber.> eu au c.J am e S e lw al.cw kt beaal sw ea$ts . O 1 w hs ac4 alent ALS E i.Av ms a
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The M a..Jl 4(ac e kcam l k=4 6ece 4.L.v. A.a et.,m f . ..s o m L, mici.,es m J .1 <<,,e) Lk.s eevn chu.A Lc.mc N e_ t. tJe cue . d,ut. L .J AL,m. Les
- A3 4Le T5t , c c. ele. FIGURE 2 EXAMPI.E
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2dS , Event Report No, t-90-003 Report: Pege n of g hwi.' 5# eel ~ l I. e t'. i t
. Al nyct. 9; So an,sr A S le Ases Alrel was decheed. U ea f henan~y w.
Ib s , I ouNemed All Yeoulnaci penseuuel lu et;b lke PA nud wa.4 la Ike Adm. . panLagful Cn Su e k n. iusle eisc is . id.Ils.a m.aules , I slaaled ecce.a.ug pksue e,Ils d.eeci. aq jna. J) . le 4alce seJeral nel.oas. These enlis enee in s skani pen **d *l 4*'me . The eleoaelg , cal ondee of the ' 4llouiu9 lis4 is le 4ke 6es/ el my ,temony. Aa;wg A s f.'=e H.e c5c
. . s 6, . , . ., ~ ,4 '
') M ke LacLey called nad Rep.essed elecle. cal supponi la g.e n\;9 u 6tenkens IQ901 $ IB603, This suppeal uns saf,*si.
>\ M.ke Lackey entled sud sist<d M Eq..p. Mstsk %s eloY
' uu,.
aud 4ke 5/ - p talenloels eu h Aes,a~el #4/c4 6e Resel. Mcchaa. cal suppvef was seul o.4.
- 3) Mike lackey ealle/ eu/ said to close up 4Le 5/G mauways ,
I-HLI.9totb ,l 1-120s UL
- 03S, As soou As passble. Neu weer seulcan ad /Nd'c lackey called Aud Asl. /ke Slalus of N hessue.z eA maawq. I iaf.wed him :l. was off, nucl A. sl. led 4k.J was cA.
- A Roo Leganad cetted mud ask akowl 4ke skove lesW .lems.
._ #e. Aew dceehd me to A.ve #e P ,essunteen m ,u u ,y ps ~
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- 6) 1, called N M vey Naud f.'uje A Avd la b h eM kim o[ 4ke
- people d.o weee ta cout*;- w ea l mud dd acli.ws Aq w e a.c.
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I PROCEDumE NO. REYlS60N PAGENO. ! VEGF 00057-C 4 27 of 37 '
.. Event Report No. 1-90-003 t Report: Page 1 or 1
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY 7 I wc J J te., to aexc4 (c 4L. est. .I 4 seem s d u s . .>. 4L , esev& !
e u r e. t enc e c J . > t. e d 4e all ou 4ke Beer + 2xw Roe u {cu rnec ' M b tut. M AN A cc e rut O Es.>f e b bet M a, el S.ars c h 1 Res&ded Eo 4, d/=ect -o
+L.4 s eurb unceur hu v a r wrv e weer irce. m & m e u c csc '
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU NWNw D BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe)
- Phoue uuabees le 4ke u k Rieu s h w aJ fu,l. i.e s he. OT. 75c, -
l P Ee Fh Ac t oc 7 E AsI Lv' 08T A m t B.
- P 1
i l 6. COMENTS: i - i mn
- q u .. sf.._ e- f ra* 'sw i
i I 1 i 1 4 i l SIGNATURE TITLE DATE ; swAu { Lhv i Akl} CL . ', 3bd%
- For reactor trips the personnel statement form in Procedure !
10006-C may be used in lieu of this form. l 4 FIGURE 2 (CONT'D) EXAMPLE I l
voocEDumE NO PAGE NO l mEVt5aON VEGP 00057-C 4 26 of 37 4 Event Report No. 1-90-003 i Report: Page "Y or g EVENT PERSONAL STATEMENT i 1. FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO, DURING AND AFTER THE EVENT,
- SUMMARIZE THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT YOU OBSERVED, AND YOUR 4 SPECIFIC ACTIONS TAKEN BASED ON INDICATIONS. -
l Prior to the event I was escorting the fuel truck. We went into the switchyard to fuel up a welding compressor. The compressor was already full so we attempted to leave. The tranciever pole was directly behind f us so the driver couldn't see it as he was backing up. We backed directly ] into the pole and snapped a line. There was a pop. I called to let central know (by radio) what happened and awaited further instructions, i while I took control of the vehicle and kept people away. ) 4 l a
- 2. DID ANY AUTOMATIC SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION REQUIRE
{ ANY OPERATOR INTERVENTION 7 (Describe) None in my immediate area except for the fallen power line. There 4 was a reactor trip and complications in containment. i
, 3. DID TRIS EVENT REVEAL ANY PROCEDURAL INADEQUACIES 7 (Describe)
The only inadequacies I saw was the inability of our backup systems to ' compensate as they initially should have. 1 FIGURE 2 EXAMPLE i W el
PROCEDURE NO R EVISION DAGE NO VEGP 00057-C 4 27 Of 37 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Paget'0 o r ; J.'
- 4. IF THIS EVENT OCCURRED AGAIN, WHAT WOULD YOU DIFFERENTLY?
I would limit all " unnecessary" radio traffic and do my part to insure all of the proper supervisor and members of management are informed to the best of my knowledge.
- 5. ARE THERE ANY LESSONS LEARNED FROM THIS EVENT THAT YOU BELIEVE SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN TRAINING 7 (Describe)
In training I feel that the instructors do a very thorough job, but there is still nothing like the "real thing". P
- 6. COMMENTS:
SIGNATURE TITLE DATE fY b., _ U .$ t t 1 h.:. T e n n ., (Frat 3C6 /% Richard O. Berry
- For reactor trips the personnel statement fom in Procedure 10006-C may be used in lieu of this fom.
FIGURE 2 (CONT *D) EXAMPLE
1 PP.OCEDUAE NO AEWSION PAGE NO l VEGP 90142-C 2 19 of 23 il l Event Report No. 1-90-003 EXAMPLE Rep et: Pege // of 146 , DATA SHEET #3 VOLUNTARY STATEMENT ? SECURITY DEPARTMENT ! (1) Date 3/21 19 go (2) Time 0800 (3) Place FS8 l 1 (4) Name of Person Giving Statement: H. Glenn Grimes. Sr. (5) Address: Rt. 1. Box 237. Old Wadley Rd.. Swainsboro, Ga. 30401 (6) Work /Home Phone Number: X4283 (912) 237-5024 (7) The following information is given voluntarily: Durina the event on 20. March 90, I was assigned to the TSC as Security Coordinator. One of my duties was to relay badge accountability results to the r- roency Dirwetor. I contacted SAS and talked with Lt. W.A. Stewart concensing the sc ountability. I was informed there were between 7 and 9 and c 7 2ter pages of hadams on site. On the first neoe alone there were 43 persons not accounted i far because of the areas they were in. There were also accountability rosters cent to SAS with a_r_an n. rs. SE/N0 num6ers (no way for the operators to distinnuish). and s with no ncrs. This alone with the fact that personnel did not suit the PA and renort to their respective accountability locations and quite a large number of persons that exited did not scan their ACAD's out of the Page Iof4Pages ; 1 1 Job
Title:
NSS - CT., OPS ! Supervisors Name/ Work Extension: CPT. P.M. O'Neil / 3763 l Emplopd By: GPC Security ' l l l : l i i
~
..u.
EC CEDuaE NO A E WS'ON PAGE NO l VEGP 90142-c 2 20 of 23 l Event Report No.__ l-90-003
~-
Report: Page of 54; EXAMPLE Page2 of ~~ ages 4 DATA SHEET #3 STATEMENT CONTINUATION PA, compounded the problem. After I received the on site badge report from SAS, the Emergency Director (Skip Kitchens) requested personnel in the TSC, i assist me in accounting for personnel. At the time there were one hundred ninety-seven (197) personnel unaccouted for. With everyone's assistance 1 and my recognizing some names, I called various departments and located more personnel. At the termination of the event, I still had forty-seven (47) persons not accounted for. Over four (4) hours had lapsed. EPIP'S#91704-C states personnel coded as badged in the CR, TSC, OSC, CAS or SAS, personnel , on the CR or Security Department accountability lists, or personnel accounted i for by other valid authorityare considered accounted for. I feel that if l everyone was considered accounted for, that were coded as badged, into all arvas escept the broad areas, ie., Power Block General or Protected Area, this would enhance Security's ability to generate an accountability. P i I further state that I have read this entire statement, initialed . all pages and corrections, and signed this statement and that it i is correct and true as written. (8) Signed at HAT' dMT/I, this c27 day of N M / k_, 19/8. !4
- 9) I'ENESSES: -- r ..%-
gNorperson giving 7% O 1 statement) 151gn&ture) ' yt L bw M L1u.d A be 6'
- Address)
(51ggr ce b 152 4 S/l1n A Pl% A OulutVA 4 (AddressJ
)
NO.
PwOCEDURE NO + REVISION PAGERO VEGP 90142-C 2 19 of 23 il Event Report No. 1-90-003 Reports Pagel? of ;i% DATA SHEET #3 , VOLUNTARY STATEMENT ' SECURITY DEPARIMENT . I (1) Da te _ 3/21_ 19 90 (2) Time 0802 Hrs.(3) Place FS8 l (4) Name of Person Giving Statement: Patrick M. O'Neil (5) Address: 3508 Potomac Dr. Augusta Ga. 30906 (6) Work / Hone Phone Number: X3763 (404)798-7570 (7) The following information is given voluntarily: On 3/20/90 we (8iCP Security) were involved in a Plant Emergency (Site Area). I assisted in trying to make an accountability but due to several problems it was difficult in organizing the accountability. Listed below are the
- areas that hampered the accountability.
Misinformation on whether to leave site for accountability. The fact that some people did not report to asses 61y areas for accountability. Personnel not scanning ACADS when departing Site /PA. i
- l.ists came from CR. OSC & TSC in different forms and in most cases they j used no numbers and ACAD nm6er mixed. In some cases names were not given i 4
so deciphering list took time. Page of Pages
- I A
. Job Title SNS (Shift Captian) Supervisors Name/ Work Extension: Doug Huyck (NS$0)
- Employed By: GPC Security I
4
*$ }44%
SACCE;LPE NO . AEV:SiON PAGE No VEGP 90142-C 2 20 of 23 .I fI Event Report No. I-90-003 i Reports Page , EXAMPLE Page AofA,74 ot ;i4[ Pages : DATA SHEET #3 { STATEMENT CONTINUATION ; Large amount of ACADS being turned into Badge Island at one time.
- Slowness of Security Computor due to swap of primes caused by temporary loss of power to PESB.
Misinformation that allowed personnel back into PA before accountability was complete and then sending them out again. Slowness of information or at some times no information on direction from Control Room or ED. P I further state that I have read this entire statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement and that it is correct and true as written. (8) Signed at FSB , this 21 day of March , 19 90 (9) WITN SSES: n (10) h Ou (Signature of person giving N M(f ~ statement) i (51ghatge) l 15a1 5 1 M L.~.J.8~ (Address) / U W f;Kgnature) Ac7L4Wrs'7M.1 L _'k.. (Address) ' i l, i i s DOO$
. . - . - - . . .= .-. - - . . . . . . _ . - . . - - - . _ - -__-_
i , l
)
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page Pr of S4( I Event Personal Statement Per your verbal request, following are my observations concerning the Unit 1, "A" Train (1-2403-G4-001) diesel engine start sequence Tuesday morning March 20, 1990; I was on standby in the cafeteria waiting for the start of the maintenance runs on the "A" Train engine. Ray Howard came to get i me, and advised me that.the engine had shut down during a start. ] When I got into the diesel bay, operations was preparing for an emergency start. Operations performed an emergency start, and { I i went to the Engine Control Panel to check the annunciator status. I I observed the following annunciations; 1) low lube oil 2) low I jacket water pressure alarm 3) low L.O. pressure sensor malfunction. I investigated the associated engine system, both ' visually and snooped fittings, and found no abnormal conditions. The above annunciations cleared themselves after ten to fifteen minutes of running. Maintenance added lube oil to the system to clear the low lube oil annunciation. Patrick L. Cross 3/22/90 l 1 l l I I
1 l
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
-- , j mocaouns se. nevisos paea see.
00058-C 1 I VEGF 7 of 14 Event Report No. 3-90-003 Report: Page l of,74,f l 3007 CAUSE DETERMINATION WDRESEEET UNIT / SEEET - 1 0F _
- 1. ETIDrT INTESTIGATDs Sc 8 4e, ,[
mk s, . . e ,,, ann,a
-5
- 2. ETALUAfot(S)/INTESTIGAT0t(S): [d7
- 3. RESULTS OF INTESTIGATION/ REVIEW (I.clude references a.d attach
. ..i. .ie. . nee . if .e.4e )
sA. hs 6 AL / & 4J&&
.. CAuSEs r e., ic 4:c....
J o fr,- fsr,,,,, s . .dr, 4 Am L ut YA e Nm4 4 ./ 9b e// :4. t . O
<> retr a , 2 s t'c3 >, five Ad . . ., > n m i e., w J r
iinssi CAUSE CAssuumi/svasa CCBE b) / I Oct
. TIVE ACTION (.):
l b. RECtBSIEMB/ w,, mal CORR 7 8q%&-ek A,ver. fPe- 4 ( ai 6 ) '
-c m ner/
s 1 i
, c. ACTICES TO RECURREBCE: (Compley,e if met insiedad $a b e'aeve)
'f g 'c", t. t.4 i n o Ao / 4 h, sin,- s A w za sne/A cof % ren:ren. 73 6 h, c A ux ,e & re er,:<w ,.a xr. ! :
e v i y i q 2. n + 6 /, < 1 h /tc ./ re v i r ,, e l'Ar e- as he +<nc k s ) ,'j, kr<-- tL % :< A' L o wk... e do f. % ;' i- s A ormfrefea! - }
- ~. o s a. '
I M Resp. Bapt. D. Approval: J,. //# em RATE: !5/ u no Estiasted % 2atian Date: -- _ Bumbers />ni // # r.2 ;
& dH Sr- ff ~~ f bl ?9 WW / Iy 9G j te asiaG&sva SIS &aumE BATE EmerveeIBLE h IERTL DATE l
4 OIT tia casete reviewed corrective estian approved. I N SAGER Ts w aCAL surrvET DATE
- &.# rig- m . - -
y .} }P ///* f/- !0 ** S~I ?/ -/:
- , g .,)' ...L . e w +d/* /' */' "" c*' ' 5 a qg.np j./,a ,i g f Q e{ w % >n % M "- Q i /
.~ __. . __ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ._. ._ _ .. _ _ _ . _ ___.___.__ _ _
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'nocaounsac. newesoes paea e o.
Vrop 00058-C 1 7 of 14 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page h of 546 2007 CAUSE DETERMINATION IdORESEEET
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: Nc U I,c, , 7' Due k ire , , er mso/esoron Y
- 2. EVALUATOE(S)/INVESTICATOE(S): [d 7' I
- 3. EESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attack continuaties sheets if aseded)
- a. CAUSE: 'Ye a, k d , ; .. Aro k, kCar be i / c.,/ /ac k
.3 4 o fe,- f /rm 5 A,4 Lo, Le, tA a hi.a 4 /ed 15 th-e er, . A. 7 . C/
(' r.; ,, ,' tivo p n-tr s , J Ad .., .:>n no i ->1 u n ot i P evi CAUSE CasavuuY/ITENT CCBE EJ /IOa
- b. sect-runtp cotRECTITE ACTION (s):
I[' / t%,,as/ f41 -b -ek 4,ver. , (2e d far G ) l s
)
l 7 c. ACTIONS TO RECURREBCE: (Cample \ i h g f, I. tJo e en a < iw, .e Le e,,sa en o / *
%,o / sL 4 ke dujz e & re er,: rems,.Kr, !
if not taalidad is a1,% re rken 73 b above) 11:
& V !
V l 7,7 2. C.s fa 6 frM L hitc ./ r e w i r, ,, < /% ,.e a s fo r-fewe k s
/cr< - th- j:ekun L . i.go f.%:
s,-a a . U ia s A yo/refe/ ' i Resp. 50pt. % . W reval: 4 //J - > BATE: 51 oI w j Estiasted Ceeplattaa Date ' Robers o n i //#r.21 l $ OH Ss e- ff ~~ l / -f' D WW (~$ In 90 l Imm8TIG&sva SIm&..mE DATE Emer==eIBLE h ieman. DATE l , 4. 01 Mipitia toeste : 1 corrective estica approved. MdBAGER TEC W ICAL surrvt7 Daft i l a FIcuts 1
/
4
- pmOCEDumE NO. REY SeoN PAGE sec, l VEGF 00058-C s S 8 of 14 Event Report No. 1-90-005 Report
- Page s ' of F -;
CONTINUATION SEEET I a. CAUSE: Security Officer duties and training for escorting is LTA. Security Officer training has not stressed the officer's collateral j responsibility for safe operation of vehicles. In addition, the officer j may not leave the vehicle to act as a ground guide. I j R001 CAUSE CATEGORY /IVENT CODE: Di / 10
- b. RECCISIENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (s):
- 1) in training. emphasize that officers have authority and responsibility
- @j cM i ,,,,;
to assist vehicle operators avoid plant equipment which could be dameoed by unsafe vehicle operation. j . i 2) Desianate the use of around-auides when manueverina larae vehicles in j' restricted areas. i 3 i c. ACTIONS TO PRETINT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included'in b abovek i l - l M OA /
% Yfk .' ^
i Resp. Dept. Ngr. Approvalsc, d\CIn 1 - oo-=U:=ruritv) D&TE: 5 Ana 90 Estiasted Completion Date: I %r- 9e \ OIT N ebers fr 7J/ { a. CAUSE: Manr-- nt decision to staa. weldina ==chinna and air enmarmunes j in the swI tchward di d not cane i der adwarsa enneman==cma. ' ! 1 l t RGGi CAUSE CAisuumitavses smit 01 ./ in b In the futura atma- ==chinae and
/
h/ f . RECmW meterial onNITE the East ACT105(s): and West ends of the Turbine Buildina. l I l I i j ,- innvasa Risvaisin;it (Complete if not tecluded ta b above) j. I
.i g gj fc.ACTIpSg;Coordinatorincorporaterecommendationappropriately.
es r/,*o
"_a i
i ' , / /// , Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approvals f.,/./ / I f R&TE: */ # r Estimated Completica Dete p/Wpo OIT Buber: '-:. 7 - FIGURE l'(CONT'D.) , 2 i
-,.-n , - , . , - , - . . . - - - , - - - . - - , , . . . . - .
1 l woocsovas e nevision VECF noa no. 00054-C 3 i 1 a of 14 Event Report No. 1-vu-UU) Report: Page 2!" of J 4i CONTINUATION SEEET s.J".AUSE: CLtc e% cd y e b i e \ c a. , K rM c a \ c, e9 a T r s nM c_rm+rn rn Alhe m u A c h erek
\\ w A.
) %+ Anum m' b c i c n a etnin i -A eMiv e c n n+t cA & e s 64 e 1 I s 1~ ' I I I ^ EGai CADSE CAa-r x/iirssa 0--Et hI / R1 I
- 'c**
h' b. w - n CORRECTITI ACTIOW(e): lOm E rec *t 01 Sente OR Aw:cimrc,neich barviet Ai, - ! .h 6 'c 4) ' vek se o \ Ar A r a 4u;. ; e- { , _c t , , .u m, n u u n_y _.r_ _ gA, Tn -Yhe i k u u%c h a Ar d . n 1 re rJ 4/Va.
- %jgs u c u , 2 4-
_;, n ech , g, 43 _gg v i. n o r s n + o m A_-
% J f om mg g l
W Yukwr As ' Da-nnm o ovm BV TNW 59vyy comm ern;e'. i,
- c. ACTICES M PRETErr ESCOREDCE: (Ceaplete if act taaluded la b above)"
Esep. Dept. Ngr. Approvals p F # M V RTE: #2/A. Rettasted Ceaplation Deter Y M /# OIT N ebers n'y 25
- a. CAUSE $Tnc e 4he T_% bn wpaoov n cu T t W ikdnt' f MLnOcsRk "%k RCiuR9 i
1 n , u \ M w- =; u 60n 2 % me= 'r% -n?.O s i Mc u e ' W c3 %nc K %e
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M O 'r toADEridAW
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^ no <gc.a
- -n ci n ' o rev i +- ond%
fonos en ormind Wte\) a, r 3 i P. vi w M c, o 5 r# - ' c . An,1ame M vme. ;=__
""'E: (Complete if not tesladed la b above)
. er.
Esop. Dept. % . Approval # h I,hi Eetimeted Coupleties Date: D&TE: d -Il 4 0 CoM PL ETF_ OIT Rober: /fJ .
- FIGURE 1 (Cuasa'D.)
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1
'emoceovas *o naviseon > Paoa wo. :
VEGF 00058-C
' 3 8 of 14 i
I j Event Report No. 1-90-003 . 2
~
Report: Page 7'f o f _- 4 6 ! No f e u , k e CONTINUATION SEEET '
- s. JOSE: /,,.im . A.) n r/o. < 2 de . />*rs lo ce ** se. /T sti .' .# e % fw at trw_ u v., C, eo. ,, a A. M a< .fr wn /d nr >J a e /<. 5 s-4 Jaear, fe e o,>., / oe e A /. n a "t4. r se/,:< /s Jif sof ha ce b
.Saa f/. c. e ., f he n o.s /rA e_ /~c, , sesbor A r a k. . . uo ter 1. -,, e , e s a v v 4 v y l
2007 CAUSE CATEGORY /sysai C002: p -/ / fu
- b. REC 000 TENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIOp(s): per c;,,,,, / a t - <. . ,/,,*,/,, 0-
/C _c /r- AvsAf ban sr /er f w i
d Jb* tp u s r- P4o e r in**r ,f en
/,er-><r'e J aue/ 4ceni.as i
J p - 5-fe fr A .% L a .i a 6 3 4 4
- c. ACTIONS.79 (Couplete 1,f act pluded is b above)'
sh/ef FREVENT h s-r RECU)I -
- =,c AENCE:
4 ,w c i ,~ en i ses c edi-e.s,
/LJ +I41 + 0 1
1 1 ju v.aev fa, ,, ( Resp. Dept. Ngr. Approvals g- /W D&TE: M T/n/ A l Estiasted Completion Date: { 1
' r//,/9c, OIT Bumbers i r/,1 /
- e. CADSEs A .bs<,
~ik ere aks swf o //c wo-, o s s ; <1 ',, ,,
I 7Ar, fr u, /c
, 7h w1e ef a /% % , is .
A- < r rk oA_.,o e /'e (se e s c /r h Me ,-c, / ) ' 6 Essi CAUSE Chaivuuit. vans Gwis s- / / /u
- b. n'- CORR 8CTIVE ACTICE(s): aa , - e s ,. . / W . /* a e r, /, 'e ./
.i afl*A MW f l1 D_s old >* < W, ltJ, .i a erf a W/d *; kca fA rx /d 4 a., srod,,-fr / ' ' 1 1 i 4
- c. A6,uGEi 10 ii v . Rig,v s is (Complete if met ins efed la b above)
/ V G G, l' (; o ,. a n / /Y?.s.s c. - h sua os/, c./ s a fmY reevi, . e l ( &r t'la e r.,e,,
),s % 1ek.'na (br o ,. s deK> /e la ..e n - f4e., a o<e P o n fL/ h H s r>
} . . u 7"E . < P!et$ rent,Y x '/ l .$ e r?>e /srdkN . A l /m < N _G[a W , US -9 e.>i n /. i tesp. Dept. Ngr. Approvel: # /u ---+ D&TE : c. /, tt c
- Estiasted Completion Dater- 3 '
OIT Wimber < r *.? 2 FICURS 1 ( OWT'D.).
N - anocsovas e nevoom pasa mo. VECF 00058-C 3 i 8 of 14 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Reports Page h of 14i CONTINUATION SEEET
- a. CAUSE: 1rsc\do c,( A CcyMc3 of hA7n I-douq nE A- \o m 6s A h\ e- 6mnW t s n\s r6 he -sm s & b v Ac1.
m EGai CAUSE CAT'C"T/svus 95: n\ / l \i b. EDODERECTITEACTION(e{s e s+c s e-t n\\ wwv and nu s / via mm awse in a- \me , a 1, [/h)' KRd s Y -- ib o n_. ' t m 'rA an \e%s e n a -& c e- \\ e d % gj40 nees no e I i ss&e n n f e d u r e ,_ '
)
- c. ACTIONS TO PRETENT RECURAINCE: (Complete if met included la b above)'
- a n. c,4 . m i Vel t_
c' ei s am mmm q q g 4fg g
-; . r n o n t- c>n r- Me ReO om me n d A4i6n in er,n\ao) v' . ,2
#sar t Ad 9 00vs chwieM4a4nA4L Or mbush bien rn r4 n c_e A u c o t !
Moc d-V v2.J ! Reep. Dept. Iqsr. Approvals y /L4- 7 Mrts 3/,;m yf y Eatfaaeed Comptetion Date: ' '
~
OIT Bumber: / rr;3
'e . SE 1
~
i < \ 4 N ! \ 1 A i i Euvi r* = c -_ .v _. .- < s ,. a / 1
,. - %a- i
. A i \ l
\
N
- \
l \
\
c . Au sMs 10 . . . E _ _ - _s: (Complet met * ! o f la b above) i I \ [ \ l l \ ! l \ Resp. Dept. % . Approval: \ ND&TEt j Estiasted Complettes Date: OIT 4 FIGURE 1 ( M a'D.) T
1 1 l waouma ao. avvise paos =c. YEGF 00038-C 1 7 of 14 i
- Event Report No. 1-90-003 300T CAUSE DETERNIMATION WO UNIT I SEEET 1 0F _
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: 2 itse\ C,9eset-dTnr- \t io i Cau%e o% A- r- e n ncL ne e se a A. \ u Kn Ai o A j \ \ u j .
- 2. ETALUATOE(5)/INVESTIGATOE(S): 5bI l 3. RESULTS OF DITESTIG& TION / REVIEW (Include referessee and attach i continuation eboots if seeded)
- e. CAUSE: hNd(\ Bit 3 G i
3 l r I N Casswuui/svama CW E / i
- b. RECeedEN ED CORRECTIVE ACT105(s):
i [// ! g , y /CemAuet A rcs u h\e sh-64sn a % a 9 49 t m s n o j J.,7 y ' 9er4- o un 4 ( <r ko Asi\e w> AmT Aicsn M suomy h 3. PetWT nom % & cd . s i
,y
, c. ACTIONS TO PRENT ESCBERSCE: (Couplete if met taaleded la b ebeve) i y/g ,G1 Pnm n\, 4 h e*- O aiiso N Ae r mi nati nn c n;
- n AA e AAum +n E- Q T G2o rm4 .
T i, I2) . . , ! Esop. Bapt. W . Approval: W u JfkTMm R&TE: # & e 1 ] Fatinated Complation Dates D1 Y-/S-X/e-tr es0 r:E ddF G t.4 b } f~. - (L *T* /4'-r- 9e' W- f &fid l Inva571G&sva SIm&. I DATE Emerve IBLE N Fash. DATE l ! 4 017f 1migiqtadg seemitmeste r a tswed; corrective estism approved. I (/A M cL A > dir t I?( , l
"'"' S TEC WIC&E SUFF0tf DATE l
( i FIGURE 1 j
~ ~~
- maouma ao. nay,se paos =c.
VEGF 00058-C 3 7 of 14 l Event Re N t No. 1-90-005 ROOT CAU$E DETERMINATI0lf WORE N ** *" - ' ' uw!T / saEET t Or
- 1. EVENT IWTESTIGATED: _ [1 E3 et C.- E u r A A T M --'7~E'&
CA L, M s'-ri >J / R EL r 4 81 t 1 -Yu m= r EstPEA. A TJC F~ E: : ': L Rivo ID tiss;v G r ssu17eH es' l 9
- 2. ETALUATOE(8)/INVESTICATOE(S): C d., /
- 3. RESULTS Or INTESTIGATION/ REVIEW (Inc1'ude references and attack continuattoa sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: /71ArJt e rA c rum /s avS 7A l LA*~71 ce) JUA ~rfXi4L YsA/S AAA 7r><'sA e a rp Et 7s / ' uTA fk'sS udd 4 -T'w Pcc.ATxw b~,7cncs >M.3= DtF/~1o L T ~~10 fA t s AfM7F AND ' I/A /2 4- HI T ~f ?C V & AfuT f WA r eJr /Vt- l'K r^/2L-f> M t;A f.'/ 6 A i.a ace w A.u s h d m -r a a . M Gr a r.ni' FAs oven ARE A00 e rn. '
is0T CAUSE C&iewuY/svami C@Es c7 / /da
- b. y ED CORRECTIVE ACTION (s):
{/] z :') -Ta MEPAL= / %GmT REe Foe A- D rsi c J a.E/> EW d; t: <T = . . . " -- = . u:2= b sv a rc x e.s . % torrO w n e.- bll lA),7L4 l M C L'F LELrAGLF' "*^~-'^--'"'*PT" 3 Wf7C1n R . -
)
nEM mholeo KU nl33/qp
'j h f' Ai??)t'(M6 mPc6si sv6 s, -
Chu PAhnOU mGTH0D S . k i ! c. ACTIONS TO FR N RECURRENCE: (Camplete if met tasladed is b above) i Gt ro en uv b, M%rc 1 , , .n a A Ear k L rwLo IM, 4-IMO
/' Ec n 1- -90 1
- g;, / _
#* m. .. Resp. Bapt. % . Approval:'t (2) # R&TE: t M
- ' " ' ' Estiasted Complatian Date /2/ S-1.5-St OIT Bumber:(D / 717 6 '31J7
% k4)), +L L*/ 7' /4 r M Yff x "Mn 9D Im m371GATUR SIS &avaI DATI REmiveeIBLE Nfmaii. DATI l
4. Op g tiyy g t. Sig ... . -u . t WBAGER TEC M CAL SUPPott DATE J i FICURS 1 < ~~'
N paocsovas no. naviseon paos no. VEGP 00058-C 3 8 of 14 Event Report No. 1-90-003 CONTINUATION SEEET Reports Page W of 3 M 4 a. CADSE: T ro ele ,u s h c}e n s e f pac e .rore,[e adrony . secd s nef add, erred U U ' Pes.>ese.- n iin u e s u t + , o le . Ioad -uds a m el eeremur-e,ua L t'N r es A , 4 , a ( 41 w ,t'r,a ursees en \ R elke nursel r. m . ..e leere n ,it .n ,h'e.,4 1ht durirt Eem res i a , 4,.a t =4 a Pir ) '3 i ik _ a <4,rie l +%n a d u t! godeal are t<osen+ rescu rren tl/, ' ( Fis i th e vr e e sdr a f te r dier t '4 mi3 )
, \
M CAOSE CATEGORT/ syn s CODE: B/ 7 ,b l
; b. REC 000(ENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (s):
- f. Mod, k Wie l E.o n ene lonte 4 n itou. & e la r4s 4n he C reu o L4 r 4 a ,4h % c, a ede e r i
t., l ')/ 6.L/ 6 '
- - or-1 L K clua,,ao a L' Dier I -4 a e 1 4o he w
as e neeeato s4 o r 1~. 1 w u , M )
- c. ACTIOttS TO PREYENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not imeluded la b above) l i 1 ni e j W 4 I h 4-fMo I.In-I-C'n ECD Resp. Dept. Ngr. Approval M-2, W L*, him ,
Estimated Completion Dates regntev, MTE: 4-1410 OIT Bumbert //f 7.5 s a.' CAD l Y I Ewi CADit Chi- _ _uin a wei /
- b. RECENGIE EED CM ERCTIVE ACT105(s):
s t $ c. Am.uCES 10 iFinvasa REwamam,s (Complete if act tatleded La b above) 4 s 1
\
Resp. Dept. Ngr. Approval: MTE: Estiasted Campletion Date: , OIT Wimber: FIGURE 1.>(CONT'D.)
. _ _ _ _ . _ .~__ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __..._ _._ _ . _ . _.
l
~ ~ ~
l N "0- newesom noa =c. ! VEGF 00058-C 3 7 of 14
~
Event Report No. f-90-003 i R t Page 4 of W 2007 CAUSE DETERMINATI05 WO IT UNIT / sazET 1 or _
- 1. EvtNT INVESTIGATEn
- Arc./ se.,r d e r, . o
) ' 04 d.d ,,nl re c 4 a < +- , c te. +.nn,a C k',,s .i e l a a. / Paereetu aer ) ' ' j ., t Drs,i ., M, 6 4. .$ /z - . , c ) i " s i s
- 3. EVALUAT0t(S)/INTESTIGATOR(S): 3 A 7~
l 3. RESULTS OF INTESTIGATION/ REVIEW (Include references and attach l continuation sheete if aseded) i s. CAUSE: Pe er e da . e Ir c s 1L a s, neleeuck (Crduodroa uol rosnte]) . I Rce.Aes : 1 na d. o es,a sesP rL,eu(Mi kn r d . re4, e n c 4 <- ser f a c4,,, a
- a fe nod ehrse P h m.,en 4n. . o
). \J t , e imiah CAUSE CeasuunT/svawr C(BE E.3 / /o . ! J/6 b. RECIESIEE ED CORESCTIVE ACTION (s): l t7 W '* L' # "' D 'c"du S t "*Nd " ^ " *- * * " ^**M W C M ^ fkG - 2, Ac c.de 4 a,- . n aa ao o sea ^- r'a : =P Rzer-mons s i J i i l 1 c. ACT1058 TO PRET WT RSCRREBCE: (Camplete if not taaleded La b above) i A'ehJ .., ' 6 ' a b,a 1
>A ,
2 KE& % - 4/UG"
- seep. sept. g. Approval p /. i6a . r. 7 m MTE: y-s-PC j istimated Ceepletian Dates ,; 7-/ 90 /9-i.5-90 ET Rumber:2. // 7;2
$ Je4}} &[LT / d -3 4 d NlGd l Levaan G&svu SI M A mE BATE inn si. DATE
- 4. 01 t ed toesta r ; corrective estima approved.
[ ."'"* " TECWICAL evrrvEi Daft
- *A -
s ~) ~ } rpak *1 ho - rh FICURE 1 J
i T ~~ . .. j nocsoune e me,,e,ou ,,a, no _ ! vsGF 00058-C 1 7 of 14 i Event Report No. 1-90-003 , acor cess arramInrIon voa0Efr*' "*'* " " ! vuIr i surrr t or !
- 2. gyar ImSTImrum: '~Diese_\ Cc nercdbs- \rb va\ ', ab, b 4 v oR- n ne u m A % c tnuic. hva T
( A'D . b A u M 4e.Y)3rsbr 4r-- T n -bd i\ A 4 d n ') ) ( c . .mb . d A4 ots cA -b-iymah ho \ 'r 5.n 4L h n- J l
- 2. EVALUAr0R(S)/INTE$rIGerot(S): [f I
- 3. RESULrs Or INTESTIG&rION/ REVIEW (IacIude references and attack coetteustion sheete if needed)
.. cAuse De hdis / t rA huhAur1 a n3 !sf&\\ Ann - mshna\ -
- L o o. u_ To Ae N, a te n%ed woA- Gre \ Aht- hunA c\ e % s> c %,J e .
/h w -
swa CAUSE CAssuvuY/sumes CWE: C .J / f /; a
- h. ,m
- b. REccISW BED CORRECTITE ACTIOW(s):
.. e-4" "F'" 1 -4, T> e 4, e m , a e . mer\ p d -C a. , w: e ,
f-f/ ' M a. L uccas . nutw dak- acar s+ e c a c - wanAhe Reo utre mo6%. gul rn we nmo k sk , a e, si a htue ac u i e W u, A T NT_ T) R., l N nors C,rdun -V o r .) 6 m caner uM b k e n nee ' MM m n w . 1 h 3. r do nu Cf -Wac n c' 2,c re_thw CLc.+o u. i l l
- c. ACTIOg8 TO PRET W T ABCURREBCE: (Canylate if not tasladed is b above)
-- .> j . k% sx I ItvVasTi& Arc E s m .a c w G Atta. u .a i c_ G>tru l >=t e c 1 % Cf h - T YP5 sv5n m Omh
\ Essp. Bapt. W . 4 , pre.al: + Y R&TE: v/NN l Estiasted Ceay1stian Dates , PM- 5tb a IT Bamber: /WI1
% bb}} A~r.e d'l T * /-/-S'tJ Y<X/9A
! LevasTaE1UE 515 &aumE DATE EmerwesEBLE himasi. DATE~
.. . y g i.i g sit .. Si g . .. .. .e.e..
l l y as e sCA Vavervii DATE s ricuns 1
- /9
i g .--.. . . - . .
'paocam w. naves,on p..
vgor 00058-C 3 7 of 14
) Event Report No. I-90-003 Report: Page W of I
2007 CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSEEET j UNIT ! SEEET 1 0F i l 1. EVENT INTESTIGATED: Dip we 6t Med--rnc -" Tie,P.
^ '
"D .i s n - CrE wn r va_ 'h, m C ,- m rAsc.cr c4 (ld
% !-ta k Sb B % O EAl T 93 -t'2 s P =
j
; 2. ETALUATot(s)/IX7ESTICATOR(S): 74 7 l 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attack 4
continuation sheets if aseded) j a. CAUSE: /u A t s s-o o A, F D8E_sEL bru r.C2r rc c h -rAsC_-7
.i 1 acm C i
1 ' l r j 2001 CAUSE CaissvEY/svami CODE: 6/ / /J a j , b. w - ID CORABCTITI ACTION (s): 1 (2I . r/ja .
- )vesm r r2 E A -rd Ud a r .s-r i
l
- - run r t iu 5727 as '
\
t ra c n L Pehwn ins r3 h1rRL tdLil T TAfL T f Mar f i
- c. ACTICBS TO N RECURRENCE: (Coglete if met taaleded la b above) i l
1 4 f Il A ENG assy. sept, p . Approval: 4 lb.eno, nu, a naft: 4 -l Wo_ l 3 Estiasted %1stian Dates Compt E Tk, , Bamber ///77
< W1}} Se fL'~
Inva571GATER SI m avaI
/ 4-1. "3 DATE Y A EmeinmeIBLE M454 man /amL, 14!/'1 GC DATE 4 0 tai seemitasets r swed corrective estima spyreved.
MARACER TECWICAL SUPPott DATE . e FIGURE 1
/s
i
~ - - ~
'paccaouas no.
neweev casa no.
,! VEGy 00058-C 1 7 of 14 1
~ Event Report No. 1-90-003 4
- t
- Page h of ; 4f BOOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WO j UNIT l-4 i SEEET 1 0F _
I
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATO:
L t' e el -! ? ' av. ,, n. - h .,a / C L , ., ,, - E ,a
-v 14 s.a. i e An.,-c d a f / e e 6 in a i Ldk wi, eh ! & 4.s,w .ed />e :( 4 4 4 h5 4' A ~L \ _
l . 3 ' j
- 2. EVALUATOE(5)/INVESTIGATOE(S): 8[ I
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach q continuation sheets if needed)
Dr.'Yeb e 1
- s. CAUSE: // c)po r l Pro essu, e r sw 7/ W t 2 a.d ,~~*' 72 0 - i 2.
/ %' s h !*Go k in ar* e} v o re / a i J e <-,o r 1 / >k s, a vs4rs 1
we<e ' nst ev M <-e# ~ A, A p' me/u4r/ m As~w ebs-o b or;Jr +o deek..ess FA +> / e1o/ a,e en o, n /rhe en era L/e . l 'rs., a ese . c fer < :A neerr& ..<a J7A Na.- p i- co s s e_ ' f a d, u I fed 'rk. 'no /W, . . . Essi CAUSE Casswumi/svans C(BE EJ / /de
- b. avermarrunD CORRECTIVE ACTIOW(s):
se e ha /ea. f i i i f i l l
- c. ACTIONS TO PRETENT RECURRIBCE: (Couplete if met taaleded La b above)
*. A I d'n a , n ce <:,, e me ed,- s (94 7/ 9 -r y i
& s w.11 As re :'ile,J ta re w ee sa w m ed a ns.. . ei-a nin a, e Les to ho r w 2 2C -/ 2 )
, uL Ad* ,,, num2 4 14 6 # 0 -/ 1 l /v4 "T C/' ) ed /3/*/i-/ 2. nei ne' fa de /m e:n a 74o i
fau/ a m o < a /w - = .% ?M m e,a A la . "
=ap -
1 b A & Resp. Bept. %. Approvals J- A Et J .sh R&TE: 4 4 0 l F*timated Ceglettes Deto: C-If-9n 10 Bumbers /// ? 7
$ W,*)} -G e GT /4-P fa e. l$!/7l9d
[ Leva 571GA15E SI M ava5 DATE EdirvueIBLE hfish. DATE
- 4. 0 init toeste reviewed, corrective acties approved.
l 54544I1 ft @ aCAL evrrvtf DATI i ' FIGURE 1
l 4 .
