ML20080P104

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Transcript of a Mosbaugh 940824 Deposition in Atlanta,Ga Re Opportunity to Review Prefile Testimony. Pp 463-721.Supporting Info Encl
ML20080P104
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1994
From: Mosbaugh A
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20080P058 List:
References
OLA-3, NUDOCS 9503070210
Download: ML20080P104 (400)


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  .. . 6  ~,..                                                                 463 i-          ?:?
v i
1. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ' 2 ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD i 3-4 IN THE MATTER OF: )

                                                         )' Docket Nos.

.. 5 ) 50-424-OLA-3 - ! GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ) 50-425-OLA-3 j 6' et al., ) l 7

                                                       .)  Re: License Amendment   !
                                                        )  (Transfer to            -

8

                                                        )' Southern Nuclear)       :
                                                        )

(Vogtle~ Electric Generating. ) VOLUME III 9 Plant. Units 1 and 2) ) i 10- , 11

   -t i      . 12              ~
       "' d DEPOSITION OF
             \13                                                                   '

ALLEN MOSBAUGH 14 , 15 August 24, 1994 5 16 l 10:10 a.m. l 17 l 18 19 5200 Nations Bank Plaza 600 Peachtree Street, N.E. l Atlanta, Georgia ! 20 21 22 Judy J. Bragg, CCR-A-521, RPR-CM i 23 BROWN REPORTING, INC. 24 1100 SPRING STREET, SUITE 750

     ;s sp                             ATLANTA, GEORGIA      30309                  !
  / J-25                                    (404) 876-8979
                                               ~

9503070210 950224 PDR ADOCK 05000424 _ . T PDR

                                                                                 )

I I 464 l l 1 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL L ~ l i 2 On behalf of Georgia Power Company: l ) 3 ERNEST BLAKE, Esq. i f Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge j 4 2300 N Street, N.W. ' Washington, D.C. 20037 5. JAMES E. JOINER, Esq. , 6 JOHN LAMBERSKI, Esq.

  • Troutman Sanders 7 5200.NationsBank Plaza l 600 Peachtree Street, N.E.

8 Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216 i j 9 . . t On behalf of the U.S. Nuclear  ! j 10 Regulatory Commission: i 11 CHARLES A. BARTH, Esq. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission f l ! 12 Office of the General Counsel  ! ![s 11555 Rockville Pike l 13 One White Flint North ' Rockville, Maryland 20852 l 14  ; t 15 On behalf of the Intervenor:  ! 16 MICHAEL D. KOHN, Esq. 1 Kohn, Kohn & Colapinto 17 l 517 Florida Avenue, N.W.

  • l Washington, D.C. 20001 18 19 Also Present: i l

20 Mr. Darl Hood l 21 22 1 23 24

 /~

l 1)T ! 25 - - - I

465 A) \_ 1 (The reading and signing of the i l i 2 deposition by the witness was reserved.) 3 ALLEN MOSBAUGH, 4- having been previously duly sworn, was. examined and 5~ testified as follows:  ? 6 CONTINUED EXAMINATION , 7- BY MR. BLAKE:

      -8       Q. Mr  Mosbaugh, when we brc ke of f last 9  night, I asked whether or not you would.take an           !

10 opportunity-to review your prefile testimony before ' i the Senate Subcommittee and determine whether or not 11 12 in that prefile testimony that you divulged to the i '~'T ,

  / 13    Senate Subcommittee that'there was a distinction in      ;

i 14 the language between the LER and the COA letter of 15 April 9th. Have you had a chance to do that?

                                                  ~

16 A. Yeah, I have had a chance to look over- i 17 this package, and in addition to the prefile 18 testimony here, this includes all the detail of what 19 I provided the NRC with the write-ups of validations l 20- and the very. detailed documentation, one write-up on i 21 the confirmation action response and the aspects ' 22 that I thought were false in it and a separate 23 write-up'on t,he'LER and the aspects that I thought 24 were false in it. (O,) 25 That was what I provided to the NRC as l

466

~
1. .the source, some of'the source information of these 2 allegations in the summer of 1990. So the complete -

3 package of allegations I gave the,NRC is all , 4 included here. So this has some very detailed t 5 information in it.  ; 6 Q. Let's try to get off to a good start now 7 in terms of trying to answer the question that I 8 asked, and if you want to add additional material, ' l 9 just let me know. t 10 My question is in the prefile testimony i 11 that you provided to the subcommittee,'did you l i 12 identify for the subcommittee that there was-a  ! 13 distinction in the language that we arelall talking I 14 about, the 18, 19 language between the COA and the 15 LER? . i 16 A. And in the prefile testimony in i 17 attachment three is the COA language and in 18 attachment, they are both in attachment three is the 19 LER language and my discussion of the falseness of l 20 both languages. 21 Q. So is it your answer to my question that 22 it's not pointed out in your prefile, typed prefile . 23 testimony to the subcommittee, but if you were to { 24 read all the attachments to it, you could discern 25 that that was the case; 1s that correct?

I l l l 467 ' (~h (,) 1 A. I didn't see anything in the prefile 2 testimony detailing that. The details are in the 3 attachment, and I guess I would also add that the , i 4 prefile testimony, I filed to address harassments l l l 5 and intimidation within the nuclear industry and my 6 experiences of that. l 7 So that was the subject of this hearing, 8 the subject of my oral testimony, and the subject of 9 the prefile testimony. The subject that I was asked l ! 10 to speak about was not my allegations on the 11 specific LER or COA to NRC. l 12 That became a small part of the whole i l ((~3

    ,j 13   presentation and, like I said, the details of that l

14 are contained in the attachment. 15 Q. Insofar as it was just a small portion of l 16 your presentation, you still would think that they l 17 deserved to have accurate information and complete , 1 18 accurate information? i l 19 A. That's correct. ' i 20 Q. And nothing inaccurate or misleading? 21 A. And the language is quoted in the 22 attachments. 1 ! 23 Q. And you regard your prefile testimony and 24 referring to the language being identical between I' 25 N-)T the COA and the LER as being accurate and complete? l

  .        . _   .      . _ . .         . . _ .-           _.                 _        _~

L -468 () 1 A. I don't believe my prefile testimony i 2 states that. i I l 3 Q. .Let's take'a'look at.your prefile , 4 testimony. Let's look at footnote five~on page 11 't 5 and what it says, so.thatsthe record will be clear .. 6' on this, is that I. recorded. statements.made'by -l 7 plaintiff Vogtle project vice-president Ken McCoy. ' 8 and GPC's senior vice-president,JGeorge Hairston,. 9 (and others), demonstratingJthat they were. aware- - j i 10 that prior statements related'to theEreliability of i i 11- the diesel generators were materially _falso and that [ { 12 they intentionally' reiterated theselsame false 13 statements when filing the licensing event report, { l 14 (LER), to the commission 30 days after the site area i 15 emergency had occurred.  ! ! 16 Now, I used the term identical. You used 17 the term there these same false statements. Aren't 18 you here referring to the statements in the COA'and l 19 then the statement in the LER? i l l 20 A. It says they reiterated the same false 21 statements, and the documents have the same false. 22 statements with respect to stating-that there were 23 no problems or failures on any of these starts,-as I 24 quoted, as was quoted before. l ( ) 25 In addition, it was the intent and it is 1 1 i l

469 k-) 1 the stated intent under the sworn testimony of the 2 people that signed both of these correspondences and 3 the people that reviewed both of these 4 correspondences that it was their intent that these 5 statements conveyed the same information or intended 6 to convey the same information to the NRC. 7 So Georgia Power people that signed the 8 document and reviewed and approved the document 9 agree with that. 10- Q. Isn't the testimony that you're referring 11 to from these individuals that they xntended to add 12 this to clarify it? I \r 13 ( A. No. 14 Q. To make it -- it is not? 15 A. The stated testimony is that they 16 intended those statements in the COA about the start 17 count, the start count statement, they intended that 18 to convey the same information to the NRC in both 19 the COA and the LER. That's the testimony I'm 20 referring to. 21 Q. I understand that their testimony with 22 the COA was that they didn't realize there was a 23 problem, they felt like that was accurate 24 information they were providing, and when later  ! I (_/') 25 questioned about problems that had occurred, they '

470 0 1 introduced that language into it-in' order to try to 2 rectify:that problem and. clarify it for.the reader,. 3 didn't they?

      '4.        A. And:theyfsaid that that 3language did-not' 5   change and that it was merely conveying the'same
      '6   information. They said that.
      .7         Q. And do you think that the introduction of 8  that language about comprehensive test program was 9  just insignifi' cant, immaterial?
    .10         A. No. As I have stated before, I think' 11   they added it there so that'they could.say.the same 12   thing but to add an undefined. phrase to muck itiup 13   so that they could argue it after the fact'        .

14 They intended it to read Ehe~same, be'the 15 same, appear the same; but they wanted to allow 16 themselves maneuvering room to argue it-after-the 17 fact if and when they got caught. 18 Q. This is a theory that you have come to 19 fairly recently, isn't it, the conspiracy to. muck it 20 up by the introduction of these words? That is, I 21 have never heard it articulated before this 22 deposition. 23 A. I have certainly been able to clarify it 24 since we have conducted discovery, but..I would add 25 that it is part of the theories that I have heard

n L l l 471

 - (~'T                                                                        .
   \-       1 E                the NRC's Criminal Investigation Division, the
2. Office ~of Investigation, articulate as'well.

l 3 -Q. I thought we were talking about'your I f l 4 articulation. .Have you articulated that before this 5 deposition? 6 MR. KOHN: Other than to his counsel?  ;

                                                                     ~

l 7 MR. BLAKE: Sure. 8 THE-WITNESS: I don't believe that that 9 has been written up'that way that.I can ' 10 recall in the allegations, but I=would need r i 11 to review all of those allegations-to be 12 absolutely sure. l 13 I have been able to focus on that much 14 better since we have taken the testimony and ' 15 since we have specifically heard from the 16 Georgia Power witnesses that they view the 17 verbal presentation, the COA letter, and the l 18 LER to convey the same information. 19 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Written up or articulated 20 or intimated or in any other way advanced by you 21- prior to this deposition? l 22 MR. KOHN: Other than to his counsel.

23. MR. BLAKE: Right. I don't ask, as a l

24 general matter, about his communications with

. ' (~hg8 25 you.

l l i w

i i i l l 472 k w/ 1 THE WITNESS: I think over. time-ILhave I i 2 had some discussions with OI personnel about i 3 that theory. Like I said, they-had.that 4 theory before I did. 1 5 -Q. (By.Mr. Blake) So-you indicated that you l 6 thought it was a significant or mater'ial addition, I i 7 but you didn't think it was important'enough.to I 8 point out to the Senate .in t.he prefile testimony, is j 9 that correct, other than it could be -- s 10 A. I have answered that before. The~ purpose 11 of this testimony was'to discuss my experiences as aL  ! 1 i 12 whistle blower and discuss harassment and " /~N (_) 13 intimidation. t 14 In the course of that, I touched on a l . , .. .mmber of allegations including delusion valves and f 16 other things that are unrelated. In the details, it i 17 contains all the information in terms of an l 18 allegation on the COA and the LER, including the 4 19 quoted language that I gave to the NRC initially. J 20 Q. Let's go back to the time of the site J 21 area emergency. Let's start there. 4 22 Up until that time, what had been your 23 experience with or involvement with, knowledge of ) 24 diesel generators and their operating patterns or i 1 Is )

       .                               25   reliability statistics, starting where you want up i

I

         %/                                                                                                              i I                                                                                                                         !

. i

l 473 N' 1 until now. 2 A. Starting in 1984, I became responsible 1 j i 3 for the system engineers who at that time were l 4 functioning as test engineers, and that included the t l 5 engineers that tested the diesels.  ! 1 6 So beginning in that time frame, the 7 system engineers and test engineers that were 8 preoperationally testing, doing the scope of testing 9 known as preoperational testing, reported to me and 10 continued to report to me from 1984 up to the time 11 of the site area emergency. 12 Once the plant was operational, those

  ,/ ~

(_) 13 engineers were formally called system engineers. So 14 the diesel system engineer reported to me from the 15 time that unit one got its license up to the time of J 16 the site area emergency. i 17 Q. Who was that person?  ; 18 A. I believe for that entire period of time, 19 it's been Kenny Stokes. I believe Kenny Stokes had 20 the diesel responsibility, I think, pretty much from 21 the beginning. 22 Q. So these people reported to you ' 23 administratively. Had you had training or had you 24 ever worked with diesels yourself? () 25 A. I had never been a system engineer on the

4 474  ! ([): 1 diesels. I had been involved'in some_other plants 1 R 2 and test programs at other plants?where.the 3 preoperational'testLand system type-engineers worked 4- for me, Land.that included. engineers ~that worked on-5 the' diesels. 6 So in the course'of'that work history' , 7 you know, I had that scope'under:my responsibility. , l 8 I wasn't'_the system engineer on the diesels. They-  !

      -9  reported up to:me-through a supervisor and then to.                      ;

1 10' me as preoperational testing, superintendent, 'and ' i 11 then later up.through a supervisor to:an engineering

    .12   superintendent to me.-
                                                                                   )

O 13 Q. How would you characterize your' state'of 1 I 14 knowledge of the diesels as of the time of the site ' i 15 area emergency? 16 A. Well, I was knowledgeable about the 17 diesels and some of their operating history, but I 18 was not a system engineer and by no means would I 19 say an expert on Vogtle's diesels. 20 I have an engineering background. .I have' 21 received SRO systems ~ training which includes systems 22 and diesel systems. I do have a fairly extensive 23 background in aspects of fluid flow,' aspects of i 24 thermodynamics, and those types of areas that relate (()25 to my engineering . capabilities to analyze certain l l J

I 475 1 kinds of problems which would include humidity and 2 dew point and fluid flow aspects. '

3 Q. In the course of that six-year period, l l

4 did you have occasion to focus on the diesels or the { i I 5 diesels' reliability, the diesels operability among 4 i 6 your various responsibilities?  ! 4 7 A. Not specifically. I thinN the site area ~ 8 emergency obviously focussed the maximum attention 1 9 on the diesels and the diesel failure and.the diesel

10 reliability. From the beginning the industry has 11 had some focus on TransAmerica Delaval diesels
   ,_    12      because of problems experienced in the industry and                                     ,

13 established an owners group. ' ] 14 So there were certain industry problems 15 that were focussed on in the construction and in the u 4 16 preoperational testing period that were generally i 17 the issues of the owners group and there were some [

18 very detailed documents, some specific inspections 19 that the plants were doing with TransAmerica Delaval 20 diesels related to cracking and problems that had
21 been experienced, and I know the system engineer 22 that's been working on those.

23 So that was an overall industry-wide 24 concern and in particular of TransAmerica Delaval , ) 25 diesels, but I don't believe up until the time of 4

                                                       , , ,       ,-r, - ,  , - - - - - -a y p ,- w e--

i l I I 476 l\/} 1 the site area emergency that there was any'special- , 2 focus on the reliability of the Vogtle diesels dut 1 3 to problems that were occurring that were unique at 4 Vogtle; but that all changed when the site area l 5 emergency occurred. 6 Q. Had you had any questions in your mind 7 about-the reliability of those diesels or the ' 8 adequacy of the. control system of the diesels? 9 A. Up to that point in time I had not l 10 reviewed that. Like I say, I don't recall any 11 events occurring that would have caused us to do 12 that. l /~ j 5% )h 13 Perhaps some problem with that was that 14 some of the problems that were occurring with the  : i 15 diesels even before the site area emergency weren't 16 being properly recognized by operations.  ! I ! 17 So there were, I think, some inadequacies l 18 to recognize that the diesels were having problems

19 before the site area emergency.

20 Q. The training about the SRO 21 responsibilities which you indicated that you had, l l 22 you previously have indicated that you weren't SRO 23 licensed and, therefore, weren't in a position to 24 determine whether or not the diesels were operable.

     ) 25 Do you recall that?

i 477  ?

jy  :

1 A. That's correct. 2 Q. What was the difference between obtaining i 3 a license and the degree of training _and instruction  !

4. that you received on SRO responsibilities that would'  !

5- distinguish one being able to make that 6 determination and one not? ' 7 A. I was SRO certified on a boiling water 8 reactor by the General Electric who operates a 9 simulator at Tulsa or operated a simulator at Tulsa,-  ! 10 Oklahoma. l 11 You do not have the authority within'the i 12 nuclear industry to transfer your license from a BWR l s/ 13 to a PWR, and you don't have the authority to 14 transfer a license on one plant, an SRO license on~ 15 one plant to another. I 16 So it would be inappropriate'to assume 17 that just because I had a certification,'that I l 18 -would have SRO authority at Vogtle. I guess I would 19 also add that what I had was a certification and not 20 a license, and there is a difference. 21 Q. On March 28, 1990 when you talked about-22 one of the diesels being operable, it's the same 23 tape that we have referred to before, the 24 transcript, did you believe that the diesel was ( ) 25 operable?

! e I i- l r l t.. , 477' - I lL A. That's~ correct. .l l

             '2         Q. What was the difference between obtainingL                                               l 1

3 a' license and-the degree.of training 1andfinstruction j 4 that you received on.SRO responsibilities'that-would

                                                                                                                    .r
             -5   distinguish 1one being able.to~make-that'                                                         .

I 6' determination and one not? 7 A. I was SRO certified _on afboiling water.  ! 8 reactor by the General Electric who operates a 9 simulator at Tulsa'or operated'a' simulator at' Tulsa,- ': r 10 ~ Oklahoma. j 11 You do not have the authority within:the. i 12 nuclear industry L to transfer your licensesfrom acBWR- l O 13 to a PWR, and you don't.have the authority to -'i l 14 transfer a license on one plant, anLSRO license on' - {

           .15   one plant to.another.                                                                                 i L

16 So it would be inappropriate to assume I ! 17 that just because I had a certification, that I i 18 would have'SRO authority at Vogtle. I guess I would: 19 also add that what I had was a certification ~and not 20 a license, and.there is a difference. 21 Q. On March 28, 1990 when.you talked about 22 one of the diesels being operable, it's the same 23 tape that we have referred-to before, the 4 E 24 transcript, did you-believe that the diesel was () 25 operable? ) L I j l , l .. l/ , . . , _ _ _ _ _ , , . _ , , , _ . , - ,

p- _ l 478 ) 1 Forg'et whether or not you were qualified l 2 to specifically make that declaration. I 1 3 A. I'm reporting the status of the diesel as i 4 determined by operations personnel. I 5 Q. Did you question that? 6 JL. Did I question their determination?  ! 7 Q. Yes. Having received SRO training,- ' 8 having been SRO certified, did you question whether ' i 9 or not the diesel was operable when you heard this ' i l 10 declaration made by operations?  ;

11 A. No, I didn't question that, i

! 12 Q. Let me turn to the next events. We have . 13 talked a lot about the April 9th scenario, but I 14 still have a couple of questions. Were you aware k 15 prior to April 9th that the company intended to seek 16 authorization to operate the Vogtle plant?  ! 17 A. To restart? 18 Q. Yes.  ! 19 A. I may have been tcid that. I don't have 20 an independent memory as to exactly when I may have  ! 1 21 been told that, but it's obvious that at some point l 22 in time, management would want to restart the plant. 23 Q. Yes. i 24 A. Sometime in that time frame I may have 1 (m- 25 been told by management that they were going to seek i

i I 4 I 479 '

 /'N
  's-)   1     a restart.                                                 '

2 Q. What was your title at that point? 3 A. Acting assistant general manager, plant 4 support. 5 Q. But you don't recall ever_having'been in 6 a conversation or in any meetings in which it was 7 discussed that the company was going to seek ' 8- restart? 9 A. No. I think I may have been, but I can't- > 10' recall right now a specific meeting or a time ~about i 11 that, but it would be logical that I may have been 12 told that before they made thefpresentation on April ' q,) 13 9th. . 14 Q. You never knew prior to April 9th that i 15 they were going to make such a presentation, or did 16 you? ' 17 A. I may have. I can't recall when I first 18 knew that. If I was told about it in the time frame 19 before April 9th, I don't believe that I was aware I 20 of anything before, like that week before April i 21 9th, i 22 That would have been the time frame that 23 management may have made it known and they probably 24 wouldn't have made it known just to me. They may

 .( ) 25       have made it known to a number of people.

i i 480  ! t 1 Q. As of April 9th, based on what you now 2 recall your state of knowledge was, is there any  ! 3 reason you believe, would have believed at that 4 point that the plant shouldn't restart? l 5 A. At that point in time? l i 6 Q. Yes. , 1 7 A. At that point in time, I guess I hadn't l 8 put together the basis for which~the plant should  ; i  ! 9 restart, and I was no't asked to participate in , 10 putting that basis together. 11 So I guess I would say I probably lacked 12 adequate information to make that determination. I l 13 wasn't asked to participate in that process. 14 Q. Are you aware today of any knowledge that l l 15 -you had on April 9th that would have caused you to  ! 16 oppose a restart of the plant? . i 17 A. I can't remember anything. Like I said, 18 a lot of the facts that support that or support my y 19 current belief that the plant was not ready to be 20 restarted are based on information that I learned 21 after that point in time. l 22 Q. As of April 9th, did these system l 23 engineers responsible for diesel testing still i 24 report to you? i ( 25 A. Well, no. There were some changes.made 1

I l I l 481 i l ("x l l !

     ~'
       )

l 1 in their reporting that occurred shortly after the 2 time of the site area emergency, and what changed 3 was that a critique leader was assigned to be 4 responsible and control the testing of the diesels l 5 and to control the testing to determine root cause. l l 6 That was Kent Holmes, and Mr. Skip Kitchens assigned 7 Mr. Holmes that responsibility. 8 Mr. Holmes, in that capacity, reported to 9 Mr. Bockhold, and.the engineers that were doing the 10 testing were under their normal-line of l 11 responsibility at that time reporting up to me.

  ,s
   ,      12             For the purposes of the restart testing

(-) 13 and the specific response to the site area 14 emergency, the diesel testing was directed to be 15 controlled through Mr. Bockhold to Mr. Kent Holmes. l 16 He was assigned as critique committee chairman to l 17 control the testing, the restart testing of the  ! 18 diesel. 19 So that changed the reporting 20 relationship that existed in the normal line 21 management. In addition, Mr. Ken Burr, who was a 22 corporate person that reported to Mr. Louis Ward, 23 came to the site to assist the engineers with the 24 testing. b)

  'N _ / 25              In addition, a contract engineer, Mr.

i 482 P 1 Chennault, was hired by Mr. Burr to come and assist 2 with the testing of the diesel; and in addition, I - 3 believe, a Mr. Dave Lizenby of Southern came to the 4 site, so some additional corporate personnel'and , t 5 people in contract to them came down that had 6 different reporting chains and were'the people that , t 7 were, involved in the testing of the. diesel.  : I

8 Q. Did you feel you had been relieved of I 9 responsibilities over the diesel that you had had l l 10 prior to the site area emergency?

j 11 A. In some respects, I think my normal line [ 12 management had been. usurped in a couple of' ] l 13 respects. Mr. Kent Holmes was an individual that in i 14 the active capacity worked for me, yet Mr. Kitchens', [ t 15 through Mr. Bockhold, had seen fit-to assign him as

16 the critique leader.

1 17 In addition, then, Mr. Bockhold directed i 1 18 Mr. Holmes to control the testing of the diesel, and 3 19 Mr. Holmes in that capacity reported to Mr. I i j 20 Bockhold. So there were several management actions 21 and edicts that disrupted what had been the normal  ; 22 line management function.

23 Q. Did you point this out to anyone or 24 complain about it?

( ) 25 A. No, I did not point this out. At this

                                                                                  ..,,c . . . - .

l 483 L . ,d V 1 point in time I had also begun to feel that 2 management was starting to discriminate against me l 3 because of my having made. prior allegations to the l 4 NRC.

        '5              It seemed almost like kind of a pattern, 6 a continuation up through the management actions;                 I 7 against me to bypass me in certain activities.

l 8 Q. Did you feel that this critique team  ! 9 approach and Holmes having been. appointed to oversee l 10 the diesel testing and reporting to Bockhold by 11 Kitchens' directive was in order to take you out of 12 the route? l l 13 A. Well, it partially accomplished that. 14 Q. Did you think that was an intent in what 15 it was they were doing? 16 A. I have no firsthand knowledge as to 17 intent. I can only observe the effect. 18 Q. Why didn't you raise that with anybody, 19 if you felt disenfranchised or if you thought it was 20 wrong? 21 A. Well, when you have been raising some i i 22 issues and you feel that you have been discriminated 23 against, I guess the effect on the personnel is an 24 effect of suppressing them. 25 You figure well, I will raise some more

i . . . - --- . .m.. _.s m._,m m a _s - .--_.,2m.:. __ t 4 484 , i b - (_/ 1 issues, they will call me a complainer and they will' i- 2: . attempt to use this againstame. l 3 Once you feel-the pressure of management s i- 4 or that management: is trying to do.that to you, it  ; 5 has a chilling effect on you.  ! 6 Q. Did you feel that this created,any1 sort-  ; 7 of' safety concern, this disruption of the' normal' i

8 ~ management chain?

i- .

;               9              A. I didn't think.about .it in those terms, i

j 10' Q. As a. normal-matter when you thought

11 things were being done-inappropriately or wrongly, i 12 did you feel it was your' responsibility to raise I

I i i 13 that? ' i i 14 A. Yeah, and like I said, I-did, but-when L 15 you start, when management starts taking-actions ? i 16 against you and then.you perceive a management 17 attitude against you, it has a chilling.effect on 1 i  ! , 18 you.  ; $ 19 -Q. Have you ever raised this item with i ! 20 management? i i 21 'A. This item being?

22 Q. This item being the. change in the

,. 23 reporting relationships concerning. diesel testing. 1

24. Have'you ever questioned management about their 25 intentions?

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                 - - - . -      -       . -      =.               - . .            .   --                  -      _.                        .     .- . -. . = - .

i 1 485 ) . () i l- A.. Well, in'the discovery process,-we made i { ~2 it a point to ask questions about thatLbecause we l i: . . j 3 didn't know, for example, who wouldfassign Mr.. , j 4- Holmes. 3 i

5 So I. guess.my; full' knowledge of these; j
6  ; changes has'only developed 1since wenhavejh'ad'ani 1 7' opportunity to do more discovery. ,

i 8 Q. Who'do you think;was" involved'in'this 9 _ determination to take you out:of the chain and.to  ! f 10' ha've. Holmes reporting direc'tly'to?Bockhold rather' - i .

11 than having.the normal reporting. relationship; 4.

4 - - 12 through'you with regard to. diesel testing? . 13 A. Well, I would thinkithai Mr. K'itchens or,  !

                                      ,                                                                                                                                           i 14                perhaps, Mr. Bockhold.                            I'm speculating about that,                                                                         )

j 15 but, you know, the people he-reported to and j- 16 apparently Mr. Kitchens said that he assigned; Ken.. l 17 Mr. Bockhold was the one that directed 1 Holmes to be-18 responsible to control the testing of'the diesel. j 19 So obviously Mr~. Bockhold played-a role in that. 4 20 Q. Weren't you later added to the critique $ 21 team? 22 A. - Well, that's true. The answer is yes.

23 Q .- And in that role, did you not have an
i. .. .

! 24~ opportunity to oversee, participate.in, get the t 25 results of diesel testing? l r i i 4

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486 ( ) s / 1 A. Well, I'm trying to think of what time 2 frame that occurred in. It seems to have been 3 sometime later, and Mr. Bockhold stated at that time 4 that he was doing that, he didn't just add me, he 5 added all managers. 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. So it was a situation where all the 8 managers were added on to the critique team. 9 I believe it was at the time that the 10 critique report was coming out, and the purpose Mr. 11 Bockhold stated of what that was was to implement 12 corrective actions that the critique team was

,   ,0 V          13  recommending.

14 These were the longer or intermediate 15 term corrective actions. That action, in some 16 respects, disrupted the conduct of the critique team i 17 because there was a loss of continuity with the 18 original members that had made up the critique team. { l 19 Q. Did you think that the Holmes l 20 responsibility and his reporting chain, that there 21 was anything inappropriate about it or that it 22 didn't work? 23 A. Yeah, there were some problems with it, 24 and Mr. Holmes expressed some of those concerns. I

      /'

(,)s 25 think on one occasion, the diesel got tested without

F l 487  ! 8 o A 1 Mr. Holmes' knowledge and kind of in violation of an  ; ) i 2 understanding that they had.with'the NRC relative to  ! i 1 3 the quarantine and the preservation of root cause

                                                                                         }

' i 4' evidence. The diesel was tested. The NRC didn't l 1

5 know about it.

6 i They weren't expecting the test and, in j 4 .t 7 addition, they changed out parts. So these changes e

8 of reporting relaf;ionship and the conflicting  ;

9 interest of outage and operations and. critique, I i i 10 think, had some problems. , 11- Q. .And you think that incident would have I 12' been avoided if diesel testing had still continued 13 to report to you? { i 14 - A. I don't know the answer to that. I'm l 15 just saying that a change in normal reporting  ! 16 relationships has the capability of causing a 17 disruption of control.  ! i t 18 Q. Is that what you attribute that . 1 19 particular incident to? 10 A. I haven't been able to look into that . 21 incident in enough detail to draw an exact  ! 22 conclusion. I know the incident happened, and I l 1 23 know there were problems with who was in charge. { l 24 Q. You have indicated that as of April 9th, you didn't have enough information to oppose a ( ) 25

                                                                             .    ,y.. _

488 C\ U 1 request to restart the Vogtle plant. Did there come 2 a time when you had enough information.so that you 3 felt the plant should not operate? 4 A. Well, on the 9th or 10th of April'I sent 5 a memo to Mr. Bockhold, my then supervisor, stating 6 that the phrase in the confirmation'of action letter 7 which requested restart from the 9th, just a' day 8 before, within~a day or two after that was the l 9 presentation that was made and the confirmation of f 10 action letter was issued, I-sent a memo to my 11 general manager stating that one of the bases 12 requesting restart in there, the statement about the l 13 review of the air quality being satisfactory, was 14 not true and said that the statements made in the 15 confirmation of action letter _about air quality-16 being satisfactory was, that it was probably not 17 satisfactory, and attached some documentation and a 18 review of air quality measurements to it. 19 So that did two things, that put him on 20 notice that that was a false, inaccurate statement 21 in the confirmation of action letter and, in 22 addition, the bases which had no concern to the NRC 23 about air quality had some inaccurate statements.in l 24' it and that, indeed, air quality had been l i (-) 25 unsatisfactory. l^ i l

      .- .       .   . - _ . - - . - - - - , . _ . . = ~ . .. ~                              . - .   ..   .      .    . _ - . - . -     . - ~
                                  ^

489 1

             = 1 --                         Q.                   My question ~was[didi t h e r e -- c o m e ? a' t i m e-.- -
             .2                             A' .                 ButlI1didn't'in that;' letter,.youLknow,
3 state, you.know, we should prevent restart or 4 something-like that, but0it'certainly was oneiofythe t
5. bases that. restart had been~soldLon. ,

t . 6- Q. What is the:answerfto my. question?. j 1 7

                                                                                                                                              'i AJ. -                Well,II was' going;over the things I. .did '                                 j

{ a l 8. that.I feel notified. management thatethe basis for'

                          ,                                                                                                                     l l.

l, 9 restart ~provided for NRCLwasLwrongjor. inaccurate.: ] i 10 If the basis for_your requesting /restarti 11 is wrong, then maybe'you shouldn't be granted

           -12       restart.                                   After'that;in April, late / April, I think                                      j i
     ~      13       it was the end of April, the:30thUis-when"I sent' 14        another memo stating that another:basisffor restart, 15-     .the statements to the NRC about theidiesel' start 16        count reliability had been inaccurate.                                                At that 17        point, however, the plant had already been l                                                                                                                                                '

18 restarted. 19 Q. I still haven't heard the answer to!my 20 question. 21 MR. KOHN: Could you restate the 22 question? 23 Q. (By Mr. Blake) My question is did there o 24 come'a.. time when you felt the plant should not be 25 operating, not did there come a time when you' felt ~

l 1 l 490 l (~)  ! l\/ 1 some information that had been provided to the NRC l 2 was inaccurate. Did there come a time when you 3 became concerned abou"; whether or not the plant 4 could be safely operated? 5 MR. KOHN: Are you starting with the  ! 6 April '90 time frame? 7 MR. BLAKE: I'm starting With April 9th 1 8 where he sitid he didn't have knowledge, 9 didn't have any reason to oppose restart on i 10 April 9th. 1 11 MR. KOHN: I object to the form of the l 12 question, because it ignores events occurring 13 before April 9th. t 14 MR. BLAKE: What?  ! 15 MR. KOHN: I will withdraw it. I think 16 you're trying to focus on the diesel j 17 generator issue. Is that my understanding? l 18 MR. BLAKE: Yes, I am. 19 THE WITNESS: I would say that the I 20 time that I arranged to meet with the Office i 21 of Investigations, I think, probably was the 22 time that I had reached the conclusion that 1 t 23 the problems and the basis on which the 24 restart had been requested were sufficient ! i

 /^N.
( ) 25 that the plant shouldn't have been restarted.

l l l

l 491 ( 11- Q. (By Mr. Blake) This was in the July 1990-2 time frame, is that the' interview you're talking 3 about? 4 A. I think it was probably in the June, mid

S -June 1990 time' frame.

l L' 6 O. 'SoEby mid June 1990, you had reached the 7 position that it might be unsafe to operate the 8 plant? 9 A. The plant probably hadn't been restarted 10 and that there were some diesel problems that could 11 be continuing safety problems with the diesel. l 12 Q. And those particularly related'to air C) 13 quality? l ! 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And whether or not they would start 16 reliably? 17 A. Yes. 1 ! 18 Q. Let me continue, then. Did you.go to the 19 company and say that? 20 A. I had already gone to the company.about 21 those concerns in April 10th or-lith and April 30th. 22 Q. You had raised with the company questions 23 about whether or not information it had-provided was 24 accurate. 25 Had you discussed with the company - l

492 (~) \/ 1 whether or not you thought that' equated with whether 2 or not the plant could operate safely? 3 A. I discussed with the company the 4 technical aspects of that related to the air quality 5 concerns, that bad air quality can result in 6 corrosion, moisture, and that there are~small 7 orifices in the control system and they can be 8 affected, et cetera. 9 Q. Who do you think in the company 10 understood that you believed the plant was not, 11 could not be operated at that point safely? 12 A. I discussed those-things with Mr. /'N (j 13 Bockhold, 14 Q. And do you think that Mr. Bockhold 15 understood that your position was the plant couldn't 16 be operated safely because of air quality problems? 17 A. I think Mr. Bockhold dismissed the air 18 quality concern and didn't take it seriously. 19 Q. Do you think that he understood that your 20 position was that the plant couldn't be operated 21 safely because of air quality? 22 A. I'm not sure I ever said to you that-at 23 the point in time that I made that discussion, that 24 I had drawn the conclusion that the. plant couldn't (h t x/

  ! 25  be operated safely. I think I just told you that

l l 493 1 the point in time that I kind of reached that state-2' of mind was in mid June. 3 Q. And my question then was did you discuss , 4 that with anybody at the company?  ! 5 A. Well, by mid June I had filed a. labor 6 case against the company. By mid June, and I can't 7 remember, June,' July, but in that time frame, I was 8 fully working,with the NRC because I didn't believe l 9 the company had been responsive to me. I 10 Q. Is the answer to my question no? . 11 A. I had some discussions with the company , 12 people that I had concerns about the reliability of l O

  • 13 the diesels and that there were technical issues and l

14 that I was working with the NRC at that point. 15 I informed the company of those things in i j 16 June, what I think I recall was the June, July time ' 17 frame, the time frame after which I stated I had J l I 18 come to that conclusion. 19 Q. I will say the question one more time, i 20 and I would like to have the answer to my question, 21 if you can. If you can't answer, that's fine, too. l 22 My question is did you say to anyone in i 23 the company that you felt it was unsafe to operate 24 the plant because of air quality concerns when you

    .25     apparently reached that determination in about the

q 4 l l l 494 I O 1 mid June 1990 time frame? 1 4 2 If.I have mischaracterized what you said, j i 3 tell me that. If you can't answer the question, j 4 tell me that, but that's the question that I would 5 like to have an answer to. 6 A. I can't recall that I specifically stated 7 to the company a statement like you said, that it i 8 was unsafe to operate the plant, but I did state to l 9 the company my concerns. I had stated the basis for l l 10 my concerns, and I at that point had taken my , 11 concerns to the NRC. g- 12 Q. We are talking about the mid June time

 ~'

13 frame. The next piece of correspondence from the [ 14 company to the NRC was at the end of June, June f i 15 29th. What was your knowledge or involvement in  ! 16 that piece of correspondence, knowledge about it 17 before it went out or involvement in it?

                                                                         \

18 A. Well, I was the one that brought up with i 19 my management, I believe I was the one.that first  ; 20 brought up with my management the belief that the i 1 21 LER 90-06 was incorrect, and I worked to revise it. 22 I got it revised. I got it sent to, through the PRB I 23 and sent to corporate. Then it was never. forwarded 24 to the NRC.  ! [ 25 So then i pushed to get it sent out. It 5

i i 495 i ! l i l(~% i r

  %,)                                                                               b j                  1 took an excessive period of time to get it sent out             ,

2 and then finally it was revised some.more.and sent 3 out on June 29th. 4 Q. Let's go back through each of those i ! 5 steps. You initially pointed out the need'to 6 management to revise the L E R ,. and what time frame l ! 7 was'that? - 8 A. On April 30th I sent a memo to my general l ' manager stating that'there were inaccuracies in the 9 10 April 9th letter and in the LER of 4/19. L 11 Q. And your general manager sent you a note 12 back to look into this, in essence? 13 A. He sent me a note back to get with, and I l l l t i 14 had a discussion with him, as well, to get with the , H 15 people in operations and he pretty much meant Jimmy 16 Paul Cash because Cash had been involved in the 4/9 17 letter originally. 18 So he did send that memo back, and then I 19 did work on it and get it to the PRB and revised. j i 20 Q. And the time frame that the PRB approved 21 revision was what? 22 A. Well, I had a meeting with the general 23 manager. The note came back, seemed like the first 24 couple of days of May, maybe May 2nd. I got with () 25 Cash shortly after that, got with my technical i

l i I I ! 496 l (r-"N) l O' l 1 support manager. l 2 I believe he worked on a draft maybe on 3 May 4th. It seems like it went to the PRB on the 4 7th, 8th, 9th time frame, and it was forwarded to 5 corporate and I know it was in corporate by the 15th 6 of May. 7 Q. How do you know it was in corporate by , 8 the 15th of May? l 9 A. By a log that's kept. l l 10 Q. And then you indicated that you pushed 11 this topic. How were you doing that? 7- 12 A. Well, considering that it was the l Q ') 13 correction of false information to the NRC, it i 14 should have had very high priority, but instead 15 after the 15th of May, we didn't-hear back anything. 16 Q. We is who? 17 A. We is me and the technical support 18 personnel. 19 Q. Were you reading the logs on a daily 20 basis to know that it went to corporate on May 15th 21 or have you just since determined that? j 22 A. Well, probably in that time frame, I 23 probably knew, due to my daily discussions with the 24 technical manager and so forth, about the status. (m (_ 25 Q. Who is'the technical status you are I 1

-~ .

                                                                                                                                           ~l 497.                         :
  ?/'l?                                                                                                                                      !

b' 1 referringsto? . 2 A. Mr. Aufdenkampe.and, perhaps~,. people  ; i 13- :under him. A t u t h i s.:. p o i n t ' m y ' k n o w l e'd g i [i s 1 b a s e d o n - 4 the-log. 5 Q. But~you believe1that!inithe:May time  ! i

           '6'    frame, you.would have been awareLthat'it'was                                                                           N 7'    forwarded to corporate.in the mid Mayctime?                                                                                !

i 8 A. Yes, and, in fact, I believe thersfis; i

           .9    other evidence that indicates'that relative..to-the                                                                         ;

10 blue folders and stuff. -l 1 11- Q. What did you do?after.mid May?- , 12 A.- Well, after.a periodlof time:when it; y

      )   13     seemed as if it had gone into a blackIhole.in                                                                               !

14' corporate, I talked to some people, .I think I'mayt f 15 have talked to Mr.~Aufdenkampe, I may have' talked to j 16 people in his group. I seem to. recall talking to '! i 17 Mr. Odom.

                                                                                                                                           'l
                                                                                                                                            -i 18                     I recall Mr. Odom talking to Mr. Bailey i

19 about why it wasn't submitted yet, asking when are '

                                                                                                                                             \

20 you going to submit it. I think.now.I'm maybe into j 21 the early June time frame. After it became apparent i 22 that it had stalled -- 23 Q. When was that? 24 A.- Well, I'm thinking, I guess I considered ( 25 a reasonable time a week or so that some action

                                                                                                                                             )

t

        .                .~-            -                                  .                             , . . -   , . - , . .   ......6

l L 1 l l 498 C/~\ 1 should have been taken, but by the time we got to 2 the end of May and early June, it had apparently 3 stalled. l 4 So I recall discussions with Mr. Odom and 5 discussion with, I think he was on the phone with 6 Mr. Bailey. 7 Q. What was Mr. Odom's position? l ( 8 A. He,was one of the supervisors in the NSAC 9 department that handles all the NRC correspondence < 10 for the site and works for Mr. Aufdenkampe at NSAC. 11 He is an NSAC supervisor, I believe, was his 12 position. 13 Q. So this was a person who was two levels 14 below you? l 15 A. Well, Mr. Aufdenkampe reported to me, and 16 I think he reported to Mr. Aufdenkampe. 17 Q. So what does that make him, one level l 18 below you, by your parlance? 19 A. I guess he is two. l 20 Q. Two levels below you, so you went to a l 21 person two levels below you and asked what had 22 happened to it? l 23 A. I believe I asked Mr. Aufdenkampe, too, 24 maybe not on the same day but in this time period. 25 I recall making a number of inquiries on different

                     . . ~         .                               _    _     -  .

i t 499 j_ k~. I i

1. dates. l 2 Q. Of-these two: people, Aufdenkampe=and 3 Odom? ,

4 A. I may have asked Webb. ! 5 Q. What is.Webb's title? i 6 A. You said two levels below me, let me l 7 clarify your statement, they were two levels below 8 me, when I would have had the responsibility; but as 9- you should know, by May 10th or lith, I was relieved

10 of all responsibility. So I was no longer in l

! 11 management at that point. , 12 gg Q. So they no_ longer'were two levels'below h l i (' _) 13 you but they would have been two levels below you? 14 A. They would have been two levels below me 15 when I had the responsibility that I held before May 16 -10th or 11th,'but after the 15th, which is the time  ; 17 frame we are talking about, I had no supervisory 18 responsibility. 19 Q. Now, you were on Mr. Webb. What was Mr. 20 Webb's title? l l 21 A. He was an NSAC engineer. j 22 Q. And who did he report to? l i 23 A. I think he reported to Mr. Odom at that i

24 time.

I

       -   25              Q. So he was below Mr. Odom?                                               '

i

d i-i l

I
                                                   ,                                                             500 4
,Q

~

         ~#            1             JA.      Yes.

! i (' 2 ~Q. And-what did these people?say-to you when j i

j. 3 you inquired? ]

i . . . 1 j- 4- 'A. Seemed likeEMr. Webb at one point'said - l t . I

5 . that'he had1 inquired himself,fhe had. wondered the. j i

l- 6 same thing, why nothing hadJhappenedi tolit.. So'it- l 1 i f 7 seemed likefhe.had similar concerns.* l I 8' He had-told him'it was. sitting'on a. shelf. '! i." l 9l - in' corporate. Mr. Odom indicated te Ae,'myL. j

10. recollection is, that nothing had been.done with  !

1 .' l 2

                   'll     it.                                                                                                       i 1

l- 12 It seemed like:heThad a.conversat' ion with j

                                                                                    ~

13 Mr. Bailey and' asked when it was going ^to1be' 2 i

,                   14     submitted, and Mr. Bailey said-it wasn'tfgoing'to be.                                                      :

i  : i 15- submitted until', it seemed like'he"identiIiedithel  ; i - f~ '16 day that the IIT was goingi to' make :the . presentation i 17- to the commission on this Vogtle site area. 18 emergency, which seemed like it was a Thursday:or,a 1 19 Friday and itiseemed like thatdate is~maybe June 1 i 20 8th or thereabouts. p I !' 21 Q. So you made these' inquiries i n 1 1 a t'e . M a y , c - < .\ i 22 is that the time frame? 3

                   -23                 A.    . Late May, early' June.

124 Q. And then what happened'throughout'the ( ) '25 next'three weeks or the bulk of June? t 1

501 lO

   \~/            1L               A.               Well,.it seemed like it was'about June-
                                                                                                                            '}

2 8th that my labor case was filed, and things,became  : i 3- more active'after that. a 4 Q. I don't understand what you mean by i-l 5 that.

 ,               6                 A.              Well, it seemed at that point some motion'                                  ,

l 7 started to' occur with the LER: revision. 8 Q. Which you tiedito=the filing..of your  ! i 6 9- labor case?  ! 10 A. There could bela relationship. l 11 Q. Is that what you just inferred? ~! 12 'A. Yes. l 13 Q. I'm not trying to put words in your' , 14 mouth. I'm just trying to determine from'you what 15 your thoughts or ideas are. I t 16 A. ~It could have been from my. continuing  ! 17 inquiries, but about June 8th, it seems like, was  ; 18 approximately the date that my labor case'was filed, 19 and it seems like that was, the LER had been dead 20 across the revision or forwarding the revision by t 21 corporate had been dead for about three weeks. l 22 Like I say, you have to understand, this 23 is not just an ordinary revision to an LER. 'This is 24 a revision to correct previous false information.  : ()25 Q. And what do you mean by it'seemed to

         . . _ . _                  _ - - -                    _. _ . _    . _ . __     . .__                   ..___1
                                    ^

, 1 1 502

    ~

l

  ' O( \  1  trigger a lot of action?

2 A. Well, it seemed like after that point, I 3 became aware of two things. One was that corporate 4 was now requesting a complete rewrite to the LER.- 5 They were not going to just correct the 6 false information and write a letter and correct it 7 with the NRC. They wanted a complete. rewrite. ' ~ 8 Q. Had they had a different view, corporate, 9 before that date, to your knowledge?  : 10' A. There was no plan to do a complete 11 rewrite until six months later, a major' update to 12 update corrective actions and so forth. Since this 13 addressed the site area emergency and since 14 corrective actions, there were some longer term , I 15 corrective actions, our plan had been that'there 16

                                                                 ~

would be a subsequent rewrite that updated the NRC 17 on the status of those intermediate and longer term l 18 corrective actions. . 19 Q. And you believe that the filing of your 20 labor complaint prompted the company to change its  ; 21 mind and require a complete rewrite of the LER as 22 soon as possible? 21 A. No, I believe that the decision at that 24 point in time to do a complete rewrite instead of to , 25 promptly correct the false statements in the LER was l l

                                                       .     -     ,,.n.-    - , , . - , -

i l  ; l 503 l -y

   \-)      1  a dela'ying tactic.

And who do you attributeLth'is delaying

2 Q. ,

3 tactic to?

           -4        A. My recollection is that a high level               !

l t 5 person in corporate, Mr. Hairston,. wanted that. 6 Q. And Mr. Hairston, .you believe, instituted . 7 this delaying' tactic. Now,.was ~ this tied to the' 8 filing of your labor case?-  ! 9 A. I don't recall the' exact date, and I-said i i 10 before I can't say if it'was tied to the labor case i 11 or to my continuing inquiries.- 12 MR. LAMBERSKI:

 .()(/ . 13 You don't recall the exact date of your labor case, you said?

l 14 THE WITNESS: No, the exact date of 15 when I first became aware that a complete ) 16 rewrite was desired. i 17 Q. (By Mr. Blake) We may have two things l 18 going here. One is you said there was a lot more 19 activity that seemed to have been prompted by the 20 filing of your labor case?  ! i 21 A. Right.  : i ! 22 Q. Hadn't been much activity, much interest, 23 much involvement, much action, and then after you 24 filed the labor case, there seemed to be a lot of 25 activity. I i-

504 C's %-) 1 Then you said one of these actions, 2 activities, was a determination by corporate to 3 completely rewrite the'LER, that that was a delaying 4 tactic. I was asking whether or not that was 5 prompted by or related to, in your view, the filing 6 of your labor complaint. 7 A. And I'm speculating that it may have 8 been. I don't have recollection in my head of each 9 of these dates and when I first became aware that a 10 complete rewrite was going to occur. 11 So I don't have a set of dates written

,s    12 down there, but my recollection from what happened i   't

\> 13 in that time period is that three weeks or so went 14 by and nothing had happened. The feedback to me was 15 that the document was receiving no attention in 1C corporate and sitting on a shelf. 17 That seemed strange to me, given the 18 importance of the revision, and it seemed strange to 19 other people, such as Mr. Webb, who said he had 20 never seen that happen before. 21 Q. What do you attribute that to now? 22 A. It appears that they didn't want to 23 expose, they didn't want to correct it. They didn't 24 want to go to the NRC and tell the NRC about the ( ,) 25 air.

l,. l i 1 505  ! And they is?. j

          .1            Q..

l  ! p 2L A. Personne1Ein. corporate.- Since'I'minotlin: ' i 3' ~ corporate,'I would he hard-pressedPto.know,.butJwhy; t 4 the LER to correct false informationfto-NRC wasn't . l

5. cpromptly : dealt- with in open and : honest ' communication.  !
                     ~

67 and attention to.2 detail and no' detail'is too-z smal'l~,-- -I

                                                        .                    .                                         -l 7-  that.it doesn'tLmake-a difference;L in that                                    0:    ,

l 8 atmosphere, and given.the' requirements of.10;CFR' -

                                                                                                                        ]
                                                                                                                       .\

9 50.9, itLdoes:not make sense thatLitLwould have sat l 10 on a shelf-forith'ree weeks. 11 .Q.- But it's'your-beliefithat that'.was as a

      ,  12    result of the1 decision,: that is, tojputitLoff, it:                                                      i 13    wasn't simply somebody ignoringrit or: forgetting l 14    about it, somebodyLin corporate,.somebody in               -

15 management? 16 A. ;Let's call it an intentional. del'ay.- 17' Q. And this action, subsequent action 1 by-

        .18 . Mr. Hairston requiring a complete rewrite'was 19    another step or another method of intentionally.

20 delaying the submittal of this?. 21 A. I'm speculating again, but I have the 1.' 22 belief that it was-a continuing delaying tactic. i 23 Q. And is it your view that the company felt I 24 that NRC wouldn't learn about this correction or l

        '25   wouldn't learn about the ~ inaccuracy in'the LER until

l-

                                                                  -506                !
         'l   this LER revision was filed?

l 2 A. I believe that the company's initial-plan  ! 3 was to file the correction in such a manner that i l 4 they wouldn't learn of it and it wouldn't be i 5 specifically flagged even after they filed the- ' 6 revised LER. 7 Q. And whose theory was this or whose mot'ive { 8 or intent was this? 9 A. Well, the original LER draft, I recall, j 10 there were several cover letters and the original  ; i 11 cover letters weren't even going to flag the error. I 12 The LER that was. going to go along with (~  ; (_h ) 13 those cover letters was going to restate the diesel' l t I 14 start data in terms of valid parameters from which I 15 no comparison could have been made by the NRC to 16 -those numbers and the earlier numbers. The LER 17 revision normally in the course of business goes up 18 to AEOD, and without a cover letter flagging that 19 there was an error and with the body of it being 20 apples and oranges to the original submittal, I 21 think it's reasonable to think that nobody-in the 22 NRC would have identified the change. 23 Q. Because you think the NRC, when it gets a 1 24 revised LER, it doesn't compare the initial one with l [') V 2 5 the revision? l i

4 5 0 7' i 1 A. Even if they compared it, 'they couldn't 2 have told anything. The'ending date was.different i 3 and the LER that was being drafted along with that J 4 cover letter had switched to some valid terminology. i

5 Q. What were the dates of these drafts that
6 you're referring to? ,

i 7 A. I would need to look at the blue folder 1 l 8 and see. , J 9 Q. What was the time frame? 10 A. They were drafted in June. ' 11 Q. This was after your complaint was filed i 12 and the sortoof activity that you're talking about i r~N

(,) 13 would seem to have been prompted by your labor

? l

14 complaint? I
                                                                          \

4 15 A. I would want to look at the blue folder. I 16 ( , A large number of the drafts were after my labor ' 17 case was filed. You know, there were six or seven k 18 different draft cover letters, i 19 Q. You're not sure today? i 20 A. I would want to look at the blue folder. 21 I don't keep all that many dates in my head. 22 Q. So you believe that the company members, 23 people in corporate management, intentionally were 24 deferring correcting the information in the LEC and ()25 one of the actions taken specifically for that as a

508 O 1 delaying tactic was Mr. Hairston's determination to 2 completely rewrite the LER?

                                                                               )

3 A. What I said was there were twol things

                                                                               )

4 that happened in the June time frame that delayed .! 5 the submittal of that LER,'and the complete rewrite  ; i 6 decision and the determination to do a quality l 7 assurance audit were the two things that I started  !

                                                                             .l 8 referring to earlier.

9 Q. And your belief is'that: those two actions

                                                     ~

10 were taken as part of a plan to defer the submittal j 11 of this corrected information to the NRC? i

                                                                             .\

12 A. Yes, as part of a' plan to delay and as , 13 part of a a plan to posture the company for,- t 14 perhaps, allegations and violations that they knew f; 15 might follow. 1 j 16 Q. And do you believe that'NRC, you believe  ! l 17 that that plan, to be successful, would require that l r 18 the company believe the NRC wouldn# t learn'about-the j 19 inaccuracy or the need for the correction to'the  ! 20 inaccuracy, until it received the LER revision, 21 correct? 22 A. Not strictly. I l 23 Q. Well, correct me, then. 24 A. I think if you know how the NRC does  ! ( 25 business, and certainly the company's executives

                                                                               )

i

l 509 T l k/ 1 have a long-experience in knowing how the NRC does i 2 busines's, that what is significant is flagging this 3 information to the high levels and the decision 4 makers. 5 If some of this information is known to . 6 the lower level, not everybody has the full scope of ) 7 information and can put all this together and, you. l 8 know, understands it'in context. I believe the 9 company didn't want to, and the. intent of the 10 companies was that they.not make waves on these t 11 issues until the critical NRC activities had 12 occurred.  ;

   -   13              That included the return to operation          !

14 period up through the IIT, the. issuance of the IIT 15 report, and the completion of the IIT report to the 16 commission. 17 In that period of time they didn't want 18 to make waves by admitting that they had filed 19 incomplete and inaccurate information in the 20 documents that they obtained restart on, and that ! 21 included this LER, and that relates back to what I 22 mentioned yesterday about, you know, once you're up, 23 you're up and if you're down, you can be held down. 24 Q. There has been testimony that calls were 25 made to NRC in the May time frame by Mr. Hairston

l i- 1 l I {- 510 l ' 1 1- .and Mr.-McCoy. Doryou;believe those calls did not: ^l . I i take place?. 1 3 i4 3 A. Well, from'the. testimony thatLwe' 4 obtained, for example,. from Mr. Hairston-and.now-I i i 5 will address.first his June call, Mr. Hairston's 6 testimony.about'his June call is not'particularly~

       -7 credible because he-led us: to believeand-led the'
         '8       NRC to believe.in various filings that that: call was           !

9 to inform Mr.-Ebneter'of false statements in the LER , 10 a and his actions ~and so forth when,'in fact, it ' 11 appears to me'that Mr. Hairston called Mr. Ebneter ii 12 to talk about a fire emergency condition'at< Plant 13 Hatch on that call. 14 He claims ~to-have made an earlier call in i L 15 May. After I read Mr. Ebneter's affidavit'about [, 16 what Mr. Ebneter understood to bel-the content of Mr.- l 17 Hairston's call, Mr. Ebneter, in his affidavit, does ) 18 not state that he was ever told that the numbers 19 were false. 20 He states that Mr. Hairston notified him 2 :L . that he was doing an audit of the information and 22 if, important word, if there was a need for a 23 revision, the_ revision would be_ filed.-  ! 24 So I think there is some question about'

                                                                                -l

()25; the content L of.what Mr. Hairston discussed on his i i I

l 1 511 i A i

  \/      1 calls,'and based on the affidavits from Mr. Ebneter, l

2 it does not appear that Mr. Ebneter was-told that i i 3 false' statements had been made. l i 4 Q. What about Mr. McCoy's calls?  ; 5 A. I'm having a little trouble remembering 6 what we learned from Mr..McCoy's calls. I guess I 7 would want to review some documentation, because at ] 8 this time I am not remembering what I learned.about l 9 Mr. McCoy's call. I would want to look at that-10 before I responded to that.  : 4 11 Q. You earlier indicated that because the 4 12 company had a sophisticated understanding of how NRC~ r) k_/ 13 functions, that it might be that they would get away 14 with providing, deferring correction to the LEC and i 15 then even putting in information in the LER, it ) 16 might not be understood or surface or have the 1 17 impact on NRC if it was done in a certain way. 18 A. I think that's fairly correct. l 19 Q. Do you think that telephone calls by Mr. 20 Hairston to Mr. Ebneter, by Mr. McCoy to Mr. 21 Brockman or these level of management calls on the 22 topic of whether or not the information was accurate 23 would be consistent with such a sophisticated 24 approach by the company to try to submerge this es I

      ) 25  correction?

I

    . - . - -.-           .    .    . . . . .     -             . . .      - . . -.. ~ . .       -.      .. -              .. -. - .. .                        , , .

l

                                                                                                                                                                              -)
                                                                                                                                                                              .1 1."                                                                                                                                                                               ;

I: .

)

g , 512 l t - i~ 1~ ' A. Y e s'.. <

 .-                 2            . Q .:-         A n d h o w f i s ' t h a t'?_--                      ,

t -- , l A. . Welli, one ,-- anot!he raspe c t ' that :I .; observed , l U . .. l

e. 4 at' Plant Vogtle was,;you used the word I' 5 sophisticated, g- . ,

i 6. Q. Y e s .- If I'm. wrong,.just? correct me.  :- I ' m l i- 7: reallyijust trying . to--unde'rstand .your position'. r .; j 8 A. . Well, I'will"use-the terminology that'was. f

                                                                                                                                                                            ~!

9 used~.at Plant Vogtle,'getting.the'NRC in. bed with: - i 10 us .- ' d 1 11 What this meant was making. contact ~with,.

                 "12  --

the NRC, discussing antis' sue with themgand<the way. O 13 .this can be done improperly is tofonly.discussipart 1 a 14 of the inf ormation .with them and, get . an'.: agreement or, 1 L 15 understanding.  ; 1 16 Then if it.-becomes-'a' problem.-later, it' 17 puts the NRC in a more difficult position,lto'takeJa' 18 firm stance' in opposition because the licensee comes ' 19 back and.said well, remember, we; called you on1that. 20- Q. And'is this,the.way;youlthink'this:was . 21 all part.of a grand plan.by management? 2 { 22- A. : I'm not sure this was a grand; plan,=-but' 23 these were some-:known operating' methodologies. 24 .Q. And did you t h i n k. t h a t ~~t h i s ' w a s .. o n e 1

                '25      occasion when these methodologies.were employed?
                                                                                                    .,    4     ,     ,._4                ++.--e   e ===.m-- -   ---&'---

513 .O1 4 A. It.may have been.

2. Q. So.the. company, higholevels.of management 3 of the company' called high level managers atfthelNRC 14 and mentioned the topic but'only a portion of the ]

t 5 topic, and then subsequently-you;put in.the LER-  ! i 6 making the actual correction, the' lower levels of l 7 the NRC, and then what1happens? l 8 A. I think the way they were going-to handle- l 1 ,

                                                                                            \

9 this change which resulted in'the filing of the  ! s 10 labor case, the making of the.allegatinos to NRC,

11 the knowledge that I was working'with the NRC, if 12 not the knowledge but the strong belief that I was f

1 2 p (-')\ l 13 working with the NRC, I think that changed the way-14 they were going to handle it and.that then-  ! a 15 ultimately it.was handled with a cover letter that I 16 specifically flagged'the errors.  !

                                                                                            )
17 I think in_the beginning when you look at 1

i 18 the blue file and the series of letters and cover j 19 letters in the blue file, it appeared that the way 20 it was being handled kept changing. a 21 Q. So they changed once you filed your labor 1 22 case and the company came to understand that you i' 23 were working with the NRC, to use your terminology, 24 and then they altered their game plan? , 25 A. I think it affected the process. I think

     . _.-.        .m__    . _ _ . . _ .__
                                                                                                                                      .i 4                                                                                                                                      a 514                       ,

1 j 1 the' filing of my labor case affected the. process- .  !

 ,                2             Q..           And in the latteripart of' June did you                                                  l 3     have.any involvement in.or knowledge'about what the l-                 4      company planned to say in its revision to.the.LEC?

a 5 A. Well, I had'been removed-from the Plant l 1  ! I 6 Review' Board which was involved in'obviouslyfthe'LER i

7 and'LER revision at that time; but I did have i

. 8 occasion to' sit in on some PRB meetings.- - J j 9 So in that respect I had1some  ; i j 10 involvement. I believe'I expressed some concerns l ! 11 about the letter, the cover letter that was being l t  : 1 . 12 submitted. I i . j 13- Q. You were shown a draft of the cover , i i 14 letter by -- + , 4 .

. 15 A. I acquired one. I can't recall how, but .

L 16 it's something that I could have'gotten from any of  ! s j 17 the people that used to work for me, if I-asked them I- 18 for it. 1 19 Q. Aufdenkampe, those people who were on the- t 20 PRB? a 21 A. People at NSAC or PRB secretary. ' 3 22 Q. What would the time frame have been?

23 A. This was toward the end of June when the 24 final drafts were coming out.

we 25 I recall getting'a number of.the cover 1

                                                                             .          ,   .ar  ,          yy- e - v e , re, ,r.----

i l ' l l l-515 O' '1' letters 'from Mr.-Webb, and we,had some discussions i

                                                                                                                                                             .i
                                                                                                                                                             -(

2 .about him and he told me'how Mr. Hairston was-  ! l 3 changing them, and that was unusual. [

                 .4                          I think he thoughtLit was unusual'that 5   all.of a. sudden the highest level person, the senior' 4

i 6 vice-president was-inserting himself into letter >

                                                                                                                                                             ~!.

l 17 drafting. 8 .Q. I think you indicated earlier you thought' ' 9 this'was quite-an unusual correction to the LEC, i 10 that it was correcting inaccurate'information? 11 A. It was very unusual and it should have- i 12 been immediately addressed insteadoof delayed for l O 13 months. j 14 Q. And when you looked:at-this draft, more 15 than one draft or one draft? l 16 A. Several drafts. i 17- Q. You saw several drafts in the late June'- 18 time frame? l 19 A. Uh-huh. 20 Q. And what was your reaction to those?< 21 A. That they contained ~ false information, L 22 wrong reasons, differing reasons, contradictory' 23 reasons, reasons that weren't true for the error. 24 Q. And what did you do with that

           -25        information?-
                                                                                                                                                 =           ;

g 516 , 1 A. Well, I think I attended one of the later 2 meetings in the Plant Review Board when the letter, 3 the final cover letter was being finalized. I 4 voiced actions. I'm not a member at that point. 5 I'm sitting on the side lines. < 6 Q. So you attended a plant review meeting 7 when at least one of these drafts was' considered? 8 A. One of the later drafts. 9 Q. And you vo' iced what objections? 10 A. Yeah. What we are talking about is + 11 documented on tape recording. It would be usefu.', i 12 perhaps, to review that, for me to review that 1

    --  13 portion of that tape recording rather than relying 14 on memory solely.

15 Q. What do you recall was the reaction of 4 i , 16 the Plant Review Board to your objections? 17 A. Well, the bottom line reaction was that a i 18 number of the members seemed to agree with me, and 19 some of these people weren't members. It_seemed

                                                         ~

l 20 like on this occasion, it seemed like Mr.' Majors was 21 on the phone, was added to the conversation. 22 Mr. Majors had just been recently 23 assigned this revision at corporate. He was brought 24 in cold and had no prior knowledge, which didn't j' %

  ' (,) 25 help. Mr. Greene, it seems like, was chairing the

1 l l l, 517 1 7~^N ' (" ) 1 PRB meeting, and he hadn't been involved either. 2 He had been in SRO training and then on 3 shift. So he didn't have any involvement or 4 knowledge. So when I raised some of the concerns, 5 it seemed like other people seemed to agree with me, 6 but the end result was that corrections weren't made 7 and the draft cover letter was sent out with some' 8 false statements for which Georgia Power has now 9 been issued violations for. 10 Q. So you raised your objections, you felt 11 some PRB individuals agreed with you at that time in /,_\ 12 that meeting? 13 A. Yeah. 14 Q. And then what happened? Did the PRB vote 15 on it, accept it? Were you there? 16 A. I can't recall the actual vote, if the 17 actual vote was taken when I was there or taken at a 18 subsequent meeting. The best thing to do would be 19 to look at the transcript to decide that.  ! l 20 I recall that Mr. Greene said he heard l 21 all he needed to hear. I took that to mean -- I was 22 fairly upsec. I think you can tell in my voice of 23 the recording at that time that I was upset. He 24 dismissed my concerns and said I have heard all I (_) 2 5 need to hear or something to that effect. l _._ _ __ _- 1

                                                                       )
                                                                       }

I 518 3 (O 1 Q. Do PRB meetings commonly have attendees 2 other than PRB members? 3 A. I think there is one member that is not a 4 voting member or one representative that's not a 5 voting member that attends them all which, I think, 6 is quality assurance.  ; 7 There are other nonvoting members that l 8 attend. So it's not unusual that there would be L 9 some participants in PRB meetings other than the , 10 defined-voting members.  ! 11 l Q. How did you happen to be at the meeting? , 12 A. , I think I learned about it.through some

  \   13  personnel that used to work for me and I kind of            '

14 invited myself to the meeting. ' c 15 Q. Then you voiced objections, Mr. Greene, t 16 in essence, said I have heard all I need to, and you ' 17 were upset at that point. What were you upset ^ 18 about? i > \ 19 A. I was upset before that point. Mr. 20 Majors, who was working on this specifically for Mr. 21 Hairston in corporate, was on the phone, too. 22 Q. Was he upset, too? 23 A. He seemed to agree with some of my 24 statements, but the end result was that the sections ' 25 weren't changed and the true reasons for the errors

   ~.   . . - . . . - . - . . . - . . -        . .    - . - .    .-     . -.          .         ..            . - - . . ~

f i f

                                                                                                    -519                     !

('N i

          .1              weren't clearly stated, accurately' stated in the'                                              -j i

t 2 cover letter and the cover letter.was sent out-that- l

          '3              wayLand Georgia. Power has received violations onfit'                                              I l

4 now. -) i 5 Q. And you were upset-beforeethat? i 6 A. I was: upset during that meetingfbecause I ,

l 7 saw this document going forward and-going to be ,
                                                                                                                          '}

L 8 submitted to the NRC with inaccurate =inf ormation in  ! l . I 9- it and incomplete information in it'.

                                                                                                                             ?
                                                                             .          ..,                                  i 10                              Q. Information that you-didn't agree with,.                                      {

1 1' but how do you reach the inaccurate, becausenyou' 1 y 12 didn't agree with it? I

                                                                                    .                                        I 13                              A. NRC has' issued violations to state that                                      !

i 14 it was inaccurate or' incomplete. l 15 Q. I understand that as of 1994,.but as f 16 of --  ! 17 A. So they agreed with my feelings that I l i 18 had at that time. I 19 But it was-your feelings, your difference

                                                                                                                              )

Q. j i 20 with what was being said that' led you to be upset? I 21 A. I was upset that we were going. ahead and 22 providing inaccurate and incomplete information to 23 the NRC. I thought that was wrong. 24 Q. And was your voicing your views in the 25 PRB your vehicle that you used in order to inject

 .-~                                 -.     .

l l t l l 520 i i (~)'  ? 1 that opinion into the company's determination of 2 what to send? ' j 3 A. Yes. I did that by my comments in the 1 4 PRB which was fairly direct, and I also did it by l r 5 making allegations, additional allegations to the i 6 NRC. 7 Q. Had you ever had prior disagreements with 1 8 PRB actions? ! 9 A. A couple. l 10' Q. On those occasions did the PRB take an  !

                                                                     \

11 action that.you didn't agree with?  : 12 A. Yes. < 13 Q. And did you do anything about that? , 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. On those occasions? 16 A. I filed a quality concern. 17 Q. And on this occasion, did you -- 18 A. And I talked to my management. 19 Q. And on this occasion, did you also follow 20 those steps by filing a quality concern or talking i 21 with your management? 22 A. I was already work 3ng with the NRC 23 Department of Investigations. I had decided that 24 that was the appropriate place to take my () 25 allegations, and I voiced them directly through the

1 521 1 company channel, and when-the documentfwas issued 1 2 without corrections, I took them to the NRC. l 1 3 Q. So once you started working with the 4 Office of Investigations, you had a'different l. 5 approach about problem solving or differences that i 6 you had within the company? 7 A. You mentioned the quality' concern. At l 8 that point I had concluded'that that vehicle at that 9 point in time would be ineffective. 10 I had done the first step, I voiced this 11 directly through the responsible group and voiced my 12 concerns by my participation, and when that wasn't O 13 effective, I took these additional allegations to 14 the Office of Investigations that I was working 15 with. 16 Q. Did you have any more involvement or play 4 17 any other role in the finalization and submittal of J 18 the June 29 letter? 19 A. It seemed to me that not too long after 20 that meeting, the letter was signed out. I think 21 Mr. Hairston signed that letter. 22 MR. BLAKE: We can stop there and we 23 will carry on from there. We will take ten 24 minutes.

 \_) 25                (A recess was taken.)

522 't 1 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, you 2 indicated just before we broke that by_this point in 3 time, you had lost faith in the effectiveness of the 4 quality concerns _ program, and that may have been a b 5 reason why you didn't carry your difference with the

.        6 PRB on then at this point where you-had_taken that' 7 route earlier?

8 A. Yeah. 9 Q. Is that correct? 10 A. That's correct. You mentioned the 11 quality concern. There is no formal sequence-or 12 pattern of raising concerns. 13 The policy is that, and.I guess the 14 requirement is that we can raise concerns on a 15 variety of different matters and if an individual 16 chose to raise an issue just with the NRC, that 17 would be a fine method of doing so, too. 18 There is a number of different ways to 19 handle it and I think it's.up to individuals to 20 choose what methods they want to use at any point in 21 time. 22 Q. What was your problem with the quality 23 concerns program? 24 A. Well, my problem wasn't with'the

  /~

( ) 25 program. My problem was with the manner in which

                                                                                   .1 e

523 1 -the one quality concern that I filed was handled.

                                                                                     )

2 Q. So did you think that the program was all 3 right but somehow it was not. operating,'not being 4 properly employed for your concerns? [ 5 A. It was usurped for my concern'because.the. 6 person that would normally investigate.the concern,. 7 since my concern was taken away from that normal 8 process. 9 Q. Did you tell anybody.that.you felt you , 10 were being discriminated against here in your use.of p 11 the employee concerns program? 12 A. I expressed concerns about the handling 3 13 of my quality concern at some point in time. I 14 think I discussed that with the NRC. I 15 Q. Anybody at the company? 16 A. I think I may have discussed that with 17 Mr. Bockhold, and I may have discussed that with Lee 18 Glen, but I'm having trouble remembering exactly who ] 19 I discussed that with. I know I raised that as an  ! 20 issue at some point. I I 21 Q. Do you recall whether or not you i 5 22 indicated to them that you felt you were being 1 23 discriminated against here, that it was being used I 24 in a different way for you than for others? () 25 A. I didn't feel that, and I don't feel that

524 C-)N -1 way. I feel that the concern I submitted, not 1 2 necessarily because it was my concern, but that  ; 3 concern was handled in a different way than concerns i

                                                                           )

4 would normally be handled. ' 8 5 I was told by Mr. Bockhold, I found out ' 6 that Mr. Bockhold took that concern away from the , 7 individual whose job it was ~to investigate the 8 concerns. I was told that by that individual. i 9 Q. Who is that individual? ? 10 A. By Mr. Lyons. Mr. Lyons told me that Mr. 11 Bockhold took it away from him. Then I was told at 12 some point that my concern was being handled by the

     ~- 13  organization as a whole.

14 Q. Who were you told that by?  ! 15 A. I think Mr. Bockhold said that. The 16 concern was handled by the whole organization. That d 17 isn't the or that wasn't the purpose of the quality:

                                                                            ]
18 concern program, that it be handled by line 19 management or management in general.

20 The quality concern program was set up . 21 that it be handled by a specific department, namely, j i

                                                                            \

22 the quality concern department. l 23 Q. And do you know of any other concern 24 raised by any other person other than your concern I

                                                                         .i i        25  raised by you that was handled in such a manner?                I j

525 A 1 A. That it was. handled by the whole 2 organization, I don't know. Mr. Lyons, for a period 3 of time, reported to me and I can't recall other 4- concerns where he told me that this had happened.or 5 I was told where the whole organization was handling 6 it, no, from the period of time that I had 7 involvement with quality concerns. 8 Q. So that we go along basically in a 9 chronological fashion here today. I want to' refer-10 you to your interview by the Office of 11 Investigations on July 19th, 1990. Do you have a 12 copy of that transcript? 13 A. Not with me. 14 (Discussion ensued off the record.) 15 MR. BLAKE: For the record, we will ask 16 that this be identified as Exhibit 9 with the 17 same nomenclature that we identified the 18 others. 19 (Mosbaugh Exhibit DG-9 was marked 20 for identification.) 21 Q. (By Mr. Blake) This is the investigative 22 interview of Allen Mosbaugh conducted in July 1990, 23 starting apparently at 7:30 p.m. and conducted by I 24 Mr. Larry Robinson and others. Let me refer you to 25 the transcript of that interview at page 225.

A l 526

                                                                                                                 }

($) .1 At this point'in the transcript, and.take

2. your time in reviewing the preceding;pages, . whatever  !

3 it takes for1you to confirm.that this is the--case, I { 4 -believe that you are talking about;a telephone'  ! i 5 conference which took place on-April.19th. 6 At ~line'six, beginning at line six on' 7 that'page, you respond'to'a question'by one ofothe

                                                                                                                ]

8 investigators as to who was involved in the 9 ci conference call on the other end, and.youistate).in  ! the room is Aufdenkampe and myself.~ $ 10 ~

                                                  .Also1on-the                                                   ;

11 phone is Bockhold, Bailey, I think Stringfellow, i i 12 McCoy, and later, I don't know how much later,. { 13 Hairston. 14 What was the basis for your~ stating that I t 15 Mr. Bailey was on the phone? 16 A. My memory of that time as to who was'on i 17 the call, and that may have included memory.of~not 18 only listening on the call, but it may have included 19 memory of discussions with Aufdenkampe or 20 something. 21 I would note that at the time I recalled. 22 those people, I didn't recall Mr. Shipman who I now 23 believe definitely to have been on the call. I I i 24 didn't recall him. 25 Q. So in July of 1990, you provided the NRC l

                                                          ., . . _ . . _ .                       ....L.,~.----    s

J i 1 527. f () 1. investigators with inaccurate information abo'ut who J

             '2~       was on the phone-call?'                                                i
             .3              A. I provided-them'with what I remembered as                  j 4-       to.who was on the call.

t 5 Q. Say that again~. I'm'sorry.- I 6 JL.. I provided them as to'what I' remembered' i 7 as to who wEs on the call.

                                         ~

8 This wasn't;a question that'they had-9 posed to me'and said go out and'research this or r e

          '10         .give me the opportunity to go research this1and ask                    )

11' other people and get the best answer, such as was I r 12 Georgia Power's opportunity in the White Paper. 5 O . 13 I did this.from my memory that I had 14 contemporaneous with the time I was asked this' 15 question. I

  • 16 Q. And your. memory turns out not to have l

i 17 been perfect?  ! 18 A. That's correct. l i i 19 Q. Do you think other people's memories can 20 turn out not to be perfect, as well?' 1 21 A. I believe that's true, but sa effort, a 22 good faith effort by a big organization, given.some-23 time, should be much better than the instantaneous 24 memory of one individual. O ( / 12 5 Q. Did you' review the tapes before you had

                                                                                             -l

I 528 j O 1 this interview in Ju.ly of 1990?

2. A. No. I

- U

,         3        Q. Referring to the next page of the                  ;

4 transcript, 226, at the top of that page there is'a 5 question about Mr. McCoy. breaking away and calling-6 Ken Brockman. When do you.now believe that that 7 McCoy call took place, that is, prior to, during, 8 after call A? Where do you place it in time? 9 A. At this point.in time I don't,Enot having i 10 listened to the tape, I don't remember Mr. McCoy { .I

       ~ 11  breaking away.                                                 !

i

12 What I remember at this time, having
  .O

(./ 13 re-reviewed the tapes, is.that Mr. Shipman came back 14 and informed me of Mr. McCoy's call. So that's what 15 I remember at this point in time. I don't at this , 16 point in time remember Mr. McCoy breaking away. , 17 Q. Do you have a view today on whan that j 18 call took place? . 19 A. Mr. McCoy's call to Mr. Brockman? 20 Q. Yes. I 21 A. I believe it took place before call-B in 22 my nomenclature. l 23 Q. You think it was before the conversation? 24 A. Before call B.

     )25           Q. Before call B?

I l

                                                                                                                                             'I s

529 . l

         ?l-        4 A..      As I'use that nomenclature.-

l 2 - Q. 'During.the' course offcall;A,:as you.use-3 fthat nomenclature? .f! 4 A. I' haven't~been able to determine that. c [ 15 Q.s Mr.,Mosbaugh,.I'm going to askEyousto , 6 . take'a-look.at a transcript excerpt from.tapeinumber, *: 7: 69. It1was'one.of.the attachments to our1 earlier- ( 8 proposed 1 stipulations, which I.thinklyoufhave a copy ,

                                                                                                                                             ~!