; _ . _ . I j.. Mocapung no.
navisov paea ne, I j VEGP 00058-C 1 7 of 14 l { Event Report No. 3-90-vv3 i j l i Reports Pege ~' ? of -;L' I ROOT CAUSE DETEENINATION WORIEEEET j UNIT ! SEEET 1 0F j ) 1. EVENT INy'STIGATED: 3,es. / _ 6p,,ye !ce [r, ,"o l 1% a .- 1 < r D ,s / ~ f.*c n af A%em , rGe resr D .o [ j -5 t { 2. EVALUATOE(5)/INTESTIGATOE(S): 72 7" l l 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Inc1We references pad attack i continuation sheets if seeded)
- a. CAUSE: S:/n,dN,./ f?be.> Anmw Me6&
No s?se ? immii CAUSE CA FawumT/svani C@ Es D1 / /da ) b. encemanwangD CORRECTIVE ACTIOW(s): a L t i I l I i
- c. ACTIONS TO W RECURRENCE: (Casylete if met lasladed in b above)
! on gge, (d Fusa o,- dr'a/~, a oneeLie /m/se.1 su t/in in e l C ~ au . A I,,, o s Be /s . : 4 ned:n . t- k fas~m a ud :,, ate n/,s,> s 4
-90 aos '<f in se AK./,iw D f e r~ ime.,t er sdom sse/ fun /, c., s l Nh r.-
(?) Th e
,n eerl lhe eeeerd:,,a r4, s efAfat 1, . ,, ;n , a.,s m n~r,se a..H be e>-vMo s, .a f
- no,n a r-s vn-Au " ' ' '
j =eep. sept. D . Approval MD, m sb / Mfu)
- (j'Estianted Ceapletian Dete'f115 - 1 95 /IE.r- i 26 9 BATE: 4-5-to j 1
rVD G) I? ~_'s f.n kND -fr [*/-1* / .f-5 '?S ,f ^ fy 4 l InvasuG&TUR 515&aumE R&TE EsarvestBLE h IERTL DATE
#~
- 6) 4 0 tai a W eneste r i errective estica approved.
" ' ^ " ' ' " _
- as e SCAL ivrrvtf DATE ,
l f' f, Peu ejys M .'U* ' ' ' ' bf r w reh to l5a ? 'Ord if***". i
,n /., fe.,A;f 7 a'+w e s .".~4; ata; .
/G.J ,,e ,e;e r FICURI 1
~~~ ~~
anocsovas e avviseou aAose.c. VEcp 00058-C 1 7 of 14 l 4 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page W of 14 . ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORESEEET 4 UNIT / SaEET _t oF _
- 1. E NVESTIGATED: Die se/ [,.- are #- If, .o
) auste a $ ran y en- en ame/,o es s '
a #- s>,-n n su1 caits.,-- s . - ) ~ j , l 2
- 2. ETALUATOR(S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): [AI i
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation eboots if needed)
- a. CAUSE: }. htelneuale i n e f C esos o_
/ T o-a:mim , / v+a re mim a l ><m= J-
&asabtos arecesf '
l Jaa) l V. '. . > >
- a L. />sa 6. /> Tv fa Wan h*ib 4FA t*ns-s'ec /
- emoenn a # 2 5/uoo e ~ t 1so dr c 4.rnr \ l l -
i l iusi CAUSE CaliusEY/svami C(BE D/ / /0o l l b. arennammgD CORRECTIVE ACTION (e): I i s
,2g' hh
! . c. ACTIOp8 TO PRETENT : (Couplete ij met includedy b above)
- f., '
- D. li)99Ji*L2 rl$A
^
Cr9 Sa r* m/sOneeCW &7 + m a.v-rm., s vz e - --, 1 wa:su- a. Ya . Q' h.:= "-_-=K.: Y ,lc y~ /ar a f m a / = =>.a ra far* fa:/s r a n. A.oA an
=J - s ~k a mm f er.'fo ~sasas nr n>eame--r !
Jafa -:amaE L~n na/ a *~ ao a fn>* raL'a6a*//A7 i2 at aa er e a n+-L/o /mdm / si;s re- .>rama- 7 Q. &n
-p. Ja/aLPatd n 1 a s- 1. .n ,
.h (J E /AM/d //XE.3 A&TE: -(c/o Eeep.
Eettasted Bept. D. Approvals Ceaplaties Dates p& */'m /~ // OIT Etabers /3rD u nr l
- 6 den G- C /2 7~ / -4 f) / $ 9c)
Inva5TIGATOR SIGE&aumE DATE REiFGieIBLE h fiEii. DATE
, ,,m ,
p , j i. ; 4. O!?f4ait1[t ptmaste reviewed; corrective acties approved. I L LA /C/13Itd l \ M&EAct1 ftpWICAL SUPPott Daft
'i. L s. Dem,~ Awaccesan l poor cwa Amyss.s Tu,~,~s
- r! cuts 1
- J
i - J
' ~
1
- '#WOCEOUof 40. nyyesoN paqq me.
'VEGF 00054-C 3 I
8 of 14 Event Report No. 1-90-003 3 Reports Page ):nn of.;;4. CONTINUATION SEEET i
- s. CAUSE: _f uoc h nak h -A- ed h G, R mh nck Mp '
I hofA Or% 9_ r, nesb in n erN t_ +he hC-. 4 R n c3ec Ab\p j 1 g i - s -
}'
i l e% Essi CADSE CAs-f-x/svens sisE: O /in j Q9 .
- b. REC 000 TENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIOW(e):
90 d91d -M\e j PC, \ A in A Y -Wu nc -M6n ctrvi
- s. (D j g/! ;//7 Qv,%\u n\o +ho nApo u Ac u M- Who i % --\-o cA- ~6 ; r- Aon&i hJ h&
L u nc% on a\ Nw A\ .t u ncA csrs .
i O '
il Q.j- % Vamw rP LE3P%s TesToriL Is TM!r AFVR.ofK' Arc- FuA.<7to u t
- ) Tes7 incaveti COST /Ouince" ScHGous Im PR c7 1
- c. ACTIONS TO pBETENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if met imeluded La b above7 i
Wuse
-W e -% i ne -k M et \; M Me- rt Q o ca u i r e d i
i 4 kA ^ a /C p Beep. Dept. IEgr. Approvals f JK- t~u& Eseinsted Compleeion Deto
. R&TE: t*,@
t 3 #Mr-p, N4/a/ro0IT mmber: Q71M K E: 99 c ue nc 9 QS FCEM -\9W\ n N%u d a ! U i
.)s '
ockNunk -a eissure In-4, a r wh a m e m l k J l~ l Ro \i ob% Ltr N I i swi e*=== ca -_--i. . wei: /
- b. RECCISIEWED ACT105(e):
i
; 1 mue et m 01 c% n t e nWoum _ 1h +n e wa\u Me
-ne n As e u AcI u cwN Esv n s V hinu s e r. ue n to .
> N J \1 l Dhi M n mana_ cie (n9M- Mcwrcsu M c% Wnn\ se cmw t ,
} J M ' N N
- c. A61aa=5 TO - v in w amam s: (Ceaplete t tesissed la b above)
'I m n\v n\o Gno%u ed se cuo n e 4 F% 7CL% -
l I i ii 3 x In% ea r n-W d e% m -te-in n a . N J i J N l ! 3
\
A Esey. Dept. IW. Approval: D&TE4 i Estiasted Completion Date: CIT mmber: ' ' i FIGURE 1 (COIrT'D.)
- fr
I Ev:nt Report No. 1-90-003 1 Report: Page ,'? o f T 4.- PROCEDumE NO. ArVIS40N PAGE NQ. VEGP 00058-C 1 7 of 14 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET UNIT / SEEET 1 0F
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: 9MES e! be,r tre , l
<,g L L L le Te d 4*or n-,/ nhu kno w e the f brea c de n i
n :r- Joy k sn A ~ ' ~
- 2. EVAI.UATOR(S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): bT i 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: Lk:, ,,, ,% CWu. s o froc ee/re- /4/ro.ss /7W V
rJ/n ndce Proce l te4 Ob nef fe n or & ba la L/e. fee ft., , a f Har- ,,ra , n fe -a n c s t h & L,re L 4 a.s a i r- / omit sn fe% Duco sv(, Purvcnc& TU SnN& AP77_x2. oVt.1L'imvc s r l 2007 CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: #_3 / /#.,
- b. RECODGENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIOW(s):
1 q , Ih c. ACTIONS TO PREYENT RE Es (C late if not included is b above) f?/ U I, h vo s e uoro nroce es h 7-e ru r r c L LL /<. te . A~,. M/e.i nea:.,W cn ex w t 6ena a air 6,'c snfox. 4
/d FRW 0F PTc We CM%ve. '
Resp. Dept. %. Approval: + # ' MTE: ghfe Eariasted Coupletion Date: T . vf-u OIT Ilumbers //17 P
~I~5N We'bf l~r -
INVESTIGATOR SIG kTURE EA' ~ /J-?- DATE f)$ 4 Y m """!R _% /Y/b pATE 4 o rev 4 li 9 0 l i g ammitments revi dgeorreceiveaction . yER TECINICAY SUPPORT DATE FIG.UR.E 1
Ev:nt Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /r2 of p
; PROCEDumE NO REVISION PAGE NO.
VEGP 00058-C :4 7 Of 14 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSEET UNIT / SEET 1 0F
- 1. EVENT INVE TIGATED: '7">f,. c, / dpners oe-Prote ate- lnkin M arocc- Nachee for m < u m .., 1.,.;c
+is h /e n ir, a 1 s.ai~ v o'
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): -- I
; 3. RESITLTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach ! continuation theets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: frd C-e b re . W r Dras / 4- f/9
/ack o f~ w rag e r A>r as,Z ro w s 4*> A hn_s/ hs pre >% F are i n jes' ; , Le.; c S&em " "
/
/
/
- /
/
4
/ - - -
ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY /EV DT CODE: s y / /B4
- b. REC 000ENDD CORRECTIVE ACTION (s): /
/
/
{ N / tN7
, 7
/A/
. 6/
W i 4
/
- c. ACTIONS TO F RECURABICJ: (Complete if ryGlh,+M
~
- l. P e 'i3 esoronric f e- troce l e emet Jo tacluded ig b above)
/,1 clu/c A.1tJ a ;/. Os,es ,4 e ' t. , A /e a,:,,. o r a'- l-ccc sedem 7 v -
v - -
/
/ i
/ 1
/
/ Resp. Dept. %. Approvals A //A B&TE: en i
/ Estiasted Ceepletion Dates 4 , T Bumbers v:
C kAnJJ 4~< [ff INTISTIGAME SIGRATURI
/ A .c ?o DATI Yf.
REiiniisIBLE MARausa/iiETE.
/ Yl1 Id DATE l A. 0 la ; canniements r ed; corrective action approved.
, AAEAGER TECWICE SUPPORT DATE Nolti b ) ' b nu.hv [ .
h
- A sh 3uggysai ,
A a "4. . ., .
, -- - s l
~_ ,
. *nocaouas no. neveom paea me.
; VEGF 00058-C 3 7 of 14 i , Event Report No. 1-90-003 j
ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WOR
; ow1T / sazET _y_ Or __
A I 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: _ /4 0bL JCami r - TrrF ate 4 wi-r4 7 Col 5utm b rf/JMAJC.u- Akh/A /6dCC rW-w O s*f 0- S 24 % %
- (c Gh %-7 T= 0FPsf c~
1 17., >-J j 2. EVALUATOR (8)/INVESTIGAf0t(s): ~ Tom L -' M N' 9'I i 4 3. RESULTS Or INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSEs ER,oc- u bs> O Mrs A H R.ARu: -~7o >0Atex/s o nc
_ PLo%T s 1A-rs -r. D ie Ar % 3' arcit s La Af] /Aeu cr> M E~A a s D & st exA 19B . **TH E- DMA.} /3 Neso fA' tit T Ta u-m r i na n asp) A~o 6%-raers n Ata 7 c-0 is r ! TM SiTOA-vt eu > 1 4 EUOi CAUSE CAlisnmT/svan C(BE _As E 3/ i o A. l b. nammenemhED CORESCTIVE ACT105(s): ' A//A l i l ' c. ACT1058
'" TO FRETWT RICBERBCE: (Ceaglete if met taaleded la b above) my , ygj nbc9r a wo Ea t kop %m.aiCA7n sh 5 a 0 0:00 AG eoa mA rcb w ht P Rn en.,w-rc pi s.J / Swm_, To Muog l 4ju, ; p 3 614 MPRn?etsaw c a n ae - t u surrL1 alt T I5 m J . A Wu .
{ w as si s r a m-a w=w1 uer ETC ) A vA uA nt s . CORRtMz:- Ac ha'V. i n_ .- . .. > l' pg Resp. Sept. %. Approvala y W/4A/aM ~KE M ' B&TE: #ff/YO Istaasted Complettes Date -7/9/rb OIT Bumber: '/# 7 5 / S WJ)b & .DC 1' / d-i - YA - l9 /tkd l In se n GA1W SI m & umE D&TE iiiiuseIBLE N IERTL DATE
- 4. 0 tai e W emente rev 48 corrective estian opproved.
y EmsC&VevervET Daft 4 FIGURE 1
/ y
l *~
- Poocasuas W- nevisos anos eso.
vgor 00058-c
~ . 1 7 of 14
- l Event Report No. 1-90-003 l 3 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WOR
** 89*
i UNIT SEEET 1 0F i l 1. EVENT INVESTIGAT : S\h Grec. E merc.tentv '
- W di ct ' GCCsC .
l 'T M B\ s: C Ns@ s > s i -g W Treb\em toi% moe urqML oress Re \enses i ' r~t, w ra l 2. EVALUATOR (5)/INVESTIGATOE(S): TcE h ;f. 7" j 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach j continuation sheets if meeded) .
- a. -40 CAUSE: leM ac-S_% OLk \1 Ek\ h "ie_d br On00 u R@t V Oi~tCM~
he _ qiu? O j e cn e A i A - Re ri u i re m o iW ' ' i Cor AcetiJtAt v /ve ri4sc w k o n Atvs ? . rA- exis4 , ! 'ho wn A R ed' ' on \ i tv t tn.n i Th. } \ I l l s a mudf CAUSE CAimuumT/summi CSE: ES / to t I
- b. RECT 20EENDED CORRECTIVE ACT105(e) j dA' i
i u i j j i ! m
- c. ACTIONS TO PRETWT RECURREBCE: (Camplete if tasleded la b abov )
1 4(4 ..% / 79\9G%ts b be % \4e \;e rs M e c Sor h e_c_h M C A ! naine 4.c En v cic 4u orkesa - cL onenori Mc j s'> # . u~dll /L*' cic e ur c rc,e e Aa uc ru@ n 4 n 4- ent ontMe ic oe 1 -b c e -R-\ e c -V- i \ j W erdi e ora-i n n we_o u s're m ent l P i n - 9 \ Resp. Bapt. D . Approval:
- VI N XEE' R&TE: e/9/90 M5h N G )- Estiasted Csapleessa Date: ' 7/'t/90 ,OIT Bumber: Wn0 j
4 M /) 5 Inve5TIGA15E 5EM &aumE f 4 7~ /43'44 R&TE [I EmerveeIBLE himmia, e- /+[/2/4d DATE i 4. 0 init toeste r I corrective esties opproved. M 1psCAL SUFF0tf DATE . / i 9 i FICURE 1 il
I woovas ao. n evis e n paos ac. I VEGF 00058-C 3 7 of 14 1 Event Report No. 1-90-003 i Report: Page , i of144 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORESREET j UNIT SEEET 10F
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: $*t /c Area E,He, g e.3 c v -i / ltcha /6 00C i nwa lv t*,v o ,,f % !
i im Hea, wdb ko,euledee af e rm ,n u es t e a d o w r cu na b , h i v
. ~ , 6v re<ne n k ac, r n ., A o I ,
i n~ 4-v u
- 2. EVALUATOR (5)/INVESTIGAT0t(S): - G .~i'6 (A* "
- 3. RESULTs OF INVESTIGATIOW/ REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: }Dr. en,o rr r { ase l f r a s.s e ) l o tr < n o u d 4 o il, e so lu n ko on inhe c h a , are em 3-30 '/O / holedu re s dad vr ef n dd a e r a
e noe,(se <:r d ri a 4 t n n . 1%eelu ar1 avd Tra,.s , e e L rA i g 5007 CAUSE CaissGEY/svami CCBE G /, E3 / /Ca
- b. arermarrunED CORRECTIVE ACT105(s):
A/A i l 1
- c. ACTIONS to FRET WF RECURRENCE: (Caeylete if met lasladed La b above) I
~y ,r y , _ E wo<arae v' m oonre nevre,<aeI af ce < n n ea le in ree ro ue
-ta M , ,r n ' in 'enw m u '.1o r 4 se a e wkw 'ea na b , I, 41e e uA o e . ,
i% 16e
> <r., a eH en .u a a r e 4r n a wekm ,s e ba u ald / odo eid. !']kI %ia s,JJ addme va < r aus uja, e ei e en, ., u :, ra'lin ,n a .e a e a c., s , M , e 1 P<ceedu<er have bee,,adre.,.ded.
V
- .n> !
Enop. Bapt. Q . Approvals f M I/Au12] Vk' W DATE di9/90 Estiasted Ceepletian Date ' (J/f/9D OIT Bumbers />.M /
$ We)) 5>- CA 1~
Im m3TIG&TUR 5E M Lava 5
/4-5-?d BATI Yb$
REmivue L., lYll/Q) 3LE N fmaii. DATE f A c e, MAE4GER ftp.amiCAL evrrvtf Daft FIGURE 1 n A
i l e ! Event Report No. 1-90-003 ! Reports Page t'f ot ; 4: 1 'PmOcEDumE NO. AgvissoN pAGEMO. VEGP 00058-C .'4 7 Of 14 i ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSNEET UNIT l SEEET 1 OF I
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: Eiri A t a
LANT~ booshoc ESIEMIL tIV
. ~
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): G k.I a
3.
- RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: $h.JoAt AS OLIC. GS h&OM5T1471Ve
~
bW4t$ i M 6r C,TCict- #WooGH ' ? i i i : l i issi CAUSE Cai;Z+T/ EVENT CODE: N 10 (
- (75)' 6. En CoasscTIvE AcTIOw(.):
/
k gh t1 v '-~ WTD ACCOU6 /3 AC TN oCAL You)Gl?. LJ AlstJP> ecs w o covTA wmour wiirceiry No ac%* t h=rrre
* ,. c m , % - 13 Cl> u rn o rm lavr5 2x Du="cTZm / FbSStat.n' Duatuc, l CVYAGG" t*t%)O177D N L PRD t/s od" Guilti~lrN 2 BR Yu%%T CON Fi{>uR A 71OA) 70' GN.5VM 19rv RPYRZf t'I A m OR % A F: 5 7~Y f CDR fb2Any ) LA/GL.
g i a u i if ( Sas' ACMo0P f.) hit OS(9/ Y lJp 6 g-\
- c. ACTIos8 TO PRETENT RECURRENCE:
- ,Gy) TNcce PoAA7G THESd GUIDetinSS (Complete I4 if70metLTC imeluded la b above)2, L.
- Y"*'"c _
^ -_m A 7'E Q @ i M K /LAwT- I-Ecc2DUQs (.sh . (hop /voP x 1 } . :. m.- W N' '
x ( heir "MCPIV C P Yo4 It Q Sft+s) " /4465~ r\ i Resp. Bapt. S . Approvals pP / " L 4LAJ R&TE: 4/t5/fsl Estiasted Coupletten Dates WA OIT Bumbers /##;'7 l % We>J i INTESTIGATUR SIGE&aumE Gr- fl-f I d'-! - M W0 DATE RisivuaIBLE h raman, Y-1= lY20/90 , DATE
- 4. 017 t e toeste r eved; corrective acties approved.
i
- Et TE @ CAL iirrvtf DATE i
/
9' i FIGURE 1
-. - . --.?
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page ;e' of,3 #
- Paocaouas wo- arvessoN
' Pasa wo. VECP 00058-C 3 7 of 14 l - 1 J ROOT CA'J5E DETERMINATION WORKSEEET , UNIT L SRIET _1 0F ] l 1. EVENT INVESTIGATEDs E~Ctsipingd7~ }l197c/} (co,sev AP/20/ss*M/~ fly' l )
~72 Mwd 79T Asret $RDon &s scrd. Ce weria as $7 w?i& TE5.
l a 2. EVALUATOR (S)/INVESTICATOR(S): #RI
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach
- continuation ebeets if needed) j a. CAUSE: $P4d /. 7-4 l 'E E Ouo enrm niv7- 2>> c fie u & r 'ro /7/rar-lM u/> ri+ prasoddc L
' laAvexidt;. cpcieredrs/ Mn Du aoW74 V 7;Ve- skice WA.s r t. ose n 12 A% PECK /pr>+rGt V r2 sr2 m r n r h00T CAUSE CATEGORT/ EVENT CODE: n/ / /04
- b. REC 000 ENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIOW(s):
- c. ACTIONS TO FEETENT RECtmRIBCE: (Cauylete if met tasinded La b above) ps fs rnsttred ponenum na ordae Aomuoie rnn r/ VG" rnJwDL 4 Yn _i n - us a ^
m riivca nr tria m svvr . An $ws a E - O A*
' y,,, ,:: :='t * ~
f ! += =r ^ % _2 ,,,,,2' 7, - : : _..". : : '? L'.; , i A
,a y yo ov' ;in{W $
SS# *Et. : - #:=
- J '* 4 o =:2 22 := a 1 ::'_ mesuiv enssa
_~"- .. 7::.'. .'.*:=_e = 2: :MD nm; & 4lt/% erCa cane vana Cbemorm.ws CAN V muT r wang cpu 1%TM. (kT* !M D - @ 0 P. wcs var IA! AciPIUDP M 4//sMe) ~ S tr RuPIU OP PHsectu)Poty " race Resp. Dept. . $ . Approvals t AhlsLsu MTE: #/rf/'J/> Estiasted Ceephusa Date U/ A ' 0 Rumber ///A'
< }r4 J & E*d ~'~
INTESTIGA'UR SIG HT RE Is'-F *h) DATE k meerveeIBLE h I ali. 3-m
/4bcl46 DATE 4 O teosts r i d errective estion approved.
/E4NAGERTfCWICALSUPPORT DATE I
FIGURE 1
t i W ~ 1 anoceovas eso. aaviseoes enoa a.o. I VF.CP 00054-C 3 8 of 14 ! I Event Report No. 1-90-003 Reports Page i*7 of SW
- s. CAUSE
- Ih r e di_,,,s f,n s. 41, e sD we<e uet a lwe n en tr e s ) wJue l, 3
A ll" tv f d A e sar tsa rt r es um,vve v ro v t< 40 he asia fled . Co ns m o a e vl..,ug n e a e- ren 1k, arau,k 3 ud ' ,,e + d..ec+ed ~k. n,ase e tr e b au-ase ar.,+ (u t. e k l. ne,u ,,41s A,oe4ed ,a u,'<e ner a ir i,r de._,a ), J
, . - ~ ..
M -% EaiH CAUSE CATEssui/svana wei
- b. RECOBBIENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (s): Me
/- t/iT a,e oei A ,, e cl<ed a , e c lea r l/
- os, eft-_eleed a.d noeueh ~r l, e_ ac e r ,- ctra,a e{ ese,ened. '
. v ' ' 1 i j l i e i i i f. m s ; r
- > i
- c. ACTIONS TO PRETENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if act included la b above) !
l
't ' A , h elude to letsen s lea r n ect ,a luce seel ar.-ah e 4 a r se .o e . j e
i u l 4 l f n i A / l Esey. Dept. IIgr. Approvals -W ICJ-MA BkTE: VA/cc, 4 j Estiasted Completies Dates G/ts-/ 9c OIT Bumbers /f74I
- a. Es Scmar Acrivinc-1 Co~overm hiw.11+r Locs op- l l , O k/dt KD .c r .'? t e u G u & !N rdd n lai /4 0 11147~
} Ws nI2E /%'t;YX*n Fst l'c /HW Ss4F1=TV tAh& T A.c r tr/ j f-VL C Cs ' cut.c=S . i i a CAUIE C&samuust.. . GBE #3 / /;> e
'd 5 cY P Q.O CGO.22d" To TWG l
Q n r\ ?
..o6 M Mk (W OL1 Tabs. TMzr W e voP th6ruwaass THz: AriAc&)
1 <m _ 'MLasoPWy prf.W4/oueo ne i nl ales ' fC - To wLQ) -D FNot%= TDke Ari A16 FM Lucan,&-n ' 'o 09aQMDQ % o^)
~
kW tsc-h bMDcscuizg
\
l l t'3 2
$ Teu( b1'.H2OviOF TFAN/4<. ER 5Pos cw rw eOtooA t$ otua% 8 CockiN6 /Heum v
- c. An.u " " 10 rum . me . m m.s (Complete if not lasleded la b above) 4 i
a 4 A >, b in Mo@tVKF/h _L - */se /Go
- Eesp. Dept. W . Approvals pthn UTA CCO^ 'l/1190S[
4 mar.64e,ssata R&TE: wfr/+u <c j Estiasted Complettes Dates j,Lc, s.fs.9o scoa,ew c!T Busber: 6) :rt . in7 _ l Iwas 1 (Cussi'D.) . (.)te, J - u t,
I l El I o o2 l rop /voP PHiw sopay py.in,i;g kc d/O P af )dd Axp l
.w a) Om & / uol % a,/4 e ya/#Ar Agu oem,~ wr
/+ ~h sr A c.
A rJ~p/No % nA ) n zk g~ ' ' A k & h n + ~2 e. n.c (h\**) ,e*<l5 4
=J A:1 A Y- a
- a. S L!
m
/m 2- *?# #'C
-r_ /L f IL t i D
--~
[ [ ' Y " C /11% k
%,$,,a ! u y* /2Nbt$hlMm M ,
b) t &- 4 -
%AL-cA 2n. q) dd kr k & .frdI d % f % 6 iso *r AC achf as. % cs $- . a o,,. a,1 c- ia,. , . ,
.t.
. ... l~aA~) % .is u
l
- i EK l 9c - 003 py . 10 % f ?%
-G u.o P at M,J - L asp (~c o n +,ns e a) i :
.t a)a o r;
; l
- tee. Con ta .n m e nt Ega,p meet Hatch need nor be closed wah a m.n.mam i
l . o-F 4 b olfs pro vi ded :
\
l l i O A method is provided for closing the Containment Equipment Match without . -. the use of electrically operated ! equipment for blackout concerns, 4r
" EL)TheContainmentEquipmentMatchis _
}
ca able of bei closed with a ; imum of 4 bo es within 25 minutes l
': as demonstrated using the method
- installed above,
- 1 ..
l ttv The Containment Eq ipment Hatch is . 1 continuously manne with a hatch i closure crew while operating the
- ' RCS level below 191 feet elevation,
.\
- l 1
I ~ j #.
. ~- I dB l &
n ,. -
- 2. - '? j g;(M t
- 3+
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- l q
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i Event Report No. 1-90-003 l Report: Page //3 of .H6 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET UNIT 1 1 EVENT INVESTICATED: Burke County EMA director experienced great difficulty in obtaining follow up and amplifying information concerning the emergency.
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/INVESTICATOR(S): L. E. Mayo
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTICATION/ REVIEW (Include references and attach cont 1.nuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: There is no one assigned to answer questions from the offsite agencias before their representatives : san the EOF. ;
The EOF is responsible for these type of functions to keep the I CR handling the plant problems. Administrative Controls I.TA. 1 ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: _ D1 1 10m e )
, .j gg p, b, RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): Assign plant personnel responsibility of communicating with offsite agencies prior to o their representatives arriving to the EOF.
p, . , ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in Il k' b above) Comments from Burke County EKA Director - Install er. tension of ENN in the Burke Co. EOC - Install extension of ADL in Burke County EOC. Resp. Dept. N 5 r. Approval: k N N DATE: 5 0-Estimated Completion Date: F OIfNper: //*f6' S M4h} [v (( T 14-SW Y / 4 /t.h/O INVESTICATOR SIGNARJRE DATE RESPONSIBLE MANAGER /ERTL DATE
- 4. OI initiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved, bA 1G{f3Ac)
DATE AGERfECHNICAlf SUPPORT
i Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page li. of Ji;4 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET j UNIT 1
- 1. EVENT INVESTICATED: Initial notification of local and state l agencies during Site Area Emergency, 3-20-90, was not completed '
within the 15 minute time limit.
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/INVESTICATOR(S): Id
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTICATION/ REVIEW (Include references and atta.:h continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: Power supply for primary ENN in Control Room was '
inoperable due to loss of onsite and offsite power. Backup ENN ) does not contain all agencies that need to be notified, resulting in ! delays in notifying CEMA and Burke County. Design not fault , tolerant. P g ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: Al 1 10m go , .n t* uC bb. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): Add Burke County and GENA to
~{ the backup ENN. - con,,)ste fre e o.f ot)'t? 9)
$ # ,5 8
,\
h Add battery backup to primary ENN. qgg.)lif, c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b above) i idf s m) h Contact communication consultant to recommend reliable, simple alerting system to notif offsithe J/A m a4 encies.f/1f90 Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approva : DATE: Estimated Completion Date;EP 4/s/40 OIT lumber M O //140
*'1 A - t- 6 2.5-9 @ Jr1%
$ Webb 6- !C 7* 1 OlfD h s> 14' i26f9c)
INVESTIGATOR SIGMATURE DATE RESPONSIBLE MANAGER /ERTL DATE i l
- 4. OITs initiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved.
kNAAas ~1 G l< 3 /V& DATE AGERTf/HNICALSOPPORT 1
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page // A of 344 ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET f i UNIT 1 ; EVENT INVESTIGATED: Initial notification of local and state agencies during Site Area Emergency, 3-20 90, was not completed within the 15 minute time limit.
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/INVESTICATOR(S): Id
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTICATION/ REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: Pcwer supply for primary ENN in Control Room was inoperable due to loss of onsite and offsite power. Backup ENN does not contain all agencies that need to be notified, resulting in delays in notifying CEMA and Burke County. Design not fault tolerant.
ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: 11 1 10a
~t//S . L.) b. RS69MMEN " CC"J.a44vp nuaAvaiU).
'" - i = # 2" nuu i,u a . uvuau.y .uu u r.nn 6u EshWA codyo Mn'en cedrop r
= u =, ua, .. - -- y e-ya4upoo ew.
p p.;gg . /g. / . c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in i b above) Cv.a.,; :r__- d e=*i-- ----"? ..; ;. . 6- nu ..l.llr . 47- 1 21erti ;; ;p::: :: n;tify effr'*- -----i: 7 Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: P i, ./ft DATE: 4-ld 9 Estimated Completion Date: 9 h-i %9D .0IT Number: /M77_0 Md Aln 9 , C hein D Sm.- L'dT INVESTICATOR SIGNATURE b4-fe'd DATE ll 90 RESPONSIBLE MAN 5GER/ERTL DATE J 4 OITs initiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved. 1 of. $ ! <.4 1Y3lfG AGERTyHNICALM.'PPdRT DATE
t Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /'I of M4 CONTINUATION SHEET y nNM TH 2 :1 rt d r'~
- a. CAUS Communicators in CR did not start the notification process h ri : - af ter declaration of the Site Area Emergency.
.ff./ '_?
+I ' F Administrative Control Enforcement LTA.
ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: D2 / 10m
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): ED supervise the notification process.
(Complete if not included in b gg c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: above) O
'A A/li ,d '7) @ Manager Operations and Manager Training and EP to jointly hold g seminar for all EDs to discuss role and responsibilities as ED.
Revise procedure 10,000 to address ED responsibilities..
,1 ,
, gj Revise Management of Radiolo81 cal Emergencies to include j thorough discussion of ED versus shift duties including the responsibilities of offsite authorities.
- a. CAUSE: Security Officer that is used for notification communicator l back up did not respond to control room because the officer did not j receive instruction from radio operator. i l
10a 1 ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: El /
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): 1 l
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b 9
fkW lf TrainallSecurityShiftsupervisorstodesignate/anENN communicator for his/her shift ano preferentially assign the ffC. officer a post where the officer can immediately respond to the control room. Also the designated ENN communicator should be trained to request permission to go to control room upon declaration of an emergency. / / [ 4/9/GC,' 2, e.. g < ....! p = --- .em _--n--
- n 7
-- siti a n. y . o.e _ < < p . m.] . . . - ; >g 2 - ,
& 9f-S To Resp. Dept. Ngr. Approval A __ ' ' " 9- DATE:I kerr 90 Escimated Completion Date: ul 4 3e/m - Olt Number (/)/f74T in'46) h /E756 f.J ti I*7 g . 9 o F I- ?d ~ fc'c $//74'1us:)
, 7 - / 90 - TeuG f-
- Yh 4 N/z l40
. i
. \
Event Report No. 1-90-003 , Report: Page //4- of SM ! CONTINUATION SHEET l
.. C SE: Excessive numbers of plant personnel (involved and n involved) were n the control room during the Site Area Emerge . This created confus Standard policy / Administrative Contry not strict enough.
[d /dd " ROOT CAUSE CA CORY/ EVENT CODE: D1
/
,/
fcf b. RECOMMENDED CORRE VE ACTION (S): perations Shift Superintendent j dismiss non involved ersonne rom the control room. G ENJhelj / g g dd
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURREN (Complete if not included in b above)
- 1) Amplify procedure 10,000 on Cont Room access during emergency ,
conditions. r i
- 2) Inc dde delegation / priority setting in SRO 1 training
- 3) aining for ED's and Operations staff concerning delegation. priority setting - training by contractor. )
- a. CAUSE: The plant page is superimposed on the backup ENN in the Control Room, casuing interference in making the offsite ;
notifications. ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: B1 1 10a Design LTA
/ b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S):
i ef/ Repair the BU ENN and plant page to eliminate cross talk and M N' interference on the BU ENN.
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b i above) l Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: f ['/ M / - DATE:
Estimated Completion Date: .rw.C OIT Number: /Pfaf - 1 I 27
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page / J of ~h CONTINUATION SHEET
- a. CAUSE: State of Georgia and Burke Co. EMA are not part of the backup ENN (South Carolina) system. Non fault tolerant design.
9/ / /Ja
] ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE:
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S); Add state of Georgia and Burke f /'( f. County EMA to Backup ENN system. ,p 4 f9 0,N* f90,
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RE RRENCE: (Complete i not included in b above)
- a. CAUSE: Control Room communicator was not aware that primary ENN in the TSC was operable. Training LTA.
ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: 6/ / /da h by RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): Retrain all communicators used for offsite communications in the use of the primary ENN, all backup methods of notification, use of Control Room merlin, offsite radios, power supplies for all communications equipment and the importance d of notification information to ffsite authorities. This training gg should also include all SRO's Require shift clerks to participate in monthly communications equipment test. Conduct quarterly communication if drills in ..s..
.;. ! either in plant or in the Simulator. (include communicators) F-
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b o ,.. > . . e ;pkL ,
4de. Resp. Dept. Ngr. Approval: 8t TE: k N O i OIT Number: Estimated Completion Date: 4 as 44MJ h M bl. ?O Qg 9 jy ;.f. D 1 9hrho Q ,7 77; m 3 'E-t.7- 10 h 0h* 5 .ii- fu Hs!412 W
$?V5
& l2.
r - ac.) y sr , 4" /V- rd ,,
,i . .
i l l l l Event Report No. 1-90-003 l Report: Page f1 of 1d( ) ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET UNIT 1
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: Problems encountered in implementation of the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. There were over 200 people at the relocation center with no one in charge.
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): EA7 l
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach l continuation sheets if needed) l l
- a. CAUSE: A decision was made to deviate from procedure in that a HP technician and Security Officer were not sent to the off-site relocation center as required by EPIP 91104-C, OSC Manager checklist, Sheet 1 Step 6. Procedure not followed.
i ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: El 1 /da r
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): !
l l 1 i
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b above) j Publish a': lesson learned in Management of Radiological vi e d Emergencies. There were over 200 people at the relocation center with no one in charge or in contact with the emergency J .* J' - t-J a
- organization at the Plant.
Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: / N DATE: Y!k!Gd l Estimated Completion Date: fo/39/40 0TN bar:/ff 7 2
$ We}} [y- [fY Z L 5YJ % ZYl!fSC)
INVESTIGATOR SIGNATURE DATE PrSPONSIBLE MANAGER /ERTL DATE l i 4 OITsf nitiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved. l A 1 G b3/to
~
DATE AGERTEpICALWPPORT ] i 7 i i i
l i Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page .' '7 of 7# CONTINUATION SHEET i
- a. CAUSE: The TSC was not fully set up at the time of the emergency declaration. There was not enough chairs for the TSC communicators.
The TSC conference rooms is not available for their intended function as they are being used as offices. SPAC enforcement LTA. leave the TSC in EPIP configuration, j 1 ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: D1 1 /84 l 4
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): l 5
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b p)pte -
I.ock the TSC te prevent unauthorized access in order to prevent r
'[ ,4 chairs from being removed and possible unauthorized use of the 4 , g ,,. 3 r < m communication equipment.
Y~ k Restore the TSC conference rooms to their intended functions as l emergency facilities. 1 l
- a. CAUSE: The status loop telephone bridge was inoperable at the beginning of the emergency because of loss of power. Non fault tolerant design.
ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: B1 / /8a
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S):
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b
, ,],,6 i j) above)
A"'
/7AW T-*1) Investigate powering bridge off batteries (UPS).
h je f e --, 2) Inve sti feas'ibility ef-providingKComputginfosaation t . OSC and iackup40F via PC moden[s. 7 4 r-Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: N/M I- DATE:/ I*Y N Estimated Completion Date: .r-k-A E OIT Number: /7/71
? )
,w
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page l'7 of J4i i ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET I UNIT 1
- 1. EVENT INVESTICATED: Failure of phone equipment in control room.
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): [f f
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTICATION/ REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed)
- a. CAUSE: Loss of offsite and onsite power supply to Merlin phone system,in control room. Non fault tolerant design ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE: B1 1 10a
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): A r
l 1
- g c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in r -) b above) .) y) '. Improve reliability of Merlin phones in the CR and EOF to be h4 - -
similar to plant PBX. 1
, _m -
J l Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: 4 bd $M DATE: 4-ll'id Estimated Completion Date: " (0 9h OIT N er: /ff/3
$ $}s b.- NT INVESTIGATOR SIGNATURE 1 + 4 1?de DATE f - 1 lig fd
[ESPONSIBLE MANAGEF/ERTL DATE 4 OITs initiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved. j A bh$ - 1Gb3AO
-DATE p.,AcERpECaNiceSuPPORT 1
!/
i l Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page />4 of 34 ' ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET UNIT 1
- 1. EVENT INVESTIGATED: Classification of emergency declared 3-20-90. _
(AMtgh wh: === nae d-1 r:f f:: h; -' an i e - r f :ff. L . ,.. .. y u . gh Dry % SA cts & M sw ChmA'l
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/ INVESTIGATOR (S): A7 h og,/)y
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION / REVIEW (Include references and attach Qh continuation sheets if needed) b .
- a. CAUSE: Emergency Action Levels are not mode dependent and in some cases are confusing. Procedure less than adequate. ,
1 ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: .D. / /d a 1//A
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): r
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b above)
- 1. Review implementation of emergency plans for action levels
[h M/,-s' - based on criteria specified in EPIP's with Emergency pgg p.) ' Directors.
- 2. Investigate applicability of NUMARC EAL's to VEGP after NRC review and comments on NUMARC EAL Report.
Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: f ATE: f 90 Estimated Completion Date: F12 f(/90 0 T er: /P 7/ 1 a
& h4Jh Ge [ l ~~ 14 546 Y b Y m 14lIrl90 INVESTIGATOR SIGNATURE DATE RESPONSIBLE MANAGER /ERTL DATE W
4 OIT initiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved.
!d AGER TEpICAL Sif> PORT i cl.,tra DATE s-
s l i Event Report No. 1-90-003 I Report: Page /)(/ of 3 f o' ;
)
i ROGT CAUSE DETERMINATION UORKSHEET UNIT 1 1.
@ i' w
l EVENTINVESTICATED:/ERTcomputersystemwasnotreliableduring l emergency.
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/INVESTICATOR(S): E/ ~7"
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTICATION/ REVIEW (Include references and attach I continuation sheets if needed) !
- a. CAUSE: ,
ERF computer did not reliably display data. Non-fault tolerant design. ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: El 1 10a ) r ~m b.
' Jc.7J RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): ,
j
\
'g ~ f't (*/' + 1) Emergency Preparedness establish a test program for all ERF cgf computer equipment.
pe/ede 4 ) Outage a anning sign planner to ack wor ders mon ly ba is ds d y erge Pr dn
, f' Coo nator, c Jjekh.*ik
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in
' 7' b above)
Resp. Dept.Mgr. Approval:da ' ll ATE: d1/If f C Estimated Completion Date: V(4//f/90 OIT N bar: /P74A
$ hlCAJ $< Eif 'T 14-5-91 h n LYllf9d INVESTICATOR SIGNATURE DATE RESPONSIBLE MANAGER /ERTL DATE 4 OIT initiated; commitments reviewed; corrective action approved.
A) Lb2 if kWfd NAGER CHNI'CAIAUPPORT DhTE 2d
)
1 1 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /Jl of 3./i j ROOT CAUSE DETERMINATION WORKSHEET UNIT 1 i
- 1. EVENT INVESTICATED: Onsite Personnel Accountability not effective. !
- 2. EVALUATOR (S)/INVESTICATOR(S): [4
- 3. RESULTS OF INVESTICATION/ REVIEW (Include references and attach continuation sheets if needed) ,
I
- a. CAUSE: Page announcement not made in a timely fashion. :
Announcement delayed approximately 20 minutes. Procedure not used. 1 ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: El / 10a l l
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S):
I e
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in )
b above) 4}l>)qG
- 1) Include as lesson learned in Licensed erator Training h 87 2) Conduct walk thru drills on day & n t shifts
- 3) Increase emphasis on accountabil in Management of fM.se' Radiological Emergency trainin ,
- 4) Investigate need to perform countability at Alert j i
l Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval [ DATE: l Estimated Completion Da : OIT Number: 1 1 INVESTICATOR SIGN RE DATE RESPONSIBLE MANAGER /ERTL DATE 4 OITs initiated; co itsents reviewed; corrective action approved. I
/
MANAGER TECRVfCAL SUPPORT DATE \ f IMCt00GD vu Q'y T- 9AGcf
/ l 4 y& & l > 'O
~7 l
i Evont.R p3rt No. 1-90-003 Report: Page ial of T?4 1 ~ i CONTINUATION SHEET
! a. CAUSE: Personnel knowledge of accountability procedure requirements is j we ak.: PESS allowing entry into PA. personnel sent back to work, confusion as to location of assembly area. Standard policy, l administrative control confusing / incomplete.
ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: D1 1 /Y
- f f
$ b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S):
\
NA ) l l 1 i
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complets if not included in b q j
. . - - above) ) 1 ! [gd! , U 5:tri cli "^': er cr :r-- ?ility p r :: ' : ::;rir w a sheet on accour,tability l 4f-g C,41 r/ /) All badged personnel requirements. Cl#JK receive 6 4 hbriefin)/4/fo f'4 7 l l
*g.[, ygf/' 3) g , Conduct walk thru drills 22 ty: ' ni;;M ^* fer with ar.nual full l
,-~., scale walk thru. JctM -'ftist 'T~o 4 thPL O f M ee'st.? r ,
< d' 'd s ? 4) Increase emphasis o [n accountability procedures in CET/ERO I
)' training. {xt#}
,Jf fg c h Signs will be posted by Security Officer stating only ERO
, - personnel will be allowed entrance to the PA. This action will be included in appropriate Security procedures. {CNO3 G Mpt Au M6t's + Jarsr*s tasaes rwr 1"Wrie Pfesoaku "'5' m "b
- 4/6 GM ATR , Ade 6tf 8 y' A/3*/fo [Aff All Ol*1 NEAO'b j a. CAUSE: Scripted announcement needs improvement - confusion existed concerning location of " Assembly Area" and designation of "Non-EsJential" personnel. Seeeedece-4mr. 'P44's BArassa
- t a ar a rr
- ffADE /d 4 'f/MflY A?5'N/eA) f ROOT CAUSE CATEGORY / EVENT CODE
- El / /8 d
! b. RECONNENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): A
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b above) l AS J
h- 6/v/ C# (p./)nRewrite 2:xie scripted rri;rc announcements -- r = r: = :1x:1 to specify Assembly Area location 57
#4j ~ C J "
- r r---I t - ? rif in n ' =^ f:: x:: r ?ilig. {geg}
-(O U 7* $) ;Cuneary ?toetsurets *1'o Kaauer 6 O e stt* C'YE ****- i CoHnuPriss) ef fMi +[ mal C4 pdm E:g/h- }
Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval:joW-i
,. m _ _ /sLE%t V Estimated completion Date: @.wa/Dth OIT r://h7/1/ iff?- 1 irgf ,4
. .111. '
W E. k /NC2 EASE n!"MPd4 sis nd GTEt^let- ) CDMWMatt4 7~ rom ~* in s//10 M-.It1 lmc
/N [D 7CA/N/A%y-. ~
]Kr.H} ,p.y . , n pe r tr
,ep *cddmkw c am si %:
1 17?f2 e .<. .n: m . c e ,r l sm gp 'ga. - Gishl9b
,im u....~w .
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page !)] of 344 CONTINUATION SHEET
- a. CAUSE: Page Announcement not Audible. l
- 1) Problems with hearing announcement identified in Containment, turbine deck, diesel generator room, and NSCV tower area.
SPAC LTA ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: D1 / /,7s i
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): i
/./ bb l
1 1
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b w above) l rnf j y f, 1) Conduct routine, periodic testing of page system to assure ' '
.N m operability and audibility, p'i- '('1
,7 f,y 2) Sound emergency signal tones for longer duration to assure personnel are aware of emergency announcements. (may require timing circuit in alarm panel). , ,, ,
Y'N' VO
&fhi ,
Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval: [ - DATE: # Estimated Completion Date: (1) '/-Ar# OIT Number (2hed % ! h>Y &CSQ bl b l 5$
i Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page 'j4 of 34n-CONTINUATION SHEET
- a. CAUSE: I.arge number of personnel unaccounted for on initial pass.
Design needs not addressed. Accountability print out is not human factored. i ROOT CAUSE CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: _ "1 1 Oa
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S): i ;
NM
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete if not included in b A above) b) 0 '
g- 4' ,,- 1) Revise Security Accountability Software to more clearly identify
- only unaccounced for personnel. ,
- . 07."S E : Page announcement not effective ROOT E CATECORY/ EVENT CODE: 1
- b. RECOMMENDED CORRECTI TION (S):
// & $
- is 10 l
- c. ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: (Complete ot included in b above)
Resp. Dept. Mgr. Approval:f d, DATE:d~/$TT) Estimated Completion Date: f-I f- QO OlT Number: / 9?/l_ 1 i 1 1
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page !! K of 146 OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS SITE AREA EMERGENCY March 20, 1990 l
- 1) FINDING: Video copier in the EOF is not operable.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repair or replace copier. l RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: ' 2- D COMPLETION VERIFIED: f M d27/ DATE: l
- 2) FINDING: Public information managers for EOF arrived 2 hours after
~
event declaration. , wnnECTIVE ACTION: EYi m r rrel are evet1. 1 w illi r ; M --- MM RESPONSIBILITY: $ M Pektsc f )- cse mbw% ed rumor cuk/need f he dbad REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: (('D COMPLETION VERIFIED: Jce Cl /[' 7 7 2- DATE:
~ 3) FINDING: HVAC in the TSC is too loud.
~~.
M* b;O a CORRECTIVE ACT h.nvestigate and end corrective action to reduce
, f er antiTent..n evel in TSC.
- go d b ' '~
RESPONSIBILITY: ngineering , 4 4.10 REQUIRE LETION DATE: COMPLETION VERIFIED: DATE:
, w l
- 4) FINDING: Access into the OSC was not controlled during the emergency.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Establish one entrance / exit out of the OSC proper. RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: j '
~ d COMPLETION VERIFIED: e '.I / '
'~-f
// DATE:
3
'I Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page Js ofjf.'
OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS
.5) FINDING: Met tower comm equipment is very dirty which could affect proper equipment operation. ,
l CORRECTIVE ACTION: Clean comm equipment at met tower and establish cleanliness inspection program. RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: .>' ~ COMPLETION VERIFIED: , , c' e' 81 /!.
. -//-
i l 1
- 6) FINDING: Status loop communicator headset in the TSC had faulty l Connectors.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repair or replace headset. i RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: j .2 J,) COMPLETION VERIFIED: t> e Cf I/ 77f DATE:
- 7) FINDING: Sound power phone jacks channel #2 in the TSC (next to status loop comrnunicator phone) does not work.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repair or replace phone jacks. RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [~,0 COMPLETION VERIFIED: s ) 'd $3- /[o 7 ,/ o/ DATE:
- 8) F*NDING: Core Inventory Determination procedure 91504-C does not address new/used cores.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Make modifications to procedure to address accident or reload with new/used core. RESPONSIBILITY: Reactor Engineering REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: j '[~ COMPLETION VERIFIED: ,>vae d 7 ?7 7 DATE: '
Et ..a,.::: OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS g/ ~'J-
, , ," ? .y [
- 9) FINDING: Plant page in the TSC was extremely loud.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Install volume control onspeaker that is located over TSC Manager chair. RESPONSIBILITY: Engineering REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: f ,2 *f COMPLETION VERIFIED: v E e. I '
, 2 k[
l
- 10) FINDING: Powerstrip for dose assessment computer in the TSC is missing.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replace powerscrip. RESPONSIBILITY: Emergency Preparedness REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [ ,E' 4) " COMPLETION VERIFIED: v C', dj /[779
- 11) FINDING: The event re-creation is very difficult due to insufficient los records.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Players critique - All ERO personnel should keep a detail log or account of their individual response and the major events that occur which will enhance timeline re-creation. RESPONSIBILITY: b. hey f REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: f. [- fd COMPLETION VERIFIED: [<< 6f / 7, #8
- 12) FINDING: There are no site telephone directories in the TSC posit.*.on packets.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: telephone directory to position packets in the TSC and t .
%~ ' '
RESPONSIBILITY: Emergency Preparednes's% s ' eg N<v/ REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: A ,.
- W_ .,
COMPLETION VERIFIED: #~ / aJ a
,A
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /l/ of 3 4 OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS
- 12) FINDINC: There are no site telephone directories in the TSC position packets. ,
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Add site telephone directory to position packets in the TSC and the EOF. RESPONSIBILITY: Emergency Preparedness REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: j -[, y , COMPLETION VERIFIED: [c d, d[ / / 7((
- 13) FINDINC: NRC personnel on the NRC operations and of circuit continuously dropped off bridge circuit. ,
CORRECTIVE ACTION: NRC to report to AT&T for repair, l RESPONSIBILITY: h C] [/q [ g f g g)O i REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: ) COMPLETION VERIFIED: [h.4 CJ /[7[2- 1
- 14) FINDINC: Access to the CR from the TSC is not readily available to all TSC personnel because of "special access control".
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Delete "special access" to CR from TSC side of control block. RESPONSIBILITY: Security REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: f-[-fgf 1 COMPLETION VERIFIED: [e 6f //pf] l l l 4/
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page.j;9 of 344 OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS )
- 15) FINDING: The position of "Docurnent Control" in the OSC was not filled.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Maintenance departraent assign maintenance personnel to fill position of Document Control in the OSC. RES PONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [-[-// COMPLET10N VERIFIED: d <-
- 16) FINDINC: There is inadequate capability to read drawings in the TSC.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Supply hand held viewers for TSC engineering use. p j RESPONSIBILITY: Emergency Preparedness REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [-[ #j i COMPLETION VERIFIED: [eg CJ // 7(( l
- 17) FINDING: ERF terminal #CRT2 in the EOF is not operable.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repair or replace terminal. RESPONSIBILITY: kam f. REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [-[-M COMPLETION VERIFIED: Mc Of //7[7
- 18) FINDING: Some primary ERO personnel were not fully qualified.0ther personnel therefore had to be used in designated Emergency Positions.
pa d otA~ lI.f4 in G M .Nm W ksSy
- CORRECTIVE ACTION: Emmer un3u lif!M E"^ r- --
I i a l ! 2Z - - .- @ RESPONSIBILITY: Gtt. P/f/< N REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: J~.p.fg COMPLETION VERIFIED: [q 47' ,/7//'
l Event Report No. 1-90-003 i Report: Page /1n of 3 ff < OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS
- 19) FINDIhG: OSC to small enDRECTIVE ACTION: Emergency planning and maintenance engineering develop ;
action p n to correct problem. ' RESPONSIBILITY: % , ,d , .,,g- ,4) ff REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [ //
- h h i COMPLETION VERIFIED: j*d L')I M 7/8 /py !
- 20) FINDING: Personnel who were not in an ERF were not informed of the status or updated on the Emergency.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Change EPIP 91102-C to have the ED consider the need to, inform Non-ERO personnel of the status of the emergency using the plant page. J RESPONSIBILITY: Emergency Preparedness REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: g,j ,jj COMPLETION VERIFIED: P 7 /[ 7 f / 2 ING: Oglethorpe Power Corp. representatives do ava a
- g. ) g , i nated seat in the EOF.
-per CORRECTIVE ACTION: Provide thor ower Corp. representative a seat and teleph zw he EOF.
G. Bo r)ho Y RESPONSIBILITY: gency Preparedness REQUIRED ION DATE: C LETION VERIFIED: 7}
6 Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page G1 of 344 OPEN ITEMS / CRITIQUE ITEMS
- 22) FINDING: Periodic maintenance checks other than operaitonal tests,
, are not performed on emergency communications equipment. CORRECTIVE ACTION: Establish a preventative maintanance program for the following emergency communicatier euqipment. a) All radio tranceivers, tra t,wi tters and repeaters b) ENN Equipment c) Micro wave used to support 4NN and dedicated , circuits d) BU ENN - cleanliness, power supply e) ADL - cleanliness, power supply f) Met tower microwave g) Training Center microwave l RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: ,, j g LUMPLETION VERIFIED: J cr[ /[7/2 i
- 23) FINDING: The TSC Communications closet which contains the Merlin and BU ENN equipment is filthy and a hazard to proper equipmant operation. The BU ENN is powered in a i
unproffesional manner. The equipment is plugged into a 5
. socket power strip which has 3 other items plugged into it.
} The power strip is not secured nor are the power cords i running from it. i ) CORRECTIVE ACTION: Clean up the communications closet. Discard useless items and clutter. Secure the power cords properly and in general do a proffessional job of connecting and securing the communicattons equipment. RESPONSIBILITY: Maintenance REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE: [-/ ~ /f COMPLETION VERIFIED: de, y j/7ff
l Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page dd of J4g he'ditional suonortina Items
- a. Unit 1 Shift" Supervisor Log
- s. Unit 1 Control Log
- c. Unit i Outside Area Operating Log
- d. Unit 1 Control Building Operator Log
- e. Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Operating Log
- f. Unit 1 Auxiliary Building Radwaste Operator Log
- g. Turbine Building Operating Log
- h. ERF Computer Printouts
- 1. TSC Manager's Log.(Attached to W. F. Kitchen's Personnel e Statement
- j. Classification Determination - Data Sheet 1
- k. Site Area Emergency / General Emergency Checklists (2 Total)
- 1. Alert Checklist
- m. Energency Director Checklist n.- Emergency Director Log
- o. Press Release #1
- p. Press Release #2
- q. Safety Analysis - Corporate Follow-up Commitment
- r. Dianal Generator Test Schedule
- s. LDCR for Emergency Start on Loss of Offsite Power
- t. LDCR Delineating the Pre-Event E'ectrical Lineup
- u. Emergency Notification Numbers 1 thru 9
- v. TSC HP Supervisor Notes
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Report: Page /?J of 346 Additional Sunnortina Items
- w. OSC Support-Request Info. Form (Team #2)
- x. EOF Manager's Log
- y. NRC Notification Checklist
- z. VEGP Security Department Call checklist aa. EOF Sequence of Events bb. South Carolina EPD Interoffice Memo -
cc. Extract from SRS Communications Log dd. South Carolina EPD Fax .ee. Security Incident Report e
!!. GPC Notification Checklist #4 gg. NRC AIT Quarantina Notice hh. SAE 8-hour Follow-up Report
- 11. Deficiency Card
.jj. OSC Manager's Log (Attached to H. M. Handfinger's Personal Statement kk. Secu:ity Vehicle Access Logsheet l 1
- 11. Transcript of GENA Tape Recordings mm. Diesel Generator Failures List i
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'PROCEDumf No.
mtvisKm nmts Pm 14 4 at J 4L ' VEGP PAGE No. 91001-C 7 8 of 12 ; 4 I Sheet 1 of 1 ; DATA SHEET 1 ( t 5 CLASSIFICATION DETERMINATION '
. i 1,
Evaluate status of fission product barriers: l Breached / Challenged i
- a. Fuel Cladding Integrity YES NO i
(See Figure 1) -
- b. Reactor Coolant System YES NO Integrity (See Figure 2) i 4
- b. i
- c. Containment Integrity YES NO l (See Figure 3)
- 2. Determine the highest emergency classification level for present plant conditions (See Figure 4). -
Check One Notification of Unusual Event Alert i Site Area Emergency General Emergency i Comments: ba a u.~. W er d Mb AM
- n. t cP l
n v
- 3. Assume the position of Emergency Director.
4 4 Signature k i raergency Director Date 3 /101 f0 o7 Central Time O? g/C03 - 4. Proceed to Notification of Unusual Event Alert, Site Area ' Emergency / General Emergency Checklist of this procedure. a as l w
Event Report No. 1-90-003 Reports Page J ro _of _7 4;i i emocaouma No. newseow VEGP Pasa no. 91001-C 7 11 of 12 4 j Sheet 1 of 2 SITE AREA EMERGENCY / GENERAL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST . 1. Maintain a log of as theavailable). incident (this may be delegated to other personnel,
- 2. Make an announcement ever the public address system for all areas as follows:
NOTE i Wording in [ ] may not } be applicable to all ' situations. - 1 i i " ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL - THIS IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY - A SITE AREA EMERGENCY (GENERAL EMERGENCY) HAS BEEN DECLARED [FOR UNIT l ]." * (G \ n Goa brief wb descr4 cion of the event) / s<s # [ on s
- AC Qcant & awr L tv i Anau \
i f (EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED RESPONSE FACILITY. NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL EXIT THE I PROTECTED AREA, REPORT TO ASSEMBLY AREA.1 !. (Repeat Announcement)
- 3. Sound the appropriate alara:
Site Area Emergency - pulse cone l General Emergency - yelp cone i 4
- Repeat the announcement from Step 2.
5.
- Direct early dismissal of non-essential personnel or site i
evacuation as described under Early Dismissal / Site Evacuation on.the Emergency Director Checklist :n Procedure a 9119Z-c. " Duties Of The Emergency Director". 6. Determine offsite relocation center for site evacuacion. } 7. Notify security of early dismissal or of evacuation routes prior to making the PA announcement. 8.
- Implement notifications in accordance with Checklist 1, Emergency" 91002-C, Emergency Notifications" Director Notificction Che 4
f v . . - - . w . - e - r .
t cv:;nr Mcpori No. 4-90-003 PROCEDURE No. Reports Page ]fl of 2% ngVisiON PAGs No. VEGP 91001-C , 7 12 of 12 Sheet 2 of 2 ! SITE AREA EMERGENCY / GENERAL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST
- 9. 7f a radiological release is involved, request offsite dose l
grojections be performed (see Procedure 91304-C, Computerized And Manual Back-Up Methods For Release Race And Dose Calculations"). 10. Perform accountability of operations staff not badged into control room (if not complaced in Alert Checklist) Procedure : 91401-C, " Assembly and Accountability". (This maybe delegated to other personnel, as available). 4 11. As necessary, Procedure make p' Protective Action Guidelines"rotective actij 91305-C, . 12. - Continue Checklist with subsequent actions aer the Emergency Directoit in Procedure 91102-C, " kcies of The Emergency ! Director". l i bEmerpucy vik Director l
'P i
sisnature ! Date/ Central Time 7 2e/b/ o#b I v
. l G
a J 4 W $ , l'h *~ . d MM
k Ev:nt Rrport No. I-90-003 Report Page _jjl,of M
- paocsouna No.
VEGP navmon paos No. 91001-C 7 11 of 12 l Sheet 1 of 2 a .. SITE AREA EMERGENCY / GENERAL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST 4 p- 1. Maintain a log of the incident j other personnel, as available). (this may be delegated to I I 2. Make an announcement over the public address system for all
- areas as follows
NOTE l Wording in [ ] may not j be applicable to all situations. - } . i*
! " ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL - THIS IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY -
i A SITE AREA EMERGENCY (GENERAL EMERGENCY) HAS BEEN
- DECLARED [FOR UNIT DV6- ) . " ,
e (Give a b ief descriptio 4 m- hw u ult onof the event) l.o ss o f A O . 1
; [EMELGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR ~' ASSIGNED
; RESPONSE FACILITY.
??^* T: ACE, MFGRT t"":"TO"*id'e A3or.rihii nar . i U-96i --e u.au
~
j . (Repeat Announcement) 3-28-f d ! 3. Sound the appropriate alara: j l Site Area Emergency - pulse tone i General Emergency - yelp cone 41
- 4 Q'
Repeat the announcement from Step 2. I i 5.
- Direct early dismissal of non-essential personnel or site
- evacuation ao described under Early Dismissal / Site Evecuation on.the Emergency Director checklisc in Pre sidure
! T119Z-c. " Duties of The Emergency Director". 6. i Determine offsite relocation center for site evacuation. 7. Notify security of early dismissal or of evacuation routes l prior to making the PA announcement.
- 8.
j- Implement notifications in accordance with Checklist 1 Emergency" 91002-C, Emergency Notifications" Director Notifiestion Ch 1 i e-2 . 2
l l 1
.............e I go 00s l
Report: Page f e3 of J tf, i PRoCEDUmE No. RgYisioN l PAGENo, i VEGP 91001-C 7 12 of 12 ; Sheet 2 of 2 SITE AREA EMERGENCY / GENERAL EMERGENCY CHECKLIST '
- 9. If a radiological release is involved, request offsite dose p'rojections be perfonned (see Procedure 91304-C, ,
Computerized And Manual Back-Up Methods For Release Race l And Dose Calculations"). I
- 10. )
Perform accountability of operations staff not badged into ' l control room (if not completed in Alert Checklist) Procedure ! 91401-C, " Assembly and Accountability". (This maybe j delegated to other personnel, as available).
- 11. As necessary, make protective action recommendations per Procedure 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines".
- 12. Continue with subsequent actions ser the Emergency Director 1 Checklist Director".
in Procedure 91102-C, "% cies of The Emergency l fff0bSignature t u. Emergh y Director Date/ Central Time /0942 e 4 e t a ge P e 6 6 ese = = . < _?f i __ -
1 4 Event Report No. 1-90-005 Report: Pcge !r4 of us PMocEDUAE NO. REvessow
- PAGE No.
VEGP 91001-C 7 10 of 12 i I i 1 Sheet 1 of 1
; ALERT CHECKLIST j
- 1. Maintain a log of the incident (this may be delegated to l other personnel, as available). l l
i 2. Make an announcement over the public address system, for all areas as follows: NOTE Wording in [ ] may not be applicable to all j situations. i 1 j " ATTENTION ALL PERSONNEL - THIS IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY - AN ALERT HAS BEEN DECLARED [FOR UNIT / ]." ,.. i , (Give a brief description of the event, if appropriate, and cement.) l rebesttheah l m i-W/ b m. / b = .M 11 . i 1 " EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL REPORT TO YOUR ASSIGNED EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITY. NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNE4 EXIT THE PROTECTED AREA, REPORT TO ASSEMBLY AREA." ) (Repeat Announcement) '
- 3. Sound the alarm for an Alert'- warble tone.
i , j 4. Repeat the anneur.coment from Step 2.
- 5. Implement notifications in accordance with Checklist 1,
- Energency" 91002-C, Emergency Notifications" Director Notification Checklis
- 6. If a radiolo ical release is involved, re i grojections he performed (see Procedure 9 se offsite dose C 4-C, And terised And Manual Back-Up Methods For Release Rate se Calculations").
j 7. Perform accoun*abilit of o i i control room. (Procedure 9$erstionsstaffnotbadgedinto 401-C, " Assembly and Accountability". available). This maybe delegated to other personnel, as 1 8. l As necessary, aske grotective action recowiendations per i Procedure 91305-C. Protective Action Guidelines". 9. 1 . Continue with subsequent actions per the Emergency Director i Checklist in Procedure 91102-C, " Duties e f The Emergency Director". i b' Signature - E r.mergen 1.rettor
- 7 Date/ Central Time- , / 20/f,
- 115
cvani tupor T No, e-yg.gg3 Reports Page
- r at g l l
Paocaouas No. aEvisioN PAGE No. i
- VEGP 91102-C 6 12 of 18 1
j Sheet 2 of 8 j EMERGENCY DIRECTOR CHECKLIST SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS Transfer of Responsibilities
]
- 1. Review with the ED:
J -Sununary of events 4 l g Plant status p Equipment status gy Emergency classification 1' Q 'p/ e. Status of notifications of offsite authorities Cl ;A 7hV. f. Protective and corrective actions J p. Completed chscklist items 4 1
- h. Status of facilities activation
- 1. Any noted defic'ancies
- j. Status of assembly and accountability, if initiated
- k. Outstanding orders 1.. Recovery plan of action, if known
- CAUTION Assure that initial actions in Procedure 4
91001-C, "Bnergency Classification And Implementing Instructions", have been coupleted as necessary prior to proceeding with this checklist.
- 2. Review facility readiness with facility managers.
- 3. Assure that logkeeper maintains a log of ED actions and I records any transfer of responsibility.
4
- 4. Formally assume from the OSOS the position of ED, using the l folicwing message format:
, k AT 9/J' ON 20 0 I AM ASSUMING THE EMERGENCY (Central Time) 'fDate/ i i
DIRECTOR POSITION AND HERE5Y RELIEVE YOU OF ALL EMERGENCY i DIRECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES. I
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1 Nm-74 ,' 90 11 L44 ID PUB.!C ffRS Sc5 IH:W1 TEL NO:205-968-S363 0143 PO3 Event R: port No. . Reports Page ':- 1-90-003 of % l l
#1 Release i March 20, 1990 1 9:50 CST , !
l I A site area emergency was declared at Vogtle Nuclear plant near Waynesboro l at 9:00 A.M. (CST) today. The emergency was declared due to a loss df on- and l off-site power to Unit I for approximately 36 minutes. power has been restored to essential equipment in the plant, and the situation was downgraded to an l alertstatusatabout9:15A.M.(C$T). Unit 2 tripped off line but did not experience a loss of power and currently is being maintained in a stable condition. ' l The loss of power to Unit 1 occurred when a construction vehicle backed into a power pole in the switchyard adjacent to the plant. A site area emergency is declared whenever on- and off-site power is lost for more than 15 minutes. There has been no release of radiation and no danger , to the public. Non-essential personnel were evacuated as a precaution about j 9:00A.M.(C5T). 1 to:W i s a I
w -22 '9e tinu toi m a IC c e s SCS IH:ri TEL 4:205-966-5363 s143 pg4 ( 01 Event Report No. 1-90-003
. Report Page /f4 of g l
l
#2 Release l- March 20, 1990 l 10:30 A.M.
The Vogtle Nuclear Plant continues to operate in " alert" status. " Alert" is tha second least serious emergency classification. The plant is stable. l Unit I was already down for its second refueling outage. Switchyard maintenance was in progress in connection with that outage when a construction l vehicle struck a switchyard power pole. One of two diesel generators attempted l to start to supply power, but failed. It then was started manually. The second l ! diesel generator was out of service for planned maintenance, also in connection ! with Unit l's planned outage. That inability to supply emergency e i diesel-generated power for more than 15 minutes resulted in the declaration of the " site area emergency" at 9:00 A.M. (CST). Unit 2, opr'ating at normal power, tripped off-line due to power fluctuations on the Unit I tide of the ! plant. Unit 2 did not lose essential electrical power, however, j Shortly after 9:00 A.M. (C5T), non-essential personnel were assembled and accounted for in accordance with emergency operating procedures. They were not evacuated as initially reported. Work is underway to restore normal power to Unit 1. Neither unit sustained any damage. Noonewasinjured,andtherewasno release of radioactivity.
i d t%R-27 ' 90 15: 24 10:5Ct N TLE iEL tC81 s *. a :c :5W %
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- Event Invenisados,' paresreph 4.6.4 require as --' of the salen eenseguemms and imp; i an evoet. His aseenament has been made and is locluded in the anached drak emat crisiges for the 3/20/90 eke area
) emergency evest. la ordsf to meet the istaat of the event is@ios precedere, @ eM review of this ausuneat and develop.nent of a dotaded analysis is requested to supplanneet the event arteigns.
1 1 i
- 2. In the analysis, esvelop recommandadoes that rednes the probabOlty of osservenes of sash as esses er r
the newrity or comaequemos of and es event. Spesincally, commaries the reisvest assumptions, sSmes, con I j recomma*t== of REA vo4011 response, dened Pehrmary 14,1990, esasuulag less of ears eneEng whib in m ! *P*'8888-i l
- 2. Consider the impea of tremebet - in plant areas outside plast headay, l
- 3. Review elocarical linseps for modes 3 and 6, suelects possOds % and resummend W te gas er to munid.
1 i j
- 4. The results of this naalysis should be presamted for reviser to Vagle Peeinst mensysset no le i
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g A f *,,,"/.;**.fi . ,,, Southern CompanyServices me saw eeco e tw.- February 16. 1990
'footle Electric Generatina Plant - Units 1 and 2 & <
NK final Response to Request for Engineering Assistance - M [ IM Fis i ll Log: 54-8817 Security Code: NC ' Mr. C. C. Miller Manager of Ensineering Vogtle Pro. ject - Nuclear Operations l Georgia Power Company , Post Office Sox 1295 e 8ireinghas, Alabama 35201
Dear Mr. Miller:
The attached report is the Phase !! response to RfA E9011 which addresses the specific IMC concerns identifled in Generic Letter Number 88-17 and subsequent responses. Also, this report verifies plant The results from the RCS venting analysis were discussed w contact report. at Westinghouse for concurrence prior to the issuance of this This document completes activities concerning REA 5 9011. If yee have i any questions, please call David Detsen at extenstee 4850. ! Very truly y l i [M. b A C. Ramse6 #. KAJr/DM/se Attachment me: 8.Beckhold,Jr.(w/att.) A. E. Cardena att. *** M. W. Norten /ett.))
- M C. R.Iqyer R. E. Pattfck i
- 5. Pietrayk (w(w/att.
P. D. Rushtes /att.) ) NONis DocumentFlie(w/att.) ProjectFlie __.________.______w _ _ _ _ - __
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1 i i 1 ) l 1 i 1088 or CECAY HEAT RDOVAL 1, AMh!JtTIchL S'NDIIs i ter l i 1 M Etat'DLIC GENDWTOC P!ht ) IMI'!5 G4E AM) 'DC i 4 a A RDiPCHSE 10 GENDLIC 11T1Dt SS-U
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i 1his report is j for the Vogt.le the result of a Southam Ctapany Services stady card.rtad Electric i and ocreams in IOC Generic Isttar (GL)Generat.irq 88-17.Flant, REA W,-9011, regartiirg i== == { Icos of the residaal heat reesval system &Jrirq 1hisperiods letter oi='~ r the of ruband j inventory the request in ande theinreactor coolant system. this riport partially fulfi.11s
)cc GL 4e-17. }
Westirghcuse WCAP-11916 is a r*=9 stLdy of ganaric the, three, ard fcur loop j plants aparating at a inventory or "mid-loop" condition. 1he thermal j behavior h)draulic analyses partorismi in the unstin@cune study predict acs
! following the loss of ItlRS cooling &mnng mid-loop cparations.
j pr=== rization rata, by concems addressed the analyses irritde time to core boiling, the RCs time i that can impact DCS recovery to core unoowery, genings in the its bcurdary 1 various 7c5 configurations. responses, ard renowery aparations for j t this plant-specific study, vG-9011, verifies that anssyticris used and conclusians parformed an etwn in WCAP-11916 anocupass Plant vcurtle. l Calculaticme were alternata the anjor cperational considerations listad in the WCAP No the ut37. recovery aparations are suygested to replace those described in { er==g =w maggestad by the utRP methods results.for issawwements were unos for gerations not j hast far 48 henars after startdown and grated flaal af 3565 left. Plant U flow omicanlatism was A gravity i i the rattaaling wter storage perfe-d which adeled St31rwentary additian fmn l j tank 0557) throu$ paths other than thee dancribed in the WCEF. 4 i i In ganaral, the results are as fo11cass- ' ! I
'o 1 the amanytians listed in the WCEF eich anximian the cure heatag !
rate and pmasuriaatim and mininian the tian to heiling and anse unmowery annengnes Plant W% { o theeuttish i at 57 mimuf a$Mthe te of 8.3 Eda, that te sus mesuusy to es sue,sAbs et 8.8 F stans la tbs map su/hdE ra === ;
- in musstsen m plast. the '
j L piant anstas's aparatismi.aparatam processes tahan tras the 5thP enotapan i o i 1be utap analysis lagh11as that any vent witti an area of 0.5 ft2 er { lamper is adagsste to present acs stessurisatim. tis tarding does net ' ! . If a 35 autt lag is penant i .er to W .sutaaf untums ; i emuld in as ger 3mmuuma past ! eut en enM 3sg n is angpustad he avoidet. ' . i a%s peammas et 5 gels. the gravity flew paths di t i rumpactive fleuratas are shown in ripaus 2.2 and 2.3. l l
en l
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j S 4 :v J.ll { o the mieulate$ time for taarkirig insfde onntairamert witheut a wat. s. n niin .rt., i nte wum, we.s. 3. i
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anleutetad time rar workir i W 140 "F is 21 min w,ith no centaliment coolcs aparating.inside om tatsh an cpen contairmant, a miniasm of three tierensure th3t tamperature remains balcw 160*coola:s mast he aparated of NWt; this Md be necessary to allcw perseme'. r for 57 to min after loss contirue ! contalsment closure activities prior to core unop.ory. j o A rWiew of the NRC questicris to Georgia Power Ctapany relatisq to GL Number 88-17 is in secticm 4. This rwiew ruir.ms the plant 5 specific finiings of this report to 9.iesticms poemd by the NRC. l" o A review of GPC i..- twas was done to irumars generic information from tt:AP 11916 used in the pah erwa==4 Pla.-'.* Vogtle. k 1 t i i I ea l i k i l } i l i Ie e l N t 1
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{4 r-2hes anscutive samary 11 cantants iv List of Figures v Intztxtuction i 1 Arview ard Parform Plant-Specific Analysis 1.1 General Description of Asviews ard Analysis 1.2 Plant-Specific calculations 2 3 1.2.1 Time to Saturation 3 1.2.2 Time Required to EMpose core 6 1.2.3 ACs Hastap Rota for 48 hours 8 1.3 mi===q of onnelusiens 4 2 Analysis of norqpen er omndition phenomena . 2.1 osmaral Descriptica of Analysis u 2.2 Plant-specific calaalations 12 2.2.1 NCE Pressurizatian mate 12 2.2.2 eruvity riaw Irwentary Additaan is 2.2.2 acs venting 20 2.2 Instrumentatlan Aspects 22 2.2.1 Isvel lamammunant Daring Stems ennerstar m en 2: 2.3.2 IImammum et Ertues 4 W @eratian 34
- 2.4 ammary er anneausians
} as l 1 3.a sa'anMpenitis enlanaties3.1 e MER16 ofasAnalp j 3.3.1 mMaq, antainment maatse tamat as 3.3.3 Cktaimers Tuuperature ammmmmmme 30 l 3.3 mamary of Osnciusians 33
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3k mes ! 4 Review of Generic Inttar es-17 1 i 41 General Description of Review 4.2 ElMpeditious Actions 34 4.3 Programed h 34 4.4 WCAP Section 2 Review 35 36 5 Refenances 39 6 Attactaments 41 i l l l i l
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J- . . . LIsr or FIGUREE , M 2221g P2 s 1.1 Haa% volume Magicms 1.2 h 2 Saturatim 4 1.3 7 1.4 Time for h % Hea% Rak 9 ' 2.1 ats Pressure 10 2.2 Gruvity new for evts and sI
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response 1toofGenaric this report rwiewed ard performed plant specific analysis in Istter tere parformed an (GL) 88-17 programased smhancements. Reviews estemmine eat GL 88-17 and Georgia power Ctaparty (@C) proondares to information i in 183 P-11916 required verification. tacimical the decayreview heat rata parformed cm WCAP-11916. A camparison Ataas mad wasard wwt.1 ed plant. pcur levels between Plant Vogtle and the WCAP j i , whicts can andel Infonnation was obtained about the MhPP ocuputer systmun, several calculations various wereplant acruiltions, parformed to including mid-loop operations. study encor verify that results of the WCAP saturation, passed Plant Vogtle. i time requirud 1he calculations were time required to (MCS) heat @ rate. to expose the core, and knactor coolant system the analyses conducted i made to GPC in the initial GL 88-17.in this section were based cm W!
- osukact analyses to applement Section 3.4 of the letter directs:
) - fcur pr ew, instrumentationescistirug informstlan and develop a basis j equipnent/ Nuclear Steam apply Systeminstallaticm and response, and the analyses should (1585) intaracticms and response, the basishardware can be subjected and shculd pewide mafficien is developed. W.:.- Aardirt Emphasis should be placed upcm chtainirug a ocuplete M--ion, ytheofIgic1888 statesbehavior under noryower aparation. In its anos an enson11ent start toward that the Westinghouse Owners Grcap (%CG1, has mentian is made anstirug this recommandation. Flarther (DCG) in 18:nP-11916 analyses and calculations parformed of the for different ganaric thernaktydraulic analyses parformed by two, thren, and four lay plants. The information for Plant Vogtle. in 10-9011 mgplement the 143P section 2 plant of this report operations. 1heanalyzed bachgroundhow nargisuer auntitian phonemana i recommandatlans sectism 1, ase plant meds in a, as-17 and in the e> day rumpanse As in lal, that data in the tamp specific cmiculatieris tore partaamad to verify parfasand verify the N3er w w plant vogtla. The stanatiers addition anpable by pavity flowgrammarisatie Euts, the ammet et irwentary (NW) to the M3, and the ~*-==y N3 preemme haileip. of vert spanings in the stb to relie studied to detsemine its suspense 1hs N3 mid-lacy totar lauel instutaunta including the eessat of draindom, to the diteurent systen effecta sentian 3 insida sentainase czumens a saamm aurimummet amma heiling busins within ssal ans ihn zo per8EEmE8 he andiamative h dutemmine egal to ththe amourtwithin of tJan sepainstthe cantainmaa. to reunive a aanaa pesuimminas esamententim ose)e anziam a11mehta Antivisant amminen nesses to kamp the sentainment ana the mener at enntnisuure coolers prier to care wiopimy. temperstime balar las 4 sur the 57 min Sectlan 4 of this report amuute all sia geopus e;nhanommentarevieund E,80-17 ant the resperus 1stta adagataly attrussed. recommented by tbs IR: have been 1
4
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a i g,n y y y y yg mgg i 4 1.1 GNERAL !EBCRIPr7CDi OF REVIDE AND ANkDEIs { Piant Vogtle aparatimal patondures were reviemand for darges W& ircorporated i Jeet, a contaltasinformation fourd in WCAP-11.916. ( 11916. steps ard cautions obtained Ptwee&ars frtas info ra 18019-C, "Inss or
; m tion ! ho111rg, 2Lis heatty infocustionrate, and IJicludes the time to core uncovery,in WCAP- time to
- infonnation itan will beexce '" pt the last RCs gravity fill frtas the peer.
item is discussed in this section.AllThe of this j last j information is used=d in Section 2 of this ruport. Roomune this specific i the WCAP, W2 analyzed for plant aparation, it was necessary to verify that { erwv=pa- Plant vtsytle. ganaric 1.3. She two, three, arut four locy plants, ^ ainsults of these reviews art in Section the WCAP analysis i assurptions enompt the list 13 decay ammaptions for the ganaric study. All of the the fuel modaled heat power, enocupass Plant Vogtle. Since month cycle fuel, this amataption needed verifiantion.in the WCAP i WCAP-11916 assummes a I paher of 3700 let andganaric four-loop 17 x 17 fumi plant with a that: mal Plant vogtle uns a core average burnup of 20,000 364M CU. Evert if The decay heat tgrated, the gewer level would ime a ==vi== of 3565 Itt level. ganaraticn rata essentially increases llamarly with pauer banup atounsidering the appread plarined fuel sesyMIU. annapumant strategy, the cuare i atzwe thePlant vagtle could 40,000 Increases in humasip i slightly. 30,000 7tr PlantsetHEU vagtle, level increams the emony hast rate caly ! lower power level the decrease in dummy haut rate saa to a increased hurray. is sagd!My langer than the samal increams das to remits and any engmated mode 1herefore, there is renamable usagin hutuman j resalts of cymretian at 71 art Dogtle. Also, tha i Stundt of an evalustian at the voetle deamy hast memos using the sec heinical l
- Vogtle models to Positian be very ASB class 9-2, Ber.2, Anly (Attacteust 1). 1981, dinned the NCRP ard i
hounded the other at Alttums ! between the tus andals was sen11 eaupered assug*1ans the 4120erencesto the e i these la utRP and Plant Dogtle's eene average basap. amant en alwaysfindings the by daasy hast er generated utsp 11 sis.by esset telt at plant Septle
- he bounen,s as sendte i
i the utar deng hast asses,
=1=1=*id=us taan ges2esand using i
j tem utaP. tiens at 48 kness after atnadmes Sor angerisen with the thu time Se enlantations pericamed were tias regaised to esturatian i trempeen the esto, and at3 hastne sehe. i " ' = 1*
- 48'm didBiseases humunast St.enses that no Ckuglariaans sesnits, of the plant the tresentary vehaus Sur Degtle uns enlad i specific calanlatian to the ERP tintings are 1
distaansed in aestlan 1.3. { i A brief history descriptian at its ant atzusture of the MAP omgneur prope alms wi ! Attaduumt 2. aid-loop analysis cupehility age genanntat in 5 i
- 2 i
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This and data section devalcys Plant Vogtle-specific data for czagarison with ;
} ramalta fram WC2P-11916. !
l i 3.10 for calculating plant-specific data wrw W as genersi guidance 1h . 1 1.2.1 )
- TDE MEQUDED 10 SATURATION t j the -- -Wans !
used in the WCAP wru also used for this calculation.used in this emiculati Assumptiers
- 1. Initial condition for pipe, vessel ard water is l'404.
. 3. Uprated poker is used (3545 IWt).2. Water elevation is 187 I
- 4. .vi -L1916, Figure 3.2.4-1 " Decay Heat power vs Time After Sustdown," applies to Vogtle.
i
- 5. Pawar level used is for 48 hours after shut &wn (par WCAP) .
i 6. region, tentar upper volumns used intamals for time region, to naturation include the core and 30 { Volumes used for time to core uru:mery% of the hot y include 1 . a 4 region, hot and cold legs, surge line, and a portion of the ! reactor coolant pump (acP) bowl and RCP maction line. i
- 7. solid heat capacities for the thick vessel estal sections will
- not be included for cxmservatias. -
j ! s. Heat loss through insulation is conservatively left out, e 1
- 9. All tiasrushtwo1ain.
hast rumcwar (Net) cooling and flow is last at i
- 10. Mc3 cyanings include the pressurizar (PER) annumy &ari ng hastyp j and a stamm generator (SG) aanway 4aring boiling
, u. onntainment and (nCW) are at atmospheric pressues. i u. saa are not available for emaitrig. . i j Using MCRP figure 3.2.4-1 rate for Vogtle is and uprated Saal Sur -Haptle, the decay hast a (3545 Mft)(.0048) = 17.11 Mft er 18,230 EtWe (973,000 MWlain) . With an acs ini 7p 2. et water temperature et 1MPF, ans a finni meter the Beamuss ditSasunt tamparutaats increase tar the emanaria is foranalysis. for all. et tfas antaulatiana, the acs was divides into espera she sessans ano m in Fsgure 1.1. s its total veksua et es ones regian La 3 3 it . [(r/4)(13.5 inn.)3(3do.5 in.)l/12 = 180s j From FERR manties 41 and 4.2, the Saal vehme is i ((151 la.)(t/4)(0.374 la.)2(264 auds) (193 miles)M tt 3. l 3 i l
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J. ' ~~ * : 2 l- ) M' Fram FEAR table 9.1.5-g, ~. l Osing the 501.3 1kmVft the 1eMar internals wigft is 240,'000 12ma. as the density of stainless steel, the volume l of the IcMar internals is i (260,000 ihm)(501.31ksv ft3 ) = SL9 ft3. 3 About 30 percent, or 155 ft3 i l estimated to be in the core reg, ion, of with the aleur internals volume is solid beat capacity of 9324 Scylbe-T. ' Die might of U0 { Imre ard 45,296 1kan, respectively, tras FSAR hble2 ard clad in the cors region are 222,739
- heat 4.3.-l. 1he specific (CD) for
- Bewit=-r. fuel is 0.06 StWikar-F and for Zircalley-4 clad is 0.061 ,
l
- Therefore, the core region wtar voltame issabtractirg the fuel ard metal volumes true the total vo j 1696 ft3 - 489 ft3 - 155 ft3 = 1052 ft3 l
1 Vith a solid heat capacity of } (222,739 1hm) (0.06 Sta.V1kur-F) + i (45,296 Iksa)(0.001 Stavlhar-F) = 17,tD3 Sta.VF. i i The total vaham of the core esport regica is l i { i ((4r/3)(es in./12)3(0.5)) + ' ((r/4)(152.2 in./12)2(2.5 ft)) = 1143 ft3 . hi. 35 percent, 132 3 i to be in the care agpcet region.ft , of the lower internals vaham is estimated 260,000 llut, with a rific heat capacity 1heofteidut 0.12 EtaVlkuPF.of tta lauer internals is l 1 1harefase, the care appast regica tetne vehamn is u42 st3-laset'-esiet3 i with a soljd heat aupacity of i (260,000 Iku$(0.13 RtV1kurF) = 31,200 MWF. the total ! alawatica isvehaus of the gpur internals sugian to the 137 ft 4 in.