9: ;of.- j; 10 Th'e stipulation was numberf77. -:Iiwould.  !

      - 11    like to ~ask - you to look: at . 77-BJand the' supporting.                                                                       I transcript.for that being from tape.--69,--transcript O 12 13-   pages eight through :11, and see~whether'or notithat-                                                                            -

1 14 refreshes your. memory on when the McCoy, Brockman 1 15 conversation may have taken place. relative 1to call I 16 A. I 17 MR. KOHN: What document do you want' i I

      ' 18-              him to look a't?

19 MR. LAMBERSKI: .The stipulation. 20 MR. KOHN: The stipulation? 21 MR. BLAKE: Its 77-B, and I will

                                                                                           ~

22 provide you a copy of the transcript 23 excerpt. 24' THE WITNESS: All right, I have 25 reviewed stipulation 77-B and the transcript.. l I m.

                            ..             , , - . ,          . . _             ,..           . ,                       ...,_,m.-,  -..._-..)

530 . O\

              \/

1 Q. (By Mr Blake) And your answer is? ' I 2 A. This doesn't refresh my memory of Mr. 3 McCoy, of when~Mr. McCoy broke away or.came back in i 4 the call. My memory as of now is that I didn't 5 learn about that from Mr..McCoy but I learned about 6 that from Mr. Shipman. 7 I may have incorrectly stated here Mc'oy C 8 instead of Shipman, but my best belief.at this time j 9 is that I learned of Mr. McCoy's call from'Mr. 10 Shipman. I 11 Q. On the assumption that this is an 12 accurate rendition of what is stated by you on that ! 13 tape, you would say.that you were inaccurate'in what 14 you were reporting here? 15 A. I may have said McCoy instead of ' 16 Shipman. I can't say at this point, but it doesn't 17 refresh my memory that McCoy came back on the phone 18 and that I learned that independently from that 19 rather than from Mr. Shipman. 27 Q. Do you have any reason to believe today 21 that you might have intended to mislead people or 22 lie'when you said this? 23 A. No, I certainly wouldn't have done that. 24 Q. So you believe it to be inaccurate, but rx ( } 25 you don't believe that that means that you were i l

531 f'T 1 either lying or misrepresenting when you said it? 2 A. Itlmay be inaccurste. I just have no 3 separate memory of McCoy coming back into the

4. conversation separately than learning about that 5 from Mr. Shipman.
                                                                  )

6 Q. Note, also, in1this transcript the 7 language that you were on the phone for the whole 8 thing. Is it your belief today that you were on the ' 9 phone for the entire conference call A? , 10 A. No, I'believe that ILentered the l 11 conference call A after it had. begun. 12 Q. Do you believe that because the tapes l 13 that we have been provided pick up in the middle'of 14 that call, is that the basis for your belief? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. Or do you have an independent 17 recollection? 18 A. I also have an independent _ recollection 19 of coming into Mr. Aufdenkampe's' office when the  ; 20 call was already in progress. 21 Q. Do you believe that you could have 22 participated in any portions of that call which are 23 not taped? 24 A. I have no recollection of that. ()25 Q. Looking at the bottom of the same

                                                                                                     )i i

l 532 1 trans'cript page, 226, you are discussing ~this

                                                                                                     )

i 2 conference call, and you refer to it as taking place i 3 on the 18th and that the LER was signed out the next 4 day, which would have been the 19th. Do you see' 5 that language at the bottom of 226? i 6- A. Yes. i 7 Q. Is that inaccurate or wrong?  ; 8 A. The big conversation with the higher - 9 level executives occurred on'the 19th, is-my~ current 10 knowledge. , 11 Q. So is this information inaccurate that 12 you provided to the NRC?

    /^%
  • k- 13 A. The date of the 18th is incorrect. It's  !

14 the 19th. ' 15 Q. Did you intend to provide them inaccurate '

               ' 16                       information?

17 A. No, I.didn't remember the date that 18 precisely.  ! I 19 Q. Looking at transcript -- l I 20 A. I would like-to add again that my I 21 statements are as accurate as I recalled them at the 22 time I did the interview. 23 If I was asked that. kind of question and 24 did the research on it and got the LER which was 25 dated and to forth, I could have gotten a better and i i

533 I r~'s t )

\#

1 more accurate answer that would have probably 2 indicated the 19th, but this was done in a live, l l 3 contemporaneous fashion and was done several months i 4 later and I was off by one day. 5 Q. Looking at transcript page 250, in 6 particular the answer that you provide in the middle  ! 7 of that page, lines seven through 19, is it your 8 view today that there is a time limit on correcting 9 information to the NRC? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Is that a two-day time limit by virtue of 12 50.9? f"N (_) 13 A. 50.9 states that significant information 14 has to be reported to the NRC within two days, and 15 that's based on a requirement that I believe was in 16 effect at this time; and I haven't looked at the 17 current requirement, but at this time I believe that 18 was the requirement. 19 Q. So if you were answering that same 20 question now today that was put to you in July of 21 1990, this answer would be different? 22 A. Well, no. This answer is entirely 23 correct, because the statement here is LER revisions 24 do not have a due date on it, probably should be rm ( ) 25 now, but my statement that there was no time frame

1 J 534 I b)

  ~-

l' that you're required to submit a revision to anELER 2 is a true statement. 3 There is no time frame requirement to ! 4 submit a revision to the LER. There is a i

5 requirement in the initial submittal for 30 days.

t 16 There is'no requirement, to my knowledge, on. I t 7 revisions. ] 8 Now, the separate issue is correcting or' 9 identifying to the NRC significant information, and 2 4 10 the identifying to the NRC of significant 11 information is required to be done within'two days  !

   ~                           12         by a call to the-regional administrator.                      That call i

,' 13 doesn't constitute an LER revision. . So that's a ' 14 separate requirement and can be handled differently . 15 than an LER. , 16 Georgia Power didn't-need to submit an

  • 17 LER revision to meet its obligations on accuracy of  !

18 information. It could have satisfied'those 19 -obligations by calling and informing the regional 20 administrator of that significant information, 21 namely, the error and the correction to the error by 22 phone. 23 My statement after that is that, but.I l 24 think there certainly is a timeliness-requirement in O, 25 correcting inaccurate information provided to the _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ ___m_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . r +- - -e

i 535

    /^
    \_));                                                                                                                  l'
              -1    'NRC that a licensee is obligated to timely. correct, i

2 and.my-statement there is referring to;the l 3 3 correction requirements of 50.9.

  • 4' Q.- .Is that what you were referring tosin 1
                                                                                                                          -i 5     July of 1990?

6 A. 'I can't sayfif.I was specifically_ f 1 7 referring to that.in '90. I may have, because I had 'l 8 been distributed a memo' earlier in, I believe,~1988. ' 9 about 50.9, but in addition to the requirement' a-10 nuclear professional, upon' finding out:that 11- significant inaccurate information:had been supplied I

                                                          ..                                                                L 12       to the NRC and, in this case, information that was.

[~h

     '-                                                                                                                     i 13       used to obtain a restart, would immediately correct                                                    !

14 that. 15 They wouldn't sit on it, regardless~of 16 the two-day time frame. I think it's something that-l 17 somebody would want to do immediately. Ifcan recall 18 other managers that I worked for-that when we had an 19 issue like that, that was what they did.- 20 They immediately grabbed the phone and 21 immediately called a responsible person in the NRC *: 22 and said hey, we screwed up here, I got this 23 number. I 24 I remember Mr. Paul Rice talking about 25 how he handled such situations. I remember Mr.

536 O i 1 1 Bellamy talking about situations that he had been 2 involved with. Their actions were to do it the same 3 day, not to wait two, three, four months, 4 Q. Wouldn't your view today be, if you were 5 asked this question, that that should have been 6 corrected in.two days by virtue of 50.9 or is that 7 not your view today? ' 8 A. Yeah, that's my view. 9 Q. So if you were asked this question today, 10 it would be a different answer than there is an 11 obligation to provide timely responses, it would be? 12 A. I'm focussed.more on that, you know, 13 having reviewed it as part of this case. The NRC 14 issued the violations against Georgia Power against 15 that specific regulation. I think that's focussed  ; 16 attention on that regulation more so than back at i 17 this point in time.

                                                                   )

18 Q. Is that what brought 50.9 to your 19 attention? 20 A. No. What first brought 50.9 to my 21 attention was when the regulation was promulgated 22 and when the initial letters came out about its 23 interpretation. 24 Q. In 1988? f25 A. I recall definitely those letters in

537 'n - Q - 1 1988. 2 Q. Let me go back to one of the earlier  ; ^ 3 . transcript pages that we talked about, 226.- Think  ! 4- in terms of whether or not your answers would be the i 5 same today as they were in' July of 1990. Read, if i 7 6 you would, lines four through 13. 4 7 A. All right. ' i 8 Q. Is the portion.of-the transcript from the 9 . tape recording that you're referring to here.the 10 portion of the transcript'or'the portion of the tape 11 that just becomes so important in terms of.'your view

I'T 12 that the conspiracy was hatched by the exchange.  ;
/ 13 between Mr. Hairston and Mr..McCoy?

14 MR. KOHN: I object. Mr. Blake, I I 15 believe, is mischaracterizing the-witness' 16 prior testimony. 17 MR. BLAKE: We can certainly, straighten 18 that out. I hadn't intended to do that. 19 THE WITNESS: Are you referring to the 4 20 disputed portion? 21 MR. BLAKE: Yes. 22 THE WITNESS: So your question is -- , 23 MR. BLAKE: Let's straighten out Mr. 24 Kohn's problem first, because we talked a lot

               '25         about this yesterday.                 Certainly I hadn't

538 { 1 intended to. misrepresent what I understood

                '2       .you to have said.       '

l 3 'Q. (By Mr. Blake) I' thought'we.had: agreed- s [ 4 after we talked about that'that there and then was l 5 hatched'the. conspiracy.about to1 disavow and to-

                                                                                                .{

6 testify ~that they hadn't understood.that the' ~! 7 information was false, and that,was what-was'on'the'

                                                ~

8 .-minds of-those1 people in yourTview at"the timeithat' 9 exchange took place. > l i 10 A. I think'my testimony,wasithat it. .j 11 culminated-with this exchange. - 12 Q. All right.. So youlthink1that they. O 13 discussed prior to this conversation, priorJto this l 14 exchange that they would'take the position that they 15 didn't know that the information was false? 16 A. I.think I said that the action of 17 intentionally submitting false information in this 18 LER occurred over the course of that day and . 19 culminated with the discussion-in-the. disputed 20 portion, and it was completed by the filing of the 21 underlying; documentation. i 22 Q. You'see, I did misunderstand, bec'ause I 23 understood in our conversations yesterday, infyourL j 24 deposition, for you to have said that.you believed (:) 25 that ehere had seen prior conversations 1about the

                                                                                                  ]

e .- 539 4 , l' introduction of the language on comprehensive test j_ 2- program,_that that conspiracy had been a subjectLof ' 3 discussions before_the telephone conference that-we f i . I 4-had recorded,'and that it was implemented in'that l i 5 conversation by the injectionJof:those words-and the-l , 1

!             6       agreement-to~ include them.                   That, I'had understood.                                          !

i

- 7 A.- That's correct. I
j. ,

j 8 .Q. ButfI'clearlyLunderstood,you yesterday to i 1-

             .9       tell me that.you. felt with regard to their view that

) '1 0. they wouldn't admit that they understood the ' 11 information was false which was represented by this. 12 exchange,- the disputed exchange,.-to have beent  ; 13 hatched, to have been conceived, to have been t i- 14 implemented all.in the course of this exchange off l l . .15 words. i

          '16                               Now, did I misunderstand?.             Do you believe i

!- 17 there was prior conversation between these l > j 18 individuals about this topic, as well?-  : ! 19 A. I believe that in the disputed portion of. 4 20 tape 58, that those individuals discussed how they 21 were going to, further discussed how they were going 1 22 to handle the situation of intentionally making the-l 23 false statement.

24. Q. But you believe that they had discussed'

()25- it previously? J J b '.-. -

i 540 ("') 1 A. Well, I believe, and I stated yesterday 2 that I believe there to have been prior discussion ) 3 about introducing the fuzzy words. 4 Q. Yes. 5 A. Into the LER. 6 Q. I understood that from yesterday, but 7 what I didn't understand -- 8 A. And I view that as being part of the - i 9 effort to intentionally submit to the NRC and'LER 10' that would repeat'known false information. I i 11 Q. But the idea that they would take the 12 position that they didn't know it was false, which O 13 is what I -- l 14 A. The way they would handle -- 15 Q. Let me just finish so we don't talk 16 together at the same time. 17 Th'e idea that they were going to take the 18 position that they wouldn't admit that they' knew the 19 information was false, which is what I understood l 20 you to get out of this disputed exchange. I had not

      .21    understood the subject of prior conversations 22    between them in your view.

23 A. My view is that discussion is what it-24 is. It's a recommendation by the lower. people to 25 Mr. Hairston how to handle the situation at hand,

             ?

541' O 11 and in that I mean.the intentional-making;of,th's i 2 . false statement. 3 Since I7wasn't party,'present,'end~ 4' ' corporate, I.am specul'ating. based on my review of 5 -the circumstances and myLbest belief. 6 Q. And you believe that that'topicfhad1been 7 previously discussed'byLthese individuals and was: 8 simply'being confirmed 11n:the. disputed l language?. 9 A. I1wouldn't ~know that. I,would have no 10 way'to know the previous-discussion, if'there ha'd

   '11  been any. It may have been, it may not'have been.

12 There is no way I can say that.

                                                  ~

13 Q. Is.this language which you refer to in 14 July 1990 as I heard a voice say something to:them 15 and again in the background, I didn't. catch the-no 16 on the phone, what was being said, is this the same 17 language which yesterday you_ characterized as being 18 relatively clear and capable of interpretation, more 19 capable than other portions of the' transcript? 20 A. I think you are somewhat' 21 mischaracterizing what I said. 22 Q. Well, please straighten that out. 23 A. First of all, I will'say that some 24 portions of this are clear, of the disputed section ( 25 are clear. Some portions-are not as clear.

                                                                        . . - ~ -

k i , 542 I'7-sd 1 What I did say yesterday is that when we ' i 2 asked the Georgia Power. witnesses about the disputed ! I 3 section, the response we got was'I. don't remember, I  : 4 4 can't hear, I can't identify that that's me. i 5 We got a big zero. What I saidLwas that i 6 ' when we played portions of the transcripts which  ! 7 were equally as inaudible or not that' clear, letfme 8 be clear on that, that were no clearer than this, , 9 other people seemed to hear it fine. 10 Other people.when hearing the portions [ 11 that were relatively clear like portions are here i 12 said hey, that's great, this really brings it back,

  /

k-) 13 this really refreshes my memory.  ! 14 So it seems a little strange to me that , 15 all the people, when we get around to discussing ' 16 this section, have no recollection. It: doesn't 4 17 bring it back. They can't hear it. They can't-18 identify themselves, and that seems very different ] 4 19 than the testimony we have gotten from other people 20 in other sections. ] 21 Q. In July of 1990 at the time of this 22 interview by OI, did you understand this portion of 23 the tape to include Mr. McCoy saying let me explain, 24 I will testify to that and Mr. Shipman saying 3' (t~T s_) 25- disavow?

l

                                                                       'l I
                                                                  ~543     !

1 A. My independent recollection, having not  ; l 2 listened to the tapes, was I recalled Mr. Hairston 3 asking about the start situation. 4 I recall Mr. McCoy-saying something about 5 testifying. I recall Mr. Shipman saying something.-  ! 4  : 6 like or saying disavow. That's what I'have an  ;

7. independent recollection of.

l 8 Q. The recollection is, you're saying now ' 9 that in July of 1990, this testimony was based on 10 your recollection of what was.said, not-based on any {

                                                                         \

11 review or listening to the tape recordings of what  ! _ 12 was said? '

   \/ 13        A. That's correct. I didn't listen to the i

14 tape recordings in preparation for this testimony. 15 Q. So.you didn't have a view in July of 1990 l 16 on whether or not it was difficult to determine what i 17 was being said in this portion of the tape? ' 18 A. No, I wouldn't have had that view. 19 Q. Let me shift now to the end of August. 1 20 There was another communication, is the next step in 21 the scenario, to the NRC. 22 Let me ask you what, 'l any, your role 23 was or involvement in, knowledge of the I 24 communication sent to the NRC at the end of August. 25 MR. KOHN: Ernie, it's five to 1:00. i

t 544 ;

  <N 1       Are.we going to start on that?      We might just l

4 2 take a lunch break. 2' 3. ;MR. BLAKE: Thats fine with me. Let's f 4 make it a little shorter, if we can, and  ; 5 let's try to stick to it. Why don't we say 6 at 20 after. . 7 (A luncheon recess was taken.)  ! 8 Q. (By Mr. Blake) When we broke for lunch, 9 I had asked you about your involvement-in, knowledge  ! i 10 of the August, end of August communication to the , 11 NRC. 12 A. fou're referring to the end of August ("N.

  \

4 13 communicationb to the NRC to correct the April 9th 14 letter? 4 15 Q. I'm referring'to the August 30 16 communication. 17 A. Right, which-corrects the April 9th 18 letter. 19 Q. I don't know how you' re going ta) , 20 characterize it. It's not'always clear that my j l 1 21 characterization would be the same as yours, but I'm l l i 22 just asking about that communication, your i 1 4 23 involvement in it, your participation. 24 A. I guess leading up to that was the I 25 operational safety inspection which began the

545 beginning.ofL-August.for two weeks. 1 In'the' course'of-2- thatz period of time,'the NRC -- 3 Q. .Let me just stop-just for a-moment. ' I ' m-

 -4    not asking you about'your communications with-5  counsel, but I want.to ask'you-whether or not you're-6, aware'that you're not free to discussianswers;to 7  questions with counsel in the course of a                             '

6 deposition. 1 9 MR. KOHN: Excuse me. 10 MR. BLAKE: I.want-to ask him whether- = 11 or not he is aware that'he is not free to 12 discuss his' responses-_to my questions in the 13 course of a deposition. 14 MR. KOHN: Well, he hasn't. 15 MR. BLAKE: He hasn't, okay. That's 16 fine. 17 Q. (By Mr. Blake) There have been no 18 communications, is what you're saying, between you 19 and counsel about my questions to you in the course 20 of this deposition? 21 A. I don't know what you're talking about. 22 I'm not turning over and saying -- '23 Q. I know that, because I can see you here, 24 but we take breaks and I just want to know that you 25 understood that ground rule and have abided by it.

546 /~ O' 1 A .. The requirement, again, you're trying to

                                                                                                        )

l 2 ask me if I was discussing the responses? 3 Q. Yes. 4 A. To questions during the course of the 5 deposition? I 6 Q. Yes. 7 A. I mean I have on.the breaks, and Mike and 8 I had lunch together. So we discuss things, f 9 Q. Of course, and I'm not asking you, and-10 obviously you're involved in this' case so you have , 11 conversations with your counsel about this case. 12 What can't be done is for him to assist.you in O 13 responding to questions that I pose to you in the 14 course of the deposition, and the answer to that  : 15 question is no, I take it. That's what Mr. Kohn was 16 saying.  ! 17 MR. KOHN: That's correct. In fact, we 18 didn't even mention the August 30 19 communication. 20 MR. BLAKE: That's correct. I just 21 wanted to be sure that that had been the 22 ground rule and you understood it. 23 THE WITNESS: You're saying that 24 because you introduced that question before i~s (_)25 the break. Is that what you're getting at? ) l l

                                                                       )

547 f*N  ; O 1_ MR. BLAKE: Yes. .That's what prompted 2 ' it now.and I wanted to be sure that's been

    '3         the case throughout the deposition.                    ,

4 MR. KOHN: I'm not sure that's been the  ! 5 case for the other witnesses that'have 6 testified. 7 MR. BLAKE: It's certainly true of'Mr.- a 8 Mosbaugh, is that'what'you're saying? 3 9' MR. KOHN: Yes, but I'm not.sure that 10 it's been true of the licensee. ' 11 MR. BLAKE: I'm'sorry to have 12 interrupted you. 13 Q. (By Mr. Blake) August 30, you were 14 starting to talk about OSI. i 15 A. Right. In early August for two~ weeks, 16 NRC sent a team to the site to do an operational l 17 safety inspection. 18 In the course of the issues reviewed by j 19 the team, they were looking at issues of. inaccurate 20 information and false statements in the confirmation 21 of action response and the LER for 4/19/90 LER and, j 22 i I think, the first revision to the LER and were ' 23 asking questions about the revision of the LER and 24 so f or 'h. 25 We held meetings about those issues and

548 s 1 there were interviews conducted in that period of 2 time. In that' period of time, some of the questions j 3 that the NRC brought up with management was why  ! 1 4 haven't you corrected the confirmation of action I 5 letter response, the 4/9/90 response, why haven't i 6 you corrected that. l 7 So I think there was some NRC insistance 8 that a correction to the 4/9 letter be issued. So 1 i 9 based on the NRC's insistance, the company then got ' 10 to work on a revision, and I think at that point the 11 correction that's now over four months old, it's. 1 12 been four months since it was issued, and I think I 13 the NRC thought that it was about time that 14 something be issued. j 4 15 Q. Mr. Mosbaugh, are you going to get around l 16 to answering my question? 17 A. I'm trying to give you the background: 18 about my involvement in it because that was sorae of 19 my earlier involvement. 20 Q. I haven't heard you refer in one i 21 sentence, phrase, or word to your involvement yet.  ! l 22 A. Well, I heard about what I'm telling you  ! 23 from my involvement, and so some people started -- 24 also, I would add at that point I am out of line 25- management. So I am hearing from other people 1 I'

l 549 l il what's. going on. ' 2- Q. Whofwere these people?  : 3 A. In general, the peop'le that.used to work

4. -tor me.

5 Q. That would be? l 6 A '. That would be people like Horton and i 1 d 7 Auf denkan;pe and -the people in the-NSAC group, the 8 people that are on the PRB, those people. s 7 t 9 Q. Who was on the PRB that used to work for - 10 you? -! 11 A. Aufdenkampe-and Horton, the secretary. 12 Q. So it was those people that you1were' , 13 hearing from? 14 A. Right, and we had meetings'with all the 15 managers. So that was the rest of George Bockhold's 16 staff. 17 So a revision was. initiated, and toward 18 the end of August a letter, this was being revised 2 19 by a letter, a letter went to the PRB to revise the 20 4/9/90 correspondence, and it stated a reason for f 21 the error, and it gave the numbers that would have 22 been correct at that time. 23 It had a chart in it that listed'all, in 24 this revision they were going to include a complete ()25 listing of all the starts, of all the diesel

i

                                                                                 .550     j
 . (^h.
               -1  starts.

i ~ 2 So the PRB met with that, and I. attended,

- 3 I sat in, invited myself to a couple,.at least'one 4 PRB. meeting, it may have been more, where the draft-4 I 5 was being reviewed by the PRB. j 6 I remember that Mike Horton,'in the [

t 7 course of that, wanted to take'it upon himself to < 8 make sure that the lists, the attachment to the j 9 letter was absolutely accurate. I remember him 10 telling me how he had worked until 3:00 a.m. in the , il morning about reviewing the logs and getting-this 12 list right. ' 13 So he brought the list back,. and at the

  • 14 same time Mr. Bockhold was sitting in on'some of 15 these PRB meetings then, too.

16 Q. Some of the PRB meetings that you were 17 attending or the one that you attended? 18 A. I can't recall if I attended justLone.or 19 maybe two. I know Mr. Bockhold was in one.PRB 20 meeting that I attended when the 8/30 letter!was 21 being reviewed. In that meeting Mr. Bockhold 22 started to insert himself some what into the 23 process. 24 It was a little bit like he had done in [J25 some earlier PRB meetings. The PRB'was. talking

551 Ikj 1 about language in the letter and he was directing 2 our suggesting to the members that the language not 3 be changed or that some of these weren't issues and 4 so forth. 5 I viewed that and another member of the 6 staff viewed that as a little bit improper because 7 the PRB was supposed to advise Mr. Bo'ckhold rather 8 than have Mr. Bockhold steer the PRB. 9 Mr. A:2fdenkampe was an individual that 10 was having those feelings about Mr. Bockhold's 11 participation. s 12 At any rate, the Horton list was added. 13 The letter was eventually approved by the PRB and 14 sent out to the NRC on the 30th of August, and that 15 was pretty much my involvement and knowledge about 16 it. 17 Q. Your involvement was that you recall 18 attending one PRB meeting at least in which Mr. 19 Bockhold participated in a way which you regarded as 20 inappropriate and you think Mr. Aufdenkampe did, as 21 well, that is, regarded it as inappropriate. Is 22 that the summary of your involvement? 23 A. Yeah. I will say I felt he was steering 24 the PRB. A ( ) 25 _ Q. And what did you do about your views?

4 552 O( / 1 A. And by August 30th I was communicating-2 with the.NRC about my views, and I believe in-the 3 course of the time I communicated my viewscabout 4 what had gone on with that letter with the NRC,.but 5 I can't' remember exactly when. 6 Q. Do you think you felt it was 7 inappropriate how Mr. Bockhold was injecting himself 8 into the process? 9 A. I think it was somewhat-inappropriate. 10 Q. And do you think it hurt the process? 11 A. M r .' Bockhold kept saying that if this is 12 how Birmingham wants the letter, this'is'the way we () 13 ought to have the letter, statement to that effect. 14 I think it prevented the members some of the freedom 15 that they might have otherwise used in drafting the 16 letter independently of the ones at Birmingham. 17 Q. And did you mention this to anyone in the

     . 18  management of Georgia Power?

19 A. I don't think I brought that up with 20 anybody in Georgia Power at that time At~that 21 point the NRC, I had signed an agreement with them 22 to be a confidential informant, and I was voicing my 23 concerns about Georgia Power to the'NRC. 24 Q. Did you feel that signing the agreement () 25 with the NRC to become a confidential informant

i I I 553 t/ 1 somehow inhibited.you from being able to raise  : 2 concerns within-Georgia Power or to point out where , 3 you felt problems were occurring? 4- A. No, it didn't inhibit'me from raising. l

5. anything internally, but at that point it had become 1 6 ny choice to raise the concerns ~I had through the 7 NRC. ,

j 8 Q. Did you feel at that point any obligation ~ ' 9 to your employer, Georgia Power, to point out ,

10 problems? '

11 A. I had attempted to do that all along, and '

   ~   12      by that point I had been relieved of all my.
  • kl 13 responsibilities, and I was removed from involvement i f 14 in most safety related kinds of activities. {

15 I felt that my communication of.my i 16 concerns with the NRC met all my obligations, 17 including my obligations within the company. j 18 Q. Because you felt that if your concerns ' 19 were correct or regarded as important, they would be 20 provided back to the company and there would be a I 21 cure of the problems? 22 A. No, I felt that because that was a stated 23 option within the company policy, that if an l 24 individual felt that his concerns would be best 25' addressed via his communication with the NRC, that J

t 554 1 that was part of the company policy. 2 Q. Is it your view now that the: problems 3 which you did not point out to company management , 4 but pointed out to the NRC could well have been 5 acted upon earlier by the company, assuming that' 6 they were right, that your views were right, which I 7 don't want to dispute, I don't know one way or the  ! 8 other? , P 9 A. At that time I had lost confidence in the 10 company's resolving these concerns without NRC 11 involvement. 12 So I will supplement, to give you a more O, 13 complete answer as to what you just asked. What I 14 had observed the company response to be was to 15 posture itself against me as opposed to taking the 16 kind of corrective actions that I thought 17 appropriate. 18 So because of that, I don't think the 19 company would have, of its own, resolved these 20 better or more promptly. 21 Q. So you don't think the company at that 22 point would have taken suggestions from you? 23 A. At that point the company had been

24. dismissing my concerns and posturing itself against j (3'

(_) 25 me. .

i s g -{ 555 4 4

 '   c:)      1-                     z C         What were examples'of ~ that; posturing c

2 "itself.against.you? ~ 3 1A. 'Thecremoval'of meffrom my - i; e.

                                            ~

l s4 ' responsibilities, thefremoval*of-me from;theLPlant; 'h,

'5- Review Board, the statements made1tofme by, .

[ 6 management-about not supporting:the" directed . I q 7 resolution of the company,:thoselkinds.of things =. ' 8 Q. All of whic'h you attribute'to your  ; F 9 positionLas a whistle blower? i-I 10 A.. Yes. '

i. ,
         .11 ~                         Q.        .Rather than.a.substantivefrejection,'that;

(: - 12 they just didn't accept your view?; i' .

13 A. Yes. The concerns were not taken 14 seriously.by the company.  ;

i 15 Q. Why. did you go tct the L PRB. meeting? '  ; 16 To find out'what the company 1was goingfto l A .- t [ 17 -do about -- this had begun-around thaltime of the d l-18 site area emergency, and I felt false information [ 19 had been provided, I had given my management memos, l' 20 tried to get it corrected, tried to get LER a-21 corrections issued. 22 I was following through on what I had. 1' . 23 begun many months before and trying to learn for p 24- myself how the company was going to complete the j()25 corrections of these false statements. c> O j

i d

                                                                        -556   i l

1-Q. So it was being done in orderJfor youLto 1 2 . determine what the~ company was doingjrather than to-3 try to provide input or to make,an-accurate' d 4 submittal to.the NRC? 5- A. At that' point I was no longer a PRB 6 member.. I was obtaining information.as to what:the 7 company was doing and wanted.to follow 1up on1what1I 8 _had begun and~ wanted:to provide: that= evidence.to.the 9 NRC as I had begun to"do at thatlpoint in time. 10- Q. Let's go-to what1I will regard as the

    =11    next stepLwhich was.the 2.206 petition fil'ed'in
12. September of 1990.

13 (Mosbaugh Exhibit DG-10 was' marked  !

    -14          for identification.)

15 Q. (By Mr. Blake) We have marked 'f or the - ) i 16- record at this deposition this' document which is 17 entitled Request for Proceedings and Imposition:of 18 Civil Penalties for Improperly Transferring Control 19 of Georgia. Power Company's Licenses to'the SONOPCO' 20 Project and for the Unsafe and Improper Operation of 21 Georgia Power Company Licensed Facilities. 22 The document that we distributed and'made 23 an exhibit is just an excerpt from'that' entitled 24 Document. It includes the first page andL then'pages

(
  )25     nine through 13.      Do you recognize this document,

557 f\

 .V '   1   Mr. Mosbaugh?
       '2         A. Yes.  .It's a portion of the'2.206 3   petition that Mr. Hobby and I~ submitted.'
                                                                         '(.

4 Q. Looking at the bottom'of page nine ' 5- carrying over to the top of page ten, the. sentence: 6 reading on April 19th, 1990, Mr. Mosbaugh had- - i 7 informed SONOPCO's senio'r vice-president,-Mr. George 8 Hairston, that the diesel had suffered trips and' ' 1 9 failures. What's your basis for that statement? I 10 A. My basis for that statement is the 11 conversations that I had on April 19th,with Mr. 12 Stringfellow and Mr. Shipman-and the word.that had 5 '( 13 come back of the statements of Mr. Shipman-that-he 14 was. going to immediately go down, he and Jack } 15 Stringfellow were going to go down and-talk to Mr.

16 Hairston about what I had just informed him about.

17 and then the feedback from SONOPCO that Mr. Hairston 18 and McCoy and Mr. Mcdonald were reviewing or i

19 believed that a material false statement had been i

4 20 made and then the subsequent actions on call A. 21 That told me that what I had begun, that 22 the communications had occurred and the 23 communication loop had been completed.

24 Q. Are you referring to the discussion which
  !   25   appears on tape 57 between you and Aufdenkampe?

i

l J i - j 558 I

               -1                        A.           I just referred to conversations.that;are-d
                                                                                                                            ')

l 2 contained on both 57 and 58.. -l + t i 3 Q. 'Do'you.thinklthat this istanLaccurate  ! i [ 4 statement? j , _.[ 5 A. Yes.  ! I

6 Q. That on April.19th, you informed;Mr..

l l l 7 Hairston.that the diesel had suffered-trips and-

8 failures?

9 A. I'just described the' communication chain, }-  ;

- 10 that' occurred up to Mr..Hairston1that had~ begun with i

11 me and Mr. Aufdenkampe and how'the confirmation

         12             communication loop-had been completed and came back'                                             d 13 f

to me. 'i $ 14 Q. Looking at the next sentence, 15 i nonetheless, later that day,. Mr. Hairston: signed the" ] j 16 LER after he had been Advised that the'information j

                                                                                                                          >j j           17             stated therein contained false informati'on.                                   What's 1

1 18 the false information that you're referring to 4 19 there? i

20 A. False information about the start count

?, 21 statements, i j 22 Q. Assuming that Mr. Hairston was informed? j 23 as a result of-your conversation with Mr.. Shipman ' 24- and Mr. Stringfellow, i s that'your position? 25 A. I discussed that with Shipman and r b.

  • 1 4 1 w

p.- y e~g. - r,m- w - - + - - -

i 559 r~ i 1 Stringfellow. 2 Q. Assuming that they subsequently 1 discussed

         -3  that with Mr. Hairston, was that before or after.the-            !

4 comprehensive test program language ~was introduced? 5 A. I believe that they' discussed that with , 6 Mr. Hairston before the' comprehensive. test program i 7 . language was introduced. i 8 Q. And certainly your questions about'the 9 accuracy.of the language was before that-language 10 was put in? r 11 A. That's correct. 12 Q. And do you have reason to~believe that.-

 .\'[') 13  Mr. Hairston might not have believed that the~

14 introduction of that~1anguage cured whatever the 15 problem was, assuming that he heard about the 16 problem at all? q l 17 A. Yes, I do. I have reason to believe 18 that -- let me start over. I believe Mr. Hairston 19 did not believe that that introduction cured the J 20 problem. i 21 Q. Because you, in fact, believed that he 22 understo 1 the problem and just put that 23 introductory language in there so that he would be 1 24 able to argue about whether or not it was x, 25 inaccurate? t 1 4

                                                                 = ~ -     **

l 560 .l = 1- A. No, because I believe Mr. Hairston~ stated j 2 to us that it:was his intent that'the information 3 contained.in the 4/9 communication' conveyed;the same 4 information, the-LER conveyed;the same.information 5

                                                                                                               -i as the-4/9 ph' rase conveyed.-   I believe:Mr. Hairston-                                           1 6

3 considered those to be' conveying the same i t 7 information to the NRC. ' 6 P 8- Q. Looking at page 11, small F, what is f your: f 9 basis f or: that statement? 'I 10' A. I think we reviewed this:beforetor>have . 11- gone over the' facts up to this1before, but my' basis i 12 for that statement is, first, thatLit took.way too j O- 13 long since the. revision: was issued.toJget anything. i

                                                                                                                 ]

14 out. 15- Second, that seemed strange'to me and it 16 seemed strange to other people that were?normally. 17 involved in the processing of LER's. I have:already. 18 covered how I think it should have been of such 19 importance that it should have been handled J i 20 immediately, that it.shouldn't have'got routine 21 ' priority but it should have-gotten top and expedited 1 22 priority.  ! I 23 Q. I-agree with all that you're saying. My; i 24 only question to you is what is the basis for your  ! I ( 25 statement that SONOPCO intentionally delayed i l I

() 561 \-) 1 advising the LER?

      '2        A. Those are my bases because if there 3  wasn't something intentional going on here, SONOPCO 4  personnel would have done it timely. The fact that 5  they didn't do it timely indicates to me that-there 6  is some motive involved.

7 In addition, as I stated to you before, 8 when I questioned this with Mr. Odom and I believe, 9 as I stated before, he called Mr. Bailey and Mr. 10 Bailey, this was early in the week, stated ~that 11 well, he thought that they were going to assign the

,r] 12    LER revision out after the June 8th meeting or the
  ~

13 day of the June 8th meeting, that's part of my. basis 14 for linking it up with that meeting. 15 Also, Mr. Bailey, who is the corporate 16 licensing manager, stated his personal inclination 17 that we should not issue the revised LER until the 18 IIT reports, I think, was the words he used. That's 19 on documented tape recording. 20 Q. Do you hold that view that because it 21 wasn't sent in expeditiously, it was, therefore, 22 being intentionally delayed, do you hold that view 23 even today even though Mr. Aufdenkampe told you in 24 ( June of '90 that Brockman had been told about the ' \> 25 inaccurate information that phone call by Mr. McCoy? i i

J 562 l (]~ 1 A. I question the extent of the , 2 communications of the Georgia Power personnel that 3 they have claimed with the NRC. An individual could 4 call the NRC about this and state things like, and I 5 have heard the company use the words well, you know' -

  .         6  we had problems coming out of maintenance or things 7  like that.
  • 8 You know, like when we had to prime the 9 fuel lines. The NRC may well have understood and j 10 accepted that, you know, a failure like that was i 11 something that they could dismiss and live with, i i

12 okay. 13 I believe that some of these 14 communications were like that. They were partial i 15 communications not telling the whole' story, not 16 telling that there are problems with diesel trips on i 17 Calcon switches, which would have raised some 18 eyebrows. 19 Q. Are you aware that Mr. Aufdenkampe had 20 discussed this topic with the NRC residents? 21 A. Mr. Aufdenkampe had some discussions with 22 the residents. I recall him saying that. 23 Q. My point is do you think that still there 24 would be an intentional delay in revising the LER r's t

        ) 25   that had some evil motive even though there had been

j ' j 563 I [ 'J e . ' (- - l 1 . conversations with the NRC by the Aufdenkampe j l 2 residents-or McCoy to Brockman? l 3 A. Yes. , l 4 Q. How can it Le.to any avail?. 'How could l l 5 deferring it result in some successful hiding of it 6 if these conversations of the. topic had already been 7 discussed? 8 A. Because I believe that'the communications

                                                                                ]

9 that occurred were partial and were not being ' 10 formally admitted to by the company,'and the1 company i 11 did not want to formally admit that they.had.gotten 12 restart under a false premise until these critical' O 13 meetings were over. 14 Q. Do you now include Mr. Aufdenkampe'in the 15 circle of individuals who had this sophisticated 16 view of how to do business with the NRC? 17 A. I do not know what Mr. Aufdenkampe's 18 communication with the NRC was. I believe I recall 19 him saying that he talked to the resident, but I 20 don't know what that was or the extent of that 21 communication. 22 A number of these communications have 23 been held out both to the NRC, to OI, through sworn 24 testimony as being, you know, as meeting the 25 requirements of open and honest communication and

l = 564 1 promptly informing the NRC; but when we have delved f 2 into'the actual communication and the content of the

                                                                                                                      ]

3 communication and looked'at it from what was 4 received on the other end, it'hasn't been-as- i l 5 advertised by Georgia Power.  ! 6 Q. Let meJgo to'J on'page 12. The;first 7 part of J reads the review of the performance ]

8 records of diesel generator will demonstrate that it 9 was unreliable. Do you see that portion?  !

10 A. Yes. I would like to review the whole , 11 statement. All right. l , 12 Q. Was it your view, then, in September of ,

() 13 1990 that the diesel generator was unreliable?

14 A. Yes, I believe that there were 15 significant reliability problems. I believe that by  ! 3-16 September, the diesel had not only. experienced its i 17 failures during the site area emergency but: i  ! 18 experienced failures after the site area emergency  ; i  : 19 when it supposedly had been fixed.  ! 4 20 Q. Are you talking about the May time frame? . i 21 A. Right. Then it experienced failures in i 22 July due to other causes, and then it experienced 23 failures in August due to electrical causes. So

 '-         24  there were a   --

and then it was recognized that some 25 of the earlier failures hadn't even been caught by [ V['\

                                                                            .e..c. . .       +-+,e           *-t
                                                                                                               -l
                                                                                                                 ~!
                                                                                                                 .)

a 565 .I 1 'the'. operators and weren't properly' logged. l

                                                                                                                 'f 2L                    SoLby that point in time the diesel ~'was                                        .!
         ':0 .having problems.due to three,nat least three                                                       j
                                                        ...                                                         i
         '4  -

separate causes, one relating to the? diesel .  ; i 5 pneumatic system, one relating to-.the' electrical [ l system, and another one relating to the starting

                                                                          ~
         .6                                                                                                    '!

7 system; that.the records 1were not-whollyiadequatelas l 8- -to how extensive the failures'were because operators j 9 had failed to. log failures, and by September,:the. 10 diesel was demonstratingLa multitude of problems.

       '11'          Q..        Do you think that.yourLview of the~ diesel    .
                                                                                                                 .l 1

j f 12 generators were. unreliable', had been arrived ~at-in 13- about the-September 1990; time frame?. l I 14 A '. Only.by September hadiall'those problems- l i 15 come to light. 1 16 Q. Prior to that you had not' reached that'- 'l 17 same view? 18 A. Well, the problems mounted up and-19 problems that weren't known initially, we became 20 aware of over the summer. So by that time the 21 problems were mounting up with the diesel.

       ,22          Q.          So you didn't have that same' view in 23     April, correct?            We talked about that earlier.

I 24 A. Well, in April it had demonstrated l O 25. problems. It had failed during the site area I l l L_- - . _ , . . .-. ,,

i 566 0 1 emergency and the company was,' thought that.it' had- , 2 fixed the problems;but by May it was apparent that l 3 they hadn't fixed the problems. 4 Q. So was it in May that you arrived at the' .; 5 view that the diesels were unreliable? 6 A. I'm not'sure I' flag a particular point'in [i 7 time, but by the end of the summer, there.were j 8 definitely serious questions about its reliability 4 9 by the end of the summer because of all these , 10 different problems that surfaced. 11 Q. Let's shift to a memorandum in support of 3 12 summary judgment that you'provided.in the Department (J 13 of Labor proceeding.in May of '91. I'm trying to go I 4 14 along chronologically so that we can understand what 15 your state of knowledge was.

                                                                    .                          i 16             (Mosbaugh Exhibit DG-11 was marked                l 17      for identification.)                                     l I

, 18 Q. (By Mr. Blake) We have marked as our 19 next exhibit, number 11, a document entitled . 20 Affidavit of Allen L. Mosbaugh. I believe it to be 21 dated May 15th, '91. 22 It's handwritten on the version that we 23 handed out. This is just an excerpt from that ~ 24 affidavit which includes pages one and then 13

!x                            25 through 18 and 24.

I

i fl 567 l f"% \

 ~

lL MR. KOHN: On the last page is a i 2 different dete. I

3. THE1 WITNESS: On the~ copy it'shows May l 4 14th1and-May 23rd. l 5 MR. BLAKE: That's right'. .The document 6 reflects those dates on the_last page. I
      '7          don't_know whose handwriting it is on the
  • 8 first page in.the top right. ,

9 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Do you know what the date 10 of this document was, Mr. Mosbaugh? i 11 A. These dates on the back are my 12 handwriting. 1 13 MR. KOHN: If my recollection serves me 14 right, the 5/14/91 date was a fax date. I'm i 15 trying to recall. I think that maybe -- 16 MR. BLAKE: I don't think there_is.any 17 confusion about what this document is, in any - i 18 event. ' i l 19 MR. KOHN: No. 20 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Look.at pages 14 and 15 21 in this package. You recognize this document, Mr. 22 Mosbaugh? 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. Focus particularly on the language at the (O j 25 top of page 15, that same paragraph that follows and

568 1 1 carries over. .This is all a matter of tape recorded j i  ; 2 conversation; is it not, what you're referring to 1 l 3 here? I 4 A. What I'm referring to is documented on 5 tape recorded conversations. 6 Q. Is it true that over the phone you told i I 7 Mr. Shipman that the statements in the LER were not ) l 8 true? l 9 A. That's correct. 10 2 And you believe that that's-what the l 11 transcript of that tape recording reflects? l 12 A. I think my statement in the transcript I [\/ 13 says something about if anybody said there weren't 14 problems or failures, then that's.just not true, 15 referring to the 18 and 19 start count. 16 Q. And-the next statement, you believe to be 17 -true and supported by the tape recording, I went 18 over the dates of diesel failures with him'and 19 unequivocally stated that, contrary to the 20 statements contained in the LER, the diesel had 21 failed twice? j 22 A. I went over the dates and times of two i 23 specific failures of the B diesel generator, gave l 24 him the date, the time, and apparent reason. I () 25 unequivocally stated to him that contrary to the 4 l 4 3

s 569 1 statements contained in the LER, because the LER 2~ that we were talking about said that~no problems or 3 failures had occurred and contrary to that, I gave 4 him the dates and times of two 1-B. diesel failures. 5 Q. You believe today that statement t o Inn ' l 6 accurate, the count or characterization of what's l 7 recorded in that tape recording on April 197 8 A. Yeah, and I believe Mr.-Shipman-believed I s 9 it, too, because his response was how the world did 10 this get through the PRB and something about I think 11 this statement just needs to be stricken. So he ) 12 must have the same understanding, i 13 Q. I'm only asking about your statement here 14 and whether or not you regard it as an accurate 15 characterization of what, in fact, was stated on 16 April 19th? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. And I don't think that Mr. Shipman has 19 expressed any view on the accuracy of this  ; 20 characterization? 21 A. No, but that was a communication I had 22 with him, and I communicate something and he 23 responded back indicating an acknowledgment and 24 understanding of what I had communicated. () 25 Q. What about the next statement, I also

570 i 0 1 participated in subsequent telephone. conversations I j 2 later that day in which my concern over the false a 4 3 statement contained in the LER was relayed to Mr. 4' Bockhold, Mr. McCoy, and Mr.'Hairston. What 5 subsequent telephone conversations are you referring-1

6. to there that you participated in?

7 A. Well, by the time of the conversation, i j 8 the word had come back that my concern over the 9 false statement had been relayed up the chain of 10' command and that word had come back that Mr. McCoy,  ! , 1 11 Mr. Hairston, and Mr. Mcdonald were reviewing, I -j 12 believed there was a material false statement had 13 been made and they were reviewing it now. 14 So it was my view that the entire l l 4 15 management chain at that point knew about it. 16 Q. Do you believe this to be an accurate i 17 statement of what occurred on April 19, 1990? 18 A. Well, I would say with respect to 19 including Mr. Bockhold here, based on my current 20 knowledge, maybe the group that my concern about 21 false statement was related to was Mr. McCoy, 22 Hairston, and Mcdonald, was the feedback that I got 23 back. 24 Then it was after that that Mr. Bockhold,

  )25             Mr. McCoy, and Mr. Hairston became involved in the

l ,

                                                                          )
                                                                    '571- !

l r'~% 1 call which was-referred to as call A. 2 Q. So you believe this is an accurate-

3 statement of what occurred on Aprili19th, if'you l- 4 change Mr. Bockhold to read Mr. Mcdonald?

i 4 5 A. Maybe-"was" .should say "had been." 6 .Q. You think it is an accurate statement if 7 you change was to'had'been andfchange Bockhold'to 1 8 Mcdonald?  ! 9 A. Yeah, I think that may clarify it. -Like

.       10   I said, based on the knowledge I-have'now and the il   review that I have done of tapes and so forth, it 12  was the group of McCoy, Hairston, and Mcdonald that           l 13 I got the feedback that my concern had gone up'to i

14 this group rather than thic group including Mr. i

15 Bockhold. l i

16 Q. Were you a party to a telephone

17 conversation in which your concern over the accuracy

). 18 Jf statements in the LER was relayed to Mr. Mcdonald-l 19 or Mr. McCoy or Mr. Hairston or Mr. Bockhold? 1 20 A. No. 21 Q.- What does.the sentence mean? 22 A. In the later conversations that 1 23 participated in in the end of the day -- I'm sorry,

,-      24  participated in later that day, my concerns over the

[()25 false statements, I'm saying had been relaye'd to Mr.

572

 ,y                                                                     .
  ~

1 Mcdonald, Mr. McCoy, and Mr. Hairston. 2 That is saying that by the time we got on 3 to what I. described as call A, my concerns had gone 4 up the' management chain to the top. By the time ite-5 got to the point of call A, we already discussed 6 what I believe happened on call A as a result of my , 7 concerns going up to the top. , 8 Q. And that which happened on call A as a 9 result of your concerns going up to the top was?  : 10 A. Was that they added the words'to fuzz up 11 the language but intended to keep the same language 12 that had been submitted before and went ahead and 13 issued the LER out that way. 14 Q. And is it your view that Mr. Mcdonald i 15 also was involved in this conspiracy or discussion 16 to generate that language and insert it into the ' 17 statement in order to fuzz up? 18 A. He may have been. Since I wasn't in 19 corporate, I would have no direct way of knowing 20- that, but I do know that he was identified as part 21 of the group that believed a false statement.uad , 22 been made and that they were discussing and that { 23 they were reviewing then. It was after that that  ; l 24 the action on call A occurred. (O

  .,/ 25          Q. This discussion in which this' approach I

573

 's/     1  was conceived and then subsequently implementad in 2  call A,  then, took place after your concerns were 3  transmitted to Mr. Hairston and before call   A, 4  that's what you believe?

5 A. I believe so. 6 Q. And sometime during that period of time, 7 these individuals got together and decided how to 8 insert this language, what language would be ' 9 inserted and how to accomplish it, and that was 10 implemented in call A; is that correct? 11 A. Again, this is speculation and theory 12 that this is what happened. I wasn't in corporate, 13 but this is a speculation in theory. 14 Q. Do you see a distinction between your 15 speculation in theory and the statement which 16 appears in this document which is I also 17 participated in subsequent telephone conversations 18 later that day in which my concern over the false 19 statement contained in the LER was related to Mr. 20 Bockhold, Mr. McCoy, and Mr. Hairston? 21 A. Well, at the time that, I have indicated 22 how I think, based on my current knowledge, this 23 should be more correctly worded. At the time I 24 wrote this, I didn't know everything that I know today. ( ) 25

i 574 g

 %/

1 Q. At the time you wrote this, you believed 2 you had been involved in a telephone conversation 3 late in the day on April 19th in which your concern l l 4 over the false statement contained in the LER was ' 5 related to Messrs. Bockhold, McCoy, and Hairston? 6 A. I believe this was correct at the time I 7 wrote it. I didn't write this with a thorough 8 review of tape recordings. 9 Q. You wrote this in May of '91 based on 10 your recollection of what had occurred in April of 11 '90 without having reviewed the tape recordings of

7. 12 the April 19th in the interim?

13 A. Well, at this point in time the NRC was 14 in possession of the originals of tape recordings 15 that I had made and tape recordings that I retained 16 that contained these conversations, the originals 17 were with the NEC. 18 I had made some copies of portions of 19 those recordings, and I had sent those to my 20 counsel. I believe that there were some other, in 21 fact, paging through this, there were some other 22 dates that were not quite correct because I hadn't 23 done a -- didn't have all the tape recordings to do 24 a complete review from. 25 Q. What is the answer to my question?

l I 575

     /~T                                                                  '

kJ 1 A. I did this from my recollections. 2 Q. You did it from your recollections of ' 3 what occurred on April 19th, 1990, but without 4 having reviewed tape recordings from April 19th of ' 5 '90, correct? ' 6 A. Uh-huh. 7 Q. Is that similar to the explanation'of the 8 language on the preceding page 14 which says in , 4 9 paragraph 27, I and another member of my staff, who . 10- I would guess to be Aufdenkampe but I ~ don't know,  ; J 11 you can confirm that, relayed this information to i 12 SONOPCO personnel on more than one occasion in or 13 about April 17th and 18th,~1990?  ! 14 A. Yeah, that was the date that I was just 15 talking about. i 16 Q. That is, you regard today that as an , 17 inaccurate statement because you attribute'it to the ] 18 fact that you had not reviewed the tapes of what i 19 occurred in April 1990 since April 1990, and you  ; 20 were going just on your memory of what had occurred, 21 which was faulty. j 22 A. I was going on a memory, and I think I 23 recall this in or about language in here because of l

;-       24   my certainty or knowing that there would be some

()j 25.

     /"

uncertainty. I believe that having reviewed the 1 i

576 O 1 tapes.and having transcripts and things like that i now that more than one occasion occurred on April t 2 3 19th, 1990. , j 4 Q. So that statement should read: now, you 5 believe I and another member of my staff and is that , 6 Aufdenkampe you're referring to? 7- A. Yes. ' 6 8 Q. Relayed this information to.SONOPCO ! 9 personnel on more than one occasion on April 19th, ' i l 10 1990? 11 A. Uh-huh. 12 Q. And the more than one occasion would 13 refer to your conversation with Shipman and,your 14 conversation with Stringfellow? ! 15 A. Well, there were two kind of separate i 16 conversations with Mr. Stringfellow interrupted by a l 17 conversation with Mr. Odom. l 18 In each portion of that conversation, the 19 information was relayed and then was acknowledged by 20 Mr. Stringfellow. Then he had another conversation 21 between me and Mr. Shipman and Mr. Scringfellow, 22 then, occurred after those conversations. 23 Q. . Is it Shipman and Stringfellow who are 24 the SONOPCO personnel that you're referring-to here? 25 A. Yes. l-

i l 1 577 I i

  -[)                                                                       !
         'l        Q.      Turn to page 16, if you would, paragraph           '
                                                                             \
2- 33.

3 (Discussion ~ ensued off the record.) i t 4 Q. .r. (By M Blake) Do you believe the first-5 sentence in paragraph ~33 to be correct? d 6 A. At.this point.in, time I do not-recall the' 7 nature and extent of my conversation.with Mr. Larry. ) Robinson the first. week of June of 1990. I 4 8 9 I recall contacting:him.- I,believe that , 10- my counsel may have' contacted.him, but1 I'really at.  ! 11 this point in time can't recall,what we discussed. . 12 Q.. Do you think it is accurate in.that by ' 13 June of 1990~ you had reached an opinion.that Georgia

                                                                           .e 14   Power intentionally submitted false information to              i c

15 the NRC, the COAL and the LER? i + 16 A. My recollection is that by the June time 't' L 17 frame of 1990, I believe that the submitting of the l 18 information and the LER and the COA was either at i

19 the level --

it was at a level of wrongdoing which' I j 20 is termed by the NRC as being careless disregard or i t 21 intentional. i I 22 I know I had discussions in that time l 23 frame with Mr. Robinson when I met with Mr. Robinson l , 24 about what those meant and what it took to be

   /'

(, 25 classified one or the other. By that point in time, i , i l ?

578 1 that was my feeling, that this was in an area of 2 wronadoing which, you know, I think it takes an F 3

          ' investigation to draw those conclusions of being i
4 willful or careless disregard.

5 I know Mr. Robinson and i had 6 conversations about that. I believe at about the 2 7 same time frame, I had a conversation with Mr. Roggy 8 about those same issues where we used those terms. 9 Q. At that point you hadn't.yet determined 10 whether or not it was intentional, it might have ' 11 been careless disregard? Are you able to 12 distinguish between those two terms now? . [_, i I. don't

  \-  13  understand the humor in that.                                           '

14  ! A. Those are legal terms. I believe they I 15 are legal terms. I know that was what Mr. Roggy, 16 when I had a conversation about this with Mr. Roggy, 17 he said only lawyers could make those, distinguish ! 18 between those two. 19 I don't consider myself an expert on the i 20 legal ramifications of those definitions, but they 21 are into a classification that I know is considered-22 wrongdoing. 23 Q. So today whatever your background, 24 ,, whatever the amount of time is that you have spent , (_) 25 i on this topic or thinking about those words, you are }.

I l 579 l' unable to distinguish between the.words careless a 2 disregard and the word intentional? i 3 A. No. From a legal standpoint, I don't 4 think I have enough knowledge to do that. l 5 Q. I can't, of course, ask you for a legal 6- conclusion because Mr. Kohn will jump up and-7 rightfully say you can't ask about legal 8 conclusions. I'm just asking for your common 9 understanding of those two words, those two , 10 expressions and whether or not you can distinguish 11 between them? 12 A. I have a common understanding, but'I  ! ('h

(_) 13 don't think they are that black and white. The
. 14 reason I say that is in this industry if somebody 15 chooses not to go verify something, that might be  !

4 16 considered careless disregard, but the choice, the l 17 decision of making that choice might be willful. 18 I don't think there is a black and white  ! 19 distinguishing between those terms, and I think I a-1 20 really only an investigation can draw that l

21 conclusion.

22 Q. Let me ask you to look at the next 23 document'in the sequence, chronological sequence of . 24 documents, a document entitled Georgia Power /SONOPCO ()25 2.206 petition response is filled with lies which I

           -         - - - .               ,                              .ee. y

1 ,/ 580 (3/ 1 believe would have been submitted in June of '91. 2 We can mark this as the next exhibit. 3 (Mosbaugh Exhibit DG-12 was marked 4 for identification.) 5 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Do you recognize this 6 document? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And would it have been dated in June of 9 '91, to the best of your knowledge? 10 A. Yes, oumetime in June. 11 Q. Look on the second page, if you would.

   \

12 There is a paragraph near the bottom that states Mr. [_J \- 13 Hairston, the senior vice-president nuclear, had 14 enumerable indicators and apparently direct 15 knowledge that the information presented to him was 16 suspect, if not outright false, before he signed the  ! 17 LER. 18 Tell me what the basis is for your 19 statement that Mr. Hairston had enumerable 20 indicators and what those were. 21 A. Well, he apparently had been told the 22 information that I had provided to Mr. Stringfellow 23 and to Mr. Shipman from my conversations witn them 24 and Aufdenkampe's conversations with me and them. /~5

  , ) 25         Q. And we are agreed that that conversation,

r 1 l 1 i-i l I _ 581 I( )

                 'l      if it.took place, would have concerned theD1anguage                                                   i
                                                                                                                               \

i 2 -before'the incorporationEof the words comprehensivet j2 i- 3 t'est program?' > , t 4 A.- I believe;that's' correct. > f 5 Q. What'were the other enumerable-  ; 2 6 indicators? l 7 A. I'm'sure that"the'discussi*ons'thatLI"had 8 with'Mr. Stringfellow and Mr. Shipman,1we talked' { d 4

                                                                                                               ,              s

! 9-e aboutza number of specifics. Weitalked.aboutcthe ~! I 10 i. COA and we. talked about'the dates and7timesEof the-  ! i '11 failbres.

1 1

12 We talked-about this havingLbeen l 13 presented to Ebneter already. So I am sure that Mr. i ll~  ; } 14 Stringfellow and/or Shipman went down and relayed i j 15 that same information to Mr. Hairston. i

16. Mr. Hairston obviously,nIrbelieve that.

. 17 communication linked up when it occurred because Mr. i-j 18 Hairston came.back on to'the call, call A. He 4

19 starts asking about trips.

d j 20 So the communication link occurred.to him I. f 21 and he knew that before the LER was signed, That's [ 1-1 22 where he should have gotten his' direct knowledge , L; i 23 from. In addition, the word came back'to.the site 2 i , 24 that McCoy, Hairston, and' Mcdonald believed that the

             )25        April 9th statement was false.

1' , i b,

 ,, .__           _        _ _ _           _ _ _ _ _ ~ . - - -

i , l i ! j 1 582 l (")Y (_ 1 Since on call A, the managers got 2 together and specifically stated Bockhold and McCoy, 1 3 McCoy stated you ought to use the same thing that l l l l ' l 4 you used in your presentation, George. . ! 5 So right then and there it was decided to i 6 use the same thing that had been in the COA. Mr. Hairston has since then stated that he considers 7 8 these to be the same. So he knew or should have 9 known that it was false before he signed the LER. l 10 .Q. Were the enumerable indicators and the i 11 apparently direct knowledge all of those items, the l 12 information which may have been provided to him by  ! ii l' 13 Shipman and/or Stringfellow, is that your view? i 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. Any other enumerable indicators or 16 apparently direct knowledge? 17 A. This is speculation on my.part, but I 18 think there is some possibility that lists of diesel 19 starts existed within corporate organization at this-20 point in time.

21 Mr. Cash's list, for example, had been i

i 22 given to Mr. Byrd by this point in time. So I think  ! 23 it's altogether possible that the start list may

24 have been incorporated, but that's a speculation on
 -(O

_) 25- my part. That's another potential source.

t 583 , r's  : I Q l 1 Q. Is that what you have in mind here when' - 2 you were-talking about apparently direct knowledge , i [ 3 or enumerable indicators? A 4 A. No. I beliJve when I wrote this, I was , j 5 referring to the information that should have been 1

!       6   provided.to him by Mr. Stringfellow and Mr.                      ,

f .; 7 Shipman. I.want to add one other thing to that,

i 8 too.  ;

9 I keep, you know, we' keep talking about 10 as,1f the only flow of communication to corporate is i r . < 11 coming from me, and that's not the' case. There was 12 an extensive flow of communication coming from many l .t 13 people on-site to corporate, not just.me. , 14 So Mr. Hairston, for example, and Mr. 4 15 McCoy and all.these people participated in staff 16 meetings, participated in morning calls. i 17 The knoaledge on-site as diesel failures j 18 occurred live in March and so forth, these people 1 19 had some direct knowledge of all these things , 20 because of their direct involvement in the 21 day-to-day site operations. 22 So it's not as if the only source of 23 information that Mr. Hairston or Mr. McCoy or any of 24 these people would have would only have come from me 25 or come from Mr. Aufdenkampe.

l 584

,a l

'w) I 1 Q. Do you have any knowledge that in any of 2 those conferences, there was some sort of running 3 account of numbers of cor.aecutive total starts 4 similar to what you might see at a plant site about 5 number of days without an accident or something like 6 that? 7 A. No, but in their logs, they have logs of 8 specific trips and failures which were the ones that 9 I was telling them about. 10 Q. In their logs being? 11 A. Some of their notes, so forth, Mr. 12 Shipman's notes, Mr. McCoy's notes, you know,.those 13 types of notes. 14 Q. The missing link here, Mr. Mosbaugh, is 15 whether they had some reason to believe that the 16 number of starts after those failures weren't 18 or 17 19, that number. That's what's missing? 18 A. That's not the missing link, because the ) l 19 April 9th correspondence and the drafts of the LER's 20 refer as the starting point to the date of the site I 21 area emergency. 22 These people's mind Eet, if you look at 23 the statements they made, was that they were just 24 going to use the numbers from the April 9th rs k_) 2 5 presentation which never was based on the

l

  /+

585 ( V}- 4 1 comprehensive test' program. 2 Q. But is it_ clear.to'you.that Mr. Hairston, 3 Mr. McCoy' believed that what was being stated was 4 every diesel start since March 20th, 1990 has been 5 consecutive and they now number 18 to 19, is that 6 what you think that they.were saying? i 7 A. They knew what the confirmation of action 8 letter of 4/9 said. They reviewed it and signed 9 it. l 10 They know what it said, and the group of 11 them and the group of them at that point in time i 12 doesn't include Mr. Hairston, but when the group 13 discussed that, Mr. Shipman, Mr. McCoy, Mr. 14 Bockhold, they discussed using the numbers from the-  ! 15 4/9 presentation. 16 They didn't discuss using a set of 17 numbers that only started after the comprehensive 18 test program. { 19 Their directive was to use the numbers 1 20 from the 4/9 presentation, to use the 18 and 19. So 21 what was in their mind was not as you describe. 22 What was in their mind was using the numbers that 23 were part of the 4/9 basis. 24 Q. Let's go back to the 4/9 basis. Do you 25 believe that Mr. Hairston, Mr. McCoy, believed and

i 586 l Ch i I k- 1 understood that the numbers 18 and.19 described 2 every start of the diesel since March 207 l 3 A. That's what it says. t i 4 Q. And that they knew better because they I a 5 also knew there had been failures and that's what 6 the evil was? l 7 A. The 4/9 letter consists of, if I recall, ] 8 two sentences. It'says there has been this many ' 9 starts since the event. So it gives a~beginning l 10 point in time and it has an ending point in time,

                                                                         )

11 there has been this many, (indicating).  !

12 Then it either has a separate sentence or i
   ,) 13  comma, then it says no problems or failures have 1

14 occurre'd during any of these stops. That's the l 15 verbage that's in there and that's the verbage that  ; 16 Mr. Hairston signed out. 1 1 17 Q. So your understanding or your belief is, ! l 18  ! let me just take Mr. McCoy, that Mr. McCoy l

19 understood on April 9th and again on April 19th when i

20 these were submitted, that 18 or 19 starts, those 21 numbers that were utilized, described every start 22 from March 20th unt.1 April 9th, and that they had 23 all been successful and there hadn't been any 24 failures? , wr -

l l

                                                                     .587        !

ps (_/ 1 him to state what Mr. McCoy understood. 1 2 MR. BLAKE: His belief to what Mr. ) 3 McCoy understood. yes.  ! l

4 THE WITNESS
-Well, I speculate that J

4 5 that's what Mr. McCoy thought because I guess i 1 , 6 he reviewed and must have approved of that 4 7 verbage in the 4/9 letter. I think they felt j- 8 that on 4/19 it would be safe to say the same-9 thing because.they knew that well, . i f we had 10- said that before, then there could only have  ; 4 11 been.some new, some additional starts since 12 then.

       ) 13               So I think they felt safe on that, and 14       I think they just kind of shifted themselves 15       back in time to 4/9. When you read the                    l 16       transcript of tape 58, that's what Mr. McCoy                 1 17       says, you ought to use those numbers, 18 and 18       19, 18 and 19 had no relationship to the 4/19 i

19 count, no relationship. J 20 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Now, I think we can 1 21 remove that by just talking now about April 9th, for . 22 example, and what you belief to have been the 23 understandings of the people. 24 Do you think on April 9th that Mr. McCoy { ( 25 was unaware of any problems with the diesel or any

I 588 ') () . 1: . failures with the diesel since April, since March' 2 ~20? On April: 9 was he aware'of any problems with 3 the diesel, any problem starts with the-diesel? j 4 A. On April 9th, I believe Mr. McCoy knew. tor -l 5 should have known that there were problems,and. l 6 failures of the diesel. 3 L 7 Q. .And do you believe,-therefore, thatfhe'

       -8        just~ allowed that language to go in knowing-that

! 9 there-had been problems?  : 10- A. I'm speculating.  ! i 11 Q. 'Yes. fs 12 A. About what.he did. We tried to , (_) 13 investigate that area in the course of discovery and 14 since we were unable to find'out how it got in there j 15 and Mr. McCoy and many others saidLthey coul'dn't 16 identify whoever verified that statement'. i 17 So I' guess,Ifwould say at'some level of. i 18 wrongdoing, Mr. McCoy must have allowed that l 19 statement to be approved without verification, ' 20 perhaps, knowing that it.was uncorrected.

                                                                                                  )

i 21- Q. .As of April 9th, weren't NRC personnel, j 22 wasn't there. common knowledge among' management and l-23 people involved with the diesel that'there had been l 24 some problems associated with diesel after March 20,. 25: after the day of the event, that there had been some

U-  ! 1 f , 589'  ! 1 , subsequent problem: starts?s Wasn't that(common: l

                                                                                                                                                                              -i j                    ^2~        knowledge?L i

} :F A '. .Well,. common knowledge'within. Georgia; i

:4 Power, yeah, I?think it was'commonLknowledge within.

[ i 5: -Georgia Power, with Georgia. Power [ management. '{ il I 6' Q. :But not known:by.NRC personnel?: 1 i 'i l 7- A. It~may have been'known'..by,some1NRC l 1-I i- 8- . personnel. ' i, 1 9, -Q. But'you believe'thatMr. . McCoy and .Mr.: i l  : q 3 i 10 'Bockhold or Mr. Hairston,Jall.of.whom. thought'theyL  !

                                                                                                                                                                              .J i                                                                                                                                                                               ;

1 1- could get away with saying there'hadn't been any, i gs 12 problems since March 20th with the diesel? l

        \/                                                                                                                                                                    ]

i 13 A. I think they were a little worriediabout " l 14 getting away with it. ~I think that's why they made- > } 15 some contact with the NRC and"tried'to get:the2 NRC ' i 4 3 16 somewhat in bed with them and.maybe' told'them, you {i 17 know, well, there were some problems when1we first - j 18 were priming the lines and'some of that kind ofL $- 19 discussion, but not any complete and accurate l

;                  20        discussion.

l- 21 Q. But you.think that these individuals ]' 22 believed that the number.18 and-19 represented 'he- t 23 total number of starts since March 20?

24 A.- A ., of --

l-i 25 Q. As of April 9th. i

 , , , . ,    --,-         . _ . .      , . , _ . .          , _ , , _ . .          ...,:.:...., , , , .     .._ __              . . . . . . .._,....._.......L.,,.,_.,.._

590 0 1. A. .That's what they signed out. That's'what'

                         -2   -the COA that they signed out     --

3- Q. And they went forward with thatisame

4. belief or with'that same understanding on April 5 19th?

6 .A. Yeah, believing that there.had been some 7 .more, but.they felt safe saying.the's'amelthing.thatl 8 they had said-before. At that point in time theyf 9L had submitted the 4/9' letter. 10 They had made the; verbal-presentation 11 with the 18 and 19 numbers to NRC. The NRC had 12 those numbers in their head. That was what was 13 before them, and they felt safe on the 1 9 t h :: o f 14 . showing them the same numbers again and that would 15 not raise eyebrows particularly, i l 16 Q. And do you just totally dismiss'the-17 assertions, I will use for your benefit, assertions 18 by any of these people that the introductionLof-the-19 term following the comprehensive test-program.was-

                   .20        meant to describe a period of timeiafter March.:20 21       and not until which the start or the count of 22       successful starts was meant.to' occur?

23- A. Yes. l l 24 Q. You-just totally dismiss that? 25 A. I dismiss that assertion because in those u l l

l l 5 9 1'

 ./ ~
 \_)T   1-
           -very same people that testified under oath to us 2   that they intended to convey the same information.

3 I will further add that those people have had great 4 difficulty in defining, since they can't' define the 5 term comprehensive test program, how can they have 6 had this understanding of how ic made any 7 difference. , 8 Q. I guess you would agree with me that it's 9 a big difference between.your view of why they ,- 10 inserted it and their not having an adequate or j 11 common understanding of what the words meant when 12 they did insert it? There is quite a difference I l 13 between those two theories or explanations for what l l 14 they were doing, isn't there? 15 A. That's why I said in my mind, there is l 16 not such a fine line, there is not such a black and 17 white difference between careless disregard and willfulness because the choice of something to one 18 19 person can appear to be careless disregard, but that 20 choice may have been-intentional. 21 Q. Clearly under your theory, though, there 22 was an evil intent by the insertion of the language? 23 A. There was an intent of wrongdoing. 24 Q. Presumably we could agree that wrongdoing ' (~h (_) 25 is evil and, therefore, it's probably an evil l

i f

592 d
      -1      intent?

f

2. MR. KOHN: We can' agree;on.this side' .

i 3 Are we in agreement with that?~  ! 4 MR. BLAKE: That intended wrongdoing isj l

                                                                                                                                    'i 5                    avil?                                                                                                  j
                                                                                                                                   -1
6 MR. KOHN: Yes.  !

I

7. (Discussion ensued.off;the record.). 1 i

8 Q. (ByLMr. Blake)l Turn to page.eight, Mr. j 9 Mosbaugh.. a ji 10 A. (Witness' complies with the. request?of; i I

    .11       counsel'.)

12 l Q. -At the top of.page eightithere-is the .j 13' statement Mr. Mosbaugh left'with the underst'anding 14 that t h e f a l s e s t a t e m e n t w o u l d l b e s t r u c k ~.: This 15 refers to what period of time?  ! 16 A. After I told Mr. . Shipman;about the' 17 certain dates and times of failures, Mr.: Shipman 18 made a comment that he thought'he just needed.to get - 19 this statement stricken. I think those were his 20 words, and maybe it would be best' if we'look at i tape

                                                                                  ~

21 57. transcript.

   '22                       Q.             The period            --

23 R j A. But he talks about getting the statement. 24 stricken, and asked me if-I think my.information is j 25- good and I tell him that it's.the best information

   .   . .         .r.~_,      . - - - - . . .                 -            .-   . . - -     .                     -.       .      -      -_

l - 4 I 593-l 1- .t h e r e .-i s , and'I believ'e'-he makes another' comment 0 1 2- about getting;those statements' stricken. ~! 1

j. .3 So.I'm leftEwith theLimpression that
                                                                                                                                              .t 4     'that's the action'that's going on.:                                                                                       i i

j 5 Q. So~the period of time that . you '.re . .i 11 6 l 3 referring to1here is at,the.end offyour conversationL  ; { 7 on April 19th with Mr.' Shipman'in which you- , 4 i i' 8 discussed your, view of whether or not the LER draft.

j. 9 was accurate? 'I 10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And you, at,the,end:of that conversation L 12 j with Mr. Shipman, left that conversation with the t 13 understanding that what you regarded as affalse  ;

                                                                                                                                              .\
14 statement would be stricken or struck?

[ 15 A. Yes. l 1 i

16 Q. And did you subsequently come to <

4 17 understand on April 19th that thatiwould not occur?- l' 18 A. Yeah. On call A, the conversation l 19 occurred where they were rephrasing that section-

20 instead of striking.it, and I heard'Mr. McCoy state 4

k 21 .how they wanted to say the same, use the.same 'l

I I

22 j information that you used.in your, to Bockhold,-' that  ; i

23 you used in your April 9th presentation.

J l 24 So it indicated'to me at that~ point that

           - 25       they were keeping it in and then Mr. Stringfellow s

i )  ! 3

!                                                                                                                                               I i

E l T l -- . _ -- - -- -- -- - - - - - - -- ~~ ~ ' " ~ ' " * " ~ ~ ~ ^

                                               . _ .                  =                   . ..        .       .

594 i O1 appeared to be taking that down as they were'saying l i

2. it. Then.later on, Mr. Shipman read'the final  :

i 3- verbage.to me.at some' point on call B. - 4 Q. In the course of call'.A when you i

                    .5  understood them, that it was no longer likely to-be                                                                            :

l 6 the case that the information would be stricken or 7 struck, did it occur to you to speak up at that- , 8 point when Mr.'McCoy was on the phone, when Mr. ' 9' Hairston was on the phone,'when all these people'who l 10- may or may not have received the information.were on-i 11 the phone? l 12 A. Well, it was --

                                                                                                                                                         .l
13. Q. And say to them exactly'what you had 14 tried to provide indirectl'y? Did that occur to you, 15 that thought?

16 A. It didn't occur to me because what 17 appeared to me to be happening is Mr. McCoy.and Mr. 18 Bockhold and Mr. Shipman were saying let's tell the.  ; 19 NRC the same thing we told them before,.let's use 20 the numbers that you had in your 4/9 presentation; 21 and when they said that, they had all atLthat point 22 acknowledged or the word had'already come back to me l that .they had acknowledged the'4/9 presentation was-23  ! i 24 false. 25' ( Mr. Shipman had~ acknowledged that. Mr.

  ,,w  , , , . , .      ,-~r, -

a 1,~,., - e , - , , , , , , . . - . . , - . . , . ,n .--n,, ,--.u, ,n-~w.-, - , ,

1 ^ 595 O V 1 Stringfellow had acknowledged that. It had come 2 back to'me that Mr.- McCoy,.Mr. Hairston, and Mr. 3 Mcdonald believed that to be true.  ; 4 At that later time on call A when they; 5 stated let's use, you ought to use'those numbers,. 6 George, you know, you ought to use the numbers from , 7 the 4/9 presentation, at that point it appeared ,to- ", 8 me that they were knowingly going to put the same , 9 information.back in as they knew at that point had ' 10 been incorrect in the 4/9 ~ presentation. 5 11 Q. And so it wasn't worthwhile to. point out i 12 to them to insure that they had the information that 13 you thought it was false? 14 A. These were the top people in the company. 15 Q. What did you regard your role as on that 16 call?  ? t 17 A. I wasn't supposed to be on that call. } 18 Q. Why is that? 19 A. Well, I didn't know that call was going 20 to take place. I stumbled into that call, and I had 21 been sent off to do something else at that point in 22 time. 23 Q. You had been sent off to do that? 24 A. I had been sent off to get an interview 25 with a blue collar worker that didn't work for me, l

l l 596 f'S U 1 to get an interview between him and Mr. Hairston. l 2 Q. And you opted not to do that but rather 3 to participate in this call? 4 A. No, not at all. That was what I was sent 5 off to do, and I did that. At the time I did that, 6 this other call was simultaneously occurring. I 7 guess I finished my task.a little early, earlier

  • l 8 than the point in time that that other call had 9 finished.

10 So since I was a floor below in the l 11 building in Mr. Swartzwelder's office, and since Mr. 12 Aufdenkampe's office, who was a friend of mine, had l

  /~~                                                                                         !

k%) 13 been a longer term friend of mine, his office was on 14 the floor above, I just stopped by Mr. Aufdenkampe's 15 office. 16 What I discovered was this call was ~in 17 progress. 18 Q. Did you regard it somehow as, your role, i l l 19 being inappropriate, that is, it could have been 20 improper for you to have spoken up? 21 A. Mr. Shipman knew that call was going to i ! 22 occur, and I believe this was a planned call, and I 23 hadn't been informed of it. Like I said, I kind of 24 stumbled into it. l- , y_) 2 5 Q. Are you implying that you were being cut l

  ~,    .
                                                                                                     'I i

(' 597 i

           .1-        out of it?.      You had been sent off to do another 2         chore and then they arranged this call?                                          ;

[ 3 A. I'm speculating ~about that,-but that is a:  ! 4 lpossible speculation. 1 i i 5- Q. And-Mr. Shipman might have.been the; e

                                                                                                     .r 6         instigator of this attempt to' cut you1out ofithis                               l t

7 call? , t 1 8 A. Mr. Shipman is'the person'that gave me 9 the.. assignment ~to' arrange an interview withla-blue

         -10          collar plant equipment operator.                       Equipment 11                                                                                          .,

operators.didn't work'for me. They weren't people I. j 12 normallyfwould interface with, but I wentfoff to do O 13 this task. i 14 Q. Did it strike you as strange at the time? 15 A. Yes, I did. 16 Q. And did you say so to him?. I 17 A. No. I said yes, sir, I will-do,theibest 18 I can do. 19 Q. Did you have it in your mind at'that. 20 point that you might.be being sent off to do this 21 while something'else went on. 22 A. No , I didn't. I did believe it was 23 strange that these people are union people, there' 24 was a possibility-I would have to contact them at (j25 .home. They didn't work for me. They probably

l I l i 598 l l 1 wouldn't have-known me from Adam. They worked for , 1

2 Skip Kitchens.

. 3 They worked for Mr. Swartzwelder, Mr. Y < 4 Cash, and down the operations chain, not.the support l 5 side of the house. I-thought it was. strange, but I l

6 went out to do what I was requested to do.