- [(r/4)(1a.s an.)agg, s ,3ys 3 = saa st8.
rram rRa mass e,ms.o i total vetsas is ^"r es weartointeennis _
^
ha 244 wesen ft . 3 Ahmt,15 se tsa,ooo tam. m. percust of the 3 i lauer intasmans seksus (?s et ) is esticas to be in thds neglam. j
; marmeare the gear inensants restan water volume is i
sas sta - 7s st3 = 44s st3, wie a solid heat espacity of
; nsa, coo lame (o.12 stay 1her.r) = ts,s4o seeks.
5 I_ __ _ . . _ _ _
i
.a. -
the' total volan of the domenmar regian is ' ff
' lE i
((r/4)((1731n.)2 - (152.51n.)2 )(210.51a.))/123 = 434 ft3 2 tenidt is also the water volume of this region.
*Ihm four i are endi cold leg pipes ard nortles have a 27.5-in. inside dia'nater ard 1
inside diameter 27 ft Icrg. and the arefour hot leg pipes ard noetles have a 29-in. j each 19 ft lang. i irtitial level at the hot ard cold leg cantar line isThe total water volune with 0.5 [(r/4)(27.5 in./12)2(100ft.)] + , 0.5 [(r/4)(29.0in./12)2(77 ft.)) = 400 ft3. this is 223 ft3 cold leg volme end 177 ft hot 3 leg voltane. The heat capacities for the the pipe metal hot and cold legs are calculated using all of t volume as a heat sink. The solid beat anpacity for the hot pipes is 7760 acLVT. ! Phr the somnario dancribed in the WChP, the wtar capacities in the l gare,the "F. seper totalplena water ,heat ard so capacity percentis of the hot lag are heated to 212 k ! (1o52 ft3 + 449 ft8 + (g.3)(177 ft3 )) e (61.35 lauvft )(1 stavite F)(72 F) = 6,864,329 Stu. ! 'fh!r heat capacity 1 rise is for the fuel and clad over the 72 degree tamparature i (17,033 StWF)(72 F) = 1,226,376 Staa. i l Qabining the Sant azul estal heat engacities with the unter heat i capacity, the time reqpired for the hentyp is j (4,864,329 Blan + 1,226,376 Stu)/(973,000 MWain.) = 8.3 minutes . I 1.2.2 i TDE 6 to nece ctsa i 1his calculatian detsumines ths lanyth of time it tahms to hast andt boil j votar att the tadter is eagnosi et ahsve e the tsp of the care. She hail ett vehms of i
- 1. Mk and auge line touter velems.
1 2. t ! 3."heur 'a===' unhar unter vehms.
- 4. Guld lag mi ymp mastian water vahams aboveabove the y cues pla l the hoteam of the enld Imps.
4 j All of the ammaptians used in the gewiaus sectam ase valid 9er this enimistian. assumed based en the utRP analysis,A setti pamalty oe 3s paraant o i - i 6
i i ! I i
-:.< . a : ,r:;
l p r, l'4,- J
*4I
}
t000.0 ., 900.0 - 7
,o u 800.0
- w
- m A f
g 700.0 4 g,
< y
' f
$ \
, 600.0 .
m , 2 , 500.0 - l, (,a
>= '
d 4 400.0 -
<( r t --
I 300.0' l 140'F. Intut:t RCS, Ne $0 WOTer O.0 40.0 80.0 120.0 20.0 60.0 160.0 200.0 100.0 140.0 140.0 Ting AFTER REACTOR SHuTOOWN (HCMtS )
........ FROM PROCEDURE 18018-C FROM PL ANT SPECIFIC CALCUL ATION e
FIGURE 1.2 - TIME TO SATURATION 7
i
] ,,
i J .
- P .I the het leg side j+ ,y.. ' ' .: ,
water volume of thesteen ganarata albow wter volmes are ack5md to the ' totar voltans of provimasly computa$ hot legs. 1his gives a total J 177 ft 3 + r/4(2.41 ft)2(3.3 ft)(4 pipes)(2/2) = 220 ft3 { 1he j trzse surge line water the entrance up tovolume is calo.tlated the second elbtw. ===Ing the line is half full
! pipe is 22.79 ft arri the water voltane is 16 yft .forw the total length of the largth is 3 ft. ! The water volure for this region is 109 ftof the dovrecmer re Each j 4 ft, RCP is ammmeri to have a water volume equal to itseinside dir tc albow times the area of the cold legs. The cold leg steam gercrator r,
j centains water for 1.15 ft. 3G albews and cold leg rezzel is Then, the volume for the RCPs and the \. l i r/4(2.29 ft)2(4 ft)(4)(2/2) + go ft3+ 4 r/4(2.58 ft) (1.15 ft)(4) = 77 ft3 .
- Adding the totar volume of the i boil off teter w itane is 1094 ihm.
fy
- t. At 140 region, 449 ft3 , the
{ lkan. Sub(21ectirg a 35 paroent , the walqht is 47,150 j Using the enthalples spill penalty fttaa this giws 43,648 i 212 *F, the decay heat required to heat and boil off this unas iso I (1150.9 StW1km - 107.M StW1ba)(43,6441km) = 45,530 499 Btu , . 1 i 1he decayo heat re@Lired at to sia r is to hast the care*regian unter vaham from 140
- (180.18 StW1tus - 107.96 StW1ha)(64,571.761km) = 4 462 081 S , ,
' 1hs .
"r dagens ta perature rise istotal heat capacity of the IMS eastal 72 used 9e t
i (81,157 StWF)(73 r) = 5,843,317 Blaa. 1he hast irgut j the a n of all tbs hastneedret to boilger enou$ water to esame the ante is irquts, Wdsat is 95,035,097 Shah the decay i 1 anauw is than ser 48 luuss after asutemen is 14,330 Maye Set ties to ha j (SS,W,8FJ Mis )/ (14,330 stWs)(60 aHaia) = 57 ala. { 1.2.3 MS M M M3 43 y'*qs 1 16 datandne the depens F per miruta haste sur 48 haan afte r reactor ! seutukan, car tawe caansedivsan to same. tan total degree chanen by the anast se 1 (73 *F) / (8.3 ala.) = 8.6 *F/ min. 1 8 J l g -
r iC 1
.7 rj /8/ ~ .su ;
I e i 8000.0 l u
$ 7000.0
)
$ 6000.0 2 o \
f ' h ' ' 5000.0 ^ s o < = o
~ 4000.0 J,
- f. \
i (" ,- Y '
' ~
\
n ),o*,o 3000.0 2000.0 0.0 40.0 80.0 120.0 140.0 200.0 20.0 40.0 100.0 140.0 130,0
?-
TIME AFTER SHUTDOWN (MOURS) i i
........ FROM PROCEDURE 18019-C
- FROM PLANT SPECIFIC CALCULAVION i
l l FIGURE 1.3 - TIME FOR CORE UNCOVERY 9 i
~
i
, .s.,
Is 7,. . 13.0 I 9 l 12.o I i
\
11.0 i l
, j
.z
{ 10.0 9.0 - x 's s CL 2 8.0 - 4 li , I a s r i 7.0 A 6.0 k.% i S.O h m , N 4.0 140*F. ' ' Intact ' RCS. '.o So water 0.0 40.0 80.0 120.0 140.0 200.0 30.0 60.0 100.0 1 - 140.0 180.0 TIME AFTEft !!EACTOR SMUTOOWN (hours)
= = = = = = = = FROM PROCEDURE 18019-C
'MM
, .- PLANT SPECIFIC CALCULAT10N
. i .
FICURE 1.4 - *EATUP RATE 1 10
, n 1.3 33eSET OF CN"* Ram i n. Arsues and a ptions u.ed far the waar amora are in {r ( . . j Jf section 2.3.4, wtap this ic analysis pages wtw 11 thacupt 14. All of the assaytians used for !
4 This verified to be applicable to Flant vogtle. udes the ans.mption about the decay beat power thist as { snailed i differenons toinensure decay heat that differences pcm.=r. in the fual did not cause sigrtificant 1 ' specific time for calculations wr= pe.rformed to estimate the time to saturation, i corw smcovery, and pts heate ruta for Vogtle. the utap { approach considerud crtly heatirg the wter volwe dizwetly aruurd the j fuel to 212*F thidt takes approacimataly 8 min. The plant-specific I calculation heatw estimated 8.3 mirutas or W-dmately a airutas for this to occur.
)
The heatag rate for 1 plaram, miruta. and part of the hot legs is estimated this volumn of wtar,# upper to be 8.6 F par j The ump estimated a sli@tly higur heatg reta. After the ! i wter is heated, it takes apywimately 49 acts mirutas to boil off the uter voltme above { the core and expoem the Lgpar cars plata. 1hs WCAP i estimated a slightly faster time to core uncomry. hfrg all of the canditions ) } enompt the decay heat rata remain the i amme throu@out the somnario, gragitical comparisms can be made at j various 1.4, show times after stutdown. Qarves, plotted in Figags 1.2 1.3, sed i the data from the plant-specific calculation an gr,aghs tre I Proomans laol.e-c. The data points shown an the graphs irdicata j i j calculation sne proomens graphs are points using the assumption aantioned akxws. 1hm data for ) All of the from the NCAP ganaric 4 lany plant analysis.
- plantvific for titidt the specific calculaticrs curvus follow the WChP cur %es in the regicris
- di.fferences were perfasumL Some of the i in the data can itaraticris of several changing omdit. fans sudt as hast sink be attributed to the accuracy of camputer and totar and vapor weltmas. aantactim l calmlations estinata a larger hastap volumsAnother differgnes is that the vogtle voltam than used in the WCAP analysis. Rasswer, and a smaller boil off l the time astimata cutcomes do not differ sl 8tner ampary proom&ans. ynificantly fram the g:sstis used in the Gentgia Phr the ineaumstian analysse in this mestian, only Stessesse 130194: was found j will be discusses to contala in inessmatian mesequentsuspairing sections. verificatian. Other poemaares 3
ser ==essi currelahs to
.mW assults
.ne .ino. m. ,i nt#.2 2.tions
"""===8 ja tiis egetairenempass Fiant4logtiaby the ithy analysis, the uthF re j
i j e l _. . . - - - ' ~
i 2 [2 ,. ~. 2.0 meu.YSIS cr sel35CBER CMDITIW PMDOGG6 N) ' b 2.1 CE16AL N*NJDrIcW OF ANALMIS i
'Zhs MtlRP to ruryx:ner tescandition reviewed for informatien arut generic calculaticns relatirug i
acs daring loss of 3Det during mid-loop.phenamana that wculd affact the geration! i the 1he related tgic h===d in ' acs. WCAP tes acs pressure build, &ae to inadequate vwitang on an intact allowirugA pressure buildip could enume an uncontrolled loss of inventory, build @, the core to became n-: d. Darirug this time of pressure readings to theaparators. instrument accuracy could vary, thich would give false j of recovery actions the Also, a pressure builde tculd limit the types j limitation on gravity flew. Plant-speci.fic operators are able to perform, incitailrug 3 4 m these topics calculations were performed
! vogtle. to dotarmine the agplicability of the WChP results for i
Mcs preneuriaation1he plant-epecific calculations perforund were to dotarmine the i mid-1cep, inventory rate, additionthe adspancy of differunt venta used thile at
- and the possible via gravity flow fram the BM5rr, i j including systmo druindown. accuracy of instrument readings during the different conditions 3 2.2 MmrP-sperTrre armta'rrs=
i
'this section develops Plant Vogtle specific data for campariaan with
) data and results fram Nt'AP-11914. a fer calculation plant-epecific data were used as general gnidance.The I i i 1.2.1 Res ymmeernwigest agg
- A simplified amiculation tas perforund for
- WCAP-11914 213 pressurisatlan analysis. with the i
neglects the ' affects or Sur agailibrium air ans acs heat art given metal heatDespite irgut. einhotheseans1.taitutians assumes standeeta most important statorsretain estemmining the seamane authap are, ths plantvMic heat the cniculation is usefal ana in H9d erst veper vulnames therefore, this i pressuriastian. the genegal tauti of the j should ha uomi Sur - ammune9fthe assagelans, the anlantatian calculatica are 11 send hah. ar. doen jugenes anly. Assagtisms Ser this i 4 i 1. care inter tempeenture is initially at 213ay,
- 2. Per M3D M914, U pescent of the enemy heat gunmentat by the Anal is used to heat come asent.
- 3. 9than et unter la Its is 12 443 ftd.
- 4. to sette of usbar te vagar v,oluna does amt svar langth et time j
i S. MB is imbast ut apa % and as M with senaulsey side totar. l in plans. Massle dans ass est
~
- 6. Deaur heat 8er Dugtle Saal is a omstant l
- 7. Etemets of av runnedansibles are neglanted.18330.5 s q/t.
- 8. 353 enemi haut simiu are neglected.
- 9. ?
- hast la^^ T ^s eunditiers are assunst est my given
- ==,.r. gut, tui.. i.e., uniform liquid ans vapor i
u 1
- . _ - . - .. . - - ~ ~ . .. .. . . . . - . - - . - - - _ _ . _ _ _ .
i I
). . ; j< U .i ' Ftir n; syststhis somrario, the first Im, of thermodynamics will be applies for a 'n .::
that undergoes a ennge of stata. 1hs control tuardary for the system is the entire Mcs to volume. cronaAs the systen mdargoes a change of 4 state, the only enarw the bczrdary will be the decay heat irgnat by the fuel. the systme wi.1.1 he 1harefore, the not &ange in the internal energy of
- neet. exactly agal to the not energy 1symJt by the decay i
'Ihe rufennoe
- camparature of a u *r and t.ime - o s, w epoint for the adriition of energy (heat) will l
Um~Ut at
- Us't
) 3 l
= (1077.6 (1so.11
= 38,447,423 Stu.
stylba)(3335 stW1hn)(8927 et *tp/26.8 ft /1ha)o.o1671g et /lba) ll 1 'nds is the total isttarnal anary tar the systan. far vogtle --tng 13 percent for core metal heatw is1he deony heat rata 16230.5 stWe - ((0.13)(16230.5 Btys)) = 14,120.5 atWs i so, for a Soo-a 7,060,268 Stu. irrearval, 1 hen, the thetotal energy internal irsiut into the boundary is , a is 45,507,691 stu. Sinoa the - far the system after 500 tharmodynamic d ensty la now kncash i aipation g es can be aestituted into the anary balanon i
- U soo aUr (353 W vg) + Ug (M2V v,)
i to i at 2 44,219,735are the new stacas or tavarature ana - If tem anversies stu. substitutes into the If the preparties at the valus sur o is for U is 44,132,817 Stu. see sentituted, the value l a U of 45,507,491 Stu, By interpolating IDetassen these taso r=" _-- for i corresponds to a esturatian guessure the fimmioftsuperature as is 241 8F, thich xs pressure has 1suunmaams seen 14.7 psig to as as after too s, the 1his amend j to 3500 s aftmetases.is used sur 500 e intsavels futua the tins heiling begins i ! Figues 21 j and thans 3eg is a glaut plat ofMar thisdata.plart-egocitio data ant tbs four pcMur to imper intess sutlas desmikedmaeses at ord of essen i I in the utRF. ass the I i,- . i i i l 4
- -- ,e - . ,. _ - _ . _ _ _ . _
' ! ,i ! !
p~! Q %v
- O. _
_ - 0 -
~ 0 g E P 8 0 V
._ L O1 4 _ - rm G O3 L
/
P O- .
- I V< 3( o, R
P #,
' 0 E _
O)4 O4 o
- - 0 5
T A
- / 3 W L .
, " G 4_t ,
, r s, o .
S N ; 0 O O - #* 0 N I , 0 T -
- 3 ,
A ' S L < - C U C w
- o. R L
- 0 T C A
- C o,j - 0 S C A
8 9 C
- 2 T 0I - - N. s 8 F * .
0 I e - 1 I C (.. 0
. I CS e
. - e s _
_ E E 0 ER u . _ N P
- 0 SH g
a _
- y_
US
- 2
- D -
t 8 m _ L T
- m i
*- E 4 _
L N M O A H L
. o. I . 1 P P O T E 2
_ O S _ MM 0O
.o S I
A C s 1 5 4 F R
~
._x P O
a l s I O. F 47
=
O
= 4 0 L .
=
- 0 - _
0
- =
E . I E R
- H _
_ T _
- O. -
O D O N _ S A P - O O O. L 0 0 0 O - 0 0 0 R 0 . . O. O. 0 U S 0 0 0 0 0 O. O 0 6 0 3 O 0 0 O 4 4 3 3 0 S 0 S F 2 2 I l L aO eC'* 8,2e=e*n mua _s
2.2.2
- MVITif FIABF 2NVDf113Df AEIETIGf 3 i
l 1his amiculation dotaraines py it. - thttup different systans, to the 3C5.nowrotes for gravity Scne frtet the surr, l chsaical and volum control systas normal 1ha systans analysmi include the ing flow path Whids was i mentioned injection in the uchP, the evcs safety inj an n owpath, the safety injection flowpath for both ursits. system flowpath, arut the residual heat rW systen j are listed balaw. Assumptions used in this calculation
- 1. All valves in the nowpaths are full open. All l
needle valves are modeled as throttlei 11che valves.
- 2. Punps are modeled as a re&acer and en elbow.
- 3. Wald-o-leta cause insignificant preneurs drcys for gravity ficw coruiitions and therefore are not andeled.
- 4. The Its water level is at 147 ft-0 in.
5.1he suet is full for each its pruneuru aandition. Pall j was defined as a level just atme the minissa level allowed to most technical specifications. i t 1he initial water level for setpoint of the tank. the INFr was estarmined by the law alaru ! the pipe tras the tank 1he water level in the vessel is 187'-C". All of 1 each of the syntans in tktit to 1. the entry point in the IE3 was adeled fcur flowrute was modeled for tktit 2 analysis. The system for tksit 1 with the higust the czarrant isaastric To chtain pipe informatias, pipe, ramber of fittings, and elevatione. detasadning the length of drawings ware used for 1he amenaulli egantion," auxilfied ama. for use with equivalent langths, a s used to determine the 0=[(Pata-Frae+6s)/tr f1/2Due + 1/n' s f2/2cge'))1/2, the verfahles are as sous m 0 = total f1sar Pata = atanagheric prammate head i Fues = N 3 puummat head i 45 = elsvutien difestenen .. . D = pipe diamatar a = pipe arum f = frictian anster 1 = eedvalart lanpet et pipe a - ensame of pipe tunn ess 1 e i e
l 1 f,.. * '-: 4 2 datammine the tems, valves, and apaivalent length of esce pipe, the tambar of albows, f) N '# 5 'A 4 number of elbows, pipe enlarymments ard -n.#ders were countad, me tems,
;' value for their pipe size. and valves ters multiplied by the aspropriata 410. All equations are tma crane hchnical Pe@er Ftur the safety Injectim system, the pipe information is:
i, i Pi- Eina (fti Arma f 2ft 1 *~ivalent t_ i 24a 10" (1.845) 2.7921 344.75 a ret) Frictlen Facte_r (o.729) 0.417s 311.08 o.o12 sa (o.ess) 0.3474 0.014 i 303.5s o.ols sa (o. sos) 0.2006 294.92 4' (o.31s) o.o7ss o.015 3" 553.5o o.ois j (0.255) 0.0513 s.00 2" (o.172) 0.0233 242.25 o.ois o.ois l
; 1hese esta include the ocesutations for the pay are FE-922. 2 detaratne the flowrata when the a:s 1 the pipe data into the flow equation. pressure is 30 psig (49.2 ft) irsut i,
3 Q = ((0 - 49.2 + 41.4)/( 10.57 + 141.75 ))1/2
= 127 gel / min.
= 0.282 ft /s 1
1his sees method is used for preemmes of 0,10, 20; ans 2s psig. i ; Ptar the i 4 inttamatim disaieni is: volume and control system (sI mode) the pipe l {
>= sina ret) Arnetet3 1 a=dvm1=* f=a rett i 24' (1.085) 2.7921 Feb+
Looer Loap 4 e Y raa ms 3.4 rmer. russessinnrra , 1 ?,
*i s
1-
iE .. turing drainkom p Y.: L. to drain by gravityhalow al las ft-o in., the stame emerstar tutu /s begin > 'i this draining occurs. amaause ths 3 is re vent at the te of the tubes, slup of totar as rendam slug flow (also called gurgUruji . As the the level in the lege. antar the hot armi cold lege they create large) swells in inilcators The swells will be seen both csi the control rom necessarily and on thein be equal sight glasses; howvar, the sielled level will ret remas gurgling, genantor tubes drainI. maps the 1 and 4 het and cold lays sinoa the randomly ard independently. tharing any activata the.'ardlevel clear=ha wi.11 several he arratic times ardperiod. during this the icw level alars should use the control The operator the hot leg room indicator for the transmitter attached to is miniina critical to maintaining Net performance.being used for met auction sin value irsiicated 1he operstar should use the Ngt auction nozzle is covered.as the level in the hot leg to e muru that the Inap 1 cold leg level, should1hs si@t glass IG-10401, tetich maamres gurgling wiless the transmitters are out of service.not be used to dotaraine level dur generator tube draining it is Also, during steam cicealy monitor met parameters autrusely important that the cperators pressure, and motor current in cedar including pump nowrata, diadiarge function should vartexing ocx:ur. to gaickly detect loss of pump 2.3.2 Measurimment Errors During Mid-loop operation Differential pressure . to density differences tranmaittars sense hand and, as such, are s@ ject density of the proomme fluid. botheen the sensing line fill fluid and the ambient tagerature in the According to design critaria 00- , the pressurs containment can he as law as . 1ba for the gauges used to calibests the level transmittans trill cumpensata the acs will ambient he at tamparaturn appatacinately at the led ties
*F. of calibratism. Ihm totar in teter density arut She dif2 memos hetaman the will intrcubon an(at 140*F) the referanos lag density at range indicatar and error of 1.8 percent (0.5-in.) en the narr(iar thir2ng autages idiere law omntainment1.8 parannt (1.5-in.) en the vida sang >
arrw can be minimised ; tangierstures are agected, this ' i transmittare as anlandated balannby adjusting the enlihrstad agem of the
- calibrated sparp(4,ygg)m(physiani apan) !
! idiere: -
- nirniani gary 96 iness for Eb11330, wide sung j e density of wetar at medast temperetnan 3
= density of water at het lag tuupausture
- 1he aunaustainty by asess studin3 the to tsunamittar loops dian to haethese as estam i that med sur ta m atveil.1 m se taaseeme=ar =- n paubnimal syssLeimatian
! the t i vegacted range to intutshaus an arter of 3.0 pesenet f neartaintias (0.htm.) es are es surrar irstiaster and 3.0 percurt (2.bla.) en the vies Emmes inAicator i Sinos the hanthese selstas artnes independently, ! a they een he combined usani tbs pesomes enrusity essets act ap ares authed to obtain en overell ths " agues sont em of the i asser. i 24 i i
- ' ; t s :. ;
Narrew rurge erzw = (1.6 pescurst 2 + 3.o percent 2)1/2 *6 fy .: Ml Wide range error = (1.4 3.4 percerit parcent (g.0 in.)
+ 3.o paroent 23 1/2 ,
3.4 percent (3.3-in.) 1he arror values presenta$ bare obtained frue calcul tion X5CF11316. static transmitters pressure sincecharges they utilize in the a Ks will have re affact en the Presmus. referarce leg to cancel cut static 1he sight glasses
==== mument devices andIG-10401 ard Isr-lo402 are also head sensirg suffer from darmity-induced inaccuracies. 1he density2.5.
Figuru Ath errors for varicus ambient temperatures are shcun in 1his error The error is less than 1/2 in. at mid-loop elevations. show a 1cuer level than actually exists in the Mcs. reads in the cansarvati Mar:11ax can also error cmunein readiry the martiscus of the fluid in the si@t gl=== Incp amasurunent inaccurecies of arcund 1/2 in. escause the glass 1Islo401 de: mincaly line shcws is used to omnnect the si@t glasses to the Ecs, si@t equal the hot lag level undar Loop 1 cold leg level, @lch may not exactly cartain conditions, such as steam ganarator tube drainirg and loss of 75m. - 3.4 Ent94W GF GMCIIRIGE ' men ventlig pressure in the through reacter thecould thresbe safety relief valve apenings, the flowrata to equal the asunt grestar than to pais ser the staan heat. man venting thttugh the preneurisar meremy the pressure in reactor assald be aggrnaciastaly 4 3 there is a large gold aids cyanirs, pais. tesen a eu,nditim endste enre ' enough to farms a vammel pressure of 4 psig is great care. itsventary out of the onld sido cyaning and unnower the of Mur Plant the temp disammond vbytle, this in eaction finding does not curumar with the fin &ing Anglysis". 3.4.2, "Susangy of Iaggs 4 tnt l i rr The MRP analysis implian that any verit with an asas of 0.5 or larger is adagasts to penwant M5 putamusiastism. An ggior i plerna peussure of 4 gaig along with a legge cald la the ' is adegate teens a lasgo es1A leg apaning amists. upper coes 3 that It is nennemmend ! genomenes 1300DC,13006 C, and 1300bc he serimed ans aurised as i M to sedise teos tendts. Ary of the vents gemonitly spe amened to emeday psumane of as nuesta emas. 41ss, these vents era { adegate es amuss msg perity flow Bres the WWE eus he asemplished. ' If vartedny glamens osame and M is last, the 1sual teenemittaus and sidst vul still he umahls but will hagin to lame =T - of accamecy le ese to density changes withda the N3 aus). will Mis laes besse l see pronounand as the unter tamparature in the ses ammt.inues to rise. i 1bs cold . legs will digger eram the level in the het lap ens to heating
- in the the al@cases thornesse, the level trenamittaen ecu14 he uses in lies or t glasses.
If pts level drtys halow the reactor vasesi het and ! 25 l i
._________..________.._.m _ _ . . - . _ . - , - . . _ . . . - _ _ . , _ . . - .
H ., .'
- r. - ' - -
cold lay nemales, the transmittars and the sigst glasses will not offer any informatian on the laval et tastar above the auss. 1he operable incore theraccci@les will provide tasperature informatian thich will indicata localized stasen volde. The tamparature infacention cannot be semily cerzthorated or cznes checkad by the cperator and, therefore, will prabably be of little tase. thsring recovery operations, gatar injected into the IES may asume false level readings cm the indicators and the e1@t glasses, but cmos the ICE has stabilized from the : injection operations, the level indicators and si to determine 3E5 level within their normal accurec@ies.t glanees any be used nmile operating transmittars with the Mcs level below 174 pressurizar level, level 11310 1he narrtw ranpa hot and 11320 shcmald be used to m:nitor RC5 water level. leg transmittar will petwide the most accurate tid.le in mioloop. Pericalic channel checks between the the ttars should be done to insure readings are accurata. the transmitters differ by sors should thenbe7%. cameldered cast of service then the readings relied The midloop e1@tglass, 10-10401, should be on only if tranmitters aru out of earvice because there could be actual level differences between the si@tglaan and the transedtters. P t i 5 I I I ~
.a . !
i i l 6 4 j 26
( LG ERROR VS. 3.2 - PROCESS ELEVATION FOR DIFFERENT AMBIENT TEMPERATURES
,3 -
2.8 - 2.6 -
~
14 - 2.2 - ' j 2-d 1.8 - Z O 1.6 - r G 1.4 - r 5 i .2 - 1- / *
- OR - .
0.8 - 0.4 - 0.2 -
- i d '-
O s s s s s s s i i s e i 192 1ge4 ,, ., , f96 I98 200 202 ,23 . 186 188 190 .s y
.'n'.
PROCESS ELEVATI.)N (FEET) t>
+ o i20 DEC F
*J 60 DEG F 90 DEG F j.
l - -- -- - ===re .= sinnrFSS EIEVATION
1 i -
; <p ;.
z 3.0 N N M MM hh j, ,, 4 3.1 GNDIAL NcN & REVNt AND ANMMTR s i -n chiculations tsare performed tetich
} determined the temperature in I
cemitainment hosp the temperaturw after a giwan time, the cooling requirst for contalment to rueult, and the Mpc in contairment after a given tian.below 1Co*r prior to the ti j conditicns 1he envixurunental ] and 2 of this in containment ruport. were creatm$ using data calculated in sections 1 j plant personnel concerning Infornw. t'te tion was obtained frcum plant procedurus and 4 physiological limitations for working a harsh environnant. requirements for cuantalmen
- 3.2 PLAwo-spnmvTe carm[ATIONS 1
! Dtis section develcys Plant Vogtle-specific data for erwire zh1 and 1
radiological achieve $ coralitions in aantalment. 1hs methods used and the rueults
} These calculaticnswerewere not developed for ocuparisen with informatica in 18 CAP 11916.
developed to conditicms that will escist in provide a better understanding of i detenmining teutt osanges need toPlant Vogtle% aantairument and to aid in be made to procadurus to lessen the i ocnsequences of a mid-Icep accident. I 3.2.1 MID ICOP Q3fIADetD(f RADIATION IZYEL I the objective of this amiculation j time la cumtalment hafore a regirator is reqdred.is to dotarmine the ==wh= i
- this calculation are listad below. Anstaptions used in 1
- 1. The assumptions frias sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 apply.
- 2.1hs atmosphart in the contaimant volume above the cpeettien i floor is considered to be perfectly aimed at all tians.
j 2. to She aantainment j aansist of the clasrvolume gens above used theear taptids = stamm of the tant *m is ammand the 220-ft grade and the te of the es.ganarstars plus 80 paraent
- 4. The air iede is moelled team the entairement is assumed to onntain ne radiomativity. 1 bis is a asservative assumptian i
i there will be a anlesse at greed level directly to thea enrizarunent. j 5.1hethe dose initial activity at suestar eastdem is enneidsred to be t ar=ai'i valent 3.4.s. iodine (M) limit speciflad in Sadsdaal ! indlas Se potential der the commmunes of an kasumes Aumadimenly priar to sendskam is not included i to intim to M lasst value.eteeng systems will rugddly reduos angr me
- 6. cuby 3-131 is suasidered in the =1aa1M== l
~
! 7. Se pladesus of me is censarvatively Spunted Amdine en the madnous of the cantainment
- s. les cantatruant aselars are operational.
- 9. Se eneminuant agaignant hate is span.
i i e i 28 l i i
i The irsitial canditiers are staan hol. ling rata WC of I-131 = 16.72 1kuvanc f, *' ' 545 Activity limit = 9.00E-09 uCVoc
= 1.00 ucyg I-131 half life onomy time = 8.07 days 3
partition factor = 2 days (4s houn sitar ah)
= 0.01 a:rstalrumant true volume = 2.2sto6 ft3 i nw to berate of insertionmass aq.alter to the of radioactivitytransfer into the centalrunent air is assunni 2
partition rata of the stamm multiplied by the phase. to reflect the t.i.."w.cy of iodine to remain in the vatar ( t j 1he staas boiling rate is i 3 l (14.72 thmVs) (453. 59 Wihn) = '. ,! .5E03 g/sec. the radiatim decay factor is i i EXP (-C.693(decay time)/(half life)) EXP [ 4.693(2 days)/(8.07 days) = 0.842. i i Prom thane, the l steam heiling rateactivity insertian rata can he deternined.' hitiply the radiatimi dem y factor.try the activity limit, the partition factor, and the (7.545E03 g/s)(1.00 uci/g)(0.01)(0.842) = 83.9 uci/s i time can be amiculated.Sy cenasing a time after boiling begins, the activity If the ties is 27 minutes, than=1a===4 Aring that l (27 min.)(60 sVisin)(43.9 uC1/s) = 1.0638 uti ~
- and, l 3 3
! is (1.04306 uci)/(2.2eDS ft )(30.48 cc/ft )3 = 1.63348 uct/es j the amameretia activity of in aantaname. ot is 8.0947 uti/es sur ttils tian ess w 2 saves an averen i
=1~1=*= Sines this tian paried he mimimend sur es 2Nela tien period.less the ISC, an agusted than the lec can4e hauss i ((9.096 6(40 tes)1/((27 min)/(40 atWhir) = 0.0347 uct/e .
i i 1he ag getyig la tthut enugared to this adjumm8150 te estemmine if the tias semens aLlamed sur an angesure to this ISC. ! retiscoiseen, tian of asummes If ala mattwity to adjusted ISC is 1.011, tede ladiantes the j redimactivity does agaa,l to ttis anxins alhembts sur tbs la 4 e d 1 29 i I f I - _ __ _,
% A2-3 t
3.2.2 czarmDesser 2nnynusunt Assuseert
,y $ 0I 8 #
E { In the event that am is last diaring midlaap amiitions arti camot be
; restored, path exists, omtajnsent a stasm isolation will be initiated. If a large acs vent cnos boiling initiatas within the reactor vessel.erwiminent will be created inside th
} the increamed temperature an Se anness the effect of
; the aantairment closure activities,
- calculations rueult. Thewere performed to determine the tamparatures that could calculations were divided into agareta cases to dotaraine:
(1)ortheafter 1so time* repaired acre boiling for the contairunant atmom5 hare tamparature to reach initiates aparatirg, and (2) the temperature at 60with re contairement coolers mint.as j initiatas for varlaus rambers of contairvannt coolers cperatirig.after coil boilirg i The following ganaral assusytims wazu made for both of the abcue cases: i 1. i the contribution to the containment anergy of pipirg motors, 1 i lights, and other yT 2 is -w to be negligible.
- 2.
j 1he heat sis structures 9e represented by the umasive concreta and staal inside This is a the contairement is 1% in the calculation. } assumption 1 above. sigrsificant ocnservatism wtich is partially offset by i i 3. The i in antire ametrit of reactor decay heat is -w to be consumed j ' asma the aanversion of reactor water at 212*F to staan at that ta parature. *
- 4. The reactor anargy is easmed to be the decay heat ruta at 44
- hour. .ft., ==do-, e=s i
xi.a e .
- 5. The re&ction in reactor water votes aggremented by the runwal i
of i 1hus,the steam throu$ the pressuriser is considered negligible. j the artire mass of stamm presiend in the boiling proomms is i vented into the contairment air space. i 6. i i 1he 120*F initial at 2004 canditians sulative inside knialty.the onntairmart are ammand to be l In a&$1 tim, b "~i'5 M WY tS b h M Mly! O i j 21aar is aan.iemmes to be pareestly ahme at au times so that ashastian sensitians asist in the cantairaut stmughese. i s. me ammassmee vate. u e ese in. senstaans is a.m d to emmist of to clear space above the tig of the staan generators j
$ as 80 of the grams enntasmart vehme betaman the 220 R geda and the tap c! the stama genossenus.
r 3 au vehmes enring the event Sis ammagtlan ( j catalsment is epn to atmaphare so that that the l
- venting of tuina, innsas cantairment.cantairmant air as possible to ameld 1 30 I
f
i
- Ea' o . 9;;-]
j 10. p e r :~ .: :- i 1hs air tetich is aupalled trum the contairiment is assum;d e to be ' i at its initial a1x with the emaitions. that is, the vented stamm does ret i air tetich ja veitad. This ammaption is cannervative in that it precitdes the runwal triza the l cantaitument 4 steen. a" W ere of any of the anar5y traut the boiled off 1
- 11. No contairement coolers azw operating.
'l l Utilizing these ammaptims, a siglifiet mass ard enar5g balance was < established to dotatutine the appetminate time required to reach 160*F I with no ocmtairment coolers gerating and the containment open. the k results indicate this tian would be 21.5 min. j i For the second atmospharm case, a updal was develcped to determina the contairinent two, three, tamparatures at 60 min after cotl boilini initiates, with zero, j that ard four containment coolers gerat.ng (aero coolers amans perforius the fans are cparating but to cooling water is available). 1he arm i addition trumi a mass thebalance scs boiling. at 5 min intervals to M ta the steam aanditions 1hn modal asamms saturated atmashare 1 span to and performs an anarsy balarce at the erd of the 60 minuta tian j assumptions verify arethe == w conditicas are reasonable. 1ha following utilised, i i above: in addition to ammaptions (1) throups (4) 1 j 12. The atmosphere in the entire contairment volume is considergid to i be perfectly exist in missed at all tians en that asturatim censitions j the cumtainment ataongitare. 1tiis is rensanable because at least me cooling fan is ammmad to be twaing.
- 13. 1he condensation miculation. 1his,of the released steam is neglected in the
- in effect guemans the presanos of an t
additianni vapor boiled hast offsource the of mafficiert alas to erumme that the j reacter reunins in the vagar stata rather than partially omidensing as it natus the cantairmart air. { i
- 14. the omstainmart volume unet 8er the =1=1a*4- is ammand to censist af the artire containment valmus.
i i 15. M m i
.tt vehm maW hta,
- cantainmara 1 la te.
eg.N t. en to sammastsee as that 6 $ emth.t 6 in th. i anda18mm4 sit ventine or l tuAleyinsdenaantairmare.as pensible to avoid my algnMan=* puessutt 1s. en air
- ensur ften the aantairmara se asamed to be at the entsting at the ans er the peerasus time stay.
} 17. Se amenirgerg coolets aus j penset te ym9 sum at the tasseuture autsting at the start er ese tien sesp. 3e ensaw i russous av the amatars is asa mmi en to samt lansre heat nuovato i l1
,dizestly ouques,the cooler drein flat.aus the anarw nus.us by
( 31 b. i i j i
i M 1hs resalta are tabulated balaw and are shown in grastLical form in g/ figure 3.lt 3
- with at least one cooler fan running
j mauber Tuoperaturw in contalismant 1
' of at the following times after start C2molers j Cparating 10 20 30 i 1
i 40 50 60 l
; O 139.4 150.8 159.4 164.4 172.0 l 2 134.0 176.8 j 144.7 151.2 156.5 160.7 164.3 3 134.3 l
141.4 147.0 151.3 154.6 157.4 4 132.5 134.5 ,i 142.8 144.1 144.6 150.6 It can he seen htun the abwe that a minimum of three coolers would need to be in cperation to ensure that aantairment tamparaturn does not h j 160*F within 40 minutes. I 3.3 E30cJtY OF CENC21EICMB i. 1he assuuyticms for the amiculations perforem9 in this section wars conservative j over time to allow the changes in the cumtainment erMJurment to wolve
; and 100 peromnt without raamarcus itarations. 1hs initial assu11 tiers of lad *F
{ hast sinks presentrelative taanidity will tahm same tian to develop and the
*:rt, heat g reta. in a massive cumtainment structure will tant to delay i
ancitirg aantainment, Also, since none of the onntamination as andaled as ammmmhat longer than omiculated.the actual ties witil IWC limits are reased will be l the calculated time for inside amtaiment wittunt a respirator is { 27 min after inventary begins. I coolers 1 bis is without omstairuuant l ! and purge or exhaust fans apareting. pernamel inside cantainment within the Isc far aWun boiling begins wculd need to etit aantainment witida 2 I i aantairmant after the 27464 curwould week. the tian sur omntirmand unek inside i j min an the emnditian of the i restrators and should he deemanined by th agnias. ' ! The ! ramens 1 isties 21der wouking inside aantairmant weil the tangerature without aantalmut smalaus aparating. At a i tamparatame asuund work to amatimes immiamthe air is het anmWh to inen the 1 mugs. Per i
- activitias, all aseDaham aantalmentan egen aantairusent to asuptmas clamute
! coolaus stunde he . At a minlaus, esse sentaus weald nand to coments to amme that is not l aammedad seier to the pendicted ties ear ones mouvuting (57 almtes). i i i i . 32 I e
- - - - - - - --------a ,_ _ ,,__,mm__, ,_,_,,_a,__ a,_,, _g. ,a, , _ _ _ _wu__,sa_a-- ,____ _ _ ,a,__a g - - , , - - - _,
l
*W, 3
b$ / V 3 1 7$ i
! l} AO' i
3 ,- < , q y S
$L i \
j . 6 il 4 } - - t 98 in 3 5 i i 1 ^
~*
5
~.
h 1
, & w
, t a
1 a . , , & - i = .
- t 25 .