! 7 Q. And in the course of this call when the i r 4- 8 comprehensive test program language was introduced, ' 9 what was your_ view after the introduction of-that g 10 language about the potential accuracy of the LER l 11 with that language inserted? , 12 A. Well, by the time that language was  ! j 13 introduced, the' people on the call had. stated their i j 14 intent. I could tell from the statements on the i 15 call the intent of what the people, how the people 16 were wording it. i s

17 They were wording it to be the same as 18 the~4/9 letter. That's consistent with what we have I i

19 heard as of this date, but from strictly a verbage

20 standpoint and just looking at the words, the words l 4

$- 21 added a new undefined point, and so to me looking ]

22 only-at the words and not at what the people were 23 intending, I needed to define what the-comprehensive
- 24 test program was.

25 Q. Is it fair to say that it raised a doubt I l

  - - _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -                        .-        .                 _ - . .       ~. _ _ . . . .

e u , I 7 599 1:

j. .1 -in'your mindJabout-whether or'not this might'not f -)

l =2' have' cured the; problem?. ) l l 31 A. I guess T. . would say that1at that point'in j

                       .4          ' time,.I guess I wasn't smart enough or ce3nizant r                                                                                                     -
                                                                                                                         -                                                      i
5 enough to understand;all t h e f p o s s i b l e. r a m i f i c a t i o n s_- j r
6. ' of why ITwas added and the way I view.it now~. .

I i '! [r 7 I'just looked'at it from~the verbage [ 8 standpoint, and I needed to find the comprehensive y 4 l { 9 test program. So my' thoughts.at.that point turned { { 10 0 to that definition. My subsequent; conversations 11 afterothat are focussed on-that definition. I 12 Q. So'is it. fair so say that' the 4

                    - 13           introdoction of'that language' raised.'a doubtnin;your                                                                                       ;

14 mind-whether or not it' cured the~ problem? 15 A. The introduction of that.languaga kept me

l. -

i j 16 from being able to, looking only atithe words,.the j 17 verbage, it kept:me from being ableftoLprove it was l J . 18 false. .; 1 < 1 19 Q. If the words hadn't been introduced, if )

.                                                                                                                                                                             ^\

q 20 they intended to just cp> forward with the language j' . 21 as you saw it in the. draft without-the introduction 4 22 of that language, would you have spoken up? ] 23 MR. KOHN: I' object. It calls for-1 24 speculaticn, but the witness;may answer. 25 THE WITNESS: I guess the reason why-I 2 ~ I y J.-. y v. 9 .._y_m.+,mp ..77_e..g,e**aFV m v 7 -'v 'r VvW'yry

  .   -     -     .    . - . - ~                      .       .   .             . . .

600 j

  .cn                                                                                                :

1- didn't speak up was because I. observed the i 2 intent of the people to be promulgating 1a l 3 3 known false statement, and these were people  ! 4 a good number of levels higher than me in the i 5 organization. 5

         .6                      If the wording hadn't been changed and                             l i

7 I had the perception that the intent was to

8 promulgate a false statement, I don't believe 9 I would'have spoken up in those circumstances  !

l 10 probably either just because I guess it would [ 11 have been a feel of intimidation'given the  : 12 circumstances. 13 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Is it your view'that as 14 of April 19th, the people in corporate' knew that h l 15 there were not 18 or 19 successful,1 consecutive 16 successful starts after the failures which you had  ! l 17 pointed out, that is, they knew better than that? i l 18 A. Will you ask that question again. 19 Q. I will try to do it in some bites, so 20 there is no doubt. You point out to' Shipman that 21 there are some failures-that occurred.and you point 22 out the dates, and you believe that Shipman went on , 23 and; pointed out the same information, all of it, to I ! { l 24 Hairston? ! (f%)- 25 A. And/or Stringfellow. L i I- l l l l h- , . . . . . . . -- ., -

l i $ t i  ! 601 l 1 'Q. Shipman and/or Stringfellow-pointed.this f

                                                                                       -?

2 information and all of this informationiout-to I

                                                                                       ,i j'        ,3  Hairston. So, therefore, you believe_that Hairston                       [

l 4 was aware that there were a couple of' failures, two- l 1 5 failures.which occurred on the dates.which~you had- l I l j-6 specified? j

                                                                                         \

j' 7 A. And that Hairston knew'at that' point in 8 time that a statement-like the'one in the 4/9 9 presentation was a1 false statement-becauss of there , 10 not being 18 cnr 19 consecutive starts. 2 i j 11 Q.- That's my impression. You believe that

  • 1 12 Hairston realized on. April 19th'that there were not O 13
                                       ~

18 or 19 starts after those couple of failures, i 1 14 assuming that they were identified to him and the 15 dates of them by Shipman and/or Stringfellow? 3

      ' 16          A. That there wasn't an'18 or 19 consecutive 17   string between 3/20 and that letter date, '4/9.

18 Q. Yes, you believe that? 19 A. I believe that. 4 20 Q. That there weren't, in other words, 18 or- l 21 19 starts after failures which could have been 22 included in whatever his understanding was of.the 23 comprehensive test program? ' i 24 A. Now you're throwing comprehensive test 25 program in. '

                                                           '602 1       Q. I am, and I mean it to be the same i

2 question, but I-will repeat it again.  ; i 3 You believe that as of April 19th, Mr.  ; 4 Hairston knew, realized, knew that there weren't 18 5 or 19 consecutive successful starts after the couple 6 of failures, assuming that he was apprised of the 7 couple of failures which you had been talking to , 8 Shipman and Stringfellow about? 9 A. I hate to intercede, but you have used 10 the term successful starts again which is not a term 11 used in any of this correspondence. 12 Q. Well, what was the terminology? O) (- 13 A. I don't want that to muck up our ' 14 communication. 15 Q. I didn't intend that it muck up our , 16 communication. 17- A. I believe that Hairston knew that there 1 18 was not a string of 18 or 19 consecutive starts 19 between 3/20 and 4/9. 20 Q. At any point in time? 21 A. At any -- 22 Q. During that interval. 23 A. At any point in time in that interval. 24 Q. That he knew that there weren't? l f~% ( 23 A. Right, and that knowledge is how and why l 1

4 603  !

       }/ .'

t 1 he knew or believed that.the 4/9 letter contained.'a  ! 2 material false' statement. l 4 3 Q. And.he obtained that knowledge on the i i 3 ~ 4' 19th, you believe, by virtue of your having passed t ,._ 5 your information on'to Stringfellow and. Shipman? 6 A. I couldn't say when he first obtained it, , ! 7 but I believe that the communication camel in first [ i 8 on the 19th from Stringfellow and Shipman. i 9 Q. And if I ask the same question about-Mr. 10 McCoy, would I have the same answer? 5

               'll         A. I would.say the same.

12 Q. That is, that he realized that there 13 weren't 18 or 19 consecutive starts in the. interval  ;

14 af time or any period, any. portion of the interval '
15. of time between March.20, and April 9th? '

16 A. Yes. , 17 Q. And the same thing would be true.of Mr. l $ 18 Bockhold? i 1  ; f 19 A. The word came back about McCoy, Hairston, t l 4 20 and Mcdonald. So that's the scope of people that I 21 ascribe that to. 22 Q. What about Shipman, where do you put him? l 23 A. I think Shipman, yeah, the same thing 24 because I would say that he and Stringfellow are the

            )25       same because I'm saying that's how that information 4

2 604 m

  -     1    got to the other three, t

2 MR. KOHN: Is this a reasonable-time  ; i 3 for a short break? 4 MR. BLAKE: Let me just finish'up'this 5 document. 6 Q. (By Mr. Blake) On the same page, page 1 7 eight, in the last paragraph of text at the bottom, 8 it appears that the first sentence, Allen Mosbaugh 9 arrived' late for the 4/19/90 PRB and missed _the i

10 discussion of LER 90-06 and, as such, did not vote 4

11 on it. Do you still believe that to be an accurate ' 12 statement? '

 /~N

(_) 13 A. 'I abstained from voting; yes. r 14 Q. Were you present for the discussion of 15 the LER? 16 A. No. I came in late on it. I came in 17 sometime, I think part'of a discussion was going on, 18 but I arrived and I don't know if I arrived in the 19 middle of it or in what portion of it I arrived but 20 I missed the beginning of it or some earlier-portion 21 of it and because I was not there for the discussion 22- and I had not done a review of it, I felt 23 uncomfortable voting on'it and I abstained from 24 voting. ()25 Q. There had been a prior PRB meeting in

1 605 {

 .I(I                     I which a' draft of,this LER'was discussed on'.the day.                               -

j 1 " I

2. :before?

li 3 A. I believe there had'been a PRB meeting on- ' i

                         .4:           the~18th in which an earlier draft was reviewed.                              ,

i i 5 Q. And'was,there a~-vote at that meeting in-  ; 6 which you voted to. accept it?' I 4 7 - A. I don't know'if there was a vote at'that ' 8 meeting or if we just took1 comments at that-9 meeting. I don't recall.ifthere wasTa vote. The i 10 PRB meeting. minutes would.best reflect if a vote was l 11' taken at that meeting. l 12 l /~h I recall'a discussion at the'early- I f~\ 7 13 meeting, and I recall individuals making comments:on j 14 it. PRB practice would be to review something and 15 if it was felt that the comments were. minimal, a-16 document might be approved with comments.and if-the ' 17 comments were more extensive, then it would just be 18 ' brought back to the PRB. I remember comments being 19 made on the 18th. 20 Q. And in the PRB meeting on the-19th when 21 you walked into it, this was the subject of 22 discussion, the LER? 23 A. Reviewing that portion of the tape, I 24 think, would best indicate that. My independent 25 knowledge is that when I walked in, I walked in in {'

l i l l 606 \ (^. l 1 l L-) i 1 the middle of discussion. l 2 Q. Do you recall any of the other topics 3 that were on the PRB meeting agenda on April 19? l 4 A. From independent recollection? ! 5 Q. Yes. 6 A. No, I don't have independent recollection i 7 of other topics. I believe there would have been, I 8 mean there would have been. A review of transcript 9 58, I think, would allow us to see what topics were l 10 discussed when I was there. i l 11 Q. Do you recall that there were any topics

 ,-   12  before the PRB at that point that were more l

l ('~/ i 13 important to you than the LER and its accuracy? ! 14 A. This probably was the most important 15 document we were reviewing at that time. 16 Q. So why was it that you didn't take a role 17 in the discussion on the LER and its accuracy? l 18 A. Well, I believe there was an action item 1 i 19 on the table or as part of the PRB to be looking at  ! l 20 the start count statement because there had been an 21 evolution of that. 1 ! 22 Mr. Aufdenkampe and his group, who worked 1 l 1 23 for me, were working on that. I had been taking a i t 24 role because you have to remember the LER at that k%) 25 point in time is essentially due. So the LER, the l 1 i {

i 607 i (

 \/   1~ - way an LER is normally processed is it's hatched by i      2'   .the site'in the first two weeks of the 30 days, and i

3 this is just a. general rule, it's handled by [ 4 corporate in the latter period of time. . 5 This transfer of responsibility occurs l 6 from the alte to corporate and obviously at the end I 7 of the 30 days, the responsibility has to be with 8 corporate because only corporate is going to sign it 9 out or in the last day or two of this 30-day  ; 10 period. l 11 I was taking an active role in the review l l 12 of this because on the 18th and 19th, I was involved

 .C 13 l (         in these calls with the corporate people about the L

l 14 start count. 15 Q. When did your arrival at the PRB meeting [ 16 take place relative to your conversation with Mr.  ! 17 Shipman, before, after? 18 A. The transcripts of the day obviously will i 19 document that. I think my independent recollection , 20 is that the PRB meeting on the 19th occurred'before l 21 my conversation with Mr. Shipman, but to be sure, I  ! ' 22 would want to look at a transcript, the transcript i l { 23 sections. I think that's my independent 24 recollection. ()25 Q. But you have indicated this was the I

l 608 l l() 1 single, this was a huge item to you, this might have.  ! 2 been the single largest item that the-PRB was i 3 considering at that point. . 4 A. I think this was probably the most. , i 5 important item on the agenda. f 6 Q. And do you recall being asked whether or 7 not you wanted to vote and declining?  ; 8 A. I think somebody stated to me something-  ; i 9 like, you know, because I arrived in the middle of  ! 10 it, do you'want to vote and I said something like I i 11 probably should abstain. So that's the way it was .

       'M   conducted.                                                       ;

1 j 13 Q. Was your basis ~for abstaining that you 14 had not been a participant in all the conversation? t l 15 A. That was part of my basis, and the other 16 part of my basis is that I just, my recollection is 17 that just prior to this PRB meeting I was attending 18 a quality assurance audit exit on the site area l 19 emergency, which was another very important 20 meeting. 1 ! 21. The quality assurance department was ! 22 issuing its report and findings on the site area l 23 emergency. I believe I was in that meeting before 24 this, and I had not had adequate time to review this- ! O ft j 25 latest draft of the LER and had not participated in

m . - _ _ _._._ _ _ . _ _ . _. -- . .. _ . _ . . ~ . .. . ( -

                                                                "4

_- -rl .j j i

                                                                                                                                                                                .i-l609                            '

0 * < 1 V + Ll~ ' the F f ull'i PRB :Ldiscussi'on, and;therefwere'La2 number'of-

                                                                                                                                                                       ;'    .:i
                  !2.

other.: issues in y t.his - LER . I.guesshitlwas/eight  : 3 pages'long., .

                                                                                                                                                                                 .f IL.was-l working-and continued lto: work withi 4-

{ [ , 5- .my staff.and with the corporate 4staffTabouti.thei a 6> - start' count numbers duringLthe; rest: of.the x day.

                                                                                                                                                                              -]
                 ~7                             .So the rest of-thel-members 1of:the board 5 2
                                                                                                                                                                                .i
                                                                                                                                                                               ..{
                 .8 who had'been'there-for.'.the meeting, whichfincluded,;                                                                                              ?!

9 I;believe[ Mr -Aufdenkampe',1were more"than capable l

              '10 '       of ~ reviewing the.LER.                                                                                                                             -f
             ' 11 i

Q. 'Did~the-LER thatLthe-PRB:reviewedJthat-

                                                                                                                ~
                                                                    ~                                                                                            '

12 day' include the language.which'you believe toLbe i O 13 1 iI false,,which you shortly:before or shortly afterlhad' '

             -14          talked with Bill?ShipmanLaboutswho;would be; carrying l               15        ~ on to George Hairstonsabout, wasL this.the.2same                                                                                                       1 j-              16         language?

L. 17 A. From that day on the 19th, I believe that l 18 that LER contains language like since the event. I t 19 think it contains'the 20 times each statement and: 20 yes, I believe that's the same language that after 21~ that meeting, Mr. Aufdenkampe and I called-Mr. 22 Stringfellow and later Mr. Shipman.about. 23 Let me add one other thing. I believe

           ~

24 the vote on that day also included comments about  ; 25; that section. So I believe the way the PRB works,

                                                                                                                                                                                    )

610 1 approval with comments, I believe it was voted on 2 and. approved with a comment to do further review or 3 verification of the diesel start count phrases. I 4 believe it was approved with comments. 5 Q. The LER included language which you felt 6 so strongly was false that you subsequently right 7 after that and went and-talked with B'ill Shipman 8 about it, urged that it be carried on to the highest 9 levels of management, but you remained mute in the' 10 PRB meeting and elected not to vote on it? 11 A. That language, if I recall, it was 12 approved with comments. So the completion of the O 13 approval was the resolution of that portion of the 14 language. 15 Q. So you were content not to say anything 16 to the group, the PRB group, about your views 17 because you understood that they were_ proving it 18 only if it was subsequently amended or subsequently 19 subject to a check? 20 A. I didn't know the extent of the 21 conversation and discussion that had occurred before 22 I came into the meeting. 23 This may well have all been discussed in 24 the meeting. Since I wasn't there for that and ) ('  ! ( 25 since I didn't participate in discussion of other

i l l ! l j 611 ' . /"%  :

  ~

1L pages and'other areas, I felt it was not-appropriate 2 to.-vote on it. I proceeded, out of the meeting,~to ' , 3 continue to work on the accuracy of those. sections  ! 1 4 with Mr. Aufdenkampe. 5 Q. Was.it your view that.the discussion ' l-l, 6 which you had missed might well haveJanswered i 7 questions that you had about the accuracy of the

  • 8 language, that's why these individuals --

l 9 A. I.didn't know what was discussed while'I 1 10 was gone. I didn't need to take all the PRB 11 members' time to bring me up to' speed.- 12 The PRB works as a body and only a quorum i [(_/) 13 is required to vote-and approve and.the PRB members i l 14 are all qualified members and I believe Mr. 15 Aufdenkampe, I believe Mr. Aufdenkampe was'present-16 at the PRB who was my direct report ~that was working 17 on this for me through his NSAC department. l 18 Q. I can understand the parlimentary 19 approach and your sensitivity about taking people's 20 times on potentially on less important items, but on 21 this one -- l 22 A. Well, Mr. Blake, I think it would have 1 23 been inappropriate for me to vote on a document that 24 I did not feel I had thoroughly' reviewed and to vote ()25 on a document that I had not participated in the 1

l 612 1 discussion. I believe'that is what would have been .I 2 inappropriate. i 3 Q. And what I'm really asking was did.it l 4~ occur to you at that. time to saynhey, look, I think t 5 this may have a material false statement in it. 6 This might be wholly inaccurate. Can somebody tell 7 me why you are content with this language? , 8 A. 'And that's exactly what Mr. Aufdenkampe - 9 and I did within a fairly short period of time to-l 10- the corporate people that had responsibility at'that. 11 point in time for finalizing the LER. -; 12 Q. Did it occur to youf t o say that to your i O 13 peers, your-bretheren in the PRB? i i 14 A. No, it didn't, and I.believe, like I ' 15 stated earlie.r, that it was a-comment that was part 16 of the approval to go do that after the meeting. 1 l 17 MR. BLAKE: Let's take a break. 18 (A recess was taken.) l 19 MR. BARTH: At the last prehearing 20 conference, your brother stated'that you 21 intended to file a comment on the licensee's 22 response to the NOV. Do you still intend to 23 and, if so, can you give us some idea of when 24 to expect it? 25 MR. KOHN: Yes, we intend to. I have l l

                            . ~ _ - . . r.        ~ . - .     .                      . . _ _ _                . _.-    < . _ . ~ , _ ~ . - .
   .. js E                                                                              '

613? , O

   ;                             t
                     ;l                     notifigured out what1our. schedule'was..                                            '

2$ MR. BARTH:. Withoutflookingyat.our" >  ;! 3

                                                                         ~
                                        - legal authority to examineLit,- 'since1I,have-i 4                     notitold you that,:we.do want ~ to look at~this?                                                  '(

1

l 5- thing andLpay close. attention'ito-it'.

J 6- RMR . KOHN:. Once we finish up with' q 7 discovery'here, we'will be 1 ableito. focus'our' t 8- attention ( . i

                     ;9                                                                                   '
                                                   'S o: that should.be at the end of today.-                                      ,

10- Is there'a'particularitime line'that was I 11- better suited for.the NRC? Obviously;the l l 12 . sooner the better. .;

                  ~13                              MR.;BARTH:-           People.are~reviewingithe 14-                    licensee's response now and as soon-as they.

i 15 get everything.they'needJto review',.the  ! I  : 16 faster it's going to go. ' 17 MR. BLAKE: I have heard thatJthe NRC-18 is likely.to beat their. deadline and'mayJ bel 19 done next week. So you might.want to get it

                                                                                                                ~

20 in, take that into account'. 21 MR. KOHN: You couldn't say that.with a. 22 straight face, though, Ernie. 23 (Discussion ensued off the record.) L l 24 Q. (By Mr. Blake) 'Okay, Mr..Mosbaugh, 'let's ( -25 shift, if we can, to your response to Georgia-t - . + . , . , , - . . . . . . ~ .

                                                                             . .--.. .--:......~ . . . ....-.-.~:,..-...

1 614. ["T

 - (,)                                                                          l I

1 Power's First Request for Documents'which you i l 2 provided on June 2nd of '93.  ! 3 Let me provide you with a copy both of 4 the interrogatories and the response. If we could l t 5 mark this as Exhibit 13 which is comprised of two 6 documents, actually, Georgia Power Company's first 7 set of interrogatories to Allen L. Mosbaugh served 8 on the 30th of April 1993.  ! 9 (Mosbaugh Exhibit DG-13A was marked 10 ' for identification.) 11 MR. BLAKE: And Intervenor's Response 12 to the First Request for Documents by Georgia. , 13 Power Company which I believe to have been 14 dated June 2nd, 1993. 15 (Mosbaugh Exhibit DG-13B was marked 16 for identification.)  ! 17 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, let me 18 direct your attention to page 21 of your response. 1 l i 19 Read, if you would, the first paragraph.under number 20 four, submission of false information in the cover 21 letcer accompanying the revision to the LER. Are 22 you on page 21? 23 A. I was hoping I could look at the question 24 and get reoriented here. 25 MR. KOHN: What page?

  , ._ ._ . . . . ~ , - . . _ . . .       -

3-i 1-f

4 e .
I t.

615' 1; MRV BLAKE: Page121. [ '2 MR. KOHN:- 'I think that'sfa1 l f 3 ~ subsection'. 'I don't:think-that'stactually.a i '4^ response.

q i 5 MR'. BLAKE:- ' T h i s .i s h w i t h i n i t h e.-~r e s p o n s e . j 3

5 6 to 12.

                                                                                                                  ~

f I 7 ' MR.'KOHN: Okay.- We werefreading , ,: .8 interrogatory number four.  ! { . . c .  :\ l :9 THE WITNESS: I amforientedLin_the:  ; l [ 10 document. - l 'l

- lin Q. (By Mr. Blake)- Have.you, read that

[

             - 12              paragraph, the one that begins?on June 129f,.1990?                                                                                      !

11 13 A. No, let-me read.it'. All-right. l P 14 Q. Is it your view today that:that, do you. !. ] i .,

                 ' 5 still hold that view,today asiindicateds in that                                                                                       !

j 16 paragraph? I 4 ). 17 A. Yes. '!' j 18 Q. And what is your basis for. believing that 4 .i i 19 Mr. Hairston knew that the cover letter contained j l 20 false information concerning the cause of the error? E 2; 21 A' . I believe'it was common-knowledge,- I i ~

                                                                                                                                                                        )
22 won't say common knowledge but since Mr. Hairston, 1

.i

23 in my belief, was involved, in.the submission of the 1

24 false statement in.the original LER, then Mr. 25- Hairston should have known what the error was; .yet

616 </T

(_J

1 it seems to me that the error here was attributed to i 2 record keeping practices.  ; 3 In addition,-I was starting to say that I I 4 think it was common. knowledge that as far as Mr. 5 Hairston and personnel in corporate was concerned,. l 6 'that there was a personnel error, at least'this was , 7 part of what they appeared to be aware.of, I'm nob I 8 saying that was the cause of the errors in the LER l j 9 or the COA, but that was being bantered about as a , f 10 1 cause at the same time. . 11 This document states that'the reason for i g-) 12 the error was record keeping. practices. . I had i \_) 13 contested that at the time Mr. Hairston-had been , 14 involved with this LER and because of his firsthand. 15 involvement, he should have known better. He should 16 have known that record keeping practices were not 4 17 the cause. ] 18 Q. The fact that you were contesting Mr. 19 Hairston's or anyone else's view of what the cause 20 of error was wouldn't make it an intentional or 21 knowing false statement or false information, would 22 it? 23 A. I believe that his direct: -- he had. 24 direct involvement in this LER. He was one of the

  \_  25 people that I believe-was aware that the start count

l l j- ~617. [ 1~ that they'put in it Lwas false before it'went'out, ], 2 and.I think it's consistent'with my~ belief that the l

                                                                             .i 3         initial LER was intentionally put out false; that              ]
j. 4 Mr. Hairston ascribing the cause in-the. revision I t

i

5 that he put out to record keeping practices .
                                                                                 ?

! 6 indicates that he should have known that that was j 7 not the correct cause._  ! i  : i

  • j 8 Q. If you accept for the moment that Mr.
9 Hairston, on April 19th, did not know that the i

. i 10 statementEthey were making was false --

11 MR. KOHN
Of course, we don't accept i -

j - 12 that, but for.your question, we.wil17-- l\- 13 MR. BLAKE: I p sus'ect you willLagree i I I 14 with me that there is some record evidence to R ! 15 support that. j 2 1 16 MR. KOHN: Not from my position, there 17 isn't, but go ahead. i j 18 Q. (By Mr. Blake) If you accept that Mr. 19 Hairston did not realize on April 19th, did not 20 intend to put out false information in the LER, did j 21 not know that he was, then could you accept that the 4 j 22 cause might have been improper record keeping rather i 23 than personnel error or whatever you believe to be ,

                                                                                 )

24 the proper cause? ) 25 A. No, I don't accept that record keeping 4 l

i i 618 l CE) l 1 practices could under any circumstance be the cause , ! 2 of the error in the LER or its predecessor; no, I l i l 3 don't. l 4 I can't accept record keeping practices. i 5 'You're asking me to speculate starting from a l 6 starting point that I don't believe. So this  ; i 7 logical process gets fairly twisted. I don't 8 believe record keeping practices played any  ! 9 'significant role in the errors that occurred. 10 Q. Do you understand the' basis for Georgia , 11 Power's having said that record keeping practices i l 12 was the root cause of this problem?- Do you  ! 13 understand what they have art'iculated as the root l 14 cause and why? l ! 15 A. I understand what they have articulated  ; 16 and do not agree with it because they continue to. ' 17 point out record keeping practices associated with 18 the records that were never used. l 19 So record keeping practices associated 20 with the. records that were never~used or accessed 21 for this can't be a reason. 22 Q. If the combination of, records had been 23 available to Jimmy Paul Cash, completed and 24 available as they were to you by April 30th, do you ( ) 25 think that it is possible he might not have provided

619 ,q p hh '1.

                                                   ~

the same'information that he-provided on~.or about f .2- April 7th? l

3 A. No.

J , L .4' MR. KOHN: 'First, I3 havefto object,

                                                                                                                                           .\
          '5'                        because ' exactly the inf ormation that: Mr. Cash l

l 6 .provided, loc. Cash testified-that he provided  ! I 73 the-right. number and that Mr.~Bockhold:didn't' 'I } 8 useithe number. i  ; l-9 RSo-I can't, unless youtwantito' state l !- 10 whatLyou believe Mr. Cash provided and i i

11 starting that as the foundation, ILdon't f j.,- 12 think the witness:can answer,because I don't-l

[k 13 think the. testimony is' consistent.between: ' ~

j. 14 your witnesses. ,

i a 15 Q. (By Mr. Blake) When you;provided_your -l t

16 information on April 30 to Mr. Bockhold, did you use  ;

i 17 a number of different records? ' }-

18 A. Yes, I did.

j 19 Q. And were the combination of. records that l 20 were available for you to use.on April 30 all 1 1 21 available and compiled so.that Mr. Cash could have 22 used them? d j 23 A. I don't specifically know the answer to 4 i 24 that as to the state of compilation of the records. 25 The data sheets, the diesel data sheets may not have i l

                                           ,.            -,             .  ,        -,..c,-,.-   -. -. , - - . . . - - , - ~ , . , . . . -

,. . .- . - - . - . ~ -. . - . . . . . . - - e i i 620

                                                                                                          ]

l() i 1 all been available at that point in' time, but I - l 2 don't know that. I do know.that if I had provided 3 my -- if I had chosen to use only the records'that j

                                                                                                           \

g 4 Mr. Cash did use, I would still have been able to i 1 5 make an accurate.and conservative statement. [ 6 Q. That is, by use of only the-control room l 7 log?

  • I i
8. A. Yes. i
                                                      .           .                                        l 9                   Q. You would'have arrived at the same' result     -

10 that you did on April 30? 11 A. I would have been able to make an 1 i

        .12     accurate statement and conservative statement.to the'                                       1 O      13     NRC relative to the numbers of starts.

1 I 14 Q. What would that number.have been?  ; I 15 A. I would need to review those logs at this 16 point to answer your question. j 17 Q. Have you ever done that exercise? l I 18 A. I have looked at the control log from: 19 that period of time. I'have also looked-at the list 20 that Mr. Cash compiled from the control log, and in-21 the course of Mr. Cash's deposition, we. asked Mr. 22 Cash to do that.

        .23                           The information was there..            All of the 24     problems and failures were logged, and the few

( ) 25 errors that existed in the control log would have

4

                                                                                               -}

621 - r ~~ ) (_)  !

1- resulted in making an accurate but conservative 2' statement to the NRC.

t

3. Q. Do you'believe if the record keeping were i  !

. 4 to be improved upon in terms of consistency and in  ! 5 terms of timeliness of compilation of these kinds of  : , 6 data, that it would be an improvement to I 7 management's ongoing knowledge of diesel operation? i I 8 A. Will you repeat the question? 9 Q. 'Sure. Do you believe that if there were- , 10 improvements in the consistency of information in  ! i j 11 the logs, the way in which operators make notations

12 about diesel starts, for example, and if compilation
i. 13 of data regarding diesel starts were to be done in a 14 more timely way than what actually existed as of l

15 early April 1990, that it would provide more 16 reliable information on an ongoing basis to 17 management about how the diesels had been operating? l 18 A. When you say logs, are you referring to 19 control log? 1 20 Q. That's one of them, yes. 1 21 A. Just the control log? 4 1 i i 22 Q. No, any logs which are used in 23 conjunction with record keeping associated with the 24 diesel. s.( 0 25 A. Normally management doesn't use those

622 f~)# ~ 1 logs, but bett er practices with respect to record 2 keeping by the operators would be an improvement. 3 Q. And you think that the record keeping 4 such as it was in early April 1990 regarding past 5 performance of the diesel played no role in' people's 6 understanding of the accuracy of the numbers that 7 they were reporting to the NRC on' April 9th and then 8 on April 19th? 9 A. It played no role in the accuracy of the 10 statements that were made on the 9th and the 19th 11 because of the methods and the reasons for 12 incorporation of the numbers and the statements. (/ 13 Q. Refer on the next page in your response 14 to item lettered C at the top of page 22. Referring 15 to the question, as well, that was being responded-16 to there, do you still believe that to be your 17 position? 18 A. I believe it is accurate, and I will . 19 state that my response there is relative to learning 20 about the approved or seeing the final draft of the 21 June 29th, '90. letter. I believe I saw or became 22 aware of that a few days after it was signed out. 23 Q. What are the specific incidents you're 24 referring to there? O ( ) 25 A. Well, the incident is the June 29th, '90

l i L l 623 .g b -

        'l    letter containing an inaccurate'statementiabout the                                           ;

l' 2 reasons for the errors, and the questionEis when  ! ! 4 3 . . .

  • 3 intervenor became1 aware of.such incident.:  ;

V  ! i 1 4 Q. LIs this. response meant:to~conveyLyou  ;

                                                                                                            ~

i ! 5 learned about the contents of the June 129, 1990' ' i >

        '6'   letter a few days after it was submitted?                                                 j   ,
7 A. Yeah, the-final approved content, right. t j- 8 Q. 'Let'me
go now-tolyour' hearing'testf. mony  !

, 9 to the Senate committee. I have already provided' 10 you with a copy of a transcript oft your testimony.  ; < 1

11- A. Oral testimony? 1 I

I f 12 Q. Yes.. Let me refer you-to'pages 53fand' l . O 13 54, specifically at the top of page 54, lines three j i [

14 ~and four, if you would take a second an'd read that

i i 15 in context. s l l l 16 A. All right. l I- 17 Q. Can you describe to me what you meant-by,- i 18 and certainly these statements are.the' core of the ] j 19 basis of the decision? l j 20 A. The diesel start statements, specifically 21 the statements in the confirmation of action letter 4 22 about'the diesel starts. 23 Q. Those are the statements that are 24 referred to, and what do you mean by are the core of 25 the basis of the decision? i i

     ,                   e   ,---,-m-   -,                           4           ,0--,  ---,J.,- ,w..         i
         . ,.      .    .. - .        ...--    -- -.         .. ..- --           .    - - . . .. . . - ~                - .
    }                                                                                                                                 -

1 , i

;                                                                                                          624 1

F (-) l' A. I believe that.probably the'most i l ] 2 important' aspect of the NRC's decision'to' allow- i

)

3 i

                     . restart-of the plant after'the site area, emergency.                                                           j f'               4     was the status or their perception of the reliable

[ 5 fatatus of the diesel generator, and so I consider I i - j 6 the diesel to be at the core of.the NRC, the. - 1 l 7 perception of the diesel; reliability' status to be at  ! I i 1 -8 .the core of their decision. R ] i :9- They considered other th'ings, but'_I think: 1 10- that was probably the most important thing because-l 11 if the diese1~had not failed, there'would never have

?                                                                                                                                      -

J

12 been a site area emergency declared.

() 13 Q. So you believe that the' statements about

j. 14 there'being 18 or 19 successful starts and there f I j 15 being no problems or failures to have been.the core j 16 .of the basis for the'NRC's determination-to allow; i
j. 17 Vogtle to restart,.is that what you mean to. infer 1

i 18 here? 4 , s  !

;             19                 A.      I think I said the NRC's perception of                                                        l c

j 20 the reliability of the diesel was at the core of the i 21 NRC's basis for restart decision.  ; 4 22 Q. And in taking in kind of'all that we know I j i 23 today and altering the language to make it accurate, [ what would those numbers be?  ! !: [~) 3_t 25 Let's assume that we were to write in 1 i e 4

                                                       ,. --      - ~       v-     ,-

r'o - V v - *

  • er*- '+'74-

l

625 s j
,          \/          1   that same letter to the NRC, make the!same                              '

2 presentation,-oral presentation on the 9th,~the same i 3 COA letter on the 9th'of April, but change the , 4 numbers to, in fact, be those numbers of consecutive  ! 4 1

<                      5  starts prior to April 9th at whatever= point'in time 6  they started which I think we could agree would have 7 been around March 23rd, correct me if I am~ wrong, so that the presentation would have been wholly
                                    ~

8 9 accurate. Is'that what you would have had the j 10 language' read? , ] 11 A. The NRC has stated their view of the 12 materiality, if you will, of the diesel start l 13 statements, and I think they expressed it fairly 14 well, that if they had known, one, they said it was 4 i 15 material to their restart decision.

16 Then they additionally had said that if

, 17 they had known certain things, it would have caused 4 18 them to look into these areas further. If they had 2 19 looked into these areas further, they would have l 20 looked into continuing Calcon switch problems; and I 21 believe ultimately would have delved into the root 22 cause deeper and if they reached the point where 23 they thought the root cause had been adequately 24 provided, they surely would have never given

              )25        permission to restart.
                                                                 , . .  ,.s _ ._ --  a  ~'*- - '

4 e f .' a t-

626- 1 F 1 MR. KOHN: I would like to make'a small )

1 F 2 belated' clarification objection 2toD your

. l I 3 _ question, focussing on-the diesel: start i

! 4 language.  ! I , [ 5 The record indicates that1Mr..Mosbaugh'

                                                                                                                                                      ]

e -. 6. indicated that.the diesel' error statementiwas - l i

  • i 4

7' also materially false:and that.is someth'ing

l D 8 that wasinot included in the last question.

i- ' 1 j 9 Q. (BylMr. Blake): Taking yourLcounsel's > j 10 p J suggestion to heart, Mr.-Mosbaugh,.would~you agree , 1 1' [' that that lano age, too, would have to have been {)

12 changed?

j i . 13 it should never have been. submitted A. Well' , 4 1 l 14 the.way.it was. 4 1 j

j. 15 Q. And is it your view today&that, knowing s
all that we know and' describing.it accurately.to the i

j '16

                                                                                                                                                     .i 2

17 NRC on April 9th, that the NRC would not have i 10

allowed restart?

j- '19 A. Yes, that is my opinion, and I believe 2 20 that is the opinion of the NRC because I.believe ! 21 they considered these items to be material'to-their i l

              '22       decision.                                                                                                                        !

J-23.- Q. Do you understand their statement that ' -] 24 these items were material to mean'if they had i

                                                                                                                                                        )
             '25-       received d'ifferent information, that'it'would'have I
                                                                                         . _ . . _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . -              - - ~-

627 O (_) -1 altered their determination? 2 A. Yes, that it may have altered their 3 determination, that's correct. 4 Q. May hav.e, but in your view, it would 5 have? 6 A. You're asking me to speculate about what , 7 the NRC would do. 8 Q. Yes, I am. 9 A. I celieve if the NRC knew all of the 10 relevant facts, that they would not have given

       - 11 permission to restart and that includes the facts
  ,s    12  that water poured out of trip lines and all those

(

 \~     13  kinds of things that we now know today.

14 Q. And is that what you fead from the NRC 15 notice of violation or other information? Where do 16 you read this? Where do you get this impression? 17 A. I have just recently gotten -- I'm sorry, 18 part of where the information of materiality comes f 19 from the NRC is in the NRC's response to 20 interrogatories that we submitted. l 21 It seems to me that there are some 22 statements maybe in the OI report or in the notice 23 of violation about the effect of false statements on 24 the NRC's actions. 25 Q. So it's a combination of NRC's responses

      , - .     .-     .   -  -.   . . . -      . . _ ~ -  ,   .   . ..

628 1 to your' interrogatories, in OI report, and the  !

 -2   noticelof. violation language?

3 A. Those are the sources that ~ I can recall  ! l 4 at the moment. ) 5 Q.. And when you. read those, you interpreted l 6 'them as a basis for an NRC position that had they l

                                                                        -i 7   received what'you regard.as accurate information on                ;

8 April 9th, they would not have restarted, they' would l I 9- not have allowed restart of the Vogtle plant? f 10 A. The basis for my speculation?  ! 11 Q. Yes. I 1 12 A. As to what the NRC'would do? l 13 Q. Yes.  ! l 14 A. Yeah, I consider this part of.the basis  ; l 15 for that. Like I say, the-basis wouldn't' end' l '16 there. I think what I recall some of those 17 statements saying is that if we had known, we would .) 18 have looked further. 19 What I'm saying is, therefore, part-of-i 20 that process would have'been looking further'and 21: finding more.- I'm saying.that that would havo 22 ultimately resulted in no decision for restart, a 23 ~ decision against restart at that point in time..  ! 24  ! Q. Let me ask you to'look at the next 25 document chronologically which is your response to-

    . , . - ~ .-             - . -                 .~..                ---       .       ..       ..       ,.        . .. .                     - - - . - ,

l l

) ,

629 i 2 l' the se'cond' set.of interrogatories-provided by 7,i 2' Georgia' Power. - We will mark thesetas.L14,i and it's 7 3 actually two. documents. . ' l

4 The'first'is Georgia' Power: Company's .
5 .Second Set'of Interrogatories'and'RequestLf'or'
                                                 ~

ll t

                 -6        Documents.to Allen ~L. Mosbaugh; served on.-the.'26thi~f.-                                            o                            1
a. +-:

7' July-1993 Land-.'the second.iszyour response,'.Mr.)  !

                                                                                                                                                              -t 8     ..Mosbaugh, entitled 7Intervenor's.: Response toLthe~

9' 'Second:. Set of Interrogatories . of:f Georgia Power ! l 10' Company served . on' ' Augus tf.'11th, ~ 19 9 3.: - 1 -l 11 (Mosbaugh Exhibits.DG-14ALand DGf14B l 1 12 were marked for" identification.)

              ~ 13                      Q.          (By Mr. Blake)              Let me'ask you'to;. taker.a                                                     i 14         look at.page eight.of your response.                                         For: purposes                                            f 1

15 .of my qu'estion, I don't think youLwill.need~to look  ! 16 at the question or do a' lot of surrounding: , R 17 research. Let me just ask you the question.. l 18 In your response-there, 5-F, which 19 appears on-page eight, you refer to an instructionL. a

                                                                                                                                                             .i l

20 Cash: received from George Bockhold, just get the: 21 good' stuff. What's the basis for that? 22 A. The basis of that is I was repeating 1what-23 I remembered as a statement made to me by Mr. Larry 24 Robinson about when he was asking me.some questions

             ;25         about Cash's instructions, and that was what I                                                                                          i 4

l l __ ,, _ -_ . . , , , . ~ . . . . . . . . , _ . . , _ . _ ~ . _ ~ . _ - ,

630 j , O 1 remember Mr. Robinson to have said or asked me 2 about, was Mr. Cash, you know that Mr. Cash has been 1 3 instructed to, he had used these words or a phrase j 4 like this. 5 So that's my basis for ,that. Having at ) l 6 this time reviewed Mr. Cash's OI testimony, I don't l 7 believe this phrase as quoted here is something.that i

;        8 Mr. Cash indicated as his instructions, and I 9 believe in actuality, it's just get the successful i

10 starts instead of the spreads. 11 Q. So do you believe this to be inaccurate? l 12 A. I believe it is inaccurate, but it was j 13 what I knew at the time or believed at the time from  ! ) 14 Mr. Robinson to have been the instruction.  ! 15 Obviously Mr. Cash's testimony would have been the . 16 best place to get the source of that information 17 which I eventually got access to. 18 MR. BLAKE: Were you intending to 19 supplement this, Mr. Kohn? 20 MR. KOHN: We were intending to review 21 responses, I mean there has been a lot of new 22 material from all sides and I don't know what 23 the parties, I think there was a conversation 24 with the licensing board where all the

  • '-[-)

j 25 parties agreed to review everything and 1

631 - ['Q V J ' 1 :~  : supplement.

2. That's my recollection. I-don't know-3 'if that's-on the time line anywherei but the 4 parties have agreed-to.do that at~a date. t L5 certain-.

6- MR. BLAKE: Had you-had an' intention to:

         .7            supplement this-particular~one?
  • 8- MR. KOHN: _I haven't read these
        .9             responsesLin about a' year now.

10 MR. BLAKE: So the answer'is probably 11 no? 12 MR.. KOHN:- The answer is that we,have ! 13' to read them all'after we finish our i 14 discovery and see where we stand. < 15  ! Q. (By'Mr. Blake) What was the' context of 1 16 Mr. Robinson's describing Mr. Cash's instruction 17 from Mr. Bockhold as being to just get the good. 18 stuff? 19 A. I recall that he asked me something about' 20 what I knew or what I might know about Cash's 21 instructions, and he made mention'to me that his 22 understanding was that Mr. Cash's instructions were 23 just'get the good stuff or a phrase like that. 24 I had not heard that, that that was his l 1 ( 25 instructions. Like I say, since I reviewed Mr. i 1

v i 1 l 632 l

1- Cash's OI testimony, I believe his. instructions were j 2 more like'just get the successful' starts. 'You. asked d

l 3 for the context. I guess I assume Mr. Robinson 4 meant that the good stuff was synonymous.with i I 5 successful starts.. I think good stuff was a 6 different -- it's not a defined-term. . I would call' f' 7 that slang more or less, but I'think Mr. Robinson 5 j 8 had that in mind. That's not good communication. J I l.a 9 think it's slang. } 10 Q. Was this a conversation'that you had'with. 11 Mr. Robinson which you gathered this information? [ s i 12 A. Yeah, and I can't recall when that

/~h

)J 1 13 occurred, but he had asked me about Cash's ~ i 14 instructions, and this was a comment that I 15 recalled. i 16 Q. Do you recall receiving similar types of 17 i characterizations from Mr. Robinson? 18 A. Of a slang nature? > l 19 Q. Of any nature, characterizations of ' 20 conversations between Georgia Power. employees, l 21- characterizations of submittals--by Georgia Power to' 'j 22 NRC, characterizations.ofEanything that we might  ! 23 refer to as factual' evidence in this case? 24- A. This was a little different. Mr.  ; 25 Robinson normally wouldn't use that kind of term. i

                                                                , , , _ _ . . __         . . + - - -     --

633 . ys ( ) x/ 1 I'm a little unclear about characterizations, but I  ; 2 would say generally no, Mr. Robinson asked i l 3 questions, I provided him information. We discussed 4 what I provided him, but Mr. Robinson would not. 5 generally comment on or provide what you're 6 describing as characterizations. l 7' .Q. Yesterday you described Mr. Robinson-as l 8 the source of some information you had about some 9 recent interviews of Georgia Power people. Do you 10 remember that? 11 A. No, I'm not sure what you're referring l 12 to. I (~h ' (,/ 13 Q. Yesterday you described Mr. Robinson as l l 14 having been the source of some information to you l 1 l 1 15 about questions which had been put.to Georgia Power l l i 16 personnel regarding air quality. Do you recall  ! 17 that? 18 A. Oh, about finding water? 19 Q. Yes, j 20 A. It wasn't about air quality. It was 21 about finding water. 22 Q. I put it in the air quality camp because 23 that's what the significance is of finding water, 24 isn't it? ( 25 A. No. Finding water is significant in and

{ l i 634 (~/1 N_ 1 of itself. 2 Q. Was the source of the water that was 3 being discussed or concerned something-other-than 4 air? t 5 A. The source was humidity. 6 Q. Out of the air? ' 7 A. From the air from the compressors, but 8 the significance is not air quality. The ' j 9 significance is water and its effects on the ' 10- pneumatic system. I 11 Q. So in the last two days we have discussed 12 at least two instances where Mr. Robinson was the ! (_p) 13 source of information for you. Could you describe ! 14 to me or characterize for me how much information 15 you have received from Mr. Robinson over the last 16 year, not provided to but received from. 17 A. Generally Mr. Robinson has asked me 18 questions. I believe the comment he made to me 19 about the finding of water or personnel being asked 20 about water was when I took my allegation to Mr. 21 Robinson about_the finding of water as documented in 22 the tape recording. 23 So that was how we came to discurs the 24 finding of water and the knowledge that the tape 25 recording. indicates of Mr. Burr and Mr. Chennault

i 635 ,A k_ 1 and Mr. Stokes, of the water pouring out of the trip I 2 line. So that was the point in time that I had a 3 discussion with him. HNo , I don't believe I can tell 1 4 you information I received from Mr. Robinson over 5 the past year. 6 At times I.have talked to Mr. Robinson  ; 7 about issues on a daily basis, and.I have had a lot 8 of contact with Mr. Robinson because of the ' 9 submitting'of allegations and the discussion of 10 those allegations in concurrence with him,'and it's l 11 been very extensive. l 12 Q. Is your inability to characterize the l ( ) 13 information that you have received from Mr. Robinson l 14 today, received over the.last year, because it's 15 been so extensive, you just aren't able to do it 16 now, or would you say these are the only two facts 17 you have ever heard from Larry Robinson? What is 18 the problem or what is the inability to do it? 19 A. Well, if you have had that many 20 conversations, I don't know what it is, but with 21 that many conversations, it just becomes very l 22 difficult. 23 I have been discussing these topics with 24 Mr. Robinson for four years, and to try to -- I mean 25 if you were to ask me the,same question as to

636 (~\ A/ 1 information I received from my wife, I would have i 2 the same difficulty. 3 I might be able to remember the most 4 recent conversations, but what information I - 5 received from my wife, I couldn't even answer that 6 question. i 7 Q. I would understand that and, frankly,'it 8 never had occurred to me to find some analogy 9 between conversations between you and your wife.and 10 you and Larry Robinson. 11 I'm just trying to understand what the 12 nature is of the discussions between you and Mr. 13 Robinson which have been other than Mr. Robinson 14 asking you questions as an OI investigator. 15 What I'm getting out.of.this, and I would ) 3

      . 16     appreciate it if you would correct the impression I 17     have, that these have been discussions where Mr.

18 Robinson passes on to you a good deal of information-19 and it's difficult for you to characterize it l 20 because it has been.so textensive, as extensive, for l 21 example, as have been conversations with your wife l 22 over the last year. 23 A. I think that's an improper i 24 characterization. When I call Mr. Robinson, it's '( 25 usually because I have a new piece of information,  ! 4 i I

l 637' ' 1 but-let me give you an example. I 1 2 As we.have.done-depositions over the last' 3 two months, when we did'a deposition'and I heard 4 ' testimony of' Georgia-Power witnesses'that'I thought j 5 were relevant to my, allegations,RI would from time  !

\

6 to time call Mr. Robinson and say I wantito'letLyou ( 7- know what was testified to today by this. witness-8 about this issue, and~I would pass that information  ! l 9- on to Mr. Robinson, and I,would in'my' mind"go  ! l 10 through'the various witnesses we'did that day and j 11 provide that to him. 'l 12 I provided to-him, you know, what-I-l O 13 thought were key things. In some. cases,they were' I i 14 things that I knew he had not resolved'in.his OI 15 investigation., but.I felt we had gotten.an answer 16 to, maybe'a-missing link or something.like that or 17 maybe a different story, a contradictory story, l 18 perhaps, to-what he had obtained in OI testimony. . p . 19f So I would have reviewed that. testimony 20 with him and, like I say, at times in the last I-21 couple of months, I called him sometimes daily, 22 providing him that information. Generally he does l 23 not provide information back to.me, and generally l 24 those calls are for the purpose of my feeding him l 25 information. . u

 ^
                                                                                                                     . v        --         .-   - - .

i  ! i  ! 1 638 1 On a few occasions he has asked me some  : i 2 additional questions. I guess these are two i j- 3 A . examples, the one you mentioned about the water, and ]' I believe that occurred'when'I contacted Mr. 4 l 5 Robinson about the tape segment ~ about finding water i  :

6 in the trip lines'and this~one here came from, it
7 seems to me this comes from'a year or.more'ago, my '

1 j 8 recollection of Cash's instructions. 0 9 Q. So is your characterizationLwhich I asked j 10 earlier for you to give meLabout the/ amount of i Ell information Mr. Robinson has passed along to you ! 12 that it's infrequent? t i 13 A. My contacts with Mr. Robinson are 14 generally because I-call him to give-him , ? j-i. 15 information, and that's been very frequent after . 4

16 late, but my contacts with him are generally to give 1

l 17 him information. } 18 Q. Has he ever called you to pass on l 19 information to you? 4 4 20 A. He has called me to return my calls, but .I

12 1 called me to pass on information, he has called me1
j. '22 to ask me a question, perhaps. To pass on 23 information, . that's not something'that I can reca'll l 24 that would normally happen. Normally I call Mr.

25 Robinson and sometimes he has returned my calls. l-a e v - 4 . .--m.. .e.- , . . , . . , _ .,.w__+1 ,e-.-c~ ~.w.r- +.4-. -v w e 9

l  :  ? I l L639 f -

                                                                                                                                                                                'l
  \_/'                                                                                                                                          '

1- 'Q ~What'.is the answer.to my question?-

                                                                                                ~
                      - A.           The' communication was. generally from me.                                                                                                !

i

              -3     to him.        It's very difficult'in the course of as L4 :  much communication as I recall to.' remember.Eit a l l'.
                                                                                                                                                                                   ~

l , i 5 Q. Mr.fMosbaugh, it's. obvious.that 1 you'reL . l: 6 struggling-totry to-recall-ornto try toigive.mecan 7 answer,to the: question, but take.your7 time.: i 8- A. I.can't recall' occasions.where.he called

              -9    me to pass.on'.information,.:but'I have' difficulty 10     because I have. talked'toihim on many occasions,~. as                                                                           I.
            'll     previously described.                                                                                                                                          l 12            Q.           Do you recall at this~ point any'other i

13 . pieces of information.which Mr. RobinsonLhas given L t 14 you? I don't understand the smirk or the humor. 15 A. There'is no humor,: it's just that'when l 16 you ask questions about communications'which'have 17 been over a period of four years and ask for any 18 other item in a period of four years with a lot of 19 communications going on, that taxes my memory. 20 I-believe:in the courseHof responding to-21 some of these interrogatories, we described: some of 22 my conversations in an interval'with Mr. Robinson, 23 and I think that's provided in one of-these L 24 interrogatory sets. b

                                - , - .            _   .i _ . __     _ .. , _ . . . _ . _ ,
                                                                                                  .l._...,..,,... _ . . _ . _ . . , . - . . . ,
                                                                                                                                                       ,i -,  - - ~ ~ . , . - .

640

  /~

t 1 .because a similar question had been asked about 2 communications with Mr. Robinson, and I scratched my i 3 head and tried to remember as much as I.could that 4 .was responsive.to that question, and I believe it l 5 was in one of these documents. 6 At'this point I'm having trouble L 7 remembering what was provided in that response from i 8 independent recollection. I guess' including what 9 was responded to you before, that's as much as I can 10 remember here. 11 Q. So you don't remember any other 12 information that you received from Mr. Robinson?

l. 13 A. Not in addition to what might be'in that l
14 other, in that response. I remember that instance.

15 Q. On the same thing, page, look at 6-B. 16 MR. KOHN: I guess in reviewing'the OI 17 report and aeeing how Mr. Robinson questions 18 witnesses, it often appears he provides them 19 with information and, for instance, plays 20 portions of the tape or I know this is on the 21 tape, what's your response to that. ! 22 So I have a difficult time ~with your 23 line of questioning inasmuch as it seems Mr. i 24 Mosbaugh was expressing that with respect to

  /'T
 .(,) 25                   one thing that was in the course of

i s t 641

  ,m 4  (

conversation with Mr. Robinson about did you

         .1 2  know anything about Cash.just wanting to get 3  the good stuff or something like that.

1 4 So I have.a hard time trying to ) 5 differentiate in my own mind how Mr. Mosbaugh 6 is supposed to find out what is being 7 volt nteered to him or what 's in a' question. 8 I really think that the questions and answers 9 are very vague on that. j j 10 So I have a general note I wanted to i 11 make on that' point. I think that just 12 looking at my' understanding of how Mr. .\/0 4 13 Robinson questions people,'it would be an i 14 impossible position for.any of the witnesses 15 to say what information did Mr. Robinson

      - 16 volunteer to you because even during the 17  course of the OI interview    --

18 MR. BLAKE: I think, with all due 19 respect to your observation, that the 20 discussions that Mr. Mosbaugh is describing 21 between Mr. Robinson and him and the 22 relationship that has existed and does 23 presently exist between Mr. Mosbaugh and Mr. 24 Robinson is quite different from on the 25 record OI interviews by Mr. Robinson of other

642 7 1 GPC personnel, remarkably different. 2 MR. KOHN: I would agree because I 3 don't believe Mr. Robinson is capable of 4 having discussions with Georgia Power people , 5 without their attorneys and formal things. I 6 mean Mr. Robinson doesn't have that problem 7 with Mr. Mosbaugh. 8 MR. BLAKE: I don't understand the

,          9       point of that comment.

10 MR. KOHN: You said that the 11 relationship is different, because Mr. 12 Mosbaugh is the source and Mr. Mosbaugh is (_) 13 providing information. 14 Georgia Power Company is not providing 15 information particularly that I'm aware of. i 1 16 It certainly doesn't seem to be volunteering 17 information.  ! 18 I Q. (By Mr. Blake) Focussing on 6-B ~ at the i 19 bottom of page eight, will you read, as well, the i 20 interrogatory to which you are responding. 21 A. (Witness complies with the request of 22 counsel.) 23 Q. Do you still agree that that's an 24 appropriate answer, a correct answer to the A

      ) 25   interrogatory?

l i 1

. -j i

4 643 l !() l' A. Yes. The information about the.1-B l diesel? trips, dates, .and times _that I provided is

- 2 ~

V j -3 the:information that. demonstrated'that'the' draft'  ; 5 4 j that was in existence at that time was inaccurate 5 and that same.information, those same' trips, dates,

i. . -

l' 6 and time demonstrates-that the. final' language is j i- 7' inaccurate, asLwell. . j- r 8 This question ~is_with: respect 1to the i 9 language, the final language, but those- particular: l Il 10- . trips make the final language inaccurate as well as f ) j 11 the draft language inaccurate. i 12 Q. So although the interrogatory-referred to l l i 13 the final language as it appeared in the LER-which 2  ! 14 included' subsequent to.this test program and your { I j 15 answer referred to discussions you had of-draft ' f ' j 16 language which did.not include those words, you { 17 still believe it to be responsive? 4 j 18 A. No. You are mischaracterizing it. The 1 l 19 information is the trips of the 1-B diesel on the. 1 4 j 20 22nd and'on the 23rd at particular times is whatEI l- 21- provided, and that information made the draft i i 22 inaccurate and made the final language. inaccurate. 23 Q. Your answer in 6-B is referring, however,.

24 to discussions that you had before this language was
           - 25        inserted?

F -

                                                                                                                                -t

_ _ . _ . . _ . . . , - , _ . - . ~ , . . , _ , ,

644 (O 1 A. That's correct, but the information 2 conveyed to those people is applicable to both and 3 that information demonstrates the statement as being 4 inaccurate. 5 Q. Would your answer be the same with. regard 6 to F on the next page, page nine, that is, the 7 discussions on April 19th, the phone conversations 8 in which you participated wherein Shipman and 9 Stringfellow were told that the language equivalent , 10 of this constituted a material false statement was ' 11 the draft language?  ! 12 A. The language that is equivalent to this (D \_/ 13 is the confirmation of action letter. I view that 14 the information, that the language in the final LER 15 and the confirmation of action letter are equivalent 16 language and were intended to be equivalent. 17 So I had conversations on the 19th with 18 Mr. Shipman and Stringfellow about the confirmation 19 of action language, and I view that as being 20 equivalent to the final language put in-the LER. So 21 that's what I mean by equivalent to this. 22 Q. Go to page ten, response to interrogatory 23 number seven. What was your role in the preparation 24 of this revision? ( 25 A. We have discussed that before, but my-

645 0(~x 1 role was that after April 30th when I notf.fied my 2 general manager that the confirmation of action { 3 letter and the LER contained a false statement,.I 4 subsequently worked on getting a revisionito the 5 LER. 6 I~ got Mr. Aufdenkampe who worked for me , 7 at the time to use his NSAC departmen't to draft a 8 revision, and we got that revision process through { 9 the plant review boar'd and we sent it to corporate 10 by May 15th. 11 Q. And were you involved in the version of _ 12 the letter, the version of the document which was k l ' 13 provided to the corporate office by May 15th? . f 14 A. I was involved in it in that I reviewed l . 15 it and I think to some degree' worked with Mr. 16 Aufdenkampe or his people on it. .I participated in i 17 the PRB review of it, yes. Can we take a restroom 18 break? . 19 MR. KOHN: Mr. Mosbaugh needs to go to 20 the restroom. I 21 MR. BLAKE: I only have one more in 22 this document, if you can hang on for one 23 more. l 24 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Let's go to page 14.

, (7"N._) 25        Looking at C-2 at the bottom of page 14.               I don't

l l i 646 l l  !

       )                                                                                                  '

l ('#

   ~

1 think you need to look at a lot of other documents 2 in order to understand my question. First, do you 3 believe that statement that appears in C-2 still 4 today? i 5 A. I guess I would like to know what the 6 response is to. 7 Q. Forget the yes portion.and just take the .; 8 statement by itself. I think it stands alone. 9 A. Yes, I believe that's correct. 10 Q. Now, we have talked a lot about who was 11 on the call and who wasn't. We have talked a fair 12 amount about who knew or who should have known. i 13 Just tell me now what you mean there by everyone. 14 A. I mean everybody, lec me explain it in 15 general terms. 16 Q. Okay. , 17 A. Everybody having line responsibility for , 18 that document and its accuracy and its verification 19 that participated in that call, I believe those , 1 l 20 people knew or should have known, had an obligation 21 to know those facts. 22 By name, since Mr. Hairston signed the 23 document, it would be Mr. Hairston, Mr. McCoy, Mr. 24 Shipman, Mr. Bailey if he was involved, Mr. ' ' /'\ (*( ) 25 Stringfellow, and because Mr. Bockhold participated l l

i I { i l l 647 (^h i kl 1 in the phrasing of the development of the section- ) i 2 that was later determined to contain a false 3 statement, I include Mr. Bockhold, Mr. Aufdenkampe, ] 4 h and myself. Let me try to work it from the other 5 direction now. 6 Q. Mr. Ward, Mr. Rushton ~are some names that 7 have appeared. 8 A. I include Mr. Rushton because Mr.LRushton 9 was in line responsibility for that letter. Mr. 10 Ward was outside the line responsibility. 11 Q. So you don't include him? There was some 12 question whether or not he was on the call, but 13 assuming he was on the call, you still would not 14 include him in this? 15 A. Well, I would include him, because I 16 believe he did know because Mr. Burr worked for him i 17 and was communicating. My statement.was knew or 18 should have known. ! 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. I believe he did know. Therefore,'for 21 that, seven people, I guess that's everybody. I'm 22 not including the two part timers over in Mr. 23 Aufdenkampe's office. 24 Q. You're not including them? ()25 A. I'm not including -- my view is I don't

. ~! I i l

                                                                                                                               '648          i r

1 really consider bor. Webb or Mr. Williams-to be on + 2 the call because of the brevity of their walking in

-3 and out.

, t i

4. MR. BLAKE
'Okay, let'sLtake a break.
5 (A recess was taken.) l f

3 6 Q. (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, let me' turn  ! 4 i 7 now to the transcript of.your.. interview by.OI in .; i

                                                                                                                                              ~

j 8 November of 1993, and let me ask that.a copy of that  : I i

9 transcript be. marked as Exhibit 15. '

i-

10 (Mosbaugh Exhibit-DG-15.was marked  !

11 for identification.)  ! 1- 12 Q. (By Mr. Blake) This is a 195-page , t !"~ 13' transcript dated November 4th, 1993 of an interview i j 14 conducted by the Office of Investigations of-Allen-j 15 Mosbaugh. The front page on the exhibit, indicates 1 16 that it began at 10:15 a.m. You have'seen-this

17 document before, Mr. Mosbaugh?

4 1 18 A. Yes, s 1 19 Q. Focussing on page 34, which we could do 4

20 it in several different places, but this is just.one l D

g-j 21 instance, you refer there, at lines ten through 16, l 22 to the Kochery list. Mr. Mosbaugh, describe toime I 23 the Kochery list. s 4.-

24 A. I was' refreshing my memory with the page

{'

           - 25     you referred me to.                       Paul Kochery provided me a list 4

_ . n.

               -             _ _ _ _ . . ,. , .           .           .     . . _ . _ . . , . . _ . . . .     -_,,_...._.-_,,a..... . .....

i i, 649 1 that he, my memory is that he prepared it or Mr. 2 ' Stokes had prepared it for him. It was a 3 handwritten list consisting'of several 3pages. 4 I think_it had some pages, the list that J-5 I remember was for B, and'he may have had some pages  : 1 6 for A and some pages for B,;but I'think I was.mainly j

7 looking at pages that related to the B 'diesel. It 0 J

8 was handwritten. It had a date.and,'I think, a >

                                                                                                         )

9 time, and a brief comment about what had occurred on l 10 that start. 11 It_was pretty much one line per start. l 1

;    12  It seemed like it started sometime in March, early 1 /

$~ 13 in March, as far as the' listing. I specifically  ; 2 i ! 14 remember it containing' entries on March'22nd and . I 15 23rd that were the basis'for my supplying that i 1 16 information *o Mr. Shipman. 17 Q. On the 19th of April? 18 A. On the 19th of April. It seemed like it i 4 19 contained information that went, start information 1  ; 20 that went into April, and it seemed like it started I 4 f 21 with entries that began about-the time of the site 1 j - 22 area emergency. 23 I'm not sure exactly what Mr. Kochery's

- 24 purpose was for the list, why he had prepared it. I- ,

25 believe that he had prepared it from, he or Mr. d

                                                    , y-    ,   , - -     --% e--      -= --y . - - -

i i l l 650 1 Stokes had prepared it from the' operations logs or 2 from their involvement in the. actual testing. 3 .That's most-.of what I remember about.the Kochery- 1

                  .4  list.-

5 Q. Do you know what prompted the generation r 6 of the Kochery list? i 7 A. I don't' recall the reason!why:Kochery or i

                                                                             .               t 8  Stokes or whoever. prepared it started preparing it,                  i 9 but it seems'like I b'elieve hhey prepared it related                   ,

10 to'the occurrence of the site area emergency.- l 11 Q. Could~.it have been'because the' diesel . 12 start. log was not up to date and-they-wanted - O (2 13 information'to be brought up to date from-March  ! 14' 13th, 1990? I i 15 A. I wouldn't think so, the reason.being is 16 that what Mr. Kochery or Mr. StokesLwould have' l l 17 wanted to update the diesel start log would have l l 18 been for the purposes of classifying starts as' valid l 19 or invalid, and the list that-I remember didn't 20- contain sufficient-information for~Mr. Stokes or Mr. l 21 Kochery to do those classifications. 22- So I don't think that it would have'been 23 an interim or-something to. supplant the valid, l- 24 nonvalid' start information because-I don't'believe-25 when I saw it, the information there wouldn't have 4

]

651

  ~'

1 allowed me to determine valid or invalid starts. I 2 don't think it would have allowed them to determine i 3 valid or invalid starts. 4 Q. How did you come by the Kochery list? 5 A. I went to Paul Kochery's office and was 6 talking to him, and I don't know if I asked him a 7 question in that area and he showed me a list tha't 8 he had. 9 Q. And did you make a copy of it then for 10 yourself? 11 A. I can't recall exactly what I did, if I  !

 ,_      12   took it and made a copy or if he gave me his list or l                                                                          l
      )

k/ 13 if I took -- I don't recall how I got a copy or I 14 exactly what I did with it, but I know I obtained  ; 15 those 1-B diesel start trip failure information from 16 his listing. I think maybe -- well, we can call it  ! 17 a log, but it was his listing of starts. 18 Q. And it was this Kochery list that you 19 were relying on when you raised with Mr. Shipman and 20 Mr. Stringfellow the fact that there had been 21 problem starts? 22 A. It was either the list or information 23 from the list, and when I spoke to Mr. Shipman, I 24 know I gave him a specific date and time and a

/"s

(_) 25 reason for some 1-B diesel failures. I recall that

652 (] V 1 I had obtained that information from what I am 2 terming the Kochery list. 3 Q. You have indicated that you recall the 4 list enumerated the two diesel problems which you 5 raised with Shipman and Stringfellow on the 19th. 6- Did it also indicate the diesel problem on the 24th? 7 A. .I can't recall that. I don't recall 8 raising that with Mr. Shipman, but I can't recall 9 that being on the list or not on the list. 10 Additionally, I can't recall if it was 11 listed on the list but not listed as a trip, 12 perhaps. I just can't recall that from his list. 13 Q. Is it possible that's because the list 14 stopped on the 23rd? 15 A. No, my recollection is that the list.went 16 into April. 17 Q. And what did you do with the list? 18 A. Well, I had used the list for that basis 19 and had the specific information of the trip which I 20 conveyed to Mr. Shipman, as I talked about. 21 At the same time, Mr. Aufdenkampe had Mr. 22 Odom going to the control logs and developing a ! 23 list, and to my recollection toward the very end of 24 the day on the 19th, and I believe probably after 25 the LER was signed out, they came back with a list,

s 653 - O 'l and I don't remember:if they had gotten every start l . 2 . a t' that, point.

                                                                                                                               ~

3 'I'know'they were.trying.-to[findisome 4 starts,'andJthey1 had said1something1thatfthey-hadn't

                 =5-                        gotten ' all- the- starts yet, but it fseems ':like - at', the
                                                                                              ~
                 '6                         very endiof the' day,'they1came'back withiaElist-out!

7 'of the control that-they:had_obtained, control-8 logs. .

                '9                                                                       Then~I also on'that.dayfor'maybe thejnext...

10 day, I had. mentioned'to~Gus Willir.ms who was<inthe-11- office.next-tolAufdenkampe's office, whethe'rior.not' '

                                                                                                                                             )

12- .heihad control' logs, and he indicated that heidid-I 13 have the control logs. - 14 So after that pointfin time, I.used:the  ! I 15 control logs and got some other documents.to develop.- l 1 16 the list that I eventually _put togetherLonthe 17 30th. So at that point in time.the usefulness of 18 the Kochery' list, ~there wasn't any.use'and I don't 19 know what has happened to it since thatitime,- to a

20. copy or information that I had-to'take from that-21 list.

22 When I developed the: final _ list,EI'had-23 used the source documents, the control log and , 24 diesel log sheets, I think the diesel log,Jthe data

                                                                                                                                          .)

O 25 sheets, and the control log. i l

654 1 So when I used information after that, I 2 - would use source information. 3 lQ. Incidentally,.while you're raising that 4 topic, how would you characterize that task which 5 you accomplished by April 30 of getting a. list that 6 you were. confident about, easy, difficult, somewhere. 7 - in between?' What would you use in the way of 8 adjectives.or characterization?

9. -A.. Well, it had been,my decision toLusevall 10 the available information that I hadfrather.than, 11 for. example, just the control log. I-also worked on 12 it mostly at home rather than at' work.-
) 13                                              Q. Did you just take the logs home?

14 A. I took some copies of some logs home, 15 made some copies. I would say thettask was of 16 average difficulty. I didn't consider the task 17 extremely difficult. 18 There were difficulties to the extent 19 that I had to get control logs, somebody that 20 routi~nely worked'in operations, youlknow, and-had 21 logs. 22 .First I had to get control logs, but I 23 found those with Mr. Williams, and he:had a. couple 24 of books of them. The only' difficulty with control () 25 logs is that I had to look through maybe 50 pages or- __.-_----_---.-u-__---.----x-n..._-_-,--- _- - - - . . - --u._--.--- .-------.a-- . - - -

~ l

                                                                                                  .655
                                                                                                        -{

l'T'

                                                                                                        'I
\_f- --1 ' whateverLthe. appropriate number of'pages was.- i 1 >
f. -2 -The' data' sheets,-I1got from'Mr.' Stokes 3 and I think heLmaintained.the log information there,  ;

j '4 too. In addition, part of my effort wasinot4just, , r

 ~
i 5 like I. said,: I chose to use'all-the information'and i

1 6: cross compare and cross reference.- i i 7 'So part of my effort was.to identifyL i i , j 8L which information.was in'one log but not in'another'  ; { 9 log. . So.by doing that, I made'the task.more i i 10 difficult-than merely-taking one' log and~getting t i j 11 information.  ! 12 j i At any-rate, I would say it was an nj

                                                                                                         -i 2

13 average difficulty task.. It wasn't extremely. l 14 difficult. Like I say, I know I. worked on.it'at-I f 15 home. Since I have four kids at home,-time is ! [ 16 scarce. 17 Q. You realize or you believed that a false

1 18 statement was submitted on April 9th, and you j' 19 realized that sometime shortly after April 9th, I i

i 20 correct, regarding the number of diesel starts? j 21. A. When I got the document, yeah, the 22 statement in the cocument about the air'qualicy and

23 the diesel starts were the two things that jumped 3

1 24 out at me. I began an effort to work on air quality

( 25 first.

i i - s l

_ .. . . _ ~ . . . _ . _ -

                                                                                                                                                                - 656

{ (2) 1 .Q. By,the 19th, you.were more: convinced that' i i

               '2                   the information was inaccurate?.                                                                                                    ,

l 3~ A. Yes.- , l 4 Q. ~That had been-provided to the NRC? j i 1 5- A. ,Yes. ' i j 6 Q. And you were' ablelto'getJa' list;that you 7 were comfortable with by Aprilk 30th which;you- .j

                                                                                                                                                                                        -l 8                   described as average difficulty?                                                                                                                   l 9                             A.-            .The list that?Ifwas -                      the purpose of.the                                                              l
\

10 list that I-prepared for April-30th.was to put1my' l 11 managemen. on notice of the. false statement being 12 made. So yeah,'that's correct,'I.wa,s'able'to-do l O 13 that by April 30th. i 14 Q. How much time do you;think_you-invested , i 15 in obtaining the documents and'then in compiling the j 1 16 information? l i 17 A. 1 can only give.you a very. crude estimate i 18 since that's something I worked on over'four years v j 19 ago,' definitely'less thaneight hours total. - 20 Q. Looking at'page 34, your statement there. j 21 at lines ten through 16 would reflect.that you j i 22 believed'the Kochery list went'through April 13th, l 1 - 23 correct? 24' A. I need to read-this transcript section in

            - 25                    its co'ntext, because I think it' starts on the e

d i 4 4. J w w r x , - r - .

                                                                ;      --,..,.n.      ,,,,.,..r                .w-r-, ,m,.     ,..~.--4                  w-   -           N N.--     ,

657 1 previous page. It appears to start on.page 29, so I i 2 need to read-for a little bit here. Okay, I have l 3 read those documents now. j 4 Q. Was it your testimony, then, to ~the

                                                                      )

i 5 Office of Investigations that your. recollection was  ; i 6 that the Kochery list went through April 13th? 7 A. I think my testimony was that I was i 8 reviewing a. transcript which.I recall was, I think ' 9 it's on tape 57 or something, that Mr. T'ipman made 10 the comment about a list that went through the 13th 11 of April, 12 That's what I was talking about when I 13 discussed with OI the 13th of April date was. based 14 on-Mr. Shipman's comments about the list that he 15 said we were reviewing the other day that went 16 through the 13th of April. i i 17 Q. Do you believe that Mr. Shipman was 18 referring to the Kochery list? i 19 A. I thought that was possible, yes. 20 Q. You think that Mr. Shipman had available i 21 to him the Kochery list? 22 A. I don't know. It's possible that he 23 did. It's possible that he was discussing 24 information he had obtained without having the list. ()25 Q. You don't have a recollection of what the

658 l'. date was for final data on the Kochery list t h a t' y o u'- 2 saw? 3 A. RMy only recollection is that I believe.it 4 went into April, and I don't have a recollection of 5 the exact end.date of that list. 6 Q. Do you today have.the same view-thatfyou' 7 indicated here that Mr. Shipman may have had a copy. 8 of the so-called Kochery list? 9 A. Or he had'information about thetlist, 10 yes. 11 Q. Do you think, therefore, that Mr.' Shipman 12 had available to him a list of starts that went 13 through April 13th? 14 A. I don't know. 15 Q. Is that what your testimony is here?. 16 A. I think my testimony-is'and my belief 17 currently is that he may have, but I don't know. He 18 was referring to something. He could have had it or 19 he could have just had information about it. 20 Q. Is this based on your review of the tape 21 or a transcript of the tape of language? 22 A. This discussion, yes, it-is. 23 Q. And discussion that you're tk. king about 24 took place on April lath? ()D25 A. I want to look at the. transcript. It

W 659 . 1 (3 l 1 seems like it was the 18th or the 19th. Mr. j' 2 Robinson and I were looking at a transcript when we 3 discussed this. It seemed to me more like it was on 4 the 19th rather than the 18th. , It seems like that 5 was on the 19th. i 6 We may want to look at. tapes 572and 58 to i 7 allow me to determine that. That's what I was * ! 8 looking at at the time that this interview 9 occurred. Mr. Mosbaugh, let me return if I can to a i 10 document that we talked about earlier but only in a ' 11 very general way, and that's one of the memoranda I j 12 from you to Mr. Kohn, this one dated 4/12/94 13 entitled The Real Cause, The Diesel 1-A Failure, i ! 14 Focussing-on the first-paragraph of this 15 document, what is the significance of the statement - i , 16 that the early morning of 3/20/90 was a cool one. , 17 A. It was. It was one of the coolest j 18 mornings of the month. 19 Q. What is the significance of that to this , l ,n 20 discussion? 21 A. Well, if you have air that has high 22 humidity in it, then it has a high dew point. ' 23 If it's environment, the ambient air in i 24 the diesel room were to be cooled down due to the ()25 ventilation system drawing in cool outside air, then J i

660

/

1 condensation could occur inside of the lines that 2 had high humidity in them. 3 Q. So the significance -- 4 A. The condensation inside of those lines 5 would create water within the pneumatic system which 6 any good engineer knows would cause serious problems 7 with a pneumatic control system. 8 Q. So the significance is that the 9 temperature in the diesel room on the morning of 10 3/20/90 was cool? 11 A. Well, there is two aspects to that being 12 cool. Because of the way that the ventilation (As) 13 system is oriented in the diesel room, there is a 14 definite potentiality for local cooling as opposed 15 to just the bulk room temperature. 16 The air is drawn inward into the building 17 under normal ventilation through sets of large 18 louvers in the walls. These louvers are oriented in 19 such a way that local blasts of outside air comes 20 in, so there could be, say, spot cooling unrelated 21 to those louvers. 22 So I think this possibly has an impact on 23 causing dew to form within the pneumatic control 24 system. I don't want to link it just to the bulk r~'N () 25 room temperature. That's my clarification or my

1 661

('J'-
  \
      )    1 point.
                                                                               \

I 2 Q. What's your basis for stating that the 3 dew points were probably in the 80 degree Fahrenheit l l 4 range? 5 A. Well, the dew points that were_taken and [ 4 6 measured on 3/29 were in the 80 degree range. I 4

7 I believe those dew points were the' data t

l j 8 taken closest to the time of the site area emergency 9 on 3/20. The values-are only taken routinely once a 1 i 10 month. So the closest data is, I believe, the data 11 from 3/29.  ! 12 Q. So it's an assumption that the 3/29 data ( / 13

   %s
       \

would also have e,pplied on 3/20? .< 14 A. l That's my best engineering judgment, that l l 15 that would be the most appropriate data to apply. 16 Q. Do you know what the air. receiver tank 17 pressure was when the system was operating? 18 A. Just normally operates at 220 to 240 PSI 19 range in the air receiver. 20 Q. And what about the normal pressure in the 1 21 control air system? 22 A. I have testified to this previously. It 23 is regulated at approximately 60 PSI. 24 Q. And did you take into account the ()25 difference in the pressures when you talked about

l , I ( 1 i i 662 l

 /~N

.U l 1 what the dew point would have been for the control l i 2 air? l 3 A. I'm aware of the effect of pressure on 4 relative humidity and dew point, and I'm aware that l 5 the dew point at 60 PSI is a lower dew point than 6 the dew' point at 240 PSI. l 7 Q. Do you know about how much lower? r 8 A. It's approximately 30 degrees 9 Fahrenheit. The use of a zygometric chart can 10 determine that. It is not a completely constant f 11 function, but you can go into a humidity zygometric 7- 12 chart, go to the different lines of pressure and (-) 13 determine the change in dew point. I 14 Q. Would you agree with me.that humidity in 15 the air would precipitate out, in other words, the 16 dew point would be reached a good deal sooner in the 17 air receiver tank than in the control airlines? 18 A. No. 19 Q. You wouldn't? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Do you think it might be reached at the 22 same time? 23 A. The air receiver tank is a-large tank 24 with considerable thermal mass as compared to small 25 three-eighths inch lines. l sn -

                    =

663 ) l' Therefore, youfhave'to take11nto account ! 2 the. heat transfer and the rated of cooling of a i { 3 i small line,.which would be fairly' rapid as compared- i 4 to the rate of cooling of a1very11arge tank.

                                                                                 )

5 In addition to_that,: you have to take  ! 6 into account lthe aspects of massitransfer within thel 7 tank because the tank is holding a very large volume 8 of air as opposed to.a tiny small.line. 9 It's similar to taking a temperature  : 10 measurement.- A thermometer, you would.use a very i

11 tiny dot device, bulb so that its conditions-i 12 equilibrate rapidly as-opposed to aLvery large item.  !

l 13 which would only change its conditions very' slowly, l 14 i So small lines are going to'be affected

                                                          ~

l I i 15 more rapidly than the large receiver. ! 16 Q. Is'it your view that the water which-17 caused a problem in the control airlines'got there' i l 18 by virtue of the dew point being reached in'those j l 19 lines and moisture in those lines and air in those l 20 lines precipitating out rather than water getting L 21 i into the lines, for axample, from water which i 22 existed in the air receiver? 23 A. I believe that is the most likely l 24 scenario for the creation of water in the trip i L()25 lines. L L l 1 - - - - _. ~ . . - ,

    . - . - . . ~ . -         -  .- . ~ . .              ~     . -   . . . . - . . . - . . -                     . - .~ -        .    -          ..

1 o i R L t. 1664 { i 1 LQ. What'.s your understanding of how-the air 2' :is supplied to the sensors on-the diesel? 3 A. 1 From the receiver through the logic, board ' 4 to the trip. lines to the. sensor, f 5 Q. -Is it. supplied'onlyLwhen necessary, that 6 is,'when you'try to. start the diesel-or~Iis it-  ! 7 supplied at all times? . 8- A. I believe there is~different conditions I 9 based on different trip lines., In addition, the~  !

                                                                                                                                                      ),

i

U1. presence'of leakage would effect that and the --

I

11 Q. The so-called'.006 orifices or orifice i

12' that play an important role in'your theory, is it O 13- your understanding that the air supply to the-j!

                                                                                                                                                     .1 14        sensors passes through-the .006 orifice?

15 h A. Under some conditions of' operation, I. 'i !

  • 16 believe that I will be, I am looking at-that area, l lJ 17 and I believe the statements or understandings. l
                                                                                                                                                       )

18 expressed in this document, I am going to clarify p 19 and correct-those because I have a better l_ '20 understanding of the pneumatic logic board currently. I 21 having obtained a schematic of it through the L i i i 22 discovery process. 1 i 23 Q. So it might be that-the theory that you

l. -24 have outlined in this. document, you will be amending' 25 or-supplementing?
                                                                                                                                                    'l l

I

                                                                                                                            ._....--__._..;.-,1,

l l ! l 665 l 1 A. As I study the logicEdiagram, I real'ize l 2 that I may want to clarify some statements I made  : 3 here because of my initial review of that. It does f l 4 not affect in a general way or in any general way  ! l 5 the basic theory. l I ! 6 MR. BLAKE: I'm going to'stop now i 7 because I have promised Mr. Barth to leave an 8 hour and a half for him to ask questions, and.  ; 9 it's-about 6:30. If he'does not take that 10 time, then I will have an opportunity to t 11 return to this with you. Thank you, Mr. 12 Mosbaugh. t i 13 EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. BARTH:  : 1 15 Q. Mr. Mosbaugh, I will ask you several 16 questions to follow up Mr. Blake's. I 17 If I mischaracterize what you say, please 18 correct me. I think you testified that Mr. Hairston 19 in 1990 submitted papers to the NRC which he knew l 1 20 contained false information; is that correct? i 21 A. If you're referring to the 4/9/90 letter 1 l 22 and the LER, are you referring to others? l

23 Q. I think either he did or he didn't.  !

L 24 Regardless of what the letters may be, is it your l 'N

                        ) 25    testimony that Mr. Hairston submitted information to
              .=.

666 r\ l' NRC in 5490 which you knew contained false 2 information? 3 A. YEs, that is my testimony.  ; 4 (Discussion' ensued off the record.) 5 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Sir, do you consider that 6 Mr. Hairston, because of the submission of false 1 e 7 information to the NRC, so lacks character that he , r 8 should not be permitted to' engage in activities 9 related to Atomic Energy Act as amended? 10 A. Yes, because of the -- 11 MR. KOHN: Do you want him to -- I 12 don't know how you want him to answer the l f'1 (,) 13 question, just as a yes? 14 MR. BARTH: Most of the quastions, I am i 15 entitled to yes or no, but at the same time 16 he is entitled to explain an answer. If he 17 wishes to explain an answer, I certainly 18 would not prohibit him from doing so'. 19 THE WITNESS: Yes, because of the 20 multiple submittals and the pattern of l 21 submitting false information and then 22 proceeding to continue to cover up and not be 23 candid with the NRC about' admitting errors 24 and resolving the problem. ( ) '25 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Going again back to 1990, l

I i i 667 l l' 1 is it your opinion that Mr. McCoy is tainted by the l l 2 lack of good character to the extent that h'e should

3. not be permitted to engage in activities subject to 4 the Atomic Energy Act? i i

5 A. Yes, because of similar' response that I

.        6  gave for Mr. Hairston.

I i 7 Q. I would then take Mr. Bockhold, who was 8 the plant manager at. theLtime, and ask you the same d 9 questions, does he so lack character that he should 1 10 not be permitted to engage in activities regulated i 11 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission? 4 12 A. Yes.  ! 2

   \_, 13         Q. You were the acting general manager'at 14   the time; is that correct, sir?                                                        i i

15 A. No. l 16 Q. On March 20, 1990, were you the acting l l 2 1 17 general manager? 18 A. No. 19 Q. When were you acting general manager? 1 20 A. Never. 21 Q. Were you acting as assistant general I 22 manager? 23 A. Of plant support, yes. 24 Q. And when was this time period, sir?

   's  25         A. I was made acting general manager or

668 O# 1 acting assistant general manager, plant support, in t 2 approximately March of 1989 and held that position 3 until approximately May 10th of 1990- . 4 Q. You had another assistant general 5 manager, Mr. Greene; is that correct? f 6 A. Mr. Greene assumed the role of assistant 7 general manager, plant support, in ap'roximately p May 8 10th of 1990. 9 Q. Do you feel' that the lack of integrity 10 and character ascended above Mr. Hairston in the 11 corporation? 12 A. Yes, I do. 13 Q. Do you feel that Mr. Mcdonald lacked  : 14 character so as to not be trustworthy to operate a 15 nuclear facility? ' 16 A. Yes, I do. 17 Q. Did that extend above, does your opinion 18 extend above Mr. Mcdonald to the president of the 19 corporation at the time? 20 MR. KOHN: For clarification, the 21 president of SONOPCO, we might consider to be 22 Mr. Farley or the president of Georgia 23 Power? 24 MR. BARTH: eN I don't'know where SONOPCO .(j _ 25 came from.

i i e i b

                                                                                                                                                .669
A

(-)" 1- MR. .KOHN: Are you lookingLat-a;1990 ' f 2 time frame, I guess? { i- 3: MR.:BARTH: In March of 1990, there was  : 1 4- no'SONOPCO. I i 5 -Q. (By.Mr.;Barth) Could-you answer?the' '! 6 question?< j 7 14R . KOHN:- 'You're. referring to'the ' i 3' 8 presidentLof Georgia Power? j l, 9 MR. BARTH: Yes. i 1 10 THELWITNESS: I think my answer'would. j 11 be'yes.

                                                                                                                                      -                                     ~

12- Q. ( By ' Mr '. Barth) Mr. Mcdonald'has now been. 13 replaced by Mr. Woodard and Mr. Bockhold.has been { 1 21 4 replaced by Mr. Beasley. -Is it your-view that Mr. l L 15 Beasley and Mr. Woodard are also' tainted with this 1,

*16 culture of lack of good character?

i- ] 17 MR. KOHN: 'I'm not going to object to 18 him answering, but I will pose an objection i j 19 that discovery with respect to remedy;has not 3 4 20 been begun and we have not deposed Mr. ~ i 21 Woodard or Mr. Beasley on this area. So with i' t 22- that, I will allow him to answer. i J 23 THE WITNESS: I don't fully know 24 enough about Mr. Woodard to be comfortable i 25 answering your question. l __ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ - _ - . ~ - . . _ _ _ - . _ . - ---- -- - - ~

                                                                                                    .1 a

i i I i ,a 670 LO j. 1 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Could you answer the 2 question.with regard to Mr. Beasley who is now 3 general manager of the plant? t 4 A. I have difficulty, answering with respect I 5. to Mr. Beasley, also, because there.isn't an issue. i 6 that involves Mr. Beasley that:we have not ~done { 7 discovery on that would help me-in reaching an i 8 answer to your question. 3 j 9 So I' find it difficult to answer =the 10 question with reupect to Mr. Beasley, as well, 5 l 11 because of not having done~the deposition or l ! 12 discovery with him. 3O 1' 13 Q. Do you feel that'the Vogtle facility 14 should not be permitted to operate at the present 15 time under the people who are now operating in it? i j 16 A. Yes, I feel it should not continue to be !- 17 operated under the management structure that'now l $ 18 exista. 19 Q. Do you feel that the Nuclear Regulatory i- 20 Commission has failed in its operations to protect i 21 the public health and safety by permitting the

I d'

j 22 Vogtle facility to operate at the present time? 23 A. I understand'that the NRC is still in the 24 process of making decisions on these issues. i So I .I

    - 25 believe the NRC has failed in the extent that I l
                                                          , ,            , ,_n         evr     -w
  • i
                                                                                         -i t

G 71_ .-

0#

Q i , p' 1' think they7should have been more-timely, but.I would , i

2. reserve-opinion on'that until=the Nuclear Regulatory 3- Commission completos what has been a lengthy 4 investigationcand makes a determination and if,- once.

5 they do that, I hope they do the right thing and I' 8 6 guess I would only.say I1 could only hope that it had' i 7- 'been a little faster. I reserve judgment until they 8 make their dec,isions.  ! 9 Q. At a minimum would_the right thing be to  : 10 prohibit Mr. Hairston and Mr. McCoy'from engaging in 11 the present: activities which they do? 12 A. At this point you're asking my opinion 1 13 about remedy, what I: guess is being referred to as i 14 remedy. I believe there should'be management 15 changes. I believe there should be a-change, a 16 program instituted to change a culture that I 17 believe existed and continues to exist. 18- Q. The question was in direct relation to t 19 Mr. Hairston and Mr. McCoy to whom you already 20 testified lacked character. 21 A. I believe that part of the management 22 changes should include their removal from their 23 current authority over Plant Vogtle.

                 '24              Q. Three times, sir, you responded to 25   questions from Mr. Blake to the effect that Mr.
             .-    . . ~ . . . - . -         -  . . . . . . -  .

a

                                                                                                             '1 I                                                                                                             J 4

l 672- j 1 Chennault saw, quotes, water poured out of the trip 2 lines,.close quote. Is that a reasonable l 3 characterization of your testimony? i 4 A. Not exactly. My references there are to , 5 a portion of the transcript where Mr. Burr'and Mr. 6 Chennault discuss the pouring of water out of a trip 7 line, and based on Mr. Chennault's contribution to-8 the conversation, I infer thatRhe was there and knew

  • 9 about it or saw it. i l

10 Q. Do you recall the piece of' tape ~you il played at the deposition of Kenneth Burr.in which 12' Mr. Burr walked in the room.with a jar or a glass of O

 . V 13   . water?

14 A. No. 15 Q. You do not recall playing the tape, that 16 sort of a tape at the deposition of Kenneth Burr? 17 A. No, I'm sorry. I thought you were 18 talking about -- 19 Q. Should I try the question again, sir? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. Did you attend the deposition of Kenneth 22 Burr? 23 A. Yes, I did. 24 Q. Did you play a tape at that deposition? ()25 A. We played one or more tapes at that

,._m.,.____._.-

l
                                                                                                                            .i l                                                                                                    673                       i
      ~

al . -deposition. .' I Q.. -Did1one of-those tapes contain.'aEpassageL

  • t ,

!_ ;3L in;wh'ich - Mr. Burr. walkAd LintoL a: room- in : wliich

           .4-      Mr. Chennault,was presentlandIMr.fBurriwalkedlinto'                                                       I 4-5-    .the room andisaid he had aiglass or. water >or a jar;                                                 .

.- - . , i

6- of water. Do?you
recall _ playing-that. piece'of[ tape?:

b' ' ~ l

                                                                         .                                                    \

! 7 A. 'I would like to clarify 1your. , ;l 1 1 8 characterization of thefsituatien'.. We:did; play.a l i 9 tape 1 relative'to the' situation you'reidescribing.- l . 4 10- However, Mr. Burr was-inLthe room,he didn'tiwalk ,  ; 11 into the room.

12 -Mr. StokesLwas in
the' room onLthe phone- .

13 and Mr. Chennault was sitting i n t'o - t h e ' r o o m~. t I' , l !. - 14 walked into the room. J f- 15 Mr. Burr was either1 holding or had.next ) 16 to him a jar partially-filled'with: fluid that 17 . appeared to be water, and we played a tape relative 18 to the conversation that occurred in that setting.

                                                        ~
                                                                                                                              ]

l 19 Q. Could you briefly summarize the thrust of 20 that tape, sir? 1 1 21 A .- The thrust of the tape was.when I saw the 1 1 22 jar of fluid, I asked what's that, or something to 1 i 23 that effect, where did that come from. 24 Mr. Burr stated that it had poured out, 25 and it was further clarifled'that it had poured out. l

674 .l 1 of a trip line, meaning a diesel pneumatic trip l

        '2   line.

3 I think words were, .say, out of the end'- l 4 of it. I~think Mr. Chennault had'been the one who i 5 added out of the trip lines as to the origin of '

 ,       6   where it had' poured out.                                                                                        -

7 Q. And in response'to questions from your' 8 counsel, did Mr. Burr not testify he did-not recall 9 this? j 1 10 A. He testified he did not recall that. l 11 Q. When your counsel deposed Mr.fStokes, did 12 not Mr. Stokes also testify he did not recall'this? 13 A. I believe that's-true. 14 Q. Does Mr. Chennault~ recall this at all? 15 A. We didn't depose Mr. Chennault. 16 Q. Do you have any other information which' j i 17 would tell you whether Chennault recalls this? 18 A. I'm not sure if Mr. Burr or Stokes made a l 19 comment about that. 20 Q. Do you know of anyone who. questioned Mr. 21 Chennault and told you the results of his 22 questioning in this regard?' 23- A. Yes. Mr. Robinson indicated'to me that 24 he was going to question Mr. Chennault. That is an. O -( Jo25 additional fact I am aware of. f

                                              ,             ,   , . ,   7.- , _ . . . , . . , .,         y . . . , ,

f, 675

     ,O
                      '_1 -      =Q. Did he tell you the results of his i

2 question 1to Mr. Chennault? j 3 A. I can't recall that he told me the-i 4 results. i 5 Q. Is - this piece of tape part of what 6 convinces you that there was water in pneumatic 7 lines which caused the problem-with the-Calcon 8 switches? 9 A. It's part of it, and the. testimony of j 10 additional witnesses is an additional part of it,  ; 11 because despite the fact that those three witnesses 12 denied having found water in the trip-lines, other 13 witnesses acknowledged their memory that water was , 14 found. 15 Q. Wo.uld it be proper for me to characterize ' 16 your April 12, 1994 note to Mr. Kohn the real cause 17 of diesel 1-A failure, characterize that as stating 18 that your view is that water in the lines caused the 19 problems of the switches? 20 A. Not necessarily of the switches. A 21 proper characterization of my theory is that water 1 22 formed by condensation within the diesel pneumatic 23 system, pneumatic control system caused a variety of 24 malfunctions including the failures during the site O g 25 area emergency.

l 676 1 Q. Did it cause corrosion-in the Calcon i 2 sensors? j i l l 3 'A. It may have caused some corros' ion in the i

        .4      Calcon sensors. Most of the materials of the.Calcon      j 5      sensors would be gen'erally corrosion resistant:to 6     water.

7 Q. From your own personal knowledge there 8 was corrosion of the sensors? i 9 A. Since most of the'componet.es are 10 resistent to corrosion by water in those sensors, 11 generally there wouldn't be' corrosion in them. 12 Q. The question is do you know of.your own 13 personal knowledge if there was corrosion in the 14 Calcon sensor switches? 15 A. My only knowledge about corrosion within 16 a Calcon sensor is obtained from NUREG 1410. 17 MR. BARTH: Counsel, could you ask your 18 witness to answe^. the question? l 19 MR. KOHN: He answered it. He'said 20 that he has no knowledge other than what's in 21 NUREG 1410. 22 MR. BARTH: Thank you for that. 23 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Does the NRC analysis. l' 24 agree with your theory that water caused the 25 problems? I

                                 -~

l 1 l I 677 1- MR. KOHN:- Can:you; identify?which~NRC i a 2 analysis?. 3' MR. BARTH: ~Any . . ,

          ~4                   Q.     . (By Mr. Barth). :Did'the-NRC' analysis-
                       ~after the accident on-the 20th'of March / support you'r.

5 i 6 theory that there was water insthe-lines?l  ! l 7? '. A . I'can -- , 8 MR. KOHN: I are-you referring to NUREG 9 1410? 10 THE. WITNESS: I consider thelNRC's-

                                                                                                                                  \

L1 analysis-to be that which is contained 11n "t i 12 NUREG 1410. However, that analysis is:a. lA l 13 melding of the~NRC's.-analysis as.obtained l 14 from Georgia Power plus'whatever analysis - 15 they added to that. It doesn',t state.in the-  ; 16 NRC analysis. 17 It states the licensee' conclusion. I l 18 believe it states the licensee has concluded 19 or something to that.effect that the most l 20 probable cause is improper intermittent-l , 1 21 operation of the Calcun switch. That does l 22 not agree with my analysis, and I believe { 23 that statement of the licensee's most  ! 24 probable conclusion is incorrect. 25 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Are you aware of'the u l

p l j' 678 i (_ L1'- concl'usion of.the manufacturer of the~ switches,. -! 2 sensors?. .i _ 3 A .. I'm not aware th'at.'the manufacturer.of' 4 the switches,'the Calcon-corporation, d'idian 5- analysis which concluded,anything-'about theidiesel1 6 failure duringjthe-site; area emergency.. < 7 Q. Taking.you backLto Ken-Burr's'-deposition, j 8 do you recall that Mr. Burr testified that there 1 j 9-were regular meetings'every day in which the events l 10 were discussed and at which the NRC was7present?: 11- A. I know from his~ deposition.and from 12 events. occurring 1at thel time that'there were-13 frequent meetings with the NRC~and a'whole variety 14 of Georgia Power people.

.5 Q. Did you attend those meetings,Hsir?

16 A. I attended some, probably not all that 17 many, but I attended some meetings with the IIT team 18 or members. 19 Q. Do you recall discussing problems with 20 the diesel generators at those meetings? 21 A. Yes, problems-that were discussed-with 22 the IIT team. 23 Q. Is it correct that you workediclosely 24 with Mr.-Robinson, the'NRC investigator, in-O' developing his investigation? L) 2 5 a

679 O 1 A. No, I wouldn't say so. When you say 2 developing his investigation, you mean like writing 7 $ 3 his report? 4 Q. No. Did you suggest areas for him to 5 investigate? 6 A. I gave Mr. Robinson allegations. I gave 7 Mr. Robinson testimony. ' 8 Q. Is the sum and substance of the 9 information you gave to Mr. Robinson contained in 10 your allegations and in your two depositions? Not 11 depositions, examinations under oath. 12 A. I gave Mr. Robinson allegations at my 13 first meeting before my first OI interview, I had a 14 lengthy discussion with him where I informed him of 15 a lot of things and gave him documentation that's a 16 meeting that occurred in mid June of 1990. 17 It wasn't until about July, it seems like 18 the 17th or 18th that we did a formal interview. I 19 sent, in the course of the summer of 1990, I sent . 20 additional documentation to Mr. Robinson. I recall 21 I sent additional allegations to Mr. Robinson. 22 So I would say the sum and substance of 23 the information I gave to Mr. Robinson is not 24 limited to the two OI interviews. 25 It's those interviews plus documentation L

680

 ,O k )'

m 1- plus allegations that I have given him over the 2 course of time. 3 Q. Did you tell him what telephone calls had

                      -4     been made and did you ask him questions about those 5   telephone calls?

6 A. What telephone calls had been made when? 7 Q. During March and April 1990. 8 A. Yes, I discussed communications that'had 9 occurred in that time frame. 10 MR. KOHN: Were you referring to the 11 conference calls in tapes 57 and 59? 12 MR. BARTH: I haven't 7n answer. C\ Q 13 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Have you read, Mr. 14 Robinson's OI report? 15 A. Yes, I have. 16 Q. And do you agree with it? 17 A. I guess basically I do. However, I 18 believe in some areas, the OI report does not go far 19 enough in detail. 20 Q. Do you think that it is, with its 21 exhibits, persuasive? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Do you think that an educated person with 24 a normal intelligence would be persuaded that the 25 conclusions reached by Mr. Robinson are correct? [\~)\

681 [ \/ 1 A. I would think so. 2 Q. You are aware that the OI investigation 3 was turned over to the Department of Justice for 4 their review; are you not? 5 A. At that point in time, yes. 6 Q. You're aware that the matter was reviewed 7 by a grand jury in Atlanta, Georgia; are you not? 8 A. Yes,, I am. 9 Q. You are aware that on March 31, 1993, 10 Sally Yates wrote a letter that the Department of 11 Justice had declined to prosecute the case? f3 12 A. I am not aware of the date. I know that 13 the Department of Justice's involvement ended with 14 respect to the case. 15 Q. Are you aware that the Department of 16 Justice declined to prosecute? 17 A. I guess I lack sufficient understanding 18 of decline to prosecute. I know they dropped the 19 case, to use more lay terminology. 20 Q. And some five months later in July, you 21 testified before the U.S. Senate committee on 22 Environment Health Works, Exhibit No. 8, and on page 23 ten you stated after the accident, I was able to 24 record evidence demonstrating that management had O(_) 25 engaged in criminal conspiracy to conceal

682 ( i safety-related information pertaining to the site 2 area emergency and intentionally submitted material 3 false statements to the NRC with respect to the site 4 area emergency. 5 I just ask your evaluation. Isn't that 6 presumptious, after the Department of Justice has 7 not found the same view? 8 A. No, because the statement says I 9 documented evidence that showed a criminal 10 conspiracy. I gave that evidence to the NRC. 11 The NRC thought that evidence was 12 sufficiently persuasive to refer it to the 13 Department of Justice, and that process occurred for 14 a period of time until it was dropped. 15 I don't know all the grounds for it being 16 dropped, but that says to me that the Criminal 17 Investigation Division of the NRC thought, didn't 18 think it was presumtious, that it had involved a 19 criminal conspiracy or they wouldn't have forwarded 20 it to the Department of Justice. 21 Q. Are you aware that the group in the NRC 22 called, for lack of a better title, the Vogtle 23 Coordinating Group, did not arrive at a conclusion 24 that criminality was involved, are you aware of

    ,b)             25                  this?

683 O 1 A. No, that's not, that wouldn't be exactly 2 my understanding. The reason for that is that I '.. Il 3 thought that wrongdoing, which I guess to me equates ' 4 with criminality,. included, I will use the term 5 careless. disregard and it is my perception and maybe 6 I'm incorrect that careless disregard is what the 7 coordinating group found. , 8 Now, maybe I'm misunderstanding the NRC's 9 structure and level of violations, but -- 10 Q. Is it not true that the OI investigation 11 came to the conclusion that Georgia' Power personnel 12 intentionally and deliberatly lied to the NRC? O 13 A. Yes, it's my understanding th'at'the OI 14 made those kinds of statements. 15 Q. And you have testified that that report 16 is persuasive. Did the Vogtle Coordinating Group's 17 report r e a c h t h e s a m e c o n c l u s i'o n , sir? 18 A. No, it did not. 19 Q. And, therefore, is it proper to assume 20 that these people simply cannot understand the 21 report or are misguided? 22 MR. KOHN: I'm going to object to the 23 question inasmuch as you're asking the s 24 witness to speculate as to the knowledge and 25 involvement of the coordinating group.

i 684 y\

     >    1                 Discovery has been pending for many 2         months for the NRC to provide that 3         information, and I believe the judge entered 4         an order requiring the responses to be 5         filed.

. 6 Inasmuch as you are just asking the 7 witness to speculate, I find the question at' 8 this time to be improper. 9 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Could you answer the 10 question, please? 11 MR. KOHN: Could you restate the 12 question, please? ('} 's_j 13 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Do you find that the view 14 of the Vogtle Coordinating Group is unreasonable? 15 A. I don't agree with I don't agree with 16 the view of the Vogtle Coordinating Group in its 17 report. I believe that the coordinating group has 18 been too lax in its viewing of these violations, and 19 I believe the Vogtle Coordinating Group did not use 20 all of the factual basis that's in the OI report. 21 I additionally believe that I hope that 22 the members of the Vogtle Coordinating Group will 23 use the additional facts that have been obtained 24 through these depositions to take a second look. ()25 Q. You already testified, sir, that a

685 O1 reasonable and intelligent person would come-to the 2 same conclusion as the OI report. So I'didn't ask 3 you the question since the Vogtle' Coordinating Group 4 did not come to that conclusion. 5 MR. KOHN: First, I object because the 6 coordinating group is not a person. 7 Group think is a very different thing, 8 and we do not know who the coordinating group 9 is. So I'm going to instruct the witness not 10 to answer. 11 MR. BARTH: You are well aware that the 12 court cases are quite clear that you should-( ) 13 not -- 14 MR. KOHN: If you can tell us who the is coordinating group is. 16 MR. BARTH: If you will be quiet, I 17 will continue, Mr. Kohn. The composition of 18 the group is not of any interest. The 19 group's opinion is of interest. I don't care 20 who is on that. I'm asking was the group's 21 view reasonable. 22 MR. KOHN: Well, I object. 23 MR. BARTH: Do you still maintain that 24 he may not answer that question? 25 MR. KOHN: If you want him to maintain

686

  /"s k'~ ')

1 a response as to the group's reasonableness, 2 then he needs to know the identity of the 3 group. 4 You have failed to provide that 5 information to date. If you will provide it 6 now in your question, I will allow the 7 witness to answer. 8 MR. BARTH: Are you aalstructing him not 9 to answer? 10 MR. KOHN: I'm asking you to provide 11 the information he needs to answer. 12 Mk. BARTH: Answer the question. (D (_) 13 MR. KOHN: Mr. Mosbaugh, if the 14 coordinating group consisted of individuals 15 who were incompetent, would that affect your 16 answer? 17 MR. BARTH: I'm conducting the 18 deposition, not you. Under the regulations 19 you are permitted to object and state your 20 objections and that's all. I'm not here to 21 argue, Mr. Kohn. If you want to instruct him 22 not to answer, instruct him not to answer. 23 I will be glad to take it to the judge 24 if I have to. You have your choice, but I'm f% ( ,) 25 not here to argue. Besides, I don't have \ .

i 687 Ik l' much time. It's a rather simple question, i 2 was the group's conclusion reasonable. { 3 MR. KOHN: I.will restate my.

          .4          objection. The' witness can answer.

1 5 THE WITNESS:, I disagree with the j 6 group's view, and in light.of what:I know, I 7 believe the group based its view on some  : 8 information that has now been shown to be- 1

                                                                                                                          )

9 incorrect. 10 So because'of those factors, I believe ' 1 11 at this time the group's view and conclusion l 1 12 is not reasonable to me. At the time =the 73 13 Vogtle Coordinating Group made their view, I i 14 didn't and perhaps they didn't know'as much 15 as I know.

                                                                                                                          )

16 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Could I take you-back to  ! 17 when you began making tapes. When did you start-  ! 18 making these tapes, Mr. Mosbaugh? l 19 A. I believe the first tape recording that I 20 made-at Plant Vogtle was in February of 1990. 21 Q. Do you have any kind of an idea how long 22 each one of these tapes last? Were these hour tapes 23 or two hours? ! 24 A. They were not all, I' don't believe they 25 were all recorded at the same speed, but the L

! i l l l 688 > l (~')s

     \~

1

                                                                              \

majority of them were recorded at the speed where 2 they would have approximately a maximum of one hour I ! 3 on.a side. I 4 Q. Is that two hours a tape? l 5 A. A maximum of two hours a tape if.they l 6 were recorded -- l j i 7 Q. For some 277 tapes made.be' tween March i i 8 and, when was the last one, September? 9/7/90, does  ! 9 that comport with your memory? 10 A. No, my memory was that the first tape was 11 made in February, not March. I 12 Q. The concluding date is correct,  !

    -(-   13  approximately?

14 A. Approximately the first week in September l l 15 of 1990. 16 Q. Mr. Blake questioned you about this very 17 briefly at the last deposition. Could you start the 18 tape recorder with your hands outside of your pocket 19 or would you have to reach in? Could you tell me 20 the mechanics of how this worked? 21 A. I would start the tape recorder by having 22 my hand inside my pocket. 23 Q. Did you turn the tape off and on during 24 various recording sessions so as to eliminate what 25 you thought was just not ' relevant or garbage?

1

                                                                                     -689    ,
  <~                                                                                         f k_g[                                     -

1 A. Generally not, but I couldn't give you an 2 absolute answer in that regard.- Generally I tried 3 to'get'the segment of the conversation that I was '! l 4 recording in its full context. f l 5 So generally I would, if I knew 6 beforehand that I wanted to record a particular l 7 conversation, I would attempt to initiate-it at the l ] 8 beginning of ~ the conversation or when I entered the i 9 conversation and would not terminate it until I left 10 or until the conversation ended. j 11 However, sometimes if I was not recording 12 and a conversation struck up, if you will, then I-13 would need to initiate tape recording of the 14 conversation that I was interested in recording. ! 15 Q. Did you initiate conversations in order l *16 to record them if you knew there was a topic that ! 17 should be recorded? l 18 A. No, I generally went about doing my 19 business as a manager the way I normally did which, 20 in many records, I did business by walking around 21 and meeting with my people and talking to my 22 people. 23 That was a little bit of my management i j 24 style, was to drop in to people's offices. So I l /' i' 25 continued the same management style.

   ..   ~...- .-_. _ - - -.                   - .   - - . . . - . .        . . _ - . _ - . - - .    . .-

I i i

690 i

O' ;1 Q. Were any NRC persons present Eduring these 2 taping sessions, and I exclude theLtape session.you  ; 3 had with the NRC' inspector in his; office. 4- A. Yes, there were some meetings.that I-5 recorded where NRC personnel were present. So the 6- answer is yes.-  ; i 7 Q. Were there many of'those meetings?  ! 8 MR. KOHN: I" object. .That has nothing 9 to do with -- can you tie this into diesel  ! 10 generators, Mr. Barth? I'm not aware-of any , 11 such-meeting that had anything'to do with-i 12 diesel generators. Can you!tell me how'it, l 13 ties in? i 14 MR..BARTH: No, but I think you have  ; 15 made an excellent suggestion and I appreciate 16 it. I would like to rephrase the question, i 17 but you have really helped me out. 18 Q. (By Mr.. Barth) On any of the matters 19

                                ~

relating to reporting of starts of diesel' generators 20 after March 20, when you taped were NRC personnel 21 present? 22 A. Will you rephrase 'r restate that? I 23 didn't listen to the conditions again. 24 Q. You have heard-it from both your counsel ()25 and me. At any of the taping sessions which

l 691 )

           -1   regarded the diesel generator start matter or the 2  reporting of it, the LER, the April 9 meeting, the                                                 i 3  April 9 letter, were NRC personnel'present?

. 4 A. Well, I believe at meetings -- i 5 Q. At tapings. 6 A. I had a conversation with the resident l 7 inspector of where I discussed with him my concerns 8 -about LER and diesel statements that I taped, and I 9 recall that'when the OSI team in August' exited, I 10 recall recording that meeting. i 11 Q. Were there any others, Mr. Mosbaugh? , 12 A. When diesel generator starts or the LER 13 or COA issues were discussed, that's the question? ,

                                                                                                                   )

l 14 Q. You attended the depcsition of Jimmy Paul 15 Cash; did you not? 16 A. Yes. a 17 Q. Your counsel asked Mr. Cash what start 18 numbers he gave Mr. Bockhold. Do you recall that? 19 A. Yes, I do. 20 Q. Do you recall the numbers Jimmy Paul Cash I 21 gave him? 22 A. I believe Mr. Cash said he gave him 27 23 and 22 or 23. I 24 Q. Did you attend the deposition of Mr.

>    r

( ,, 25 Bockhold, sir? l  !

                                                         ,-   ,-.                                          - - ~ w

l [

    ~

692

  /h
 !     1
  \J 1          A. Yes.

2 Q. Did your counsel ask Mr. Bockhold the 3 number of starts that were given him by Jimmy Paul 4 Cash? 5 A. I think he did. l 6 Q. He not testify under oath that Jimmy Paul , 7 Cash told him 18 and 19? l l 8 A. That's my recollection of Mr. Bockhold's l 9 testimony. 10 Q. I am done with the facts. Now I would L 11 like your personal opinion. Knowing these people,

       \

12 which one of these people was telling the truth? Ikl 13 A. Mr. Cash is telling the truth, in my 1 14 opinion. Mr. Bockhold had already put 18 and 19 15 down on the slide before Mr. Cash brought him back 16 the list with his totals of 22 or 23 and 27 17 respectively. 18 Q. This is speculative, so please don't 19 object, Mr. Kohn. Where on earth did Mr. Cash get 20 this 18 and 19 figure from? 21 A. He didn't. 22 Q. Where did Mr. Bockhold get this figure 23 from? 24 A. Mr. Bockhold got it between him and Mr. 25 Burr, in my opinion.

693 f' 1 Q. During the course of the-OI 2 investigation, did you also have meetings with the 3 director of~the Office of Investigations? 4 A. Who is the director of the Office of 5 Investigations? 6 Q. At that time it was a-man by the name of 7 Ben Hayes. 8 A. I don't recall meeting Ben Hayes during 9 the'OSI inspection. 10 Q. OI investigations. 11 A. I'm sorry. I may have misunderstood.- 12 Mr. Ben Hayes came to my house and met with me 13 during the course of the OI investigation which, of 14 course, spanned a number of years. 15 Q. This is the house in_ Georgia? i i 16 A. My residence in Georgia, that's correct. 17 Q. You testified in response to a question 18 by Mr. Blake it's been an historical fact that when 19 the dew point was high, there were problems with the 20 diesels. Do you recall this and do I accurately 21 characterize it? 22 A. For the period of time that I have 23 reviewed, that's correct. l l 24 Q. Is this any more than a layman's

     )25    observation, or do you have any kind of strong-1

l l 694 O 1 factual indication that this is true? 2 A. I am in the process of reviewing the 3 information and data that I obtained through ( 4 discovery which includes the maintenance work order l l 5 list provided by Georgia Power and the information I 6 have been able to obtain about diesel problems and 7 failures, and I have already noted a degree of 8 correlation, a fairly good degree of correlation. 9 Q. Will you tell us what the Pearson Product 10 Moment is? 11 A. No, I cannot do that. 12 Q. I thought you just said there is a good 13 degree of correlation. Would you tell us what it 14 is? 15 A. You have asked for a technical

     '16   statistical quantification.

17 Q. That's what correlation is. You said 18 it's a good correlation and I'm simply using your  ! 19 own words. Tell us what the good correlation is 20 Pearson Product Moment is? 21 A. I have not reached the point in my 22 evaluation to do a statistical analysis. What I 23 have noted in terms of correlation is that during  ! 24 the periods of days of high dew point, it has been j ( ) 25 coincident with the days on which the diesels i 1

   .n,     . . , . - -- . . . - - . . _ .               -

3 L: y < g ir

                                                                                      ~
695; i i

sfm  ;

     %  f    1        experience: problems.

f

            ~ 2'                 Q.            Have you worked out.'aicorrelation or do-                                                                     j i

3 -.you.have an impression 1from looking[at.the data?c j ~ 4 A. 'I have notfdone any: statistical? analysis' l i 1 I 5 Lat;.this time. , e 6- [ L i-Q. Could I-referryou tolthe; executive L 7 . summary, Vogtle:Diese1~ Operability,sdolyoulremember- - 8 that document which you providedito Mike ~Co'11 ins?L l

                                                                                  .                                                                             i 9                   A.           .I. remember-the document-'you're looking.                                                                     -l 10         at.        The executive summary.of diese1Loperability is                                                                                  '

l-L ;11 not my document. ' That 's1a ' document --.that Georgia 12 Power prepared by that title.- . What$you:haveLis'my. l ( ) 13 write-up about that. 14 Q. I believe there is a-figure for11989 r f o r... ' i 15 Vogtle Unit 1 and Vogtle. Unit 2 of .006.andefor 1990- i 16 of .08. Are these correct, sir? f 17 A. Those are --

                                                                          'the .08 number-wasLnot on i

18 the chart in the executive summary Vogtle diesel: '! 19 operability, but the .08 number was the number told 20 to me by the performance engineer.that maintains. 21 that data as of April.  ! 22 Q. Well, it may have been my-lack of , 23 attention to you and-Mr. Blake, but could you.tell L 24- me what the .08 represents? ( 25 A. .08 represents the fraction of a whole, L l: e- , . .,-m.-b-r . --y.#. _.m_ _ ,_, __. ,,. ,__,.m .

                                                                                             - , , . , ,,g%    , ,, . .n, hy    _ w,w    ,,1w,y3.,..,y p g,. g

i 696 OL 1 the fraction of one at which time the' diesel is 2 unavailable for service. 3 Q. What. period of time does the .08 cover? 4 A. Those data are prepared.on a-year-to-date 5 basis, and I think I was not clear at the time'as to

6. whether that's a 12-month rolling average'or a1 7 12-month annual. average. My best' recollection?is2 8 that it is onL,a?12-month' annual average. So it' 9 would represent'that data to date in 1990, but'I 10 would want to look at the combinations to beisure
        ~11  about that.

Q. Do you' recall your counsel-asking?Mr. O-12 13 Webb about this figure? 14 A. No. To~ help you out, I-believe he asked 15 Mr. Williams about it. - 16 Q. Thank you, you're right. So you'do 17 remember that? 18 A. Yes, sir. 19 Q. Do you recall Mr. Williams' . response? 20 A. Yeah, he acknowledged that that was the 21 data at that point in time for 1990. 22 Q. And did he not testify that the .08 L 23 represented three months of data for 1990 which 24 would make it an arithmetic average of the three f- 25 months?

697 i i

  • 's '

1 A. I think it's a year-to date figure, and I 2 think, like I said, my best belief is that it's 3 year-to-date based on the year 1990. 4 So if that's correct, it would have been 1 5 the value year-to-date for January, February, and 6 March. Also from Mr. Williams' testimony, I believe > 7 that the .08 was stated to not include the failures 8 of the site area emergency. i 1 9 Q. Just to make it clear, it would not be a l 10 difficult mathematical exercise to determine what 11 the averages were for January, February, and March 12 to March 20, 1990 to bring it down to.08 from .006 A (_) 13 from the preceding year? 14 A. I don't believe that, if it's correct i l 15 that it's year-to-date basis, I don't believe that 16 the data from 1989, then, would play a role in the 17 1990 data. If it was a rolling average, it would. 18 Q. And you don't know which it is? 19 A. My best recollection at this point, and I 20 saw year-to-date on that as an asterisk note at the 21 bottom, I think it says YTD. 22 My best recollection, having noted that, 23 is that that stimulates to me that I think it's an 24 annual 12 months rather than a rolling 12 months.

   ,rx

( ) 25 Q. Can you make any sort of reasonable

i 698 l (~h (_) 1 scientific conclusions with three months of data? 2 A. I think you can. I believe this was 1 3 noted in the testimony with Mr. Williams, in 1987 4 there is only six months of data. It had jumped up 5 more than an order of magnitude from .006 to .08. 6 Even though it isn't a whole year, I 7 think it's something that should be I that is ,

8 flagging a trend.

9 Like I say, I note that .08, I believe 10 Mr. Williams said, did not include the failures of 1 11 the site area emergency. So I think it is i l 12 indicating a significant departure. J

  %  13        Q.

l Are you talking in terms of statistics or 14 talking in terms of a layman's looking at it? ' 15 A. I'm talking in terms of a layman rather 16 than a statistical evaluation, though a statistical i 17 evaluation could be done. 18 Q. I think there was, it is my impression l 19 from the questions your counsel was asking that l 20 there was a feeling that Mr. Bockhold was trying to 21 hide the 1990 data from public revelation at the 22 time. Is that a reasonable assumption of_mine? 23 A. I don't know about public revelation, but 24 I think he knew it looked bad. It was something  ! 25 that would raise eyebrows'and have to be explained j l l l

699

 '\m)    1  if it was put on that chart; and because of it 2  looking bad, it would have to be explained to the 3  NRC, and he chose to not include it in that chart.

4 Q. From your working in the plant and your 5 knowledge of the plant, is there any data in that 6 facility that the NRC cannot obtain by simply 7' walking in and picking it up? - 8 A. I don't know how to answer that question. l 9 Q. That's a good answer. To the best of 10 your knowledge, does the NRC have the ability to i l 11 obtain any information it wants from the plant? 12 A. I believe the NRC has a right to access i (/ ) 13 any information they want at the plant. I believe l l 14 probably the NRC's biggest problem in doing that is 15 there is so:much information and there is relatively

      .16   so few NRC people to look.

17 Q. And if Mr. Bockhold wanted to play cutesy l 18 and not show 1990 data, is it not true that the NRC 19 could find that data simply by asking for it? 20 A. If they knew to ask for it or wanted to 21 ask for it, they most certainly could. I would like 22 to make an additional statement with respect to the 23 last response, if I could. 24 Q. Certainly. I A. The fact that the NRC has the power and (_-) 2 5

700 i-As/ 1 the authority'to access information at the plant in 2 no way alleviates the responsibility of the people 3 at the plant for providing accurate and complete 4 information to the NRC. i 5 So in no way is Mr. Bockhold's action of 6 not providing complete informational alleviated by 7 the fact that the NRC has those powers. 8 Q. Thank you. That's well understood. Have 9 you seen the response by Georgia Power Company to 1 10 the NOV, their responses dated July 31, 1994? I ) l 11 show you the front cover. Have you seen this? I I 12 A. I have just recently seen that. (' ( j) 13 Q. Have you read any parts of it? 14 A. I have read some parts of it. I have not 15 had an opportunity to read it all or read it in 16 detail. 17 Q. I would like to read you a sentence and 18 ask for your comment. The sentence is on page five 19 of the Reply to Notice of Violation, EA 93-304. 20 One of the reasons that the BEGP general l I 21 manager tasked the unit superintendent to review the 22 logs and count the number of DG starts was due to 23 the absence of the single source engineering support 24 DG start log based on data sheets or DG's. Do you ( 25 understand what he said? l l-l

[: i L 701 pfw kl 1- A. Not exactly. I would like.to read'that'.' 2 Q. I will provide it for.you, sir,-tofread l l l 3- it. , j 4 A. I have read'that sentence now. 5 Q. On April 9, what was your position with 6 the' plant, sir in, even though you have answered 1 t 7 many times before? I 8 A. . Do you have a.. question about this? 9 Q. Yes. l 10 A. My position on April 9th, 1990, I was.the l 11 acting assistant general manager, plant support ~. 12' Q. Did you have any working' relationship (~h () 13 with the diesel generator log which is stated in-14 that sentence? 15 A. The system engineer maintained a log 16 called the diesel generator start log, and that f 17 engineer worked under my organization. Is that the 18 relationship you're looking for? l 19 Q. Were you aware on April 9 that that log 20 was not up to date? l 21 A. I don't believe I was aware. 1 22 Q. In your normal course of duties, would. 23 you be aware on a day-to-day basis whether that log 24 was up to date? 25 ( A. No, not generally. y 7- , -ww-

l l l 702 (-- (_) 1 l Q. Because I don't know, where was that log 2 kept? I'm talking physically.  ! i l 3 A. The log that the diesel system engineer i 4 kept was a summary log that he kept at his desk. It l  ! 5 was a summary tabulation. The data came to him when  ! 6 the operators filled out data sheets and sent them 7 to him. He kept his log, and his log was not a 8 source log. It was a summary log based on the data 1 9 sheets being sent to him? 10 A. And he kept that log at his desk. 11 Q. Was his desk in a closed office and the _ 12 office had a door? i\x-) 13 A. His desk was in a bull pen area where 14 probably 30 or 40 engineers had their, it was in a 15 cubicle kind of office in a bull pen kind of area on i 16 the third floor of the service building. 17 Q. In your position at the time, you had a 18 great deal of responsibility. As a matter of course 19 did you check to see if these kinds of logs were up I 20 to date? 21 A. No, I would not normally do that, no. l 22 Q. The next is an opinion question. Would 23 you expect the general manager would check that log 24 on a daily basis?

 ,G

(,) 2 5 A. No.

i 703

    )

i i 1 Q. Do you have any idea how Mr. Bockhold 2 knew as of April 9 that that log was not up to date? 3 A. No, I don't. 4 Q. Did Mr. Bockhold ever discuss'with you 5 that the log isn't'up to date, Allen, get'that thing l 6 up to date? l l l 7 A. Not that I can remember. l 8 Q. If you had known that that log was not up j 9 to date, would you have taken measures' to see that 10 it was up to date? l 1 1' A. The need for this-log to be up to date l 12 was for the purpose of meeting NRC requirements i 13 relative to reporting the number of valid failures 14 in the last hundred diesel starts. 15 So reports like that were reported in a 1 16 special report to the NRC. Such special reports, we 17 would make, and I believe sometimes we would meet l 18 those special reports via the LER submittals. 19 So as long as the log was brought up to 20 date at the time that a statement of valid diesel 21 failures in the last hundred was being made in a 22 document being prepared, then the log met its 23 intended purpose. l 24 The need to have the document up to date lO l (_ 25 each and every day would be unnecessary unless on

704

 /^y                                                                             !

l 1 that day, information was being compiled from it for l 2' the purposes of stating number of failures in the l 3 last hundred. 4 It would have concerned me if I-had known

5. the log had been out of date and used because.if 6 that were true, then inaccurate information could be 7 obtained or could be given, but I didn't' view that 8 log as something, and I don't view that log right 9 now as something that requires an absolute live time 10 updating as long as the individual using it is aware 11 of its status.

12 Q. I was just called upon to make a' side 13 comment, that sort of was a good clear answer. 14 A. I would like to make another comment 15 about the statement since we are reviewing that 16 statement in that response. That statement didn't 17 make any sense to me. Mr. Bockhold's assignment to 18 Mr. Cash was not related to that log or its status. 19 Q. Thank you for the suggestion. Were'you j 20 present when Mr. Bockhold gave his instructions to 21 Mr. Cash to make the count? 22 A. No, I was not. 23 Q. Did Mr. Bockhold tell you what his 24 instructions to Mr. Cash were? 25 A. Yes, he did, in the course of deposition. L . .

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J h

4 705 O

U 1 .Thank you. j Q. You had no prior' knowledge ^ t j 2 from Mr. Bockhold as to.what he' instructed Mr.'Cashi 3 to-do, is that correct, prior..to the deposition? l 4 A. -No. F 5 Q. Did Jimmy Paul ever tell you pri'or tofhis I ) 6 deposition what he was instructed to'do?. i~ j -- 7 A. Yeah, he had some conversation with me l 8 about1what1he did. I can't recall.if he was telling 2 3 9 me what he did.as1 opposed.to what his instructions 10 were. He may not have~said his instructions. He ' ( 11 may have-just said what he did. p . 12 Q. Your~second request for admissions totthe } . 13 staff requests that the staff admit the1 truth and~ l 14 accuracy of OI Exhibit 36, and the collateral 1 [ 15 matter. Those are your tapes number 57 and 58. 16 Your counsel, Georgia-Power counsel, andicounsel'for j -17 NRC have agreed to those tapes. .Could you tell.me i

18 why you asked us to do it twice?'

k 19 MR. KOHN: The witness didn't prepare J 20 those files. We would be happy to discuss-i 21 that when I get back t.o. Washington. i 22 THE WITNESS: .No , I can't tell you ] 23 that. J j 24 MR. KOHN: If there is something you f' 25 would like to discuss about that for J 1 i-4 i

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i I

                                                                                       .a 706 Oi      ~1 :           clarification, just give.me a call,. Charles.                  l 2           .Q.        (By Mr. Barth)  HaveLyou reviewed-and 3    approved the1 discovery requests that your counsel 4   .:has. filed upon the NRC prior'to their being filed?

5 A. :I believe we have discussed:them,=but I j 6 .wouldn't say that I approved or: reviewed and 7 approved. .I have had.some discussion about-those 8 issues, but Il,wouldn't say I have reviewed'them 9 frequently.. l- ! 10' Q. During March, April, and May~1990, did 11- you discuss any of your tape ~ recordings:with NRC I ! - ,12 . personnel excluding'in-regard to.the dieseln hd ) 13- . generator issue?- Lo L .14 ' A. No. 15 -Q. After the tape recordings.were turned' 16 over to the NRC, it is my understanding'that'che NRC 17 had transcripts of these tapes made; is that l 18 correct? 19 A. That's correct.'  ! l~ 20 Q. Did you and Lori Robinson go over a  ! l 1 21- number of those transcripts and make handwritten l 22 notes as to who the voices were and fil3 in voices 23 an'd words? i 24- A. Yes,.I did. l 25 Q. I have seen a number of transcripts with l

                                                                                        'l l'

u _i

1 707 l 1 handwriting on it. Is some of that your handwriting i 2 or did you and Ms. Robinson both handwrite on them? 3 A. I made notations as to voice  ! 4 Il' identifications and corrections as I listened to l 5 transcripts with.Mr. Robinson and Mr. C;taig at a 6 time. I had a copy. I believe'there ware other l 7 copies that Mr. Robinson had. I know 2: wrote on r 8 mine. 9 He may have written on his. I think I l l 10 recall him writing on his. So I suspect there i l 11 exists transcripts with mine and his. -I am not sure ! 12 that Mr. Craig at a time didn't write on some of the

 /~T 13      transcripts, too.

14 Q. In response to a question from'Mr. Blake, i 15 you stated that you had experience with diesel 16 generators; is that correct, sir?

17 A. In the course of my work history in '

18 nuclear power, I have had contact and had 19 supervisory experience over engineers that had 20 diesel generator responsibilities. In the course of 21 training I have had some systems training which 22 included diesel generators, but -- 23 Q. I don't wish to interrupt. I do not wish 24 to limit you to nuclear power; any of your work 25 experience.

708 1 A. In my other professional work experience,- ' 2 I have not had experience with diesel generators. I 3 do own some diesel engines. 4 Q. Is it correct for me to assume that your 5 diesel generator experience is limited to that that 6 you had at the Vogtle facility? t 7 A. No. I worked at other fac111 ties. i l 8 Q. Could you tell me their names, sir? 9 A. I worked at the Zimmer Nuclear Power 10 Plant. ' 11 Q. Was the generator operating at the Zimmer ' 12 plant when you were there? 13 A. I believe that -- l j 14 Q. It's never operated. 15 A. Excuse me. l 16 Q. The Zimmer has never operated. 17 A. Yeah, I know, but the plant's equipment 18 was in a fairly advanced state of preoperational 19 readiness and I believe that included the diesel 20 generator. 21 I had responsibility over the same area 22 like system engineers and preoperational test 23 engineers. I believe at the time that Zimmer was 24 shut down, let's say the preoperational testing was ( ) 25 almost 90 percent complete.

. 709 1' Q. Could you please detail ~for me your 2 experience with the diesel generators. Did you put 3 your hands on it, take it apart, help put it 4' -together? 5 A. No. . 6 Q. 'I want to know~ what: kind of; expertise- you 7 have had with a diesel generator. .I.will. allow you 8- to develop that for me. 9 A. I would not have had.the hands-on 10 experience with the diesels. Like I said' , I have 11 had.some systems training, diesel' generators as'.part 12 of my systems training and SRO' kind of training. 13 Because I supervised the-engineers that 14 were testing diesels and engineers that had the 15 system responsibilities with diesels, I would be 16 involved in diesel generator issues, problems, and 17 that kind of activity; but I never.had the 18 assignment as a diesel system engineer and I would 19 not have had a lot of so-called hands-on experience; 20 though I have done walk-downs of the diesels and 21 certainly have crawled around them, been in the 22 field with them running and with them testing and 23 being tested'by the engineers. 24 Q. Are you certain that Mr. Boardman had the 25 diesels running at the time?

i i 710 l 1 1 A. Mr. Boardman was responsible for -- Q.. Construction. 3 A. Construction. activities. My . 4 ' responsibilities were over theLpreoperational) 5 . testing activities; and yes, my-recollection.is thatL J 1 6 the. diesels were-operational.. I'believe=we had'the: ' I 7 preoperational testing.90, 95_ percent complete._ 8 Q. Could you identify the yearEfor me,: sir, b 9 the time in which you'were there,-in which_they werel l 10 operational, .the diesels?  :) 11' A. I was at Zimmer:in the time frame of'  ! 1 12 1977, approximately, to 1984. i ( 13 Q. Can you recall.when those' diesel' i 14 generators were tested-for operability?  : 15 A. No, I can't. The Zimmer plant went- ~ 5 l 16 through more than one preoperational test: program E l 17 because of its construction problems, and I can't. l t 18 recall. . 19 Q. Did you have experience with diesels at 20 another nuclear facility? I believe you used the l l 21 plural when I asked you about experience.

  • 22 A. I didn't have a' responsibility at any
23. other facility other than'Vogtle and Zimmer that i

! . i 24 involved activities over the diesels. I+ (}25 Q. At the Vogtle facility, I understand that' i l. _ - - _ _ - - _ . ,,_ _ 1.. :._,- , , . . . _ . .

I i

711 1 you had supervisory responsibility. Did you ever 2 help to hands-on examine the diesel at the Vogtle 3 facility?

l 4 A. Yes, I have. I have crawled over the l 5 diesel and been very up close and personal with the ! 6 Vogtle diesel. I have done a-field walk-down and l l 7 probably spent a geod bit of time in the diesel room I 8 reviewing the , typing layouts and the equipment, and l 9 I have been present a number of-times during diesel 10 . testing and diesel runs, 11 Q. Did you help remove the Calcon sensors-l 12 for examination after the site emergency on March fi 20, 1990? l \/ 13 i i 14 A. No, I didn't. j 15 Q. Did you ever yourself see any water come 16 tut of the pneumatic lines to the sensors? 17 A. No, I didn't. l 18 Q. Did you ever yourself see any presence of 19 water or water vapor in the pneumatic lines leading l 20 to the sensors? 21 A. Not in the lines. I saw the jar of fluid i 22 that was ascribed to have come out of the lines. 23 Q. Except for your observations about dew 24 point and Mr. Burr's jar of water, do you have any J 25 other facts which would lead you to the conclusion  ! l l L i i  : I

l L , L  !

                                                                                                       ~712 f'                                                                                                                   ,

1 that' water was in the lines leading to the Calcon

                                                                                                                    \
                  .2.         sensors?

3 A. Yes, the testimonyJof some.of1the l 4 witnesses tha't we have deposed. i ' 5 Q. Could you help my, bad memory-and tell me- i 6 which witnesses? 7 A. It seems to me that Mr. Mcdonald,- Pat: [ 8 Mcdonald, some witnesses were,-let me say,l tentative 9 in1their recollections. They=said that theyLmay  ! 10 have seen water so I will' include those. I believe , l 11 Mr. Holmes was one of'those witnesses.  ! l g 12 I believe Mr. Charles Corsey, maintenance  ! D 13 superintendent having responsibility over.the l 14 diesels, was an. individual that said he remembered 15 that. i l 16 Q. During your stay at the Vogtle site', can. i

                                                                                                                    ~

1 17 you tell me how many times you'saw Mr.. Mcdonald. 18 on-site in the diesel room? 19 A. I can't recall that I ever did. Just~to  ! 20 make sure,we are not miscommunicating'here, these j 21 people are people that said they knew :of 'the 22 occurrence of water within the system. . I'm not 23: l L saying they testified that they'saw itxfirst hand. 24 I hope we are clear on that. I' _'25 Q. I assume-with the sapienty of your

713 i f') . k_) 1 counsel, you followed up and asked Mr. Mcdonald who , 2 he told you saw water. Who did Mcdonald say told  ! 3 him he saw water in the lines? 4 A. I'm not sure Mr. Mcdonald, I don't recall.  ! 5 Mr. Mcdonald's response to that question if he was l l l 6 asked. l 7 Q. Good answer. Do you recal1 Mr. Holmes } 8 telling you who told him he saw water in the lines? l 9 A. No. I believe if he was asked that, he l ! 10 said he couldn't recall. He was tentative about his 11 response. 12 Q. Do you recall who Mr. Corsey said told t (~) l (,j 13 him he saw water in the lines? 14 A. I believe he was asked that, and I don't 15 think he could remember where he had obtained that  ! 16 information from. I 17 i (Discussion ensued off the record.) 18 Q. (By Mr. Barth) Mr. Mosbaugh, time has 19 run out f or me, but if you would like to amplify any 20 of your responses to me, I would like you to feel 21 free to do so unless your counsel closes it down on 22 time. I do not want any impression that we are 23 trying to shut you off from saying what you feel you l 24 should say. j }25 A. I don't have any further response to your r

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l 1 1 714

                                                                                                                                                                                  'l i

1 questions. j i

                      '2                                    -MR. BARTH:          Then I have no further                                                                              i 3                    -questions..               I do. appreciate-your appearing .                                                                            ;

i 4 here. 1 f 5 MR.- KOHN: This concludes Mr. i

                                                                                                                                                                                   -l 6                    Mosbaugh's'. deposition.                               .- T h a n k- y o u ',.

l . ,; l 7 gentlemen.- '

                                                                                                                                                                                  -l
                                                                                                                                                                                   ~l 8
                                                             .(Deposition concludediat 8:00u.p.m.)                                                                                  !

!- i 9 'l

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J

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! i ! 12 13 .l 14'  ! 15 l l

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20

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23. _, ,s -- 25 y t-i t-

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l' l' 715 'f 1 . i 2 ,INDEX'TO' EXHIBITS  ;

                                                                                                     ~

3

                      ;Mosbaugh-                                                                                                                                        '

4 Exhibit Descrintion' Page  ; 5 -' l' DG-9 Investigative ~ Interview' 6 7/18/90,' Allen'Mosbaugh- 5251 l 7 DG-10 ' Request for.; Pleadings and.. l Imposition of Civil Penalties ~556 ' 8'- DG-11 Affidavit of' 9 l Allen'L. Mosbaugh? 566 j 3 10 DG-12 Document,.Mosbaugh to NRC Submitted 6/91; 580 11 3 DG,13A Intervenor's Response to'First s  ! , 12 . Request ~for Documents by.GPC- 614 l 13' DG-13B GPC's First Interrogatories to Allen L. Mosbaugh 614' 14 DG-14A GPC's Second Interrogatories l 15 to Allen L. Mosbaugh 629 , j 16 DG-14B Intervenor's Response to Second Interrogatories'by GPC 629 17 DG-15 Investigative Interview, 18 11/4/93, Allen Mosbaugh 648 1 j 19 (Original Exhibits DG-9 through'DG-15.have been l attached to the original transcript.) 20 , 21 22 23- - - - 24 f 25 e l l l l li ..... ._ _ -

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l \ l l l. 716  : 1 STATE OF GEORGIA: 1 COUNTY OF FULTON: I 2 I

                                                                              )

3 I-hereby certify that the foregoing 4 transcript was reported, as' stated in~the caption, 5 and the questions and answers thereto were reduced- I 6 to~ typewriting 1under my. direction; that the l 7 foregoing pages.463 through 715' represent a true,: ( 8 complete, and, correct transcript of the evidence 9 given upon.said' hearing, and I further certify that 10 I am not of kin or. counsel to the parties in the l 11 ' case; am.not in the employ of counsel for any of s 12 said parties; nor am I in anywise interested in the 13 result of said case. 14 Disclosure Pursuant to O.C.G.A. 9-11-28 (d):- i 15 The party taking this deposition will receive l 16 the original and one copy based on our standard and 17 customary per page charges. Copies to other. parties 18 will be furnished at one half that per page rate. 19 Incidental direct expenses of production may;be 20 added to either party where applicable. 21 Our customary appearance fee will be charged to 22 the party taking this deposition. 23 This, the 25th day of August, 1 94. 24 i JUDY J. BRAGG, CCR-A-521 (' 25 My commission expires on the 9th day of December, 1994. l' l l

x717 l

        'l                 DEPOSITION:OF' ALLEN MOSBAUGH/JJB 2                             I do hereby certify that I'have read all questions propounded to me'and all= answers 3                given by me on the 24th day of August,'1994,Jtaken s

before Judy J. Bragg, and-that:~ 4

1) Theresare no changes.noted.

5 2) The following changes are~noted: ._ 6 Pursuant to Rule '3 0 -(7) (e) of the. Federal-Rules offCivil Procedure and/or the Official Code of Georgia. Annotated 9-11-30(e),: both-of t which-read.in 7 part: Any changes'in form or substance;which you

                        ; desire to make shall be entered.upon the 8                deposition...with a statement of the reasons given...for making them. Accordingly, to assist you 9                 in effecting; corrections, please use.the' form below:
                                                                                                                                                                          ~

10- Page No.____Line'No. -should read:-

                                                                                                                                                                                                .1 11 And the reason for the change is:-                                                                          ____________

12 ______ ___________ _ ___ _ 13 Page No.____Line No.____should read: ____ 14 __________________________ _

                      'And the reason for the change is:                                                                                                                                          j 15                 _                    _               ______
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16 Page No. Line No.____should read: . ___ 17 _ _ _ _ ________ _ _ -1 And the reason for the change is:  ! 18 __ _____________________ 19 'Page No.____Line No.____should read: ____________ l 20 _ _ ___ And the reason for the change is: __ _________ 21 _____ _______ _ _ _ _ ___ ________ _ 22' Page No.____Line No. should read: ____________ _____ --__ _ =______ 23 _____ And the reason for the change is: 24 ___ ___ _ - - _ - .

i l I 718 O  ; G .1 DEPOSITION OF ALLEN MOSBAUGH/JJB 2 Pa9e.No. - Line No.____should read: ____ _ 3 4 And the reason for the chan9e-is: ___ _________ 5 Pa9e No.____'Line No.___should read: ____________ 6 _____ ____ _ ___________ ____ 7 And the reason for the chan9e is: _ _ _ _ _ . _ ______ 8 l

                                -Pa9e No.____Line'No.____'should read:                                                                                                       _________

______________________________ i And the reason'for the chan9e is: _______________ i f' _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

                 .11              Pa9e No.____Line No,                                                                  should read:                                        __                  ___

12 ___ ____

l. And the reason-for the. change is: __________

j 14 Page No. Line No. should read: 15 _____ _ 16 And the reason for the chan9e is: _________ 17 Page No. Line No. should. read:

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i 18 ___ _ _ _ _ _ - - And the reason for the chan9e is: i _ 19 _____ . - _ - _ _ _ - - 20 Pa9e No.____Line No.____should read: ________ i ____ _____ ________ __________ l And the reason for the chan9e is: l 22 _ ___ _____- 1 23 Page'No.____Line No ____should '7sd: ____________ 24 ____ _ And the reason for the chan9e is:

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s 719. l i t j .f s i-l' DEPOSITION OF: ALLEN MOSBAUGH/JJB  : 4 [ 2 - Page No. Line No'. should. read: ~i

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t ,. And the. reason for the change is: ___ __ __. i 4 - i

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                   .                        And the reason for the change is:                                                                              _____                                                                                                                 !

a 16 _____ _____ 'l ) 17 Page No. Line No. should read: 1 i 18 ___ i L, 19 And the reason for the chan9e is: _________ ___ 20 Pa9e No. _Line No, should read: ___ ______ ,! 21 _ __________ ___________________ And the reason for the.chan9e is: 22 ________ _ _ _________ L 23 Page No.____Line No.____should read: ____________ i 24 _____ _ _ - 1- - - 25 And the reason for the chan9e is: ______ k 1

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1 l l 720 (mV) 1 DEPOSITION OF ALLEN MOSBAUGH/JJB 1 l 2 Page No._ Line No. _should read: __ ____ 3 - " And the reason for the change is: _______ _ 4 - ----_ 9 l l 5 Page No. _Line No.____should read: __ 6 i l And the reason for the change is: l 7 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _____ __________ 8 Page No. Line No. should read: __ 9 ' And the reason for the change is: , 10 - -- - - --_-----_-___ 11 Page No. Line No._ should read: ____________ ' 12

   ,bx)                            --

And the reason for the change is:

   \_/     13
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14 Page No._ _Line No. should read: - - 15 - And the reason for the change is: _________ 16 -- --- - -__ _ 17 If supp.'emental or additional pages are necessary, please furnish same in typewriting annexed to this l i 18 deposition. l 19 ' l

                                                                                                                       ~~~~~~~~~~~

20 ALLEN MOSBAUGH I 21 . Sworn to and subscribed before me I this the day of_ ______, 199__. 22 23 NOTARY PUBLIC. My commission expires the day of __ , 24 199 -- ( 25

l 721 i [^} (_/ i 1 l l 2 -AMENDED CERTIFICATE l 3 4 STATE OF GEORGIA: 5 COUNTY OF FULTON: -i l 6 l 7 I hereby. certify that in addition to , i 8 the certification made on Page-716 of the 9 transcript, more than 30. days provided the 4 10 deponent to read'and sign P,he original i 11 transcript-has expired. Therefore, the . 1 3 12 original is being filed without the signature i- V 13 of the witness. I 14 This, the_C* l day of !fo Po io1,, __, 1999 1 - l 15 l

       ,                              9"t9*'er JUDY J. 5RA557 CCR-A7521
                                                                   ~

1 , 18 Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public. 19 j! 20 l i 21 . 22 l l 23 24

  -0\

NY 25 ' p - n , - . >wwe w ->

In The Matter Of: GEORGIA POWER COMPANY (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT UNITS 1&2) i ALLEN MOSBAUGH July 22,1994 BROWN REPORTING, INC. ATLANTA, AUGUSTA, CARROLLTON ROME 1100 SPRING STREET SUITE 750 ATLANT4, GA USA 30309 (404) 876 8979 or (800) 637-0293 Original File 0722mosb.ase, 207 Pages Word Index included with this Min-U-Scripte

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RE 1-2 3-4 y s-rn L

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l' GEORGL4 POWER COMPANY ' AH FN MOSBAUGH l (VOGTI.E ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNITS 102) July 22,' 1994

    .                                               Page 1 }                                                                 tion, and I would 131 like to understand             j UWD STATES OF AMERICA
                                                            , pitheir Page4 )I what the gmund rules are ni for th Nac.t au ntoutAtonv cOMMS$10N                               "'E rate representative  as willbe to Mr. ! deposition. The proceedings were W
             , Atom sars'v Ano ucENSINo sOARD                 to 121 Clarify     my under%i.mding                                                                                  ,

bifurcated, and it is my understanding in m Mec e . g oEoss. A POWER (.;OMPANY, ) 60426 OLA4 Burr s 131 role here. 141 MR. BLAKE: Well 1 don't know that I that 161intervenor's discovery has been limited on m this round of depositions i ! .i w p ist have an obligation to identify who the to areas related to tel the factual bases,  ; 165 cofPorate representative is or may be $ v.,n. r m c,. P.,i um i .-4 r.

                              ..n,    $.Nsou                  171 throughout the course of this depost-specifically the diesel 191 generator issue          ;
L j
                                      > Nuci.=>                                                                              and issues directly related put to that.So '          ;

oteosmoN OF tion. I assume that the licensee is p:1 follow-4

                    ^j.j",88'"                                isi Mr. Burr is not here as a corporate 191                  .ing those same ground rules.

~, ,o m . ,n representative;but rather,as we also pol 62m se.n.s.an Pi z. 02l MR.BLAKE: We certainly intend. " discussed before we went on the record, and I H31 would appreciate. your ' 5 '"["'"'Q c,.a w

                          ,        " E' cen.s.4 x men as an uit expert on diesel generators.

And that's why1:21 he is here,is because renunders of the extent 941 to which you saown arpOmino. iNe think Iam straying from the 951 scope of a portion of the psi deposition today 16 this proceeding.and in particular poi for ! "M*,*gSgg 75 expected to cover that I:41, topic and this deposition, diesel generator v71 l .m m.am technical content of that topic. reliability or diesel generator validity or . j Pop 2 Osl And in order to ensure that I was not nel diesel generator reliability reporting.  ; AP.E ARANcEs OF COUNSEL li6] misspeaking or misstating technical I 9] I believe Mr. Mosbaugh did a (2ut , a On t n.n e ma v.am: 1:71 nomenclature associated with the considerable amount of taping of 90 7AE D ,aK P c. 8 "'l 8 ' i E E Conversations which deal with that sub.

                                                                                                                                                                                  ]

3; $17 Fione. Avenu.. N W. snake this 1191 as acc' urate and as produc-W..n.,isi.a. o c. 2 mot ject 1221 atra, and I am asking for the -  ; , tive a session as taoi possible, we had method that he 1231 used to conduct  ;

oa g ",d g g asked Mr. Burr to attend, those tapes. .

l ~1- sei P,iem.a. P.ie. a 7 imae. tail MR. KOHN: Inote for the record that ' 23m N $1, t N W tae RNI.KOHN: And I understand that.  ! " 122] Mr. Burt has riot previously been and I 1251 guess my specific - there was

           *",",'"$",,,C    ,,a*%                            identified 1231 as an expert, and inter-c a Board order T,.u     n. s.      . to        a A =,,.          venor believes they 124 would have the so. szm u            s=* Pia =                    right to examine Mr. Burr as t2si an ex-                                                                      p,9' 7 600 P cnir sts t N E.                                                                                                                .

3

           *                                               pen witness at this time.                                      01 specifically with respect to Mr. Dol-j        ,,,p",",* * ' * * * * ~ * * ' '                                                                                   berg on 91 the Wuc MeserI M
M, ca,,- A set p ,, 5 usN=..a. sue.yc_

ask Mr. Dolberg 13) questions about in MR. 8 LAKE: Well, censinly, you will taping, and it was 141 specifically deter-i M',D"'y,Qcd N="" *" '" p1 have to explore it and any future i mined that questions with 151 respect to Ms Mitzt A Young motions or (3) requCsts to the Board of taping were proper, and they were (61 c,.o.,ecou e Nac what you think your p1 rights are, Mr. u".a su" proper for the first round of depositions. Kohn. 171 It's my understanding Mr. Mosbaugh Page 3 15]Q:(By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbeugh, was tal questioned about taping in the l pj ALLEN MOS8AUGH, would you 161 describe the taping first round of19) depositions. I pi having been first duly sworn, was process which you used and that 17t has been the subject oflots of questions and not The intervenor has strenuously ob- ) 1 examined and 131 testified as follows: jected pu to the bifurcated deposition I pi CROSS-EXAMINATION '*' ""*ers and descnptions in this nature of these 021 proceedings. It h,as

proceedmg.

~ 19 BY MR.BLAKE: cost interrenor an 031 extraordinanly 19: MR. KOHN: If I might inquire, I isai large sum of remurces to do 041 multiple j i61 Q: Mr. Mosbaugh, my name is Ernie believe that was inquired into at pu Mr. depositions. It has been licensce's 051 i Blake.We n have met before.I'm with a Mosbaugh's first - position that the bifurcated nature was l law firm in Washington.181 Shaw, Pit- p21(Attorney confers with witness.) the 06) best way to proceed, and with j tman: and I represent Georgia Power iri the bitter must uti come the sweet. psi MR. KOHN: And we object. a this toi proceeding. Can you identify pel And at this juncture we are going to 1 your name, spell it, 901 please, for the 04: MR. BLAKE: I.ct me start by usi es-tablishing sorne ground rules, if you 091 object to asking questions on the j i record?.

have 061 something to say during the methods of poi Mr. Mosbaugh's tape-  !

pn A: My name is Allen Ice Mosbaugh. recording inasmuch as 90 those areas I course of the uti deposa,non,Mr.Kohn,I p21 Q: Would you spell it,please.for the ' want you to speak ps nght up and say were available for discovery on p21 the I 1 031 record. it.1 do not

  • vant you 1:91 whnpering to first round.

v41 A: Allen is A-I-1-e-n. I.ee is Ire-c. ps1 your witness or conferring with poi him 1231 Q: (By Mr. Blake) Answer the ques-Mosbaugh is M.o-s-b a-u-g-h. during the course of this examination, tion, no please. 961 MR KOHN: Before we go any fur. pu So you were just whispering to him 1251 A:I had a pocket or a small tape ther, I p j would like to indicate that or 1221 asking him a question, please do s'ecorder, before the ps) deposition commenced, that so that p31 all of us can observe, Page 8 j counsel had an li91 off-the-record discus- listen, panicipate. sion concerning the poi appearance of 91 and it uses the microcassettes. And I i po Now, what is your position? carried that 12j tapc recorderin my pock-i Mr. Kenneth Burr at this pu deposition. psi MR.KOHN: It's my understanding et,and I would turn the 131 tape recorder , p21 The interrenor's position is that p31 that on to tape conversations that I pt. Mr. Burt is present as a corporate no thought would document concerns I i representative, and the intervenor Page 6 had.and those 151 concerns were related , demands 99 that the licensee designate 4 p1 Mr. Mosbaugh was deposed about to things that I was pursuing ist as allega-

      . at this time who                                                                                                                                                            i 2

I hat t with pi respect to his first deposi- tions later.and they related to concerns , BROWN REPORTING. INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 1 Page 8 l

AIHN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 A2) ri that I had of disenmination. And I did 161Q: If the tape ran out and mu were remember onc occasion where a par. - this to ini create a record of what I was aware of riit or you expera rd ih.it it had, ticularly ist significant comment mas doing and the record tw of the history of were there times let whrit mu would made, and I was not taping,16 and so I the allegation material. leave the meetingorthe dmuoion 191in i made an effort to write that comment tiolQ: How did you determine what order to replace the tape? down. conversations init to tape and what con- lio! A: Generally,if a meeting seemed to versations not to tape? be very nij lengthy; and I knew, for 171Q: Have you provided any and all example,that the meeting. n zi you know, notes or ist recordations other than tape n2i MR.KOHN: Can we have a time recordmgs?

        #" ** '3                                            would be that lengthy, I would use cither 05) a break in the meeting or a rest      19:A: The one instance Iam speaking of .

p31MR.BLAKE: During his period of room break or nei something like that to did not noi relate to a diesel generator taping-put in a new tape or flip the risi side of issue. It related to a nil comment of a 1:41 MR. KOHN: So you are asking about a tape. And in those cases the tape - I supervisor and a superintendent. I had usi taping prior to - do you have a n6l might do that before the tape ran to I:21 provided all documents that I have specific not date? completion. relative to notes i31 and other- as well 1:71 MR. BLAKE: I don't have a specific 1871Q: You said generally that was the as the tapes,to Gewgh Power. nti date. case. tisi Were there exceptions to that? i 41 Q: Have you provided all the tapes

09) Q: (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh,you li91 A: There is no way I possibly could that you us) made?

are poi free to limit your answer to any recall taol all of the occasions that I did ri6i A: Yes, I have, And since this is and all r2n conversations of the time those things. I (2n can't possibly recall limited 071 to diesel topics, I have.

  • l period during which the u2l diesel gen. each occasion when I did that. provided all the tapes with nei respect cratororreliabilityof the diesel 12 gen- sa2l Q: Of each occasion when you did to diesel topics; but I have, as well, (191 erstor or the reporting of the reliability what? provided all of the tapes.

of the 1241 diesel generator was in con-l sideration or on your r2sl mind. (251 A: When I curtailed a tape or raol Q: In the course of your taping, did changed a tape taal or whatever. you taillisten to the recordings contem-i Pagee fasi Q: Were there times when the bat- Poraneously, that is, razi I don't mean ni A: Generally,ifIknewa conversation #I I" ** ****U # "'*"E"""" I

  • I21 before the fact would involve the Page 11 im eve ,fw example , on' a Meday, topic area of al diesel discussion then I would you listen 124: to what you had pi tape recorder ran out? recorded during that day? On any 1251 r t at d if t tiie in in I t I21 A: No,no,generaWnot.The baueries andca@ns dd you Hsten?

that became apparent, sometimes I on si sose types of tape recorden would make an 161 effort to begin tape- would last for several 141 weeks, fairly Page13 recording at that point. continuous taping, that was the ist capacity of the batteries, had been my pl A: Not generally.There perhaps was 171 Q: So there were some conversations experience.161 And so what I would do one or tal two occasions that I s:an recall in which isi you would turn on orengage where I, at home, Isl wodi verify that I the tape recorder during 191 the course is every couple of weeks I 171 would just change the batteries whether they had seconied what I ir. deed 141 heard,if of the conversation? needed taiit or not, it was something that seemed to be a tsi lioi A: If I had not been tape-recording 191Q: Ori those occasions when you

  • I*
  • I and if n n relevant material seemed to be didn't have not the tape recorder on,but - 161Imt &c fe w umes that I can going to come up or n2: was coming up, you were involved in or nu overheard recall that that 171 hsppened I wouldn t yes,I might initiate tape-recording. conversations which were relevant, did necessarW haw done h that isievening.