M
- l. t m L i r
'i T
- \
.a a e q l -
g L *
! lL a k
.F
! l I i
\' 1 I
! ' . a - ! ' u \ Iz k S 5 5 B E S
.. S 9
I i 3.1 i
S , {? I 4.0 35VZBf CF 3345 TIC IR23R 88-17 ' 4.1 GNDIAL M**DPTIOW OF REVIN 3 .. : > - ' i 1his section in regned to consists of an cwarall zeries of Vogtle design ard operation l response letters. the let mid-locy conomens addressed in GL 88-17 ard the i metions and progr====9 1heenhancements, concorris are divided into two grtnaps, expmiitious > been addressed an necause acne of these concerns have l verified in this report will be addressed.other as, only conom:1ns h relating to infocustian
- these h aants eactansive to be Arcluded are ====arized.are included as attactment D m ==nts too I
GL 88-17 is Attactament 3. 4.2 IXPEDrrId[E ACTIONS In Attactunant 1 of GL 48-17, the Npc r=v===nded that ei@t actions be implemented prior to operating in water level is icwor than 3 ft belowathe candition reactordiarm vesselthe reactor vessel flange. j Power Qupany Georgia l 1he le t's response addressed the r=v===ndations of GL as-17 for Plant Vogtle. l i recausnandatierVresponseto those ans r=v===ndations is in Attactument 4. Each 1 reviewed for the possibility of a&iing information that came out of the WO@ 11916 verification review. i t 4 Itans 2 of the i clamrw 2 of theinclucting those penetrations other thana the ==%MC resp i ! aww===nded hat &. cicours prior to the tias Action attactament to GL 88-17 regaires ocatainment23m ! loss of Izet, acqdad at tid a care uncowery could result free a i i adiition of water to the 313 imentary.with an inability to initiata alternate co i the equipanntthe penetrations, hate would also be the Sinom results the tian allowed to cleme tian allauud to close other j to core unmovery is apprinciantaly 57 mirutas.fram Section 2 of tids regnet a ! the If the assagtans used in j pressurization coeurs,calculatimi contairment aggdy and the 313 is adagastaly verted so j i within 57 min of the Icos of Not cooling. penetrations nur need to be clamed i
- tan 3 the i enviroment aedsts.
feasibility of contimed wouk wiein aantninmentaf the l eman a stasm j aancerns. sinne, after 'Itpics the 2 arut 3 et ilds supent adetens these l { instxuments will peerids a ames asimmets reading ttusi theloss , no et uml
- operstisms less of met. peruanal are repaired inside centninues $sr i It sammamal after i cungdete sentainnut a&ames activitias, all semilable centairmen
- should he apsuutet' he minimise the tagerature immense.
mid 3 5toridad that i three costaus at a minissalasy syssendans start no earlier then 48 hi
- i. tamparatuses suumia hahar 1 epsmute to ammes that aantalment
! ser 57 namme== after less of Net. ,
j after cues hailing begins est thans paremmal im respirator. i the initial 27 mimtmo cando entar aantaissant wie a reg i 1 i i 34 i
d i ik 1
-?:-)
i Items 3, 4, ard 5 m page 2 f* - %l ?!:
; descriptions. of the IGC response address lanem plan Plant Vogtle. 1he results of this report sNpport ump 11916 firdings for 3
the
; would Irwtzssments simulata differentavailable &zrirug a loss of 355t ard a cxug amenarios for a Plant Wagtle loss of Itat. 1his a
i inforination should ;
- behavior durirug a loss of 355t accident. aid in developing a more oceplete wderstandir Itare 6 on page 2 of the
- openings in the DCs used for )cc response addresses the offactiveness of j
specific venting. Section 2 of this report details l cmiculations j nW 12006-C, part D4.2.15 performed to verify that vents described in j produced in the 305. 1he (3) are adequate for rullving the steam i anfety calculation does not sqport the use of the 1 cold leg relief valve piping or the pressurizar umway as hot leg vents if a coeur if the opening is present. Pressare buil&p in the per pleram could m1y the SG prosaurizar is used as a vent path. It is roccamiended that i is prueent. anrmey be used for a hot lag vent path if a cold leg gening ! i.
- 4.3 FICGRAPMED DeMCDIDCS i
i In Attsdamant 1 of GL 68-17, the WC enhancements be devoleped to replace roccamands that six programed j ampeditious actions. s q lement, or add to the plans for addressing A preliminary copy o,f Georgia Power Company's (GPC) i 5. As in the these supeditious rWtionsactions, of GL as-17 are in Attachment i a discussion
- reammierdaticru/ items follows. of 'tha 4
Itas of the1 addresses mis and reliable indication of parumsters that describe the stata l for both rewmm1 and the parformance of systems normally used to cool the RC5 ! i accident cz:rdities. ensinnering enhancement. soug and a design change develasmant eish will satis ! study, REk St>9010, ane or these tcpian have been W=*=a the enginmaring ! was cumpleted in mana of last. study were faemulated into a ossign omnge ameamet and Fintings fram this l semagaunt onsign
- changs 7menges eM2nosi armi s>vanos2. Emplementatim at the etsu is m
- mmealed star the am and an2 refueling estages.
! Itan 2 i aaver rekamme addresses the development immentney aparations. and imphian of genom& ares that i processes The eta innarparetse into the arc i of this are trimi the utar 11918 will reflect the Dogtle 3t5 haberiar. Bemplas i verified la tras Jamnumm1 cparuting stemmene saate<: mich are l t 12006<: and dissunned ja section 2 of this suport.1 arut the adeg i Itan 4 ampummes develay a basis sur an analysis to supplement sulating imemenstian and j and section 2.4 at E g a M , instrumentatlan insen11stian ant reganee, and reagenes. As stated in teclamais 2, i l the analysis geosuman>dstian.17, WERP 11914 is an engellet stant teumed ums ! l 3M N. Cpc analysis $st this itet tes cantacted in j uns of MRF11914 atBdsFlart sugart is the prishact of the analysis ant verifies the Vogtle. i atlandstian was to agsport
, Mic
! . 2nus t M totar starege tank. a 31 via art gevi ='ty flow i Sectism 2.2.2. resalts are reported in ! test (8528) per9erend Also diatnassed on mit in item 4 tes the special greeparational flew to estassdne manceptibility 2 *i4 varied M3 Eds to vartaming. leveltest arutisNgt syntam discunami
- further in the name sectaan. !
YJ i
_ - - - - _ .,_-_m_--__..m_ mm. ..._=,__ _. . _.- ,. __,_ __..- - m_.m.m.--.m. ,m._-_---m._ _ - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ _ - - - - . - ~ - . E d I-9:-: 1 4.4 near-11 sis sucTrcat 2 EEVIIN N) j built a model using dimensional analysis for permartars that : are s icant in vartex formation. Data recorded during the test for a ' vogtle type plant were converted into hot-leg mtar 1swel as a function of i Net intales flowrate. A graph of these data is shewn in Figurw 2-14, an i page 2-35 of the WCp. 1his graph shows that an Not ficar of 3000 gal / min l needed a tantar level of appr-4mately 13/4 in, above centarline of the 4 pipe, westinghouse test data also shcme that diffarences in water levels l escisted botheen active cold laps, inactive cold legs, active hot legs, arut j inactive hot legs. The angnitude of level diffarence a s significant-j approx.imately 1 to 2 in. l I haring startap testirg cri tktit 2, an 35st ficar test, Special 1%st 34, was ! corskacted to datamine the unwi = = Itst flow that could be achieved at 1 different 3G water levels. Baceuse of the similarities between thLs test and the test acrukacted by Mastin#name, the FP-34 proomkre and resulta j were reviewed for couperiscri with the N13P resalts. Using inforentian from the test apervisor, the FP-38 test log, and the Nt2P, -
-J.icns about the test rh sudt as the ItSt valve lineg, J
the adequacy of time between endt test pheme for the water level to stabilias, and the p1messant of the twon tihe carnaction were verified. ] with the data fate results of FP-38, greghs were constructed to show the i water elevations at different points in the Its. 1hese greghs are in Figures 4.1 and i 4.2. 1he static line an each grugh is the water lehel 1 ! recorded was opera at each position prior ta starting the test. Sinos no agaipment l 1 at this time, the static lins should be the amme elevatim i at each pas ti m. 1here is a sigrnifiannt level diffenenos between these j data points and also between the train A and train 3 esta points. l Insnumstian $mmut to esplain thems difSenensus inchated ISO 30902145 an j valve 2-1201-044 21, 30 0 28900173 am lamel tsurundttaus IN and B, and a 300 m the startap strainers sur both 35 peps. 1bs selve is used )
- fcur the tygen tube summatias. She ISO zgarted that the valve was
{ diftsault to span beamums valve stan thstads uses stripped. 1 bis would
- annues the valve set to cyan, giving a Ahlse stading en tyget tamis
- level. She 1 suet tausmaittaus are used to sent es unter lawel i sipini to the amatual seen vues alas assie as of ==14wi-n. 1hs i
startap strainues der hem IWL pups were net sumswed at11 after the test
- was ataplats. Bis 4=8====**=i mahms the test date incessnesive sinos it i- is wielaer test egenst(s) this in9assatian would huus en the test I l remits. emememmer the esta tune not used te vari @ the samalts of ths j matinghause test agosted la sostian a er the ump.
i
+ .._
l I 36 l
A ,_.a -_,m..a._. _..as. 44, ..mt, _m ,....m..2 a -- - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ -
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l} 2sfaf l4 ' 4
- 5 i , ; 5:
I I En* i l 1 [ ag
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- g ~) . 1 34 . 2 g a 4 ,
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s Iy iy !! 3 i "!% ansv sammar mz m rt I m l E
,- E 4'
O II1
=
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a-,:w. n - m.- u,an- aw- -a =a_-sw,.- 4 a a em As-a,ms. ._..Aa n-- ns..,uu -,r,.---._--a-e-- -- w-,,s-w--- - --_, - - . _ f,2 i-7.y.;
. 209,r ; 4 f),a l
f lIg.
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i . . a It ; { 3 h l i .
- s
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= =r... ,,,,, . . .,
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I ff I. U ? l y l13 ." no 1 atenas 4
- 1. W S P-11916, j Filled", Rev. O, " Ices July of NHR coolirq tetile the RCS is partially 1944.
l 2. j IJnited States Nuclear Regulatory h I amicm, Office of Nuclear
- Reactor Regulation, Generic Istter 88-17, "Imma of Decay Heat mere
- ML1, Octcher 17, 1984.
! 3. Calculation
{ 4
-===ota, X4C1203S02, Embruary, 1990."Mid-Incy Operation - Imas of 3DIR Racilaticm i )
- 4. Omiculation X4C1201501, Temperature h "ttid-Incy Operaticm
! nt", Pobruary,1990. - Imms of 3DIR
- 5. CalciUtlation X4C1201503, j} "Yantirg the Its During Mid-Imep Inns of I
Qualirg", Pobruary, 1990. 1 4. Calculation X4c1201SO4, j i Pressurization mte", embruary,1990. "IIER W,-9011 h1 Analysis and nts (
- 7. QLiczalatica X4C2201305, "3EA
{ Pobruary 1990. W,-9011 Gruvity Flow 13 nits 1 ard 2",. 1 1
- 8. 1 i i VEIP leuclear Cparations Prooniste, Proostara Imme of Desidtaal Meet Amucun18, 18013-C, Ber. 6.'Abnemaal Operating
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) l j Oa7E: December 15, 19a9 1 3,E : l Voetle Electric Generatino Plant Loss of RNR CAV.NF.260 PC 1431 FROM: A. D. Jones [. . TO: W. C. Aamsey j
^ ! This letter is in response to your October 12, 1989, letter to L. 3. Long I . equesting that PWR Core Analysis confirm that the current and expected l Vogtle WCAP.11916. burnup and power levels are bounding relative to those assumed in i Further discussions with David Dotson of your SCS Vogtle Support Group were necessary in order to make an appropriate response.
3 1 in WCAP-11916, there are two factors which need to be c ', i WCAP-Il916 assumes a generic four-loop 17x17 fuel plant with a them41 t j ! sower of 3,700 W and a core average burnup of 30.000 ledD/NTU. 81 ant Vogtle is uprated, the power level will be a maximum ofEven , 3 545if m i The evel.decay heat generation rate increases essentially linearly with power . ! Considering the planned fuel management strate
- curnup at Plant Vogtle could approach 40,000 fee /NTU. y, the core average Increases in burnup
! above the 30,000 level increase the decay heat rate enig slightlyFor i Plant Vogtle, the decrease in decay heat rate due to a suer power. i ! significantly larger than the small increase due to increased burnup. level is Thus, i;here expected modeis ofreasonable operation at Plant margin Vogtle. between the WCAP 11916 results and The decay heat source model used in WCAP 11914 and sheen in Figure 3. of that report is based on Westinghouse methodology and is not available t us. In our evaluation, we utilized the NRC tranclifechalcal positten AS8 9 2 Rev. 2. July 1981 decay heat source model. i models give very close results; however, neither bounds the. ether at all times after reacter shutdeun. 4 small cessared to the mar The difforences between the two sedels 1 Plant Vogtle sendttfees. gin between the assumptions to WCAP 11914 and 4 Figure 2 gives a compartsen between the WCAP 1 S 2 dec y heat models. i decay heat Current power model level and vith 30 three possible Plant Vogtle medes of operetten: , wtth 40,000 ft4/NTU burnup,,000 MWO/MTU burnup. (t) Current l pouer le! 1 burnup. and (3) Uprated pouer level with 40.000 fam/MTU , , Based en the results of our avaluation, we conclude that the decay hea! generated results by both units of WCAP-11914. of Plant Vogtle will always be bounded by the
- - . - ._ _ _______-_ ___A
a [2 : ><) . 4 :
- JM Mr. W. C. Ramsey CAV NF.260
() December 15, 1949 9 age 2 PC 1431 If you have any questions, ple4se contact me at extenston 5079. Approved by: Warren M. Andrews t
)ev Manager, PWR Core Analysis 4 ADJ/ gps i
Attachments ! 4 cc: L. B. Long E. E. Hunt - W. M. Andrews (w/att) e S. C. Armstrong (w/att) D. M. Dotson (w/att) C. N. Myer 1 I R. 'i. Patrick . i ecc7ss c
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MAAP AS A PO$518LE TOOL O.) ' '. , #- M FOR MID. LOOP OPERATION ANALYS!$ Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide information for evaluating u.s cacabilities the PWR midofloop the Modular operationAccident condition.Analysis Program (MAP) for analyling History of MAAP The MAAP code was originally developed by the Industry Degraded Core Rule-raaking program (IDCOR) and t> now maintained by EPRI. Given an accident or a transient, MAAP simulates the plant response specifically accounting for system responses including operator interventions. The staulation continues either until a permanently coolable state is achieved or until the containment has failed and depressurized. Models are included for all the important phenomena that might occur during accident seguances leading to degraded core conditions. The code is highly modularized so that it can incorporate alternate physical models and can be adapted to different . plant configurations such as power operation or shutdown conditions. . The MAAP code participating in the tras obtained IDCOR in 1987 when it was made available to utilities program. Subsequently, 50N0PC0 Project (Technical Services) converted the MAAP code to run on a 344 personal computer. Technical Services personnel have received formal training on the use of MAAP and actively participates in an EPRI sponsored MAAP Users Group. 4 ' structure of MAAP Two sets of inputs are required by MAAp. One set of approximately one thousand inputs is the parameter file which in general specifies the following: Plant gesastry (primary, secondary, containment, auxiliary butiding)... Opersttag condittens (pressures, temperatures, water levels). 4 Systes performance (including design spectficattens). Medeling parameters (dape facters, entssivities, particle sites). MAAF executica centrol (time steps, priot file identificatten). I w . m , ..
[2 ; 2.:-; The second includes set of inputs is tne control card file (input cock) wnsen f2. / / / jk the following:
. Accident sequence to be analyzed.
~
. Temporary changes to parameters.
- Manual operation or specific automatic controls.
The intervention conditions which MAAP uses to determine the timing of manual operations or automatic controls include various events or parameters such as the opening of safety valves, actuation of systems pressures, temperatures, and levels. With the satisfaction of such predetermined conditions. MAAP may be instructed to take actions such as actuatino specified components or systems. For l's output, MAAP prints a log of control inputs (directions from the input deck), a chronology of accident initiating events and imposed operator interventions, plus any MAAP system messages. Additionally, a tabular output file consisting of selected variables in all system compartments is-written at the user-specified time interval. When the run terstnates. 4 " scenario summary of .ignificant events is priated in the output. printed output of adequate detail can become excessive during a lengthy accident soevence, hence emphasis is placed en graphical output. Graphical output allows one to quickly interpret results. analyse trends, and capture fine detail missed by printed output. Technical Services uses the GRAPHER , plotting software package te graphically display MAAP output data. 1 i Sanchmarking and Acceptance of NAAP i I At present the primary application of MAAP is for use is addressing the i severe accident issue as a part of the Individual Plant Examinatten (IPE). t For the IPE work, MAAP will he used te determine success criteria (heth core i damage and containment performance) and to calculate searce-ters releases. ! It appears that mest ett11 ties plan to use M4AP for their IPE work if plant
- specific analysis is regstred. Although the IAC has not formally approved
- MAP. it has set shW to the use of MAAP in the IPE offert.
! Various beashearking projects te validate the M4AP thereal hydraulic models j against actual plant data have hee.. cespleted. Esamp16. of favorable MAAP j beechmarking taclude the andeltog of the 11tl accident and the Davis Sesse i less of feedseter transient. In additten, favorable benchmartlag has been 4 perfereed against RELAP (Seabrook by (G48 and troens Ferry by TVA) and j against MARCN 3 (PIM and WR by the Nordic Nuclear Safety Progras). i i l . I 1 i
f/ . . 7 j.) Mid Loop Application of MAAP y. f,c 4 After the publication of Generic Letter ss 17. " Loss of Decay Heat Removal." an interest was expressed by some utilities concerning modifications to MAAP
. tha* will allow the mid loop accident to be modeled. Pacific Gas and (1ectric was the first utility to express an interest. However. General Publi- Utilities (GPU) on its own accord funded these modifications to MAAP.
These modifications will allow MAAP to analyze the mid-loop accident to fuel 1 uncovery. The MAAP Users Group has now authorized funding to modify MAAP to ! enab* e the analysis to continue past fuel uncovery. Although GPU has used the modified code for analyzing mid-loop accidents, these capabilities are not 5-neduled to be incorporated into the archived version of MAAP untti l June 1990. ) I The major features of MAAP that will allow modeling of mid-loop accidents 1 l include.
- Arbitrary initial conditions in the primary system.
j o initial water level or initial water mass. o Air in the primary system. l o Input for a time since scras to calculate decay heat or core l power as a function of time. .
- Any initial conditions in the steam generator.
j o Arbitrary water level. , o Air in the steam generator.
- User input for RHR inMow and outflow. -
- Use of RHR heat exchanger.
MAA? will allow the user to detemine the following: i - The primary systes pressurization curve. i
- Confimaties that various available injection paths and injection
- flows ces centrol the accident. ,
Estiastfee of the times available for action.
- predictice of the system response that as operater 1sould see.
i e 3 l
/ * ?] .'
Effort involved in Using MAAP for Mid Loop Analysis i
/j Ud / .~M j Altnough a plant specific parameter file does not exist for Flant Vogtle at this time, it is anticipated that one will be created for the Vogtle IPE by I
the middle of 1991 with an effort of approximately 6 man months. Many of tnese olant parameters will be obtained from design drawings and the FSAR. ' A numcer of postulated loss of decay heat removal scenarios during shutdown. suen as the following three scenarios fer Seabrook that were analyzed l manually can be evaluated by MAAP: i - The reactor is vented and remains at atmospheric pressure and the steam generators are dry, and the RHR cooling is lost. 1 The reactor coolant system is not vented, the steam generators are j dry, the vessel is filled with water, and the RHR coollhg is lost. Conditions are the same as the previous scenario, except that the water is initially in the secondary side of some steam generators. 1 These scenarios could be expanded based on parameters such as the number of j i hours from scram and the initial water level in the vessel. In the case of Vogtle, if the particular accident sequences are defined. * ' Technical Services can create input decks to model these sequences. na=ad a; upon the complexity of the sequence, an input deck could take
- approximately 4 hours to create. Although the Technical Services has run i
' MAAP on the main frame computer, using the PC versten of MAAP ellainates that expense. It is estimated that running a mid leep scenarie en the PC-i based MAAP will require between 1 to 2 hours of computer time. As stated ! previously. the most effective analysis can be achieved by observing the i plotted results of MAAP calculated parameters. l Conclusion 1 l This discussion of M4AP as a possible teel for mid leep operatten analysis ! is based primarily on too presentattens by other utt11ttes at M4AP user Group meetings. M4AP with the modifications scheduled for mid 1990 appears to have sufficient capabilities to be censidered as a useful teel for mid-loop operaties analysis. i 1 i 4 i
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{ NUCLEAR nEGUL.ATORY COe848835 sons s.ameessetoss. e c. asses h4, ;J 'mW~ , ("p (7',,*"3 : s
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WATER REACTOR $ (PWRs)To ALL wotDER5 or CPERATING LICENS t SusJECT: i i LD55 10 CFR0F DECAY 50.5af f) HEAT REMOVAL (GENERIC LETTEA NO. 88-17) 3 1 i of such a less have been of increasing concern for years. Loss of d Numeroes industry i and NRC Aprff 10 pubitcations have addressed the subject. The Diablo Canyon event of l have prov.1987, ided additional and ensuing insfght. work by both the staff and industiy orpanizations { i (1) the inadequactes demonstrated by many Itcenseeslustrated Seneric Letter (SL) 87-12 in theirbyrespon s i event at segvoyah on May (2) the event at Waterford on May 12. 1968: (3) the i 23. 1988: level at saa Onefre on July 7,1944; and ($) the apparent lack of a fndustry understanding of the potentfal seriousness of such events. e ! The report of the Diable Canyon event. Mutts-1249 ' stated that operating a seesf t1we condf tien 6ad fdontf f fed many generic weakness which reevested information from all PWR licensees, provided additional in.GL $7-12, sight, and NUREG-1269 was transmitted with the generte letter to ensure that 11consees had the 1stest information. GL 87-12 demonstrated that they did not understand the identified { Deficiencies esist fa piecedures, hardware, and training is the arees of (1) ! prevention potentfally progress of accident faittaties. to core damage (2) sitigatite of attidents before they ! a core dasste accident steeld escur., and (3) eestret of redienstive esterial if ! certais destes festeres enke initiaties and the ties available for m i fa the Westingheese and Centesties tasiseerlag desiges of aere esseers them in i tAe nuclear steen supply systems (ett$s) designed by labeest and M11ess. 3 ! Nevertheless, se believe espedittees actions are assessary'at all PWes to i rectify these defittemetes. These sheeld be pere 11eled by propremmed enhance- ; ! seats shie soepleseM: add to, or reelses the espedittees actions to acess>. ' i plish a art tappetatstue improvement. Reesesandations severlag these itses are seasserland to the attaamment ! provided to the three enclosures., and additional interestice and guidenes are i 8810140350 t t \; i L 1
f . j 2 [f f , 9.) _ y Q c~l.2 e $ ]4$ respect to each of the recomendations as related to operation f slaceevnt of the h555 on shutdown cooling, or following the attainment of 1 utnettfons under =nich shutdown cooling would nornaDy be initiated. Your 555 essonse f s to inc19ee the following:
't) A sescription of recomended esseditious actions identif fed in the attachment.the actions you na small be submitted to us within 60 days of receipt of this letter.Your reply
'2) mentation for each of the sia prograwed enhancement recesse identified in the attachment.
90 days of receipt of this letter.Your reply stall be provided to us within Individual deviations from the recomunendations will be camsidered on a case by case basis provided comparak1e 1evel ofcompensatory protection. measures are provided which will achieve a i l se further responses are required to GL s7-It and licensees or construction
- EL s7-12 to which they prevleusly cosettted. permit holders need not provide any su his will &ccept documents such as technical reports action plans and schedules greeared by ineustry groups when accompanied by cen,situests from,particienting licensees in lies of individual docusents from these licensees.
seen fadestry documenta ties. group docusents may be incorporated by reference la liceasseAlternatively, effectively resolve these issues.We encourage your participaties la cooperative efforts te Year writtee previstens ressense of sectfee shallEnergy 182a. Atomic be seteitted under Act of 1994, as amended. eeth er affiteettee' ender the Your written revoke yearresponse is are license needed to determine whether actions to modify, suspend, or necessary. P.as been performed regardfag this reevest.An analysts as regelred by 10 CFR 50.109 he original cosy of year arittee ressense shall he tresueltted to the V. S. Nuclear segoletory
'or reproducties andCassiestas. Decament Centeel Oest. Westington. D.C. 20585 distrtheties.
This reevest fs covered by Office of Pana 2150 0011 etie aspires Soester 31.1989.gement sad lodget C1eerence number The estiested seerage hertoo hours is 200 perses tours per lleessee ressesse. incledtog assesment of the nem e reestroemets preparing seerettagreports. the reestres esta seerees, gathertog and asslysias the esta, and cessents se the senereer of thft estieete and settestfees se redese the hertes any be directed to the Offten of Management and toeget. Ass 38W. Ree taecutive Office tut 149ege unskt . B.C. 20503, and to the W. S. Regleer Rege14tery Cenerissies Branch. Offtee of Adelaistrettee and Researces. Regeres and a Messgensat 2C555. Masegement. Washingtse. 8.C. I
3 O! / - VJ-f j') 1 : 3 : [.l4 If you have technical questions regarding this matter please contact Wayne Hodget at 301-492-0895. Other questions may be directed to the man Pro. lect Panager assigned to this issue, Charles M. Trasme11 (301 a12 3121) er to the 8r9 Ject Manager assigned to your plant. s'f W ,B/h/ Dennis H. CrutcTf fe f ' Acting Associate Director for Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Re991stion Atta chaient: Recospended Actfoes
Enclosures:
- 1. Overvfew and Background Information Pertinent to Generic Letter 88-17
- 2. Sufdance for Meeting Generic Letter 88-17
- 3. Abbreviations and Def fattions l
1 i i 1 3
[+ .' *: : LIST OF RECENTLT !!!UED GENERIC LETTDt3 // eneric Cate of
*etter
. No. Subject Issuance issued to 72 -1 6 REMOVAL OF CYCLE-SPECIFIC 10/04/88 ALL POWER REACTOR PARANETER LIMITS FROP' LICENSEE.5 Ako TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS APPLICANTS
&8-15 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS - 09/12/88 alt POWER REACTOR
[NADE00 ATE CONTROL ovER , LICENSEES AND DESIGN PROCESSES APPLICANTS 88-14 !NSTRUMENT A!R SUPPLY 08/08/88 ALL H0t.0ERS OF SYSTEM PROBLEMS AFFECTING CPERATIMG LICEMSE5 SAFETY-RELATED EQU!PMENT OR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS FOR NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR $ 88-13 OPERATOR LICENSING 04/04/84 ALL POWER REACTOR EXAM!kATIONS LICENSEES AND APPLICANT 5 FOR AN OPERATING LICENSE. 88 12 REMOVAL OF FIRE PROTECTION 08/02/84 M POWER REACTOR REQUIREMENTS FROM TECHNICAL LICENSEES AaC SPECIFICATIONS
- APPLICANT 5" t!-11 NRC P05! TION ON RADIATION 07/11/M ALL LIC D$tt$ OF DSRITTLEMENT OF REACTOR OPERATI M REACTORS VES$tL MATERIALS AND ITS AND HOLDERS OF IMPACT ON PLANT OPERATIONS CONSTRUCTION PERMITS 88-10 PURCHASE OF tsA APPPOV U 07/01/88 ALL PGlDL REACTOR 5tCURITY CONTAINERS LICDtstts AND
- HOLDDt3 0F PAAT 95 APPROVALS 84-09 P! LOT TEST!M OF FUNDAMDITALS 08/17/88 ALL LICDtstts 0F ALL EXAMIRATIOR M ILIM WATDt REACTO NW APPLICANT 5 FOR A
~ MILIN WATB REACTO OPERATOR'S LICEM5E UWER 10 CFR PAAT 55 48-08 E!L SI N M DELIVERED TO 05/03/M ALL LICDeltts FOR PC TNE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR stACTOR ANB N05 POWUt REACT (
IERA.At!OR . AM NOLDOS OF CousituCTton PtaMIT' PW WCLEAR POWUt ROCTOR5
12 3 :-i fj J E '# M s ATTACHMENT TO GENERIC LETTER ' RECO* EADED ACTIONS Espeetticus actions and programed enhancements are recomended concerning ! operation cooling of the would N555 during normally be provided.shutdown coolino or during conditions where such is irradf ated fuel in the reactor vessel (RV).The recoesnendettons apply whenever there sumarized below and discussed further in enclosure 2:These reconnenda Expedittous actfons: , i The ing infollowing a reduced espeditious inventory actions should condition *: be tuplarented prior to operat-(1) Of scuss the Of ablo Canyon event. related events and tap 1festions with appropriate plant personne l. 1essons learned, shortly before enterins a reduced inventory condition. Provide training (2)
!aelement procedures and administration centrols that reasonably assure that containment closure" will be achieved prior ta the'ttee at which a core uncovery could result free a less of DNR coupled wita an inability to initiate alternate caeltag er sedities of*uster to the pC3 faventery. Centainment closure procedures should include consideration of potential steam and radioactive material release from the takes place RCS showId within the SCS.closure acttv1 ties entand into the t1as betling controls should be active and la usesThese procedures and adotatstrative (a) prior to entering a reduced RCS leventory esadities for NS$$s supplied by Cosenstlen Engineering er Westinghouse, and (b) 1 1
prior to entering an RCS conditten whereta the unter level is ! louer than four inches below the top of the fles aree of the het legs at the juncties of the het legs to the RT for H115s supplied by Babesch and W11ess. ,
- and shes1d apply whenever operat1og ia these esatttiens. If such precedures and setnistrative coatmis are set operettenal, then l either egetateenet.de est enter the applicable condities er estatste a closed t
l ! A redeced fevestery tenditten esists whenever N unter leve? 18 louer than three feet beles the RV flange, t l t "
- Centainment closure is defined as a contatament osadities where a
- one fatogral barrier to the release of redtetetive seterial is prev 14ed.
Further 4iseessies and goalifIcatiens whtet the letsgrel hereter sest noet i are provided to enclosere 7 and in the deffettless provided to enclosure 3. t i 5 h w . . _ - - .
i . 4 .
? l A. } C d (3) 1 j;q Ub ]N i that are representative of the core saitonscandit ,
i i is inof atheald-loop top condition' reactor vessel. and the reactor vessel head enever the aCs i i j and continuously monitored and alarmed. should be performed ettner: maticeUyperiodica t Tempera ture monitoring 1 (a) i by an operator in the control room (CR). or
! (b) i from a 1ccation outside of the contag with tteent buildta i
i operator in the CA (f sisnificart chan$es o an occur durfag normal conditions.**should be recorded Ob serv a tions at an int j (4) Provide at least two independent ) j tions whenever the RCS is in a re continuous RC3 water level indica-level indications shov1d be periodically checked Water and reduced
; corded by an i Water level monitoring should be capable e. of be i (a) by an operator in the CR er orined either:
I i (b) . j ismiedfate weter lovel valufree a location other ag than sientffcant changes occur.es to as operster in the CR 1f i' ten faterval iens. no greater than 15 minutes during norse 4
- (5)
! !aplement procedures and aministrative centrols that ge i avoid operations that deliberately or taeslaglyy leed to pe i tiens to the RCS and/or to systems that are eseessary o metatain t i j the RCS ta a stable and controlled condities reduced teventory condition. is in a u 1 1 j AC5 east to senducted uttle to a reduced ee, thee e i i addittenet messores should be tekee to assu ( reesta reset messeres teslede maattertog le a stable and controlled seedittee. See ' j tsprevention of a less of SM gg enhanced steeld see e less necer.to essere timely response Wa less of Mit
\ -
i j A std leep esedities esists ehenever RCS unter level is tel the fler eres of the het legs at the fonettee wit the ET e top of
** Seldesee should be developed and provided t
- evacuatten of the seeIteriog peet. o escreters that essers L
t reetter and persammel safety. The go1 dames sheeld properly balance l l 9 9
3 l,? If-f er .( i.sTot (6) Provide at feast two available' or operable means of addingryinvento to the DNA normal RC5systems. that are in addition to pumps that are a part of the f n.fection pune, These should include at least one high pressure each of covered. the means should be at least sufficient to keep the events snoulo De provided. Procedures (cr use of these systers during loss of scocified The path of water addition must be before satting any opening in the RC5.to assure the flow dcas not bypass t 7) . supply System (N555) designs)(appitcable to Westinghouse eam tive controls that ressor,4bly assure that all hotImplement S egs are not procedures a blocked that is larsfavitaneously by notrie t'ans unless a vent path is providec of the RV. ge enough to prevent pressurization of the upper plenum See references I and 2. 1 (s) (applicable to NS$5s with loop stop valves) Implement procedures 1 are not blocked simultaneously by closed stee v path is provided that is large enough to prevent pressurizatioe ef the RV upper plenum or unless the RC$ conf t ur 4 water loss if RV eressurization should occur.f ation prevents RV nozzle dans does not meet this condition. Closing cold legs by proeransned enhancements: Prograsened enhancements should be developed in parallel with th - tfous actions and they may replace, supplesent, or add to the exp actions. For example, prograssmed enhancements any be used to cha expeef tfous procedures. actions as a result of better understanding er faeroved This may lessen the initial impect af sapeditions actions such include as the speed with consfeeration of which such containment factors as the closure decay heat sust be achie rate. guidance is provided in enclosure ?. Additional section 2.2.2 and the first paragraph of secties 3.3.2 illustrate flexibilf ty we have in mind as long as safety is adegestely addresse We intend that progreened enhancements be incerterated inte . plant improvement er enhancement of plant operation safety. Procedural and hardware sedifications any be isolamented wIthest prior staff approval where the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59 are
. but met, altheegh it is ser fatent to review and/or sed se later thee the fellowing schedulet ,
'Available means restly for use need. quickly eeevgh to meet the intended functional I
. . - . . = - . .- .- ._~ .. .- - . - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
i i ? . i a [;; t-@)-3 s (1) Prograsmed annancements consisting of hargwart 9 , N?b.h j j andtfication, and progressed enhancements tastallation thatand/or depend up installation and/or modification, should be tuolemented: fa) by the ene o' en e first refueling outage that montas or later following recelot of this letter,is or tattiatec it
'b) by the end of fais letter. the second refueling outage folicwing receigt of i
whichever occurs first. l I initiated as of the date of receipt of this letterIf a shutdown fo j counted as the first refuelfag outage. , that is to be j (2) l prograssied enhancements that 40 not depend upon ges hardware c l showld be taplemented within la months of recetat of this lette i~ We recommend you implement the followins sta programmed enha (1) ncements: Instrumenta tion 4 i provide reliable indication of parameters that describe the ! the ACS and the performance of systees normally state usedofto coo for both in following normal the CR: and accident conditions. e nts 1 At a minimum, provide the { (a) two fadopendent RCS lawel fadfcatiens (b) i at 'least two indeoendent temeerature seasurements rep i, the all RV times.) file suggest that temperatore te i . (c) I the eseability of continseesly menttering OM s mance whenever a OM system is being used forooling c.vstem the perfor. RC5 i (d) i visible tageretere. and Tevel,endible fadications and OM system performance of abnertal cond { \ f2) Procedures aparettes rem forentory condities. eed that provide as adeguete b
- These include i
(a) ppeeederes tatement that cover normel operettee of the MSSS the coa. { i coeltog u,seld nonnally be provided t by SE yste l l i
E A. l D 'I (b) g procedures that cover emergency, abnormat, off. normal p; w J }
. or the l eeutvalent operation of the W555, the contatnaent. ans support.
Ing systems if an off. normal cor.dttfon occurs while operati ng t vnder by conettfons DNs systems. for which cooling would normally be provided I - ' ' (c) dures in items (4), (b)searfatstrattve controls that support and supple
- this cassunication, as appropetate. and all other actions identified in
, (3) foufement i (a)
Assure that adecuate operating, eserable, and/or available and for avoiding a less of RC5 coeltas.stufenent of hig (b) Paintain sufficient esistine eeutament in an operable or available statusthey so as te mitigate less of DMR or less of RC1 a inventory should occur. } high pressure injection pump and one other system.This should inc j The utter sheeld be at least sufficient te keep the core cove { (c) i Provide adeevate etelpment for personnel co j (4) Analyses maintain the RC3 in a stable and controlled condition. , {
- basis fee precedures, fastrumentation insConduct analyse
- eestpoent/R333 fateracttens and ressense.ta11atten and response,a and t The analyses steeld i
thethehardeere that can basis is developed. be setjetted and steeld provide s Eschasis should be placed upon obtain j t 1ng a completo understandtrg of N155 behavter under nonoemer o ties. j i (5) Techafcal Seesfffcatiens Techsteel speciffestions (75s) that restrict er Itatt the safety benefit ffed of the settens and approprieto changes shes14 identiffed to this be setettied. letter should be
*Relfable the intendedogsfaseet fumettes. is ogsfaseet that can be ressesebly espected to p See tec';stgre 2 for addittomas taferestles.
i 9 '
l 2 . 6
'6) 8CS seeturtations gg ) . 9. .]
1 s i f tse (5) of the espeditteus actions should be reesamined l4-l ans 1 J tions less of refined DNR. as necessary to reasonably statatze the likelthoog of Additional information and guidance are given in enclosure 2 .
#EFistkCE5 a
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i a Level Operation " NRC Information NottCe 84-36. June (2) R. A. Newton, Operation Concerns " Westinghouse Owners Group Early Notificatten of M i Westinghouse owners" Letter from Chairman of Westinghouse Owners Group to 27, 1944. Group Primary Representatives (ll 1A), CG-88-21. May j
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I 1 ATTACBEENT 4
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{ fg vanteostats: ( I I NUCLE Am nEcut Afony COMM ss10N M / u s ..ctna. o e resse l g ~~... '. . e / - January 27. 1989 l ! Dut u t Nos., $C-ala j 50-a25 /pS . Mr. W. G. N4trston, !!! i 1 i tensor vice President - Geor Wuclear Operettons P.O.g as 90wer Company Sea 1295 g (( tg
'C g' 'ih. ,
A Straingnes, Alabama 35201
$ i
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Dear Mr. Ha trstun:
i SUSJECT: l 1 1 LETTER 88-17 FOR THE V0GTLE PLANT, UNITS 1 i I (IPEDITIOUS ACTIONS FOR LOS$ OF DECAY HEAT Ft N05. 697p9 AND 6979C) i The NRC staff has reytowed year response to Generic Letter 8817 - r it generally espeettteus meets active.s and isthe intehttons adequate for p of the generic letter .otie find te with thatresp st i ant operetten, 1 recesmondattens is the capattitty to close to be incomplete in the fellowing respects: centataannt. generic letter Veer response appears
- 1. Tracking of containment 1 j !
- opened by
- manual means.'penetrattens references only these that h6ve been :
i 2. ! You spec 1fIcally address closure ! Precedure be closed.* 12006.C whtsh ensures "of the equipment hatch v14 Operattens j Abneriaal Operettag Proceestethat the centstament eeutpoemt hatch can i operators to inttinte costalanent tissure "1801g.C 'will testruct the , actual completica of teetstaneet closure w. lie find as reference to
- 3. partievlarly with respect te penetrattees other set that the equipoithia hatch, l i
help ettigate the effects of a less eofstarted en,ironment.* ammet leftteen the cos 1 that fans investi will be seeilable ser de you s ave address whether , i nous.ggated e.,i, i.itietthe fossib(11% of continues work withts contatas
.e. .imin the einte the n feetter2 r--vessei a.e main . .wa.eet once i I L *
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! W. s. P.trston, !!! l 2 January 27, 19st 1 in regares to the other expedittuus ttoms, the program scenttf tee tr your j - response gererte f etnas ter.the capabt hty to seeovately eservsn the concerns empressed ta the However, your responses are brief ans. therefore, cc not allow j us to fully unser;.tane your action taken in response to GL sa-17 You may wist j are adequately addressed:tc =centeer several caservattuns in order to. assure you 1. { You en try.reference the casultments as implesented prior to the nest planned i ! condition that is Geltberate on the part 91 theMence, operators.We ar. assu i entry for the purpose of repatring an unanticipates rwactor coolant pus, ' seal failure eccident would would be a planned entry. An er.try due to a less of coulant be uriplar.ned. of the generic letter. Any other meaning will not meet the intent \ 3 2. j You also reserve the right to make changes 'in the future if appropriate
- The inter.t of the ger. arts letter is to allee changes under the gu i
the progressed enhancement recossendettens and subject to your av,teance'of review, as app 11 cable. .ll r k 3. i ether than level indicattsn.The lesson plan eescription did not identify the s { i behavier are else toyertant. Teaperature and the attitty to mentter RNR 4 i The lessen plos descripties did not identify ses,h vertes detail as i sysytoms and suitable operator response to prevent less of 28 i S. i The lesson plan description is states to provide 'an adeemste cuareness
- the part of personnel involved la ate. loop operattens.* Nistorical i espertence shows easy MR lenses causes b i
often by maintenassa and test personne). y apparently trett net personne) . to .veta such diffisslties, Teer progree them14 he assigned 4 1 6. You indicate removal of a presseriter esasey, steen generster asseray e three We note pre:neriter that relotteecode safet,y valves as asass to peeride RCS'eest1at. presser 18er seang e la e het side opentags is the RCS sock as a j j large stees fler eed the tsubinatten of fles restrictions is th ! line . leser pressertaer hererare . asseeay spostag. , s be perferend to eartfy the effectiveness of the opettag.C41es14ttens should l
}
There is ne need to regpeed to the above et this time. l b
; 1 1
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I i e s .- Answ/ [12 l '12*E
! 2?]o
- No/
W. G. Hatrsten, !!! - 5 . i a January 27. 1989 } As .wou are svare, the espediticas actions ycu have briafly describ e are and interim measure to achievethesc reca.6ed an tsunedtete reductionwithin risk associa byinventory uperatics., and 6111 be supplemented and in som i 1 replat,at' progr.assied enhancements. e cases tu audit both your espediticus actlers and your prcgrasuned enhanc ogram. , Thebe mey areas covered where in thewe audit doofn6t fully uncerstand espedittous actt6ht. your responset ase indicated ab 1 s
~
5 tacerely, 8 i
" . 4, r ,
- ' on B. Hopking, Project l'.4hager I ..