031Q: And sinularly, were there points you n2j make any other effort to record am Q h in t e subsequem in time 041in conversations or meetings 191 period of time, lust the few times that those conversations 1:51 or otherwise when you would shut the psi tape re. record what had taken place when your ",hC",,Uo(tat at occuned Imt corder off because it didn't appear to be , g, 041 recorder wasn't on? n6i relevant materials? nsi A: I didn't make efforts to record, pn Q: And by that process,did you alter 071 A: Generally, I would tend to take that is, n61 record via any taping. And as your p2) technique at all of recording? that ns) process to completion so as not faras record via 07) note taking,I would usi A: No,I did not. I documented that to be reaching into 091 my pocket and frequently take some notes. nsi Usually initiating and not initiating the tape 20i

                                                                                                         - my n41 purpose for listening was to took notes on handouts and the like that          verify that what I lisi remember I heard all the time.But sometimes of course,a             had191 been passed out,and so I would 120 conversation might be long;and the            take notes, some I201 notes, as well as was what was electronically n61 recorded that I heard.

tape would run 1221 out.That is obviously knowing that simultaneously I was pu one reason for a u31 conversation being documenting various things via the tape- H.71 Q: There are some tapes that Geor-terminated or the taping being u41 ter. recording. gia Power nel has received that appear minated. I might leave the meeting or I 1221 Q: Did you have any occasions to do might - 1251 the meeting might be over, that 1231 after you had left any meetings, pla tio those' I might leave the that is,to record 1241 what you had just 1201 A: My. - and I think that's true, p,9' g heard where you knew,in (2siparticular, When I 12n was asked - well, when I that the tape recorder had not been on? put the tapes together to (221 turn them n1 meeting,and obviously at that point I over, and l initially put them together to would cut the ut taping off, age 12 in A: Yes, there werc - I recall one (21 im turn them over to the NRC. .I E gathered up all the u41 tapes I had. And uld n 14 ut on t e tape r corde - ccasi n - first off, there were oc- I think what happened is that I f asi had casions when I (31 didn t have the tape some new tapes that had never been is: A: Not necessarilv. i recorder with me, for example.14i I used that Page 9. Page 13 gia.y.Scripte BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY All.EN MOSBAUGH (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 102) July 22,1994 Page 14 i 1251Q: And then did 3ou keep these l I231MR.KOHN: Iassume,are you asking

                                                         .t                                                                       } him 124i to exclude his recollection of m became part of the tapes that were ! apesin one turned over.and 121 so basically a couple                                                                      Page 16 ' communications 1251 with counsel?

of blank tapes were included' pi place throughout the period of time -

  • niQ: So tuur explanation is that they ~ HIMR.8 LAKE: Tm asking for his 121 probably 14 were never used and never that you were 12: doing this taping?

recorded on. .g. hat's com ct. #*C II'C' ""' isj A: Yes. 141 Q: And did the little stickers that you 13 THEWITNESS: My recollections are put(5)oneverc me any fthetapes? that 1411 had discussions with counsel 161Q: What was your method of main- about making isi mme copics;and based taining or ri cataloging the tapes as you 161 A: Not that I recall.They were pretty on those discussions 161 I proceeded to were using them? 171 tenacious little stickies. make some copies.From my I?1 memory ini A:I would record a tape; and for Is10: And so when you provided the of the dates and contents of Isi conver-those days i91 that I recorded more than tapes to the 19 NRC, did they still have sations and from listening to some of 91 one tape. I would put the poi recorded the tenacious little inni stickles on them, the tapes on those dates I recalled.1 nul tape in a particular pocket;and then at 11:1 A: Generally,but I believe that I was selected some portions that I could nii the end of the day I would take those not Ital always complete in my routine . remember pil that I thought were im-tapes out of p2 those pockets; and I of puttmg the I 31 stickies on, and per- " #8' '#I I5""*s a would number them I 31 sequentially. ,P,[""I , , , , , haps I didn't use enough v41 attention t And I had one pocket that would hold detail. But in the end sorne tapes,I lisi which I won't talk about. Having n4I 04i the first tape and anotherpocket that beheve, had no stickies on them. selected and found those segments, would hold nst the second tape,so forth. 961Q: Including, possibly, the blank then I lisi proceeded to nuke a copy;' 961Q: And what were those pockets? tapes? and I did that 1:61 copying myself. n?) A: Well. I kept the tape recorder in 071 Q: (By Mr. Blake) So your recollec-it71 A: The blank tapes wouldn't - I tion of poi any and all taping or copying my - I us! didn't carry my wallet,and would never usi have intended to put kept the tape recorder : 91 iri my right of any of your tapes 1191 is that you your-stickies on the blarik tapes-front. And I believe I went from my 1201 self made sonne copics of some taol por-1:91 Q: And not only would not have in. tions of tapes,and you made one copy' left front to my back left to my back tended but 1a01 probably did not? of those pil portions? ul'd ha e a y t 12 left I2:1 A: Probably did not. 1221 A: Initially, that is correct. And t,his in the tape recorder. I221 Q: Of the tapes that you provided to 123 Q: So as I understand it,the first tape the I231 NRC, how many do you think I*h'C* ,Q***.;,tha g to ti su 1241 that was completed on any given day included the tenacious (241 stickies and time inune of 1990; and I 12si provided you would put in 2si your left front how many did not? copics to my attorney. pocket.The second tape that was g25) A: I didn't use different kinds of Page 19 Page 15 Iil Q: How did you make the copics? p.g.17 til filled out you would put in your left rear pocket,121 and the third,if t UI 8 "'88 I 8 I"C" *C 12) A: Well, the tape was on the are gening 12: int that levelof detaHthatmicrocassette 131 player. And the copies were one* would go to the 131 right,here I made, I didn't have a 141 second about the tapes,some of(31 the tapes that 141 A: If there were any of those num- microcassette player, so I made the bers, Isi that s correct. I taped in t,he beginning,which do (41 not relate to dicsciissues,were of a different copies ist onto standard size cassette. ist Q: Did you ever run into problems 151 kind. And I believe on some of those And I had a stereo 161 system dual cas-where the ri trousers you were wearing beginnings 161 before I got into a routine sette deck, and I fed the electrical (?i didn't have pockets to ist accommodate of putting stickies on, rj there may have output of the small cassette player into your technique? been direct marking on the tape,but ist the ist electrical input of the dual cas-191 A: No. In fact, the trousers that I am '" ) I I e ci sene player and 191 made the copy. nol wearing today are sirrular to the voiQ: So that the one copy that you e nt trousers that I- pilin fact,the uniform susface of the cassette. made was on nit a different size cas-that I have on,with a white 1:21 shirt and ,g* pol As a result,I went to the stickles;so I blue trousers,is what I would virtually pil think you may find there may be 1:21 A: That's correct. 931 always wear. some in that early pai period, again, 03) Q: Is what you are referring to what n41 Q: And then you would get home at which probably doesn't relate to- n3 has v41 commonly been called the six night, and nst then make what sort of diesel issues. There may be none on tape - mdication on the tapes, v61 again, to some of those- usi A: Yes,that's correct. catalog them to keep track of them? nel Once I got into the routine of using n7:A: I would put a little bitty sticker on the psi stickies,I only recall that there n61 Q: - set? nel them.and I would write the date and would be a few n61 that did not have the 1:71 A: Yes. a number. sticky with the date and time; nti and list Q: I think you said snat initially that (19: Q: A date and a - that was an oversight or erroron my part was 1i91 your process. Were there any uni A: Number. in not nel being complete as to the num- other copies that had poi been rnade of bering. your tapes that you are aware of? ini Q: The numbers.again beingone for any 122 tape that wound up m your left 9910: Let's talk for a minute just about 12ii A: Yes. At a point in time,I believe, front pocket? the poi copics of tapes. Describe for me, an 1221 additional copy was made or i if you will,your 121 recollection now of copies, that I provided 1231 to my attor-p31 A: Indicating the order of the tapes i any and all copies of tapes 122: which ney. And I made those copies from the during u41 the day. I were made. i u41 initial standard sire cassette copy BROWN REPORTING. INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 14 - Page 19

l l AT I FN MOSBAUGII GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGT11 l.'LECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 102) onto another uu standard size cassette l 1251 Q: Let's start with '93 l some of 151 which you attended. Ernie, copt.So m the sense I say om 22 l when an objection toi of relevance was Page 20 # *****"* ## '"I ni the processes were different.1 went til MR. KOHN: A ai I.1 h.n e a hard time ' rationale,and I would like you to ial st 121seeingthe relevance of the - I mean, l your rationale as to why yo from standard in to standard on the dual you t31 are asking him questions with cassette deck alone, respect to - H1 and if you would like the process of making tapes in 1993 is the witness to leave,ist we will do that. noi relevant to the diesel generatorissue. I.~ 1993 I nu can't see the relevance at all* of usi that research was the re' listening . ini A: T.es. n21Q:(By Mr. Blake) Can you answer to a portion of 961 one of the six tapes, I j the n31 question,please? and that's what I recall. 191 Q: When would that have been? nel MR.KOHN: I would like to under- n71 Q: Mr. Mosbaugh, did you vote in uni A: Seems like that was sometime in stand usi what the relevance is in why Columbia ps) County, Georgia in 1992?

      '93                                                  you are pursuing 061 this line of ques-                                                           i ti ning with respect to the uti diesel             n91 MR. KOHN: Objection. l instruct the        )

n n 0: When was it that you sent them? poj witness not to answer. ' E nzi A: During the summer of '90. 12n MR. BLAKE: Basis?

n31 Q
So you sent the six-tape set to B KE If pu sam m obket and n9) put yourobjection on the record I (22i MR. KOHN: It's beyond the scope of your 04 counsel in the sumrner of 1990 with regard poi to relevance,that is per. 1231 this discovery proceeding we are in t

and received them back usi sometime in fectly fine. You pu have. I understand with 1241 respect to the diesel generator. l 1993? your objection.Now I (221 would like the 125 MR. BLAKE: This one I will explain l noi A: That's when I recall making the witness to answer unless you 1231 are to second uti copy set.1 may have - 1 made some trips to psiWashington,and :l instructing him not Page26 p4: MR. KOHN: Mr. Mosbaugh, whyto. I m having trouble remembenng all n91 i don't you psileave the room for a mo I 93 I.ou - the trips I made. I know I rnade the i ment. l 12i MR.'KOHN: Would you like the wit-second set of gui copies in '93.1 have a j j ness al to leave? recollection of listening pu to tapes i Page 24 Hi MR. BLAKE: No, he is free to stay. tsi f rom the - on the standard size cassette, in MR. BLAKE: Mr. Mosbaugh, you can Incidentally, unless my understanding is u21 though,in '91; so I can't be exactly stay p1 here. 161 wrong about witnesses leaving.it was sure ifI usi didn't get some of them back m MR. KOHN: The process has been si because n you didn't want them to hear from my attorney u41 in '91, employed in the other depositions, what the Georgia isi Power questioners Page 20 Page 26 Min-U Scripts BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 l

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY AT T FN MOSBAUGH (VOGTI.E El.ECTRIC GE1W. RATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1996 were indicating in their 191 statements: i attend im his deposition .md may not be i Ivi MR. BLAKE: We nuy have more.and and.therefore.vou wanted the not Geor. 4 aware of that nni fact;but t h.it is the fact. I nuybe 21 we should collect them, and gia Power witnesses to leave.1 don't ini ' n9: MR. BLAKE: Mavbe you could l do it in one fell 1221 swoop. if needed. have a problem. by and large, with n21 Mr.Mosbaugh hearing what I have to say refresh answer wa's my toi2m thatmemors on what his' l fortable 1241 with that's fine,1231 MR. KO im question. or sist what you have to say. 1221 MR. KOHN: I couldn't refresh your l 1251 And at this point.1 would also like to n41 MR. KOHN: To any extent you 1231 recollection without seeing the Page 31

 .would. nsi just please let me know.               transcnpt,12u and I haven't.

In renew my objection that Mr. Burr's oice a i - t le 1 der, K hn so the 125iMR.BLAKE: Maybe you would be presence 121 for the last hour serves no willing rest of us uni could hear these words of functs n because 131 no questions go to diesel generator or si factual issues Page 29 which Mr. Burr may have some ist bear. noi MR. BLAKE: My reason for the ques- . ing on,and I do reriew my oblection. tion' 2ni Michael.is - because there are in to stipulate to the fact that m 121Mr. , going io be 2n a series of questions here Mosbaugh's amendments to the peti. 161MR.BLAKE: Certainly your observa-

  - is because 1122i want to know about             tions to 131 intervene and request for                tion m is a correct one.We have not used y       hearing dated Hi December 9th,1992 it                 Mr. Burr,iel not conferred with Mr. Burr, Mosbau s cred h            Mr' os ugh.            was stated ist Mr. Mosbaugh voted in                  but I don't know 191 that Mr. Burr has 12ei willingness to make statements               Columbia County,161 Georgia in 1992                   caused any distraction or lim distur.

based on 12si varying degrees of substan. elections. bance, either. ( tiation.1 want to ri MR. KOHN: This is a deposition, and lin Do you think he has? Page 27 we Isl are not stipulating to anything at 02: MR. KOHN: To the extent that this 191 point. You can go forward with people list from - to some degree,yes. til know Mr.Mosbaugh's views on when the not deposition questions but we ob. I mean, there's n41 an additional person accurate or 12i inaccurate statements are ject to any till question concerning his observing the proceeding ost who is a made,they isi constitute lying. voting which were I:21 covered in his Georgia Power manager. That has n61 ici These are terms which he has used in first deposition. always potential for some impact. But a ist large number of pleadings, and lisi MR.BLAKE: And you are unwilling I71 besides that,I do not know of any which he has 161 used m a large number impact. of statements that he r1 has made,and I to n41 stipulate that that statement was made in his ps) amendment to petition nel Q: (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, the think I'm entitled to an isi explanation to intervene and li6t request for hearing n91 tape-recording which you described and a background for that 19) explana" carlier, the 1201 excerpts that were made l tion of what he means by this term pol n December 1992? l into the six tapes, what was 120 your when he uses it. n?! MR. KOHN: I,m not willing to stipu-late usi to anything. I haven't looked at Eu'E se in doing that' ' nil h.s terribly relevant to this n21 [221 A: My purpose was the purpose I proceeding.that term.and i think his use that 1i91 petition in quiet some time. Tbt's not the 1201 purpose of this discussed i231 with my counsel.

                                          " "8 cre ility i41 s      p> saw           s proceeding.                                           1241 Q: And therefore you can't disclose 12u MR.BLAKE: I'm prmiding a copyof                  your 1251 purpose now, n91 So that's generally the background and 061 the reason for my asking that              the 1221 petition and the amendment to                                                                                         Page 32 question, and I n?i will have more.                the petition in 1231 question to counsel.             In A: What Iincluded was based on dis-nai MR. KOHN: I still object, and I will           124i MR.KOHN: I believe the question                 cussions 12) with my counsel.

091 instruct the witness not to answer with 1251 respect to stipulation on this 1310: You mean your counsel instructed with 12m respect to the voting questions. Issue. you on siwhat you should make copies These 120 questions were asked at his of or gave you ist guidehnes on it, and p.g. 3o first 1221 deposition. To any effect they that's what you utilized? relate to 1231 credibility, they were gone in discovery is closed. There's about 161A: We had a general discussion about

over in his first I241 deposition. hundreds I21 of stipulations I would like what I rj was going to do.

l 125i! could tell you that I could ask every to get into on 131 related to license trans- asking fer, and I'm unable ni to file them. I'm 181 Q: Without what that p, guidance was 191 from your counsel, did more than happy to discuss ist opening you abide by that? i on witness that I'm about to in the next the first round up to additional i61 l week 121 questions related to the fir % stipulations in discovery, that would "" ""##* issue on 131 license transfer.which I think please ri me very much. Hll Q: What were the exceptions to it? would greatly H1 help me on their nzi A: Because it was a general discus-credibility. Particularly Isi if I asked them in: MR. BLAKE: Have vou instructed the 191 w tness not to answer? sion.1 n31 had to make the decisions on on the first set.1 would be 16i very inter- the specifics; so 04i that's the extent of ested to see if they changed their ri noi MR. KOHN: Yes, which I abided by those usi under-mind or had different recollections the n u MR. BLAKE: With regard to ques. standings.1 mean, since we didn't have laj second time. l tions at li2i all about where he voted,via n61 specific discussion. l 191 No there are certainly credibility noi in Georgia or 031 in Ohio? 11 1 Q: Are you able to tell me whether ! questions.There's a cutoff with respect < n41 MR. KOHN: Yes,I am. And to the usi or not it on; was done in conjunction i to sin credibility that I'm under, and I ! extent that you think you have a valid I with NRC proceedings or not a n-I expect the 021 licensee must be under that very same 03) cutoff. point 061 to make. I would suggest we ! ticipated proceedings orDepartment of l n41 Questions concerning voting were cause  ! get .ludge I think thatBlock might Iri be onuni the phone the most be. ! labor or [ proceedings 1201 proceedings or anticipate both? asked usi on the first deposition. ! 's my I expeditious way to handle some of n91 l 12n A: Both.Andlet me clarifythattothe nu understanding.Mr.Blake you did not ' these objections. l 1221 extent that my understanding of the BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 27 - Page 32

AI1FN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ' July 22,1994 (VOGTLE El.ECTRIC GENERATING PI. ANT, UNITS 102) labor pructedmg un always involves an to make sure that it was stated m a way through his wife.I don't know whether aspect of an alleganon and a 94: retaha- that would p3 be exactly correct. tion.thati whs I answered both. it would 1241 have been or not. I don't 241Q: So you received a cops of this know if it was at her 1251 initiative or usi Q: Mr.Moshaugh.Iwant to show you document 1251 as it was finall> prepared through him or whatever, a copy and fded with the NRC? page37 Page 33 Page35 pi But the facts are that I saw a final copy ni of a document dated July 23,1993 181 A: I believe I received a copy of the I21 of the affidavit,and that the final copy entitled tai interrenor's Motion to Com. final 121 afterit was fded. of the 151 affidavit was provided to me by pel Production of m Affidavits in the 13:Q: And that prompted you to initiate his wife, and that's n! what I wanted to possession of Georgia Power ni Com. a call ni to your counsel? immediately state as being the ist facts, pany. And in particular,I want you to Isl A: That's correct. 161 Q: Is the smement accurate as it ap-focus on isi page 7 in this document,and pears ri in this document? Is it specifi-I have put a httle tel bracket around a 161 Q: Saying that this language - cally accurate ist that - couple of hnes on page 7. F; M. KOHN: I object. ,,) A: When I read k,I was unclear as to r1 Can you readio me the portion of the lel Q: (By Mr.Blake)- in particular,was the poi inerat of the word allow;and I m document that I have put brackets 191 ambiguous? dest's really 11:1 understand the legahties around? no; A: Saying that I fck that this needed of allowed wkh eespect to 021 a husband 191 A: Not recall Hairston ever being on to be Isil clarified because it could be and wife situarian and because of those the not call, and five allowed Mr..Mos. Interpreted more than nai one way. list factors,I called my counsel. baugh to physically n u review a copy of That's what I meant by ambiguous. I nsj n4) Q: Had Mrs. Aufdenkampe indicated an affidavit prepared by - didn't feel it was wrong, but I felt that to you in nst any way, shape or form that 1821 Q: Would you continue with the end we needed n41 to state it exactly as I Mr.Aufdenkampe had usi prompted her of that 031 sentence. would have stated it ifI ns) were word. showing you a copy of the affidavit or ing it. 1:71 was even aware ofit? n41 A: - GPC's counsel. In6) Q: And how would you have stated nel A: I don't know. She didn't specifi. (151 Q: Are you familiar with this docu- it? ment 061 before today? cally nel say, John told me to show you n71 M.KOHN: To the extentIcan make this.She didn't say I201 that, n?) A: Yes.I have seen this document. any nos afterthe-fact objection just lati Q: Did she say anything else which usi Q: Did you approve this document based on nel attorney / client prsvilege,I would 1221 have led you to believe that before it ti91 was filed? object to k. he had prompted having 1251 her show laul A: Ihad discussionswith mycounsel 1201 M. BLAKE: To the cariier question you the affidavit or was even aware of as to 12u the factual content of what and 120 response? it? would go in this (22i document. ! do not I221 M. KOHN: Yes. 1241 A: I don't know what her exact in-recall approving this document 123: structi nsI251 rm tivati nwould have before it was filed. I231 M.BLAKE: But not to this one? been.I believe she said 124:G: So you don't know whether or 241 M. KOHN: No* Pagese not you saw(2si a draA of the document before at was filed? [2st THEWITNESS: I would have in dostated you waist to see it.I'm pot sure she said she tal wanted to see k.She said it's page 34 Page 36 there,and she got 131 it for me,to show tu A: I may have seen a draft along the ni that I reviewed a copy of the draft or it to me. way;121 but my discussions,I had oral that tai Mrs. Aufdenkampe showed me a n1 Q: Was there anything in the way in discussions with my 131 counsel as to the e py of the (31 draft.And I should not use which 151 she showed it to you which led factual information that would be ni the word draft ni because I believe what you to believe that 161 Mr.Aufdenkampe incorporated into - factual information I saw was n t a ist draft.lt was a final. had prompted her to show it to you r; that I isi recalled regarding the cir. 16: Q: (By Mr.Blake) Did you regard this or even was aware that she was showing cumstances of my 16i discussions with as a 17j lie? it to you? Mr. Aufdenkampe, which then my ri les A: No, ist A: I don't know. I can't answer as to counsel put into this document. I had what,191if any, discussions she had had both of those mi things, and I reviewed g,iQ: Do you regard this as an am-biguous voi statement? with Mr. Aufdenkampe 901 about show-a draft at some point along 191 the way. Inn A: Ambiguous in the sense that it 001 Q: You say you did review a draft of sin M.BLAKE: Can you repeat the n21 stated tizi allowed, okay, and I believe this nu document? question,please? the word allowed - n5i this is the fifth n2l A: At some point along the way. paragraph under a paragraph that 041 1831 (The record was read by the usi Q: Do you know whetheror not this begins with when Mr. Aufdenkampe up reporter) statement 04: was in this draft that you a me 1I lines usi carlier as the subject 041 Q: (By Mr. Blake) I'm not asking you reviewed? of that sentence. nsi whether you were aware of past usi A: I don't believe that it was.And the 061 To that extended sense, and when dealings between n61 Mr.and Mrs. Auf-fi61 reason why I say that is when I saw g ing up nTj 1I lines and finding the denkampe.1 m asking you whether, nt this final n ] document,I immediately subject of the sentence,I usi would.in m your dealings with Mr. Aufdenkampe, called my counsel' terms of English, would have to have there was nel anything that indicated to om & Because? said 991 Mr. Aufdenkampe allowed Mr. you that Mr. Aufdenkampe 1 91 had Mosbaugh, okay. And 12rq when I prompted this or that he was even aware 09 A: Because I felt that No. S's state- reconstructed this long sentence in that of it? 120 Do you understand the dif-ment was put ambiguous, and I wanted 12:1 manner,that aspect is - may not be ference? to clarify it.1 felt that fail it could be read correct because 1221 Mr. Aufdenkampe tan A: I think I understand the dif-in more than one way,and I wanted 1221 may not have accomplished this usi ference,1221 since we reread the ques-Page 33 Page 38 Min-U Scripte BROWN REPORTING, INC, (404) 876-8979

l GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ALLEN MOSBAUGII I d (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 tion.Her actions and words 123: that she ! you think that the statement ni that ap- l Page 43

      - you say the manner in which she l pears in this document specincally.the showed piiit to me.She went and got it i 141 privileges were w.m ed when Mr. Auf i                     l Q: Is No. 2 accurate, as far as you             '

no and said here's the 125 affidavit,okay, denkampe allowed m Mr. Mosbaugh to 2 ta s lere sa t; f

                                             *9*                                                           statements contained in the 14i affidavit?           I pi So from the nature of the manner in da      r pa db          i s   uns ,

you think m that is an accurate state- Isl A: Mr.Aufdenkampe had a discussion which 121 she got it out of the drawerand handed it to me to el read, there isn't ment? with me 161 about Mr. Hairston's par-isi A: I couldn,'t possibly state that be. ticipation, and that he was m being very much that I could assume 141 about ido t ae e e asked to prepare an affidavit that dis-why she was doing it,and ifJohn knew she was ist domg it.because the manner {ue pr i e es cussed ist Mr. Hairston's participation, and he was,1 believe,i91 trytrig to refresh i l was fairly limited. being waived' his memory with me as to lio Mr. t61 Q: It's fair to say you didn't ask her m nU Q: Do you believe that the clause Hairston's participation on the call.  ! anything that would have helped you ponion of n21 when Mr. Aufdenkampe understand that, allowed Mr.Mosbaugh to n31 physically pil And we discussed that, and I dis- . review a copy of an affidavit prepared cussed 1:21some things that Mr.Hairston isi A: I didu.t ask why she was dom.g it' by n4j GPC's counselis accurate? said on the call with p31 him. And so,yes, , 191MR.KOHN:I have been patient and absolutely, he advised me of n41 the - noi allowed this line of quesuomng, to usi A:I have the same problem with l and we had a discussion of the factual  ! i the si u extent that you are done with the "" 8**"*"" I" ** ' "" d g o the on ext o allowe i line of n21 questioning:but if you are not, whether or not n61 Mr.Hairston was on I want to n3 object for the record that with respect to a husband and wife,ar.d me can. 3 the entire line nel has nothing to do with that's why l nel immediately went to my counsel to inquire as to I 91 that, and a 1:71 Q: The answer is yes? the diesel generator lisi issues.And I am frustrated that the li61 deposition has clarification was immediately issued. Iin1 A: ye3-gone on for an hour and 20 in71 minutes I20 Q: Turningto No.1 inthisparagraph, 091Q: And by affidavits there, did you or whatever, and I haven't heard nej as of (2:l today as it accurate,in yourview, 1201 understand that to be referring to anything that I think is relevant to the that 122 Mr. Aufdenkampe advised Mr. more than one (2n affidavit by Mr. Auf-l191 issue at hand. Mosbaugh of the 1231 existence of the denkampe is that howyou read p2ithat. aWidavits? poi I mean,you must understand,1 could when you say it's accurate? 1 I20 ask witnesses about matters con. I24) A: Absolutely. 123) A: Well,there were drafts along the

,    tained in 122: Mr. Mosbaugh's petition              (251 Q: And what affidavits are you refer-      way.

because they may make p31 a statement ring to? to show they are incredible;but 1241if the p41 Q: I'm only asking howY u read this question pertained to one of the pst Page 42 (251 sentence? i issues that did not relate to the factual ni A: His and others. Page 44 Page 40 121 Q: What others? ni A: The waylread the sentence is that ni bases as they have been defined,I p1 telated to Mr. Aufdenkampe's af-would be 121 precluded from asking that eoseP fidavits or versions 131 of Mr. question. even if 131 it would shed light

                                                                     , g ,f da    - f    w-     re ,

to the 151 participation on this phone Aufdenkampe's affidavit and not with on the witness ni credibility. c,3j' respect ni to the content of the - well, ist So here I'm faced with asking I61 Mr. Mr. Aufdenkampe ist informed me - it's Mosbaugh questions about how he 161 Q: What are those, as far as you generally with respect to 16l Mr. prepared m tapes for his counsel.and a know? Aufdenkampe's affidavits or drafts of whole host of ini other things that have m A: I don't understand your question. that. nothing to do with the 191 dieselissue, 181 Q: What are those affidavits, as far as which is the only portion that not we are m But with respect to the content of you 191 know? other isi people's affidavits, my left with with respect to discovery. pn M 't understand your ques. knowledge of that was, what 19: I got I 2 been one t t efi ti tion. pil What are thosc affidavits? from Mr. Aufdenkampe, was that the earlier p3: deP"sition- vai Q: Yes- lawyers o I were seeking affidavits from the other people that nn would contatn no So to the effect that you wanted to u3i A: Mr. Aufdenkampe was asked to

;   nsi raise these questions you were free                                                             their recollections of the 419 eall n2 and prepare - not an affidavit was prepared        those issues.11ut I generally believe that to do in n6; the other one;and I would               for Mr. Aufdenkampe, and usi Mr. Auf-not have in objected.                                                                               that p31 applies to Mr. Aufdenkampe's                  ,

denkampe signed an affidavit discussing affidavits and drafts n41 thereof,but with l nuj Now l am objecting.and basically t:91 the i 61 April 19th,1990 afternoon phone the amplification l just gave, allowing you to raise the questions and call. And n?i specifically discussed in unt getting your respcmses, but I want psiQ: With respect to No. 3, the same that call whether tyr not usi dieselissues question, v61 do you believe that to have you to 90 know on the record that I were discussed m that call and n91 think it's unfair, p21 and I think that this been accurate? Do you n?i believe today specifically addressed the participation line of questioning is p31 prejudicial. of poi Mr. Hairston. and Mr. Hairston's that that's an accurate statement? no Q: (fly Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, do i participation or un not in those diesel nai A: Yes, I do. Mr. Aufdenkampe told you psi think that - I carlier started to j discussions, and Mr. Aufdenkampe 1221 rne that 09: he couldn't go along with ask vou a signed an affidavit to that effect,and p31 what was in the original 901 drafts and

                                                      ! Mr. Aufdenkampe also advised me that            he sent them back with corrections.

Page 41 ni question.and then he interrupted me, l the lawyers (24) were obtaining un MR.affidavits KOHN: Actually,I need to con-j from all of the other psi participants to sult 122: with my client.Do you mind ifI but let me ask pi that now,if I can. Do , that call. do it at pu this point? BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 39 - Page 44

AII.rN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 102) u41 MR. BLAKE: Well. you know the j current 131 objection to a quesnon pend j ini You have seen this document before, rules an is; well as1 do.so it will depend ; ing or line to be 141 pursued i 191 including the exhibits?

      " P"" -

tsi I want to express at le.nt mme 161 iloi MR. KOHN: Mr.Mosixtugh is fighting , Page 45 disappointment that my desire to try to 111)with the exhibits here.Mr.Lamberski 1 ni obviously., what the consultation en- ri understand what Mr.Mosha ugh views had n21 previously asked,I believe, with l

                                                  "                      I     h         wed as     these, that in3i Mr. Mosbaugh submit a       i fn       ons it n i            ur c ent.        being i9 within the scope of this              verification on some I 41 matters.           l proceeding or that lini questions about         psi Since we have been in Georgia, I 141(A recess was taken.)

the affidavit by nit Mr. Aufdenkampe is have li61 not had the opportunity to do 2 15: MR. KOHN: It is intervenor's concern also not within this 1:21 proceeding. And that; but if p?l you would like, we could toi that the last hne of questioning direct- Iearlierdescribed to 13:Mr.Kohn on the ly m pertains to the first Board notifica- have one prepared lisi and signed. I record the purpose of what my n41 ques- didn't mean to not get to that n91 before tion,if qui I might be referring to it cor- tioning is. this deposition, rectly, which ivi resuhed in much con-sultation previously not between n51501 would like nowto move on with 901 MR. BLAKE: We have received a nel regard to whether or not this is a new document pil that responds to our re-mterrenor s counsel and counsel for nit licensee., And the fact that a substantial isti transcript at this point on, or we quest. it had no I221 affidavit attached to pai poruon of questioning was asked understand inst at this point in the it,and it's my tzsi intention today.in order j that n31 directly pertains to the factual transcript and the Ii9 earlier segrnent is to understand u41 Mr. Mosbaugh's posi- l to be regarded as 12o differently may be tion on these items, to go 125) through  ; f st I card n t on is t bling the subject of f,uture 1211 motions by Mr. them and ask him for his position on  ! because it seems to n61 go into issues Ma h hm t My n mu m m page a that intervenor has not made n?j an issue whether or not the court I23: reporter puts it in two binders or in one. I uti m these. to this proceeding to date. think we both understand the demarca- 12i MR. KOHN: I have no objection to 131 1:01 And the second concern is it indi- tion I2sl point. that. I just wanted to offer you the ni cates li91 to intetvenor that licensee has opportunity to get that before you went waived their poi right to contest Page 48 on 151 with these questions, whether the first Board 90 notification is within the factual basis by lui engag- ni MR.BART: I would like to make a ui 161THE WITNESS: Yes. statement in this regard on behalf of the ri Q: (By Mr.Blake) Yes, you have seen mg m discovery on the matter. And the 131 staff to this deposition.Mr.Kohn has 1331 fact that at is now close to,I think it s I41 raised the pmblem of Board notifica-this isi document and the attachments [241 over an hour and a haIf,and we have previously;is that the 191 yes? tion 9407 ist which was released 3-24-94 , not had usi one question with respect to whether that was 161 within the scope of n i A: I was answering y ur question. diesel  ! proper discovery here. Ou Q: Is that the yes? ' Page 46 ri Mr. Kohn takes the position that it is 1:21 A: Yes. ni generators yet,it is further troubling: lei not,and I agree with Mr. Kohn that it I:31 MR. BLAKE: Can we mark this set of and as it is my understanding that we is 191 not. That Board notification is in 0 41 documents which are, as I've were here to ni discuss diesel generator regard to poi alleged attorney wrongdo- described them,insi as - issues. ing. n6l(Mosbaugh DG Exhibit I was marked ni Interrenor is not sure now that facts ut! However, the questions so far have for titi identification.) si related to the first Board notification 1:21 related to the affidavit seen in n3 Mr. pel Q: (By Mr. Blake) Okay, Mr. Mos-have 16 been pursued by licensee, Aufdenkampe's residence by Mr. Mos- baugh,1091 want you to take a look at whether they care ri to engage in dis- baugh. n4) This was a topic that was the stipulation in this poi document. h covery on that matter as let well, and I extensively usi discussed of applicant's appears on page 1,and it is numbered have attempted to make licensee's i9 I witness, 06) Mr. Aufdenkampe, by Mr. pH No.1.

counsel well aware of the scope and Kohn.1 think that n? that is within your j limit of noi this deposition, lui A
Can I ask you to do something?

scope. Any kind of not allegation of ini And I have requested that the portion wrongdoing is not. I think ti91 that is a 31 O' You can ask* n21 of the questioning up until this point line which is not too difficult to poidraw. 1241 A: Would you pronounce my name be n31 transcribed in a separate docu- That is our position. correctly? ment because I nei believe the question- ini Q: (By Mr. Blake) Okay, Mr. Mos- R51 Q: What is the correct pronuncia-ing was outside the scope psi of this baugh,II221 want to provide you with a tion? phase 11 discovery. And I am 961 request- set of documents, and u31 counsel can Page 51 ing that the licensee move on to uti look at them first.This is April.The u ) material that is directly or indirectly not documents are entitled GPC's Proposed ut A: Mosbaugh. pertains to the diesel generatorissues at Stipulations usi Concerning Alleged al Q: I will try to. not this time. GPC False Statements To NRC i31 A: Thank you.

90) MR.BLAKE: Let me reply,but quite ; p g. 4 g ni Q: What I need you to do, Mr. Mos-un briefly. I am not going to try to baugh,is tsi to read No.1 into the record, respond to uzi everything that Mr.Kohn 91 Relateo To The Diesel Generators it's if you would.out 16 loud.

has said,but I do 93i want to observe that a document ni comprised of some 38 in the course of the u41 break where Mr. l pages. And with that 38page i31 docu- r1 A: (Witness complies with request of Kohn had said already much as that he ment, I have provided you a stack of Ini counsel.) has put on the record and more.1 additional ni documents which have 1910: Did you hear the question, Mr. Page 47 ; tabs in them indicating that is they are ,' Moshaugh. Exhibits 1 through 38. And I represent 001 A: I think you asked me to read No. In told him we were moving on to a new to 161 you that those exhibit numbers are 1. topic:la and as far as I know.there is no < referred to in ri the stipulations. nn Q: Aloud.into the record. Page 45 Page 51 Min-U-Scripts BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY AT.I FN MOSBAUGli (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1& 2 ) July 22,1994 n2iA: Oh.] didn't understand it was to ' '1161 MR.BLAKE: I don t n en know the I underneath me.between me n iand Mr. be n Process of, tion do you understand the play a un role in the following? Isl A: Iwillansweryourquestions,then, change that I snean to snake to un the pai A: There can be more than one as 191 stated. 8C"tCBCC-problem psi causing and possibly inter-polQ: And with respect tothis sentence, 921 A: Would you read the sentence as action. you've 03: reconfigured it. do you 9u have any reason to challenge I14I Q: So s it Y"ur view that - it or disagree with the p2l statement as 041Q: I w uld mean to delete m. the tn Pm insi A: It's not limited. It's my view that third sentence in p31 para. enance ove aul c ,and egar I $may n t be limited to the Calcon 041 A: I don't know that he was not the the sentence with the IB diesel.Would ' point of usi contact. you agree or 071 disagree? 071 Q: It's your view the Calcon sensor Hal A: I would still disagree because of may have pai caused the problem, but it 961 Q: Do you have any reason to chal- may n t be limited to the 09: Calcon lenge 071 whether he was the point of two u9) reasons.The phrase used is the IB dicsci 901 experienced post-main- senson antact? tenance difficulties,andI p 1believe the p i A: On B 1 am inclined to think that 081 MR. KOHN: I think the witness inclusion of the phrase post main- the pH initial cause was not the Calcon answered 1i91 that. He said he doesn't tenance i2zi still tends to imply that these sensor. There was I221 Calcon sensor know.That's as poi much of a challenge are occurring as p31 part of post main. alarm annunciation;but as far as the p3) as he has.There is no 90 sense beating tenance activities and pre return 941 to root cause on B,I don't believe it was a dead horse- service, the Calcon 941 sensor. And that's some-1321 MR. BLAKE: I think I can ask him p31 951 Secondly,I believe that since the thing I can't be absolutely 951 sure of, as whether or not he knows or doesn't to the root cause.1 don't believe that know,and 94) I can ask him whether or Page 73 p not he has a basis usi to challenge it,and pl sentence says the problems as-I think those are two sociated with Calcon ni sensors, with vi a root cause analysis was ever com-respect to paragraph C,I believe the (31 pleted for this 121 trip, and perhaps with "9' D any of A, B or C.To my 131 knowledge, problem experienced on paragraph C in separate questions, and I would like was related to pi problems in the control Georgia Power did not complete a root an p1 answer to my question. logic board,and possibly ist with P-3 141 cause analysis for these trips. 13t THE WITNESS: I don't know that he 161 Q: If the sentence were to read the tsi Q: Did you? 1c1 wasn't; and therefore,I don't have a IB m diesel experienced difficulties in-ist specific basis to challenge it. 16) A: I didn't at Georgia Power. I have ciuding the ist following problems as- been m reviewing the documentation I Page 70 Page 75 Min-U-Script @ BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876 8979

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ALLEN MOSBAUGli (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 4

  ,   have for theae im failures. and since I ! to develop evidentiar nuterial.we will              procee dmg and if it is turned over to t he have been at Grorgia Power.                  1:21 subnut that.                                m.1 NRC, then we would not have a im O: And have you completed a root ' 051Were you looking sor more than that?                privilege:and it 1 we would make tho+e            l cause unianalysis'for each of these three     n41 MR. BLAKE: I am jua.t reminding and         available;and I hink om that they have identified n n problems?                      nsi asking whether or not you would                                              '     " " "

have any n6l problem with abiding by .ca[;an li ffkh ght n2:A: No. I have not completed a raot , cause 041 analysis for these problems, the Commission's tri regulations with imi Q: (By Mr.Blake) Do you adopt that nel Q: Do you have one underway? regard to the nei supplementation of as your 1211 answer, your counsel s sug-1 ' responses to the extent he ti91:s working gestiori. nsi A: I am reviewing these analyses for on an analysis which I hadn't 12o1 heard a root nw cause. lieing an individual. I ini A: I would rely on his recommenda-about previously. When he completes I tion. don't have formal uti things like root (211it,I would like a copy.if.in fact,y " 1231 Q: It's your view that 7 C, the prob. cause analysis; but I am assessmg fiel 1221 think you are obligated to under the these f,ulures for their root cause. tem 124l identified in 7 C is not associated 1251 Commission's rules

  • n910: When do you think you will have with the Calcon f2H sensor?

1241 MR. KOHN: I am not aware of that 52nl analysis complete? whether 1251 there is an outstanding - Page 80 i 12i1 A: After we get all of the discovery Page 78 lij A: First off,I will say that there are u2 information and I have enough time l l ni MR. BLAKE: And I'm not asking you many l21 technical inadequacies to A. Il to review it 12u ali. and C.An additionall3l technical analysis { to 121 do the analysis, that's the dif-  ; )l i2ii MR. BLAKE: Counsel, to the extent ference. to C is that the true problem m that 1 he 29 completes an analysis or his work 131 MR.KOHN: If you are aware of a 141 . an it g document request that would cover that Page 76 151 particular document.off the top ofmy 161 Q: That's what it says. head,1611 am not aware of one.There has m A: Correct.Is that a trip alarm - trip

til requires supplementation of any dis-covery 121 requests that we've previously been a lot m of Glings over many years. Is1 alarnd It doesn't say trip alarm. A trip j I nught be 181 mistaken.But off the top made, would i31,you ensure that that alarm was 19 received.and the diesel did supplementation s done,14i and that we of my head.I am 191 not aware of one.So not trip, which is a um different and receive it? to the extesit you can lion clue me in at more significant problem than the one any point.1 will certainly get p ai to it as Iul written here. Furthermore, some of m MR. KOHN
To the extent that any 161 soon as I can;but right now I'm not n21 document will be relied on in the components I:21 that would specifi-aware of one.1 will review the 03) inter- cally indicate that a trip should i:31 have interrenor's n case and achieved, we rogatory request and supplement.

will provide it at that wi time.To the occurred were physically observed by

;    extent the documents in 191 pmgress are      n41 MR. BLAKE: Even ifI didn't clue you         personnel; v41 and even though those nsi n?                                          components had activated to lisi cause the work product between noi attorney                                                                                                           1 arid client in preparation for the lui          61 MR. KOHN: That's correct.But if } ou the trip,the trip still did not occur.             1 i

proceeding, I think we would object n?) clued me in quickly,I would get to it li6iQ: Are we focused on 7C which l

;   then to p2l attorney / client communica-      nel sooner,if you needed it right away.         says on it713-24-90,a high J,acket water tions and attorney p31 work product           II91THE WITNESS: May I say something            temp. alarm was nel treerved although pnvilege.                                     about 1201 my tuot cause analysis?              the diesel kept running and 091 tempera-12n Q: (By Mr.Blake) Sure.                      ture was ttormal?

041 And I also note for the record that usi licensee has objected to being required 122; A: Since it seems to be relevant.To imi A: Yes,we are,because a high lacket to do nel root cause analysis at the 123 extent that I have developed that water 12:1 temperature alarm would I intervenor s request n?) in interrogatory already and my 1241 thoughts in that area, never be expected to trip 1221 the diesel, j questions, so I think your nei request to they are not complete.1 had 1251 written A trip alarm would be expected to trip provide root cause analysis on the I 91 that up and provided that to the NRC, 12 e iese As you appmac tl hasis of deposition questions is a little and I , , 9 , , l imi contradictor). a sensor malfunction comes in if12s1 you i 12n MR. BLAKE: It's early in the day for P898 79 have only one of the three come in. 1221 such a rnismatch of arguments.It s ni believe at this time you may have it as wegg, Page M not even 12u close to the same situation. 121 Q: And in the future, to the extent pl So,you know,the issue here is one of  ; bt Id a 2 expe ed th n; you 131 ptovide additional analysis of that 121 expecting a trip to occur, but not  ; later on and not so earlier. type to the NRC,141 would you be willing having a trip 13i occur. And I will also to provide it to us? note that the control logs. m as well as Page 77 the diesel sheets that are filled out, m isi MR. KOHN: You are asking his coun-1:1MR.KOHN: Maybe I misinterpreted. sel? have the notations that a trip alarm was but 12:I thought we had asked for some 161 MR. BLAKE: No,I was asking him. interrogatory 13) resp <mse, and you ob- t is n t I at ip e nted ere jected that it would m require Georgia m MR.KOHN: Calls for a legal con-c us on mi w.hether it requires - 1"10: Are you saying this is incorrect Power to conduct further root m cause because 191 it doesn't include the word analvsis. And to the extent interrenor 161 1 19i MR. BLAKE: Whether he would be ;; tripbetweentemperature nuiandalarm, wdhng nur to - otherwise it would be appropriate? and and i counselwork on root causeaualysis have working documentation in .

                                                             ! nt1THE WITNESS: I would                    discuss that
                                                                                               , lui A: It needs the word trip. And like 1 preparation for mi this prucceding.1 l with p2l my counsel before I made that . say, p2i the other part that's inissing is think that constitutes 19 attorney / client   decision.

I that it should have n31 tnpped.There is communications and work noi product n3 no indication specifically, n4: although it documents.To the extent we intend on no related MR. KOHN: Asbasis to the f.ctual I understand of this 09 it, it is l kept running 1 mean to be a BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U Scripts Page 76 Page 81

All.EN MOSBAUGil GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGTLI. ELI:CTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) it should say it should have tripped but j 04i Q: Does that mean on the vme day the u61 transcnpts with the cover letter, didn t. or within usi 24 hour 3. on ilu' Lind of so I don't u?l think that's the case.What n<a Q: And it s your view that this prob- time frame? I am not sure of nel now is which lem in which is discussed here had i 61 A: Yes,within a dav or ,,,, transcripts necessarily go with t191 that nothing to do with uni Calcon sensors? ner, s a filing f201 pmb. n91 A: Calcon sensors vent to cause a 1171 Q: Paragrap!: 8,again,let > do it on a lisi sentence-by-sentence basis so it he yg tnp; so in tf Calcon sensors malfunc. makes it easier. (191 With regard to the 12:1 MR. LAMBEPSKl: I agree with that. tion, then they vent: and uti they cause first sentence - 122i MR. KOHN: - and we did not go a trip. If the Calcon sensors were 1221 120i A: Would you like me to read at or- through 1231 and determine which j functioning properly, then they don't 12:1 Q: No,I don't think so.I gave up on transcripts were prmided p41 at the time i vent.You av don t get an alarm,and you that (22) carly, and the reason that I gave the letter was transnutted.so I 12si do not don't get a tnp alarm.v4i So yes. know if we received all the up on it was 1231 because you are not a l ml Q: So yes,this event on 3/24 did not terribly accurate reader, and 94; I was Page 86 l afraid we would have a more confusing til transcripts at that time. Page 82 record.125j You didn't read thern totany 121 MR. LAMBERSKl: Okay.Ijust wanted ni indicate to you any pmblem as. accurate, so therefore to 131 make sure that there wasn't any sociated with the 91 Calcon sensor? Page 84 confusion 141 about the fact that we had ni A: I believe the root cause associated in I was afraid we would have a less pr vided those to 151 you, with 14 this problem is most likely to be accurate than a 121 more accurate record. I61 MR. KOHN: But I will note that there i a problem with the is! logic board, Since it is marked as an 131 exhibit,I don't m have been references to certain in-problems in the logic board. think there is any doubt. I have 141 tried sens in tai the transcripts which we have 161 Q: And had nothing to do with a prob. to be very careful about referencing no recollection 191 of ever receiving. Iem n associated with the Calcon sen. what ist paragraph we were referring to, 1:01 MR.LAMBERSKl: Those are the in-sor? I gave up on your 161 public readings. serts liti to the NRC transcripts that the Isi A: In terms of the root cause,Ibelieve m So, again,we are focused on the first NRC prepared. 191 that's correct. l* sentence of paragraph No.8 of page I:21MR.KOHN: But we have no record noi Q: Root cause or non-root cause,did 2. of p31 receW those Mns. it have oil anything to do,this problem 191 A: I believe in order to answer that,1 u41 MR.LAMBERSKl: Those came as it was observed on I:21 3-24-90, that i on would have to take a look at tape No. along with lisi these.There was a set of , would indicate any problem associated 11, transcript pij pages 4 to 6. Georgia Power n61 transcripts which is ! n3 with the Calcon sensor? I:21Q: So that the record is clear, we similar to the one that n71 Mr.Mosbaugh nel A: I don't believe that you know - have 1:31 provided a copy to Mr. Mos- is looking at here, and there lisj was a I'm not usi done with m1 analysis.1 have baugh of the transcript u41 pages which separate group of NRC t:2nscripts with not completed nel discovery.But at this he asked for- n91 NRC insens that we marked up by time this prublem seems to 071 be as- hand and 1201 proposed that to you by a

05) A: I can't recall whether or not ,1 stipulation. And (21) then there was,in sociated more with the logic board than have seen n61 this version of this addition to that,I think (22: there was one with inst the sensor, transcript before, transcript of an ITT meeting 1231 that was u91 Q: As I understand your use of the n?j MR. BLAKE: Mr.Kohn.do you know prepared by the NRC way back when.

more a 120i Calcon sensor problem could 1881 whether or not, Mr.Mosbaugh might have occurred, but it 120 might have have seen (191 this, in fact, transcript 1241 MR. KOHN: I know we have the IIT before. ones,1251 but rm not sure that we have been nusked, to use words that I am (221 the ponions, introducing. not yours, by logic board I2oi MR. KOHN: I don't know if I have problems? seen 120 it before. Page 87 123i A: I m not done with my review,1 122; MR. BLAKE: IfI were to tel; you we ni the insens that were marked up.That hesitate v4i to say no,there was no part p31 had provided this,along with a num- may I21 not have been in there. I don t of this that was usi associated with the her of 9 41 other excerpts fro m know if we,131 at this point,can t locate them in our 141 office or they weren t Calcon sensor, but I believe a transcripts of tapes and psi asked for your agreement about the content of transnetted at the 15) time. I can t place Page 83 the blame on you or 161 anyone else.1 just Page B5 don't know at this time. ni predominant problem of this item C was associated pl with the logic board- lii them months and months ago,would m MR. BLAKE: As a routine matter ofisi that help 121 you? business, however, you would have for-i 1.4)(A recess was taken.) 131MR.KOHN:I think I recall which warded 191 those on, I take it, to Mr. l 1410: (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, cover 141 letter you are referring to. Is it Mosbaugh for him poi to validate or not? l when we 151 bruke for lunch, we were a ist February '94 cover letter? And I have n u MR. KOHN: That is correct.All of the l discussing paragraph No.716 ion page 2. been 16i looking thmugh our record,and 02) transcripts would have been given to Were you aware of these three events m all the n transcripts that I had I n3 Mr.Mosbaugh,a copy of them,to the when they occurred? photocopied and sent 181 over to Mr. best of n41 my knowledge. sui A: I would not have been aware of M sbaugh.At this point we are 191 unsure usi Q: (ByMr.Blake)Do you have r view these 191 exactly when they occurred, exactly which transcripts we have. on 961 sentence No.1,Mr.Mosbau,n? What I mean is I noi wasn't, as I recall, at n01 MR. l. AMBERSKl: Are you saying n?i A: Well.let me say again,I recognize the diesel and.you know, n si having any that i n I when I sent the cover letter back some uni of the words. I believe I was real-time knowledge of these.1 became in February 021 of this year, you are not forwarded a n9i transcript of tape 11,but itziaware of at least some of these events sure if you got the p31 attachments to it? I do not ever recall poi reviewing a as they were 031 reported up the n4i MR. KOHN: At this point my lisi transcript excerpt lik e this oi nu tape l l , managemenit chain. recollection is receiving a package and The only thing I recallis reviewing a p2: Page 82 Page 87 Min U-Scripts BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979

j- GEORGIA POWER COMPANY All.EN MOSBAUGil (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENT. RATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 transcnpt which transcribed all of what i transcript from your .. tape-recording i 1231 Q: And is your answer with respect somebody e4i thought was relevant on that Mr. McCcy was im oh ed at allin 12sj to the ual second sentence that reads tape 11. ' a discussion on M.o h . Nth that the Mosbaugh described the !29 problems j uii And my recollection is it was more potential logic experienced on the 111 diesel at 1239 j than 99 this.and my furth er recollection Page 90 l a.m. is that the Pago92 iti board problems on 111 could have j Page 88 been a cause of the 1211 A diesel failure ni on 3-24-90 to be agree or not agree? I ni transcript that i received and read was on 3-20? 121 A: I had spotted that one before,and less ni et,mplete, with more inaudibles 131 A: I remember Mr. McCoy being in. I'm 131 sorry that I dropped down a sen-than this transcript 131is.That's my recol- volved in nj some of these discussions, tence, but I see no 141 reference in this lection.1 further recollect 14) that I don't you know, what we are 151 looking at is transcript to a 12:49 a.m. diesel ist prol> remember these little notations on isi two sections, portions of a 161 transcript, lem. I believe in order to know if that is ' here, either. and then saying that in some way 171 161 accunte, I would have to look at , ici MR. KOHN: Referring to morning combined these applied to this group of additional ri documentation. ' report F1 given by ALM,about one third people is) discussing something that's isi Q: So you would agree with that sen-through lui side A, not said on each one. I 191 mean.it's not tence if 191 it said Mosbaugh described 19]IS there a question pending? fully accurate. the problems experienced uni on the 1B p i Q: What about sentence 23 diesel on 3-24 90f noi MR. BLAKE: Yes. iniTH.E WITNESS: All right. I note that nu A: Sentence 2 is a characterization ini A: My recollection is that the prol> of the n21 tanscript.Not in the words of lem being n2l discussed here is where n21 pages 4 through 6 include two dif-ferem n3; excerpts. One, and then the tanscript,but n31 I think it basically the diesel should have n31 tripped but there s a star, and n41 then a second conveys words of the nel transcript,the didn't.My recollection is that that is n41 , meaning of the tunscript. item 7 C, which occurred on 3-24, that l excerpt. nsi S you agree with sentence 2? information nst is not in the transcript, i u si With respect to the first excerpt,I n61 but I agree that we are n61 discussing the can't tell that Mr.McCoy is a participant 061 A: Basically. problem on the 1B dieselon the date n71 to n i that conversation. nviQ:In what non-basic ways do you . 3-24. nel With respect to the second excerpt, disagree? nel Q: And you are just not able now to I li91 can't tell that Mr. Shipman is a nel A: Well.it's not a quote, attest n91 to whether or not it occurred l participant poi to that conversation.Mr. at 12:49 or didn't? Bockhold does say 120 that there are D'l E II doesn,t purport to be a quote. , logic board problems, and I 1221 believe 1201 A: It,s a characterization. I basically we were just talking about that on p31 pil agree with the characterization. time and 12n day that this pmblem was experienced. No. 7-C being a logic board problem p21Q: Is there any non-basic way in rather 941 than Calcon sensor proble p210: Next sentence, Bockhold said is which you 1231 disagree? as to why the B 1251 diesel was harm,ms g that the 93)one that you already said that problems.This.I think. 941 A: No. you agreed with> - I tas) Q: The third sentence? P41 A: This is the one I said I basically Page 89 agreed p51 with, ni confirms that. Page 91 , ni A: This is another characterization of Page 93 ni So to that extent,there is a 131 discus-sion, but not with all these parties ni the izi transcript. Mr. McCoy never says nl Q: Right. And then we went through because there is two different conversa- that the 13i commonality is with the 1 A pl basically disagree or you basically I ' tions.rst where the logic board problems failure, and I think it ut also overstates agree, and you 131 finally said that you on the IB were 161 found that could be

                                                      -                                             agreed with this sentence?

l related to the failure of I i the A diesel is! Q: Wait a minute.The sentence Bock- Hi A: Yes. I during the site area emergency. hold ici said they would talk to the NRC 151 Q: You understand that the transcript ini Q: (By Mr. Blake) When you look at at 10:30 a.m. about n their belief that is 161 supposed to be an aid for you in both I'l excerpts, are all four people that was a logic board problem, do inj trying to help you n to determine;but i involved in a uni combination of the two if you are able to say that you ini agree I different excerpts, as you nu use 191 the  ! you A: I'm agree sorry,I with dropped that down sentence? to the with this sentence, with or without the ternunology? l next pol one.We skipped - I'm sorry, l'I transcript of this particular tape,that's l na A: In a combination of the two they i l'm lost. We skipped nn Mosbaugh a fine noj answer.If you don't need the  ; are. I described. tape or the nil tmnscript to refresh your i int Q: And so whatisyourproblemwith ' n2l Q: I didn't skip it. I understood that mem ry orto give you p2l some basis for  ! the 04 sentence? to n3l be the second sentence, and I comfortably saying, but you do, m 031 understood your saying nei that you fact. recall that there was a conversation nsi A: Well.the second sentence - I.m agreed with the second sentence to on n41 March 24th in which A, B C sorry, p6i the second segment does not occurred, and you are nst able to agree, discuss - it doesn t nii state specifically , have psi been a refermi to that sentence) - then just sav vou agree and let's try n6i that the logic board problems on nas the ; n6t A: Excuse me - to inore a 'little more quickly. If you B diesel could have been the cause of t n j Q: I take it you have not been lying don't. then n j fme, then say you dis-the 1 A 091 diesel failure during this 3 to me, nni you made a mistake? agree. s gn t, 1

  • E# " "I# **" "" UCC""** I""I SCntences have hic 1 es t2 in ie1'I are l2ni long sentences.and l would hope some very n91 specific m. formation in McCob-1221 Q: Andtherefore.it snot cleartoyou l from my resp talking (mse un you should thern haveas to dates and times poi and other
                                                 , known      that I wasn't        about 12a  the   specificity. I will not have independent from (241 reading these pages of the               IB diesel trip at 12:49 a.m.                   au recollection of that level of detail.

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ALI.EN MOSBAUGli GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGTLE El_ECTRIC GENERATING PLAhT, UNITS 102) im Q: Well, some mu may: and to the

  • Page 96 ! 141MR.BLAKE: Doyourecallhownuny extent you m do we nuy be able to  : f ist the stipulations were adrrutted to) move more ymt LI). That a my u41 only . ni Q: - that is talked about, purpose. 161 MR.KOHN: Even how poorly they l tzi A: That is correct. were t 1 worded, not many.

12si MR. KOHN: I nuy also note to the 131 Q: Paragraph 9,same question. isi MR. BLAKE: Do you recall how Page 94 141 A: I have no knowledge of the ac. nuny? ni extent you are looking for more infor-curacy of 151 the statements, factual 19) MR. KOHN: I didn't connt. knowledge of the statements 161in No.9. nution la than is in our response, you Ii03 MR BLAKE: Three-could also io phree your question that (7 Q: Do you have any reason to dispute way and sas e w everyone a lot of time. is) No. 9? oil MR. KOHN: I recall I gasped at how nzi poorly they were wntten. tsi MR. BLAKE: I'm not sure that i 161 un. 19) MR. KOHN: With the content or what derstand your point. it noi purports to be? insiMR.BLAKE: And you think that document 04) would help us a lot in this t i MR. KOHN: There is information al- 1881Q: (By Mr. Blake) The statement effort today? ready m pnn ided to you with respect to nude in Itzi paragraph No 9? :151 MR. KOHN: Yes,because these were each one of ni these responses,it may p31 A: I have no reason to dispute those a psilot of the reasons and.in fact,as to be a more productive not way would be facts,941 but I don't know any of those why n71 they are objectionable; and to to get the response. have him nijlook at facts to be true. the extent you nel feel that you need the response and the answer and say I us) Q: Returning to the last sentence of more,it may be very li9) helpful.The n21 can give you this additionalinforma- witness could then say in poi addition to

06) paragraph 8 above, did you have any tion that usi I know, and that way you reason to i171 dispute the last sentence this,I could add this or that; int and the can maybe more nel exhaustively get representation that ns' Exhibit 3 at. responses might go much quicker.

through it in a more rapid usi manner. tached to the stipulations are,in fact. n91 But,of course, you can do it any 961 way 1221 Otwiously, Mr. Mosbaugh has had a the fragnet which is discussed there? (231 difference with every r. ingle one you want. I'm just noting the way you n?! are doing it,is going to be very slow; 120: A: Other than the fact that this says that's come 1241 up, so it's not like there and nel you are insisting that he go sen- k's a n very extensive fragnet, then I is any big (2s1 surprise. tence by n9: sentence, word by word, m wouldn't I221 necessarily - as frugnets s n t that l23 ext n Pa9'99 minutia.That is not what he is doing. 12:1 C: (By Mr. Blake) Next sentence, (221 i{on ,ye reason or knowledge to dispute. e f iti MR. BLAKE: Do you think there's an 41 eXPl anation as to why he doesn t Mr.Mosbaugh? recognize 131 the tapesp usi A: So there is no confusion,I'm on " 141 MR. KOHN: We now have some con-the get McCoy said sentence. Page 97 cern as is) to whether we have received ini Q: Right. ni A: I believe to answer the question I * *

  • I I *** I *#*"* PI

would (2) need to look at tape segment 171 MR. BLAKE: Are you altering your lel

                                       '9*

No.17, transcript 4 si through 5. response from what you told Mr. Lsm-ni A: The sentence is a characterization of a 121 portion of the transcript I see,I 141 MR. BLAKE: The record should ##8 "I * ""** *8 reflect tsi that made available to counsel no MR.KOHN: No,I said I wasn't sure think it I31 somewhat overstates what list whether or not they had all been was said because n says he t41 needed t and 161 Mr.Mosbaugh is the excerpt from taEe in transmitted n21 or not, and I don't know make sure the NRC participated in any-thing 15i that we did to the diesel.The (71 MR. KOHN: We have it here? Oh,here whether they have - 03 let's be very transcript implies 16 that th6 team 181 it is, okay. cicar,my initial response - needed to pamcipate in anything we !?) i4 MR.LAMBERSKl: Tell, the record 19:THEWITNESS: I don't recall scea.ng do in troubleshooting. noi this transcript before' willinsi explain what you said. ini Q: Other than that,do you agree with 06 MR.KOHN: Yes, the record will be n u MR. BLAKE: Mr. Kohn, did you ever very 971 clear as to what is said.That 1 1 the 191 sentence! see nzi the response to these stipulations j nota: Then it says with respect to in.the n31 form of admissions? Did you was not psj sure whether they are in j Brocknun's n U concurrence,that's with existence in my 991 office currently,and ever see n4:Mr.Mosbaugh's response.or that we did not check uoithem,andI do i respect to before we fix I:2i anything,we did one of your nst co-partners do that had to get Brockman's concurrence, p31 response or somebody else poi m your not know when they came in 121 which probably may relate specifically office? whether or not all of them were there. I l pai said I do know that the UT one was ' to the n41 aspects of the component n71 MR. KOHN: Which response are you there,1231 and I said we could not locate quarantine. nei referring to? the NRC 1241 inserts. I'm not sure lisi Q: Anything else? In91 MR.BLAKE: The response which whether or not they psi were included , nei A: No. you 1201 urged me to take into considets. in the package or not. I n? Q: Next sentence? ti n which nu might make this move a Page 100 lot faster a couple of 1221 moments ago? osi A: T.he first. I agree with that sen- When you urged me to do that, p31 had ni And at this point.I would appreciate tence. you ever seen the document? 121it if you would even provide us with n9 Q: Last sentence? a ist dupheate set just to make sure that { p41 MR. KOHN: I believe so. later on 141 there wouldn't be any poiknow 90 A: Iif can't attest to that or not.1 don't l' usi MR. BLAKE: Yourmsunderstanding. that's true. believe so.And you Page 98 isi MR. LAMBERSKl: I could have done 1221 Q: Because when you look at Exhibit g gg 3 which 931is attached you don't know ni thought it would be quite helpful to whether that's the v41 fragnet - ni THE WITNESS: Okay. First, there me in p1 terms of making a record? seems tai to be two separate excerpts pu A: They were talking about. B MR. KOHN: Yes, from different i91 portions of the Page 94 Page 100 Min-U-Scripts BROM N REPORTING, INC. (404) 8748979

i GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ALLEN MOSBAUGil j (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERA'ITNG PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 j transcript that comprise the liol com- n31 Q: Oly Mr. Illake) I w ill gn e you an ' pronoun they refer or don't refer to 09 i mon refrtence from No.10. nil opportunity to eyund on your , IIT? I understood him earlier to not be u n in addition.1 can't recognize that 1:21 ' answer, but I wouhl r hke an answer able nai to make that determination.and I this occurred during a plant status meet- FC6 Of D"- 1 I was n91 astounded.1 find him to be ng l mg nu except for the notations that are 06 Are you directing lum not to say yes capable of t2nt coopenting in this on this ou transcript that were not on or971no? deposition when he takes l2ti that posi-the original nst tunscript which has I usi MR. KOHN: I'm directing the wit- ta n.and that's why I followed up 12m on been added by somebody li61 clse that i ness to li91 answer the question if he , it.Now,do you have an ob ection? l this occurred during a plant status n?! I believes he can. I 123i MR. KOHN: Yes, to the tone of your meeting. i 124 voice and the accusational tone that [2aj MR. BLAKE: om it appears that Mr.Horton,in this one Are you directing him l y )u have 12s taken in this deposition, not 12n to use the words yes or no? o9i sentence, says they pretty much ** ** *#"" 122: MR. KOHN: I'm not directing the 1231 finished up uni the logic testing last witness one way or the other. Page 105 ) night: a id it appears ini that he said in I another sentence something u2i about ! 241 Q: (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, I ni about him Iving.You are setting the ni being in touch with them pretty 1231 would 1251 like an answer yes or no. atmosphere of the deposition:and when i e closely.1 can't be sure who the they've Page 103 you al set that tone, you get those u4 been in touch with the IIT team is. responses. ni A: Having read the question and 14: MR. BLAKE: I think that you have tsi usi Q: Oly Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh, having read 121 the tanscript, which is

!  when you                                                                                          played a much greater rule in the deposi-on three separate pages,I 131 have now           tion 161 today than we have defending Page 101      put it all together and believe that the HI      depositions for t 1 this entire week. We ni read the sentence that starts at the          they does refer to the NRC.                      have applied a very isi high threshold of bottom of 4 and 12i carries over to the          151 Q: To the IIT?                               pain to the depositions and 191 have tried top of 5 which reads:So we'll ai need to          16:A: I will note,again,that you have two       to stay out ofit and let you get noi your     i talk extensively with the NRC, the IIT            I?] lines on paFe 4,the beginning of them       questions answered. I would prefer the group 14i today and walk thmugh every-                                                                                                          l on the first ini part of page 4 and the rest      nii same treatment today.                    1 thing we've done, but isi we've been in          of it on page 5.                                  02: Q: (By Mr.Blake) Mr.Moshaugh?

touch with them pretty closely, and 161 they seem to like what we re doing. 19) MR. KOHN: I would like to state for us! A: I believe, having read the sen-1:01 the record, is this a complete tence which 1:41 is on three pages, that

t 1 You are incapable of reading that ist transcript? nil Are there conversations they and they've applies to psi the NRC sentence and understanding who them occurring in n21 between? and to the IIT team.  !

j "'I M hat w at r s ti n is ' plam. R.LAMBERSKl: No, and I can061 ex-Q: Thank you. So now what is your answer to it?! the question about nni A: Well,I will note - n41 MR. KOHN: If that's the answer,then whether or not you agree with 10 not or o n Q: Is that your position, yes or no? I nsi object to the question because don't? n2i MR. KOHN: Would you let him based on the 961 tanscript, if it's not n91 A: Well, as I stated before, I cannot l answer the usi question,and don't raise complete, how can the ti?! witness give tell 1201 that it occurred during a plant your voice at my n41 witness, you a complete answer whether usi status meeting. tisj Q: Oly Mr. Blake) What is the who they are referring to? 12ilO: Have you attended any plant answer? 091 MR.LAMBERSKl: Excuse me. status 1221 meetings? fi61 MR. KOHN: And I take earlier excep- 1201 MR. BLAKE: Your question is u31 A: Yes. tion n j to your first comment making ! whetheror121 notthereisabreakinthis reference to nal lying, and you should i panicular 1221 sentence? 1241Q: Does anything in this tonscript 6

have a different n9i attitude when you I 231 MR. KOHN
Well, my client has ! or usi excerpt from a tmnscript which are questiomng the i.M witness, please. l pointed u4jout that page 4 hastwolines. ! you are reading un MR. BLAKE: I would like an answer ! I'm a little usi unsure of what transcripts t Page 106
to 122i my question. not one other ques- l we are looking at. In strike you as inconsistent with lan-tion that he 123i wants to answer. guage that might 121 occur during the I

p, , u41 Q: Oly Mr.Blake) What is the answer course of a plant status meeting? to my 12si question? When you read that ni MR. BLAKE: Well, feel free to read it 121 yourself. I m asking him when he 131 A: No, but it could be in any number sentence, sir.are you of 14) other means. reads the 131 one complete sentence as Page 102 transcribed here.141 quote, so we'll need is! Q: Do you have any reason to dispute ni incapable of determining whether to talk extensively with 151 the NRC,the that 161 this conversation took place m J them refers to IIT,12 yes or no? IIT group today and walk through 161 the course of a ri plant status meeting? j 13i A: I'm having -  ! everything we've done,but we've been o A: I have no reason to dispute it. al Q: Yes or no, please? in m touch with them pretty closely,and 191 Q: No. I1?

                                                 , they seem ini to like what we are doing.
                                                         ~
si MR.KOHN: Answer the question as period, end quote,19i a complete sen i inni A: I would need to look at tape 21,

,- you ici feel you need to, Mr. Mosbaugh: ! tence.1 asked a question not about that i unamnscnpt pages 2 to L end if ri Mr.Blake does not -  ! one sentence.1 believe it to be ini a ! n21 MR.BLAKE: 1.et the record reflect ini MR. BLAKE: Are you directing him i comph te transcription of that sentence. l that n3l 1 am providmg a copy of those not 19: to answer my question yes or no? l 1021 have no reason to question it. l pages. I 4 M*1 THE WITNESS: I do not believe that oni nu your MR. KOHN: answer does -notandif satisfyMr.Hlake his j he n41thinks l n31 reads that And he sentence. I ask is in.him! nsi whether have seenor thisnot when transcript lI excerpt. needs,he n2l can reask the question l capable of usi determining whether or , no MR. KOHN: I'm going to state forthe again. not the pronoun them not and the ) n i record.also.that therc are now cer-BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Script @ Page 101 - Page 106 4

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ALLEN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY Juh 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) tam im thmgs on these transcripts 124) reporter. Arc you savmg the ones that ,12i A: I don't see anything that would which lead me to om beheve that I don't we 1251 got had this redone' indicate tM that it was definitely not.but es er remember seeing an uni excerpt talking about percent through a pii p,g,3og , n mumadeen m W a nWCh t meetmgs. side. This is absolutely not striking any u2i bell to me at all. lii MR.LAMBERSKl: I'm saymg this is a ( isi Q: Second sentence? 121 copy of what you got in February. 29 MR. LAMBERSKl: Michael, let's 941 131 MR. KOHN: 1.et's save some con- 16: A: I believe that statement is an ac-understand something here okay,about fusion.14 I wouldn't mind calling my i curate ci characternat.on. these psi transenpts. These transcripts office and see if isi they can find this is) Q: Next sentence? were sent to transcript amongst the 161 ones that are p,9,3g there, and I think that nught r1 help ivi A: I believe the next sentence is an clarify things because - poi accurate charactenzation. 10 you in February, okay. There was a ist MR.BLAKE: I'm sure there will be ini Q: Paragraph 12, first sentence? reference la to each and every one of the transcripts in 91 the coverletter,and some 191 more breaks where you will li2 A: First,I cannot tellif this is IIT n31 there was a package 141 attached to the have an noi opportunity to do it: and if Exhibit No.46 5. Secondly,I cannot tell cover letter, being the ist transcripts, we haven't taken pil a break before you if 941 Mr. Kenny Stokes stated anything 4 think people will be n2: leaving the of- l toi And if they weren't in there, you because there are psi no voices iden-would r; have told me then;and I'm sure fice, we will take one for that n31 pur. tified. i pobe- ' 06: Q: In Exhibit 5, Mr. Mosbaugh, the I en se t u 9 the es ist n41 But it does appear at this juncture n s first titi page of Exhibit 5 is a cover page  ; tions no more than a week poiafterthat,. that this is going to be a long deposition. for the inteniew nel of Ken Stokes. the stipulations contained lui refer, n61 It is taking a good deallonger than 091 A: Yes. ences to those particular tanscripts. what I 07j had anticipated it would. I n3l And I remember on more than one thought we would pal make a good deal taol Q: And then the next pages purport, l ou occasion you told me that Mr.Mos- more headway than we wou!d (191 and a to be [2:1 excerpts out of Mr. Stokes baugh was 041 very busy looking at our good deal more quickly than we would, inteniew, but you are p21 saymg you . diesel stipulations, osi and i note that Mr. poi and there would be more ready can't tell whether or not that is Mr. u31 l Mosbaugh is shaking his n61 head affirnd agreement with (21: these just based on Stokes because it just has Q, A,Q, A? ' atively nght now. Mr. Mosbaugh's 1221 knowledge.1 hadn't p41 A: That was what I looked at, yes. I anticipated the kinds of pu arguments note ps! that the next couple of pages n i So it's beyond me that you could take nel the position in here, which I think is that we just had on IIT and they 941 and identify Mr.Chaffee them;and frankly,yours and my exchan-091 contradictory to what you said car-lier today, poj that you have never seen ges psi as well, all of which just takes Page 112 time.And these transcnpts. ni and the witness and so on,Mr.Kendall, niiTHEWITNESS: I was shaking my "E* **"# # ' head a21 with respect to reviewing 01 therefore, it will just overall take ul Q: But they identify no indisidual tu transcripts of an these numbers, but longer, pl so I think we will have plenty inteniewee other than Mr. Stokes, do ) they were complete p41 packages, and j of tu opportunities for breaks. they? Don't (41 you recognize Mr. they were not of the level of usi detail and quality of these.They had many I41 And later on, or we can discuss now, Kendall's and Mr.Chaffec's names ist as isi while Mr. Mosbaugh is reading, members of the IIT? j Page108 whether you 161 just want to go on 16l A: Yes,I do. ni more inaudibles, and they did not straight through tonight ri or pick it up { have any of ut these notations. tmnonow.I m happy to talk ist with the pl Q: And do you think,therefore,that her panies about what s more t91 con- this ini might be,in fact, pages from Mr. m MR.LAMBERSKl: Yes and the ni! e e ;but if you want to just diink not Stokes' inteniew 191 by the llT con-transcnPis you are referrinK to' tu Mr- ducted by Mr. Kendall, Mr. Chaffee,901 Mosbaugh.1 don.t dispute what you are about that,and maybe we can discuss it

  #6 saymg. are the transcnpts that were             at nu the next break.                              ** "E *h# )

ri produced and are in the documents ii2j THE WITNESS: All nght. With nu A: The format of the inten'iew is produced mi that have been made avail _ respect lisi to the first sentence,I cannot quiet 921 different, so I m having trouble able to you before. tell from the nel tape recording that this between pages 17 pu and pages 62. It un ng in a ou sta# meeting. Fur- goes from Q and A to the witness,nelMr. 191 We took pieces of those transcripts Kendall, Mr. Chaffee. It doesn't even noi listened to them more carefully hennore,I don t beheve n61 I can tell a t orcuned in a staU na meeting on look like nslit belongs to the same docu-upgraded nii them for purposes of ol; eg , ment, taining stipulanons; n2 and that s what we proposed to you on n3; February nel Mr. Dockhold has indicated that the n61 MR. KOHN: I think the witness is on 28th of this year. NRC n9) approve testing under certain simply stating if he had the full docu-ment, nej he would be able to answer n4i MR. KOHN: Are these the exact ! '#9 **

  • 8 ' "U C"" " I"C' *
  • your question.

copies nu that were provided in their " " entirety or are ne these now upgraded? uhm s i hi f o re 2 n91 MR. BLAKE: We will obtain that. n in MR. LAMBERSKl: No, these en - poi Q: (By Mr.Blake) Assuming.Mr.Mos-what I uni provided to you in February. j this v41baugh, n9 MR. BLAKE: It I transenpt pu that whenwhich we obtam strikes copy of this inteniew, pa as your coun-the full you a does appear, how i inconsistent with a psi communication set has requested, that it turns out pH ever, uni from the baugh has not un seen record that Mr. Mov l or conversation that might have taken that page 17 is,indeed.from Mr. Stokes' these. l I, ua MR. KOHN: I have a question.On the l Page 111 i inteniew 941 by the IIT, then would you uti cover page it says redone by a court l agree with the first 99 sentence in No. in place in a staff meeting? 12? Page 107 - Page 112 Min-U-Scripts BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979

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GEOnGIA POWER COMPANY : ALI.EN lblOSBAUGH (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2 ) ~ July 220 1994
   .                                               Page113 j                                       Page 115 - f                                     Page 117 l
             -in A: With the note that the transcript i p1representationofin urwpointofthe. ; ni the acthities on the 22nd and the                                -l l               Seems m to say something general to the ' problem.is 12ithat ibr r starn sensors are            23rd. And I pi believe his affidavit does -        .I
            ... effect that there 131 were temperature' 'sotimelytocahbratem Andi mnotsure not indicate that he (31 trviewed work               !
             ~ calibration problems, as opposed to 14)- he's indicating that that a the 141 reason                                                                  j

(, orders associated with the diesel 141 sen ..

            . the No.12 saying that the temperature - of the other owners.1 tinnk that's more                  sor malfunctions that occurred on the              j l               sensor 91 calibrations were inaccurate.1          a ist reason that he is giving of his per-    22nd ist and 23rd.

can imagine having 161 problems with reption. the temperature calibration not m re- Ist Q: Are you finished? lated to the calibrations bemg accurate, 161 Q: And that's because Mr. Stokes is' not in m the owner group? ' ! 101 Q: So you are unable to agree on that ist A:I think it was my. ' understanding '*3 N' basis 191 with the first sentence' poi A: I don't think it is clear. . that 191 Mr. Brewer was in the owners 191 A: Mr.Horton's note does not appear  ? smup. to be ont dated.Mr.Norton's note also .l

            . nu Q: While we are k>oking at your dis-            pol Q: Mr. Stokes works for GPC?              mskes reference to 911 the mod was agreeing 02 with this or the psospect-                                                          done,which to me would be erferring that these pages 17 and 18 lisi might not         ilU A: YC-     .                       .

to Itai a modification, a design change, . l be imm the same deposition or inter- p21 Q: But GPC was not an ownerof this rather than 1:31 testing, and especially l-. view V41 as pages 62 and following,was psi equipment? not related to diesel IB ti i operability  ! that your point usi cartier? testing,6 wmild mome@c a pH 041 A: GPC was,yes j V61 A: Well. this format is censinly dif- ' nce test.  :: ferent. ' 05) And therefore, , why wouldn,t his 961 Having read Mr. Milt Hunt's affidavit, 071Q: And if you look at the ject ' I 1171 cannot tell Mik Hunt was assisting Bates nel stamp numbers at the om st71 A: I think that's broadening the con- the BT team; nel but he does appear to !. of the page don't you 091 think k is quite M. have come to the plant and l19) appears ! a coincidence if they are from a sani ps1 Q: Okay. No.13? i didn't cut you off. . to have witnessed - he came to the l'. different interview, that they are the- did li91 I? Is that the end of your discus. plant to tant witness some testing of the i same,if you pu subtract 18 from 62,you sion on 12, taos Mr.Mosbaugh? generators prior to ' pil- declanng it !. wind up with the same 1221 number as if pu A: Iwant tolook at one othercspect. operable. Whether or not Mr. Pete 1221 i you subtract 598 from 643? Taylor,whether or not he later returned l .. p210: One other aspect of 12? - to the ist site, referring to Mik Hunt,' r g re p4 roper d so e ini A: (Witness nods head afarm. with Pete Taylorand 941 witnessed addi-numbered it sequentially,that 951 would stively.) 941 As further elaboration of my tional .special . testing and final . p51_ make sense: but if there was original point that tasi that didn't represent an operability testing of the 1A diesel as. ermr, owners group viewpoint is - teferenced Page 114 Page 116 Page 118 pi then it wouldn't.

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tu the witness' statement on page 65,I pi in HT transcript No. 257, transcript } el Q: Yes,l'm just asking whether or not can't say 121 documentation by any pages 68 and p169, attached as Exhibit i at 131 some point you are cooperating - incans from other companies, but al 1. 8,1 would note that (31 Exhibit 8 is iden-14i A: I note that since you pointed out believe some of the temperature sensors tified as IIT document 257, but it Hi to me isi the project numbers. mayhave a Hi tendencyto drift down or contains no names, just voice, voice, drift over a period of isi time, voice. 161 Q: Would appear to suggest that this might 171 he the same intersiew as what 1611 believe that's further indication that Isi So from that document,I am unable ! the cover sheet shows lui and that each, 171 that's a viewpoint of Mr. Stokes and to 161 determine who is speaking and l all four of these pages might be from I, not necessarily Isl of the owners group, whether it is Mr. Hunt ri or Mr. Taylor. l the same interview? 19l Q: 13? - IslO: You think you would be able to i poi A: But I also note there's a conflict polA: With respect to No.13, page 8 as make that toi determination if we had the in ou format. 9 u referenced from the NRC Inspection entire document in fmnt 901 of us? l' p21 Q: Okay,second sentence? Report,the 0219005.it shows a series of o n A: I have neverseen the entire docu-work orders of vhich are usi not iden. ment.1 p21 wouldn't know. p31 A: Yes,I would disagree with the v41 characterization. The witness seems to tified as to ther date which any of these p3i Q: I'm informed that even if I could indicate psi first that a fewof the owners Del activities occurred.Yet the statement get the 041 whole thing.it might not help are considering the usi change.out of says that it usi relates to malfunctions you:so I don't know usi how to get you the existing system, which is 0 71 that occurred on March 061 the 22nd over this one.'

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pneumatic, thro'u gh some son of solid d 23rd.So I can t tell from those work 061 A: I couldn't tell. state s,ystem, un) is what it says. But he doesn t say that the poi owners - he 981 Mr. Milton Hunt,s affidavit states that 071 Q: I understand. No.15? Val If I'm does not say that the owners were uni able to help you by thinking about p9l it 991 he arrived on site on the 27th.Be* more throughout the course of the considering replacmg it because the cause the poi activities are stated to have temperature and 12u pressure sensors occurred on the 22nd pu and 23rd. I deposition,I put will come back to it? were sometimes difficult and p21 con. don't believe that Mr. Hunt could have 94 A: I would need to look at tape No.

         'suming to set up.                                    p2l disrctly observed these acthities.         19, na pages 10 and 11.

in And a separate question he seems to psi Mr. Taylor's affidavit indicates that he p31(A recess was taken.) 941 relate that that's his perception that 1241 arrived at the plant site on April the 041 Q: (By Mr.Blake)We are back on the there are psi problems with the 6th,which pst would indicate to me that usi record. I think when we broke, at - switches.and I think that's his he could not have observed your counsel's BROWN REPORTING, INC, (404) 876-8979 Min-U Script @ Page 113 Page 118 ' I-

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ALIIN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY Jtily 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) Page119 j Page 121 f Page 123 tii request,you at paragraph ul were 15 ongoing page to take 4 of thealook have l nideclared that the operations it 12i operabir depanment nuy l ni of s an installation error with the tnp proposed stipulations; and we 131 have j hnes. tu With respect to the second part.1 do provided you with the tape 19 excerpt say Hi that the NRC was present thmugh 12 Q: Is it your sense you were informed for your 641 resw during the break.'h ou all that testing.151 and I do know that the of131 that between those two statements,

have done that now,isi Mr.Mosbaugh? NRC was not, necessarily, at 161 this time, in the period of 141 time between those present for all of the 1B testing because two statements?
'    it.) A: Yes. I have. I will note that I can't ri recall seeing this particular tape with          m I think in large measure the NRC                       ist A: No,he,at some time just previous these kinds im of notations on it, but I            focused on diesel lal 1A. And I m not                    to 161 this 1 believe he has tnformed me have reviewed a tape of 191 probably the            clear as to what that testing I'm 191 refer.             ofit:and I am I i making a statement that whole portion of this tape that was lioi            ring to in this transcript,                              that fact surprised me ini because I had I

closer to what's actually here, fairly full, por On Page 11 l'm expressing concerns g nen infonnati n that the desel is im so I am n u a little more familiar with the that nsi there perhaps needs to be a g mg to be operable. And I m talking transcribed ini section. broadness review done. Iul That's my

  • 1e'th s ift super 3 y**g'" gr *y o) to 03:No.15 states that as of March 28,and comment.

I 1:41 don't see a date on this tape,that I operability declaration of this diesel. p3) Q: Focusing in this excerpt on page had concluded nst that the IB diesel was 10, n4ilines 10 through 12 - lui Yet in the very same time frame that operable; and from reading usi the psi A: Uh-huh' I ** "" #*E "'"E' * ** ** * "" 8 transcript, I can't be certain that the say it is capable of n4i perfornung u! s

                                                                       - what is your interpretation n61                                                      intended function, information comes diesel uti has been declared operable at now fn7ly urw rdsasreportedinthis this point or not. usi because my state-                                                                    psi to me that there has been an installa-ments - there s two statements n91                 tanscript imm the pai tape:I - you                       tion error in n61 rolled pneumatic t ubing, made,                                              know,1 feel that what we've done (191                    which ! later found to be 1871 the tnp now, you know, has gotten the B diesel                   lines, which tends to indicate to me that i     90 One is that has gotten to be so                 operable?

operable,120 mdicating that operations nel there could be,you know,a serious  ! 1201 A: I'mspeakingtoa groupofpeopic, problem with n9 operability. 112n n te Mr.Parton's name here, He's

            .*)a)i 8oi K to e7Pe I cre, indicating the possible future dec-31 Mr. Chants - 122i these were engineers                   1201I furtheradd that with respect to this pu ssue - and I'm not sure if we will ration.                                          that worked a couple oflevels p3) down                   get into it p21 later - I had made some

' from me, and I am reporting to those 94 As far as my concluding that it's 951 people 94i what I believe probably is the philosophical statements p31 carly on in operable. operable is a tech spec defini- this process as to what the site needed fact that diesel has 1251 been declared tion:and if operable by operations;though* 124: to do to restore confidence in these diesels. And I psi believe I said we need Page120 Page 122 a test prognm to determine I ni it's operable in the sense of a tech HI because I say later is going to be Page 124 spec pi definition.then normally that is operable, I'm 121 having trouble deter-written in all (3r caps. I don't make mining specifically if it is - 131 open- til tuot cause.We need a test program to a i operability decisions.1 do not (41 hold an tions people have actually made an restore 91 operability,and we need a test SRO on Vogtle. operability I41 tech spec declaration or program to restore 131 reliability. And to  ; 151 The fact that the diesel had been 161 not' me we need to go through all of141 that. declared operable is something that 151Q: The second reference you are Isl And at this point,you know.it appears , would be ri reported to me as a condi. referring to loi appears at lines 18 16i that we are up to the operability kind tion determined by others, isi and I through 21,and it's the ri sentence that of point.171 Yet,l am presented with new would be furthering that information on reads, quote, And we certainly have isi root cause information is; which indi-to my tw staff. g ne through appropriate testing.and it cates we may not even have exited the all passed 19) to show that the il dicscl as root 19) cause phase. i g ing to be openble ina here. i ilfr n th n t t e d es I nolG: Is the only use of the term been declared n2i operable or not, did nu A: Yes,is going to be operable here. openble the n n tech spec definition of not necessarily mean that we n3i were n21 Q: End quote. declared operable? Is there lui a more

ready to - that everything was fixed- usi A
And just from reviewing this C"""" " -

Because nel I go on in this same section on 10,I'm concerned usi about a root transcript,04) you know one is stating a p3i A: No, people - I would say people future:and one is nsi stating a past;and at the nei plant are not always sufficient-a cause problem that has been identified; then what happens in the middle n6t of ly precise in their psi nomenclature. , no and that is the one of rolled tubes. all this is that new information comes to n61 Q: Can't you, as an engineer at the ( 1 n't And this section indicates that I was my n7i attention that could affect the plant n71 site,in talking with others, refer a nni httle surprised by what Paul said root cause. simply to the nel diesel as being here, meaning n91 that I may be report- uniQ: The new information between operable rather than being declared n91 ing fro m operations that it's poi those two n91 sentences? operable;and in that sense simply mean operable,but I m surprised that here's a i poi A: Yes, about the miled tubes. I was I it's poi workable,it works,I think we are

fmdmg pn that could affect the a un httle surprised.okay.I rn nowrefer. i there;is that a 12n possibility here?

operabihty, the fact that pa pneumatic I nng to a p21 statement between those p2i A: Most people,like l said.and when tubing was improperly installed. I two sentences on 10 and 11931 and on you p31 get into people that have SRO pu So in that context I can't agree with 19,20 and 21 because I am refernng to training, those people 94 are a little the v41 statement that I had concluded a p41 statement on 12 and 13.1 was a httle more precise in their usage and would that thoseit reasons,I was operable nuv beusiin sense,and for ! surpnsed on usiwhat Paul said here and reporting usi tend to use the term operable to what Paul has informed us i mean the tech spec Page 119 Page 124 Min-EMcripte BROWN REPORTING, INC. (400 876-8979

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ALLEN MOSBAUGH (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 . Page 125 Page 127 l - Page 129 ill ternunology. Other people that i ni afternoon so you m!I be able to con- niinterrupting you at this time for you

 . has en i had 5RO 121 training might be a j firm that 12iyou still h.n e ihat document. . to focus on 12 page 3, line 3, where
 - little more lax in their usage 131 and i I think it 131 would be helpful to me if I following the lines that you 131 have understanding. I would try to be more you were able to ni check this, and I referred to and the discussion about ni ni restrictive in the use of that term,      don't know what your tsi recordkeeping          reliability of switches Mr.Bockhold says:

meaning tech 151 spec, because I have amounts to in your office that 16) would And I ist told the NRC that.and ask you SRO tr;uning, indicate whether or not they have been whether or not you 161 might reconsider i6, g No. j (,) 171 provided to Mr. Mosbaugh at all for your answer? rp es tai of responding. ri A: Yes,1 will reconsider.1 hadn't read FI A: This seems to be a charac-terization out isi of a transcript, but I 191 Mr.Mosbaugh,you can just cominue tel that next line. don t recall beinginvolved 191in this.The to poi study 17,if you would, and then we will go nit ahead. 19 Q: I take it,then,that you would agree chameterization from the transcript pol noi with the first sentence.What about seems reasonable, seems to represent I:21(Discussion ensued off the record.) the second nil sentence? Am I right that what's in the o n tunscript. 03 Q: (By Mr. Blake) When we broke, now you agree with the 1121 first sen- j H21 Q: So you agree with 16. I have ob. 041 Mr. Mosbaugh was going to look at .tence? q tained a n31 copy of Mr. Stokes' interview, tape No. 27 and nsi compare it to the v31 A: With a couple of exceptions.This soon to be pages 1 v41 through 69,if you proposed stipulation No.17. says 041 that this happened on April 2nd. I want to take a look at that and usi satisfy n61 So, Mr. Mosbaugh, we have com. which I haven't 051 been able o ascer- j yourself whether the pages we earlier pleted your 071 break. Have you com. tain; and I have not been able to 961  : talked not about when we were discuss- pleted your review? ascertain whether this occurred during i ing proposed stipulation 1 71 No.12 are, g,; g; ye,- a morning n7i telephone conference. l m fact, transcript pages from thi nei n:10: Same question I have asked mterview? 1891 Q: Now, can you tell me whether or not you (201 agree or disagree with para- before with ii91 regard to the plant status, n91 A: Yes.itlocksSketheP1rtionof(301 if you participated in 120) those, does Exhibit 6 pages 17 ano IM:ven though as wh e they look (20 different from the full ((h I 12: o anything in here strike you as (2n incon-sistent with a conversation that might document you gave me - break k doW* have 1221 taken place during that plant 1221 Q: I think you are referring to Ex- I23 A: This is a characterization of the status morning call? hibit 5123i rather than Exhibit 6? segrnent la4 of this transcript.and I don't g251 A: I don't have a specific reason to 12m A: Yes. Exhibit 5. dispute 1241 that,but I don't know that. portrays et nse pt t$c " ' Y 12sj Q: Okay, proposed stipulation pass- nd semence? Page 12e graph t u reason why I say that is this indicates Page 130 Page 126 that 121 Mr.Bockhold said he had spoken ni A: With the clarification that I think ni No.17 on page 4? to the !!T team last Isl night and in- he's (2) no longer referring to his conver-tal A: In order to review this. I would formed them of a couple of things. sation with the 131 NRC,which was what need 131 tape transcript No. 27, pages 2 HiIt says he had informed them that the the first sentence was about. I Hi think to 5. Isi probable cause was an intermittent he appears on this transcript to have 91 MR. BLAKE: The transcript wir. problem. He had 161 informed them that said tsi that,but to his staff or to whoever the probable cause was an rj intermit. is on this 161 conversation, reflect (si that copics of the excerpts from the 161 transcript of tape No. 27 tent problem on a high jacket water tel ri Q: Okay, you agree with the second have been provided ri to Mr.Mosbaugh. temperature switch and potentially a sentence,181 but you want us to under. Second 19: intermittent problem or a stand that you don't read 191 that as refer-iciTHEWITNESS: This particular ver- calibration problem of pq another sion 191 of the transcript has a segment ring to Mr.Bockhold reporting on a nul switch, and that he considered the Cal- conversation with the NRC) that I do,not noi recogmze as a segment, con 1:n switches reliable and the dicscis and it is part of a un larger tape operable, nil A: That's correct. transcript that I do recogm,ze, n21 and I n21 Q: No.18)' do not recognize the notations on the n21 And from what I have been able to 031 transcript such as morning plant tell n31 from looking at this transcript.is usi A: With respect to these statements, status n41 teleconference that are not that he did 041 those things, except for I v41 cannot tell if both the NRC Region recorded on the usi transcript or on the telling the NRC that he psi considered II and the IIT usi personnel had been tape, the Calcon switches reliable, he did n6j advised that the plant typically no had , n6 MR.BLAKE: This has been a fairly those other things except for that. problems, et ceters, et ceters. I recog- i n7 consistent refrain, I think, on every p?! He seems at line 15 to be addressing nize n71 Mr.Chaffee as being a member j one of nei these excerpts, unless I am the nni group of his opinions and is no eI team.but I nei cannot tell as to  ! wrong.to date.n91 Mr.Mosbaugh doesn't longer stating what 991 was contained m - think he has seen 2ni these, his discussion with the NRC. And I 12ni 091 Q: How about Mr.Johnston?  !' believe that his discussion from line 15 (2ni A: I don't recognize Mr.Johnston.12n 12n Were you able to check with your , on page r2n over t line 2 on page 3 :s office (221 during the last break. Mr. I In addition, the verbiage is different in Kohn)- n t m reference to what 1221 he told the 1221 that this section refers to problems NRC.The portion previous to that and calibrating the 1231 Calcon sensors 123i MR. KOHN: No.1 wasn,t. 1231 the portion after that,I believe,is in during maintenance outages.and the 1241 r241 MR.BLAKE: Let me know if you reference 1241 to what he actually told statements made by Mr.Bockhold refer need 1251 time before your office closes them. to during im overhaul time.Those are down this usi Q: I'm sorry, but I think it is worth different.The engine is BROWN REPORTING INC. (40 0 876-8979 Min-U-Scripte Page 125 - Page 130

ALLEN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 102) i Page 131 ! 124 A: I can't tell that this tr.mwr pt sec ,1241 But in addition to that.1 don't believe  ; m overhauled m a nujor maintenance where tion 12si where it - and the onk section usi that it is a proper characterization j it says that whoever manner when st u; nught be completely torn down. The words overhaul 131 Page 133 Page 135 would indicate a tnajor tear-down of the ni George,which I will assume is George lii this is is accepting the fact that there diesel.141 That is different than an oc- Bockhold,that (2) this section is referring l casion when the diesel 151 might be out is so much (21 ment here because the l for maintenance,which might be nu.nor to Bockhold's view of !3 operability. I voice is saying the past (31 testing they see no way to determine that we are 141 did is not fully comprehensive, and ni t6i in nature. talking about George Bockhold's view that leaves some doubt. I?i Overhaul is a specific title that would of isi operability. All it says is what tsi And the voice is saying there's a 161 ! 121 occur on an 18-month interval, and George is saying e6 has some merit,and l the owners group,191 utilities consult for nowhere do I see what George !? said, question in terms of how comprehen-these major tear-downs. And noi that ter- sive their testing (71 is in this case. I isi Then it says he said, and I guess the believe the voice is expressing isi some-minology is different than a main-he 191 here,I will assume that the he here thing different than acceptance. The tenance nu outage because a mam' from No.19 is not perhaps referring to voice may 191 say sornething about some-tenance outage could be for I:2i only one Mr. Bockhold again. And I 1:n cannot tell thing having some merit: but not in the shift and could occurat any time during that from this transcript because the n21 broader context,I believe the voice is H31 the year and wouldn't be a total voice that I have just assumed to be Mr. tear-down tui concerned about how comprehen-Chaffee is lisi the one that says that, and sive the testing is and n21 was. nei And also it seems to be overstating he says it does seem, nel though, based n31 Q: Okay, No. 20? nst what's said when it refers to once the on history, that eventually whatever usi diesels had n61 been declared operable, is causing these things to trip seem to I:41 A: I would need tape No. 29 of the because I didn't see the 971 words work n6 themselves out. nu m nscdpt declared operable in this transcript. n?) I would further note that the voice, usi ,

                                                                                                                           & l.et dw remd renect n: Q: Pamgnph 19?                                  if ps! we assume it to be Mr.Chaffee,is,                97        cnpt proceeding was given (191 A: When I turn to Exhibit 7,I see 1201        indeed,1 91 questioning the operability Mr. Horton s note, which I,m having                or the previous testing (201 because he         n91 MR.LAMBERSKl: I asked Mr. Pen-trouble relating un to No.19.                      says there is some question of how rail         land to poi check on the letter that I sent comprehensive their testing is in this          to the staff an and to intervenor counsel 122i Q: I believe the appropriate exhibit          case.And he (22 later says that that does       on February 28th, <221 1994, a copy of

, 123: reference was Exhibit 8.Is that help- leave some doubt.The 123 past testing which I am passing out here usi now to l ful? they did is not fully comprehensive,941 confirm that the transcripts that were I 941 A: Exhibit 8.page 65,I see that there and that does leave some doubt. 1241 attached to thie letter are,indeed,the l are usi no voices identified, so I'm (2si So I would say this less than """"' ** * *' ##" having trouble refening Page 134 Page 132 Page 136 ni acknowledges that the voice is ac-01 rerifying that Mr. AI Chaffec acknow- cepting the view (2l that this is not a tu to in this deposition. ledged to Ken ui Brockman that problem. 12: And Mr.Penland has confirmed that Ilockhold's view of opembility had m

  • I * "" #'#"*" *"'.**'#"' "I some ment, 1310: Let me see if I understand your answer. H) With respect to the first sen- at came HI fmm the Ge in wW: we n Q: Mr. Moshaugh, are you able to tence in 19, one, you tst don't know pm tM lener.,ts@ey am die same tape determine 151 fmm your review of whether it is Chaffee; two, you don't 161 en u tape at w e tmnscript page 65 that the 161 substance know whether he is talking to Brock-of what's reported in proposed stipula- man;and three, -l you can't tell fmm the de i ion' tion ri No.19 is accurate, even though transcript page 65 whether lei or not is And furthermore,to confirm with 191 you question whether isi or not the in- Chaffee's reference to George is refer. Mr. Bailey at Southern Nuclear that,yes, dividuals invoh ed on that transcript 191 ring to 191 operability when he says has lu>l indeed, these are the transcripts he page are Chaffee and lirockman? some :nerit, what George noi is saying received nu when we sent the copy of noj A: On page 65 I cannot, has some merit or some other subjecty this letter with the n2: attachments to nu A: That's correct, him.

nu Q: 1.et's assume that the voice here is n21 Mr.Chaffee on this page;and I have n2l Q: And as to the second sentence VM w at we are pa ng ut to you h knowledge that n31looking at this page your usi position is? " i alone, you can t, make that n41 deter- [hhav nn - n to i y t$ n41 A: I think I just went over that, did not receive nel them. l nunation. And let 6that also nsi acknowledge assume looking atfurther this that I l nsi Q: Yes.1 just missed it.I'mn?)MR.KOHN: not sure I Okay. I would like to l page alone,you nN can't determine who l 06l understand it.You agree except? state nel that I do have your February it is he is talking to. n 28th letter, and usi that the only - and { ac?! A: The second sentence isa psichar. terization.arrd he said - I assume that we only (20 received one n l liut if, as I said before, you will a$- I sume nai that this voice, that it's a fair I91 Q: I understand we don't know transcnpt of tape 17*) 1 representation to n91 you that this voice wherner that uni is Chaffee. I'm asking usi MR. LAMBERSK!: Attached to that  ; is Mr.Chaffee and that he is poiinvolved you to assume that. [221 letter, yes. in a discussion with Mr.lirockman 1 ask un A: I don't know that it is Bockhold, 1231 MR. KOHN: At any time,I have no 941 un you whether or not the substance that's u21 my interpretation. And if he is recollection of being given -

that occurs in un proposed stipulation Bockhold,then I usi don't know ifliock-

' No.19isaccumt- based on um this page? i hold said that. either. usi MR. LAMBERSKl: Well. we have made Page 131 - Page 136 Min-U-Script @ BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 l

! I l- GEORGIA POWER COMPANY allen MOSBAUGII (VOGTLE El.ECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 l

  .                                      Page 137 I believe ri what they are are the copies           polMR.KOHN: Mr. Mosbaugh. I think.

l sin reminded me at some point there niothertanscriptsav2ilable discover) here in Atlanta. to youin121 availablel1 of tw that the30u 1s1 transcripts copied when , that we have made , were some 11 131 MR. KOHN: That is correct, outside i you've been here to our um offices and to him in Georgia. fi3 Do you remember taken copies away. the reason for that? si MR. LAMBERSKh Yes, that,s my best Hal And we can probably even confirm n41 MR. LAMBERSKl: We may have, in tsi recollection. the n21 transcript copies that you have fact, nst sent these transcripts directly to l taken away 931 because we have copied li61 Mr.Mosbaugh.I don't know that we  ! t61 MR. KOHN: At this time,the search rl them for you.I don't n41 know if we can have a n i record of that.1 think ifit was i that was done at my office obtained a or can't, frankly.But 1 have psi asked Tom done nsi Mr.Pentand would have done copy of m transcript tape No.17,what I to pull out transcript 17 from the 061 it. It's 1i91 possible that he did it for me had when I was 191 on the phone to try documents that we have made available on my poiletterhead.1 will ask him to go to confirm it;and the poi only one we to you,n71andIhave handed you a copy check that. could locate at that time - till unfor- of it here. ns) Perhaps you can confirm tunately, Mary. lane,who is covering the 12n MR.BLAKE: I don't think there's a that, yes, this is is91 the copy that your r221 need to wait for Mr. Iamberski to n21 filing, was out of the office,was a 131 office has told you is poi there,in fact, check on 1231 that. Why don't we different rape No.17, consisting of 20 n 'l there's a very easy way to (211 confirm pages.The pages were paginated in 25 pmceed. that. I believe the bound transcript 1221 length osiImes. that 1 just handed you of tape 17 has 12410: (By Mr.Blake) Mr.Mosbaugh.you (161 And on the document that was given Bates 123 numbers on it;is that not cor- were 1251 looking during the break, to here Hvi today.the pagination goes to 23, take advantage of the rect? j and the psi next page is a continuation (24i MR. KOHN: Yes,that is correct. Page 142 f with the 24 and n9125 with a big blank space after it, and that (201 does not im- (25; MR. LAMBERSKl: And the ni time, to look at proposed stipulation l' paragraph r2 No. 20 which has a refer-part with the document that is in 12 1my transcript that office. Page 140 state whether or not you agree or.91 1221 Now, when the document came in, disagree with the language? the p31 February 28th letter was filed m ni we have been handing out here today i my 124i chronology files.The transcripts and that I21 were attached to my 151 A: Sure,from this transcript.I cannot were then 1251 put with a rubberband February 18 letter do not 131 have Bates 16 determine all the things stated in No.

      "" '        '           #                       numbers on them.                               20. For t71 example, I can't determine 141 MR. KOHN: That is correct.With that        that this occurred on is) April 3rd.I can-Page 138 151 I think we can go a little further to 161  not determine that this occurred in 191 a ni cabinets.                                    clarify. And ultimately, the confusion         plant status meeting because unt r2 MR. LAMBERSKh Was this transcript            could ri end up being the documents            other not transcripts, this doesn,iketeven    the 17131 that you are referring to put in the     that Mr. Mostnugh isi was using to              have the notation we sin talked about file Hi cabinet with any other                  review were the entire 191 transcript.And       before.This one is different.So n21 there transcripts?                                    so now looking at the poi portions,it is        is no notation on this one ofit being a si MR. KOHN: All the transcripts are 161       throwing him off a bit.I InI can't explain      plant n31 status meetmg.

contained in the same filing cabinet. It at this pomt.but I will n21 call back and v41 I can say that Mr.Bockhold has made ri MR.LAMBERSKh Do you know see if we have the Bates n31 numbers on a itsi statement that we believe the them.We can maybe try to resolve 041 calibration is correct 061 with the new which ones,isi in particular,that you are that before my office closes. referring to when 191 you say all? switches.and if that's - and we don't isi MR. LAMBERSKh Sure. n?l have that problem today.So I believe not MR. KOHN: All the transcripts that Mr.Bockhold nei is referring to a calibra-l we uy have available to us. n61(A recess was taken.) tion that's been done the n95 day before n21 MR. LAMBERSKl: Including the li j MR.BLAKE: We took a break so that or on the day of April 3rd with the 120 ones that n31 you've copied when you nel Mr. Kohn could report to his office. Calcon switches. got access to the v41 documents that we I don't 1191 know if there is anything to have made available in this psi case? report. 90 And then he does say we are going to do a 122 test that will prove or dis-usi MR. KOHN: Yes.But I would also nti 1201 MR. KOHN: The only thing I can 120 pro e this theory. And 1231 that's what further like to indicate that I did have indicate is that the only transcript we confuses me in the context this is (241 my psi staff photocopy this February were p2i looking at, No.17,is the one presented because he is making an af-28th letter li91 with the attached with the p31 project numbers on it. firmative psi statement that the calibra-tnmscripts,it's my poi recollection.and 124l MR.LAMBERSKl: Well, that's fine; tion is correct,and then forwarded them to su Mr.Mosbaugh. but usi I have real difficulty believing 122 It's my understanding that when p31 that you did p.g.343 j Mr.Mosbaugh andI were going through ni he goes on to make a statement that the 941 transcripts.that we were looking Page 141 he is going to 121 have to do a test in order at the same nsi documents:so that is why til not receive those things when we to determine that the 131 theory about I believe that the sent them pi because once you received there being a problem is correct or 91 "9*

  • I the letter, you 13l would have called me not!But to spite that contradiction.then, and said where's the al transcripts, or he does ist say that in his opinion.all the m ones - from my recollection right once you received our 151 proposed diesels are still 14 operable. So with now,is i pi don't remember the big blank those -

diesel stipulations a few days later is spaces on them; t3l and I remember, too, the transcripts being si larger- which refer to those transcripts, you rl Q: So you see the quote in the refer-would ri have said the same thing. So I enced is) t:2nscript pages, what you isi MR. LAMBERSKh I believe you have am absolutely ini baffled at this position can't determine is 19; whether or not 161 copies of other transcripts, and I and very much 19) concerned. these transcript pages come from a noi l BROWN REPORTING. INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 137 - Page 143

m , _ _ . _ _ _ __ __ , _ _ _ _ l 1 $ ALI.EN MOSBAUGH . GEORGIA POWER COMPANY * (VOGTLI: til.ECTRIC GENERA'ITNG PLANT, UNITS la2) l j July 22,1994 tape-recording of an April 3 plant status { transcripts' excerpts na th.e \1r Blake meeting. It does usi appear that Mr. - 4 . meeting:itit is that correct) ' has been referring to tode . sent to Bockhold stated, We have not n61 iden-n A: Yes,that1 true, ~ Mr. Mosbaugh back in Irbnun or per tified the root cause of the lacket li?) early March time imme.% r ilon i have a order.The quote that is attributed to tini l nH Q: No.21?' nsi letter that sends them. So - Mr. Bockhold doesn't seem to be ac-i n41 A: I would need tape. No. 32 to 061MR.KOHN: Could I have a copy of curate.1 91 The transcript, as I read it,

             "#'                                                                                          says:We have 1201 not identified the root         ;

- ' n si(Tape recording transcript was given iMR. LAM 8ERSKl: These do have a cause of the failure (2:1of the high jacket I j to n61 the witness.) way of nel disappearing, don t they' water temperature 1221 switches, period. ' !- n7iTHEWITNESS: 1or starters, I can't n,i MR.BLAKE: The record should We believe they are 12H reliable enough l i nzi determine immediately from pages 5 for diesel operability,(241 period.But we i reflect 120) that Mr.Kohn found it in his are getting some resistance 1251 from the

through 8 n9; that this is an April 4th pile of(24 documents.  ;

4 meeting. Further. a2ni i can't tell that Mr. NRC in that particulararea. And 4 1221THE WITNESS: I cannot tell that this

Kitchens is involved tan because I don t Pep Me $

see his voiced identified. 125 conversation occurred on April 4th.  ! I cannot (241 tell that Mr. Milt Hunt of the til that does not seem to be the same  ; 1 I:21 I further can't tell if Mr.McCoy and NRC and others (251 participated.I don't wording or 121 sentence sequence that s 9 p31 Bockhold said that NRC's Ken Brock-  ; I believe that I can quoted. man would v41 be briefing the regional  ; 2' Pep us in Q: (By Mr.Blake)I agree with you. administrator on 1251 Friday,4490,about  ; j releasing GPC from the tell Paul Kochery pardcipated be- nj A: In addman,it says that Mr. Bock- .l 1 voices are not idemified hold 151 said that the NRC was con- l ' pay 94 on the transcng cerned about the 16 reliability of the: l lu Confirmation of Action letter.What I 151 I see that Mr.Bockhold says that the high jacket water switches, which pl . j see is (21 Mr. McCoy making a statement ni sensors or calibrations were being may have to be bypassed before the  !

to that effect. done as isj of this date,were being donc NRC would allow ist restart. And I don't i i

131 Q: (By Mr. Blake) Can I refer you to consistently;161 and he believed we had see a quote that I would draw toi that I t the ni bottom page, transcript page 7, good switches in the al plant; but I can- characterization from. I see Mr. Bock- ' lines 24 and 25 and ist the top of not see where Mr.Bockhold tei indicated hold pol talking about the potential to r i transcript page 8, line I. They say 161 that the calibrauon procedure had I'l them,but he nu does not scem i different things? not been changed yet;and I could not to referencing that to the NRC. I pl A: I think they say slightly differenc isi see lion where it was discussed that it 02 Q: No.2p. . things, but they are both talking about would be tiu changed once they had sin A: This appears to be an - Brockman 191 talking to the regional ad. decided on the best way p2l to do it. n4) Q: I see you are strugghng, Mr. Mos-ministrator about getting not a release. Ii31 I do see that Mr.McCoyindicates that One says he's prepared, and I don't baugh, est but go ahead,say it.  ! 041 whatever they send to Bruckman, nel A: This appears to be an accurate 1871 ' mean vil to be overly specific,but with Milt needs a nst copy of. those pai clarifications - well,those are characterization, with some minor cor-n61 Q: (By Mr. Blake) So to sun-A rections; but not as far as a -charac-l the clarifications pH that I have with  ; respect to the first sentence, my n71 undersrandmy wkh respect to 22, terization,I will say that it is it91 accurate. that you are os) imahle to tell whether The quote is not exact. v41 Q: You agree with the first sentence or not this was on (191 April 4th.You are  ! except nsi that you can't determine poi Q: I agree.1 at least saw issues as 12:1 i unable to determine from this taal ex* opposed to issue;but you agree with this whether or not it was an n61 April 4 cerpt whether Kochery, Hunt and t meeting on EDG testing, and you can't statement? i others were tan there.You are able t ' n71 determine whether or not Kitchens agree that Bockhold said the 1221 sensor (221 A: As a characterization. was there when you nei looked at calibrations were being done in a con- 3:31 Q: No.25? McCoy's and Bockhold's statements in sistent (231 fashion; and, quote, We p41 A: I cannot tellif this document was  ; here,i191 but you see that they are talking believe we've got good 1241 switches in about NRC's poi Brockman briefing the faxed 1251 to the NRC. - the plant now,end quote. regional administrator on 12H Friday 12s1 You are unable to agree with the next p. ,y, about releasing GPC from the Confirma- niQ: Can I refer you to the top of the tion of 122i Action letter? Pop HT first p1 page in the exhibit? pn A: Or preparing to brief him, yes. ni portion of the sentence that is Bock- 131 A: Yes. The fax line on the top indi-  ! 94i 0: Next sentence? hold added that tai the calibration procc- cates ni this was faxed out of the tech- l dure had not been changed yet tu but nical services ist building at Vogtle, psi A: I think that characterization is will be changed once they've decided ' on the best ni way to do it,but you are 161Q: So other than your inability to p89' ", determine pl whether or not it was unable to agree with the tsilast portion ni basically correct, with the clarifica- of the sentence,McCoy said to make 161 faxed to the NRC - tion that I pi specifically said there is sure that Milt Hunt got everything that ist A: I have an additional problem.You certainly not satisfied tu yet. was p ided pl to Brockman; as that 191 referred me to the top of the docu-

   . p1 0: 22?                                           m eet                                          ment, and I can 001 only tell that it was 151 A:I would need tape 34, transcript               Isi A: Yes-                                   faxed out-of the technical nu services
    -pages 14161 and 15.                                                                                building.I really can't tell any more.

191 Q: No. 23?

   . ri (Tape-recording tranteript was given l nol(Tape-recordingtranscript wasgiven n2l Q: Yes.

to W the witness.) nu A: But the terminology Paul to nu the witness.) Kochery list,041 because I have used 191 MR.I.AMBERSKl: By the way, Mr. t12i THE WITNESS: On No. 23, I cannot Pentand not checked to see if there was that terminology myself with usi respect tell nu from this documentation that this to a document that I obtained.I willstate ) a record of nu transmittal of these occurred in n4l an April 5th plant status n6l that this is not a Paul Kochery list that j Page 144 - Page 149 Min-U-Scripte BROWN REPOR11NG, INC. (404) 876-8979

I

l. - GEORGIA POWER COMPANT ALLEN MOSIAUGH  ;
_ (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994 i I
  ,      I refer to irt as a Paul Kochery list that ! J 051 Q: Wouldn't it be a logical explana- j of that.which is beyond the 23rd and 04:

! will obtam. And pal because that is used , tion if. poi in fact,the hamhvritten num- 22nd time frame. i j ' in quoten here,I consider that 091 to be bers which you arr r looking at repre. ps! Q: That is.a vague recollection of 96, j l a special reference; and I will say that , sented the date pynw. would um : observing on Mr. Kochery's handwrit-this uniis notI the Paulreferred Kochery ten list stans p i and stopsbeupathrough l _1 refer to when (20 have to a jlist that l being Ii9 telecopied moreApriP thana monththere logical expl l Paul Kochery list. , earlier on 4 6-90? (221 Q: The Paul Kochery to which you poi A: Yes,you are nght about that.1 see f refer was a (231 handwritten list nther the 12n date,and I don't understand the ativelyJ '. . 1 than a typed list? date, but you are p2r correct,I'm sorry.I H91 Q: Is it possible that this typed list,

                                                                                                                                                          ]

u.i A: That'scorrect.liutinaddition,the forgot that we are talking f231 about a with 12m its additional detail, is, m fact, a i2si detailed content.it did not contain telecopy mark at 4/6, so it looks like it typed hst of12u the same Kochery hand-this content *. 1241 was prepared by and typed by 4/6 at wntten list which 3vu saw and 122l with least, additional detail added in the right hand - R33 C I""" I251 Q: Let me suggest to you that those m and I know that because it definitely 1241 A: I don't think so.I don't remember, 1 did not 121 contain this detailed content. Pope 152 ' and 1251the reason isthis:Is that for each i31 Q: That is, the handwritten list that pl handwritten numbers up there may . start,there

i. you Hi saw developed by Mr. Kochery, have nothing to do n; with the date but i you now recall was not 151 the same as will be some other nomenclature 131 for p,9' g this typed list, and it's not merely 16) one group or another gathering docu- 91 is many entries. For example, on the because this is typed,its content was ments- first page at (210009 it says started,and different? Hi Now,let me get back, Do you have then at 17 minutes it says 131 output i tvi A: I am positive of that, any 151 reason to suspect that this might breaker closed,and then it says at 0038 {

181 Q: Mr. Mosbaugh, what were the. n t have been a 161 document prepared Hj placed on recire for chemistry, et I dates of the 19: starts on the Paul by Mr.Kochery? cetera,et tsi ceteta.The list that l had had Kochery list which you recall? 171 A: I have no reason to dispute that nore or less one 161 and possibly two Paul ist Kochery might have prepared a .catries per start, not all six of 171 these, poi A: Ihavetriedtorememberthespan of nH dates, and I don't have a good handwritten list from 19) which this was all of these subsequent times.h was start recollection on the p21 span of dates.I typed, but I can emision it being poi tal and stopped kind ofinformation. am of the belief that it u3i started - it Prepared by a lot of other people be- 191 Q: I understood.And that's really why included starts before the 22nd.23rd,04) cause it almost pu seems to have been I por had said might it have been the 24th time frame: and I believe it in- prepared from a contml log. And !!21 as same starts and nu stops but with addi-cluded some usi after that. I said before, the use of the Paul tional detail added after you saw pai the I 061 And it absolutely did not contain the c nn # ##Ilis tan. t usiin qu tes had a special list which was typed up? I n't kind of detailed information that's in nt me because 1 ::41 have usi A: Well,I interpreted your question used that phraseology specifically, as 041 referring to the verbiage on the l the started nel column. It contained more mformation like a date 091 and a 05) Q: What are the dates of the starts - right-hand column, psi but I indicated in time and handwritten notation of and 961 stops which are indicated in this the middle column are these 06i addi-l linuted 12o1 detail, such as, you know, exhibit? tional tunes, okay. lf what you mean is received alarm or 12u tripped; but it 071 A: The span of 1 A is from March the some 971 subset of this list,I have no way wouldn't contain the detail such as 1223 12th to psi March the 23rd.and for IB is of saying if Han that's true or not. ! 1AA02 alternate incoming breaker from March the 13th p91 through March 9,10: Focusing,again,onparagraph No. closed in 1231 paralleling in DGIA, et the 23rd. And that's all. 25-- ceteru.It definitely did 941 not have that 12nj MR. KOHN: I note for the record that kind of detail. 120) A: Yes' 120 this document exhibit does not have ! IniQ: Have you never seen this docu- a project 1221 number on it.Do you know 120 Q: - are you able to agree with that ment before? if an original of 1231 this document is 1221 statement except for the fact that contained in the documents 1241 this typed 1231 document h not the same Page 151 produced in discovery? as the handwritten document 1241 which in A: I have seen this document in the y u saw and it referred to as Paul 121 documents produced by one or more 125i MR. LAMBERSKl: I believe it is-Kochery 1251 list? of the people we (31 deposed. Page 153 HiQ: And do you have any reason to Page 155 tu Q: (By Mr. Blake) Do you recall believe ist that this is not a list prepared whether or ni not the Paul Kochery til A: Well, I said that I couldn't agree by Paul Kochery? handwritten list which you 131 observed that i 121 can tell that it had been faxed i 16i A: I wouldn't know one way or spanned a time frame of starts and stops to the NRC.I'm not 131 sure it's the same  ; another. HI for IA and IB which differed from list. And I will add that I'm ni not sure t I? Q: But you have no reason to suspect this,or you have asi no recollection? that this list - I am not sure that the 151 it may mi not have been prepared by Mr. 161 A: My recollection is that it included hand i ten list w s defimtel Kochery? , some starts that went beyond the to: A: Iseea noteinthe upperright hand - PC"" - p,"rh scd d h h y m d W l Stokes for Kochery. I can't be sure of l poi corner of this document, or a date, ini Q: As we sit here today,is there some  ! that seems to be un 5 30-90, perhaps l basis 191 for your having that. ini cither,in that recollec-terms of the quote Paul Kochery list. I i91 don't intend that to mdicating it was prepared some H21 tion.somethmg that pol you can tie it to? imply that it was necessarily not what i l months after the site area emergency. On A: I have a vague recollection of Paul Kochery alone wrote.It could have ' The list that 031 I obtamed from Paul j something, H21 including data up into been nu somebody who worked for i Kochery I obtained before this 041 date. April.1 just have a vague 03i recollection i him. BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 150 Page 155

! AT TFN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ' July 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLAhT, UNITS 102) n2; Q: You wcre sust referring to the v31 l 1191 A: In what time frame) { usi Q: Do you recall, from your review . handwritten list u hich you saw? 1201 Q: April 19th,1990, f the 991 tapes of April 19th,that in your no A:1 m referrmg to the handwritten ' 12n A: I don't have an mdrpendent i conversations with 1201 Mr. Shipman,you hst,1:51 ) es. recollection (221 of my diwussions m referred to starts that began on 12:1 0610: No. 26) March 12th? April 19th,1990, but I do have 123 a n i MR. KOHN: Defore we move on,Mr. recollection based on review of tapes of 122 A: I can't recallifI did or not. uni Blake,I would also like to note that having 1241 some or making mention of a 1231 Q: Assuming we are able to confirm with 991 respect to Exhibit 12 if you will Paul Kochery list on 125i April 19th. that from 1241 the tapes that you made, look at in the first three pages, they Page 158 and we can determine what 12si date you have a nnglet of uil fax transmissions said that the starts started on, whether it 1:3 Q: And from your review of those which is not too clear and 1221 has a fax Page 160 transmission hne on the top. And 1231 tapes,does niit appear that on April 19th then when you get to another page,the you were referring to ist or relying upon Ill was the 12th or the 13th.one of these the Paul Kochery handwritten list 141 for lists starts 121 on the 12th and one on the second ini to the end. you wdl see this information about diesel starts and 13th, would you agree 13: that there's a one is a lot t.m clearer and does not have stopsy a fax transnussion coincidence in the start times of 14 these ist A: I recall that I obtained specific 161 lists and the handwritten Kochery list Page 156 information about particular trips that I that tsi you were using? ni line on it. notified pl Mr. Shipman about fmm a 161 A: Would I agree that there is a ni 12i MR. BLAKE: Let me make two 131 ob. Paul Kochery list. comcidence? servations for the record.In fact,the 141 isi Q: And was there an abnormal run- 18: Q: Yes. last three pages do have a fax tunsmis. ning of the I91 diesel,a problem start on 19 A: I can't recall the specific detail you sion 151 line. All the pages in this docu. March 22nd, which you tion referred to noi are talking about as to whether it was ment, other 161 than the next to the last, in your conversations on April 19th? March - I 1:n mean,if it's the 12th of include a fax t i transmission line at the I n A: Well,I think I referred to a trip - March.is that what you 1:21 are saying it top;and the in dttference in the type or refers to? format, which(is I91 subtle,but neverthe- n21 Q: Fair enough,a trip? less,I agree with poiMr.Kohn occurs on :i31 A: - of a diesel on April 22 in my n41 n3 Q: Yes-the last three pages nii which refer to conversation with Mr. Shipman. n41 A: And not the 12th of some other DG1B or the first three refer I:2l to us) Q: And also one on the 23rd? rnonth? DGI A. 06 A: Yes WE 'N #M Dd usi MR. KOHN: I would also like to note n?! Q: Which you referred to in your pal 041 that the fax transmission times,they re s for A a 1B t st , one start usi out at 1406,the first document' conversation with Mr. Shipman? case,on the 12th and the other case usi and the n6i second document starts at It91 A: Yes. on the 13th, and it is my belief that in 1401;and the last it?j page goes to 1406. [201 Q: And does the document that we your 191 conversation when we review p21 MR. BLAKE: I agree.it appears to me have been taillooking at, Exhibit No.12 it for April 19th with 1201 Mr. Shipman, 119 that the document was probably include information on 1221 those two you,at that time, referred to the fact 12n transmitted 1201 beginning with the first problem starts or trips of the IB diescl? that the stants that you were looking at , page of DG1B at 12n 1401, page 2 of 123: A: I believe I previously indicated refer., red to Izzi either on the 12th or the 1 DG1B where we don't have the 122 that 1241 that list included the trips on 132 39* nomenclature at the top,then page 3 on and 134 starts. 1231 A: Nowthat you mention that,again, DG1B,1231 and then the DGIA was (251 Q: Was there another trip or a prob- J m (241 unclear as to whether - well,I telecopied at 1406. p+1 Page 2 of DG1 A lem start just don t know if 1251 we are talking at 1408,and page 3 of DG1 A at (25 1411. ~ M* A fainly routine numbering system. p,g,359 Page 161 Page 157 { t2l A: It wasn.t a trip, but it was a cond8- . niQ: That s clearly what I am talkmg ni THE WITNESS: Having looked at it 12: about.121 No. 26)' 1 further here,I would also like to note tion 131 where the diesel should have i tripped but didn't (31 A: First, I cannot tell that this was An a ciuded on the list we tr s si n nc udes the a lu [3VC 153 in imm f u5- re e g o 51 Exhi t as fa on 151 stan 132 notation on it. It does 161 appear to have 16; MR. BLAKE: And, therefore - 16j A: I recall that this cut off at the 23rd. an entry about a lube oil high pi

                                       .           pl Q: And in your conversation with Mr.           temperature switch, and it does make ri MR. KOHN: I think therefore it stands
int that this page could have been sup. Shipman ist on April 19th where you reference to lei this switch being plemented 191into this document. were using the Paul Kochery 191 hand suspected of causing a DG1B trip.

written list, did you make any reference 191 My knowledge would or my reading noi Q: (By Mr.Blake)Tell,since we have to the poi problem with IB diesel which of this noi would tend to make me , gone on back to this document,let me occurred on March 24th? l usk you some more 021 questions, Mr. believe that that was uit associated with  ! i Mosbaugh.about it having to do with n3: nu A: No,I didn't. But I do recall later the trip on the 22nd. There is no n2l n21 conversations in the day about there mentior df a switch causing a trip or a the handwntten Paul Kochery hst. being three 03 failures or problems,so failure or a 931 problem on the 24th,as nel Do you recall discussions in your us! I believe that there was n41 some No. 26 indicates, characterizations or reference to the knowledge of- and I can't be sure that li41 Q: Mr.Mosbaugh,let's not lose track handwritten poi Paul Kochery list, do the lisi difference between two and you now recall today p?) discussion of nst what it is we are doing here.This three is the problem that 961 occurred is not an poi exercise to determine about or reference to the handwritten on 136 from those conversations,but it's nei Paul Kocherv list? whether or not each of these p?l stipula. 07: possible. tions is a wholly appropriate summary Page 156 Page 161 Min-U-Script @ BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY AT.T FN MOSBAUGII (VOGT1.E ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANTo UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994

 ,   of an im exhibit which is referred to. ' li?l A: With respect to the first phmse,it ator had not always stan ed and operated                       ,

What we are askingis um whetheror not says tini that NRC ktwn 11 personnel as noi expected. applied to the f.tilure j you can agrre with this statement.12 o in had express knowIriler iw that, as of during the site iani area emergenc3 and I an attempt to try to help you with your ; that date,GPC had onh been able to 12ni 8 possibly to a failure durmg 12n testing of ) memory. uil then we give references to I idenufy the probable cause. I diese! I A on about March the 3 nth, i items which may or may 122i not be l 120 And whenIreview this transcript 1221 j where 1221a Calcon sensorwas purpose-helpfut. i segment,I don't recognire any people i ly vented and the diesel 1231 tripped.but 23 So my question to you on this one as ' hearing the 1231 discussions that are fmm ! I do not believe that Mr.Brockman is vai  ; I 12u have not intended it on all the Region ll. All i note is 124l t he NRC person others is can you 1251 agree with that of Mr.Chaffee.Soldon't knowl2siwho's j! referring cause he 12s1later to any unexpect so states. statement that's made usmg,if you on the call with Mr.Chaffee.if there are ' Page 166 Page 162 Page 164 nl Q: What later are you referring to? l lii will the referenced Exhibit 13? It 131 responses to interrogatories that are might be that (21 you are able to agree 12i And since it says express knowledge, with that statement without 131 any ref. I 131 Euess I would expect to see some contained m 141 Exhibit Ib. erence to the exhibit simply because Region Il name 141 hearmg what's being 151Q: Now, help me by pointing out l you al rememberit or you know it to be said by the Georgia Power ist person, where you 161 are referring to. I accurate. 161 Based on what I have been able to m m A: I recall reading that in this affidavit Isi MR. KOHN: Well 1think probablya 161 determine fmm this transcript,it doesn't 181 fmm page,I'm sorry,in this response problem with a lot of questions is most appear set that the statement that's made to 191 interrogatory contained on page 8. that further testing 191 at Wyle Labs was of I I them require or make reference to I understood noi this to mean there were l facts he lui does not have firsthand to be conducted after restart, the noi no unexpected failures. And o si obvious-knowledge of and 191 those he must com. reference is not made to it being before ly,the site area emergency was an unex-pletely rely on the 1:01 exhibits, which ! or after pii restart. Further testing is pected 1:21 failure; but I think everybody , ascertain - discussed on the p21 quarantine sensors, knew about those 931 failures. l ini MR. BLAKE: That's why we, of an n referenceisma et ep de 94dA recess was taken.)

                                                              **                                                                                       l course, n21 put the references in,in an
                                                                      #8' .                               lis)MR.BLAKE: Okay, we are back on attempt to help ii31 him. As an example,           ii41 I do have independent recollection           the 961 record after an extended break.

right here he may very ii41 well know that ps) Wyle Laboratories was used to During the n?) break we have also dis-without any reference to Exhibit 13 nsi do at least some of n61 the independent cussed the future nel schedule for this at all that on April 6th Georgia Power testing that I m aware of. deposition; and after a 09 number of faxed n6i NRC a summary listing, et 11 1 Q: And that independent testing was alternatives were explored, we've (2m cetera.The fact p?] that he doesn't, hope. going to nel be conducted after the start. determined to agree to a schedule fully this exhibit would lisi help him. I up? whereby we 12n will continue with the ,

say that only so we don't lose 091 track n91 A
I did not know if that would same line of1221 examination of Mr.Mos- i l of what we are doing. necessarily 1201 be - was being con- baugh this evening for 1231 as long as he j l 1201THE WITNESS: I have been answer. sidered to be before or after. (2n My is willing and capable,and I241 then the  !

ing I2n your questions both as to what I recollection of what happened was that deposition will be continued to 1251 have an 122iindependent recollection of, it began 1221 after, but I don't recall begtn on August 23rd at 10:00 o' clock in as well as what I231 I can ascertain from whether it was a condition 1231 to begin the the document, and I have 1241 no inde- before or aher. Page 167 pendent - for example, here that f251 l I241 Q: But you did understand that it ni morning. is was faxed to NRC at any point in sn t i. I going to be completed until -

                                                                        ~

121 And the parties will hold August 23rd

                                                  !                                                      [3] and 24th open for Mr. Mosbaugh's Page 163                                              Page 165    deposition Hi on each of those days to ni and I don't have an independent                 tu A: I think I had that understanding,           begin at 10j00 is) o' clock and not to go recollection,121 other than the tube oil          yes.                                               past 8:00 o clock on 161 either evening, high temperature ist switch. that these           121 Q: And the last sentence?
   > itches caused the 141 failure on March                                                                   e din : is        et a      at i    n'
    . th.

131 A: I see no reference to Mr. Brock- but right now that's the agreement. man. Hi Maybe 1 missed something. 151Ilut furthermore,I would say that it s 191 Michael, is that a fair poi repre-isi Q: Well.it's getting on in time,but are sentation? 161 my independent , from my inde- 161 you looking at 15? oii MR. KOHN: Yes and we will attempt

                                                                       "*# "                             to n21 reschedule Mr. Shipman, to the ni n thatil e    tch d d a cause t                ,W m' my."* moved    .

on to anon Exhibit best we can,usi to be concurrent during problem or failure on March 24th- e cla that this does 19; not make reference to that week if n+1 possible. 191 Q: (By Mr.Blake)The review you are the Wyle , testing that uni Mr. Auf-not referring to is the one you currently I denkampe is referring to.it appears that usi MR. BLAKE: liut that is not a condi-have underway o n but haven t yet com I n u Mr. Brockman is saying that the test- tion noi of the continuance of Mr' pleted. M(isbaugh's n i deposition, correct?

                                                  , ing of those n21 swnches is not impact- '

pai A: That refers to the one that I have , ing the release of n3 criticality. i i MR. HN No,Mr lost at gh 119 n31 already wntten up and provided to { 041 Q: No.28? [ l dates.12m it is just the parties are general-NRC t and reference e is some which you to thatnu have.1 m osi believe j nsi

                                                ; of not Mr.Brockman's                 A: Yes,on statement  here is No.28        my understanding li IV mia Ji rocess work 122i as smoothlyas possible that the extent to n 1 which he is saying ! and will do their 1231 best to try to get Mr.

UN O: No. 2'? he was aware that the diesel uni gener. Shipman in there at 12e the same time. 1 I IIROWN REPORTING. INC, (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Script

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<                     . .                                                                                                                                                            l allen MOSBAUGH                                                                                                   - GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 -                                                                (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1A2)                                                   !
  ' . last MR. BLAKE: And the parties have . I u41 A: It doesn't seem to me that pan of                              agree on a number of these' factual 't:sl                   ' '

25 the 1251 presentation is indicated that it statements, h. is bound to make life Page 168 would address easier. vi expressed that they are hopeful that Page 170 Page 172 the 12: Board wili go along with our til emergency director actions. tu and that's the spirit of which I ask - schedule,' even 131 though the con-  ; tal Q: Mr.Mosbaugh,are you able to con. - them tal tonight,. tinuance of Mr. Mosbaugh's't41 deposi-firm 151 that the general theme of this 13 To the extent that he doesn't spree til . tion is beyond the cut off ofistdiscovery* .

      - The parties recognize that that (61is not                 proposed stipulation 141 is by April 3,           with this,then I will have to work harder En extension of a discovery schedule,171 Georgia Power officials had learned Isi .         to 15; get evidence in.To the extent we that the NRC wanted Georgia Power to               can agree 16 on things,it is bound to but rather an agreement on this deposi-                                                                                                                                       ;

tion. snake a 161 presentation regarding the - reduce the hearing (71 timec  ! restarting of unit one? ni Q: (By Mr. Blake)I'm sorry for the I'l Ist THE WITNESS: I can basically agree , ' m A: Without those phrases that refer i,1 wkh No.30.but I have not yet deter-interruption. Mr. Mosbaugh. When we i to the isi specific content of the presen- rnined if liot George Bockhold alone -  ! broke.we had uns just finished proposed tation? directed all that I:ll preparation. st tila n as as u I'3 Y"' - pai e @y Mr. Make) Who else do you again. n21 whether or not you are able to Dal A: Yes, it would be my belief that think psi might have directed it? ' . agree with that 031 stipulation? from 1:11 these exhibits, that Georgia no A: I think we will have to wait until 941 A: I guess,like many of these 1 don,t Power officials learned pai that the NRC we ps complete discovery. I believe- 1; have 951 firsthand knowledge of these. wanted a presentation of some site area these was corpointe usi communication

  • i usi emergency related issues, and those potentialities exist. We 071 ~  ;

t beli 1ee t ro 73 941 Q: Okay,let's 30 to 30. Before you have already W that there was cp ' these.Well,I'm sure I haven't seen the dive ps) into Exhihk IS, which is refer. porate nel communication.. j first of tiri composite 17 until perhaps in enced in proposed nel stipulation 30, si,iQ: Do you think the people, other i the discovery 1 91 process. And I may' this is a topic that we've spent a I:71 f.tir thari . taoi Mr. Bockhold,5 may have have seen the second document 1a01 amount or time A '

                                                                                                 ; This is cer-    directed the preparation of it:1 the                              ,

taisily a tisi topic wluch you have dis-  ; prior io the discovery process, but I had presentation on the Friday and over the  ; no memory (2:1 ofit untilI saw h in the cussed, thought'about, for Ii91 years at weekend? l discovery process. this juncmre;and I would ask you to take  ! l'

'                                                                1a01 a look at the language and see -             12 1 A: It's a' possibihty.

122 But at any rate,I can't tell explickly whether or not you (21: can agree with psi Q: No.31? p3) imm this exhibit that this com-  ; this statement or if you can't, the 1221 pq A: The testimonyrelative to this is so ' munication that u41 Georgia Power offi-cials learned imm Ken Bmckman, psi ! aspects of it widch you don't agree, psi contradictoq that I cannot deter- l without ps . consuming a detailed mineif 31 is a ' believe I have heard that during the review of the exhibit which taal was, as course of U* I say, there intended to try to be helpful, 9m lasi not to try and tic you down. 1:1 correct statement. Page171 1210: Okay, the statement that we are l nidepositions,though.

Ill A: Am I basing my answer based on - looking t$l at is the, quote,DiesclTesting, j; ni But this second page of the exhibit 131 - what I 121 know now because we have - end quote,and 14 t; nsparency reflects l . doesn't really identify who it came from yesterday and the day 151 befont asked the information the mrny151 PaulCash unless you 141 assume that Brockman up various witnesses these kinds ofissues and Ken Burr provk d to Bockhold?

l on the top with his phone tsj number is 141 and got answers, some of which I l'I A: That's correct, i who provided this information.1 can't 161 didn't know before. m Q: Do _ you ; understand '- what the j tell specifically from the first page of the tsi Q: Yes,what I'm askingis are you able diesel testing tel transparency is?

exhibit m that - I'm having trouble to 161 agree with that statement, based on

[ reading it, actually. le ini looks like there 19) A: Yes,it's this page right here. your state of 171 knowledge? might - I can t read the xerox.19 Spray nol Q: This page right here being? valve, thrust the problem,and then there l'1 A: At this time? is tini something here. I can make out 191 Q: Yes,at this time. nei A: No.10 of Enclosure 2 to Exhibit 18. something that looks n u like Monday at not A: Because that's been changing,

    . Atlanta with NRC.                                                                                           pal Q: And the difference that you have nii Q: I understand that,                         or the tipi reason that you can't agree p2: Q: Don't be distracted, Mr. Mos-L baugh. Don't p31 he weak like the                              pai others.

MR. KOHN: Are you asking the wit- * ********* " " *

  • ness I:51 to make judgments at this time lisi A: Is that the testimony I hav l 941 A: I can't confirm that this request is whether he 941 believes certain state, is so 961 contradictory thatt deter- I can,e heard for usi a presentation that would address mine who's telling n71 the truth as to ments to certain 1:51' witnesses or i

! rccess control to 961 the switch yard. ! who put this information on this us! whether the mention he has now ti61 see that it talks about ti71 vehicular con- causes him to conclude that certain transparency. I have no ' independent i trol. I further can't see that it was unj things 07 are probably correct? knowledge as to 99) who put any of this

- requested that the presentation address informati n n this tag transparency.

reactor n9i vessel water level configura- usi MR.BLAKE: I hadn't asked for such tion and outage my planning.In fact,that 09: precision one way or the other.The 120 0: TO-your knowledge, is anybody . doesn't seem to be listed,uilif these are question ian is,as we come to approach else vying p21 to take credit for that lists of something that the NRC wanted the hearing and tail try to reduce the transparency other than t231 Mr. Bock-r221 a presentation on- amount of hearing time that u21 all of us hold? ' un Q: Mr.Mosbaugh? will have to spend,and we can lasi agree j 94i MR. KOHN: Assuming he is vying to j or have a sense that we are able to nel I take 1251 credit forit. j J Page 168. Page 173 . Atin U-Scripte BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979

            - -                       ,,     ~                          .           - . .um . i. -                                                ~-a        - < - - -

GEORGLA POWER COMPANY ALLEN MOSBAUGII  ! (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&21 July 22,1994 l , Page 174 Page 176 121 Q: Is this witneues other than 131 Mr. m THE WITNESS: It was not my ui un- ni successful st.m - o the diesels llockhold. Cash and Ajluni? derstandmg t hat Mr.llockhold was vying without signi'icant pn hirms. 141 A: No,but they have made more than to 13 take credit forit. 131 A: Mr.Ilockhold h.n prouded differ. t one 151 statement in more than one time 14: Q: (By Mr. Illake) Although he does ingand nicontradictmg i.itementsasto i fame, accept isi responsibility for it, doesn't whatheaskedIsiMr. Cash todo.Mr. Cash I 161 Q: Mr. Cash, as you indicated, had he? has provided differing and im contradict- been ri consistent.Did you indicate Mr. 161 A: He seemed to blame Mr. Cash, ing statements as to what he heard from Cash's had been lal consistent, but Mr. 1 ri Q: F.or the transparencyt

                                .             I ri Mr.Bockhold.I cannot determine if Ajiuni's inconsistent that #91 didn't allow I

the first tai sentence is in any way the you to go along with this statement? m A: For the - } truth, noi A: That is part of the pmblem,and I (91 Q: I'm not talking about the informa- 191 Q: Second sentence? can't as si recall all the consistency of Mr. tion in oni it or how the information got uni A: Mr. Cash stated that this was not Cash's statement inzt from the '90 time l into it.With regard ini to the transparen- the 90 case.Mr.Bockhold basically said fame to the '94 time frame. j cy.doesn't Mr.llockhold take n2irespon ' the same thing. n2i l could not say that p31Q: Do you remember if any of it I sibility for it? that statement is true. pu A: I didn't feel he did. were 041 inconsistent now? p31 Q: How would you change that sen- nst A: I would want to look at the docu-04i Q: Is it your understanding that Mr. tence to n41 have st represent your view? ments 961 before answering that. . Cash usi provided information that Mr. nsi A: I have no idea. llockhold used in that 961 transparency? 071Q: But do you remember any that I 0610: You have no idea? were ps) inconsistent) i p i A: I can't determine that from the testimony pai and the discovery that we ti?) A: How to change a sentence that is opi A: I can't remember any right off. have done, nel basically absolutely false compared to the n91 testimony. I think I would [201Q: And I understand it is 9:00 991 Q: Same question with regard to Mr. climinate it. 'c1 ck at 12n night. (201 Q: Next sentence? 1221 Now.Mr.Bockhold had the same 123 lani A: Mr. Ilurr stated point-blank m. his understanding, was one that you had un deposition that he did not par. 120 A: Mr. Bockhold had the same un- already (241 indicated you could not go ticipate in the p2l preparation of the derstanding.1221 I believe that to be false. along with, correct? transparency.Only to reverse u3i himself (231 Q: Tm sorry, the next sentence we and say that he did work with Bockhold, are 1241 focused on is Mr. Cash inter- 1251 A: Yes, and I can't tell - well,1 am u41 Q: Do you have a view on whether preted significant usi problems? p,g,37, or not usi Mr. Cash provided information Page 177 to Mr.Buckhold which m assum ng tlut at semence nfen m in A: Tm sorry,I jumped.12: Because of *** Page 175 the contradicting testimony,1 (31 can't be "*'"7**"""""* knce sp'eciah,Mnce the m nference m was used m. that transparenc)., . sure.that Mr. Cash's instructions were 141 is a set of interrogatories which does 141  ! l sgn cant pWems or mm Furce" t21 A: I can't tell. Everybody is con- relate Mr. Bockhold's understanding to i endicting m everybody else. hgn tp b the voltage asi and frequency statement, sI h ha stat d 141 Q: You don't have a view? this time frame that his m understanding the Georgia Power response 161 to NRC i isi A: Not at this time, of that was problems that prevented inj sta# set onntenugamnes. 161 Q: Do you have a view about the diesel from operating in an emer) ten. m Q: I think for purposes of my ques-whether or not ri Mr. Burr pmvided cy; however,191 he has stated in other tions, isi Mr. Mosbaugh, you should as-sume that that last 191 sentence refers to mformation to Mr.llockhold that ini he $ time frames facts that would un indicate used in that transparencyr that was not his understanding. I m just the preceding sentence? i sorry, nu he has not stated, but other noi A: llecause the next sentence refers ici A: In terms of a view, ! believe Mr- people have stated that n2l he stated, flurr poi did provide some m, formation me to nu Exhibit 19,page 12,last item that was used in that nn transparency. p Q Who were those other people? B.Mr. Cash recalls n2lthat he understood even though he said he never worked H41 A Mark Ajluni, Aft-u-ni. Mr.Bockhold wanted him to count 03: 02: with Mr.Bockhold on the transparen-g . nsi Q: So while Mr. Cash's position,as far where the n41 diesel had started proper $ c). as 961 you know it,would support this, ly and reached the required usi voltage H31 Q: And do you still not have anyview Mr.Ailum s would n 1 not:and therefore, and frequency. on n41 whether Mr. Cash provided any you don't think you could go pai along information to 05:Mr.llockhold that Mr. with it? not Mr. Cash interpreted significant llockhold used in that n61 transparency? n9i A: Myinitialproblemisthatit'sused pr blems 07: to be anything which n?i A: No,1 don't have a view on that. the tani word significant problems:and I wuld have prevented the diesel uni cannot tell, due to un the contadicting fmm perating in an emergency. Mr. nai Q: Okay, No. 323 Hockhold.who n9i directed the prepam. testimony if M r. Cash his 122i instructions n91 A: I have no independent were,indeed, significant problems, and non of the transparency used m uni the knowledge of the uni facts contained in u31 not sequential starts or some other, Ap 9th,19W prepemanon, had the 32 and could not state that this un is ' many other uai things that have been same un undentandmg accumte because of completely con- stated. tmdicting p2; testimony. uzi Because the first sentence says Mr. usi Q: 1.et's go one sentence at a time.if usi Q: Stated bv? l' Cash 1231 recalls that he understo l Ilockhold wanted,and un since the last we u41 can, starting with the first sen. , Page 178 j sentence says that Mr.Bockhold had usi tence.The sentence usi reads:Bockhold ' ni A: Vanous witnesses that have been i the same understandmg.1 read that as asked Cash to compile the number of deposed. relating to BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min-U-Seripts Page 174 Page 179

                                                                                                                                                                                      --'l ALI.EN MOSBAUGH ;                                                                                                                                                             *
                                                                                                                                                                                         'l GEORGIA POWER COMPANY                                i July 22,1994                                                                    (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 102) .                                                   l 122A: 1. have        no         in lependent l hold with the numbers 181241and 19 for
  • ni both because this is a - and this is Page 180 l knowledge of12 lwhether th.st = correct ! the 1A and IB d l i

pan of Vogtle un positive communica- or not. And from the retem m tes I the 1251 bottom of the diesel testing i timony, I can't determine o th.st state- transparency? tions where people communicate and l ut repeat back,and this would be con. ment is 1251 correct. t Page 164 sistent with that. Page 182 gj g. Thai's conect. 141Q: Let's, for the moment, talk just HI Q: Is there any question in your mind

12) Q: And is it because - I just don't 151 about' ni the sentence immediately about tai whether or not Cash has been understand.ls it because you don't think '

preceding. which is 161 Mr. Cash inter. ' able to locate his tsi handwritten hst?

      ; preted significant problems to be 171 any-Cash HI believes the rest of that state-Hi A: Whether he has been unable to or                     ment?                                           '

thing which would have prevented the - I isi guess that's the same question. I

      ~ dicsci from sei operating in an emergen-:                                                                             ist A: I.say that's incorrect because Mr.                    )

have no (4) information other than what cy. Mr. Cash has said about m being able t Cash 161 said that was incorrect.  ! Mm W hdden k 171 Q: Because your understanding of Mr. .

      - 191 And my question to you is' Do you
      - agree not with the next statement, Mr.                    181Q: And did he say that he had not                       Cash's lei testimony is that he doesn't believe he pnmded 191 Bockhold with Bockhold had the. same tui under.                       been able 191 to?

the numbers 18 and 19 for the 1 A and , standing? not A: He indacated that he had not been noi IB dicscis? -  ! inzi A: My . recollection ' from Mr. able tus to, Bockhold's nsi testimony is that he did stil A: I believe in this case 'they' are '! n21Q: And do you haveanyinformation probably pai contradicting tearimany.- not have exactly that - he nel did not other usi than that or any reason not to  ;

have that same understanding.

but I believe the testimony p3) at this - i believe that? time is that Mr. Cash did not ' 0 41- I nst 0: And that's what you base your. n41 MR. KOHN: IfI could note for the psi .Mr.Bockhold 18 and 19 n which view on n6; today, is Mr. Bockhold's . record,Mr. Cash atso testined he gave his appear at the ps; bottom of the diesel recent testimony? ' n61 handwritten list to Mr. Burr, transparency. n7:A:I have no firsthand knowledge i171THEWITNESS: Which might ex. n6 Q: And was that Mr. Cash's testimony' whatsoever nei of the communications plain why not he couldn't locate it, that n71 you are relying on here in his between Mr. Cash and ti,1 Mr.Bockhold. ti,1 Q: (By Mr. Blake) Well, it snight. Do - de @ n? I have acquired this through a 1201 dis. you (201 recall the same testimony that nei A: Yes. covery in the depositions and the your counsel has -

        8P0"8*8-                                                                                                          n,1 Q: Okay, No. 35? Mr. Mosbaugh,I'm ; '

tail A: Yes,I recall that. going to 1201 need,to the extent you want 12n G: Okay,No.33? (22 Q: - advanced? Andisthatinconsis. m rely on the exhibits tan or_ read . 1221 A: From this exhibit I cannot make tent fast with the fact that he can't locate through them,I'm going to ask Mr. lam- ! any i231 determination of whether or not his handwntten fut list? berski 221 to help you,at least with tape .

Mr. Cash prepared it 124) from the control 99 A
My pmblem with the last sen- 58 and the reference 1231 there.

! log and the shift supervisor log. tence,it was tul A: Yes,I don't see insened there. < 1290: let's just take the first sentence,

     . if we                                                                                                  p ,,3,3       us (Tape-recordings.w .rwassiven til not related to his being able to locate                                                         Page its Pa08181        his (2) handwntten hat, but relative to-                    ni to the witness.)

su can.The sentence is, Cash reviewed what he had when 151 he provided piMR.LAMBERSKl: Thete isn't in the

     . the operators' p1 logs, consisting of Unit               whatever he did to Mr.Bockhold and in
13) transcript I handed you, Mr. Mos-Control Log and Shift 131 Supervisorlog. 141 what time frame that occuned and baugh,and 141 this is a retype,as you and -

Do you agree with that sentence? what he had.And 151if he had the hand- your. counsel 151. know, of the NRC 14 A: I believe there is contradicting tu written list or the typed list,161 the tes- transcript. And I believe 161 the reference 4 i ' testimony about that statement, and I < tinmnps sufnciently inconsistent that I here is to.the discussion on m this m can t detenmne that-  ! cannot sci determine if Mr. Cash retyped transcript that you see running l reviewed both the Control Log m and lei Q: So you are able to agree with the ist from about the middle of page 7 ' the Shift Supervisorlog orjust the Con. Portion (91 of the sentence that says, through to 9)the end of page 9 orthere-trol ini log. My review of the list that he Although Cash has not po) been able to abouts. obtained tends 191 to indicate to me that locate that handwritten list, Cash pil n' oiTHEWITNESS:I can't attest to the ' it came fmm the Controllog. , beheves that a typed document, at' un accuracy of this section 35, again, I"i3 Q: Oni b> tached as n21 Exhibit 20, was prepared because H21 of contradictory testimony from his handwritten list. nsi lf ! were to between Mr. Cash nst and Mr.Bockhold; ' g nii A: Yes, stop at that,the last part.the not portion l beyond that is where you were unable andIhave no specine n4j knowledge of n2l Q: Next sentence? what Mr.Bockhold knew;and !'m nsi not HMS tt ' 03:A:I have no firsthand knowledge . sure that an exact number was beyond other than n41 what Mr. Cash has stated, n61A: At this time that would be mybest . lus not specific knowledge. And I m not and I can't determine that nu from the - my n?l assessments of the testimony sure that he n?i didn't know more . ' exhibit oranything.I believe that n6t Mr. w uld be that that naj ending there specifics about how the IB nel diesel Cash, from the deposition testimony we could be accurate or may be accurate, problems fit in to the count numbers. have vil obtained.! believe that Mr. Cash n91 Q: 30 091 Q: (By Mr. Blake) Do you disagrec . did prepare a nei handwritten list.I can- 12oi Ai I have no firsthand knowledge of with the 1201 first sentence of that para. not determine the manner in n9i which this,120 and I do not believe it to be graph? he gave, used or conveyed that informa- correct. 120 A: I was speakinsfor the whole para-tion to tam Mr.Bockhold- graph, 122:Q: You don't believe the statement tal Q: Next sentence? that Cash 12M believes he pmvided Bocke 1221 Q: I understood.

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1

. GEORGIA POWER COMPANY                                                                                               ALLEN MOSBAUG11 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2)                                                                              July 22,1994
,   ini A: ( >k.n.we will go sentence by sen-        stood that usi the 18 or 19 at the bottom     the 12a data.The question is:What was tencr. 2. With the first sentence.except         were consecutive.                             the date and up time? Do you see that        ,

forthe fact that usithe conferenceswith , p41 He appears to he e vid that, but , language?  ! the !!T h.n r been thrown in- there psiare aho indicain ms that he rnay 124) A: That's correct. Yes.1 see that. I Page 186 have had the (251 Q: Do you know what data is ni Mr. Hockhold would have known Page 188 referred to about the testing 121 activities from his nilist and the way this information was Page 190 nornu i c hasn of command,and I I3r don't vi tnnstated into the Confirmation of think whet herit wasllTis not what gave Action ist and the way it's worded.1 can't pl there)' him 9. that knowledge. conclude 14 that that's necessarily true izi A: Which data 1 am referring to? I m You want to go sentence by sentence? or not. believe 13)I am refernng to the data that 151 Q: (By Mr.Blake) Next sentence? would be contained ni in the C(mtrol 16i Q: No. I understood your position,I think, n to cover the next couple of 16l A: Ihave no independent knowledge sentences 1* there any W evidence,that Isi Q: Is that the data that you would as to ri what the NRC understood.1 have you are aware of,or suggestion by 191 any read their ist response. It would be logs-have 161 received fmm the Odom and witness that you have heard,that he had cal that they would have 191 understood Webb trview? om specific knowledge of the exact they were consecutive.1 believe they noi ri A: I can,t determine and have no m number of stans? would have expected that they were recollection specifically as to whether on A: Yes' consecutive, and nu so I tend to, even my mference 191 to data is that the data though I have no independent 112) exists on site,and that noi the logs that I H21 Q: And what,s that testimony or knowledge, would tend to agree with know are on site,and they've been on , evidencer ut trying to gather them or if they have that sentence. n31 A: Mr. Cash's testimony. (131 Q: last sentence., sununanzed n21 any of that data at that v410: And focusing on the last sen- point.1 can't tell what n31 my reference l ii4j MR. LAMBERSKl: Again, the refer- is.Obviously.the data was on site. l t su pes t t i i Mr c o " to the I ferenc n st pulation o3 3l refe ed to ther b u ul i1 e ash y e to l i nci de l anh **" # * "" # # other problems nei or failures which t en ns p i s broug i ne 200f page 26* n7j A: I don't know, and I can't say if I  ; occurred on the IB diesel on li91 March know, nei or I can't say that they had 1 22nd,23rd or 24th? ii9:THE WITNESS: I have no inde- completed any data um gathering at this I du 5 land n con dt i tes r ny as t ethe tra cton' statements in tc 1221 [>$referent ere i in e n or not - Mr. Cash's (221 contradictoO' transcript and in ones that I remember, to 12n data,but I know the data is on site, testimony,perhaps evidence - as to 1231 and 1231 in statements that Mr. Bockhold b ""1}* 1221 Q: Tin.' data is being discussed by I whether or not specific count lists were I has made 1241 since that further the term s given to 121 Mr.Dockhold. you and 1231 Mr. Aufdenkampe here?