Project Otrectorate !!.3 Otvision of Reactor Projects - t/t! . Off1ce of nucleer Reactor B.vgulatton cc: See nest page , 1 e n I I ? i se l l r l l 1 i t . - __ . _ _ _ __. .
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ATTACBEENT 3 ,,, .N ~ P:
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1 i i j (LV- 00184 174J17-V110 09420 4 1 U. 3. Nuclear Aegulatory Comission AT7N: Document Centrol Desk washtngton, D. C. ROSSE PLANT YOGTLE - UNITS 1. and 1 1 NRC DOCKti 50-424. 50-atl { i OPERATING LICINSC NPF.63. CONSTRUCT!aN PERn RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTtt 48-17 _ ) Gent feann: , I ^ l the enclosed response to the recomended prog Letter Inventory reested 3817 related conditten. to less of residust heat reseval natie operatingji i even thosgh unit speciffe dotatis Thisany response refoe toapplies entt 1.to heth unita 1 and 1
- responded letter dated to Desseeer the receanended 29,1988 expeditfeus settees of Generister la Pouer Company.
46 17 by i esorgta Power Campeg essects se taplement att hermere l following tee seeses gett 1 free the progreened ensansements s resutstag prior i sperattens i and first unit I refue11ep l { that 1990. se not involve heresare changes are senoduled .to sebytag tahancements May 3 k i j reseval systes perferngene tedicatten has met b evaluatt4 18 act engiste, le that the i the entleast teergte 14 peuer tempty ceaset be sure specifts than i these heresere Ceepsay will sukelt a desertetten of j the evalvettees, ut Wittle apprestattely tus meeths fellertes enepletten of ts currently projected for estater 1.1988. 1
- ..asy t o tussed.12.tte fsters. ff apareertateThe snelesed re ensure that any future saaeges. .. 1aPouerCagaw stJ1
! ss.17. will maintata the 1 of Generte Letter i revise. Infersettee relates to this issue ut11 to ava11able i .
If there are arg geestfees concerntng this letter, platse sevfte. 1
; [. i . ; -l i; p) 21 *
- i+
j U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Compf ss fon t' Y 00186 {
- a s e f.e l
Mr. W. G. Hafrsten
- !!! states Georgfa Power Company a,ndthat he is a senter fs autherf aed to Vfce execute President this esth of en hehalf o j f acts set forth in this letter and anciesures are true.Georgf a Pow 1
! E0RGIA POWER COMPMY By:
- u. s. nairsson, Igg
- Sworn to and subscrfbed before as this day of January, 1983.
- 4
"~
i Notary Pvalft ) i' c seerste Power Cemeeny Mr. P. p. Efte i j Mr. C. K. McCoy - Mr. 6. Beckhold. Jr. I N i i U. 5. maclear teem 1sters Camef asten Mr. M. L. Ernst. Actfas Reglens! Adminfstrator'
- Mr. J. B. Nepklas. Lfeenstag Project Msasger, 28 (t espies)
Mr. J. F. Regga e Senter Resteent Inspector-Operettens Vogtle i i .'l . . . .. .. .. . . .. d 4 J I I
(i . ~. s . ~ j; . . i py :?: ? :n (NCL0$URC i GE0eG!A POWER COMPAMT RESPONSE To { NRC GENERIC LETTEA s4-17 PROGRAPe9CD EMMANCEMENTS i i { the prograssmed ennancements of Generte Letter 64-1 provided pursuant to 10 CFA 50.54(f): 1 -
- 1. Nec RECOMMENDATION j
i Preyfde reliabia indication of parameters that describe the state of the to cool the ACs for eeth normal and accidereactor coolant systes (RCS) ! provide the followf ag in the control rece:nt condittena. At a minimus. (a) fue independent RCS level inJfcations, i (b) i At least two fadopendent temperature esssurements representative of thethe of coresv. satt uhenever the reactor vessel (RV) head is located on top all tlass.) (We suggest that temperature indicattens be provided at , (c) ! The capabtif ty of continuously senttoring residual heat reaeval (sHR) tes eCS. performance whenever an RE system is being usee for cos11pg systes 1 (d) . Visible and audible indfcattens of abnere64 een i temperature, level. and 42 systes performance.dittens - in 4 (PC RWOW (s) As stated la sur December 29.1988 subatttal. SCS unter level is senttered via temporary level testrusosatten whenever the BCS is la i e reessed towestery conditten. Operettees precolares include i testall topperary level fastrussets prior to dretalfastruc the BCS.
!aseressetettee and Centeel precedure Leuel '9C5 rary Water j
1 ties tastructices for testa n 230061.llette tue and is of level indicatten estes tem tetlag level tastrumentatten in the sentre) porary rees. Leveltranseitters i is
- ~
esegwed errors. direstly free the het leg between the RV e See cheesel provides wise ranse level channet provides narrow ran The tadies apprestattely one feet telow sid ge level tedicattee fees i leep to the top of the het leg. Level fs aestinuously senttored and alorsed to the sentrol rees. A 1sw leg. level alare is set at three inches asete the tester of th GPC is presently evaluating a desten changa satch util provide for peresnest installetten of the level transmitters, un espect to have this ovelsatten eenpleted by Octateel . Igm.
t i ER '7-3 j tesponse to MAC Generic Letter 8817 p r ' c 34I
- ELY.oo185 Page Two The design design dovetoement and an error analysts. will fac1wde a review of the instrumentation l control and follow up review of the installatlee and reviewGPC w111 als matetenance and calfbretten practices.
t j (b) As stated fn avr December ts.1:44 submittal, Operations Procedures t at all tfees durfag reduced faventory condittees wit place. These precedures wf11 be revised to reestre either:
- Temperature vf11 he senf tered and recorded by an operater in the control room at fatervals no greater than 15 einstes, or j - Temperature vf11 to contfnvously asaltered amt alarmed via the taersency Response factif ty (ERF) computer to the centrol rose.
j These two core exit thersecouples will provide sentinurus, ' fndependent, and representative fadication of the core temperature. , ! (c) i An engineerine parameters thatstudy will he ends wil' provide timelto deterwine the specif ts I of degraded RW pump performance. ytrettable isticattee of the enset i ' Tee study will tastede consideration indicattee of of pgthe recosamadattens aster current of generie Letter 3317 seen 64 ( indicatten, see e possible correlattee of pertesters. Ils exp i complete thfa study by Otteber 1.1908. The rees1ts of this study will letter be to taplemented according to the schedule diaeussed la the cover this treassittal. (d) I f As dissessed stove. Act level is esattamenely asettered and alarm I in the sontrol rose earfag operettee la a redseed leventary condittee. Taiperature will either he cheeked set resorted by as . centrol or esattameme reen.W mattered and alarmed via the W eg ! The engtesertag study diessseed to ttee (e) aheve. j will syntes feelste essetderettee of vistkle ses esitt)e testeettee perfereness.
- 2. f,j RME 4
j .. and that provide se adequate hasts for entry 1ste conduttles,-Thees feeleste - - - - - - "- 1 - - - - - I . (a)
; procedures that sever sermal operettee of the R$8e the eestatement.
j sed.sapportfag systees under condittees for ektet egeltog use14 nores11p he provided by the AMR system. (b) i Procedures that sever emergency, abneMuel, eff eerus), or the
; equivalent operettee of the N555, the tentalengst j systems if en off-seral condition occurs while op. eraties and supporting under ; condttfees 8Fste8.
for idifen eseling would nores11y to provided ly the RMR 1 ---- _ ----------------- .. _
s C,i -.- : { p/ , ;20 % mea, ase te mac sentric Letter as.17 r.y.ootes j es,e rarse 1 i (c) ! Aeministrative frems (a) controis that support and supplement the procedu e r s in 5 $8-17. as. (b)f end appropt ete. all other actions identified in Generic Lette 59C ats90NSE (a) j l precedure for operetten in a reduced inventory c operattens Procedure 12004-C. ' Unit Coeldown to Cold Shutdown. precedure contafas precautfens and 11mitattens concerning This operetto i ! fa aACS the reduced faventary for drainfag condf tfen This gutdance t and provides guidance g for pre ! instrumentatten 108 pump performance,edresa temperature and level ! In,jectfen pump for inventory additten, if needed.and the use of a cafety 1 precedure l instructfens for draining the RCS.13005-1. .Reacter C This precedure a se contains " j precautfens concerntng tne effects of RCS level en R2 system 4 sperabflfentylevel drainfog andfadicatfon. instructions which should ministas the tapact of i I Procedum l 13011 1
- Residual Heat Remeval Systa'. provides the
! operatlea fe e reeuced feventory tenditten.necessary ins during reduced taventory operettee. procedure address the 3 (t)
'tess of am*. et11 provide the nosestary e coeltag and direct the operaters te lettlete testateneet tissure i Centstaneet sleeure will be essempitsbed via Natetenance p 21806 C. *epentag and Clostas Centstaneet testament e Nete
{ assimistrative sentrol to the fore of as leformatten Llettlag i Cemettles for penettettees spenedterettee LCSI. asens W es(asal shtet wt11 are treated. essere tidt a i I (c) As stettd to ser Gesenhor 29.1908 ! mistetes eagettive aestrel over thesehnittal the Attt superviser penetrettees spened by esanal seens. egutpase,t hatet ans all { i sittgettag a less of 22 ovent: alas essere that the follow i - Egstposet for faveetery addities
- . Adegeste het leg vest path, and ,
. Safe vert envirossent to complete contatenest slesere.
i December 29. Igg 8 setsittalSpt believes that, etth the revist j praattte with regard te oper VtGp precedures util refleet the best current i Newever, any forther geldance that results fram Westtaghe activity se ele tapfs stil te revissed nad teensemenw *se Ohners' Grove - --~ --
l q;
- .]
a.. , ens. i. senersc ..tter as- n CLV-001:4 Page four O a
- 3. MRC ttC0mtN0aT10N 1
- m 4..or, in. ...... . e, era t ing, e..r.61.,
.../.e j
.v.n.ii.
a less of .u ACS s tof hfgh coeltag. reliabtitty la provided for cooling the RC5 ans j ) (t) j Mefntain sufffstent entsting soutpoent in an eserable er avallante
;. status they se as to sittgate less of RMR er less of aC5 taventory, shou occur. .
puso and one This othershould systes. include at least one nigh pressure injection The water additten rate capable of being preytded the by each equfpaent ites should be at least sufficient te k core covered. l d 5 (c) activitfes related to the ACS or systems necess acs in a stable and contre 11ed conditten. GPC tt!PONSE (a) The lum (ICCS). systes at VESP fs part of the taargency Core Caeling re11able. This system fs safety related and therefore highly i Furthefuere, the AMR autoclosure 1sterlock fonettes is defeated for speriews. inclosureModesof8the and RNR6 whica svetion olisinates feelettes valves. the assettsted potential (b) Inventary pusy and a addities safety injectica will be accesplished via a oesteffv31 cha ing j the ICC5 and are therefore higa . Seth of these are et ! free these pumps will be sore than suffittest to relittle. The ouretes available covered. ! i the core available fer thetsAestatstrative eestrelseswill paths ensure are that ; l
- Furthermore, Preendere 8019=C provides for the see of t i generators as en siternate usans of eseling stes appropriate. j j (c)
Aseguate investery o ognisseet for perseasel sessoaisattaes dertog redseed i ! t precedere. perettes presently entsts at VOIP and ts regstred by t
- 4. OCJM Candset bests eer ass 1sses to suppleaset existint isforsettes and d '
i eget i
*
- SS fatorettfens and res testrumentatten insta11sttee and p
* encampers thermedpastit est physica
. The est ese abes14 esf1gerst i ete W D stich i
i that the basis is developed.the hartere een be estjected a Esphasis thes14 ne pleene igen j ottaletag operatfee. a esoplete understanding of 1888 beterter seder een p i 4
- I t '
[ !. . J y ,' i gesponse to NRC Generte i.etter 6417 p' M ' lE (LY.00186 j Page Five 1 6PC RESPenSt-1 l WC. as a soster of the Westinghouse Owners' Group has reviewed 4 j utAP-11918 Pnd utilfsed 4As analysis and guidance p,revfded ther t hasts gg, less forsuhaittal. the hardware Furtherand precedersi changes discussed in our De analy te validate the annerurt eggques.sts is baial peedemand.hg Westtag, house informatten for Vt47 and outdance finaltsed.as este changes OpC will revias th appropriate.f5 i i ( effects that any fetroduce level inaccuracies. PWr ere-operettenal testing has been performed on Unit i uhtch varied RC3 i , level and RM system new to determine susceptibility te vertas j Finally, a plast spectffe analysts will he anse to seppert faventary ptt1en yfa grev1ty flaw from the refueltog water storage tank to'the I 5. IRC RECIDeceATION ' i I settens identiffed la this letter should be identifle changes should be sehnitted. { i ! allow the safety fajection pumps to be ava11thle , reduced inventory conditten without having to tevehe le CRF 50.54I. l
- 4. NRC RECRfMAI1E i
{ Itas (5) of the espedittees actions should be reesamined and opers reffned as estessary to reasonably sicistas the likelineed of less of Am. l WC RM ! 1 i As thatstated to our Decenter 29. 19e8 schattiel po ngtreanyevtherfastfon merk. free the Unit th1It Superviser prior toVERP h Operattens procedures include precautions te
- RCS inventary shfle la a toduced inventory tendition.sc These procedures i
, will 9.in
. ,.w ni1 he arevised to ensure that og be.41ese reettog.Javestergseae1tthe wert that map' tapact 32 capast11ty y.scrutfatsed. iieck w111 i
! enhances senttertng of critical parameters and precaut limitations) to protest a less of RM. : I i spc believes that the above esasures in conjunctice with the emptssis
- placed on ste.1oep operattens during 11consed operater trafetas and the l
other measures efseussed are adessets to stafelse act porturbattens during reduced feventary ta this letter and our Decenter 29. lj , operatfen. ~ 1 ! 4 4 i , -. _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ -.
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poCCEDvaENO REvaSION
- AGE NO
.VEGP 50006-C hl W El 5 U E E3 8 3 8 10 of 12 f f,- , 7. . J DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST -)
- lO DCR NO.9D-V/4h/3J REV O UNIT LNC DATE J-24 9 0 I E SAFETY 1LEl.AT D / YES NO DRAWING CMANCE ONLY i N EXEMPT NON-EKEMPT SITE l G SYSTEM or COMPONENT (Designation / Plant No. & Description): l I S Y STGm 2403 D&s st M e s n ATo c_ s l N DESIGN OBJECTIVE: E m u- r.e Die. m fe m r.,m -s n rer m u .u ._n E n .2 , .,e w e s 7 4 u n_ s_.er ~ r u .. w m em m.t ta ofc w 3 ., ws c . a E SUGGESTED CHANGE (attach sketches, verked-up dwgs, etc) - if known:
R Eu. . a as t .u um e e s se a olu -raias me uv. 0 , e = Ano i I mc sepasus ruar p.t.s w ~t w nusy r. & A.2 s r A r .r m -r. o a .
REFERENCES:
G S LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUIRED: / YES ,NO. IF YES. Describe: U F AC NO: ESTIMJA ED CO e 6 r ~ / CMahd 3/2</h .1NL iUf MA R Tesponsible EngMeer /Date Eatineeri upp Su ./ Date
/o~s.^%/4 DA EF SP DCI approved for Design Developeant / TRS 30 g (a- = "- =>
A / a t., G ..,.u.e NY / Flast Suppo g Manager /Date A p L DESIGN CRANGE PACKAGE REVIEWED AND ACCEPTABLE Responsible Engineer / Data Eng. Support Sept. / Date .i 1 DCP SAFETT RELATED: MA , PP l i LF PRS RECCBGEND8: Proceed with impleasatation - Licensing l ER documsat change approval required i N0 Do not proceed until licensing document approval EY received NA Proceed - No licensing doctanent changes necessary
- TL DCP rejected. Raasoa A
T PRS Ntg Be. Date 1 FRS Chairman /Date 0 Impleasatation as Recommended Approved Tts 30 N GENERAL MANAGER DATE DCF Non Safety talated: PLANT SUFFORT NGR DATE FIGURE 1 i nous
*cCCEOL8E NO REv' ** ~ E SC VEGP 50006-C 11 of 12
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- JUSTIFICATION
{ ] REGUIATORY REQUIRDtENT/ LICENSING COMMITMENT [ ] DEFICIENCY CORRECTION DC NO. RER NO. [ IMPROVE SYSTEM /0PERATION PERFORMANCE l DETAILED EIPLANATION: ! Ces Jl7.ol9o, tJway C p s. D/(. A Ts. ppcn l Ts.c i c.C Fos.m u4 A Low er ors 4irc. Pos aes . ()re a j Ses uG e m G d.4 e a s:.67 3TA,LT6.D(ewosr o/G T4 e e,s af 4 .4 ss et>) TX l 0% c.,cu s r~ ve. O n Aun . Ta o v.s s t .saoc.* To ~ s M** s) r~ v e s T* s* A r*a ~ a TO D .* T G* s M O
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COST /SENEFIT ANALYSIS (NOTE: Required if change is requested to improve
- performance) uls INSTAI.LATIOF
[ ] NO SPECIAL OUTAGE CE FIANT CONDITIONS REQUIRED (PRafIDE CUTAGE DETAILS FOR SYSTDts. PLANT CtBIDITIONS PRESSURE / TEMP. j . IF EITEEE OF TIE FOLLOWDC BLOCKS IS CEECEID)
- [ FAETIAL MY BE U NEED W/0 OUTAGE 7,cAe,v oer,40E5 w , s s. u Ac w ecT
] [ ] OUTass angrIns I i i 1 4 i .. ! FIGURE 1 (CONT'D.) i
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ser:I;LpE NO CEvi 3GE NO
*iGP 50006-C 12 ef 12 7,
J DCR No. b MI' i
- ESIGN CRANGE PACKAGE CLOSURE j Yes No N/A MWO's Completed and Closed? _ ,,,,,,_
A3Ns Issued? l FCRs Approved and Attached? ,,,,,,,, , , , , , , , , , , _ . , , , , , Deficiencies Resolved. _,,_, ,,,_,, Testing Complete & Results Acceptablef ___ MWO Nost i i ABN Nos: FCR Nos 4 DC Nos: " , Systaas/equipasnt may be returned to service based upon satisfactary couplettom of testing, availability of as-builts, and adequate training , and to revised operating procedures. j Operations Supervisor / Date d All Closecut Requirements Rave Seen Completed. ) Responsible Engineer / Date Eng. Supv. / Data r I FINAL FBS REQUIRED: Yes _ No _ FINAL RETIElf Data i Eng1asering Support Sept. DCF Cleeste Asseptabla YES 30. If 30. amplain: FBS Meettag Ee. Date 4 PRR Chairess / Data 0 FIGURE 1 (CONT'D.) m., .
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4.1 Origineters bab C# ' # # / ' f Priority W 1 _ 2 Print Name Date Affected Doctament: I-M d tapected Document (e): 5 :sT.en 55 II2 4 i . t I t. 2 b Change: ise o f4 Is.d i ' & r 4- 2 c .u a f / .1 hc h .. .- () Justification: L i. ntTs h(d- ' s flees this change: - (1) Cometitutes en Dereviewed Safety Questies? YES ( l NC (d (2) Cocatitutes a reducties is 04 program Comm1'taest? TES ( l NO (g (3) Cassettutes a change in Technical Specifiestieaaf TES ( l 30(I If chasse effecte Energeasy Plaa aseeer (4) otherwiseg N/A N/A( (a) toduces effectiveness of the Amorgeoey Plant - TES ( l , WO ( ) It change effects Security, aseeer (S) otherwtaeg N/A W/A(W (S) Redues effectiveness of the Seestity Plan er TBS ( l 50 44f Ni y, Omard Traistag and Oma11fication Plant NRC Approval to Required prior te laplementaties if any of the above are YES. O / M ry\M originattag Dept. Esad ipprows1
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/ signature 9 not.
Ceesurresse ' I.2 LDCR Coordianters dim 4 / N/ 9/Pltt C ~-
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- LDCR Coordinatora Signsture le 4J l / >A- Base 3 6-67 ry.AMPLt. FIGURE 1 i
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?lant Vottle - L* nit No. I and !! lot & F *. 'R-CM b Intertie of Class 1E 4160V Buses (g paced s')
REA VG-8621. Additional Response File- X78Dlos/X38CO3 Lot- NPFSG-02486 I Mr. S. N. Chesnut ; Georgia Power Company i 333 Piedmont Building. 20th Floor l Atlanta. Georgia
Dear Mr. Chesnut:
This letter was written at the request of the Engineering Support Department to clarify our previous response to REA VG-4621 regarding the. connection of both Class 1E 4160V buses to the same RAT during shutdown Modes 5 and 6. The initial response to this REA was sent to you in a letter dated July 20, 1948. Log: NPFSG-02142. Enclosed is the revised i Safety Evaluation (Revision 1) for the subject REA which was amended to address the power source to the non-Class 1E 13.8KY buses. Our previous response specified that the non-Class 1E 4180V buses be energized through the UATs as part of this configuration. This was based upoh the capability of the RATS as described in existing calculations and desc.istrated by functional test. The response to fSAR Question 430.59 comalted to this condition of isolation to ensure the integrity of the one reestning offsite power source to the required Class 1E buses. Although not specifically stated, our previous response to the REA assumed that the 13.8KV buses would also be powered by the UATS. Given that in this configuration there is only one operable offsite power source for the Class IE buses. the additional connection of a 13.4KY bus to the energized RAT would create a decrease in rellability of the Class 1E distribution system.
) tore leportaatly, the specific configuration of both Class 1E 4160V buses and a asa-Class IE 13.8KV bus energized free one RAT has not been evaluated by calculation nor adequately demonstrated by functional test, which is as IIRC requirement to verify the adequacy of the power distributten system under degraded conditions.
EC l- % ? Mr. S. H. Chesnut dq7 / J T! a 4 .- Page 2 l7} 9 The attached Safety Evaluation (which supersedes the previous one) " incorporates requirements concerning the 13.8KV bun supply from the UATs and also provides corresponding mark-ups of applicable FSAR sections. This completes the response for REA VG-8621. If you have any questions regarding this satter contact David Gambrell at extension 4486. This additional evaluation was compieged within the initial budget for this REA. therefore no new authorization is required. Very truly yours, M R. L. George. Manager Nuclear Plant Support - Vogtle DLG/dl ' [ Attachment
- ac: A. L. Mosbaugh
- R. E. Lide * .40RMS
- T. E. Richardson J. A. Bailey PFE-DDC
- i 1
1 J. D. Nurd J. E. Hallmark GPC Reading Files * (21 J. M. Wholess F. Thompson
- NPFSG Files * :
J. L. Haratyk
- K. Kopecky
- 2-02464 S. Pietrzyk
- A. Farruk
- W. C. Ramsey
- P. M. Kochery
- i 1
1 . l I ) f2 /- f.;-5 DCp N/A ] Other *** N ee21 s.E. Rev i i page 1 of a b SAFETY EVALUATION
- a. Description of proposed change. test or esperiment.
The following temporary configuration of the Unit 1 AC power system is a required in order to remove either one of the Reserve Auxiliary 4
' Transformers (RAT: INXRA 8) froe service during Cold Shutdown. This 2
shall be implemented during operational Modes 5 and 8 only. In onder to j eest Technical Specification LCOs. To toplement this configuration the normal preferred offsita .wrce circuit breaker of ese of the Class IE 41e0 V switchgear (1AAa2 or 18A03: 1-1804-82-A03 and A03 respectively) ] 4 will be transferred to the alternate offsite source breaker cubicle. This will electrically connect both safety buses to the same RAT. All { Non-Class II buses (13.8 and 4.16 KV) will be powered free the Unit i Auxiliary Transformers (UAT) which w1J2 he 'back-fed' from the 230 KV bus through the Main Step-Up Transformers. This will require the main generator to be isolated at the discossect links. Also to ensure j isolation and not escoed the RAT capability. the alternate facoming 'j breakers (feed free RATS) on the Non-Class 18 bases must be 'raoked-out' and tagged to prevent actuation by an automatic bus transfer. i Applicable plaat procedures seat be revised to reflect the proper system i i i allgament and concerns as a result of this ceafiguration. ' 4 i This temporary configuratina of the ' Crees-Train' intertie say only be loplemented during Modes 5 and 8. per Tech. Spec. LCOs 3.8.1.2. 3.8.3.1
- and 3.8.3.2. based upon Regulatory Guide 1.98. per these specifications j 1 ohe of the energised safety buses and its correspond 1ag support systems i
tie. diesel generator) shall be fully operable la order to supply power i 1 to the loads required during Cold Shutdesa. l j (continued on page 2 of 8)
- b. Reason for proposed change, test or esperiment.
} The purpose of thle temporary ceafiguration le to de-energise one of the i RAfs for malatesance purpeces shale providtag reliable poser to both i Class 15 buses 1AA03 and 18408. through the reenlaing RAT and to the plaat aus111ery leads threegt the UAfe during eeld shutdesa (Modes 5 and ! 4 sely). The ' Crees-Trala' intertie of the Claas'15 buses has been ! diesessed la the FSAR for use la emergency ettuations only. Also the j guestles and answer section of the FSAR, and the SSR address this j configuraties. Preeperational test 1-300-01, " Integrated Safeguards and l 9 Lead Seguencing Test". deme n trated the capability of each RAT to power j both Class 18 4100 V buses sa conjeacties with as SSFAS signal. The NRC staff (Per SSSR S:8.3.1) found this configuraties fully acceptable, j provided all other Technical Specifications are met.
l
)
l [d "N *] DCP N/A l
, Other RaA vg-se21 S.E. Rev 1 i
$$ $ J T )bp' j Page 2 of e I
- SAFETY EVALUATION CONTINUATION S M i
Part A. cont.. i
# l 1
The electrical connection of the other Close 1E ewitchgear to thle buw j will confors to the separation requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 in 4 that the breaker foolation and evallability of the standby power source will ensure the asterrity of the required power supply regardless of failures on the alternate switchgear. The body of this safety Evaluation will provide more discueston on the specific lapset of this configuration upon the PSAR and F.O.L. Tech. 3pec. Below la a summary of all applicable references. F.O.L. Technical Specifiestion i j LCOe: i 3.8.1.2. 3.8.3.1, 3.8.3.2 j Sases: i i 3/4.8.1. 3/4.8.2. 3/4.8.3. 3/4.8.8 ! r l Flaal Safety Analyele Report 1.8.4.2 Q.1.4.1. 8.1.4.2. 8.3.1.1.3 j Figures: 8.3.31-1 and 4.3.1-2 Table 8.3.1-3 Questione: 430.58 and 430.80 i i Safety Evaluatloa Report 8.3.1 and Supplement S (8.3.1) 4 00C-17 la appendia A of to CFR Part 50 i Regulatory Guides 1.88 and 1.78 (IEEE 344.1974) i Preeporttlees! Test 1-300-01 (Secties 4.3.48) Vogtle Dealga Criteria: 1000-E 1801, 1804. 1881 i i t I l d I l l
, e -. - . -
e ,
I 1 DCP _N/A ' N /* Ii Other anA VG-es21 S.E Rev 1 A
' .55 Fage 3 et e
- c. 'bes the proposed change involve e change to Technical j Specifications? {
(!acludes Environmental Tech. Spec.) Yes No -. X a
- As stated in parts A and 3 of thle Safety Evaluaties. thle configuration shall be loplemented only during Modes 5 and e. The
' ' LCOs of 3.8.1.2 and 3.s.3.2 require that only one offette power j
source and only one train of the emergency buses suet be j energised in Modes 5 and 8. provided that the corresponding j diesel generator le operable. Therefore these conditione mill be
~
met and exceeded by the availability of both Class 18 distributloo systese. Thus a change to the Technical Specifications le not required; however, this ceafiguration ehould be carefully considered in relatica to the Action i ' Statements of the above sections.
- d. Does the proposed change involve a change la the facility se described or laplied la the FSAR7 l
- i. Yes 1 Ne i I j PSAR Section s.3.1.1.2 describes the Class 15 power system. The l
third paragraph in thle section which describes the capacity of 3 the AATe, should be revised to indicate that each RAT also has l i the capacity to provide power to both Class 1E Trataa. PSAR ! ] Section 8.3.1.1.2.0 states that the traaefer to as alternate 3 2 offekte source by an emergency bus mould be does sely if the ! normal eeurce, the standby source, and the redundaat bus were all j lost slaultaneously. This statement should be revised to show
' that this may also be done during liedes 8 and 8 for maintenance purpeces. FSAR Questlose 430.89 and 430.00 diocese the RAT power i
capabilities and the Class 15 4.14gV eserce breaker arrangement. j respectively. The Responses to these Questfees refer to the FSAR sections above and should be revised accordingly. See the j attached FSAR aark upe for the segreeted changes. i e j Other seettens of the PSAR as listed la part A et this Safety Evaluaties, disones the Class 15 peser systes, but de met require 4 revieles. i I h 1 1 l 1 > l 2 4 N e d
DCP s/A f/ / 4 *~2t Other *** VG-seal S.E. sev 1 y ;.r > ..f yg e= * *t *
- e. Does the proposed change involve a change in procedures Jescribed or laplied in the FSAR7 Yes X No l I
FSAR Section 8.3,1.2.D leplies the adherence to the cases it
' distribution system alignment procedures. The Response to FSAR {
l Question 430.80 details minimus actions which must be performed
- to latertie the two Class 1E 4.183V buses. Applicable procedures j should be revised accordingly to reflect the changes la the FSAR provided as a result of this toeporary configuration and this safety Evaluation. These procedures should indicate the systes allgament required to loplement this configuration including the back feed through the UATs. Specific requirements should i
faclude, but not limited to;
- 1) the alismeent to remove either !
RAT free service. 2) rock-out and tag Non-Class 18 breakers (from RATS) to prevent automatic bus transfer. 3) safety concerns and
- 4) any applicable system limitations.
I f. Does the proposed change favolve a test er esperiment not described or laplied in the FSAR7 , Yes Me X This allgament is a temporary change la the Class 1E poser systes configurstlos and does not coastitute a test or esperiment. The i provistems for this schose have been stated la Secties 0.3.1.1.2 and are further evaluated la Questless 430.59 and 480.00. This configuratloa one addressed and femad acceptable by the NRC as sheen la SSER 5. section 4.3.1.
- g. Does the proposed change, test, or orporinent lacrease the probability of occurrence or ceasegmences of as accident described la the PSAR?
Yes No I FSAR Scoties 18. specifically 18.3.6. does met discuss the esserresse of as accident in Modes 5 and 8 skich eenceras the availability of reduadant safety buses. if an event should occur i uhleh estivates the RSFAS systes, the RSF seguencer has dessestrated its operability for this configerettee. (Ref: SSER S j t Scotles 8.3.1). Therefore this systes allgament does met teeresse the prehability of as accident as described la the applicable PSAR sections. 1 i f -
I i
!R ! A3 .? ocp un
^ 3 r Other naa VG-es21 3.t. Rev 1 p
,). :-O f ]$
i Fage s of a l l h. Does the proposed change, test, or esperleent increase the i probability of occurrence or cons 4quences of the aalfunction of i any equipment or component assumed to function in accidents j analyzed in the FSAR? Yes No X j This configurstion is temporary and shall be administratively !
' 1splemented in operational Modes 5 and 4. only. FSAR section 1
15.3 shows that in Cold Shutdown the plant does not require the operation of any equipeent or component chich could not be i available to perfore its safety related function as a result of ; 1 this alignment of the power systees. Therefore this t configuration does not increase the probability of malfunction related to the equipment assumed to function in accidents. l specifically during Cold Shutdown.
- 1. Does the proposed change, test or experiment create the possibility of an accident or equipment / component selfunction not j described and analysed in the PSAR?
Yes No X , i i t Saeed upon the FSAR and Design Criterios references of part A. this modified configuration (Modes 5 and 4 ealy) fully conforms to the functional requirements of the Class 18 buses, the safety i loads and the ESF systes. Therefore this modificaties does not j 4 create the possibility of any equipment aalfuncties, specifically during Cold shutdown. a j . Does the proposed chan8e, test er experiment decrease the margin of safety defined by the bases of the Technical Specifications?
; Yes No X Sases 3/4.8.1. 3/4.8.8 and 3/4.8.3 sore evaluated concerning the tapact of this temporary ceafiguraties. The availability of both ' Class 15 poser tralas meets and escoede the lattial condition assumptions of the applicable safety analyses and provides at i
least see set of distributies systems required for operation during Cold abatdesa. The modified plant configuration in these E des le sensistent w!,th requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.93 4 and W C-17 is appendia A of 10 CFR PART S0. The operability of the diesel generater Per 3.8.1.3 provides additteest assurance i that the safety function of critical systema is set lost celacident eith as accident in these Modes. Therefore this i alignment does met decrease any margia of safety defined in the Tech. Spec. 4 a ) 5 4
a
'; ) ; q, . '".m DCP N/A Other REA VG-8621 SE Rev 1
^ $.") s! Q Page 6 of 6
- k. Does the proposed change. test. or experiment anvolve an unreviewed safety question?
Yes No X __ Based upon the responses to parts G.H.I. and J of this Safety 4 Evaluation the proposed configuration described herein does not anvolve an unreviewed safety question. Furthermore this configuration is fully acceptable and is consistent with the requirements of the FSAR and F.O.L. Tech. Spec. provided thet tne proper administrative controle and app!! cable LCOs are not i exceeded. Specitsc concerns and limitations are made evident n th?s Safety Evaluation and therefore shall be integrated snto this configurat20n and the applicable procedures. q- . 1 i i 4 / e I i l i t l tDu( JLw// - de,// D. . eksbr t i LDS VA Z $^ Date 24s/ss Power / ical/Neele # Date / Of PENV/ Designee I Date h*M[s k I Ji i
i a-i A TT A Cu rnE NT T D 6. f.. (M V.1) R t. EA C- % Z I 2- ) VECP-TSAR-8 -
# ~
i Z f5 ~~ 3-Is startin 1 scheme.g to open utilizing an early "b" control 1 No paralleling of the two power sources occurs during the transfer. l j Each unit auxiliary cransformer has the capacity to supply the connected non-Class 1E load. l i i 4.3.1.1.2 Class 1E System i .
- The Class 1E ac power system is the power source used in or i associated with shutting down the reactor and preventing or
] limiting basis event. the release of radioactive material following a design power trains, The system is divided into two independent ac train A and train B, each fed from an independent l Class 1E bus with immediate access to offsite power sources.
system. 8.3.1-1 shows a schematic of the Class 1E ac power Figure Category 1Allstructures. safety-related equipment is housed in seismic j 1 The Class 1E ac system distributes power at 4.16 kV, 440 V7 and 120 V ac to all safety-related loads. Also, the Class 1E ac
- system supplies through isolation devices certain selected loads operation.
plant which are not safety related but are important to the i Figure 8.3.1-2 indicates the major the class 15 ac system. safety-related and isolated nonsafety-related loads j The non-Class 1E ac system supplies preferred (offsite) power i to the Class4-16-kV transfo'rmer 1E ac system windings. through the reserve auxiliary
- Each reserve auxiliary
! transformer has the capacity to supply all connected non-class 1E running _ loads M te start and _run the loads mi one_ Class 1E
~~
n,Gr to start 'asi res the foods st'beth C%ss'1E' trains! See paragraph 8.3.1.1.2.0 for further discussica. i u g: = = = DD , In addition to the above power distribution, the Class 1E ac i system contains standby power sources which provide the power required power preferred for safe shutdown in the event of a loss of the sources. i The power, control, and
- instrumentation cables essential for safe shutdown are routed i
with adequate sv aration from their redundant counterparts, The systems:following describes various features of the class 1E 1 A. Power Supply Feeders Each 4.16-kV load group can be supplied by one of two
- preferred (standby) power supplysupply feeder.feeders or one diesel generator Each 4.16-kV bus supplies
. 8.3.1-2
.we e n -o (g , y, l*
- ATT At' a rt.ENT T D 5. E. (R EV. t ) FcR REA & %7-1 motor loads and 4.16-kV/480-V load center transformersg u with their associated 480-V buses.
B. Bus Arrangements The Class IE ac system is divided into two redundant trains per unit (trains A and 8). For each unit, either onereach to safely of theshutdown trains is capable for that unit.of providing power consists of a 4.16-kV bus, 480-V load centers, 480-V Each ac train motor control centers, and lower voltage ac supplies. The de control power to each train is provided from de power supplies of the same train. C. Loads Supplied from Each Sus Refer to figure 8.3.1-2 for a listing of Class 1E system loads and their respective buses.
*D Manualand Buses andLoads, Automatic Interconnections Between Buses, and Buses and Supplies No provisions exist for automatically connecting one Class 1E train to another for automatically transferring redundant loads between Class 1E trainel train or i
Each Class 1E bus is provided with two (normal and alternate) offsite preferred power sources and one standby power source. During normal operation with both offsite sources available, ! supplied from a separate reserveeach transformer. auxiliary Class 1E bus is ! Only one circuit breaker is provided for the two cubieles available at each Clase 1E 4.16-kV bus for connections preferred offsite power to the sources. normal and alternate Transfer to the i ! alternate offsite source would be done manually by l administrative control if the normal preferred power l i source, the standby power source, and the redundant
- Class 1E 4.16-kV bus were all lost simultaneously.
- See paragraph S.3.1.1.3D for further discussion of this__eubject.-
- A w _
' /1. 1W) LJ c. _ _ . Duttag unit shstdeus, iltedes 3 and 4. ocly), both Class 15 4.10-RV huses may be manually cesnected to the sese offsite power q seeree (RAT) by administrative control provided that all the ses-Class 18 buses (13.8 and 4.18 KV) powered by that source are { shed and the tutomatic bus transfer schemes are disabled.
- :m.w w. m E.
Interconnections Between Safety-Related and Nonsafety-Related Buses 1 No interconnections are provided between the safety-and nonsafety-related buses at the same voltage level.
'The reserve auxiliary transformers supply power through the same'4.16-kV winding to both non-Class 1E and Class 1E buses.
8.3.1-3
i j i AINOMENT T'O S. t.. N. ( E,E\f.1) Ft. R. R. E A VG- 91,2 i VEcP-TSAR-Q 3E j Ouestion 430.59 J. s ! .' E i j FSAR paragrapb 4.3.1.1.2
- states that each reserve auxiliary i transformer has the capacity to supply all connected non-Class i 1E running loads and to start and run the loads of g,ng, Class 1E train.
j Justify the capability to start and run only one Class i 1E train by the capacity from each of the offsite source. Is this capability limited j * "Y" transformer winding or by the total j
, transformer capacity?
supply to a Class 1E bus,Following a loss of one preferred power do you intend that the diesel 1 j generator will supply the bus for the entire length of time I allowed the under this limiting condition for operation? Identify j loading on the diesel for this condition, and justify its i operation at that light load for that extended period.
- Response The normal configuration of the onsite auxiliary power system is i
i subdivided into two groups of equipment, each of which is I powered from a separate reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT). Each group of equipment consists of cne 4.16-kV Class 1E tralis, { one or more nonsafety-related 4.16-kV buses, and one 13.8-kV r.er.refety-related bus. 1 The electrical connections from the { offsite are buses source to the RATS designed in accordance and fromwith the the RATS to the Class requirements of 1E General Design riterion 17. Each of these sources of preferred i power has immediate access to the offsite power sources. IEEE
- 308-1974, as endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.32, requires a
- minimum of one offsite source per train which shall normally be i available during operation and accident conditions. The VEGP design has tGo sources of preferred power, each of which is 3
' sized for the normally connected load and has access to all transmission system power sources. The statement in the FSAR
- addresses the nossal configuration of the auxiliary power distribution at the 4.16-kV level.
{ diaeumseu in pg.rasr==h _S.3.1.1.21D R Under *ha ceam etans _ ! Qg[ 1 l 14 the systes === 'De testarigured to allow access to the afteFrnate preferred power source at the 4.16-kV leve K Unde pthe _ __ _ conditions idsettlied i (or both Class _litesee,is serestroph Ie'the_ same AATIf sul.a._D.De~ac_1udies esIy see class 18 trainthe sould connect To 1Aon [h[ j avstTalle: the'refFre. therels~ne possibility of everleading the alternate i source RAT. i The capability of a RAT is limited by the capacity of the'"Y" ! transformer winding, in that this winding is sized to provide power to one Class 1E train in addition to the connected
.non-Class loads per unit). 1E loads (approximately one-half of the non-Class 1E i.
Following a less of one preferred power i Q430.59-1 Amend. 7 5/84
4
) ii n 2 .] P. -
! 7 l 4
ATTACR/hEh',T. T 0 S.E. (,REv. O hw 2E A & if.21p3 'x~ i vrcF-FSAR-Q 4 ~
- Question 439.60 .