  • bugs worked out" (251 is one that I can't 12si Q: Number 36? define. [24 A: I think Iam discussing something Page 187 Page 189 with psi Mr. Shipman, j

ni MR. BLAKE: Mr. Kohn, any conversa- in Q: (By Mr.Blake) Have you not heard Page 191 l tions 12; that take place during the that vi terminology used before? 01 MR. KOHN: I have a question.We are course of the 131 deposition.let's all be a 131 A: Oh - p) now turning to discussions in this Ed"F I"' n10: In this context? **E" ni THE WITNESS: He asked me ifI'm tsi " 131 MR. BLAKE: Yes.1 did solely because getting tired. """ [d 141 this was the way the reference was; (6i MR. BLAKE: That's a fair questiori, Iu rmn w 8ft' "" * ## #"""'"" "E "' means, but it's not defined in ri terms of and I > we all appreciate that question, which problems would constitute bugs " * * * * " "EE"""" . but let s M just not be whispering. or m not. ri MR. KOHN: My observations of the m 19i (Tape-recording transcript was given 191 Q: And you don't believe that Mr *"***

  • b* I'" # "

to noi the witness.) Bockhold's noi testimony,as }ou underI

  • I" "## E*"E *" ' "" E" "E "I ""

u n MR.LAMBERSKl: Okay, I need to I stand it now, supports that? area, nn11 think it would be a good point to break, give n2 you, on No. 36,I need to give nu A: I've heard Mr. Bockhold testify, you some help, usi again, on this say or n2i testify that he staned his count nu MR.BLAKE: Okay,I will stop asking transcript reference to n4itape 58.It says after the sensors v31 were calibrated,as n21 questions about that tape. I may transcript insert at four usi to seven.and one starting point.1 have n41 heard him come back usi to it at a later time

  • that converts to the retyped n61 say that it was after the comprehensive ri41 MR. KOHN: To the effect you transcript to pages 21 through 26. Ac- usi tests of the control system.There has wanted him usi to look at it to respond tually,01 line 20 of 26. and I said page ! been n61 multiple bases presented as to to questions,that s n61 fine.

21.To be um precise.it would be line 9 , when he understood n't the starting I n 1 Q: (By Mr.Blake)You may also look. on page 21. i point was, when om we come back to this, Mr. n91 THE WITNESS: I have no inde ' nm Q: While we are focused on this por. Mosbaugh,at page 26 where poi there's pendent uni knowledge of what Mr. tion of 09 the tmnscript.let me ask you l a funher reference to data and else-Bockhold understood, uni but with to look at page 22, poi at lines 8,9,10. i where poi right around in this area I will respect to the first sentence on 36.u2iI There's a reference to data,and pu you , probably be askmg un again, am unsure that Mr. Bockhold under- are quoted there as saving that we have or Okay. No. 37? IIROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 Min U-Scripts Page 186 - Page 191

AI.IFN MOSBAUGli GEORGIA POWER COMPANY July 22,1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1&2) 4 l us; A: I disagree with 351 do not believe j corrective 12+: actions and nude design j 1241 Q: (By Mr. Blake) Mr. Mosbaugh my

  • l im it's accurate. rnodiDeations to the logic m board,in- i next risi one,No.38?
        .m MR. BART: I m sorry,I didn't hear                ciuding oriDce changes and other mter-nal                                                                                                                                 p,g, g Page 192 Page 194 l iii A: Ihave noindependent knowledge ill you.

as to I21 what the NRC Region and IIT l uiTHEWITNESS: I disagree with No. til type problems. were aware of as of 13) April 9th. l 3~. im 1 don t believe it's accurate. [215o I believe there rnay well have been 14iQ: Based on your understanding of l ai Q: (11y Mr. Blake) The first sentence? 131 other problems under the logic board, the 151 various pieces of evidence in this isi A: I disagree with the first sentence. also internal 14j misoperating com. proceeding. 161 including testimony, I foi don't believe it's accurate. ponents within the logic board were ist statements, documents, are you ri able I?] Q: Do you agree that there were sen. things I have learned about during the to agree or not agree with that? sor ini problems experienced on March c utse of 161 discovery. to: A: There has been a variety of ex-22.23 and 24? 17j Q: Same thing with respect to March hibits 191 presented to say they were ivi A: Not necessarily, no. I think we 23? faxed to the NRC.I1:01 can't tellif Region have noi covered that ground before, isi A: I believe this statement is inac- o e t ic is th ae liti Q: Do you believe that if there were curate i91 with respect to all of these 9 , sensor 1:21 problems, they were as. starts, and the inor different starts may whether I:21 they were faxed. I don't sociated with overhaul or I:31 main- have different problems. - j tenance troubleshooting activities? iiil Q: Next sentence? ii41 A: No,1 don t. Ital A: I think we reviewed a statement [th at ii ould t help )ou sisi G: Is that true with regard to each of somewhere I:31like that befort,that - lisj A: From what I have read from the ii61 those, the 22nd.23rd and 24th;that NRC I:61 evidence, the NRC does not ti41Q: We did, and my recollection of agree with that. is, is the in sentence all right before your Ins) problem was that there ought i March 22? im is that a gened statemem or in to be a distinction I:61 between outages l Insi A: I believe it would be false with and overhauls and the degree of work 8U"" 1181 Particular aspect of this state-i respect ti9 to all ofit, ment,. i:TI that was done to the diesel under I 12oi Q: for the same reason? cither one of insi those? fi91 A: It's with respect to their 12:1 A: For different reasons.First,Idon't I:91 A: Yes, this is worded differently 122 believe that any of the problems on than 1201 what - slightly differently than 8'332'1

                                                                                                                              *'h' the 22nd, 23rd I23i or 24th were as.                what we looked at 12ii before,                     have seen frorn affidavits of the NRC 1221 sociated with the activities of the 1241                                                               region, which I believe included Region 1221 Q: Uh-huh-overhaul.1 believe they were associated                                                                Il people 1231 which are referenced here, with the 1251 fundamental problems with             1231 A: My recollection is that this seems         were that they were not 1241 aware of
either the sensors to be mi mon hke what I remember in unanticipated failures or unexpected the transcript.You 1251 know, my under- 125i failures.

Page 193 standing of this reference to No.18, ni themselves or other issues that had p.g.gg7 Page 195 caused and 12i continued to cause til Q: Which is the san e to you as they failures of the diesel while in el normal lii which references to Exhibit 10,is that were not tai aware of th i diesel pmblem operation. the I21 statements made by Mr.Bockhold starts on el March 22nd and 23rd? Hi Q: There were other problems? informing the NRC ist related to over- Hi A: It was not anticipated that the 151 A: Other factors. hauls and not outages; and to that 141 diesel 61 would trip on start 131 2r 134, degree,I think that statement is not fully or that it would 161 receive a trip alarm ici Q: Other factors, is that water, dew ist reflective of what Mr.Bockhold told and not trip on start 136. I?) Nobody point, t i types of factors) the NRC. expected those events to happen. Ist A: That would include water. 16 Q: I want to rnake a prediction that 191 Q: Anything else? tu) Q: And to the answer to my question you are m not able to agree with the is yes? tiol A: It would include inadequacies of next sentence? (91 A: It includes those,yes. ' the liti sensor, unrelated to overhaul or inj A: I have no independent knowledge maintenance. It n21 might include logic t. " " " of what 19 Mr.Bockhold orwhoeverelse board problems, valve pmblems. at GPC intended, but I lioi disagree with gn. lt b the I tiu Q: 1.ogic board problems. Other i that sentence. would be a lizi record-setting pace, but than logic nei board problems as- 1 Isil MR.BLAKE: Michael, I see you are g. try.The s next one,p31 No.39? sociated with moisture? The reason lisiI i I:21 looking at me. 1:41 A: I could not agree with that-ask is I have not heard any references to itsi Q: Is the reason that you are unable such 116i things before this. I am aware in3t MR. KOHN: I believe the witness is

                                                        - li41 l'm getting too many physical              to li61 agree because you think that the of the moisture in problems that you've alluded to before, and I m sure nuj we ! indications of usi exhaustion.ccess rp rate office ti?: personnel had ac-to information independent of usi will discuss more later in your deposi i n61 MR.BLAKE: So you would like to I the site that would allow them to corn-tion.But 09;I m not aware of any other i stop p?! here?                                                pile data li91 thernselves?

kmds oflogic board or1201 control board j nsi MR. KOHN: 1 m concerned, yes. We problems? l are n91 going on 12 hours.My watch says 120 A: Yes, and corporate personnel were present 1211 also. ini A: Wel!. I beheve there were addi-tional 1221 problems becauseI2nGeorgia MR. BLAKE: j sh to 12011m Do you want to wrap it j 122) Q: And what are the sources of data Power, m the course of the 123i ; up 1221 at 10:00? that's 1231 independent that corporate remamder of the year.took a number of 12u MR. KOHN: Yes. has which they don't have 1241 to rely on l the site for? i Page 192 Page 197 i Min-U Scripte BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 l i

l l . GEORGIA POWER COMPANY AIIEN MOSBAUGli (\ OGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT, UNITS 1&2) July 22,1994

  , usi A: Nnce they had people on site.and        infornution back uo io < orporate in the                                                            Page 203 those                                          time frame prior to Apnl oth.                         Vi STATE OF GEORGIA:

( p.g.398 u41 And I have no mdependent COUNTY OF FULTON: t j knowledge as to um wh.it they might I pipeople communicated with theirbos- i have taken back that was used in j i31 I hereby certtfy. that the foregoing 14i ses in corporate. [21 obviously they : i l would have access to any information 131 Page 200caption, l transcript ist and was thereponed.as questions and stated in t on site. independent of the site person- VI aspects of the April 9th presentation answers thereto were reduced ici to nel. orthe t21 April 9thletterorthe April 19th typewriting under my direction:that the LER- r1 foregoing pages 1 through 202 repre-i4i Q: I see. Who were those corporate people isi who were on site that would sent a true, ivi complete, and correct 131 Q: With respect to detailed informa-have pnmded this ici mformation for transcript of the evidence 19 given upon tion,141 including the number of con- said hearing.and i funher certify that poi purposes of the April 9 n presentation? secutive successful ist starts at each I am not of kin or counsel to the parties lui A: 1 m not aware of all the people diesel and when they occurred? in the vil case;am not in the employ of because m people would come and go sci A: It may have happened. I have no counsel for any of 921 said parties: nor from corporate. Mr. McCoy poi came to riindependent knowledge ofit. am I in anywise interested in the 931 the site.Mr.Hairston came to the site.in si iciQ: Do you think it is equally likely result of said case. Miller came to the site.Mr.Lisenby came that 191 corporate relied upon site per-to the lizi site. Mr. Burr came to the site, 04 Disclosure Pursuant to O.C.G.A.9 , sonnel to gather this poi data? 28 (d): usi The party taking this deposi-l 1 believe some 03) other additional pai A: Corporate personnel had access tion will receive 06 the original and one design people whose names I can't 041 copy based on our standard and p? cus-to and 921 could call anybody on site to remember came to the site' get information. So 03) when you say tomary per page charges. Copies to paiQ: Do you have any basis for ever relied upon,I read an inference of 041 other parties uni will be furnished at one believing 061 that Mr. Hairston or Mr. corporate trying to,let me say, distance half that per page rate. 991 Incidental McCoy, Mr. Lisenby, uti Mr. Miller, the themselves psi fmm responsibility.And i direct expenses of production may be other individuals that you have just usi believe corporate people 961 had access 1201 added to either pany where ap-named, were at the site and collected to all the information on site, either by plicable, data which was 091 used in the April 9 p?1 coming to the site, calling the site, ini Our customary appearance fee will presentation or the April 91201 letter or getting nel information from the site. be charyed to 122i the party taking this the April 19th LEK? is91 Q: My question was:Do you think it deposition. 120 A: Well, I don't have any inde- equally 1201 likely that the source of in- 1231This,the 2nd day of August,1994. l pendent :22i knowledge of that,but from formation for corporate ini for this the testimony it is r231 clear and from GAYLA WHITE.CCR-B-1324,RPR i2si My detailed information, including the num- commission expires on the documents n is clear that Mr. Burr I241 ber 1221 of consecutive successful starts provided information to corporate. at each diesel and 1231 when they had 12si Q: With respect to the April 9 occurred.was corporate people who lut 26th day of August,1996. ! presentation were on site or site personnel? pop ggg 1251 A: Since you limit it to the start Page 204 DEPOSITION OF ALLEN MOSBAUGe+Gtw pl or the April 9 letter or the April 19 Page 201 i o u,,, ,,,,,,y mo n ,, ,,, ,, LER? Oiinformation,one ofIhe early drafts of *"",'*"",,',,"L*,*",",',',*,"*',,*"*","',',', 12i A: Well,since Mr. Burr was specifical. the 12: April 9th letter seems to include n.v. wnn.. .no mi l the start ist information and was sent - 4 T*= = "*a9a =*d ly 131 one working that 14 on the Mr.Bockhold saysdiesel and was the l one of the earliest 91 ,, ', 'l*, f*","('%"'" *,*,",*7f,,,%,, he relied drafts 8 ' that I have on as his tsi minut e-to-minute diesel tnan, seen that includes the start ist informa- e cew P,=.aom en, m. Dei,c.e com e and since Mr. Burr had 161 a boss in cor. tion was sent from corporate to the site. G*=e* Aaaowma Su am.> wm v eca ,ue m porate.I'm sure he communicated with I mi think both happened. **",,,'"/,'j*,"'" ',",',"",",ll['l"",*" ' " I i both. And as far as Mr. Miller,I have I i MR. BLAKE: And maybe we can pick ap=*a ** "S*=a' * ** *=o= l independent W recollection that Mr. up on Isi that particular topic when we 8,"' ,",,'","g,[",7,,,l,"Z',,' ,"';,"" [ Miller called back to the 191 office m start again 191 rather than lodging into it. P.e. No L No .nooia .a l corporate when he was on site, I see we have poi come to your deadline Aa8 ta === ia'ta ch. ape 's 001 Q: In this time frame? that you wanted to o u establish of 10:00. [*,,",*,,,,'","*,,l[",,*f We didn't make it 921 through the num- P.p wo L= No .nowa .ua pu A: I can,t specifically say that Mr. ber that I had hoped; but usi nonethe. Aac * === '- ** ch. nee '. Miller 021 was on site before April 9th' lew I will abide by your request. "*"""**""**' but I think he was. 931 You know,there were a number of corporate people p.) Hit So that would end Mr. Mosbaugh's ^"8"**"*'**"'*'8'*.d P.,e No Lm. No .howid that came to the site. came and went; usi deposition for this evening, to be Page 205 i and it would usi not - it would be contmurd ini at 10:Op o' clock on August DEPOSITION OF ALLEN MOSBAUGwGLW i 3 3- Ano m. ,u.on iu m. cnep . unreasonable to assume that those poi j P p No t,n. No .nowa ,..a I corporate people did not place calls ' p i (Deposition adjourned at 10:09 , Aao w === '= t= c' e9 * ! hack to 01 corporate. It would be inn- p.m.) l [', "l,,,,',",", ,,'lll,, "' reasonable to assume um that. "*" N L 'a* ** '"**"8 Pap 202 n9150 I believe that corporate people recx TO ExisiB7!  ! [,*,'""",',""(([h ,*,, Came 12nl to the site, and corporate ; Mahu9h Ano me . on er me chep . people called back to 120 corporate,and - 8h'N **c t'= P., i P.pe No Lee No should so.a DG- t GPC . P,'@ o posed Stew.no". ** the corporate people took information !

                                                                                                     ' And the =non io' tu ch.np i.

go,,pmr taniu i nu een .'tuwe to me ' P.g. No Lm. No .nouia .s 122 in their heads and perhaps physical , osomei.e.cnen Ana u .. m. cnon ,. BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876 8979 Min-U-Scripts Page 198 Page 205 l l

AIIIN MOSBAUGH GEORGIA POWER COMPANY 'J July 22,'1994 (VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLAhT, UNITS 1 A2) ; ea g. No ome No .hu  :. 4 Page 206 DE*03; TION ot ALLEN MosBAUG>votW , Ano the season for the change E . , Page No Lme No snavia road , Ana the maaen tor the onange e fage No Lme No showed mac f Ane me reason tot ene smange m  ! Tage No Lme No- onould read . 3 Ang Ihe mason tot the change m Page leo Lme No shoule read  ; And the reason tot the change a f ape No Line No. should med And the season for the change a r.e. No. une No .%u ed And the mason for the change a Page No. UneNo should med Page 207 DEPOSITION OF ALLEN WOSSAUGN/GLW i tno the mason toe the change m - Fage Na Line Ne enause esad And the seanoe for the change m. i N suppsemental et addemnal pages em neceena9, I please fumesh same e typewrnmg annomed to the f Oppoeden. , ALLEN MOSBAUQu4 Swom to and subsonhed Woe me. the the Gay of , t 994 $ Notag v"ublic i My emme.mn - , t L i I f 1 p l l. i i i Page 206. Page 207 i Min-U Scripte BROWN REPORTING, INC. (404) 876-8979 i f

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. KOHN, KOHN, & COLAPlNTO. PC.

? ATTORNEYS AT LAW [ 517 FLDm0A AVPdi %V WASHNGTCN. DC 20001

  • ESC DORI 234 8ss3. F Ax 202) 482-d*45
c. set : a> ... * ***8:
  • x sim = =o . -

cum camco...  ; g"*nnee n eg g g - -- . ..

          'K.,

e m.'l*"4

                   ,c. .

July 13, 1994 4 4

John Lamberski, Esq.

TROUTMAN SANDERS Suite 5200 600 Peachtree Street. N.E.

Atlanta, GA 30300-2216 e .

l Ernest L. Blake, Jr., Esq. 2 David R. Lewis, Esq. 4 Shaw, Pittman, Pitts & Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037 , RE: License Amendment (transfer to Southern Nuclear) , Docket Mos. 50-424-OLA-3r 5 0 -42 5 -OIA- 2

Dear Centlemen:

I am writing to inform you that the documents which the Intervenor is making available may not be exact copies of what was turned over to the NRC. Mr. Mosbaugh, after providing the documents to the NRC, made revisions to some of the documents to include more information, however no information was deleted. Also, none of those revisions were major revisions. In doing this he replaced the old documents with the revised documents in his computer files. Mr. Moebaugh has informed me that while some of these are not exact copies they are very close to the originals. Sincerely,

                                              //              aNA<oyL Mary        ne Wilmoth 301\let713 w

PLAINTIFF's

  • EXHIBIT
                                                                                      ; ,   D6-3
                                                                                      $ y-2 3- 9 v m

x..- .>. . sa , , i r.u . , . u .m . 3. (,w . , N ",, ',3 ' 2,'

  .                            ATTORNEY t CUENT COMrUN6 CATIONS-70: Michael Kohn I,                 FROM: ANen L Mosbaugh
                . Subiect: Prenarations For ASLB Nr: Sons. 51)culations . Naarina en Dismallamuss j

i

_HAIRSTON WAS ON THE LATE AFTERNOON CONFERENCE CALL 4-19-90 ,
                 -THE CHRONot.OGY OF SOUTHERN NUCLEAR *S DBEAL l                 -THE COVER UP WITH THE LAW FlRM. TROUTMAN *??"uma s

i i i APRIL 19,1990 about 4:00 nrn -Late afte CZ_: w.s 1 l Call: Cor(grence Call _"A" ) On 4-1900 a telephone confotones cel ecouned between Vegge age pomonnel and Southam j Nuclear pusonnd in Binningham. Alegeme, late in the anemoen to review LER 9046. In .lohn i Aurdentempe's amos at Plant vogde were John Aufdenhampe end ABen Moebeugh and in Men i McCo/s office area at Southem Nuclear, in Binningham, were . lock SilingfeRow 85 Shipman, i Ken McCoy and George Helsson. lSee Tape 868. Tr. Pg.S.17 for a portion of that oaq. ' George 90tthold wee also on the ceR and probaldy fmen another phone en gie Voglie she. AN the above personnel spoke en the see and were cieerly idenuseWe by voice. In aestian the nevnes of tiese participants were used during the convemotion inclueng George Heimtests. Also beneved to be party to the oss in McCors omne men wem Laub werd. .nm assey, and Paul Rushton (but they more not heens speelong). (See Tape S253 Tr.pg.17 and E eleo GPC transertpt 6400 pg.8 N.2122 j. For a leet poned Gus WIglems and Tem Webe negrad inte ' Auldenkampe's onios during the cot. Gus Wiluems may neve eness a helst comment en the ost.

George Hei Most penis $sted and W en the ceN witen Wie deced gesusmer gaat were 5 macussed, indeed he participated in the fonowing enchange a

Haeston. "We Got the starte- So we didnt have no, we didni have no trips?" -

Shipmen
No. not, not-1 McCoy: Let me explain. It tesofy to that.

i shipman. otesvow. i This ces reviewed and prepared the final mvision of the dional genenster start count lenguage, adding the phrase about the T,omprehenelve Test Program * (CTP) in om following anchange: Strin0f ellow: Let are make sure rm cisar. Do we went to say. *since 3 20-90. DG1A and DG18 i have been autijeded to a comprehensive test program? Do we went lo say that kind of stun, ordo we warst to say-j Sockhold Yes,you een say that. i i  ; This call reviewed and propered the final revision of the diesel Generator start count language. _ j changin0 from the nurnbere *20 times *, in the previous revision, to "at least 18 times sedf in the j following enchange: i

Shipman: Eighteen or 19 ? What did you have in your posentabon, George ? seventeen j

and is or18 and 19 ? ~ l Bockhold: Eighteen and 19, 1 i 1 a

! 3: u ni ' ana r u iuN - 14 b4 . S.ulAh . -

  1. 4s4ao5349.* 4/27 McCoy:

Wouldn't be rnore than 18 on onnf them . It would be it. Stangfellow Esy 18 times. j, -The language concoming the diesel start count was f;nalized on this call. and e indeed te t' wortling that was in the signed LER 900g6 rev.0. The spec 14c aspods of the diesel mort count l j language met were finalised on this call were the phrese about the 'comprehenelve test  ; j progranf and the use of tie phrees "at least 18 times cadn'.  : d l

APftlL 19.1990- A"r'"aF '_ m CMtoA f^" -

One more cet occuned alter tw eesve esil wthin 15 minutes.' Bit Shipman cased John ' Aufdenkampe. Aten Mosbeugh wGs silR in Addenkampe's ellos and StringfeNow was wth Shipman lSoo Tape SSO. Tr. Pg. 20 32). Jim Swertzweleer entered Ad:C..,a omce and participened in the cell. George Beckheid sNd not participate in tais ce5. Nether Heirsten or [ McCoy partiapstod on this asE ellher. t No sovielens et the essel start isnguses enouned on this esN. In test no mision wem discussed. Shipman seed portions of the diesel elefts language that were Artessed by the Ngher j vias president level pemennel en um esener cou, and they somsmed unchanged. sNpmanns

purpose en this aos was to get the sne, speemioney Ac
C tobuyinteswserpense I

revleions West had been made on the guevious esE. Shipman must have had e ' gut feeing" that Ole elle personnel were act in the fold' en supeeling !- the falso etstomente. Moebeugh stated to stWpmen met he beesved that the C - C la test i . program could not be claimed to be completed until the Undervollege test. slavt #103 and #142 respectively ghis definalen of to CTP wouki have proved the t ER statements fales) last i shipmen ignored moebeught definition. i Shipmen then told Mosteugh and Aufdenkampe that_Kae AdlCade$_hm.caAsil.BR.lRCMlam Brockman. ano that breakman "shmaiuhair underusaad' the hasta car the Annal nas caust. Wim i that said there wee no more reasonalfe geunde for Meehaupt to argue tent meneet duldre being ecoused of esguementative erinsullenlinate, j kom Kan Areakman three tearslater. (12- InterrepsinntQuesdenRenansas j B mand ( inlAda est thlaman rnisdaaramensed Brachunam'a pndannand!nes to temahammh and $nAdankamma w set emm to took se soir pomus of om seios matement being mese. The tasse wedes. { Aufdenkampe defened to h'is ines 21evole higher, Bockhold, and said tiet Gemge must have l had none beels and must have toen dellt. Moebeugh elopped esgdng i Then Wie cas tumed to e discussion of Pat hkDonakrs ist 90 Os comments udth Jim - Swertzweider who had entered Aufdenkampe's offlee. After"CaN B' ended, Auldenlampe ett had reservations about die LER because he stated to Moebeugh star gie cat .  ; l .I a i Auhsenkampo: If they Intespret it differency, we're (  ! cony..Wellsend a rev. out. Auhlenkampe: And fra not talking wrong or right, rm i

  • just taking gramcat.  ;

AUGUST 1990- NRC 088 and THE " WHITE PAPER" . In August of 1990 dunne the NRC's OSI et Plant Vogtle, the NRC requested answers in wring to several written questions. Southem Nuclear responded in a " White Paper" which was given to d the NRC on about 8-16 90.1. ster on or about 6 22-90 tw "While* paper was also lesued , intemony under cover loner of Mark Aluluni of Southem Nudear SAER. Southem Nudeer's lewyer. Art Domby, et Troutmaa Senders porticipated in tie OPC\Southom Nudeafs dee j r i meetin0s the week of 613 90 where the 081inaues were discussed and seeisted in the properation of the " White Paper" responses At this time Southem Nudeer Gid not know met Mosbaugh had made teps recordings. I'

          ' e ei a.m r..                                     m                 . ;-14-b4 . u.u a                                                                 -

suscci.c a.: 5% WHITE PAPER RESPONSES TO NRC QUESTIONS CONCERNING DIESEL STARTS REPORTED ON APRIL 9.1990 AND IN LER 90 08. REVMWS 0 and 1 - l NRC QUESTION #3- (with regard to LER 9006, revision 0, ested #1W90) ? '

Who pnspered theI.ER ?  !

Answer: *8everal drafts . "The SDd IIlddRD of LEM 90-00, fevieson 0 was amoned by a phonocen between elle mana0ement and corporate management. These perucipsene are bensved to be a. anckheid ,ar A.L Mosbanen, J. c. Aufdenkampe, W. shipman." l  ! F NRC QUESTION "5 Who m corporate added the wores 'subasouent in the tool ascerervr in 1.ER 90 06, avleson 0? {' l ! Answer: " Corporate licensin0 personnelin coniunctmeppth the ahone ennwamelien

                                                                .ggaGGAA.Aldtgg made editorial changes as dweceed Thoes present during the i                                                                 phone conversebon are thought to be W. stupman, s. sesansed .ar.

AL hioebaugh, J. G. Auldenkarnpe. and J. Stringletow o Wilh tiese responses, Southem Nuclear twice identines 'the Car as beine the one h 3 which sockheid was preseer and 'pertidpoter. o Wilh these responses, Southem Nudeer has clearly identlSed 'the Car as the one in .j which the " final sevision" concoming the tIssel starts was "proporsd'. i e Wilh these responses, Southem Nudeer ideallnes 'the car

  • as the one in willWi the *

] phrese " subsequent to the test program

  • was added.

t o With these responses, in 95 referrin0 to 'the phone conversellon desertbed above* l (mesmng M). Southern Nudeer is referring to one end only one same esN. "CaN A" Southem Nucieer intended no refemnos deteoever of the leier ces 'r in Wie above Whte paper responses M and 96 to Wie NRC because. j 1. No *propereuen" of the " Anal revison"concoming the dessel starts"escurred 4 on "CsN r. The final wereine had already been propend. Shipman seed the Anal ! already propered vestung on'Ces O'.

2. 'the wonis " subsequent to the test program
  • were not added se tal t'.
3. Dockheid was identiAnd as *present and a " participant"in Wie ceR fofested to in j

Whne Peper responses 4 and 85, but Bockhold was nether "present "of a ! *perticipant* an 'CaN B". 1

4. Swartzweider was stot idongned in the White Paper responses N or 86 as "present*

] or a "perticipant" but he ws3 in fad both *present and a *perticipent on " cab r. 1 Southem Nuclear intentionally felled to identify in their responses to the f#tC, me 'emsodives" (Vice President level and up) who partiespeted on

  • Call A* Ken McCoy was present dunn0 See meeting in August 15,1990 when these "While papelaresponses were propered but did not '

j correct the omlesion of his perudpation. In so doh0 Gouthem Nucieer sought to distance the executives trem lavesvement and to sewnst to cover up their role. speoinessy emined wwe xen ] McCoy and George Heireton. a j Also ornated were the other corporate stoft Estening in McCoy's ofnce area in Birmingham even though they were ideritified by Shipman at the time of the OSI response preparation,415-90, as j perteipants [see Tape 8053 Tr.Pg.18201 a George Fredericit had been assigned the responsibiltty for responding to the NRC's 081 written questions #1 thru #5 for the While Paper. Fredenck was present during Wie discuselon en i 815 90, when questson 83 and $6 responses were discussed and a total of 9 impviduals on 'ihe , 4 Catt were named. After those personnel were identified, Fredefick eeid,'l tNnk I can describe that one* lSee Tape #253 Tr. P0. 211. but the White Paper provided to the NRC only named 5 j personnel. McCoy and three of his corporate staff were omitted, l i i  ; i

      . Men'McGiy not only had first hasid'kM cf nis own panac,eten and the pwtscapet/wi'of~'"

/. thoes corporate personnel physeceNy present in has office area with hen dunng the caN on 419 90, but in the August OSI daily *Cmage control

  • rneebnge ha heard and acknowleged the

!- letm0. of a total of 9 personnel on 'the Call" These iricluded Louis Ward. Paul Rushion, Jack : e

     . Stan0feRow, Jun Seeley. M Shipman, George Bockhold. John Aufdenkampe, Alien Mosbau0h 4

and Man McCoy Nmedf. Men McCoy failed to conect the on'eelen of his three etoff personnel named durtne the OSI meetin0 and most importancy he falued to conoat the omesion of himesifin the While Paper responese powided to Os NRC en or about 816 00 (Questions 83 and 86). He failed to correct i the emne ommeiens when m wm paper moponen were moved om of he o.n einenessen en .

j. 4 22-90 under Mark AMunre signelure.

c Ourke Wie OSI meetiny the week of 818 90' Art Dornby. GPC) general oeunsel was preesse nor n= dema0. ooned mosanos and assind in om paperaba orname wm P o r i 4 Responses, particderfy Wie more serious ones. He is believed to have assisted Goosgo Frederict in om paperadon of to responses to the NRC's wrften queshons en 06eest slerts. The deed l starts was one of the more sonous issues during the OSI and the only one where the letC posed - l wrtitan quashons APNL 1.1991---80GTHERN NUCpyWt Rf,SPQNDS TO THE 1.200 M08BAUGH \ HOBBY PETm0N At this time, southem Nocturdd not know that there wem tapes of the 41990 conference est er whei was on any impe miained by am NRC. The NRC spec 5cou r equimd 8.When Number to respond under ceti and anirmation to Mosbeugh's 2.208 petNion in enfly 1991. Pat M@onald. 80uthem Nuclear's azacuuve vice president, el 0ned the response and edright denied Wiet Heirston was on the tale anernoon confevence Can "A". Quonng fmm Southem Nuclear's 2.208 response Sectiori ll.b page 3. last paragraph footnote 3: Footnote 3- "The wonling was reviewed by elle and corporate repnseenta0ves .. In a telephone conferenes ces late on Apre it,1900. Athem0h Mr.Heitetsn was not a panic,ent in thet een, he had every reason to beneve that the anet . drah LER presented to lam aner the call was accurete and complete." JUNE 1991 Me"lUGH CHALLENrasa eru_Tr= mages sa_nas . 2.308 PETITION RESEQNS$ in June 1991 Moebeugh filed two documents of allegosons, one 11 and Sw other 14 pages, wigt Bruno Urtch of the letC aReging that 80uetem Nuclear had made numecous falso statements in ' the 2.206 pettion meponse Among the falso statements aNeged was sie one about Hairulon's perheipation en the 419-00 iste anemoon conference cas. JULY 8.1991 "Ogal0GM AND HnmaY SUPPLEMENT TH= 2.200 PETm0N On July 8,1991 Mosbaugh supplements his 2.206 pethion. encorporatin0 portions of the allegetlens pnmded to Bruno Urich from June 1991. Among the supplements are the see0stions sDout Hairston's particqwtion on the 419 90 late aftemoon conference call as well as the allegation of a cover up. AUGUST ** 1991- NRC REQUESTg pranONSE FRnA8 ASUTHERN NUCI Fast TO THE MO**AllGH \ HOBBY PETmON SUPPLF, MENT On 8 22 90 the NRC toquested that GPC respond in wnting to the MosbeughWobby amended peDhon.

w ., w a..e ,,,, w ,.,u, .; n FALUWINTER 1991 - SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OBTAIN AFFIDAVITS FROM ALL ITS EMPLOYEES ON THE 41940_ CALL in the fallMnter time frame of 199f John Aufdenlampe was ask by lawyers from tie Troutman-  ; Sanders Law Finn representing SoCm Nudear and GPC. pmboldy John LambersW. to sign an , afRdent saying that George Heirston was not a perfidpent en the 419 00 conferenes ceN "A". Auldenkamps tow the Southem Nuclear lawyers that contrary to theirassertens he

                      ' remembered George Hairulon bein0 en Die cat
  • Auklenkampe stated that he mereed up the aftdant and gave i bedt to the lawyers. He went "bedt and forth" udh the lawyers several emes ~

en Ms sindavit. The lawyers were Siounang' Aumenkampe for me omdeva. The lawyes told Aufdenhamps that they were obtalmnB sfAdsvite front d the gg g Adnede and AmeWakamps wee "the only one who remembered Stat Helmien was on tie oor. The lawyes used this same tactie on Mosbaugh during the Nf4C9s 01 "dllution valves

  • investigation le try to denunde Moebeugh from his recoliedions about Skip KRchens statements about openin0 die (Aution valves when Art Domby. the Troutmen Senders lewyer, said 'I have privested informalen from -

my interviews with other personnel", 'l can tell you that you are 180 dopees out'.) ' Sofore Aufdenkampe signed his altidevu he escussed at the above wei Aten Moebeugh. Dwing inese oorwasssons which took pleon in Aumenkampe4 reeWenos in Augudo. Georgia. Aufdenkampe named as the personnel met he romsmenrod that penidpened en the ces ther em : lawyers were seeking om omdeva ser. Aussentempe meted. Mmess. Menneush amongressw. . stupman, anstbatt. WGar and Heimans naasesuch cananned Ms masasulan of me same personnel. There was some quashon wholher Paul fluehton wee en lhe esE let no one ternembered him speaking Mosbeugh then quoted to Aufdenhampe, mimicking Heirstent weios. ene thing that Henson j had as6d on de cos- mars just what um aun supervisor tom me to er. That menshed Aufdenkampet memory of the cell and confirmed Aufdenkampet moogechens With that, Aufdenkamps responded that he guessed that he shouldn't be talking wei Mosbeugh i about this and that there wee a "confits of interest". , AAer this ocassion Aufdenhampo and Moebeugh had another brief comversation abed the

andave when Aufsenkampe inecated met he had sected the issues uth We sEdevt.

I The Lawyers were so preneuring Aufdenhampo to sign sie alldevit tid Wiey were toquerdy .! camag at his home. His wife become conmemed about this pressure and mennoned A to i Mosbaugh. When Aussenkampo eventussy signed me sedevet. Aufdenkeepe4wils was

i. susciency coneemed shout what her husband may how been comuoded to sign that she i showed me amdeva to Monnaugh. she opened me top drawer in a emes table locesed soninst
tem een was in totween me hachen and aning room and hended We andevit to Mosbeugh.

j Moebeugh handled the document try me edges but shouW have left some Angerprints. Mosbaugh read the entire amdevit. N was atmut one page in length and stated that Auldenkamps j ' remembered est Heirston was en Sie ceN but he mes en an eerher ponion et Was est and not on

the portion of the onll when #m diesels were $=-d". ,

1 Mosbeugh reco0nited that Aufdenkampe has encred in Nating that HaeWon had act porttipsled l . in the dieselstad portions of me ceN. ! The information stated to Moebeu0h by Ashlenkampo stout his conversations with the lawyers, j a the infonnskon he stated about the content of Ns amdeve and the actues afRdavit that Moebeugh ' i { reed. conclusively shows that Southem Nuclear sought to support (vis employee offidsvts) les j denialin their 2.208 petition response tiet Hairston was on car *A*. From Moebeugh's . , i conversations wtth Aufdenkompo R is dear that Auklenkampe understood that the Southem l t Nuclear lawyers wanted him to sign an affidevn about " Call A' boosuse-l s 1. Aufdenkampe desctmed to Mosbeugh 'the Car as the ' big conference car and i accurately identfled all of the 7 out of 7 speaths participants on ' Call A*. '

2. Aufdenkampe Wentified to Mosbeugh that McCoy , pockhold and Hairston i were on itio cell addressed in the afhdevt. None of these three were on 'CeN 8".

[ 3. Aufdenkampo did not identify to Mc2eugh, Swartrwelder who was only a participant on i i ! l L

xcu t.[ r u a.o
. caset
                                                . 14-u4 4 5 No                                         -

4u4co % h 3.s er27 l ii ' 4. The lawyers were seelun0 an affidavit that denied that Hairston was on "the Calf". Th3  ; i was why AuMonkempe wouW not sign the eart.er drafts presented to him by the - j, . lawyers. Auldenkampe would have had no problem si 0nen0 an affWavit denying that 2' Heerston was en

  • Call B*. because he womi -
                              $. Aufdenkampe4 eigned asideve stated that *Meirston was on me col but he was an j

an earger portion of the cat and not on she portion of the coE edlen the diesels were e dienuseer. indeed Heiraten was on orwy a person er the 'cas c. 1 i s. Hewson saw on 'can N (see Tape ass Tr. Pg.12 N. 2 3)ihetjust what the shNt i  ; supervisorlow me to do. iust as Aussenkampe had recognised, when he tom ! unebeugh that he shoulent be temune to Mosneugh atest me est in late 1991. ' g i TMs shows conciselvely mat the towyers and the afnents understood that the ces stoned to in L the 2.208 petition #eeponse, the nas of ireemet. umn 'can N. i } OCTOBER. 31991--GPC DENIES \ PROVIDES BA818 FOR DINAL . i HAIMSTON WAS ON LATEAFTERNDON COMERENCE 1 CALL IN SUPPLEMENTAL PETm0N RESPONSE  ! 1  ; ! On 10 3 91 Southom Nuclear responded to the Moebeugh 1 Hotty supplomons Soulham . j Nucieer states that the Annis der Feelanis_d3 which denied that Heirman was on the 4-19 40 j conference ceII that sensed 1.ER 9048 was : i

1. The eenestive recollection of GPCtSouthem Nuclear

( pertennel as documented in Sie S.16 90 and 822 90 , j 1 " White paper". 4 j i j 2. Meireton's pereenal recollecelons 1

The response notes that Southem Nuclear cad not have a tape of the col and untR there is j credible evidence to the contrary, Southem Nuclear beneves Footacle 88 is concet.

The 10 S 91 totterwas siened try . Sy so ressending, Seussern Nuclear 1 u- ~ E ^ " _1 f, idenelled "CaN A* as She one referred to as See beeis for postnote 88 of One j 2.206 Polition Response because the 81800 and the 42240 White Paper suspenses I j tiocument a unwilstakatse description of" Cat # and only " car A* teescribed previousy). .l' Further, the "scGecWwe reteResten of GPC$oumem Nuclear personel'is (focumorded as t i occurred ($ee Tape 8263 Tr. Pg.1121) when the White Paper responses were being i normuisted during me s 15 00 enesung. This tape provides an unmhtskatse decadenen af the j - ___:xx wm A"' ' the 7.;.;;.;; et a - '-= ;r ^ as uma as the 3 solar j nemonnel marty to the sat la lAnCav's afbes afna.The only conference tar mas tape segmem describes le 'Ca8 A', "CaN 8'is never rnentioned. 1 George Hairston's personnal recogections are contained in his Of testimony of 625 93.

j. George Heirston rupeeledly claimed that he had no recotection of bein0 on "CaN N, yet on Tr.

PC. 75 li.7-12 Heinson was able to identify the point in time that he entered the 4-16-99 CsN A conversation. Thus Heirston4 personnel #=aama*ns at that tirpe place him on 'CaN A*. Aloe Hairston stated (Pg. 73 N.713) that he had no recoNections of other cens on 4-19 00 involving j Bill Shipman or Jack StringfeBow. (such as ' Cat B"). Thus Heirston did not know about " Cal B-t i Therefore, neltber Hairston's personnal moolections or the WhRe Pacer wNeh are cialmed to be ' i the basis for Footecte SS, suonort Footnota 83. In fact they prove Footnote 83 to be lhe meternal - falso statemert that it is. A falso statement intended to obstruct justice. 1' ! DEC_ EMBER 10.1991 GPC DENIES HAIRSTON WAS OMTHE LATE j AFitRNOON CONFERENCE CALL 'WRED ON TAPE #71 i .! l 4 4

    ._ ._     _              __-      __ __.                __         _ _ - . - _ _       _ _ _       _ . _ _ . _ _ _ ___ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ b

st.Ni m ana rilD.n 7-14-34 . S.04AM . o 4u60o5394d.* 9*27 On December 10.1991 GPC wrote s letter (ELV-03293) sened by Ken McCoy provding additionalinformatat to Thomas Murley (NRC NRR) responding to the "Wh,sgh 2.206 petnion. In this later (section IV) OPC transcribes a portion of Tape M1. GPC uses this transcript to idently the late ehemoon conference call that was referred to in une 2.206 peU6on response. GPC refers to the referenced cell as. - ihe April 19,1990 telephone conference cell when the langua0e concoming the emergency diesel generator start count was ensured in the t.an.' And states that Tape fy1:

                                                  "indicales met Hoiston was gg a pertepant duftnD the Apell 19,1000
                                                . telephone conference callwhen the language sonoeming the emergency diesel generator start count was finalized in the LER".

OPC SHIFT 5ITS Posm0N This is a new and elNevent statemord then met which had been made in Festnote 3 of the AprW 1 19912.208 petitles seaponse, because now the denial is not Wie whole cat, but only a spealAc portion of the coR, % hen the langue0e"-%es AnaNast. This statement is almber to me statement that had been pd in Auhlenkampe's afRdevil. In thle lepe seguence RAosbeugh and Auf$edkampe (amorn GPC only idengges as P1perustient) em ERecussing ' coa A". P t 11-., identdlas Genree Denkheid 5 timas in GPC's trensoript an0 ment as porticipatine in 1he Cat'. . ' By submlNing this letter to Thomas Murley in December of 1901, GPC has provided the kattukk h that McDonsis and GPCWoutham Nudeer mood, in their 2.306 petition response,."ggA". Only on *CaN A* was BeckhoM e posticipant. Of the two cats. "CaN A' and ' Call B", only on " Cat A'was the desel start 'longuage SneNaot. ' ' Cell A & 8' particisent, Jack stringfeuew characterized cab A Wie same wayin his Oileetimony (&2190 Pg 41), as Die " Dig contarmene caN" where %s Analized the LER". , l Futher GPC steles tiet this is " consistent wth the cotodive seco5 sedan et partic5 ants duetnD the August 1900 OSI". As discussed previously Wie 'tioNedive mootecBen" of die August Ott portidpants is docemented on Tape 8253 made on 615 90 during Die OSI. l Tape 8253 Tr. Pg 1111.14 thns Pg.12 E.1 documents Nie cobecalve secosection of 001partcipants for Question 83. l Tape 8253 Tr. Pp.18 li.12 thru Pg. 21 E. 2 documents the conective Pwaman*iasi

of oeiparticipwas ter ousehen es.

? j These tape segments provide an abeelutsht sanalatakabia .dnastinden of "CaN A" by 4 diNoront participants : George Sockhold, Ken McCoy, Bill Shipman, and John C ' -g j without the anghtest nietenas to "Cou r. 1 i i l DgCEMBER 18.1992- 1 SOUTHERN NUCI FA8 P8meiONna TO THE l 4 i UNiihu STATES DEPARTMENT 0F E3SVCE' a

                                                                        ,                                                    +
' GPC CUUM5 RAQsAAUGH NOT ON CALL A i la their letter dated 1218-92 to Asst. U.S. Attomey Sally Quillion Yates, southam Nuclear and its Law Firm Troutmen Sanders, again uses name tape segment as above nom tape #71 to j

5 identify ihe conference cat when the LER language was finalized *c But this time they claim that Mosbauah was not a martic69t [See letter Pg 11 Nem B.8.) . ll i j i l I

      - __. .     -_;.,c_.
                      .>.... .        ..a     . . . . .a                   . c a . m . a . v w. .                    -                               i 4uaco kon.:lw d i*
                                                                  - We do not believe that Allen Moebeugh was e participant dunng the faal CeGes of the telephone conference caN when the LER lengua0e was finanted.

See s.0. Moebeugh Tape 71. John Aufdenhampe had io . espian to Asen Mosteugh whet ned happened during aw corderence can on Apnl imh.*- By sulNnWing this letter to Aset. U.S. Attomey 8efy Qu8lian Yahu, on December 12,1991, GPC has provided vet additional and reensted irrehdable evidenqe of which ced Mcdonald and CPC$outism Nuclear meant in melt 2.208 petiben response, 'gg&*. Only an 'Ce5 A' was Bockhold a pertelpent. Only on "CaN A* wee the diesel start " language Anslerer". - Only on ' Cap A*, as quoted inen Troutman Sander's version of the Tape f?1 ergment provided to the DOJ, did John Aufdenkempo have :

                                                         a big conversation on toes numbers witti Gestan1Beckholdi" l

i JUNE \ JULY 1993 *N8THERN Naen Iraq e s*"* THE heslT 0F THE 4-19-90 TAPES- Falls to cofract arevkpm , etElemBfdR. s sy July sees, soumem Nuclear 3ecame swore of the content of at less persons at419 80 tape recordin0s and shortly themster gained paanammami of the 'elu tapes' whitfi included Wie ~

                                         " Call A*.                                                                                              ,

Once Southem Nuclear and its 4.sw pinn Troutmen Sanders was aware of the content of game tapes, they know that contrary to the Apal 1,199f 2.206 pellbon response as wen es the October 3,1991 supplemental pettien response, as wel as the December 10,1991 addhionslinfonnellen response letter from Men McCoy, Howeten was on 'Cas A*. Wilhet 2 tesys a congchon of the falso information wee required to be made to me llegional Administrator under 10 CFR 50.0. ' 1 Also requiring corsecton under 50.9 mee to "While Paper" fnue the August 1900 081 which i febed to constfly identWy aR Wie "Cel A* panicipenis. They also know stat the 1214-9100.1 response was ineormat at met smo as was. When the NftC consumed are 01 Intervlees of cunent and Sonner Soumem Nudeer personnel in ] June 1908, sie f#tC ulEsod portions of verlaus 41990 tape reconAnes thertne the interviews. Depending of Wie deles of these intervious Southern Nuclear may have loomed that their i previous statements were falso Arzt from the 01 interviews remer then the "Str Tepos". Once l Soulhom Nuclear lesmed of the smotence and content of por9one of Wiese tapes, indudin0 the later Cal'8*, their story dien0ed. i JULY it** *00THERN NLC8 88_M CHANtaES fTS STORY I in testimony to the NRC Of (71 93) and in response to the NRC, Pat Mcdonald and Soumem Nuc; ear changed their story to claim that the telephone cell they were referring to in Pet . 1 McDonelts scorn response to me 2.206 peloton was the *last call', 'CaN B*, the ceN aller Call

                                    *A'. The etwlous nood to do this was Heireton's clear wolos and extene4ve perpolpeson on snel
                                    'A' including his participation in the diesel discussions en the tapes they now had in their posession..

- Sul even within McDonales 01 testimony, he is contradictory. Mcrk eid states.helgt that on the call he was refening to in Footnote SS, pockhold wrae a parselpant V this is true then Mcdonald is referrine to ' Call A*. McDomaid contr=e9 Haindon's of tesimony in McDonalds 01 testimony of 71-e3 Tr. Pg 28 li. 25 thrv Pg. 2916.1, when McConald states that Heirston told him that he [Hairston) was not

-2....

m _..e .... s. . . w m . a . dn . - 4u4oos u u u, i presort on the c:2 coil meeneng ." Cad 8". Heirston m his Of testemony 6 25 90 Tr Pg. 7316.713 i maled he had no recollection of any other caps that d;y other than CaN A.  ; t Furmer in McDonalts 01 teshmony on pg 29 li 14. Mcdonald stated that the 4 people he {. identelled on the cau (he identelled Bockhold, Shipman. Aufdenkampe and Moebeu0h) Wofo '

a "mrer r ask" about Heireton's port 6dpseton and "mey edn't remember George being mere", of t  !

mese 4 personnet, GPc towyers only idenuften (see talow) met women asements were otesined * ] from one of the 4 personnel McDonsed stated were erectly asked. !- a By selldiing to ceR 1', Southom Nudear hoped to "make" McDonsid's swom statements "come l i inm*, teosuse indeed Heirston was not on Ces v.  ! l l The pmelem is met soumern Nuclear and Pat Mcdonald were not reestring to cod T eden may responded to the 2.208 peltion as exhausevely demonstreted above. They lied men, to cover up l i the involvemert of the executives in the falas statements of 419 90 and they are lying now . 3 t because with the proof offered by the tape it's Wieir way out. l , GPC'S FAs a TO mece nas E- mWii OF AppanayrT3 naasnMg . f DISCOVERY DI ABLRPROCEEDRMB ' in the cause of discovery in the cupent Voglie t.ioense trenefer pressednes before the A81.8. extensive escovery sequests were med. Spoollicefy h Moebeugh's first set of 't. - Oueadon 864 (1) mquired GPC to "identWy aR documents

  • that islete to in any rnenner". %

i conversations held on Aprd it.1900 concerning LER SIMIOS. GPC inRed to idengfy Sie . i i afReevils in meir response to quesson 864. Hevin0 failed to discloes the existence of me j affidsvits Mosbaugh's lawyers pressed me issue. l A discovery me

inwye,e = wesh ouir. etm0 weei .held between Mo@ught lawyers and Opcitouthem Nuclear's
                                                      .PCs iew,.es we,s .sk ,out me i                                                                                                    i.aus.oe.u i

and were ask why key didn't identify me amdaves. Their response was ' tuns'd you find out about those?.  ; j

                *a - ; - .: to this meseng GPC flied a supplement to ts respones stating met signed statements wem eineleece frem .lehn Aussentempo, Theinse Webb. . leek StringleSew, and j               George Heirsene but mPuesd to turn overlhe documents.18ee Intwvener median to compel
produman et andoves, ePCs soply and GPc suppsements susponse to n f ;.

j Moebeuph's lawyers men sought to obtain the offidavits thru the ASt.S. but the cowt upheld GPC's daim of Atomey C8ent priv0ege. i it should be noted met this Neeng of amants is inooneistent wth the 'CoRecGwe recotectiorf l of 419-90

  • conference car participants in the White Paper, the collnadwe moellecdons of

{ 419 90 conference ces partidpases dwing the 815 90 OSI damage control moeung, the Tape

               #71 magment used in the 121s e2 lener to the DOJ Pat McDonalds Ot testimony pDs. 26,28 & -

l 29 (71-93). and GPc s 6-2-es =c a respon,ses (queshon sis). EVEN MORE T88 LNG IS SOUTHERN NUca s98 CURRENT STANCE ON THE AFFIDAVITS Southem Nucteer failure to disclose the existence of their employees' affidavits, durin0 dicoovery i in mis curmnt ASLB proceedin0 is most surprising. This proceeceng centers around admitted contentions met Vogue's noense was illegally tranefbtred and that Southem Nuclear does not have the character, competence and trustworthiness to hold a nuclear opersing noense. Moebeugh's ellegations that George Herston knowingly made meterial false staternents to the NRC in LER stM106 about Vogtle's diesel genennors and specifically that 80uthem Nuclear bed i in its 2.208 potillon response about Hairston not being on the 41990 conference co8 are comrel ' tsaues to the contentions.

        . ... s..,a ,...(,r                         , o o,        --

[

                                                                                                            ...n oo .., - o .

Aner Southem Nuclears lawyers finsay leentmed to the court snat ofnesvas er wnsen

  1. retaments were ottaaned from Aukienkampo. OnngCliow. Wetdr. sad Heitsion they refused to tum them over. Why would Southem Nudear went to hold back 9 tis supportm0 svidence? GPC's filin0s to the A8LS the courts and the NRC. to prwious Mosbau0h onegations, are filled with j GPO's employees affidsvits j According to John Ausdenhampe's delements to Asen usabaugh. OPC's Nd of affiants is get L samalaar = had maled to Moenough that the lowyers now him met mey were i

geeng efedevite_ftant swa sone on the caN and thet he was lhe only ens who romernbered Hairnenwas on me eas. i Fathumes, in senos men the An8 touthem Nudears lawyes adsdeed that AmAdenhampo {' had convemations about um andevas weh moensuch , and denied met mostosen had been 4 shown Auhlenkampe's ofRdevit. This is delee. th. AuWenhampe provWed to Maobeugh, her i huoments amdevt a med, and wanessed unshaugh reading the asadovtt. usaseugh slao had j fonow up convesadons weh ure. AusserAampe about what her husband eeuw de to street me j afRdevk. l i i A POMTOF LOGIC 1 i Aufdenhampe's efDosyks and others were intended to suppost Wie $sts Wiet Hairston was not a 4 porticipent to diesel discussene on Ces 'A' or even pneuse for a snoment Ce5 T, Smely Southem Nucleer's iswyers would have been Storough and comprehensive irt fielt appmedt and j would have ottained alndevils Imm eE he cat's penidpees Soulhem Nuclear only daimed to itw Asts that matemmes nem sinained kom 4 personnes. Heirston. Asidenhampe Webb and . StringfeNow; a comthnetion that belles rosson in addmosing either ' Cod A or B". j For "CaN A* i

1. Two of the 6 'Whne Paper"identined partleipenis

! 2. Two non.'Whme Paper"identiped peroonnet j 3. AR tapether 4 et me totet 12 known penidpenis j For" Cell 3" i i 1. One of fourspeaking perGoipenis. 4 i j Regardless of their completeness, the statements were intended to bolster Sousism Nudeers i case that Holrden did not knowin0ly submt false informellon to tie NRC, then why is Southem j Nuclear refusin0 to tum mis evidence over to the court? Or is the scope and Sie content of these sfndevils now so demning that Southem Nudeer can l } not afford to revealthem? I j Aufdenkarnpe's afndevR alone shows that call *A* was the ce5 refened to in the 2.200 pedtson response. l 4 1 But additiona#y if (as Aufdenkampe stated to Moebeu0h) Southern Nudear obtained affklevils

simliar to Aufdenkampe's from Bockhold, McCoy or any participent not ce cell T, thet ad alone 4 would prwe that Cell 'A' was what Mcdonald and the low firms engitsely intended in the 1991 2.206 petition response sworn under oath and affirmetion. and the feoent etstements of Southern Nuclear, Pet Mcdonald and Troutman sandere era more lies to the NRC and ASLS.

I j l ~ i 4

  ~~ .   - . -                                   -     .

I m . t. , .ma r m m . . - w u, . o m. e - suico w ... w .. i ' Southern Nuclear 6 caught in their own web gf hes. Now Southem Nuclear b cisimeng that me 3 ! call lhet P;3 Mcdonald was refemns to in his 2 20e petton response wee Call T. These recent i

events constitute a edadgl gligt-gg and wrongdoin0 by Southem Nudear and its Law lhm I
Troutman Sanders. ,

i 9 l EN i i i GPC, Sondham Nudeer, and Troutman Sanders have made no less then 4 different end varted  ! anempts te, Jeny the involvement af meir anscultives, members of their corporale staff and j j othere on the 419 00 T,su A*. These altempts involved maldng of mom feles stalomsels to sie ' s NRC and DOJ. Canainly Southem Nudeer has me inlemal resources to accurately determine

                                                                                                  ~

} wito was en Rio est. i  ! ! Then why did Sier inned to accumtely account for the celre pedicipants? The season was to j l deres the NRC and DCJ inveshgeons into wrongdoing of meir pomensi and to Imit am l inveshgation to a smet ciceed group of presonnen whose stostos asuid be desoly seen6nsted

. TMs strategy has worked to some amient and becoues of this. NRC nehw interviewed Peut 4 Rushton er Louis Ward who were Gret hand witnesses to the 419 90 'Cs8 A* and presumably the j *l'I testify to Sist* 'Disevow" conversalien. R remains an open peseRIEty Gial Wiem em sN .
omw waneeses b T,aB A* mat have yet k to idenufied. I 1

! CONCLMS10N 1 1 j l have summarized the followin0 conceres based on the above fues: l 4 . I 1 j CONCERN 1: Southom Nuclear and as Law Fem Troutman have engaged in a

cover-up since 1900 and have made Isise statements, wilhheld .

! indennamos, dened to soport information. and Isand to cuneet

mformadon known to be incomplete anmor inaccuses to me NRC.
  • l . DoJ. and Asts. Two appEss to me infonneson and evens  !

sunnunes me 419 so centsence esilinduang me pomalpenen er l eerperste staff and aneceeves on the 4-19 90 confamnes esE ti en ellert ' i to obstruct me Nfte and DOJ inveshgations. ! CONCERN 2: Pat Mcdonald knowingly made falso statements in enom tesumeny j to NRC Of in July 1983 Wien he falsely idonned convemebon T as the commmation he was referrin0 to in his asem seaponse to Mosbeugh's l 2.20s pausen. 1 i j CONCERN 3: Southem Nuclear and lie Law Fbm Troultnan Senders falsely denied in  !

1993 Gist Allen Mosbaugh had been shown John Aufdenkampe's I affidevit, in Rs soply INief to me A$LS l

t j CONCERN 4: Southem Nuclear and its Law Firm, Trouttnen Sanders fated to identify 4 to the ASL5 in 1993 as the personnel from Wlom e10ned sistamente er offidevits were atitained. that felste to the conversubons on 41900, !- concoming LER SIMis and the " Call A andior 3"poedpants.

                                                                                               ~

l CONCERN 8: In the ' White Papes" responses to the NRC in August 1990 i_ GPCWouthern Nuclear and its Law Fem Troulmen Sanders. t tJj } emitted leendfying lley personnel who had penicipated on the conference - l catis identified in NRC Quesuons #3 and 86. 5 i CONCERN 8: When Southem Nuedear and it's Law Arm Troubnen Senders, had in their possession en the information necessary to recognise that their 2.206 pebbon responses and " White Paper

  • contamed false statements about the 4-19 90 call, they failed to report this to the NRC as required by regulations 10 CFR 40.9.

3t.Ni m ..vtc ra s a xo 7-14-u4' a.u,At . .-

  • dconos a ' * * -

I- Attomeyl Client Communcatens j To Mike, Steve Kohn From: Allen Moebeugh j Sutvect . Properations for ASLS Depoeluons, eriputsuone, hearings en Diesel Generatorissues 3 ,i i Pre 40A Sutwnittais to the NRC (44-90 to 4440): - i l i "EXEculTNE

SUMMARY

VOGTLE n8EA8'8 OPEP_Aan syy= _ i { intentionally Materia 0y Falso by Omiselon: i 4

;                                                                                                                                   l maskeraued; on 41 e0, oeces sockhoW went drudy to an inevWust ( tuo levels down) in Moshaugh's oenniastion without tecno Moebeigh orAussenkampe, and assioned that inevwusi te propese data ser a document that wous ne mind i                                                                                                                                    !

v.aecumve summary veges Diessi openesty" ESVDO. The dote eut i sockhets wanted wee the 'sefety eyesom ponennense immasteser, esm, ! ser the vepse messa, ama that wee munnely kept and repened by vague se - j f INPO. The date pnwided to BodheW, wouM be used to show 9e NRCthat VDgge deselreReWhy:

1. Had impnned subetssteIy tem 1000 to 1000.
2. vegne seem esseesty wee in the Top oueme of Nedeer plante neuenety.
3. was esser then weer seenie and insanry 'tnesses', a to a smee bemer.

i  ;

4. Diend Reustety et vogne wee est e conaere that shouW eged the NRC4 j #setzt decewen. i 4

I k s GPC's ESVD0 CHANT of BBM Data ennridad be]EtC: M M M j US Best Quente .01 .000 .012 i US Mathen .017 .017 .030 l sistem .or7 .oss .oso i ', vestie utu .o4 .05 .egs - 4 4 See allachmente A & S

  • The ominalen: what seekham exchdad som the E8VD0 was tw date for 1900, the most i

recast dele, the most supresentsuve date, the data showin0 a nogetive trend, j the data he know looked bed.The alle Atee Emerponey ocournMI on 8-so 90 i

and en ominous trend had developed in early 1880 in Diesef Resetety data (a womin0 of future problems 9 i i j There had been 4 SeRules aheedy in 1000 einos he beginning of tw year not esenEng the 2 fellures during the sto area emergency lleelf. '

l. 4 . I The Earfy 1990 SSM Date: (Predictore of to Acsklent) ? 1990 Yearto date Jan Feb &lants Aare Maw

Vogtle Ulm .14 .00 .00 .07 .06
  • i i

l 4 L . _ _ , _ _ _ _ __ _ ~ _ _ . ___._.._______;_..__.._.-___._...a..._,.___,-,..._-

3tc.6 ru .sna r a ll uN 7-14 *b4 3 4'M * ~ { The Whele Picture SEPlData; i l IMI 1HR 1911 .HM i US Best QuattNo .01 .000 .012 USlAssen .01 7 .017 .020

Blasers .027 .038 i 030
Vogtle U1M2 04 .08 .006 .48*

t

                                                                                                  *YTD Defore 32600 1
j. >

! A Totalhr Diantent Pictura: i I inclumnD Ihe 1990 dets y to but not incduen0 the legwee on 32090 ' j gem en enmely essent pimers at me opasting history of the Vogue messes - 3 4 meistety. i 3 i 1. Diesel relebulty had outstantiety worstened between me years 1000 and ! 1990 and was en an overas down Irond, worse men any pavious year. 4 2. 1990 Voglie diesel reliebety wee outetentiser worse in 1900 men " sisters i and industry "medens". 2 to 3 grnes weres } 3. The Janurery 1900 diesel rolleblity was a dieselereus (.14) so bed as ts  ; i cause alarm. Fabuery wee a diernal (.00). These racest values were lo to 20 times worse then the chart without 1990 date.

4. A .14 unsehabWymeant only e 80% re5stely. MtC4 }
                                              'ftellsbuey Gosfis 90% per plant in MtC4 Bronch Technmal Pooleon and 99% per desel in Generic Letter 8415. Less men 90% is canaldend IN0PERA8LE byGenerteLaller6415.-

j

8. The stedeucal date for 1990 was predicen0 protsems, protiloms that 4

. mensfasted themeshoe h me See Area Emergency and more aner, . i 1 Backhohl intespelonalhr gotimed to 1990 Elain. i 50ckhold know thol there was 1990 date, that A looked bed, and Socihold i choose not to include the 1980 data. Sockhold signed and sent One monthly soports of l diesel 88P1 to tecCoy and at lep level execuleves up tru Heiraten and Festoy. , { Sc. Ahold also know of the intended use of me ESVDO, to give to Bedrnen and i Ennetter of the NRC before or as part et the &S 80 pressatellon and that peft of the j purpose of the ESVD0 date was to address regional conooms about diesel opersbety and reRebHRy for imput to the restart doomien. i - ) hem in. msvoo ne en c:: _= see Of report Edits ee9 p0113 & 114 9 ESUDO la h;.u"" as the etAc 4 j Sodhold is believed to have presented the diesel roNability data

,                            showing that Vogtlet eesels were more retable than other industry diesels, i                             to MtC on glie et the IIT exit 4 2 90 at 00:48. It is tetowed that Al Chaffee as wou es Xen Brodman were presort at the emit for the NRC. gookhots i                             had saaled that the ESVDO dote was for Ken Grookman to 9tve to Ebnetter, 1                            R appears that the ESVD0 Desel n'"r., dote may have been included in the COA draft information provided to the NRC by corporate.

i. i i 4 i

   ~                ,           ._          __      ,           - - _ - _ _ _        ---- ---                        - - - - - - -                                      - - -

l 5 he ta y.,a r sia nu . 714-:s4 3 L'on - '. ' 101co33843.sloi 27

                                                                                                                                                 -                             I

. t i i M j NRC used the ESVDO Informabon provided by Bockhold at the ll? enR. (minus 1990), or by  ! corporale in te overeN dodelon making prowes to prent rolesse on +12 90. i j If me E8VDO wee act ever provided to the NRC then the 4 990 presenistion was Isles by emission. GPC know that the 58VD0 Diesel redeldih dele salsted, that j =r- - - i

                                 ~ by the NRc to show diesel operaldEty and mitelduly in the 4-                                    presentegen GPC specificesy properal the COA drolls and the ESVD0 paper ter that presentegen and g                kneudng set t looted bed, chose no'. to pnwide the informasen.

l 2 4 2 9 l l l l _ ,, . ___.,- ,,,e-- - e *-+=-ur**'* * * * "*~'*" ' ""~ ' "-

j @ r.a. W Piii m 7 l bM . . b . uon . - M bo h b. G 27 l , ATToftNEY \ p nAITpt:firJNICATiONS 3 l 1 To: Mike Kohn Date: 4-13 94 i From: Allen Moebeugh j suspct Propero6ene for Al.S$ 85 pule #ene)Depooltionet Hearings on Dieselleeues. , ) , L i 1 THE REAL CAUSE OF THE DIESEL 1A FA!LU8tE DURING 1 i THE SITEAREA EMERGENCY t l + 1 VOOTis nasant a JWW Armast gitafy"* TO MASPEM i . l The eeny scoming of >20 90 was e cool one. In the asset Dulloin0 sat air compressors and larg i air storage lenke preneurized wth air. Compresem0 air both worms the air and reises he reisthe l ! humisty. Refil9 erellen type dryore wem used to remove moistwo tem see compassed air. i Historical the mentenance of tw air dryers for the diesers centrol air had been peer w4th Wie dryers too oesn out of service inclusn0 prolosiged periods waiting on porttoperebers hohhasty famed to piece the aryers neck in senden tesowing Pers. An ominous tend had been ecewring over the past few weels appreesdainD 3-2040. Mosewed , diesel 1A contml air asw points had been in the 3rs F and 4Fe F for months up until 39 90, but ,

on 3 9 00 and on 512 00 eew poets started going out of specl0 cation high. Sy 3-31 dew points '

3 wwe measwed as very high and far socee$ng esfe kmts. So on Um merging of 3 20 00 , I moleture was present in the diesel 1A contal air with dew points probaldy in the 80 F range. The ventaishon of the diesel room had lerge louvers low in the side wens and periodicesy the nonnel ventimshon tens come on drowing tiests of ceM outside airinto the room and acrees the < , hundreds of feet of $4" etsintess tutune Sist made up the pneumatic coater symem. Coolmg the ! tube waEs down to just to or 70 F would fawn droplets of anoisews inside me stainises tubing j once fonned inside sw tubing there mouw tw me tendency er me amps to evaporate in the

presence c( 00 to 90 F dowpoint air. Many trip unsa em tocated high on the engine ateve the I ooneel penei. weh sw Jocket weier tempwaswa enes noing to em very top of om asesi, oew ,

{ would be inclined to esop bed by previty towarde tie erillose. Osw in the costret air supply lines would flow towants the ortness Additioneny, en 3 20 90 there were pre 4mieling leeks in the . pneumatic tutin0- i j t The pneumaec control system was nonneby not preneurized and the 1A diesel had not been nm ' in a week. Thus the air in me lines was stagnent. i . j THE RimATING EVENT 4DAP So there the diesel set with dew in the stainises pneumatic contet tubing. Until te palmieum truck hit tie 240.000 voll support pole within tie switchyani knockin0 out a5 AC power to Unit 1 j and tripping Voglie Unit 2 which was opereling at fos power. ;& lf f;Ihe Una 1 diesels i received a undervoltage alert signol(at the time UV edusted a " normal mart) on the loss of ofteRe power 1.00P.

THE DEREL PNEUMATIC cA817AOL L**

The pneumatic control logic went into edian supplying 60 pel control air thru emell onnees to pntsswire the trip lines that are nomuny depresounrad. simultaneously control air is supplied i thru another altniter erlflee to a small alt tank that serves as a 60 second time delay. A mee j begins between pressurtaing the trip lines and pressurtrin0 the delay tank. if the pressure in the 4 trip lines bulles to a minimum value P3 !stel eotpoint opmx. 90 pel) before the time delay tank 4 reachet Ne minimum preneure setpoint, as is well. The components are sized so that this wel i-l i i

    . .           ...s.                  , 4 , m,     . .ww                                                              -

6uwmm 4n 4 1 [ j normany happen if the t6me delay Circuit wins the race, the en0Wie racerves a trip signal and shuts down. 3 once tre trip unos me fully preseenzed to 60 pal me sensors stand mady to vent me prenewe to !~ atmosphere in tie event any parameter that ihe sensors mentor anosets 48 trip eeWng. Since . Ihe sensore een vont me pressure tester than make up control air een he suppeed tuu me 900* i o

           ' orifices, the air pmesure drops below lho P3 setpoint (approsc 45 pel) and a tip elenells generaled hem lhet channel.

i The fotowing sensors montored the Voglie diesers mechanicalparameters en 3 2000-( i P "inE""- Bir'" 00 ame I Overspeed no no 8-

                                                                                                          ,1 of 2 Tris =~ -

l Lowlube on pressure. 119 % F no . yes. 1 of 1. 30 pel HighJacket welertemp. no yes t

             . Hl0h crankcase pressure                                                                  - 2 et31                                200 F .

yes yes 1 of1 3 pai . Lowturbochargerespoes. yes yes ,

                                                                                                         . 1 st2                                  15 pel LowJocketwetwpossum              yes-
. High vtireben. .

yes i ert a pai . yes yes 1 of 4 - i High lube oNIsmp. yes no 1 et1 200 F j High bearing temp. yes no 1 et10 ' 235 F ' t iL { DG1A 3-28 00 "THE putST FAm me% THE EFFECTS OF D8mr ' i _. But on 3 20 90 thines were different; as sie air rushed to fill the lines the drops of dew . were entrained in Sie flow and when thsy came Io lhe .006" ormoe mey bloded Ilie smet hole

  • i perhaps spraying thru the hole but nonelheless restricting the flow (se suo phase pressure emps -

i tend to ske. The race was lost. me amo deley tank prenewsred befes sw trip lines and when sist 4 happened. the diesel tripped. The pm<wieling leeks eney have agraveled Wie aNuotion eeusing

the trip unes to pasewise even more slowly because the air was seeking out chur em toets.

PoesiWy some of De dew was entreined in the Dow stroom that Abed me air dehy tank as wen ( because it was alred to pressurize in to esconde but en 3-2600 t took eEgley mere men 80 I i - secones. Trip slanus would have mwnineled the iscal contal pensi chewlRO es tu tip eireute ! that famed le pmeewtes se reinimem number of senser teos to me seesbod prenews befon em nmer en out. operseers reset the annunalators wahout noting whid annunaseers were ut. t i 4

DG1A 1.ae se "THE assem Fan ME% THE Errusim GF near ;

! Atter it minutes operators initiated a second stort alernpt of the dissel by reseeing the

sequencer. The desel received encher undervolla0e start signal minos af offste power was etE out. The race began sonin. A0miri um dew metricted me posewksson of the tip enes at the l

4 oraces and again sw race was inst. sw diese tripped. The esem er me dew ma ond ne.oe mo ie deisyia,*,,se d. mesh. s y0 ese y have beenless

                                                                                                                                         . m. mne. n Is toolcel that sorr.s t$ serin 0 of the Enes would occurr escii pressurtration cycle try eveparation or i                                                                                                                                                                                    ;

l by simply sweeping more of the dew downstrearn. This time the operators otworved the trip annunciatem: l' i t owpreneurejedet woWr i HientemperstwoJacket water j Lowpressure turbochargeroil L i since thu s unser circulls are preewhod from the ume point in tw contrW logic R is [ likely met dew in this supply source impeded the pressurization of af these lines No sensor malfunction is necessary to explain these events and annunciators. In fed s

  • improper ' termRtent cperstieve of the jed at water sensors does not explain he recolpt of the 3 trip annuncletors i

u because the design of the pneumatic controls is such the! venting sensors in one drcut does not i s j-

                                                                                                                                                                +

i i-4 _ _ _ . . - . _ . _ , . _ ,.._..-_,.~.....-.m..,~-. . . . _ ~

n in w e risi m . b4 . b.u s . - 404 M DMDU i the effed other circuits yet 3 diffemnt trips were recerved. D01A htt 90 "THE TPm8' START",- THE EFFECTS OF five { j After enomer it minutes, operatore alempted a 'treak glace

  • emergency alert. In the emerg i mode only the High Jacket weler y ad low lube oil pressure trips are esive. Tfus time the eflods i

of the dew were less and most of the trip Enos pressurized feeler then ate deley tank. The rene

was won, sie Geest remained runnire. t was a close race, the Law of pneews sensor

! malfundion eterm came in, Indoenen het one trip Ins mes efloded by the dew (as was as e

leakin0 lube og pmeews senser) and had not preeswtaed feet enough to test the deley tank.

Since me oft presswo logic le 2 of 3 to trip, no trip securred. AncIher non mnergency marm came j on high lube oil temperstwo even though the sube oil temperstwo was iao F esme 40 F below i trip setpoint, e0 sin indicellon a dew problem pressortaing this portion of the controllogic-  ! j The diesel ren loaded for several hows. This generates consklerable host, he air eyelem j remains presswiaod while the deset is mnning and with the leaks in the tutun0 Ines, me dew i would have tended to be evaporated and purged out of Ihe air futung. R is Gius understandelde l that on the next 3 starts on 3-20 00 that sie airquality proldom did act meneleet teelf 80eln. ! No " improper intermhant openson* of sensam is needed to aglein these evues.just the { , adenission of the sect mm em dowpoint was se Meh te0 F) se a was meeswed not befem j (3 9 90) and eher(329 90) the scoulent. Dow points in the 80 F range were mesowed muRIp times on muelple Imerumente en 001A control air en 44-80 HOW RIUCH DEW DOES fT TAKE l How much dew does A tehe to trip 8 theeef? That would depend on hour close te race belween j pronounzing the deley tank and the trfp ilne was without dew, but the amount een be bounded , and calculated wah a low eneumptions. W you assume that the dew, unter only. Ases meu me i .000* ortlice for lhe IWE 80 sec., et a preneure esp of 90 pel afferential acrees to erMee this { would result in gesentially gg control air pressurtain0 he trip Nne and woidd pleos as upper bo ) on how much dew is needed to trip a doest. A water velocky thru the .00s" ortflos of about 100 IVoec. producet e elflerential pmesure of espetuimetely 60 pel. Calculehne the volume of e .000" maem of water at a sneer now rete of 100 aranc ser 40 sec yields about ts ec. volume. secoues of NIge as the se entfeme 10ss. soeumptions mode, a tsesel cated probably trip hem much less then 33 THE mm y m*"**" i

                                                   = EXP8 ***Tisw All the dienst tips and observeuens en 3 2tf90 and thereafter con be eginned by me singi i

simple explaination of high ig_ end the steuhin0 water in the pneumelic Enes. The - a claimed evidence to tw cordrary, audi es the inspection of air.m tank or the 5 aucron liner ! would nellhor confirm or emelude me pneenes of dew in thei doerdream staleless pneums j tubing Enes. The larger and more maselve components would be much slower to cool elf and . i form dewintemely. Ulumstely the " ~. af ' -in the annum =* tuurgggiaRer he age i ares emergency wee he condushre evtsenne that, when combined with en .0,, z.2;." of he i pneumatic functions and me observallons of 3 20 90, proves that the cause cd the ate ams emergency was uneeliefedory air quefily. j Coloon sensor problems that occurred concastrently with the air cguelity proldems were

troubilnB but can not plauseldy empieln Wie trips, alanne ans etnervations. Mio operation of .

i Calcon seasons acted irt a menner simter to the leeks to agrevete the pressuriraDon of i lines. In a few instances where the diesel tnpped 30 minutes or rnere efter start, sensor or seier componefit failures were to himme t

]

) De tripping of Diesel 1A on 3-20-90 and 18 on 3 23 90, and on 5 23 90 eRet 1 minute's

 ;                 fad otmervedons imm the socorid start and trip on 521-90 can co sensors es the cause of the trip.

4 I 4 . 1 4 I i

j. st.t ci .sna re lita . F14 o4 3.luu . -

4utoo n 49.:2wM i i i THE SEVEN TRipt OF DG1B Oel E M ** - DEJA VU F_** ^^ On 5 23 90 Vogue Unt I wee at power having been granted permiselon to soeume power j operations from tw MtC and having completed the refueEng outr ' % previous monet.

R wee anotier coolmeming.