1 ' FSAR paragraphs 8.3.1.1.2.D and 8.3.1.1.3.D indicate that only 4 at each Class 1E 4.16-kV bus foone circuit breaker is provided for the tw j alternate offsite power source.r connection to the normal or
/ Paragraph 1.9.6.2 seems to 4
i the redundant 4.16-kV safety buses when operating f standby source (diesel generators). e I i which preclude circuit breakers.the manual closing of both interconnectingInterlocks shou j pouer source Discuss and interconnection your compliance. of the redundant safety buse , j Response 4 manually connecting redundant Class 1E rtrensa toetth 4 i only done_under_administre31ve emntro144 m This is Ept
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p 1 W as discuised in .De le t e i breaker (empty) cubicle.from its cubicle and installing it . ine the altern i breaker should not be removed from its cubicle e andn instal the alternate cubicle when operating fros the standby Should this inadvertently occur, interlocks have beensource. provided ! so that when the diesel generator breaker is closed , neither of the switchgear.the incoming preferred source breakers can be closed l ocally at { the closing of a preferred source breaker in parallel the withSho ! associated diesel generator breaker, it can only be done ! incoming preferred power source and the diesel At gen j least three system in thismanual manners actions must be performed to reconfigure e th physical relocation of the 4.16-kV
- breaker; obtaining a handle for the synchronizing switch na d i
closing the synchronising switch for the alternate source ' voltage; "close" after andsynchronising turning of the the alternate breaker control switch t o two voltages . preferred source.must be followed whether or not voltagesis present from th monitor overload. the current, drawn from each power source to avoidh the administrative steps that would have te be followed tC 3 reconfigure the system, credit is taken f o i monitoring the load on each power source.or the operator Information will be which can be drawn from the RATS and the standby d generator. J
\
Q430.60-1 ' 1 Amend. 7 5/84
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Ow m.a.~ a ie LtJL A FS El- C'U? (4 Pdfc 0 DATE: July 20. 1988 Southem CompanyServiCes RE: Plant Vogtle Units I and II i i Intertie of Class 1E 416V Buses ' REA VG-8621 Files X7BD108/X3BC03 Log NPFSG-02142 Security Code NC , FROM: R. L. George NPSV Manager TO: S. E. Chesnut i Enclosed please find the response to REA VG-8621 regarding the i connection of both Class 1E 4160V buses to the same Reserve Auxilliary Transformer (RAT) during shutdown (Modes 5 and 6). A l Safety Evaluation was performed and the applicable FSAR and j Technical Specifications sections have been identified for required changes. Attachments to this letter include comments ! concerning specific aspects of this configuration 'and a completa Safety Evaluation with FSAR mark-ups, i If you have any questions regarding this matter contact David Gambrell at extension 4486. This completes REA VG-8621. The original response to this REA will be transmitted to R. E. Lide. 7 DLG/tma Attachments: 1. Comments on REA Response
- 2. Safety Evaluation w/FSAR mark-ups sc A. L. Mosbau w/att R. E. Lide w/att
- t. E. Richer a w/o att J. A. Bailey w/o att J. D. Eurd w/o att J. E. Mallmark w/o att J. R. Wheless w/o att F. Thompson w/o att J. L. Baraytk w/o att R. Ropecky w/att S. ~Mettsyk w/att A. Farruk w/att W. C. Ramsey w/att NORM' w/att GPC Reading Files w/att (2) PFE-DOC w/att NPFSG Files w/att 6-02142 e
e
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1 py j RESPONSE TO REA VG-8621
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As requested by this REA the Safety Evaluation for connecting both Class IE 4160V Buses to the same RAT has oeen completed and is subeatted with this document. The impact to the FSAR and Tech. Spec. was reviewed
- and the corresponding comments and changes are included in this evaluation. Although not stated in the description of this REA. It should j
] be uncerstood that it is required to shed the non-Class 1E 4160V buses from the energized RAT. These loads may be powered by the UATs during i
i this true by 'back-feeding' through the Main Step-up Transformer. Also it is required that the Non-Class 1E 4160 V Incoming breakers from the RATS I vust be ' racked-out' and tagged in order to prevent an automatic bus transfer from loading these buses on the energized RAT. This configuration will be implemented through the applicable procedures which l shall be revised in accordance with the response to this REA. It should j ! be noted that the disconnect links at the main generator tereinals. (by i' which the UAT back-feed is made possible), are not shown on the Unit 1 One-Line and Three-Line Diagram drawings. This should be clarified and added to the applicable drawings. i The capability of each RAT to start and run the loads of both Class 13 j i distribution systees has been demonstrated by means of the*following. D. } During the ESPAS Preoperational Test 1-300-Opysoch RAT was shown to ber j capaole of accoseodating both Class IE trainVin conjunction with am gSF {. actuation signal. This capability was accepted by the NRC and is documented in SSER 5. section 8.3.1. The power rating of each RAT is more j than capable of providing the required power to both traina la any mode of
- operation. Calculation X3CA03-1 (Aus Power Systes Voltage Study) i documents the capability of the RATS during worst case heavy and light
- load conditions. Section D-2 demonstrates acceptable minious voltage levels in conjunction with a degraded power source and worst case loading.
Sections C and D-4 verify acceptable nazimum voltage levels under light { load conditions. These sections are in coop!!ance with the applicable design bases and provide sufficleat proof of the capability of each RAT to supply reliable power under conditions such more severe than will be i i experienced in the configuration proposed by this REA. } The intertie of the Class 18 4160V buses does not conflict with the l ' Technical Specifloations LCOs regarding the AC Sources and Onette Power Distributies Systems for Modes 5 and 8 (Sections: 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.3.2). 1 and therefore complies with Regulatory Guide 1.93. The regairements of Reg. Guide 1.78 are set in that the breaker schose and supporting systems of the operable Class.lg bus provide sufficient isolation and protection to prevent a asemos mode failure of the distribution system under this , configuration daring Cold Shatdown. This Safety Evaluation does set , j address the Technical Specifications' interpretation of equipseat , 1 operability in Modes 8 and 4. with the exceptica of Sectiosa 3.8.1.2 and i 3.8.3.2. The interpretation of related Tech. Spec. LCOs is the ! responsibility of Georgia Power Company. Based upon these consents and the Safety Evaluation this configuration is considered fully acceptable provided that the proper adelaistrative controls and applicable LCOs are not exceeded. DLO15-1 E
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1 DCP N/A l Other _REA VG-8621 1 I Page 1 of 5 } i
; SAFETY EVALUATION i
i a. Description of proposed change, test or experiment. i l 1 l The following temporary configuration of the Unit 1 AC power system :s required in order to remove either one of the Reserve Aus111ary 4 i Transformers (RAT: INXRA.8) from service during Cold Shutdown. This l shall be implemented during operational Nodes 5 and 8 only. In order to
- meet Technical Specification LCOs. To implement this configuration the i normal preferred offsite source circuit breaker of one of the Class 1E
' 4180 Y switchgear (1AA02 or IBA03: 1-1804-S3-A02 and A03 respectively) will be transferred to the alternate offsite source breaker cubicle. This will electrically connect both safety buses to the same RAT. ,The
- Non-Clast 1E loads will be powered from the Unit Aumallery Transfeemers (UAT) which will be 'back-fed' fros the 230 KV bus througn the Mais
- Step-Up Transformers. This will require the mala generator to be -
! . :solated at the disconnect links. Also to ensure isolation and not exceed the RAT capability, the alternate facoolag breakers (feed froe l RATS) on the Non-Class 1E 4180 V buses aust be
- racked-out' and tagged l
to prevent actuation by an automatic bus transfer. Applicable plant procedures must be revised to reflect the proper systen alignment and
. concerns as a result of this configuration.
i
- This temporary configuration of the
- Cross-Trata' intertie say only be
' laplemented durlag Modes 5 and S. Per Tech. Spec. LCOs 3.8.1.2. 3.8.3.1 and 3.8.3.2. based upon Regulatory Guide 1.98. Per these specifications one of the energized safety buses and its correspond 1ag support systems (ie. diesel generator) shall be fully operable in order to supply power to the loads required during Cold Shetdous. (continued on Page 2 of 5) j b. Reases for propeeed change, test or esperiment. The purpose of this temporary configuration is to de-energise one of the i i AATs for maintenance purposes sh11e providing reliable poser to both j Class it buses 1AA03 and 1RA03, through the reesining RAT. and to the plant aus11ery leads through the UATs during sold shutdeus (Modes 5 and 6 only). i The ' Cross-Train' intertie of the Class II buses has been discussed in the FSAR for use in emergency attuat' loss only. Also the question and answer sect:on of the fSAR. and the SEA address this j co'nfiguration. Preoperational t'est 1-300-01. " Integrated Safeguards and Load Sequencing Test", demonstrated the espability of each RAT to power both Class IE 4160 V buses in conjunction with an ESPAS signal. The NRC staff (Per SSEA 5:8.3.1) found :nts configuration fully acceptable.
- provided all other Technical Specifications are met.
4 j
IL 3.? - ] . DCP N/A
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_Rf.A VG-8stl fq e << -*' - *t 6
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i Fate 2 of , 5 i I SAFETY EVALUATION CONTINUATION SHEET I 3 Part A. cont.. 1 The electrical connection of the other Class 1E switchgear to this bus j will conform to the separation requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.75 :n ' that the breaker isolation and availability of the standby power source l will ensure the integrity of the required power supply regr.rdless of failures on the alternate switchgear. 1 The body of this Safety Evaluation will provide more discussion on :ne specific impact of this configuration upon the FSAA and F.O.L. Tech. ' Spec. Selow is a summary of all applicable references. F.O.L. Technical Specification LCOs: 3.8.1.2, 3.8.3.1, 3.8.3.2 Bases: 3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, 3/4.8.3, 3/4.9.s
- l
. i i j Final Safety Analysis Report
- i 1 9.6.2, 8.1.4.1, 8.1.4.2, 8.3.1.1.2, Figures 8.3.31-1 and 8.3.1-I Table 8.3.1-2, Questions: 430.59 and 430.80 (Aasend. 7)
- Safety Evaluation Report {
, 8.3.1 and Supplement S (8.3.1) ' 4
, GDC-17 in appendia A of 10 CFR Part SO 1
Regulatory Guides 1.93 and 1.7S (1888 344v1974) l 1 i Preoperational Test 1-300-01 (Secties 8.3.48) ' 1 i Vogtle Design Criteria: 1004-E, 1801, 1904, 1831 i A G e 4
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," Other RE.A VG-862:
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- 0 $5 o ' }$6' 4
Page 3 of 5 l c. Does the proposed change involve a change to Technica! Specifications? 4 (includes Environmental Tech. Spec.) Yes No X As stated in parts A and 8 of this Safety Evaluation, this j configuration shall be loplemented only during Modes 5 and 8. The LCOs of 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.3.2 require that only one offsite power source and only one train of the emergency buses must be energized in Modes S and 8. Provided that the corresponding > diesel generator is operable. therefore these conditions will be set and exceeded by the availability of both Class 1E ! e i distribution systems. Thus a change to the Technical I Specifications as not required; however, this configuration l should be carefully considered in relation to the Action Statements of the above sections.
- d. Does the proposed change involve a change in the facility as
. E l described or laplied in the FSAR7 Yes X No 1
j FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2 describes the Class 1E power system. The third paragraph in this section which describes the capacity of i
' the RATS. should be revised to indicate that each RAT also has the capacity to provide power to both Class 1E Trains. (See attached mark-up). FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.D states that the i
I transfer to an alternate offsite source by an emergency bus would be done only if the normal source. the standby source, and the redundant bus were all lost simultaheously. This statement ; j should be revised to show that this may also be done during cold l shutdown for maintenance purposes. ' j i OthersekftlonsoftheFSAR,aslistedinpartAofthisSafety Evaluation, discuss the Class 18 power systes, but do not require j revieles.
- e. Does the proposed change involve a change in procedures _ described or leplied in the FSAR7 4
Yes X No FSAR Section 8.3.1.2.0 implies the adherence to the Class 18 distributies systes alignment procedures. These procedures j i should be revised, as pplicable, to reflect the changes in the ' PSAR provided as a result of this temporary configuraties and this Safety Evaluation. These* procedures should indicate the
' systes alignment required to implement this configuration including the back feitd tnrough the UATs. Specific requirements should include, but not 11 sited to: 1) the slignment to remove
' either RAT from service. 2) esck-out and tag Non-Class 1E 4160V breakers (free RATS) to prevent automatic bus transfer. 3) safety l concerns and 4) any appl:csoie systen limitations.
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- OCP N/A I
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, Other _REA VG-s621 t
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, Page 4 of 5 l
I l Does the proposed change 2nvolve a test or experament not f. described or implied in the FSAR? i Yes No X j Th:s alignment :s a tetporary change in the Cleis IE power system configuration and does not constitute a test or experiment. The provisions for th:s senese have been stated 'n Section 8.3 1.1 2 and are further evaluated in Questions 430.59 and 430.60. This I configurat2on was addressed and found acceptable by the NRC as shown in $$ER 5. section 4.3.1. . g. Does the proposed change, test. or experiment increase the i probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident j described in the PSAR? Yee No I i i FSAR Section IS, specifically 15.2.4. does not discuss the occurrence of an accident in Modes 5 and 8 which concerns the , I availability of redundant safety buses. If an event should occur!., ? which activates the ESFAS systes, the RSF sequencer has deeonstrated its operability for this ceafiguration. (Ref: SSER S Section 8.3.1). Therefore this systes allgement does not increase the probability of an accident as described in the
- applicable FSAR sections.
- l h.. Does the proposed change, test. or esperiment increase the probability of occurrence or consequences of the malfunctico of any equipeent or component assumed to function in accidents i j analyzed in the FSAR7 Yes i No X This configuraties is temporary and shall be adstaistratively laplemented la operational Modes S and 4. only. FSAR secties j
' 15.3 shows that in Cold Shutdoem the plaat alpes not require the operaties of any equipment or component which seald not be available to perform its safety related function as a result of l this altsament of the power systems. Therefore this i ' configuration does not :ncrease the probability of malfunction related to therequipment assumed to functies in accidents, specifically during Cold Shutdown. i e 4 e a i 4
- - - - -- . . . - - - - - . . - = . - - . -- . . - _ _ - _ . . . __ _ __ _ _ - - . _
i
- i DCP N/A M . Sp -f Otne'r REA VG-8s21 j)' $$Al& Page 5 of S i 1. Does the proposed change, rest or experatent create the Possibility of an accident or equipment / component salfunction not j described and analyzed :n the FSAR7 Yes No X daned upon the FSAR and Design Cr:terton references of part A.
l this annified configuration (Modes 5 and 6 only) fully conforms j to the functional requirements of the Class 1E buses, the safety j !
; loads and the ESF system. Therefore this modification does not '
create the possibility of any equipment malfunction, specifically during Cold Shutdown. 1 l j j. Does the proposed change, test or experladnt decrease the margin of safety defined by the bases of the Technical Specifications? Yes No X l Bases 3/4.3.1. 3/4.4.2 and 3/4.8.3 were evaluated concerning the 1spect of this temporary configuratloa. The availability of both j Class 1g power trains meets and exceeds the initial condittoa t i assumptions of the applicable safety analyses and 'provides at ," . least one set of distribution systees required for operation during cold Shutdown. The modified plant configurstlon la thesef i Modes is consistent with requirements of Regulatory Gelde 1.93 and GDC-17 in appendis A of 10 CFR PART S0. The operability of i j the diesel generator Per 3.8.1.2 provides addit'ional asserance that the safety function of critical systems 's not lost 4
- coincident with an accident in these Modes. iberefore this 3
- alignment does not decrease any margin of safety defined la the Tech. Spec.
i ' k. Does the proposed change, test, or experiment lavolve as I i unreviewed safetF questlos? ' Yes No I 4 i Saeed upon the responses to parts 0.5.1, and J et this Safety ' Evelenties the proposed configuraties described hereia does not levolve an unreviewed safety question. Furthermore this 4 eenfigurettee is fully acceptable and is consistent with the requiremente of the FSAR and F.O.L. Tech. Spec. provided that the proper admiatetrative controls and applicable LCOs are met i escoeded. Speettic concerns and limitations are made evident la this Safety Evaluaties and therefore shall be integrated tato j this configuraties and the applicable precedures. LDRE L'td! e,4 Date 7!/NT LDS A ZA' , . Date h f/ ~ Power Mechanical /Nue er OS # Date PENV/ Designee i Date I
- /H LM- T 0. .5 L & 2EA VG -fl.ZI l: vaar-rsaa-a - Er ' -!
startin g .ui>~ H $ achtoe.g to open utilising an early 'b" centrol odstre duringparallelingHe of the two power sources the transfer. ~ l l Each unit amtiliary transformer has the capacity to supply
- the connected non-Class 18 load.
l j 8.3.1.1.2 Class IR Systea i j The Class 15 ac power system is the power source used in or 'l associated with shutting down the reactor and preventing or i 11miting bas); event. the release of radioactive material following a design " power trains, The system is divided into two independent ac ! Class 15 bus with 1susediate access to offsite poser sources. train A and tra j rigure 8.3.1-1 shows a schematic of the Class 18 ac power system. Category 1Allstructures. safety-related equipment is housed im Seismic . j 1 i The 120 Class V as to 15all acsafety-related system distributes power at 4.16 kW, 400 V, and leads. j Atee, the' Class 13 ac
- system supplies through isolation devices certain selected 1
{ leads operaties. plant whack are not safety related but are tapertant to the Figure 8.3.1-2 indicates the major + .) l safety-related th:: Class 15 as system. and leelated nonsafety-related leads supplied by 8 2 j The nea-Class is ac system supplies preferred (offsite) power 1 to the Class4.16-kV transformer 15 ac system windings. through the reserve musiliary
- Each reserve ausiliary i tramaformer has the capacity to supply all commested asa-Class j 15 ,ruaalag__Leade._and
't a .F
~
te A l est rum the Jeeda_e1 ene Class 1E or to start and rua the leads of hetk~Claes 18 traise. See parasraph s.s.1.1.a.s for tartner diessessee p - - gj la addities to the sheve power distriketten, the Class 15 as , i i system containe staaey power eeurses which provide the power i required preferred power for safe shutdowa la the event of a less of the sourses. The power, costrel, and lastrumentation embles essential for safe chandown are routed with adequate separatica free their redundant eeunterparte. l l The systems:felleu k demerikes various features of the Claes 15 { 1,
, A. pee $erSupp1p, Feeders 1
Eseh 4.16-kT 1ead group can be.eupplied by one of two j preferred power supply feeders.or one diesel generater (etaa e y) oupply ieeder. Each 4.16-kT bus, supplies i
+
j . i 8.3.1-2 ' 4 l :
j Arra n 6.E. ,4. ZEA &% Z/
. * ;d Vi i VECF-FSAR-S - }
i
, 'q . - e r~ ;g j
( me4Yr with theirloads associatedand 480-V 4.16-kV/480-V buses. load center transformers ~ j S. 1 Bue' Arrangements
; TheCloss15acsystemisdividedintotworedubant j trains per unit (trains A and 5). For orch unit, j either one of the trains is capable of providing power to safely reach shutdown for that unit. Each ac train i consists of a 4.14-kV bus, 480-V load centers, 480-V j motor control centers, and lower voltage ac supplies.
i J The desupplies power control power of the sameto each train. train is provided from de C. Loads Supplied from Each Sus { Refer to figure 8.3.1-2 for a listing of Class 1R
- system loads and their respective buses.
) D. j Manual and Automatic Interconnections Between Buses, Suces and Leeds, and Suses and Supplies ) : No provisions exist for automatically eennecting one i.e i Cisse is train to aesther for automatically transferring leads between trains. redundant Class 15 train er . 4 j Each Class 1B bus is provided with two normal and ! siternhte) mtandby power offsite pr source.eferred power sourc(es and one i During normal operaties with t
- both offsite sources available, eesh Claae 15 bus is i ,
supplied from a separate reserve amailiary transformer. i Only one circuit breaker is provided for i ' the bus two for cubicles ceanections available to the at each Class 13 4.16-kV neraa preferred offsite power eeurces.l and alternate Transfer to the alternate effaite source would be done =====11y by j administrative centret if the aer source, the stansE>y power sourse,mel preferred power ) and the redundant
- Class
. ,a,15 r 4.16-kT bus were all teet simultaneously.
- h .. .1.1.2 f.e furth.r dieeu..i.e .,
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{ 4 g Swing mit abetdeen. both Class 15 4.16-ET teses any he meneelly es mested to the some offsite pesar eseres
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peerided that the asa-Class 15 4.16-RW sistration easteel 3 I red by that searce are i (ehed. N- - e .- - v
- 5. Intereennestlose 3etween safety 441sted and i
4 Womeafety-Belated Dusee . l
- We laterconnections are providod betecen the safety-and somentety-related buses at the same vettege level.
l i The reserve sus 111ery transformere supply power throegh the same 4.16-kV windlag to both asa-Casse is and Class is huses. 0.2.1-3 l f 0
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15 8 of 15 j 1 SheeC 1 of 3 l CHECKI.IST 2 EMERGENCY NOTITICATION MESSAGE FOR _ STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES A. INSTRUCTIONS:
- 1. !
- 2. Complete as such of tho information on this form as possible, i
- 3. Have the Energency Director sign the fore to authorize release, j j
These notifications MUST be made within 15 minutes of event classification. 4 Use coessunication circuits in the following order of priority: s.
- b. ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously) ,
i SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency i Response Telephone Directory)
- c. I Commercial telephones (Phone numbers in VECP Emergency Response '
Telephone Directory)
- d. Radios:
1. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1. ask SRS to notify other South Carolina agencies).
- 2. .
Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify the Georgia Energency Management Agency). ]
- 3. I INITIAL ROLL CALL: State the following: i THIS Jd!$ NOT A DR L! Crope.out on RELLO. TEIS IS (Name 11HE/)
~
J E144 AT TNE VOCTLE ELECTRIC CINERATING PLANT. lAIN A COPY OF THE I EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. PLEASE STANDB @T TO RECEIVE . (ProceedA with MESSA roll call in the following order. check box for responding agencies) hvannahRiver5ita h kca County
@ tate of South Carolina @ lendste County f [ Georgia Energency rnwell County Management Agency 4 M rke County i
C. l NOTIFICATION MESSACE TRANSMISSION: Transait complete notification form. obtain roll call and record acknowledgements.
. NOTE The Emergency Notification Message for State and Local Reeponse Agencies ($heet 2 and 3 of 3) !
Checklist 2. of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. !
' The actual form should be used. !
although reproduction of the foru in this procedure is authorized. i e h-+<
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Numur l (? . '
- 1. @ TH15 is A DRILL THISIS AN ACTUAL EG C ,,, i ,',7, , "_ , , '
7',,, 2 AUTHENTICATION: 1 l l 3 TIME /DATE: (Easfem)
/
mm
/d/ RE O D Y: h 'OU , [
cd yy g (Name) 4 SITE: VOGTLE UNIT: 8 CONFIRMATION PHONE NUMSER: 1 404-554 6762 4 I EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT @ ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY D GENERAL EMERGENCY
- 6. @ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE: b I- 1 /
(Eastem) mm ed yy 8 EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE- / /
/ (if 5, go to item 16.)
7.EME 0 NCY DESCRIPTION:
/VitS E Td86 l 05 5 r F A LL-14~ s*t f r*r H T13 NT T6 )No N Ts Ti AC 1 At s'T f al TY77 A T' f/92C ( FA 5 n'(2 NL ~
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- > n12TE .] n. Y, /~j %~h .
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- 8. PLANT CONDITION: PROVING TA8LE DEGRADING , @ UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCY INVOLVES:
*). g d k
- k NO AELEASE (if A, go toltem 14.) { A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Espected DuraticA T POTENTIAL RELEASE { A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED. Started Stopped to TYPE OF RELEASE: ELEVATED @ GdOUND LEVEL /
b RADIOACTIVE GASES $ RADIOACTIVE PARTICULATES B RADIOACTIVE LIQUIDS
@ OTHER 7
11 RELEASE: [ CURIES PER SEC [ CURIES ! 6 NOBLE GASES C /-
. ..,, . % g m.g 5g g g . . . ... . . @L J IODINES. O N .. / M. / /I+a. * = ' * * -
i [ l / / 12 REACTOR STATUS: $ SHUTDOWM: TIME /DATE: / i1 % POWER j (Eassem) mm ed yy
- 13. ESTIMATE OF PROJECTfD OFFSITE DOSE: C NEW D uNCsANoED oL RATION: sRS.
- s. . .* v .r . e.......*.
Destenst , , (mromm) hk , . . . ... s. '
.. . m s e . * 'e s.=A-* g g s.. - -
, , ... (mrom&) , , , (suwem@ .. (s!wom) i SITE SOUNDARY -a l=
2 MILES 5 MILES [ [N , 10 MILES t4 METEOROLOGICSL DATA: KNOT AVAILABLE
' . . . * @ WiliD'DIR(CT80N(from)- - *
'd STAtsuTV CLASS. - -
l $ WIND SPEED (mph) O PRECIPITATION (type) 15 RE ENDED PROTECTfvt ACTIONS: I
'NO RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS k ' M' \ 5 R j' .;'LTl W >n9%u9M S W .$: :.
N
- O .*
- 4 C EVACUATE
@ OTHER /
sg AppnoySpey: A ,. EMERGEN Y D4REQTOR 7gg,
%) ,,.,,,, Ol w ltt a s (Tiete) (Eassem) mm da yy no s w- , . ..y . .,. . . s... .,. . . . . . . . . . v ..u. . . . . . . . . . . .
Of'$f
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>L GOVERNMENT AGENCIES NOTIFIED ?) # ' ' '
Record the name. date time and agencies notified-1 c?1,96%
/A'< d (namef
.];- g' jd -'((} /$ q] ,
Stste of Georgia (date) l I - (agency) fnme)
- j. I f( ll; y Q ,
(name) . i ,j). . ll ~g///) V State of South Carolina v J / ) (). , (d ) (la ) (agency) 3 .- t b h -
'"* ao+ *$'l ' Av l 'f ,
DOE SRP 4, / MW YN') Y lb Burke County. GA f) .. (day / p (time }, (e p j hAvk)W2 2AM1
. dw.Ou w g- ~7j
- -~ -
j c- ,,,, g,,y, ,e (n , f-(time) (agency) (ddt
- 6. < M >Y l- / *
(varel)
'n / , .a
//j 1 .' /
;[.
l !)f Allendale County, SC
. (agency)
; (daNIus' * )0(time) ,g>0GX**kg(,t): 128/)*-~ ~~~~'~^" ' ~ -~ " -
pg, / [] '[f [' Bernwell County. SC (agency) (datf) (time)
, _ e.. . ..... .s. .. . . . . . . . . . .
. .. . ...,.................,s... .
+ . . ,
l
. . 1 ** NMM.N 4.sh.E.NhM.dlPa%Y4is,Mi),'s d.p .5, <* WP *skaw ep bM.%9.Tashanpaaresperuf s/.M/ a. . !
l
,.............:.,...%w..,.........w...,,... . . .. . , e c. . . . . . .u i . , ....'.....f..... .3 .. . ....s s....,. . .: , , . . . . , , , . . . . . . .. .
s , [ f. .* l-] pmCC~0VAE NO VEGP mEvi$8oh 4GE No r.27L
- 91002-C 15
/
8 of ;5 SheeC 1 of 3 CHECKLIST 2 EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION MESSACE FOR STATE AND LOCAL RESPPNSE AGENCIES ~ I _A . :NSTRUCTIONS: 1 .~ e
- 2. C'omp1'te as much of'the infor ation on this form as possible.
- 3. Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorire release .
I These notifications MUST be made within 15 minutes of event classification. 4 Use cosesunication
- a. ENN (broadcast circuits in the following order of priority:
- b. SC Backup ENN (Two digit to all stations simultaneously) I i Response Telephone Directory) phone numbers found in VECP Emergency l l c.
Commercial Telephone telephones (Phone numbers in VECP Emergency Response! Directory) l
- d. l Radios: i 1.
Use.SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1. ask SRS to notify other South Carolina agencies). , 2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify the Georgia Emergency Management Agency). B. , INITIAL ROLL CA!L: State the following: THIS }edS NOT A DRILL! .fAross out onel i HELLO THIS IS (Name) / 4/86[ f/W , AT THE VOCTLE ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. PLEASE OBTAIN A COPY OF TH STA.VDBY TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE. (Proceed ith roll call in the following order, check box for responding agencies) l vannah River Site Aiken County
~
ate of South Carolina lendale County gia 4aergency b -- ~ ~*' " Management Agency BarnwIsli'heeftt - ' ' ' ' Burke County C. \ ] NOTIFICATION MESSAGE TRANSMISSION: Transait complete notification form, obtain roll call .nd record acknowledgements. The Emergency. NOTE .. : Notification Message for State and Local Response Agehetes (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3) Checklist 2 of this procedure is
.s y p r .'/ :.y. %% <:'&: wH 5&e N
. Y ac tua .Y.ornshouldbeused,
- Y ~
although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized.
,, .,. ...... .. . m. ,- -
. - - - ^ ^ ' '
- EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Nume,or dS
- . =.; . :
- 1. @ THisl$ A DR8LL THl318 AN ACT L EMERGENCY ~ ;'. ~
- 2. AUTHENTICATION: . M/
- 8 ,Nt [tn
- I56eil' U (Codeworal OO> /3 / 70 f 90 d 1rer I
i 3. TIME /DATE: REPoRTEo aY: N/v f A.- i (Eastemt mm do yy (Name 4 $lTE: VOGTLE UNIT: [ CONFIRMATION PHONE NUMBER: 1-404-554 6762 l l l 5 EMERGENCY CLAS$1FICATION; N TIFICATiON OF dN'US AL EVENT ALERT @ SITE AREA EMERGENdY @ GENERAL EMERGENCY IV)th i l'A% o n O'iy0
- 6. @ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE. vv IU / 7 / 3f ,10 (Eastem) mm ed yy i
@ EMERGiNCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE: / / / (if S. go to item 16.)
(Eastem pm as 7 EMEp cENCY DgSCRIPTION: AW 0 SIM de M f 0 *' E*yy %% p , nu._ ', . A N CR.f % f . On Os ,b.'wt4 WCkf* $ V:f" 7 11& Tfa h s 4m , 3 0 7. tc !!O j 8. PLANT CONDITION: glMPROVING B STABLE @ DEGRADING Iol UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCY INVOLVES:
[NO RELEASE (if A. go to item 14.) @ A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Espected Duratiori-
@ POTENTIAL RELEASE Stopped
[ A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: Starte.d ... . 10 TYPE OF RELEASE: ELEVATED @ GROUND LEVEL b RADIOACTIVE GASES @ RADIOACTIVE PARTICULATES
! @ RADIOACTIVE LIOulDS @ OTHER t1 RELEASE: [ CURIES PER SEC. C CURIES S NOBLE GASES 5 lODINES 8 IODINE /NOSLE GAS RATIO (if avadable) D OTHER 1
- 12. REACTOR STATUS: A SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: I /
, (Eastem) mm do
/
yy
@ % POWER 13 ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OFFSITE OOSE: NEW C UNCHANGED DURATION: HRS.
. . .. . . ., . . . . g-g: .. ... C g g .. . .-
......... g g .. -
Destance (mressuhrt (mrom/hr) (mrom) (mrom) SITE SOUNDARY 2 MILES 5 MILES 10 MILES
, 14. METEOROLOGICAL DATA: NOT AVAILA8LE A WIND DIRECTION (from)
* $ STASILITY CLASS 8 WIND SPEED (mph) D PRECIPITATION (type) 15 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:
NO RECOMMENDED P w.v; i.4@,wnr..ROTECTlVE ....,c a.,,:a ACTIONSr ..u ~ .. . r w.:.-s.r.. .~ a . . . " c. - -
.~-
C EVACUATE
@ OTHER
. 14, APPROVED SV:
(Nemo) / 5AERGENCY DeECTO6 TIME /DATE: N a
'th f Mtda YO (TNie) (Eaesem) mm yy 40009
E r.: '>f
~.a -r.
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES NOTIFIED /,. **
- 't Record the name. date. time and agencies notified.
3 dlCW # A 8 /s;/ d
'(riame) ./
3.ps-p'd /()f'Z) State of coorela (date) , (time) (agency)
- y. Mit 'A f /2Db L - -
( r. .) '/ d
-)() fh fj)$f State of South Carolina (date) (time) (agency)
- 3. I N j ygfname)l 9,(I /g:)j DOE SRP (date) (time) (agency)
- 4. RtititSideas (name) d 2.m.9o IO3(p- surke County, oA (date) (time) (agency) r e
5, . .. @
/ g, [
gp (name)/-[/ Aiken County, SC (date) (time) (agency) 6 htW MMb Vine /ne) f J/ g,'j '
/f ,1'/ Allendale County. SC
. ~.1 . L*?) w::. .,: 1 :': .F#"f.~. .. .7: a,. u v. 44 V.r?*. .:..;M .
; . ..*...WJ.C .'. :.) .
- 7. _ b,J A?WN_-
Sarnwell County, SC I"*}Id p */4 /M (date) (twne) (agency)
.., ...,. . . ..~............~..........;.y....,........,..... . .. .
*% V visi>#h:' Ak;.y; ;si w9.y.is,.g.:. o.y..s r ..
.imi.y .asj.,jkia yg','..n w. , . s
>~m.e w <
. Aar A e.r. m eensea o% mew 4. e w.. . r. a./..a .w W 4pe .serm-.. *,
...n>..... s n m . .. ......., . . . 1. .
. . . . w..............w . . . . .
t ..a . . ..... . . . .. . .
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. - - - .- -#.'._i - + _ _ _ _
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.Pmt4,EDUwE NO '
fI *i*'3 e 3 J 'j' ,4" ; 4,. mEv8SiON PAGE No ' .,/ i VEGP 91002-C 15 8 of 15 4 Sheet 1 of 3 i i CHECKLIST 2
- EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION MESSACE FOR !
STATE AND I.OCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES I A. INSTRUCTIONS:
- 1. Complete as much of the information on this form as possible.
- 2. Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorire release.
, 3. These notifications MUST be made within 15 minutes of event 4 classification. 4 Use communication circuits in the following order of priority:
- s. ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously)
- b. SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergencv l Response Telephone Directory) !
- c. Cosmercial telephones (Phone numbers in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory)
- d. Radios:
- 1. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1, ask SRS to notify other ,
South Carolina agencies).
- 2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify e
, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency). ' l B. INITIAL ROLL CALL: State the following: j j THIS I/IS NOT A DRILL! ros out ' 7 HELLO. THIS IS (Name) T THE V0CTLE ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. PLEASEOByINACOPYOFTHE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. STANDBY TO RECEIVE A MESSACE. (Proceed with roll call in the following order, check box for responding agencies) l i
- annah River Site Aiken County l gp 5 e of South Carolina ndale County g Georgia Energency gement Agency rnwell County p Burke County ;
C. NOTIFICATION MESSAGE TRANSMISSION: Transmit complete notification form, obtain roll call and record acknowledgements. NOTE The Emergency Notification 4 Message for State and Local
. Response Agencies (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3)
Checklist 2. of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. The actual form should be used, although reproduction of the form in this procedura is authorized. Useg
O I EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Num e., b ' 1
@ THIS IS A CRILL i/ -
% THl3 IS AN ACTUAL ERGENCY 2 AUTHENTICATION:
{ I'Y A ,- 1 I C I OA ^ 3 TIME /DATE: !b3h (Easterns mm INI ao
& RE O T Y: '
yy VOGTLE (Name) 4 SITE: UNIT: CONFIRMATION PHONE NUMBER: 1 404 554 6762 r, l FMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
@ NOTIFICATION OF UN0SUAL EVENT R EMEGENCh' D dENERAL EMERGE L'ERT' @ SITE' AREA 6 @ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE: Wb th / 29/ kM (Eastern) mm ad yy
@ EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE: / / / (N S, go to ltem 16.)
(Eastern) mm ao
- 7. EMESGENCY D RIPTION: At <[ du.Tt '
A lf7s t _ (2 / yy 6 7'.3 T , ( ns. pwX J rLL h ~ a'T' 9 Y .' F ' l I
- a. PLANT CONDITION: g IMPROVING @ STABLE @ DEGRADilTG M UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCY INVOLVES:
[ NO AELEASE (if A. go to item 14.) @ A RELEASE IS OCCURRING Started Espected Duration [Bl POTENTIAL RELEASE @ A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED; Started Stopped
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: [IELEVATED @ GROUND LEVEL A C RADIOACTIVE GASES RADOACTIVE PARTICULATES 8 RADIOACTIVE LIQUIDS D OTHER 11 RELEASE: [ CURtES PER SEC. CURIES
. b. NOBLE G4SES 5 IODINES
' ' ' ~ ' ' ~ ^ * * ' ' ~ ' ' ' ~
8 IODINE / NOBLE GAS RATO(if availabIe) @ OTHER ~ 12 REACTOR STATUS: % SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: / / / L1 % POWER (Eastem) mm de yy ' 13 ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OFFSiiE 00SE: O NEW UNCHANGED DURATON: H
,.. .ahmeanee.
g g. . . . . . .. gg
~ ..
. .. . p. . .. . .. .. . .g.g.RS. .
c.w . , Amram44 4. -. ,. ., .w., imposwinst ,
.. . ....... essene. .. ..,.. e .4mpeal.
SITE BOUNDARY . . . . 2 MILES 5 MILES to MILES 14.MEVEOROLOG8 CAL DATA: k NOT AVAU8LE
@ WINO DIRECTION (from) *. @ ST CLASS
@ WIND S*EED(mph)
$ PRECIPITATION (type) 15 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:
< ,-w A, gew. NO RECOkMENDED Pf0'"cCTJVE ACTIONS.s w. w w.Y.w o
.e.o e .. e *-..e . . - -
@ EVACUATE
@ OTHER
< teAPPROVEDBY:. ..
gNCYDIRECTORhag.. f g.'(( ..f. ..Q .f g 7 ("a**) ( H#8) so n (Easism) m4 ea yy
s e' . J .* - GOVERNMENT AGENCIES NOTIFIED W r* .u ' l If l Flecord the name, date, time and agencies notified: i
,Q , ~
& 4@
l
, or is' g jg. 94) ((5""f State of Georgia ;
pte) (teme) ,/ (agency) l
- 2. 0 /h }h L) e bh(N b '
ff) ' State of South Carolina 3 t [ ,' DOE.SRP g 'R'uL '"'**' o}LJ @~ Burke County, GA (date (time) / (agency) '
$ ' Lj A $ 1 I"***' *
, , Aiken County, SC (date ( me) (agency) 6 -
W ' Y
/d , f Allendale County. SC
, , (d A .. . , . . . . . %.... . . , . . . '- . . .
, . . . . . jagencg, , , . , , ,
i p k 0 'AT l l [f h Bamwell County, SC (date) (time) (agency)
- . v. . . ..,........,....,w...m,,......... . ... 3 .... , ....... . ....
'.M4 toippat,M)*ve.%W.MNgM:. @% .x,,v4,4;mWf .*ghn**f* +' 14.M4' M M. ' - ,
..........r...,......:..,,.. -
..%,....- .a-...,......., . ...,., .
$ $ i q .;
PROCEQUAE NO A E vtSiON P AG E *.O ' VEGP 91002-C 15 ' 3 of 15 Sheet 1 Of 3 CHECKLIST 2 i EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION MESSACE FOR STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES i A. INS T RL'CT !ONS : !
- 1. Complete as much of the informatten on this form as possible. i
- 2. Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorize release. '
- 3. These notifications Mt'ST be made within 15 minutes of event classification.
4 Use conununication circuits in ' ie following order of priority:
- a. ENN (broadcast to all sea. ions simultaneously)
- b. SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency '
Response Telephone Directory) 9
- c. Commercial telephones (Phone numbers in VEGP Emergency Response Telephone Directory) i I
- d. Radios: '
- l. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1, ask SRS to notify other i South Carolina agencies).
- 2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify the Georgia Emergency Management Agency).
B. INITIAL ROLL CALL: State the following: 1 THIS IS/IS NOT A DRILL! (Cross,ou one) - HELLO THIS IS (Name) c, & F// AT THE V0GTLE ! ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. PLEASE OBTAIN A COPY OF THE l EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. STANt3Y TO RECEIVE A MESSACE. (Proceed with ! roll call in the following order, check box for responding agencies) , Savannah River Site hAikenCounty l
@ State of South Carolina Allendale County '
@GeorgiaEnergency Barnwell County Management Agency l
t Burke County I C. NOTIFICATION MESSAGE TRANSMISSION: Transait complete notification form, obtain roll call and record acknowledgements. I I NOTE , The Energency Notification ' Message for State and Local Response Agencies (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3) Checklist 2, of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. The actual form should be used, although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized.
- 1.n
4 i
. l
) EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Numw
; c. ; .:
I
- 1. @ THISIS A DR8LL k THl3 IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY .,,
,7
- 2. AUTHENTICATION: 32-- #( '
(Number) (Codeworg) l , // D5 3 TIME /DATE: # # '# 5 / 3 / 20 / fO REPORTED SY: I M
,E ....m, mm .. y, (~.m.,
4 SITE: VOGTLE UNIT: 6,0 t a CONFIRMATION PNONE NUMSER: 1 4044644762 t ()tG ' ' '^ @ 5 EMCRGENCY CLASSIFICATION: A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT @ ALERT @ $1TE AREA EMERGENCY D GENERAL EMERGENCY
?
6 @ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE: b ! l 0 / 3 / 20 / $0 4 (Esse.m) mm dd yy ] @ EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE: / / / (if 5. go to item 16.) (Eastem) mm ad yy 7 EMERGENCY DESCRIPTION: Lew c.C .t.tr ~ <.t s3 m ,. . n , u mm
~
l het Lv s n&wC ' j
- 8. PLANT CONDITION: $ IMPROVING M STABLE DEGRADING I=: UNDETERMINED 9 EMERGENCYINVOLVES:
! $NO RELEASE (if A go to item 14.) C A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Espected Duration "
] DME*!TIAL RELEASE D A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: StarteJ Stopped
{ 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: C ELEVATED GROUND LEVEL i b RADCACTIVE GASES N RADCACTIVE PARTICULATES I S PADCACTIVE LIQUIDS D OTHER J I I. RELEASE: CURIES PER SEC. CURIES ! A NOSLE GASES C CDINES j B IODINE / NOBLE GAS RATIO (if available) O OTHER J . 12 REACTOR STATUS: A SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: / / / l1 % POWER i (Eaesem) mm ad yy 13 ESTIMATE OP PROJECTED OPPSITE DOSE: NEW UNCHANGED DURATION: HRS. whoisteer C W ThyroM 4 Destaner OOSE RATE (mesm/hr) 000E RATE (mesm/hr) WM Chad ThyveM tawom) (mese) j SITE SOUNDARY 2 MILES _ $ $ MILES _ , 10 MILES - 14 METEOROLOGICAL DATA: O NOT AvAitAttE l A WIND DIRECTON (from) '7 N ,,_.
$ STASILITY CLASS k
, S WIND SPEED (mpM S (!d PRECIPITATION (type) O *h a- - 15 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS: QNO RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTONS 3 SHELTER C EVACUATE
@ OTHER ,
MRGENCY DIRECTOR
//momemp IO 1 / dmm/ 2 C. f 3 16 APPROVED SY: TIME /DATE:
4 hemmel (Tessel ad yy 40D09
G 5 k' D-]
'paOCEOv8E NO S EwS.CN r<
.**I A :.
PAGE NO ' VEGP 91002-C , 15 8 of .5 Sheet 1 of 3 CHECKLIST 2 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION MESSACE FOR ' STATE /.ND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES ! A. !NS TRt'CTIONS :_ i f
- 1. Complete as much of the information on this form as possible. '
- 2. Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorize release.
3. These notifications MI'ST be made within 15 minutes of event classification. 4 I'se a. communication circuits in the following order of priority: I ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously) b. SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory) c. Commercial telephones (Phone numbers in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory)
- d. Radios:
- 1. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1. ask SRS to notify other South Carolina agencies), e
- 2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify the Georgia Emergency Management Agency).
B. INITIAL ROLL CALL: State the following: 4 THIS Def!S NOT A DRILL! (Cross out ! HELLO, THIS IS (Name) 644.- ne)[ 4t AT THE VOCTLE i I ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. PLEASE OBTAIN A COPY OF THE EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. STANE3Y TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE. (Proceed I' wil roll call in the following order, cheek box for responding agencies) ! I Q Savannah River Site Aiken County State of South Carolina @ Allendale County hGeorgiaEnergency garnwell County Management Agency
% Burks Yhs ty C.
NOTIFICATION MESSAGE TRANSMISSIO!!: Transait complete notification form, obtain roll call and record acknowledgements. { 1 NOTE The Emergency Notification Message for State and Local i Response Agencias (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3) ' Checklist 2. of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. The actual form should be 9 sed, although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized. n* * ,
~
1 i 1 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION womoer 5
- 2 : .;
- 1. @ THISIS A DRILL NIS IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY .3 7 AUTHENTICATOON: CE ( Ilf h #' '
( (Number) (Codeword) ;,7
'/,M 3 TIME /DATE: /1/ 2Q./ 90 RF, PORTED BY: *
(Eestern) mm dd yy (Name) 4 SITE: VOGTLE UNIT: Onv- CONFIRMATION PNONE NUMSER: 1 404 554 6762 756 Ue9.vu-3ses
- 5. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
I
@ NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT @ SITE AREA EMERGENCY @ GENERAL EMERGENCY 6 @ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE:
/ S / 2O / d (Eastem) mm dd yy
@ EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE: / / / (if 5, go to item 16.)
(Eastem) mm dd 7 EMERGENCY DESCRIPTION: b M 'E ^ O %h Me hd b' r y --H- t2 m on s .L ee. - m st ra s Lr v.7 w' w.# 8 PLANT CONDITION: IMPROVING @ STABLE DEGRADIRG IK UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCYINVOLVES:
NO RELEASE (if A, go to item 14.) C A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Expected Duratiot) 8 POTENTIAL RELEASE M A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: Started Stopped
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: O ELEVATED @ GROUNO LEVEL A RADOACTIVE GASES N RADIOACTIVE PARTICULATES 8 RADIOACTIVE LIQUIDS O OTHER
- 11. RELEASE: CURIES PER SEC. CURIES b NOBLE GASES C COINES e IODINE / NOBLE GAS RATIO (if avedetne) D OTHER
- 12 REACTOR STATUS: A SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: / / / 11 % POWER
{ (Eassem) mm ad yy l 13. ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OFFSITE DOSE: NEW UNCHANGED DURATION: HRS. l r'- CuidThyeeM
- DOSE RATk poet RATE tinteishady Chad ThyroM 1 Otetence (meom/hrt (mesm/hr) (mese) (mese)
- SITE SOUNDARY
- 2 ulLES 5 MILES to MILES 14 METEOROLOGICAL DATA
- O NOTAvAitAStE I
@ WIND DIRECTION (from) 3N *M STASluTY CLASS A i 8 WIND SPEED (mph) 9 D PRECIPITATION (type) he 4
15 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS: l [NO RECOhENCED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS S SHELTER i
- @ EVACUATE
@ OTHER iE A,,ROVEO .7, /h4/ u EMERoENCYegCTOR T, S, OARS. ic u , ; , a, ., e i 001'0 9 I I (INI W mm dd yy
CL *: ; PMcECUAE NO c,
. ? .* -~~ . 4 AEvi540N '/ i VEGP PAGE No 91002-C 15 8 of 15 Sheet 1 of 3 CHECKLIST 2 EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FOR i STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES A. INSTRf*CTIONS:
I 1.
- 2. Complete as much of the information on this form as possible.
- 3. Have the Emergency Director sign 6ne form to authorire release.
These notifications MUST be made within 15 minutes of event classification. 4 i Use conusunicai,an circuits in the following order of priority:
- a. ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously)
- b. ;
SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency ' Response Telephone Directory)
- c. )
4 Cosunercial telephones (Phone numbers in VEGP Emergency Response Telephone Directory)
- d. Radios:
1. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1, ask SRS to notify other ' South Carolina agencies). 2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify" the Georgia Emergency Management Agency). B. INITIAL ROLL CALL:,, State the following: THIS 30/I5 NOT A DRILL! (Crost, ogg onal HELLO, THIS IS (Name) 4"I/mw Mc /re# AT THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT. PLEASE OBTAIN A COPT OF THE EMERGENCT NOTIFICATION FORM. STAND 3T TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE. (Proceed with roll 211 in the following order, check box for responding agencies) Savannah River Site Aiken County
@StateofSouthCarolina Allendale County hGeorgiaEmergency @BarnwellCounty Management Agency
@BurkeCounty j
C. NOTIFICATION HESSAGE TRANSMISSION: Transait complete notification form, obtain roll call and record schowledgeannts. l NOTE ' The Emergency Notification Message for State and Local Response Agencies (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3) Checklist 2, of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. The actual form should be used, s although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized.
- u., j
E.i :-; EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Numoer CJ - i 5 TNiSis A DRILL Cl hTN SIS AN IACTUAL MERGENCY
- 1. AUTHENTICATION: _ def Number) iCodeword) .
INC ' 53 TIME /DATE: l1'O / 3 / dG / @ REPORTED gY: b"W M (Eastern) mm dd yy (Name) 4 SITE: VOGTLE UNIT:IN <_ CONFIRMATION PHONE NUMSER: 1-404 554-6762 ytt. h Ja $ >( y kak.RGENCY CLASS 4FICATION: ) A NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT C SITE AREA EMERGENCY D GENERAL EMERGENCY 6 $ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE: SMO t 3_. / .2D / 90 (Eassem) mm do yy B EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIMF./DATE: / / / (if 3, go to item 16.) (Eastern) mm ad yy 7 EMERGENCY DESCRIPTION: ob L kLAf~ n ekcLs ,1
- 8. PLANT CONDITION: MPROVING U STABLE DEGRADING IW UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCY INVOLVES: ,
NO RELEASE (if A, go to item 14.) C A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Staned Expected Duration ' g POTOT AL RELEASE D A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: Started Stopped '
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: ELEVATED @ GROUND LEVEL A RADCACTIVE GASES .ADCACTIVE PARTICULATES
@ RADIOACTIVE LIQUIDS [DJOTHER
- 11. RELEASE: CURIES PER SEC. CURIES
$ NOBLE GASES C IODINES B IODINE / NOBLE GAS RATO(if available) D OTHER 12 REACTOR STATUS: A SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: / / / 11 % POWER (Esalem) mm dd yy 13 ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OFFSITE DOSE: NEW UNCHANGED DURATION: HRS.
r 2 :- Chad ThyreM l DOSE RATI DOSE RATE Whotetedy Chad ThyroM l Destance (mrom/hr) (mrom/hr) (mrom) (mrom) SITE SOUNDARY 2 MILES 5 MILES 10 MILES 14 METEOROLOGICAL DATA: NOT AVAILABLEL V
$ WIND DIRECTION (from) -3G4EP' '3 Y 5 e C STASILITY CLASS k B WIND SPEED (mph) O' 6 0 7RECIPITATION (type) 00 4 i
15 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:
%NO RECOiAMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTONS
@ SHELTER C EVACUATE
@ OTHER 16 APPROVED SY: ) [LM EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TIME /DATE- III0J / ) / N /1 lenome) / (Tesse) (Economp mm ad yy 803 tc 9
o [L i ?.* 3 '
#AOCEDu E NO AEw580N PAGE NO p<
'/
J 75 .5 ~W ""~ VEGP 91002-C . 15 4 8 of 15 Sheet 1 of 3 CHECKLIST 2 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FOR
. STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES t A. INSTRUCTIONS:
l
- 1. !
- 2. Complete as much of the information on this form as possible.
4
- 3. Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorize release.
i These notifications MUST be made within 15 minutes of event classification.
- 4. i Use conununication circuits in the following order of priority:
- a. ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously) l b.
SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory)
- c. !
Coeumercial telephones (Phone numbers in VEGP Emergency Response Telephone Directory)
- d. Radios: i 1.
Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1, ask SRS to notify other South Carolina agencies). i 2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify, the Georgia Emergency Management Agency). B. INITIAL ROLL CALL: State the following: THIS Mf!S HELLO THIS NOT A DRILL! IS (Name) 6 /en c/(Cross out
#J c 6e pne), M AT THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. PLEASE OBTAIN A COPY OF THE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. STAND 3Y TO RECEIVE A MESSAGE. '
roll call in the following order, check box for responding agencies) . l I t i QSavannahRiverSite @ Aiken County i,
%StateofSouthCarolina Allendale County '
Georgia Emergency
@ManagementAgency kBarnwellCounty
%SurkeCounty C.
NOTIFICATION MESSAGE TRANSMISSION: Transait complete notification ' form, obtain roll call and record acknowledgements. 1 NOTE ' The Energency Notification ' Message for State and Local Response Agencies (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3) Checklist 2. of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. The actual form should be used, although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized. u..$
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION numeer ~1 1 A TH18 IS A DRILL THIS IS AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY
- c ..;.
p- 4,
- 2. AUTHENTICATION: Y #*1' E CI '
(Number) (Codeword)
- 12. 3g 3 TIME /DATE:
/
3 mm
/ M / To agponygg gy dbd* 8(h (Eastem) dd yy (Name) 4 SITE: VOGTLE UNIT: C %_. .. CONFIRMATION PHONE NUMSER: NN m -% Mc?
$ EMERGENCY CLASS 8FICATION:
@ NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT C SITE AREA EMERGENCY @ GENERAL EMERGENCY 6 @ EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE: MO / 3 / _AC / 90 (Eestem) mm ad yy 8 EffERGENCY TERMINAflON AT: TIME /DATE: / / / (if 5, go to item 16.)
(Eastem) mm dd yy 7, EMERGENCY DESCRIPTION: OS% + how hat 6^ e N ~ <S 8 PLANT CONDITION: @ IMPROVING M STABLE @ DEGRADING lel UNDETERMINED 9 EMERGENCY INVOLVES:
@ NO hELEASE (If A, go to item 14.) C A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Expected Duraton
[ e 0TCT4TIAL RELEASE D A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: Started Stopped ..
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: C ELEVATED G GROUND LEVEL
$ RADIOACTIVE GASES rd RADIOACTIVE PARTICULATES
@ RADIOACTIVE LIQUIDS D OTHER
- 91. RELEASE: CURIES PER SEC. CURIES A NOBLE GASES C ODINES
@ IODINE / NOBLE GAS RATIO (if avestable) D OTHER
- 12. REACTOR STATUS: @ SHUTDOWN TIME /DATE: / / /
@ % POWER (Eassem) mm de yy 13 ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OPPSITE DOSE: NEW UNCHANGED DURATION: HRS.
r '- - CNed Thyrew DOSE RATI DOGE RATE Wholehecy Chad Thyeoid D6etence lawom/hr) (sweep (mrom/hr) (mrom) SITE SOUNDARY 2 MILES 5 MILES to MILES 14 METEOROLONCAL DATA: b NOT AVAIL / ALE A WIND DIREC TON (from) 36 *
$ STA88UTY CLASS b
@ WIND SPEED (mph) S D PRECIPITATION (type) M-15 RECOMMENDEO PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:
k NO ITECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS S SHELTER C EVACUATE D OTHER
- 16. APPROVED SV: EMERGENCY DIRECTOR (W I TilAE/DATE: 11 $ b f $ i A I (Tsue) mm de 003 09 (Eaesem) ry
- r 5,; s.
~
PaOCEOL AE NO
' AEvtSION
- s.
- 14 -= 24(
VEGP 91002-C PAGE NO / i 15 8 ef 15 l Sheet 1 of 3 CHECKLIST 2 EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION MESSACE FOR STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES A. INSTRL'CTIONS: ' 2. Complace as much of the information on this form as possible.
; 3.
Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorire release. These notifications NUST be made within 15 minutes of event classification. 4 Use communication circuits in the following order of priority: a. ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously) b. SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory) c. Commercial telephones (Phone numbers in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory)
- d. Radios:
- 1. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq. 1. ask SRS to notify other South Carolina agencies). "
2. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify the Georgia Emergency Management Agency). I B. INITIAL ROLL CA1.L: State the following: THIS 44/I5 NOT #/m HELLO. THIS IS (Name) ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. A DRILL! e . rfc. Me(CrossATous one)h THE VOCTLE { l PLEASE OBTAIN A COPY OF THE ; EMERCENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. STANC3Y TO RECEIVE A MESSACE. (Pro roll call in the following order, check box for responding agencies) l (3)SavannahRiverSite 3]AikenCounty [3]StateofSouthCarolina f()AllendaleCounty
@CoorgiaEmergency QBarnwellCounty Management Agency
[2lBurkeCounty C. NOTIFICATION MESSAGE TRANSMISSION: Transmit complete notification form, obtain roll call and record acknowledgements. NOTE The Emergency Notification Message for State and Local Response Agencies (Sheet 2 and 3 of 3) Checklist 2, of this procedure is a reproduction of the actual form. The actual form should be used, although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized.
1 l i EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Number B I (/7' 1n7 j
- 1. @ THl3IS A DRILL THIS IS AN ACTUAL E RGENCY ,, " !
- 2. AUTHENTICATION:
b li'i/ /s 5 8 M
- b ' .,. (Number) (Codeword) 05 3 TIME /DATE: / 3 / M / 70 REPORTEDSY: ' 4 #*^
(Easternt mm dd yy (Name) 4 SITE: VOGTLE UNIT: Cm CONFIRMATlON PHONE NUMSER 1-404 554-6762 l
'/t4 $24 35c5 I
9 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
@ NOTIFICATlON OF UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT C SITE AREA EMERGENCY D GENERAL EMERGENCY TIME /DATE: 9MD / 3 / 10 t 70 6.hMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: mm dd yy (Eastern)
@ EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE: / / / (if B. go to item 16.) ,
(Eastern) mm de yy I
- 7. EMERGENCY DESCRIPTION: O MC p d* ' mw rc r o .
l 8 PLANT CONDITION: IMPROVING El STABLE DEGRADilRS lel UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCYINVOLVES:
NO RELEASE (if A, go to item 14.) C A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Espected Duration
@ Nit:NTIAL RELEASE @ A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: Started Stopped
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: C ELEVATED GROUND LEVEL A RADIOACTIVE GASES N RADIOACTIVE PARTICULATES 8 RADIOACTIVE LIQU:DS D OTHER
- 11. RELEASE: CURIES PER SEC. CURIES b NOBLE GASES C DODINES D OTHER
@ LODINE / NOBLE GAS RATIO (if avestable) 12 REACTOR STATUS: A SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: i / / @ % POWF.R (Emetem) mm de yy
- 13. ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OFFSITE DOSE: NEW O uNCHANoED DURATION: HRS.
2 r- r Chad Thyroid DOSE RAW 000E RATE Whatelsedy Chad ThyroM
- Desteroce (mrom/hr) (mesmdhr) (awomb (mrom) j j SITE SOUNDARY 2 MILES . -
5 MILES to ufLES 5 l
- ,' 14 METEOROLOQlCAL DATA
- NOT AVAILASLE l b A WIND DIRECTION (from) N
- M STASIUTY CLASS
$ WIND SPEED (mph) 6 D PRECIPITATION (type) NOT l 15 RECOGMAENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS: l
, NO RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS S SHELTER j C EVACUATE D OTHER 16 APPROVED SV: AM ' EMERGENCY DIRECTOR TIME /DATg. 1 '. O C.s f 3 g20 f I (. - 3 , , , (Neme) (Tsue) (Eastem) mm ed yy easic e
._ ~ - _ . - --
l paOCECuSE NO 6$ 0*] REVISION e. ?: A Jy' ; VEGP 91002-C PAGE N0 '/ ' 15 8 Of 15
. Sheet 1 Of 3 i CHECKLIST 2 '
EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION MESSAGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSE AGENCIES A. INSTRUCTIONS: i 1.
- 2. Complete as much of the information on this form as possible.
- 3. Have the Emergency Director sign the form to authorize release.
These notifications MUST be made within 15 minutes of event classification. 4 Use communication
- a. circuits in the following order ENN (broadcast to all stations simultaneously) of priority:
b. SC Backup ENN (Two digit phone numbers found in VECP Emergency Response Telephone Directory) c. CommercialDirectory) Telephone telephones (Phone numbers in VECP Emergency Response I
- d. Radios:
1. Use SRS radio in TSC (Freq.1, ask SRS to notify othr.r South Carolina agencies).
- 2. e
.. Use Burke County radio in TSC (ask Burke County to notify the Georgia Emergency Management Agency). . 1 I ". .* !
B. 1 INITIAL ROLL CALL: State the following: rE5 ( THIS 19f!S NOT A DRILL! (Cross ou jtne)g HELLO, THIS IS (Name) 6 /,w,- Dc./4R AT THE V0GTLE ELECTRIC CENERATING PLANT. PLEASE OgTAIN A COPY OF THE 1
~
EKERGENCY NOTIFICATION FORM. STAND 3Y TO RECEIVE A MESSACE. (Proceed with roll call in the following order, check box for responding agencies) (E] Savannah River Site M Aiken County j' [])StateofSouthCarolina [5]AllendaleCounty l
- Georgia Energency
{} (j]ManagementAgency f5]BarnwellCounty [~)BurkeCounty C. NOTIFICATION MESSACE TRANSMISSp 1: Transmit complete notification form, obtaLa roll call and recocd acknowledgements. ; 1 NOTE
- The Emergency Notification Message for State and Local Response Agencies (5heet 2 and 3 of 3)
Checklist 2, of this procedure is I 3 , a reproduction of the actual form.
- The actual form should be used, I l
although reproduction of the form in this procedure is authorized.
- m. .,
l I EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION Numoer cf , Ei ..
- 1. @ THl3 IS A DRILL THIS18 AN ACTUAL EMERGENCY . , ,
?. AUTNENTICATION: l-- # </
bY , ' w, (Codeword) ,) 1:353 TIME /DATE: l'4I. 8 Number)3 / / 20 f 90 REPORTED SY* B /'Wa * / / 0 / ,I (Easte. mm dd yy (Name) 4 SITE: VOG..E UNIT: Cne. CONFIRMATION PHONE NUMBER:
- T W-M
'4CH 8.Mo TCC$ \
.es '
t 5 EMERGENCY CLAS$1FICATION: N,on4
@ NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT 8 ALERT C SITE AREA EMERGENCY D GENERAL EMERGENCY 6 A EMERGENCY DECLARATION AT: TIME /DATE: 3W __/ 3/ mm Mad/ 90yy (Eastemi
@ EMERGENCY TERMINATION AT: TIME /DATE: /3M 7 /_3_/ 20 f io (if 8, go to nom 16.)
, (Eastem) mm ed yy
- 7. EMERGENCY DESCRIPTION:
- 8. PLANT CONDITION: @ IMPROVING L1 STABLE DEGRADING M UNDETERMINED
- 9. EMERGENCY INVOLVES: .
A NO RELEASE (if A, go to item 14.) @ A RELEASE IS OCCURRING: Started Expected Duration '
@ p?fNT8AL RELEASE D A RELEASE HAS OCCURRED: Started Stopped
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: ELEVATED GROUND LEVEL A RADCACTIVE GASES N RADCACTIVE PARTICULATES 8 RADCACTIVE LOUIDS D OTHER
- 11. RELEASE: CURIES PER SEC. CURIES A NOBLE GASES C ODINES
@ IODINE /NOSLE GAS RATC(if avestable)
D OTHER 12 REACTOR STATUS: A SHUTDOWN: TIME /DATE: / / I M % POWER (Eastem) mm dd yy . 1
- 13. ESTIMATE OF PROJECTED OFFSITE 00$E: NEW UNCHANGED DURATON: HRS. j
=' CNed Thyveed i poet naTir oceERArm unneestody cned Thy M oseeenes (mesoner) (mrom/nr) (awom) (meem) i SITE 80VNOARY I 2 MILES 5 MILES 10 MILES 14 METEOROLOGICAL DATA: NOT AVAILABLE A WIND DIRECTON (from) e rel STASILITY CLASS
$ WIND SPEED (mph) O PRECIPITATION (type) 15 RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS:
A NO RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE ACTONS S SHELTER
@ EVACUATE
@ OTHER Y 18A,,ROVEoSy: ,A%1[k EMERoEacvDiaEcTOa TiMEioATE: 1Wf , 1 ,20 M i
f#emel i (Tsue (Emenom) mer, dd ,y RWe, ,
e a #
!! I I #* r I w N .n s y v. /y ; Q' g,: .. :
,; f) sii * ~~ l4. \
cstq Mer 7~ ,, Dm N. 7 Cp ERP Rho Mou,rea Os to AJer 013 Eef \ I C 9)O fB6tThot.nr1 Ar RC Esrsee,sr<co -cM l ODS. OK l0 PsrutrJ 5 $PC P l ows . Her kan Da Fw %c Cr Mir /can ; 7-9 eh 67 7l ! b t' ~2,0
/u A)okuu l Iloo l%To% $nuc dimu
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-i p . , 5 ,?
OSC SUPPORT p-REQUEST INF0AMAT10N FORM Y. AflE Date_{/k/ff]Al Team #__A________ Dnstte/Offsite - Radio Channel __1 / *) Tel ephone s 4552 /724-0642, Time of call __ __ Received by: OSC Mgr C *T' Other __________________ Source TSC Mgr C 3 Maint Supv C 3 ED C 3 Other ____________________ TYPE OF REQUEST ___ l______$_____ ___ _ Destinations B1dg________ Lv1_______ Rm_______ Other_ W Plant Status: Power C J Alert C 3 Site Area C-T Gen Emerg C 3 Radiological / Hazard conditions: None C J Specify _______________________ Number of peoples !&C__ HP__ l MEC__ EL__ OPS __ CHEM __, SEC__ NAME (PLEASE PRINT) EXPOSURE PRESENT ALLOWABLE DOSE ID# EXPOSURE EXP REC. L._ _ _-___-_ M__ Y___-________S__E_A__$__
- 2. _p_u__ne_ N_Y__e_"{ft_______ _1_6_7__/ 1
__ ___ _________ __L_oo -___ o _______ s._________--______---___ __________ _________ ________ _______ l 4._____-___-_____________ ________-_ ___-_____ __-__--_ __-____ s._______________________ __________ _________ ________ _______ 0* i 7.___-___________-_______ _______-__ __-_____- __---___- __-_-__ O._______________________ __________ _____-__- _________ _______ 9 _____________.______-___ __________ _________ ________- _______ 18._-_____-______--____-- __________ -________ _______-- ___-__- eCall OSC every 38 minutes cPeriodicall y check Dost eeter
- Observe for any unusual conditiona cReport to DSC Mgr f or debriefing when returning to OSC cOlgn out before leaving OSC cCall OSC when you have reached your des t i nati on White copy OSC Mgr Green copy Status Loop Yollow copy: Team Drange copy Doc Cont TIME OUT /f_: _5*_
TIME RETURNED :
a \ i 4 b [ j f /4 , y s N l.0) 3 i
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/d e The Yegtle Nuclear Plant continues te operate in ' alert' statvs. Alert
- is the second least serfeus emergency classiffsation, the plant is stable.
Unit 1 was already down for its second refueling evtage. Switchyard maintenance was fairogress la conneetten with that outage when a construction vehicle struck a switehyard power pele. One of two diesel geursters ettemeted to start to supply power, but failed. It then was started manually. The second diesel generater was out of service for planned maintenance, else in sonneetten with Unit'l's planned outage. That lesbility te npply~ emergency diesel generated power for more than 15 minutes resulted to the det1tratten if the "ette area emergency' et 9:00 A.M. (C$t). Unit I, operating 4% norsal l* pow 6r, tripped off line due le power fluttuatione en the Unit 1 side of the l plant. Unit i did nel lose essentfs1 eisatriest power, however.
- 8hertly after 9
- 00 A.M. (Ctf), non. essential personnel were essembled and l accnnted for in asserdance with emergency eparating precedures. They were not i
j evneusted as intttally reported. Work is underway le restore Mmal power to Unit 1. j Neither unit auttined say damage. No en wie injurede end there was no reitase .c ridiessii m ,. l'.p d ax y-m 4,o~: 7oni 4 w $1h.tA # u ur w m m . l
% e s f
." 2
' . ?:-?
.PRoCEDUME No.
AEvtStoN c- A
- 4 5 14 c' VEGP 91002-C PAGE NO. '
15 11 of 15 i 1 Sheet 1 of 3 i CHECKLIST 3 i NRC NOTIFICATION CHECKLIST Initiateshall contact on the ENS line. When contact is made, the i caller stater i i "THIS IS/IS NOT (cross out one) A DRILL"
" HELLO THIS IS (NAME):
i AT THE VOCTLE
- ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT.
< NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET AND STAND BY TO RECE NOTES
- a. If no response on the ENS is obtained use a commercial line
. and one o,f the following numbers: e (301) 951-0550 (301) 427-4259 (301) 492-8893 (301) 427-4056 b. i < The Event Notification i'orksheet (NRC Form 361) in this procedure is a reproduction of the actual NRC form. The actual NRC Form 361 should be used, although reproduction i of the form in this procedure is I i 1 authorized. j
- I 4
s
- 1 4
3 l b thes 4
l
)
, 1 80mes ,81 U & GuCLE AR mtGULATOAY COnest&&aQas
- OPER ATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET N '
2 .' 1 l NOTiplCAfsON Tsut F ACILiiv om onGANIZATCN UNeT CALLim S Naut
;, .: a:
- a m' '
CALL SACK s (Ns t [- 7
- Mf -
i "j ;"'/gpa' '"N' 1 bb a
) / h0 / b i.s, u.o E.e.,e.e, 20 C,R so raten si
(.HAl T$ peow.,get $/O A$Mu [ imi
,[ "" "
Teset Gm Z l ACME
'ont m/aeOOf SE FORE POeER/heoot AFTER t.Hel TS oev.eeen AO(W t,.1 Rae meieses AAAD In) Dayseed Condenen 8' ! t HAl wenes vaus Cone.i.e.a ADEC AuMA lel Oin Memmee.ag SeN Oe AMIN
,,,g,, g,,,,, % , 4-Hr Ne*Emeryoney 20 CFR $0.72(bH2)
EVENT CLAS$1FICATIONS ! H ctNeaAL<aa<actNcv caN/AAsc
- @ sifE AmE A EWEmCENCY Sf f/AAE C (nel
<aaaa a .
Fleet As ^ V F w a es ^=' ima h=' ' ^ a *5 ANFL (m) ESF Actumen Al%f l ALERT ALE /AAE C (=) Hwrnsano A8 emu t= H A) Ss4 5/D Casse=Inv AlteA E unusual EvtNT UNU/AAEC i.nl ase/%s AN#C (=Hel mMn Caesmiley AINe R to 72 teON IMt MGENCY tsme nur ce4,nnef (m) L.ght awg ANLi (n. hcl Control of Red RMeme AINC
)
[ PNys#CA L SE CURITY 172.788 077P t. ) Temens l ANTO (a.HDI Ascasene Metagnan At'*O ! ! E T a AN5'oa ra nom Nta^ -> ocaNa'*m= = ANor i.HA) A, n > x Ase . AAi. 20 aos u^tsa'Avs xaosuat am i I <-> 'cca 0 *+*' a cs ^c(* < Hsi L = a**== > 2x A.e e Auo [ OTHe n NO Ans,N LCD.NeN LNINF.N L TR.NON R I) Lee Ese$ AENS tel Off ste i nessa,al AneE D E co. o". a a ocoN i> Laa e- e A --- a' ^AaC '-> o*i '* N='.a==a ma ^ ras ) DESCRIPTION (talk bMh8 sh 4* M M $*%If J @ J dI /l I g wrs. TA,1 Cast $th .N d h)'t N bWe W4/4SM) * 'ftl i m., fr.pa. n asML , eta wwd . Tc5 e av un i g ,gn d ea r ' r. o est. 6/6 s a +ed w g h.5 , 6 fuf Lagak) & Altd. La S Q 26 Mr Chy } fry df
%'T 2 /Ven l a b la ~. \ 0Y UT fbTS %@k.
p/o JM3 cmu3h I us J : IRbt pM & blM t Mr B I rm or - % .3_,a1. l l laesues Symems eNected, ereuesene & show .an.seing e.yees, em,ess, eeeeen e# event en e .s nt, sciens samen er esense. ens.
.c ceseosNT y << e,
)(
STATEls) Y DIO ALL $YSTEtes PumCT*0N AS alOusaEOP eso Ml tocAL )v f *+ t f it=* a * *' CTNt2 00v ACEtec?ES i 88006 OF OPE R ATION ESTitaATE Filfl' "
, m ..., p r y v=TiL cona CTso- [ph ne87Aaf oats: (Aake.l A A00tisC8s AL iN8 0 ONsACx'
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s e e . se e .o asi aoo.,.o n.=seawano= p 'h - e *e T t k, g..e o g . .non, c a ... , [ m AosoLOGiCA L a t t f ast s CM4 CE 08 8 8 LL 'N AP'LiCAtt e a t t us toer,re seresewawreas sww w ee ce orsw ea ever'r earrereas s l L QU10 RE LE A5s GA5f ous af LE ASE UNPLANNED af LI A5s PLA8eNED AE LE ASE OssGOsssG Ygau NATED l hoose TopfD UNuoN870mf D Op pliTE mf LEASE T $ E ECIEDEO pu ALAmus AREA 5fvacuarto 5 Pip 10NNEL f
- POSED on CONTa WINATED OFFSITE PROTECT #vE ACTsONS 8Ecoww(NDED 'Seere reisew asim .n e=r seen g me een m ,e
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- C, I Lapw.d ,,,,,j Apactud.ny frersenae & W.sposeed to vC./m.a 0aU
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LEAE RA TE. UmaT5 earn / god 7 5 LaMIT5 , SUODEN CM LO*oG TtmM DE vtLOPMENT. LEAE START DATE: TIME . COOLANT ACTIVITV & UNIT 5 PnsMAny . SECD'eOAm y - T OF SAFETV atLAffo EOuiPMENT NOT OPERATiO8tAL. EVENT DESCRSFinort IContonvec trom tror,t) f h 4 s A e l l l
.- . . . - . . - . ~ . . . . - . . - . . - . . - . - .-. . - -
nessene see 4 VECP 91704-C * ' g 12 of 16 m go /hteT -- CHECKLIST A Sheet 1 of 1 VECP SECURITY DEPARTMENT CALL CHECKLIST NOTE , After normal working hours or after an early dismissal or site evacuation, there may not be any personnel at the locations listed below. Organization or Individual Person Contacted Primary Number Alternate Number Central Time / Initials
" Viottor Center M "
-3630
'/ -3631 /d U /
Training Center h # -3901 -3903 /635 / ' cRacreation Park [ 664 HAM -3650 -3494 /6% / v Engineering and Cenotruction [jM [ -3580 (days) Department -3585 (days) /6/7 / beeper i beeper i
//4 -828-9400 -828-9510 /* / M
, CPC Vogtle Central .
Warchouse (AM M*) -3425 -3297 M f ,/,
> Corporate Carage bai NNA -4205 /OVO f Nuclear Operations ;
Inprocessing Center (# #d -3352 -3120 v/* / M ' NOTE % w n If an Alert. Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. ,~ A is declared and is after normal working hours, perform - - the following; in accordance with Checklist B " Emergency # u Recall Instructions" ' yt },,{ s n:r r.,,.rnency aesponse
... ,,ni,.. ion acc.. i i "j, 3.m()/ /N3 A
nuesene ese VECP m 91704-C g * " " hft/ifCA fjoAMd 12 of 16 CHECKLIST A ** *I I VECP SECURITY DEPARTMENT CALL CHECKLIST NOTE ', After normal working hours or af ter an early dismissal or alte evacuation, there may not be any personnel at the locations listed below. Crganization or Individual Person Contacted Primary Number Alternate Number Central Time /Iaitials
- Vioitor Center WI -3630 -3631
/
Training Center
/667/
-3901 -3903 /O/l /
. Recreation Park kM ^ -3630 -3494 /d'#
iEngineering and / Cenetruction Department 4 [IW" 7
-3580 (days) -3585 (days) /G7 /
A beeper i beeper i
-828-9400 -828-9310 M / f h Uff" -3425 -3297 /&7 /
e Corporate Carage fX A f M W F- ~4205 7015 y
- Nuclear Operations Itprocessing Center [# d#4dh -3352 -3120 //A / f NOTE If an Alert. Site Area Emergency or General Emergency $
is declared and is af ter normal working hours, perform d# H the following in accordance with Checklist B " Emergency $[ Reca1I Instructions" M yc ( VI:GP 1:me ry,ency Response Organic.itson Recall
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90 Stitt Wolfe i TERUs George Schneider { FROMs Bob Duggleby
- l DATE: March 20, 1990 j
SUMECT: VIGP SAS. 5 =
- 1. SAE declared at VECF at 0940, 3/30/90. Reason, loss of on-l 1
and off-Jite AC power for more than 15 minutes. 4
- 2. State WP received ENN msg. il at 0959. WP notified SCEPD e and DHEC 1010 and 1014 respectively.
SCEPO operator ee.-firmed Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell County notification
- 1016, 1018, 1023 respectively,
- 3. Ceneurrently with ENN oa11 to State WP, operations Branch Manager received let ENN message. SECC activated at 1010.
County desk officers confitised Aiken, Allendain and Barnwell l
- County notification at 1010, 1015 and 1010 respectively. '
{ 4. Significant action timings, etc. documented o n o p e r a't i o n s
- Desk Journals (Encl.1) . Green sheet messages (Encl. 2) .
! 5. effsite emergency notification procedures
- agencies were IAN NUREG 0454 standards. to all S.C.
- amerTency response excellent. state egency
- \
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- 5 6
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l SENI sY; xerox leiscepter 1941 i J-ec-su i 1 1 ra , ovateno m vcor caen r a.i.mso .o e j [s . 1. -) l
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l ! WESTINGHOUSE P. O. BOX 616, BLDO 703 73A SAVANNAH RIVER COMPANY AIKEN, S.C. 29802 j l 4
- FAX COVER SHEET i 1
1 DATE: _ s/za/Pe i !
'ID: Name: /*s u ver 5 %
Location: lim 4 vo.A M ~).4. duk ! 1 e ; Phone Number: 7ar- e< rv Confirmation Numbe'r: 7 z=.- oc,r v FROM: Name: GJ LisAA Location: LMte/O A4ws4 h,w WSRC Emergency Properedness (803) 725 - ilon PTS 239 - 1ros, RRTURN FAX NO. (883) 725 8392/ ipr 8 239 8392 Number of Pages 2.- (Cover Page Not Included) l l l
eca. os.astva m esopter svei , a-go eg ; ):1ers ; 8037258302*VEQP ENER PLANNING ;# 2 4
\
j Westingh0040 PAtulit ; Sevennah River Company
** *} ,. , y, -
fy l0!s 4' l6 6 j i ESH EPS 900115 4 March 26,1990 k Mr. Jim Roberts
- Georgia Power Company
- Plant Vogde Training Center ;
River Road i
- Waynesboro, GA 30030 ,
I
Dear Mr. Roberts:
i n .. c., w-.....,. w..m.t.. I wa==> mwwi c-- r - - 3 j 1 Per yoer request, setached please And the SRS due les for the Meat Vogtle event on 3 20-90
- A consultadon with the Deparanent of Energy Oince of External A# airs (Dos CEA) and a review for classification has allowed release of tWs latonaation to yes.
If yon have additional questions, I may be mached at 725-2H4. Sincerely,
/.4. As.4A j M.O. Smith, III Manager Emergency Operadoes i
j FSW/ Ira j Attachment .\ t l. l i i I l l 1 I }
l l echt or.Aerox essesepoor svel 4 go se .s a i.iers . avannoasa ocur cocn r w h6mu i E s' ' l- ? .? - ] t f) N ' Y IIs l BSH EPS 90ll5 Attachment k ENN Messates kom Dlctolos Recorder, 32090 ; ENN#1 9:56 am(Start) 10:08 (Terminste) SAR
- ENN #2 - 7 (Start) 10
- 22 (Ter=Inana) AIARI ENN #3 ErrRacutDEQ Al2EI ,
ENN N .11:02 sa (Start) AIEEI ENN #5 11:29 am (Start) Al2EI ENN #6 11:58 am (Stan) ALBI r 1
- '!'; 27 - 12:28 pm (Start) Al2EI BNN #8 - 12:39 pas (Stan) AIERI ENN #9 1:43 pm (Stan) 11taMBfATE G
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MGDCY FRIPPMHUS DIVISION, mg 'f " *)' ' p F FACSI: NIM TRMISMISSION NUM5tas k_7I ' cususa.x wi uGE.S To FOI.t4W: _ / , b har ['T TRA!ISMIT TOs 7%@^ C[ TRON: 3.C. EPD, OTAG (SEOC-Colushia, S.C.) a n sj p sp, c ,,, P. j ACCICY/OTTIC28 ORIGI!fATOR NM E _ I/e hd ht ' CTTY/ LOCATION 8 CRIGINATOR TEI.EPSCNE:
, FACsIMIU TEI.IPHONE: FAsCIMIM TEM FNONE: ses 134 80a2 YE3tIFZCA'dION TEI.EPHONEs , cPERATOR INITIAI5: 8C S mars TRusuzTTEo .5/Le/9d
- z TmANsxxTTro / d .' 4 d 4 wt (24~Kode - Rastarn Time) ,
i en.no 1 1 l 4 1 I . 1 . 1 .
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- 1 9 -20 '90 18:34 IDiSC SECC CP$ CENTEA TEL to 903 8062 O ~n ' mI '3 pe ?
,. M MS Mdfn i #7.5 EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION N"":t -
I
- 1. @ THl3 8$ A DMILL HIS IS AN ACTUAL EMEHQENCY
- 3. AUTHEN tl CATION: 0 ft9f" Al** s' $ L t M*4
- 3. IIME/DAT(. M D i% i ba (coa *osei& M, n ,. > -. n RErorTEo sY. v
- 4. sers: L Sw' UNIT: 1 coNelaMAfiou esoNe Nuusen: - - 8/ -Wp-/o7b' d- --t
- 8. EastRCENCY CLASSWICATION:
@ NOTFICATION OP UNU$UAL EVENT @ ALORT SITE AAEA EMEMOCNCY @ GENERAL EMERGENCY
' 4. @ EMEAGENCY DECLARATION AT; TIME /0 ATE: NN
==
i I i =? i A, Sk
@ EMSRGENCY TERMINATION AT ilWEt0AT8: -
1 i i go is hem te 1 ENCY DESCRIPfl0N: _ N .? M k h.
- 7. EMLE ,s- r n m a p w m , w ~.
hkA u u r M ef ' . _Z
' ~
diNrre - a *tM CONDITION: [lMPROVING @ STASLE @ DEGRADING @ UNDETERMINEO
- 9. EMER0ENCY INVOLVES:
RELEASE (if A. Se to Mom 14.) A RELEAlt 18 OCCURRING. Started tapened Owease.
@ POTENTIAL RELEASE A RELEASE MAS 00CUfWED: alamed ,t w _
- 10. TYPE OF RELEASE: O EtevATEo [OROUND LEVEL
@ RA0lOACTIVE GA388 @ IVE PARTICULATES j @ RADIOACTIVE UQUIDS K 0THER M I
II. RELEASE: O CuRIEe PER SEcoee O curuts l @ NOSLE QA$tt @ 100eNES l
@ comsmong oAs ye _(p4THER #4 . - !
- 18. fEACTOR STATUS: SNUTOOWN TWEJOATE MM POWER
- p ,.. E. . m o , - c gTE T. ; g , g - oRAT . _ -E 00 T. - RAT. e , . Y,,,. .
, metence JEEsmei Da*8"1- JE".snL M l site couwoARY , i a M LEs i 6 MILES /' _ 10 MILES / _
- 14. METEOROLOGICAL DATA: I NOT AVAILASLE
@ WIND OIRECTON (trong _ _
(E STAtluTY CLASS
@ WINO SPEED (mpfg @ PROCIPITATION pype) .
1a. l RE NDED PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. NO RECOMMEN080 PROT"CTIVE ACTIONS
@ SHELTER
@ EVACUATE f"'" . l
l 2 Plant A.W.Vogtle 1# Pa SECURITY DEFARTMENT REFORT y} J5fe, J g' gelofA
- a. Report Nurnbar Seeu.oh k . h [ /E w > '
)
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- b. Report Date c. Log Time /Date l j
1 3941-9c j_.9 ,c c. c ,/c3_ x _g
- a. Cassification of Inciden by
- /, f(' ['W4 f., p j
) b. Cassificaton: A/) 3 [ ' c. Circle C[77.71/ Internal d. Reportable YES h j
- a. Type of incident /5stuanon/ Wolaeon -
,,b non of Inod, ,t,
- I ~nt L S! 0' 'L k 'Cl f fi'Mho fT.A l
- c. Date of Incident d. Tirri of incident e. Reported by Name f. Date/Tirne Inodent Reper
_ ' ~ ~ ~ N. " '( - .1l . .L Q ?L F E.5, k. c . .-c. W e 7:.) , ,: i Persons involved Company or Job Title Security Supervssorof How Involved (if rw Name Dept. Badge involved Person Employee State SSN j 4
- No. (If Employed on Site) Address of Individ 1
4
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