1 1 DR1R TIEPERTFALim { On 52390 dieset tenerator 1B was atened to perfonn a snantily euvemence precedwe. The '. i diesel had not toen stoned shoe 4.aSe0 ces dayup. This wee by est sw inneemt Ireuvel that the j disesi had sat unlested since See she erva emergency and longer seen OG1A set before me WRe 1-asos emergency itself (7 days). At 12:28 Wie enest won mattee (normel eter0 and alter SO lo go seconds R Iftpped. The annuncletors EEsplayed were: ! LOWpressurejocist weler '

High hapwatwo jectet water Lowpreeswa tutischargeras The 'tret out" annuncestor informauen wee less because the opemier accidentally pressed j the reest tesi human inmoed of en maenos eierm immen.

t

l. *

' nota THESECONpFJpWitE A second start (nonnal starO was siempted on the 18 <Seest at 13:12 wthpomonneldescuy otiservlre essi of Die Calcon sensors wth Snoop to deled *1mproper intonnement operellen" (venling. The deselinpped siter 80 to 90 escends wth ' Iso antdies veennqi". The feEmsing { annuncielorswemshelidayed: Lowpreenw Jeetatmehr 9 Lawpresswe twtocftergereE i with no venung eensom a wouw to impossime for a cassen owner to have seused ede tip. j Fweennere the deelge of the desel pneunwis control system le such Wiet venung of eenoors in one simut does not cause tipo in another. Thus. k every case wheft there j multiple trip annunciebers, k is not aresphie sist nwnerous sensors were r " u",were - uperiencine impmper intenment operemon. DG1B TMTHNIDSTART { A 9 tint start anempt (emergency alar 0 wee rnede at 14:12. TNs time Wie sAssel stoned and ! conheued to nm unM R wee snenulaBy shut down a4er la inindes. i j These fleet three stent, trips, and observotons are needy identiset in every respos to those en j , DG1 A on 32090. The progression of dew steadnB horn sie Inse seems to have proceeded in a menner very similar to that en 32090. 5 j The founh mort was another eme#gency start at 14:45. The dienst sen for 4 minutes untE 4 wee manua5y shutdown try the operator. - t Tes* ItERT Off THE STAftTE ON L'* ^^ j

The diesel 1 hen set for over 4 hours havin0 rever been run loaded or for any length of time durin0 the previous 4 elefie. On the Alth stort speciallnettumentation was susched to sie
pneumsuc lines. The diesel wee normal stested et 21
18 and k enpped as aeoonds tener. The fonowing elarms wwe recahed:

i i lowpressurejaChet wWer I-t i e 1 4-

    - . . - , .                          .                              . n      . ., - . . , . - .   .,       -,,      . - . -      , . . . . , _   - - . - . , .

x.u :Cate raism 7-14-34 . s.lu e . ivioo?.. m .s23r27 1 i i i i High temperstwe jocket water j l.ow presswa twtiochargeroil The P3 presswo smee mad---- 43 pel.

  -             The above test mes repeated 2 more times wth swmler resuns twt P3 prenewes slowly l               incessed.

On the ascend test P3 seached- 41.5 pel. Onmeminitest P3. t 47 pol. On the Sewm best P3 reached-$1.5 pel !- and the seesleid netinp. j j i A0ein the dewcleann0 occwred wth each ascenselve start.  ! On the RIlh test the diesel wee emergency started at 22.54. P3 presure rose to 00.5 pel I  ! l dpped to 65 pel ( et which time the diesel tripped) then rose lo 61.5 pm. The foNowing trip alarms

            ' were receives.                                                                                                              i

[ High tempjocket water. On me abdh test sie diesel wee emergency staded again at 23:38. It inpped aber 70 esconde. 4  ! This time 2 of tie jedwt water high temp awliches were abeerved to be vendag. The Is50 wing trip eierws were seassved. l l M10h tempjediet weler As these test roeune are lotsey censiment we a cause of water in the pneumste enes. i i The last two inpo of the dienst in flie series eney have involved e conentiubn0 eeuse.

  • The i Caleen Jocket water senser sney have malfunctioned as wet as there being an essa tem water in the pneumatic lines. Post celitwellen testing at these sensors revealed setpoints of 140 to 186 F. dose to tle stadup Jacket Jacket water temperstwe (ISO falknB to 155p) .1he unuest behavier of the P3 presourlastion dpping then rising may indicale e senser very close is Es setpoint er tie f passage of a che of dew which in Ihe presanos of leaks or a poespy wating eensor melnded me supply air Aow to less then the leske0e rete. This would cause Sw pmeswa to drop as wel.  !

EDIPUusi&T"* OF TItaPg neesammmun A,,, yg , non my psmann det to se aan j 4

           ~ Dow in tw pneumatic Ines logine5y engilains 10 et 10 desel Insures tabove) and einer ateociled alarme, as mese IInt occused in about a minute star stest.

There were 3 IsRune or protilems seat ed riot ecowr 1 minute after start; a

1.

a DG18 3 22 90 Tdp mRor 1 hour 3e nunales en Hi lute og temp. I i i ! Since this occurred durin0 a leaded 8 hour run, this trip probably resuhed horn a sensor that failed in service. it is 1 of 1 logic. The senser was found way out of coltusson en' l j

  • 31400 (300 F vs 300 F) and would rut centrate on 32300 when tested eRer me trip DG IS t

, 2. i 3 24 00 HWh temperstwo jedwt water trip annunastor after 30 minutes I wahout dieseitna. { This initiennt event to uncertain but could have been from g ofaweler slu and the fosas to trip may have been me reedt of the re#ed tutilne er a .n"' 2. ".., or fouled logic beant. Water in me pneumatic system would tend to foul or cause meNundtons in i thelogic boents. i

3. DG 1A 330-90 Trip during testing efter f hour 55 minutes from 1 high temperstwe jedet weier sensor. when the other sensor inne was pwposefusy wated.
  • Since a jacket water lernperalwe sensor malfunction alarm was recchred on desel start.

one Irlp signal mes apperoney pmeent from the beginning. The tip occurred aaer 1 how 65 minutes becevee that wee when the other sensore Ine was purposefup y vented. 4 i i i

                                          ,- ,                              .-,      ,          ,-,-c    _,       c__,     . . , . - ,,n,
w.;# w n u m  !

7-16-94 3 11 3 - - MNC'U l' 5 The irWel sensor was later vertfled leaking. Tile Widtollie PIX PGA THE WRONG CAUSE ! AAer 623-90 me Vegas Gesels were moWSed to remove the Cainen jedet weler temperstwo j seness as an emergeney Mp. The Mtc gented this moeficagon and leer agoned Technkui i speancedens to be ehenged to euminate the Mp on high jocket weler tempsistwo. TMs we6 - probewy unnecesswy beoouse me appesent emuse of the proidem en Sas se weh me Jacket , watw tempweews memes ses peercembremens, any almost doF (see vsJoer). Memne mis !' change wee the wrong An 9er the wrong ceues. It gave a delse senes af secu% 9tet the # set

cause of the probism had been Smed whAs me underlying moissue pmblem mmmined tetelly i unedmened. Wim tiis meenassen, intemelmoistwo couts stBI cause a esset tages at any time on an emergency start.

! VENDOR TERTMga graana " DEAR TYPE U- GOSIOM" ON Fan en a a m est -- = i NUREG 14to page J 20 mentons paene e8 roeien "such as could to cousse ty dew l sonned 1900. by consenesson when intemeuy inspeming a sticking tube es presswo sunsh in May ! The veneer speculated that Weis could have occuned during die consinistion phase. It was more

utair the meut of weier in su pneumous anos dwing the opermies phase.

. Lube c5 pmesmo is e emagency trip dowlee en the Vogde desels. .

s. Aim stamT man =r ;. VAL 1---

! =r - - c en Aewnues a = -

Dwin0 this some See treme, eedy 1000 Stru summer 1900 anceer endous problem was i occuring on DG 2A and DG 18. These desels feBod to mort 8 Wass at mis period due to

! inadeousie air mils. The dieses air compressors pavide noth contet air and stseng

  • ser th.

i diesein. W me cerami air was met then so was me mardne air. The.pensem wth me air men 3- sotonoid valves was detennined to be skalag of me pinon assemedy in lis synneer. This soeuhed L in not suppuno == ugh air power to arent me messe engine fast enough to start. Two was . i cleened to be the resuN et e intial M - ".i., deled but untu iseg no dense to stat j t There was a good deel of fine not type cerrosion found en the pi t Waser was sino repones sound dwing ins maintonenos mort. Som tyers per DG 24 had been i left off fotewing Pets and denpiones as Ngh as to F wese mesewed en Aset, g geu 11.1980. i I Diesel valve 2A felled to stat dwing a nennel seve0lence en 41380 due to Wie air stat solenoid problem, t I THE ColmHyNje pAGSt.EAf ' i { To be asfe. the air supp8ed to diesel conitol air system must be dry and free of water at eN

in addhon the pneumatic tubing and st intemel surfaces must be tee of water, contaminan j particulelse and oormelon products. Because of the natum of the airreceivers and ses refrieeration type tiryers and system inats, having the dryers off for even a bdef pened of time could create 1 J fri dew points. toosvas et the intracios of the thousands of seat of the
pneumatic tubing, once tiew forms in the pneumatic Nnes it is eflout to ever aesse he semplete i removal or assure that intomal corvosion and perlicuteles caused by weler do not remain. At Vogue there was no retable method to esswa the dyers were always in service and no acerete
record to determine den they were. The teensee's compliance was so teu stat the dryers were .

i found out of service on nom unt 1 and 2 ener the elle area emagency when the NRC NT team on sits. There la no continuous monNoring of dew points. These are ne high dowpoint storms. The dryers are not required 'OPERASI.E by Tech. Specs. AAer pWlods when me dryers wwe ou l of service or hion dowpoints measwed. mes wwe no sonoceve aeson taken to answo met thwe -

was not dew in the pneumatic control system. Sometimes no adions were taken et at.

k

i. '

i J l 1 k i 4-

x_u ni .yao riihm 7-14-34 , 3.u n -

4uoco50se; ::'M7 ? ATToltNEY) CLFMT COMafUNICAT10NS i i To:Mbe Mehn Date 4-1944 From: ARen Aleshaugh i sutgest: Properasens for Ast.s sepuissene, nepowsons Heartees en Diessieenweierreassedissues. i GPC FAILED TO DISCLn*E !M's0RTANT ROOT CAL 88E l ' CORRECTIVE ACTION EVIDENCE AROUT THE *-!* ^^ SITE i AREA EMERGENCY TO THE NRC AND THE IND88*TRY j RACKGftQUND: on 320 e0 pient vegne despared a see Ama emespeecy upon the less of

.                      su Ac power during res4eop opensons wah bom me pcs pressure boundary and the

] corneinmera treamed oesel senomier is was desseembled per meinenence samup seest 4 generster 1A sorted automeneasy en LOSP, bd t4ed aner to aseende aperation and would not i restert. operators were able to seempt a reelart 18 minusse leier by sessene sw samencer. Tim i essel generalor 1A started again and e0miri tripped stor 70 seconde and would not sostert. Case

twatup began wth the ions of doney hea cocenir. nur ended aner as minees when the Diesel 1A wee staded a third time via the r y , treehoises meera* and congnued to nm.

l 4 Tim NRC sent an AIT and toer en NT team to invesN0 ale. NUREG 1410 la the oGkeel report of theinvesapellon i THE STATED CAUSE: NUREG 1410, Jew 1996 i allinant caus

  • The hosesse beteves that the i imnroser "t for sie Inps of Wie emergency desel generator 1A dudeg Wie inddent was Sie
                                         ^ J 7- ^ afmee =-- M i===har Wr C 2 Caethang

! causes appear to inchase the essete of mialple teoks esteune M the pneumsuc engine sental i' evenem, and eennor centsamon techniques that mey have resumed in Bewer esipoint values.' THE I 8Aw OF FAITH' Wie su desel shutdown; #w jacket water leraperstwo k - j approwestely 100 F. To preted the enpine trem overnesting on evensed. the Caicon jacket ! water temperature seneste trip tie dismal el 200F +. 4 F. The en0ine is coldest whom A first slette up and therefore tie Caloon sensor would be least uhely to enhtill improper intenalment j opereuen sluring to Aret fewrainutse of operadon when the enesswed temporahme is funheet away tem ine asusuon estpoint, but tha le esectly when the tripe occuned. Post accided cautretion tesung revealed that none oflhe Coloon jocket weier lorspefelure sWildes were el

!                    for off setpoint as to have caused a trip et desel stestup temperatures (100 F) Temperuhme
transient testa vednad that upon startup, Jacket weler lernperatures actually faR to atied 155 F and rernein steady at that value. 1
<                   The as found setpoints of the two querentined ColoonJocket water temperature switches that                                                l i

} were en the DotA dwing the occident, were 190.6 F ler sensor IT8H 19111 and 100.2 F for sensorIT8H19112.' 1 j The Caloon 4 Imaroner '-'Jedst water temperature sensors are arren0ed in a 2 out of 3 trip ID0ic. In on$er for

                                                                                                                                                              )
                                     - r-"-=--'=

j h... -"- r ^ c -. ^ - to actueRy trip the diesel, two sensors must have dleployed almutaneously l The 6esel 1A E-n 24 ran loaded on 312 90 and 3-13 90 for several hours each ec

 ;                 without any storms or protWome, fated to run two times in succesalon on 3 20 90 upon LOSp,                                                 ,
;                  ran upon emergency breakgless start (witn alarms), and snen successfully ten three times later                                             !

j on S-20 90 from normat starts with no eterms er problems. Because of tiis. theJrDanser 4- intermittent enersten of the Calcon jacket wet 6r temperature sensors had to be inAieey not i 1 4

t , nn r n e - p c os - 4. o - (- } present, men occuned simultaneously to two sensors, then oc:urred egen almultaneously to two ! sensors and men went away. i-i' i in adletian irnameerirdarmklant teoreden of 4 Other different Caloon sensore mud be assurfled, to explels tw emer tdp and senser melrunction annuncistors that ecouned on 3 20 90 to the 1A i  ; diesel (eg. Iow jocket weler preneurs trip, low turtpo charger ed pressure trip, high lute all !. tempereewe, iew ide es prenews eenger mesuosior0 3 E in addition sie deselgenereter 18 mperienced similar failures ator appmeirnoissy 1 * [ minuise epwouon en >23 90 e6en a tripped on: i j lowjocist waterpresewe lowturtpo durger oilpresswo i i !; Diesel 18 tripped 7 nmes on 52S90 ( 5 trips kom namel eterte and 2 trtie from emergency i stans ) opproelmstely 1 minute efter start, tem a verlety of Caison sensors. ' c , i Surely as thage GOeEnt kiele and types of sensom en both A and 8 doest wem not i simuneneously, repealady, empedendn0 knameerintermblant annessian at the 1 missie poist I , and then personning properly themeter. Surely there was same emer esemon cause When , i viewed he Ight of tMe information the "lisensee's primary cowee" is just not credible. 1 THE INDUSTRY EXPSRIENCE NTH CALCON SENSORS W i l DELAVAL DIESELS t of the 11 operelms nucoser piante in tie USA Ihat had Delevel diesels using Canoen eeneers, no l emer nuclear plant seponed anything eleos to the fesum rate aIIntmied to Celeen sensors et  : Vogue. Accansag to NUREG 1410, forjacist taler tempereiwe outches, tem 1984 to 1990 for - all 11 suclear plante, esclueng Vegge, Wien were only $ fegures seperled by tw industry. That is - { 4 less then .1 failures per year per plant. Apparently, only at Vogtle, were We Celeen jedwt water , temperatunt eensore end othem so tequenty esiperiencing imermeer intermulas asamlian* ,or , wee more another common oeuse tot wee tsipping the Vegue tResels.  ! j THE EXTENT OF MC MNOWLEDGE. f in, lune 1990 the NRC pdliched NUREC 1410 " Lees of Vital AC power j and the Reemuel Heat memove syssen outing Mid Loop opsmuene i et Vo00s Una 1 on Wierch 20,1900". This 500 peGe document contenne

              *elmeet eN of shal* Al Chenee (who headed the llT).end his learn                                       j members know almut the sonident in adelion the Mtc issued to the ladustry several l&E nations en the                                 i' Voede socident indudin0 IN 9026 ano 9106.

l THE ROOT CAUSET fvemECTIVE ACTifW EVMNCE WITHKif: h Known to numergue GPC \ Southem Nuclear personnel i Oncludin0 personnel who gave swom testirreny to the NRC 11T, and NRC Of were at least 4 eignincent Andnge that wwe most Ikely sesociated with the failures of Voges diesels durin0 and eher the Site Ares ornergency. Some of the 4 findings may have a common mot cause. sesed on me information presented in NUREO 1410, t appears that 1 i the NRC wee completely unswere of these Andings or had e sionlikantly dWferent understanding of theirrelationship to the cause of the elle eres emergency, in seemon OPC \ southern Nuclear formesy submitted 'Correctke Adions' for the Site Arte emergency to the NRC in a louer - (ELV-01632) deted 5-14-90, LER 90-06 rey.0 deled 419 90 as well as rev.1 dated 6 30 90, and the COA written and verbal pre 6entations of 4 9-90. In edeltion GPC\ Soumem Nuclear lasued a letter to the industry on 4 2H0. 1 l 1

           ~ ,. o.   . ,a    r mou                   r:4-se . o . . av. .                                                                                                                    :

euecokm.:.5 .0 a h-i j Finding #1 : 1" i in the Nar.'c Air Lines"-During dieset toesne j .. en DG1A folkmwing the alte area emergency, meintenense and j engineering pereennel elecovered water in pneumess air lines en 001A. L NuRao sdie--Not Mongoned eLv4ses:-NW Mweened l LER toes-notmentened

coa-Nei ened 4

Finding $2 : " Lares and Numeroaan Air 8 " in Air Linaa" ( M .6 dieest teseng en 001A popowing the elle ares emergency, i maintenance and engineering personnel decovered i t "signiacent" air ineks in ein eneumese air unes. f' t NuRee 14to - The seeks were %ensidend by the vender i - e represensedwee involved wth the sessne te be I inelsancent and to not have any impes so syslern operalien." i aLv41sas-Not Montened { LE5t 9840-not monsioned . - i 4 coa-Nat menmaned e i Firiding 83 : i "Itaned Testine -During diesel testing conducted en Dete, l fenewing See site eres entergency, maintenance and enginnedag pereennel discovered an inesslisten errer en Wee pneusnees air tubing tiet wee associated wies INosel generater logic sentret funcGone. in siis ' contest the tonn " Weed" sneens a peer et tubes switshed. TInse, one men j , is instened where ste eGier ehestd be and wise,a verse, 1

  • NuRES 1410-dict mengened j

ELV41432-4 dot mentioned 1 LER 9046 -not rnendoned j COA-Not menhoned I Finding M : Chenes in OrtAsa Atales.--Deel nOchantee were made in f the slains of Sie arteses in ses diesel pneumatic sentrole , i svetem reptosing emeller ertsees with torper ones that wouhi 3 1 pese seers air, be less prone se blockage and accomedets more isekage. i 1 NURee 1410-Not mentioned  ; i- stv41ssa.-mot Mennoned l i LER 9048-not mentioned . } COA--Net menisoned I I i Finding #8 : Pneumatic Loale Board Fallwes i Thelogic eiernente of the diesel i

j. generator pneumett cont'el beanie had become fouled erut had to be
- cleaned. An entire pneumets sentret beert Islied and wee replaced.

j- NURSO 1410 -Not mentioned t- ELV41432--Not Mentioned - LER 9046 -not mentioned fI COA -Not mentioned )

 )

k - _ . _ _ . . . , , ~ _ . , _ _ _ - , _ . . . , _ _ . _ , , , , . ~ . , . _ _ , _ _ . . , , _ _ _ , v..,._..

j' stal tu a c h il m 7-teso . u Im - wooe m.a : ll l

i' L

i Finding 88 : 4 ' ' Ps aressure j -The serksesse tipline

prenews owinnes whicn setermine if em elesel tipo enn the OS sec.

{ estoy, wwe known is how reponiebaty preshme eesusens on resing tip Ene presswee (reset). .PC equeted the setpoint eher the she eres - onergency. 1

                           ,,u        u..         me,,.or,ed elvessat-41st noensoned 1.ER964s        notmortioned L                           ccA-aset mennened l

3 CONQERNR; '

1. The primary cause of the diesel generosor failure swing me '

i Vogue she Ame EnerDency of 320 90 se needin NURES uit lepreheleyincermet. i f- s.Themammmeinnunseunmm a sirauser awestappew I- to hevo toen a temer is probably inooneet.

3. As ow primmy and osermuties causes of the essel sedwes et vegne duries and ener en she ame unagency won no addressed, appropriado conodive amiens won not iskes and mee may a coneneine seany risk et piant vesse invoMno noch -~

Unit t end 2. '

4. The inelviduets udio had first hond knowlege, of et least some of these s enames, save seem iestimony le We NRC mul htuun subsa mis inhumeson. The neenese ss e menis semen te monops mis eigeMonalinfonnenen to the NRC.
s. The seensee se a whose assen teJdenstr.aan sanna me vest eeuse of the M640 anddent end retamed me mener to servies in en tasale conR0uraten. The 5conoce know er should have known tiet *1mproperintermNient opershorf mee not the primesy root cause.
s. When failume vinuoNyidentical to the thosein tw one mee evnugency, ocoened to DGt3 on 5-2840, sie scenees egeln taboo to her natfr the MtC, le5ed to identify and conect the protnem, and consnued operation in en ness!Loenagwellen. The noensee knew w should have known the sw *impoperimamment operation
  • was not the pnmary root esues.
7. 880ndicant infomwtion concomin0 root cause and conoceve schons associated with the 8 Ancings et Vogueipos not jg3gt.HRQ This resultee in a certous breshdownin 4 procese of conveyin0 '-

Bolefdialeslphr fiel-a lammad to the M =. and could conethute e

8. The wHholding of the informe5on conconung the 6 findings u.-4 the NftC to d the E-'
                                                                  ~-^'s vernien af r_- " '== in NUREG more         1410 pleuseDie      that would explainations.      otherwise have been decor 0ed in favor of
9. CorwurrenUy, the f fse statements made in the 4-D 90 oral preserestion.

the COA, and the t.ER about air quality, dowpoirts, fauty instrurnents. _ _ _ _ _ - . . . - - - - - - - - ~ ~

i

                      ,y u - u . w4n r u i.v.o            . ;-ia-o4.      u.uu                                        -

at'm %wb4 ~ 1 i; 4 A and no trips on diesel B, spechcelly had the esse of gemthe Mtc mag from the evidence that wmdd supone tie impsperinterminevit 3 operation' concluelen as not stedible, and keeping We MtC's focus of i silention away from the real toet cause of the socident, dew in Ihe anos. i

;                                                     10. The comsciive actions resultin0 st Mant Vogtle and posetdy the industry wouts how toen muon nung pedes passesy assaiens Unit 4, anstir. and mine monamnine som a sencluelen of W in the pneumaec spelenf Swn kom a conclusion etimpoper
-                                                         intenreent spemtion.

vuodn en insuswy air quemy protdams had aimedy ammed i diensipestlems et oeorpienes t 1 4 J k u 5 i l-1 i 1 t 1- . i a

                                                       ....m
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l

j pa ta; UNITED STATES

, p NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON p g REGION 11 e ' 101 MARIETTA STREET.N.W. I ' f ATLANTA,0EORGI A 30323

   'k*****                                                 ggy 14 W                                                                       l i

Docket No. 50-424

     ' License No. NPF                                                                                                                l Georgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston III Senior Vice President -

Nuclear Operations- 3N P. O. Box 1295 EXH Birmingham, AL 35201 ' MKY-Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

MEETING SUP94ARY - V0GTLE UNIT 1

    .This refers to the management meeting conducted at our request in the Region II Offices on April 9, 1990. At this meeting, Georgia Power Company (GPC) briefed the NRC management on the event critique results and the short-term and long-tem corrective actions planned to prevent recurrence of the problems that resulted in the Site Area Emergency at the Vogtle facility on March 20, 1990.

During this meeting, GPC management discussed the direct cause, the contributing causes, the implemented short-term corrective actions, the planned long-tem corrective actions for the initiating event (fueling truck inside low voltage switch yard), the reasons for the delay in off-site notifications, the problems with site personnel accountability, the need for-improved comuni-cation between the GPC Corporate Office and the site Technical Support Center, and the need for improved actions to respond to the loss of core cooling capability during mid-loop operations. Diesel generator testing and operability, quarantined components, and the Unit 2 reactor trip were also discussed. From this meeting, it was agreed that you would finish reviewing your Event Review Team's long-tem corrective recommendations and would transmit a sumary 1 schedule of actions taken, or to be taken, to the NRC by May 15, 1990. Your initial corrective actions and additional items, which were verbally comitted to the Region II Regional Administrator during the management meeting, were i specified in a letter dated April 9,1990. This letter also enclosed your fomal request for relief of Item 1 of our Confirmation of Action Letter, dated March 23, 1990, to pemit the return of Vogtle Unit 1 to Mode 2 and subsequent powes operation. A list of attendees, a copy of your presentation handout, and l a copy of your April 9,1990, letter are enclosed. It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial. Your presentation at meeting and the items specified in your April 9,1990, letter demonst & i g D appropriate power operation. corrective By letter datedactions April 12, 1990, to justify that the the Regional Adminplant trato( could saf 1 nd g authorized proceed to powertheoperation. licensee to return Unit 1 to Mode 2, attain critical,1%y, /pg j% f g e k> A' S#CEL A

l l%' i MAY 141990 l

   *-      Georgia Power Company                    2 I

In accordance with Section 2.790 of NRC's " Rules of Practice " Part 2 Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room. i Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be pleased to l discuss them. i Sincerely,

                                                                                                             )
                                                                /Mi s A. Reyes,  irector [

Division of Reactor Projects i

Enclosures:

1. List of Attendees i i
2. Presentation Handout I
         .3. GPC Letter dated April 19, 1990                                                              !

cc w/encls:

R. P. Mcdonald .

l l Executive Vice President-Nuclear i Operations ' Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 l l C. K. NcCoy Vice President-Nuclear Georgia Power Company P. O. 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 G. Bockhold Jr. General Maria,ger, Nuclear Operations Georgia Power Company - P. O. 1600 Waynesboro, GA 30830 J. A. Bailey I L Manager-Licensing i Georgia Power Company l P. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201 i

Ernest L. Blake, Esquire l Shaw, Pittman, Potts and -

Trowbridge i 2300 N Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20037 (cc w/encls cont'd - see page 3)

Georgia Power Company 3 g, cc w/ enc 1s: (Continued)

J. E. Joiner, Esquire l- Troutman, Sanders, Lockerman, and i Ashmore-1400 Candler Building 127 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30303 ,

D. Kirkland, III, Counsel Office of the Consumer's Utility Council Suite 225, 32 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, GA 30302 Office of Planning and Budget , Room 6158 i 270 Washington Street, SW Atlanta, GA 30334 . Office of the County Commissioner Burke County Commission Waynesboro, GA 30830 J. Leonard Ledbetter. Director Environmental Protection Division. Department of Natural Resources 205 Butler Street, SE, Suite 1252 Atlanta, GA 30334 ' ! Attorney General l Law Department l 132 Judicial Building

Atlanta, GA 30334 l

State of Georgia l i l l i l

           .. . . = . .   .     - . - -- -                . --        .      . _.         --

j 2-  ! l I ENCLOSURE 1 l LIST OF ATTENDEES j Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) - Region II S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator i' J. L. Milhoan Deputy Regional Administrator C. W. Hehl. Deputy Director, Division of-Reactor Projects (DRP)

E.W.Merschoff,DeputyDirector,DivisionofReactorSafety(DRS) i A. R. Herdt, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 3 DRP-T. Peebles, Chief, Operations Branch, DRS i K.E.Brockman, Chief,ReactorProjectsSection3B,(RP38)DRP
G.~A.Belisle, Chief,TestProgramsSection(TPS).EngineeringBranch(EB).DRS j T. E. Conlon, Chief. Plant Systems Section (PSS). EB, DRS
M. D. Hunt, Reactor Inspector. PSS EB, DRS-P. A. Taylor, Reactor Inspector, TPS, EB, DRS i R. F. Aiello, Acting, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle, RP38 DRP (Telecom) i R. D. Starkey, Resident Inspector, Vogtle, RP38, DRP (Telecom) _

( L. Trocine, Project Engineer, RP38, DRP 3; K. M. Clark, Senior Public Affairs Officer { NRC - Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations l S. A. Varga, Director, Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II l G. C. Lainas Assistant Director for Region 11 Reactors

!                  D. B. Matthews, Director, Project Directorate II-3                                                                                                 .

J

NRC Incident Investication Team (IIT) Representatives l A. E. Chaffee, IIT Team Leader (Telecom) j W. J. Lasarus Assistant, IIT Team Leader (Telecom)

Georgia Power Company

t. - -
W. G., Hairston, III, Senior Vice President - Nuclear Operations' i C. K. McCoy, Vice President - Vogtle G. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager - Vogtle

, J. A. Bailey, Manager - Licensing

J. P. Cash, Operations Superintendent - Vogtle
  • G. R. Fredrick ' Supervisor, Safety Audit and Engineering Review-

! K. S. Burr, Senior Project Engineer  : 4 l l 4

                            , ,              -- w -,,,--.               ,.c-      .mr-w-wr-  %    --rw3g.. w- ,,nv -ww , .            3-=-9'y -p   =--em         + -r

ENCLOSURE 2 4 l PRESENTATION TO REGION 11 j NUCLEAR RE6ULATORY COPHISSION ON

V06T1.E SITE AREA EERGENCY
;                            MARCH 20, 1990-j                                   AGENDA                                                         .

e OPENING. REMARKS C. K. MCC0Y 4 j e EVENT REVIEW IEAM CRITIQUE- G. BOCKHOLD

e TRUCK / SWITCHYARD

. e OFF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS l e PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY- ! e COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATE / SITE i e MID-LOOP OPERATIONS i ! e DIESEL IESTING/0PERABILITY G. BOCKHOLD 1 e G. BOCKHOLD j QUARANTINE COMPONENTS i e UNIT 2 6. BOCKHOLD 3 l ] 4

                     .O                                                                            ,

1 1 i

    ,                                                                                           1 i

INITIATING EVENT l FUELING TRUCK STRUCK INSULATOR SUPPORT INSIDE THE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD CAUSING A FAULT TO l THE 1A RESERVE AUXILIARY IRANSFORMER.  ; 1 i e DIRECT CAUSE l TRUCK DR!YER AND ESCORT WERE INATTENTIVE TO SAFE OPERATION OF THE TRUCK. j i i e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES ~ i l CONTROL OF VEHICLES NEAR VULNERABLE AND SENSITIVE AREAS NOT ESTABLISHED. MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT STAGED INAPPROPRIATELY. 1 THE USE OF GROUND-GUIDES INSIDE THE PROTECTED AREA WAS NOT CLEAR.  ! i l l : k 2 I

4-

                                                                                                                          'T
Int:roffice Correspondence GeorgiaPowe, I l

I a l i, DATE: March 27, 1990 4

RE
Vehicles In Perimeter Area f FROM: G. Bockhold. Jr.

i i TO: Site Personnel l { Due to the recent plant event of March 20. 1990, the ~ following 'shall be' implemented issnediately:

!                                All vehicles wf thin the Perimeter Area-(PA) la iMeh the driver l                                 does not have rearview visibility R that are larger than a                                                                l
!                                 pickup truck, are required to have a Wagpan at all times                                                                 i
then the vehicle is backing up. i i

i i Addf tional policies / procedures on this issue will be forthcoming. { l 1

                                                    . b4W i

I 4 i I a 3 _ 't 2 i l

    "     ' - " * ' ' -                                   Tr ivr-+r           m.                                      =      yN-y           e-e- 4+wwwm_._

?- F l t i

EERGENCY PUUI IFLEENTATION- ]

{ ! DURING THE EMERGENCY, OFF-SITE NOTIFICATIONS WERE LATE AND/OR DELAYED BEYOND THE 15 MINUTE q l j TIME LIMIT. , l , i l

e DIRECT CAUSES- ,

k POWER TO THE PRIMARY ENN (1E EMERGENCY a- ~ POWER) WAS LOST. l ALL EMERGENCY AGENCIES:WERE-NOT' INCLUDED ON THE BACKUP.ENN. (BURKE COUNTY AND GEMA l l 1 ! ADDED N/6/90). i < g i e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES-i CONTROL ROOM COMMUNICATORS AND SUPERVISORS l }

WERE NOT FULLY KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CAPABILITIES. (PRIMARY ENN IN TSC l j

HAD POWER FROM THE SECURITY SYSTEM DIESEL.) l THE SERIES METHOD OF NOTIFICATION CONTAINED ) , UNSATISFACTORY DELAYS. EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DID NOT ENSURE PROMPT l NOTIFICATION OF OFF-SITE AGENCIES. I AMPLIFYING INFORMATION WAS NOT PROVIDED TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. . n .. J. I 4 I i N  ; n e L i 4

              .     .  .                                             . _ . - 1
l. . 1 Int:roffice Correspondence ,

GeorgiaPower A DATE: April 4. 1990 RE: . Emergency Notification Netuerk (DDI) Comunication FROM: George Sockhold. Jr. . j T0: Emergency Directors (ED) and Comunicators , 1 j To ensure that ENN comunication. is timely. Emergency Directors 1 will ensure that the following improvements are implemented: 1 j 1. Imediately up(on comunicator the declaration Shift Clerk) of an will perform a roll emergency, call the  ; l to determine the operability of the ENN while the message  ; is being prepared by the E0.

2. Burke County and GEMA is in the process of being added' to the backup ENh and this will be installed and tested within the next few days.
3. The ED will personally ensure notifications are timely and problems are resolved. The ED will assign extra personnel or use TSC facilities to solve causenication problems as necessary.
4. The TSC uses different power supplies than the Control Room and TSC communication systems may be- operable when Control Room systems are not.

Since Burke County must respond quickest to most emergencies. ED's will ensure that lurke County receives the ~ highest priority for ENN notifications. We are investigating improved comunication hardware and techniques. In the meantime, your personal attention to ENN comunications must ensure that we do not have the problems that we experienced on 3/20/90. I L%ux .. 1 G8/gww .. ;~ 4 5

                                                             .     .-..-m.-.._--,-__.-__-..__-4m__-
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EERGENCY PLAN IMPLEENTATION l

DURING THE EMERGENCY, SITE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. 1 4 1 e DIRECT CAUSE - i ) ACCOUNTABILITY PROCEDURES DID NOT PROVIDE j FOR THE SITUATION OF NOT EVACUATING THE '

SITE. (6ENERAL MANAGER'S MEMO OF 4/6/90) 1 e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES t

THE INITIAL PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT WAS DELAYED APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES. PERSONNEL WERE ALLOWED TO RE-ENTER THE l ! PROTECTED AREA.  ! i PAGE ANNOUNCEMENTS ARE DIFFICULT TO HEAR IN SOME PLANT AREAS. i THE COMPUTER GENERATED PRINTOUT DID NOT l , ALLOW QUICK IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL. l i l - THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR FAILED TO PROVIDE 4 GUIDANCE AFTER DECIDING NOT TO EVACUATE 4 PERSONNEL. 4

  • . l 5

l l 6 _  ; I I l l 4

l* . t Int:rgffice correspondence GeorgiaPower d , l ' \ u i i DATE: April 6,1990 4 RE: Accountability During Emergencies Log: N0V-00426 l] FROM: G. Bockhold, Jr. j T0: All Emergency Directors and Site Personnel l In the event of site emergency conditions', we will implement ' j the following revised procedures. These changes will enhance personnel j accountability and safety.and ensure better infomation flow for-l employees. They will also provide flexibility to the plant when' i responding to emergency situations. When the Emergency Director (ED) makes an emergency classification, he will make the appropriate tone and pape announcement on the plant j

PA system. He will direct site personne to the appropriate. locations.

4 If you can not hear the page, report to your supervisor. He or she will direct you appropriately. Normally non-essential personnel will report to the Admin. Building auditorium or parking lot. David Phillips, the Financial Services Supervisor, has authority to coordinate with the ED and control the disposition of non-essential personnel. j In~ his absence, the senior person present will contact the Security Captain for additional assistance. [ Emergency Response Organization (ER0) personnel should report i immediately to the appropriate facility. Other shift personnel, j supervisors, and managers on-site should report initially to the OSC. ' Overflow personnel will assemble in the maintenance machine l j l

shop area. '

4 When directed by the ED, the security department will initiate l 2 accountability. The security department cannot account for personnel i l who fail to log into the appropriate ERF (e.g.. control room. TSC. j cr OSC) so it < s essential un comply with the ED's instructions as ! soon as possible. Your assistance implementing these instructions will ensure l we manage emergencies better and provide plant personnel with sufficiept , information to keep them informed of abnormal plant activities. l j l Thank you for your assjstance.

                                                                                                   ~

k 1 j G8/ erd 7 i xc: Department Heads

  • i NORMS 1
                   -            .      -     _ _ _ . _ ~ ___                       . _ _ . _ . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ . . _ . . - _ . _ , _ . _

J .{ 4 ) i EERGENCY PUUI IFLEENT&IJEi l COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CORPORATE AND TSC NEEDS i TO BE IMPROVED. . 4 i i e DIRECT CAUSES 1 i IHE STATUS LOOP TELEPHONE BRIDGE WAS NOT-

 -            OPERABLE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EMERGENCY.

i BECAUSE OF THE LOSS OF POWER. 1 i s  ; 4 i i 1 i i i 9 5 ( 1 8 - 4 l F 2

ig . j =. 1

i. .

l > i-2 MID-LOOPOPERATIONS -! I J ' ACTIONS TO RESPOND TO LOSS OF CORE ' COOLING AT i- ' MID-LOOP SHOULD BE IMPROVED. j - j e DIRECT CAUSE t

                                                                                                                            ~

s f

                  -                                                                                                         i IHE " LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL" PROCEDURE

]- j SHOULD PROVIDE IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR A ~ i LOSP CONDITION.

?
i. e CONTRIBUTING CAUSES .

i THE " LOSS OF RHR" PROCEDURES ARE TOO NARROWLY ! FOCUSED FOR MODE 5 a 6 CONDITIONS. i l , 1 DIRECTIONS FROM THE EMERGENCY DIRECTOR , i WERE NOT ALWAYS EXPLICIT. , i i t i i i e k 4 4 9 _ i 4 W ?< ].

                                                                ..      .   - . . - - - . . . . ~       . _ - . . . - .

J l e i DIESEL TESTING l

  • NORMAL 36 MONTH DVERHAUL AND INSPECTION i SPECIAL TESTING i

M H , l - 1 IN OVERHAUL ~13  ! j c 3/20 EVENT ) 'm5, STARTS, IROUBLESH00 TING " SENSOR CALIBRATION LOGIC IESTING a E-RUN BUBBLE.IESTING 1) V? t I MULTIPLESTARTS[14) i {JJN RUN_.IDL'i

                                                               ~

4 6 MONTH RUN SURVE!L' LANCE'i) DIESEL OPERABLE l UVRUNI6S1,.f/) / SENSOR CALIBRATION'- LOGIC IESTING- li LUBE OIL DCP RUN /; j E-R_UN_BWlBLE.TESTINGfO

            'MULTIPLESTARTS(5)l'
            -                                 DCP UV RUN FUNCTIONAL' 0 j                                '

__VRUNIESJ,QL '

      . 6 MONTH SURVEILLANCE'[.

! M IESEL OPERABLE i HLJACKET WATER RUNS (3)- CDCPUVRUNTES[v

        \

18SUCCESSFULSTARTS 19 SUCCESSFUL STARTS e

                 /                                                      -

10 } I

l l QUARANTINE COMPONENTS i

      ~

TEM ERATURE SWITCHES l e 1A PROBABLE TRIP CAUSE JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE (2/3 LOGIC) i 1 INTERMITTENT . ] 1 POST CALIBRATION low (186*F 8 VENTING) e  ! i 1A OTHER TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 1 LUBE OIL IEMPERATURE (SLUGGISH) i e IB TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 4 JACKET WATER IEMP (VENTING) 2 LUBE OIL IEMP (VENTING & CALIB.) i PRESSURE SWITCES e 1A 3 1 LUBE Ort PRESSURE (IRIPPED) j 2 LUBE DIL PRESSURE (CONSERVATIVELY REPLACED)

                                                                                        )

4 e IB  ; 2 Logic (WOULD NOT TRIP ENGINE)  ! i 9 11 1 a

1 1 I i I i . ! UNIT 2 i e- DNIT 2 TRIP UNIT 2 RAT B TRIP /PRI' MARY DIFFERENTIAL IRIP TURBINE TRIP / REACTOR IRIP SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSE PROPER l ! e CAUSE DIFFERENTIAL RELAY CT SET 3000/5 VICE 2000/5 . , o CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TEST THE REMAINING RELAYS ON UNIT 2 i - UPDATE SWITCHYARD DRAWINGS BASED ON AUDIT j

l CLARIFY EXISTING POLICIES FOR SWITCHYARD e

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April 9, 1994 " . . i 1

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i t..;er ;;. * , i ELV-01516 l - 0012 i ~ Docket No. 50-424 1 ! U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ! Region II i- 101 Marietta Street, N. W. ! Atlanta, GA 30323 ! ATTN: Mr. S. D. Ebneter i l

Dear Mr. Ebneter:

j V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT , ! FONFIRMATION 0F ACTION LETTER l ! l { On March 20, 1990, a site area emergency was declared due' to a loss of o*fsite  !

power concurrent with a loss of onsite emergency diesel generator capabi* tty. . I i Following the event, GPC received a Confirination of Action Letter dated enrch

! 23, 1990 concerning certain actions we were taking. We have reviewed the March 20th event and the appropriate corrective actions necessary for er:ry into '! . Mode 2 have been accomplished. Therefore, we are requesting approval.te. return 'l ! Unit I to Mode 2 and subsequent power operation. The following discuss'in l l provides justification for this request. , e  : ! In accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating plant procedures, an event review { team has investigated the events leading up to and following the site ama ' emergency. The event review team has presented the results of it's rev er to management and those recommendations considered important-for continued rafe } plant operation have been implemented. ~ These include establishment of a i management policy on control and operation of vehicles (see attached le: ar from I { George Sockhold to site personnel); upgrading of emergency notification tetwork  ; j communications (see attached letter from George lockhold to Emergency D ectors . ! and Communicators ; ratesting and calibration of both Unit I emergency 21esel I generator control) systems; temporary barricades to prevent unnecessary ertry 4 into low voltage switchyard areas; and communications of immediate corrrtive

actions related to operations to licensed operators. l, e in addition, the event review team report also contains a number of lonper-term l reconnendations which require additional management review and evaluatim. l 9

These include the sequencing of outege activities; plant conditions durng  ! ! emergercy l l-mid-loop notificationoperations; system upgrades; post-maintenance changing dieseldiesel generator functional contro testing; logic; and j re-evaluating the duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Director-  ; i 1 i 3 DRP OFFICIAL COPY l 1 4

                                                - - , .   - . .   ._                          ._  ...,__.m.y                 ,.,,,_ .. ,_,_, # ,                         ,...__,y y , - , - - . , , - - . - - . ., -w.

I. l Georgia Power d.

       .U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission j        Region II i        ELV-01516
Pace Two

( l The most significant occurrence during the event of March 20, 1990, involved the j failure of Olesel Generator (DG) 1A to remain running to support shutdown ! cocling. Georgia Power Company, utilizing utility and vendor technical experts i has investigated the DG failure and has detemined the following: ! a. During bench testing, all three jacket water temperature switches were found to be set high during the DG maintenance inspection in early March 1990 (by approximately 6-10 degrees F above the setpoint). All three were

adjusted downward using a calibration technique that may have differed from j that previously used. .

4 ! b. Following the March 20 event, all three switches were again bench tested. 1 Switch TS 19110 was found to have a setpoint of 197 degrees F which was i approximately 6 degrees F below its previous setting. Switch TS 19111 was j found to have a setpoint of 199 degrees F which was approximately the same - i as the original setting. Switch 15 19112 was found to have a setpoint of

186 degrees F which was approximately 17 degrees F below the previous

! setting and was readjusted. Switch TS 19112 also had a small leak which i was judged to be acceptable to support diagnostic engine tests and was ! reinstalled. i i c. During the subsequent test run of the DG on March 30, one of the switches ! (TS 19111) tripped and would not reset. This appeared to be an i intermittent failure because it subsequently reset. This switch and the j leaking switch (TS 19112) were replaced with new switches. All subsequent testing has been conducted with no additional problems. l d. The Unit 1 jacket water temperature switches have been recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent calibration technique, i e. Subsequent testing indicated that the diesel annunicator indication of i March 20, 1990 is reproduced on a high jacket water temperature trip. I j f. A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine i starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine the actual ! jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine in a l normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts without air ,

rolling the engine to replicate the starts of March 20. The test showed i

! that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a j standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 156 degrees F and 4 remained steady. j j  : l - i i

L. ' l Georgia PLmer A U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission , Region II ELV-01516-Pace Three

g. Since March 20, 1990, GPC has performed numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), extensive logic testing, special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs under various conditions. Since March 20, the 1A DG has been started 18 times, and the 18 DG has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test-without air roll was conducted on April 6,1990 and the 1A D/G started and loaded properly.

Based on the above facts, we have concluded that the jacket water high . temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on March 20, 1990. In addition, the following actions have been or are being implemented to ensure a high state of diesel reliability.

1. Operators are being trained prior to their next shift to ensure that they understand that an emergency reset will override the high jacket water temperature trip. Alarm response procedures will be revised to address emergency reset functions prior to April 30, 1990.
2. The undervoltage start feature of the Unit 1 DGs has been modified such that the non-essential engine trips are bypassed. However, alams- are-still provided to inform the operators of off normal conditions. (This change will be implemented on Unit 2 prior to April 30,1990.)
3. GPC is evaluating the possibility of a design change and Technical Specification change to delete the jacket water high temperature trip as an essential engine trip.
4. GPC has reviewed air quality of the D/G air system including dewpoint control and has concluded that air quality is satisfactory. Initial reports of higher than expected dewpoints were later attributed to faulty instrumention. This was confirmed by internal inspection of one air receiver on April 6,1990, the periodic replacement of the contol air filters last done in March,1990 which showed no indication of corrosion and daily air receiver blowdowns with no significant water discharge.
5. Based on discussions with the NRC in Atlanta on April 9,1990, GPC will finish reviewing the event review team's long term recommendations and will transmit a summary and schedule of the actions taken or to be taken to the NRC by May 15, 1990. The administrative procedures that specify control of vehicles in the perimeter area will also be revised by May 15.
                                        ._.    .                  ..                 .            - _ _ _ - - - - _ _ ~ .

l* i Georgia Power d i l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Region II l j ELV-01516 1 Pace Four ) 6. GPC will continue to work with the IIT and an independent lab to evaluate ~ the instruments currently under quarantine. Upon completion of the the lab ]- test, calibration procedures will be revised as necessary to ensure consistent performance. ) Completion of these investigations, reviews, tests and corrective actions j justify GPC's determination that the DG's are operable. GPC will continue to' work with the Transamerica DeLaval Incorporated Owners Group to improve DG' l reliability. GPC will also review possible improvements to protective instrumentation and controls.

Based on the above discussion, we have completed the appropriate corrective j actions necessary to safely operate the unit. We request NRC approval to allow 3

Unit I to return to operation. ! Should you have any questions, please inquire.

Sincerely,.

! p.}.Ita= h w i W. G. Hairston, III-

1 WGH,III/NJS/gm l

i Attachment t l xc: - Georcia Power Comnany j Mr. C. K. McCoy ! Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. j ! Mr. R. M. Odom ' ! Mr. P. D. Rushton ' ! NORMS l 1 l U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission l Document Control Desk ! Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle , l l i i 1

_. ._ _. ..--_ _ ~ _.---__ _ --- _ _ _ _ _ ----_------ 1: l

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    - 8 rm.nram A aca a 35201'                                                                                     ]

Teleono e 205 868 5581 l'

                          -                             April 9, 1990                       w .r.,. m. ,, v W. G. Hairston, m Sesor v.:e cres;oem Nucleaf C e'at ons
                                                                                                                ~

i ELV-01516 0012

  -Docket No. 50-424                                                                                               ,
                                                                                                                 ,l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                                                             :

Region II  ! 101 Marietta Street, N. W.  ; Atlanta, GA 30323 j ATTN: Mr. S. D. Ebneter  ;

Dear Mr. Ebneter:

V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT , CONFIRMATION OF ACTION LETTER j On March 20,1990, a site area emergency was declared due to a loss of offsite I power concurrent with a loss of onsite emergency diesel generator capability. Following the event, GPC received a Confirmation of Action Letter dated March 23, 1990 concerning certain actions we were taking. . We have reviewed the March 20th event and the appropriate corrective actions necessary for entry into Mode 2 have been accomplished. Therefore, we are requesting approval to return Unit I to Mode 2 and subsequent _ power operation. The-following discussion provides justification for this request. In accordance with Vogtle Electric Generating Plant procedures . an event review-team has investigated the events leading up to and following the site area emergency. The event review team has presented the results of it's review to management and those recommendations considered important for continued safe plant operation have been implemented. These -include establishment of- a , management policy on control and operation of vehicles (see attached letter from l George Bockhold to site personnel); upgrading of emergency notification network l communications (see attached letter from George Bockhold to Emergency Directors l and Communicators); ratesting and calibration of both Unit I emergency diesel generator control . systems; temporary barricades to prevent unnecessary entry l into low voltage switchyard areas; and communications of immediate corrective  ; actions related to operations to licensed operators. I In addition, the event review team report also contains a number of longer-tern l recommendations which require additional management review and evaluation. These include the' sequencing of outage activities; plant conditions during  ; mid-loop operations; post-maintenance diesel functional testing; emergency notification system upgrades; changing diesel generator contro1 logic; and re-evaluating the duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Director. PIAINygyp g EXHiggy PG c

a. y GhorgiaPoner A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j Region II  ! ELV-01516 - Pace Two The most significant occurrence during the event of March 20 -1990, involved the failure of Diesel Generator (DG) 1A to remain running to. support shutdown cooling. Georgia Power Company, utilizing utility and vendor technical experts has investigated the DG failure and has determined the following:

a. During bench testing, all three jacket water temperature switches were i
                                   'found to be set high during the DG maintenance inspection in early' March '

1990 (by approximately 6-10 degrees F above the setpoint). All three were l adjusted downward using a calibration technique that may have differed from that previously used.

b. Following the March 20 event, all three switches were again bench tested.

Switch TS 19110 was found to have's setpoint of 197 degrees F which was: approximately 6 degrees F below its previous setting. Switch TS 19111 was found to have a setpoint of 199 degrees F which was approximately the same as the original setting. Switch TS 19112 was found to have.a'setpoint of 186 degrees F which was' approximately 17 degrees F below the previous - setting and was readjusted. Switch TS 1911z.also had a small leak which was judged to be acceptable to support diagnostic. engine tests and was reinsta led.

c. During the subsequent test run of the DG.on March 30, one of the' switches (TS 19111) tripped and would not reset. This appeared to be an intermittent failure because it subsequently- reset.- This' switch and the leaking switch (TS 19112) were replaced with new switches. All subsequent testing has been conducted with no additional problems. .
d. The Unit 1 jacket water temperature switches have been-recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent calibration technique.
e. Subsequent testing indicated that' the diesel annunicator indication of
                                   ' March 20, 1990 is reproduced on a high jacket water. temperature trip.
f. A test of the' jacket water system temperature transient during engine starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine the actual i Jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine in a normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts without air rolling the engine to replicate the starts of March 20. ;The test showed ,

that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a i standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady. 4

h. j j. f~ ' GeorgiaPowerd

i n  ;

i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Region II ELV-01516 - ). Pace Three j; 1 g. Since March 20, 1990, GPC has performed numerous sensor calibrations i (including jacket water temperatures), extensive logic testing, special- ] . pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs under various

conditions. Since March 20 the 1A DG has.been' started 18 times,'and the 4- IB DG has been started 19 times. No failures or problems have occurred

! during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage start test i without air roll was conducted on April 6, 1990.and the 1A D/G-started and

loaded properly, ,

i . Based on the above facts, we have concluded that the jacket water high j- temperature-switches were the most probable ~ cause of both trips on March 20, 1 1990. } i In addition,'the following actions have been or are being. implemented to ensure ] a high state of diesel reliability. 1. 1 ] 1. Operators are being trained prior to their next. shift to ensure that they

'i understand.that an emergency reset will override the high jacket water '

! temperature trip. Alarm response procedures will be revised to address { emergency reset functions prior to April 30, 1990.. I

2. The undervoltage start feature of the Unit 1 DGs has been modified such that the non-essential engine trips are bypassed. However, alarms are still provided to inform the operators of. off nonnal. conditions. (This change i
will be implemented on Unit 2 prior to April 30,1990.) -

l ! 3. GPC is. evaluating the possibility of a design. change and Technical 1 Specification change to delete the jacket water high temperature trip as an essential engine trip. j 4. GPC has reviewed air quality of the D/G air system including dewpot'nt I e control and has concluded that air quality is satisfactory. Initial reports ! of higher than expected dowpoints were later attributed to faulty i instrumention. This was confirmed by internal inspection of one air , l receiver on April 6,1990, the periodic replacement of the contol air

- filters last done in March,1990 which showed no indication of corrosion and  !

i daily air receiver blowdowns with no significant water discharge. 1, 5. ! Based on discussions with the NRC in Atlanta on April 9,1990, GPC will ' i finish reviewing the event review team's long term recommendations and will i transmit a summary and schedule of the actions taken.or to be taken to the i } NRC by May 15, 1990. The administrative >rocedures that specify control of l- vehicles in the perimeter area will also >e revised by May 15. I' i

l 6 GeorgiaPowerA U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II  ! ELV-01516 - Paae Four

                   .6. GPC will continue to work with the IIT and an' independent lab' to evaluate the instruments currently under quarantine. Upon completion of the the~1ab test, calibration procedures will ha revised as necessary to ensure              ;

consistent performance. Completion of these investigations, reviews, tests and corrective. actions

     .              justify GPC's determination that the DG's are operable. GPC will continue to work with the Transamerica DeLaval Incorporated Owners Group to improve DG reliability. GPC will also review possible improvements to protective instrumentation and controls.

Based on the above discussion, we have completed the' appropriate corrective actions necessary to safely operate the unit. We request NRC approval to allow Unit I to return to operation. Should you have any questions, please inquire. Sincerely, (4),). l4=YM W. G. Hairston, III i I WGH,III/NJS/gm  ; 1 Attachment xc: Georaia Power Connany

             .             Mr. C. K. McCoy                                                                i Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr.

Mr. R. M. Odom Mr..P. D. Rushton

       ,                   MMS U; S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission Document Control Desk Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle i

2 1

i i i

..                                                                                                l l

l l 1

  • c *i - April 19, 1990
       -                                                                   ELV-01545 0342 Docket No. 50-424 I

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 l l Gentlemen: , V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENCY .. ,

                                                                                                  }

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Georgia Power Concany hereby submits the l enclosed report related to an event which occurred on March 20, 1990. l Sincerely, f J../.b 5 ~n W. G. Hairston, III l WGH III/NJS/gm

Enclosure:

LER 50-424/1990-006 ) xc: Georaia Power Company Mr. C. K. McCoy , Mr. G. Bockhold, Jr. l Mr. R. M. Odom l Mr. P. D. Rushton NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Comission Mr. S. D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator Mr. T. A. Reed, Licensing Project Manager, NRR Mr. R. F. Aiello, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle 3" PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT

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UCENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) j ' MT5Eb.ECTRICGENERATINGPLANT-UNIT 1 [i i[o i$1412 A il f[18

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j LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER LEADS TO SITE AREA EMERGENC'Y ... .,

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                                                                                                                                                                                                     ....eDoi l                                     R. M. 000M, NUCLEAR SAFETY AND COMPLIANCE
 .                                                                                                                                                                                                    410#4       812 6 1-13 2 1011 00asPhl,8 Dest L,est 90. SACm agaspoesser, sa,LU.E s.gC.ets ses Tens . esp., #13.

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2 Dn 3-20-90, Unit I was in a refueling outage and Unit 2 was operating at 100% . power. At 0820 CST, the driver of a fuel truck in the switchyard backed into a support for the phase 'C" insulator for the Unit 1 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) 1A. The insulator and line fell causing a phase to ground fault. Both Unit 1 RAT 1A and Unit 2 RAT 2B High Side and Low Side breakers tripped, causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP). Uait 1 Diesel Generator (DG) 1A and Unit 2 DG2B started, but DGIA tripped, causing a loss of residual heat removal (RHR) to the reactor core since the Unit 1 Train B RAT and  ! DG were out of service for maintenance. A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared and the site Emergency Plan was implemented. The Reactor Coolant System heated up to 136 degrees F from 90 degree F before the DG was emergency, started at 0856 CST and RHR was restored. The initial notifications were not made within the required 15 minutes due to the loss of power to the Emergency Notification Network (ENN). At 0915 CST, the SAE was downgraded to an Alert after onsite power was restored. The direct cause of this series of events was a cognitive personnel error. The truck driver failed to use proper backing procedures and hit a support, causing the phase to ground fault and LOSP. The most probable cause of the DGIA trip was the intermittent actuation of the DG jacket water temperature switches. i ~ Corrective actions include strengthening policies for control of vehicles, extensive testing of the DG, replacement of suspect DG temperature switches, and  ; improvements in the ENN system. e.. e . .

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! oisloloIo1 4l2l4 9;0 O g 0l 6 3 l0 0l2 or 0p i vm ,-. .e am.w nn A. REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT l This event is reportable per: a) 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv), because an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the ESF Actuation System Sequencer started, and b) Technical Specification j ] 4.8.1.1.3, because a valid diesel generator failure occurred. Additionally, l l  ! l this report serves as a summary of the Site Area Emergency event. I t ! B. UNIT STATUS AT TIME OF EVENT l Unit I was in Mode 6 (Refueling) at 0% rated thermal power. The reactor had s been shut down since 2-23-90 for a 45 day scheduled refueling outage. The j reactor core reload had been completed, the initial tensioning of the

reactor vessel head studs was complete, and the outage team was awaiting j permission from the control room to begin the final tensioning. Reactor level was being maintained at mid-loop with the Train A
CoolantSystem(RCS)l(RHR)bi Residual Heat Remova pump in service for decay heat removal. The 2 temperature of the RCS was e ng maintained at approximately j 90 degrees F.
Due to the refueling outage maintenance activities in progress, some i equipment was out of service and several systems were in abnormal j configurations. The Train 8 Diesel Generator (DG18) was out of service for 1

a required 36 month maintenance inspection. The Train B Reserve Auxiliary i Transformer (RAT IB) had been removed from service for an oil change. j ] The Train B Class 1E 4160 Volt switchgear,1BA03, was being powered from the

Train A RAT 1A through its alternate supply breaker. All non-1E switchgear  !

l was from being powered from the switchyard. All Steamthe Unit Auxiliary Generator Transformers (S/G) nozzle dans (UAT)had beenby backfeed i removed, but only S/G's 1 and 4 had their primary manways secured. l Maintenance personnel were in the process of restoring the primary manways  : ! on S/G's 2 and 3. RCS level was being maintained at mid-loop for valve ! repairs and the S/G manway restorations. In addition, the pressurizer

manway was removed to provide an RCS vent path.  !

I i C. i DESCRIPTION OF EVENT I On March 20, 1990, at approximately 0817 CST, a truck driver with a security i escort entered the protected area in a fuel truck. Although not a member of

the plant operating staff, the driver was a Georgia Power Company employee
belonging to a service group used to perform various plant services. -The j driver checked the welding machine that was in the area and found that it 4

did not need fuel. He returned to the fuel truck and was in the process of backing out of the area when he hit a support holding the phase "C" insulator for RAT 1A. The insulator and line fell causing a phase to ground fault, and the transformer breakers tripped. l q

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von u - . . B. ,ane ,sm m m i At 0820 CST, both Unit 1 RAT 1A and the Unit 2 RAT 2B High Side and Low Side l breakers tripped causing a loss of offsite power condition (LOSP) to the Unit 1 Train A Class 1E 4160 volt Bus 1AA02, the Unit 2 Train 8 Class IE Bus 2BA03, and the 480 volt busses supplied by 1AA02 and 28A03. The Unit 1 Train B Class IE 4160 volt bus 1BA03 also lost power since RAT 1A was feeding both Trains of Class IE 4160 volt busses. The loss of power caused  ; the associated ESF Actuation S stem Sequencers to send a start signal to  ! one Unit I and one Unit 2 Dies 1 Generators. DGIA and DG28 started and sequenced the loads to their respective busses. Further description of the Unit 2 response to this event is provided in LER 50-425/19g0-002. . One minute and twenty seconds after DGIA started and secuenced the loads to  ; the Class 1E bus, the engine tripped. This again causec an undervoltage (UV) condition to class IE bus 1AA02. The UV signal is a maintained signal at the serg.ncer. However, since DG1A was coasting down from the trip, the shutdown logic did not allow the DG fuel racks or starting air solenoids to t open and start the engine. This properly caused the en ine. starting logic  : to lock up. a condition that existed until the UV signa was reset. For this reason, DG1A did not automatically re-start after it tripped. After the trip, operators were dispatched to the engine control panel to investigate the cause of the trip. According to tWe operator, several annunciators were lit. The operator briefly reviewed several instrument read-outs and detected no immediate problem. In order to restore emergency power, the operator reset the annunciators without delaying to evaluate or record the annunciators that were present. During this time, a Shift i Supervisor (SS) and a Plant Equipment Operator (PE0) went to the sequencer panel to determine if any problems were present on the 1A sequencer. The SS pushed the UV reset button, then reset the sequencer by deenergizing and energizing the power supply to the sequencer. This caused the DG air start solenoid to energize for another 5 seconds which caused the engine to start. This happened lg minutes after the DG tripped the first time. The engine started and the sequencer sequenced the available loads as designed. After 1 minute and 10 seconds, the breaker and the engine tripped a second time. It did not automatically re-start due to the starting logic being blocked as described above. By this time, operators, a maintenance foreman and the i diesel generator vendor representative were in the DG room. The initial report was that the jacket water pressure trip was the cause of the trip. This report was discounted because the maintenance foreman and vendor i i representative observed that the jacket water pressure at the gauge was about 12-13 PSIG. The trip setpoint is 6 PSIG and the alarm setpoint is 8 PSIG. Also, the control room observed a lube oil sensor malfunction alarm. i l

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o is lo lo je l 14 2 l4 9l0 - 0 l0 l 6 - 010 0 l4 or 0g m, n- . .c , an.w n,, j Fifteen minutes after the second DGIA trip, DGIA was started from the engine i control panel using the emergency start breakglass button. The engine !' started and loads were manually loaded. When the DG is started in the emergency mode, all the trips except four are bypassed. However, all alarms

!                              will be annunciated. During the emergency run, no trip alarms were noticed
by the personnel either at the control room or at the engine control panel.

l The only alarms noted by the control room operator assigned for DG operation j were lube oil pressure sensor malfunction and fuel oil level high/ low alarm, neither of which would have tripped the diesel. { At 1040 CST, RAT 18 was energized to supply power to 4160 volt bus IBA03. 1 DGIA supplied power to 4160 volt bus IAA02 until 1157 CST, at which time bus j IAA02 was tied to RAT IB. l A Site Area Emergency was declared at 0840 CST, due to a loss of all

!                              offsite and onsite AC power for more than 15 minutes. The Emergency Director signed the notification form used to inform offsite government agencies of the emergency at 0848 CST. The shift clerk attempted to initiate offsite notification utilizing the primary ENN in the control room but found it inoperable due to loss of power. The shift clerk then went to the back-up ENN and initiated notification after roll call on this system at
0857 CST. Due to the loss of power, which rendered the primary Emergency j Notification Network (ENN) inoperable, and some mis-communication, the initial notification was not received by all agencies until 0935 CST.

The Emergency Director instructed personnel to complete various tasks for restoring containment and RCS integrity. All work was accomplished and ]j maintenance personnel exited containment by 1050 CST. 4 j The SAE was downgraded to an Alert Emergency at 0915 CST after restoration

;                              of core cooling and one train of electrical power. By 1200 CST, plant conditions had stabilized with both trains of electrical power being                                                                                      i i                               supplied from an offsite source (RAT IB).                 After discussions with the NRC                                                                  !

I and local government agencies, the emergency was terminated at 1247 CST and  ; all agencies were notified by 1256 CST. j D. CAUSE OF EVENT  ; i Direct Cause: J 1. The direct cause of the loss of offsite Class IE AC power was the fuel i truck hitting a pole supporting a 230kV Iine for RAT 1A. This was a

  !                                  cognitive personnel error on the part of the truck driver. There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that directly
;                                    contributed to this personnel error.                               -
2. The direct cause of the loss of onsite Class 1E AC power was the failure of the operable DG, DGIA, to start and load the LOSP loads on buss IAA02.

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3. The direct cause of the failure of the primary ENN system in the
control room was the loss of electrical power to Unit 1. The primary i

ENN in the control room is powered from Unit 1 Class IE AC power. 3 Therefore, when Unit 1 lost Class IE AC electrical power, the primary - ENN in the control room did not work. Root Cause:

1. The truck driver met all current site training and qualification requirements, including holding a Class 2 Georgia driver's license.

However, site safety rules, which require a flagman for backing vehicles when viewing is impaired, were violated. .

2. The root cause for the failure of DGIA has not been conclusively detemined. There is no record of the trips that were annunciated after the first trip because the annunciators were reset before the condition was fully evaluated. Therefore, the cause of the first trip can only be postulated, but it was most likely the same as that which caused the second trip. The second trip occurred at the end of the timed sequence of the group 2 block logic. This logic allows the DG to achieve operating conditions before the trips become active. The block logic timed out and the trip occurred at about 70 seconds. The-annunciators observed at the second trip included jacket water high temperature along with other trips. In conducting an investigation, the trip conditions that were observed on the second DG trip on 3-20-90 could be duplicated by venting 2 out of 3 jacket water temperature sensors, simulating a tripped condition. The simulation duplicated both the annunciators and the 70 sec. trip time. The most likely cause of the DG trips was intemittent actuation of the jacket water temperature switches.

Following the 3-20-90 event, all three jacket water temperature switches, which all have a design setpoint of 2000F, were bench tested. Switch TS-19110 was found to have a setpoint of 197 degrees F, which-was approximately 6 degrees below its previous setting. Switch TS-19111 was found to have a setpoint of 199 degrees F, which was approximately the same as the original setting. Switch TS-19112 was found to have a setpoint of 186 degrees F, which was approximately 17 degrees F below the previous setting and was re-adjusted. Switch TS-19112 also had a small leak which was judged to be acceptable to support diagnostic engine tests and was reinstalled. The switches were recalibrated with the manufacturer's assistance to ensure a consistent' calibration technique. l

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0l0 016 or 0$ l +.c o - . =c amm During the subsequent test run of the DG on 3-30-90, one of the ! switches (TS-19111) trip >ed and would not reset. This appeared to be i an intermittent failure >ecause it subsequently mechanically reset. This switch and the leaking switch (TS-19112) were replaced with new switches. All subsequ'e nt testing was conducted with r.o additional problems. A test of the jacket water system temperature transient during engine i starts was conducted. The purpose of this test was to determine the i actual Jacket water temperature at the switch locations with the engine i in a normal standby lineup, and then followed by a series of starts i without air rolling the engine to replicate the starts of 3-20-90. The 2 test showed that jacket water temperature at the switch location decreased from a standby temperature of 163 degrees F to approximately 156 degrees F and remained steady. ( Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water temperatures), ' special pneumatic leak testing, and multiple engine starts and runs were performed under various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control systems of both engines have been subjected to a comprehensive j test program. Subsequent to this test program, DGIA and DG1B have been 4 started at least 18 times each and no failures or problems have i occurred during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage i start test without air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and DGIA started and loaded properly. l Based on the above facts, it is concluded that the jacket water high i temperature switches were the most probable cause of both trips on 3-20-90. l I E. ANALYSIS OF EVENT i I The loss of offsite power to Class 1E bus IBA03 and the failure of DGIA to } start and operate successfully, coupled with DG1B and RAT IB being out of j service for maintenance, resulted in Unit 1 being without AC power to both a Class IE busses. With both Class 1E busses deenergized, the RHR System ! could not perform its required safety function. Based on a noted rate of j rise in the RCS temperature of 46 degrees F in 36 minutues, the RCS water

;                        would not have been expected to begin boiling until approximately I hour and
36 minutes after the beginning of the event.

i Restoration of RHR and closure of the containment equipment hatch were completed well within the estimated I hour and 36 minutes for the projected

onset of boiling in the RCS. A review of information obtained from the
Process and Effluent Radiation Monitoring System (PERMS) and grab sample i analysis indicated all normal values. As a result of this event, no j increase in radioactive releases to either the containment or the j environment occurred.

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Additional systems were either available or could have been made available to ensure the continued safe operation of the plant:

1. The maintenance on RAT 1B was t.ompleted and the RAT was returned to service approximately 2 hours into the event.
2. Offsite power was available to non-iE equipment through the generator step-up transformers which were being used to 'back-feed" the Unit and supply the non-1E busses. Provided AuxiliaryTransformers(UAT)ltwascletred.ClassIEbussesIAA02and that the phase to ground fau IBA03 could have been powered by feehng through non-lE bus INA01,
3. The Refueling Water Storage Tank could have been used to manually establish gravity feed to the RCS to mainiain a supply of cooling water to the reactor.

Consequently, neither plant safety nor the health and safety of-the public was adversely affected by this event. A more detailed assessment of this event and an assessment of the event had it occurred under more severe circumstances will be performed and included in a supplemental LER. F. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

                                                                                                                                                                    -i
1. A management policy on control and operation of vehicles has been established.
2. Temporary barricades have been erected with signs which direct authorization for control of switchyard traffic to the SS.
3. The Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) diesel start and trip logic has been modified on Unit I so that an automatic ' emergency" start will occur upon LOSP. Therefore non-essential diesel engine trips are blocked  !

upon LOSP. The Unit 2 DG's will be modified by 4-30-90.  ! l

4. The DG1A test frequency was increased to three times per week until 4-20-90 when the test frequency will be changed to once every 7 days in l accordance with Technical Specification Table 4.8-1. This frequency

) will be continued until 7 consecutive valid tests are completed with no ' I Including the 1 . more than one valid failure in the last 20 valid tes'ts. l two valid failures of this event there have been a total of four valid failures in 69 valid tests of DGIA as of 1157 CST on 3-20-90. i

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! .... e .ws 'e mer i VEGP - UNIT 1 o is Io ]o 1o l4 l2 p 9l0 0 p 16 0l0 0 l8 or 0 (8 i ms u e m.m a ,.c w aumm 4 ! 5. The defective DG temperature switches have been replaced. In addition, l a test program will be conducted at Wyle Laboratories to investigate the reliability of this type of temperature switch under various conditions. i This program is designed to aid in determining the failure mode of the I i suspect switches. i

6. A back-up ENN system powered from the AT&T system, which previously existed and was operational for South Carolina agencies, has been extended to include Georgia local and state agencies. Instructions have been given to Emergency Directors and Communicators concerning use of  ;

the emergency communication systems.

7. Further corrective actions will be addressed in a supplemental LER.

i, ! G. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 3 ! 1. Failed Components: 2 Jacket Water High Temperature Switches manufactured by California l Controls Company.

                                                                                                                                                                     )

Model fA-3500-W3 i 2. Previous Siellar Events: I None i

3. Energy Industry Identification System Code:

i ' Reactor Coolant System - AB Residual Heat Removal System - B 1 Diesel Generator Lube 011 System - LA  ; j ! Diesel Generator Starting Air System - LC Diesel Generator Cooling Water System - LB l ! l j Diesel Generator Power Supply System - EK  ! l Safety Injection System - BQ 2 13.8 kV Power System - EA j 1460 volt non-1E power system - EA 1460 volt Class IE power system - EB ' i Chemical and Volume Control System - CB

Containment Building - NH
480 volt Class IE Power System - ED i Engineered Safety Features Actuation System - JE -

l Radiation Monitoring System - IL i 1 J ) _

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                                                                                                                         .i                          1

(.. 8 ' h u-Het ter Onsamme er y- __ HEARINGS before the . SUBOOMMTITEE ON CEAN AIR AND NUCI. EAR REGUIE10N coMMrrIEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND FUBUC WORKS UNITED STATES SENA1E HEARING ON THE NUCWAR REGUIAURY COMMISSION'S HANDIJNG OF MIFGATIONS OF INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT RAISED BY EMPI.DYEES IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY THURSDAY, JULY 15,1993

              % "--                   M M h, IDC.
                       ,                 201 North Fairtur Street, Suite 21
                   /        .                Ah% Virginia 22314                          _

M 1hl: (703) 5483334; Fisc (703) 684 7278 [" ; 1bB-free: 1 800 848 4007 3: PLAINTIFF'5. EXHIBIT m

                                                                                                                                           %O 34V N

.1 . s l Table of Contents l - U1 Senate 'Ibursday, July 15,1993 i l W1 and i l Public %rks,5% on ' ! Qean Air and Nuclear Regnhelan Mshington, D.C TESTIMONY OF: PAGE l. Panel I: i l MR. PAUL BLANQi, WEST HARTPORD, CONNBC'11 CUT 15 n l i Panel H: p MR. allen MOSBAUGH, AMELIA, OHIO 40 i j . Panel HI:  ; l MR. A. W. DAHLBERG, HI, CEO, GBORGIA POWER COMPANY .76 ! Panel IV: i ! HON. DAVID C WB11AMS, INSPECTOR GENERAL, US NUC2AR l REGUIXIORY COh0ESSION l 4 ! ACCOMPANIED BY: -l l i MR. LEO NORION, ASSETANT INSPECIOR GENERAL ! FOR INVESTIGATIONS, US NUCLEAR REGUIRIORY COMMISSION 96 , Panel V: i HON. IVAN SEllN, CHAIRMAN, US NUCEAR REGUUGURY a COMMISSION 122 l i Panel VI: l 1 l MR. JEROME GOLDBERG, FRESIDEN% NUCLEAR DIVISION, PIDRIDA l j POWER AND IJOHI TE3rTIFYING ON BEHAIF OF 'IHE l t AMERICAN NUC1 EAR ENERGY COUNCIL 158 i i i l j i i ---.- _ _

i i

                                                                                                                                .g 1                      1    ' #01 HEARING ON THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S HANDLING OF i

( 2 ALLEGATIONS OF INTIMIDATION AND HARASSMENT RAISED BY EMPLOYEES' i j l i 3 IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 4 #02 j 5 #03 THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1993-l

                             #04U.S. Senate 6                                                                                                                                                   .

4 7 #05 Subcommittee on Clean' Air and Nuclear l Regulation, i l 8 Committee on Environment and Public Works l ', 9 #06 Washington, D.C.  ! i < l 10 The' committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:00.a.m. in j 11 room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. i

12 Lieberman (chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

I ! 13 Present:' Senators Lieberman, Metzenbaum, and Simpson. i 14 l ) 15 i l 16 i j 17 < 18 . 19 }' 20 21 j 22 .- 23 4 4 24 e i 25 i 4 e w -y - P- e -

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i 2

1 Senator.Lieberman: Good morning.

i 2 This hearing of.the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear l-

' 3 Regulation will come to order. - J 4~ Today the subcommittee is conducting a hearing.on the i

f 5 NRC's treatment of whistleblowers in the. nuclear industry. ) i

.6 For purposes of definition, whistleblowers are people who j 7 infor1m the NRC of nuclear safety concerns, or people who I

a allege that they were intimidated and harassed by their ! 9 employer because they. raised safety concerns. i 10 The NRC's Inspector General hggJ ust issued a report j 11 which I requested on the NRC's handling of allegations of ^ i \ j 12 intimidation and harassment that are raised'by employees in ' i j 13 the nuclear industry. I i 14 The IG's report contains some disturbing statistics on I j i < j 15 the small number of investigations undertaken by the NRC'in ' 16 response to allegations of violations of the whistleblower i l 17 protection statute, which I will want to ask,the NRC about 1 l 18 today. 1 l- 19 For example, the NRC IG reports that between October of 3 20 itse and April of 1993 the NRC received a total'of 609 ) { 21 retaliation complaints and initiated full-scale investigations i 1 22 of 44 of them. Only 7 have resulted in enforcement action -- l 23 seven enforcement actions out of 609 cor;.d s.ints over a four-t 24 and-a-half year period of time. 25' That record raises serious questions about the NRC's

               .- _..                  ..       ._ .     -     ...-.,..a                ._.._____...____..__________._____:__.

1 I 3 ) i 3 .

i conduct in investigating and acting on whistleblower i
i

{ t complaints. l 3 To indicate why I feel that is so, according to the NRC's i [ 4 IG, the Department of Labor has found in. favor of whistle- ' 1 5 blowers, or allegers, as they are called in that report, in 58  ! i . . 6 cases over the last 5 years, and 41.other cases have been- ] 1 j 7 settled. ! s .of those cases, approximately 100, the.NRC has' completed 9 only a investigations, Land.another 13 are outstanding.  ! L lo so the question arises:, why, in so many cases where the [ 11 Department of Labor has found that there was unlawful -

                     .17      discrimination, retaliation against the whistleblower, has the                    l t

i 13 NRC not taken any enforcement action?, j 14 These statistics are statistics.that have consequences, I 15 because employees in the nuclear. industry are literally our b ! 16 first line of detense against nuclear. accident. They are the i 17 aost knowledgeable about the nuclear equipment that they build l 18 and operate, and have the primary responsibility for 19 protecting the public health and safety. l . 1 i 20 Because of this overriding responsibility, workers in the i 21 nuclear industry must feel free to raise safety concerns with-l 22 their management or with the NRC. I ! 23 The NRC, for its part, of course", has the responsibility I 24 for regulating, licensing, and inspecting nuclear power. plants i- 25 so that there is an adequate protection for the public health i

( . . .. .- ..- . . - - . ._ _- 4 ) l i 4 , j 1 and safety. ] 2 However, it is obvious that the NRC cannot inspect every i

                                ~

item that affects nuclear safety. The NRC has perhaps two or )- 3 i j 4 three inspectors at each nuclear power plant.- There may be i j 5 more thar,1,000 or 2,000 workers at these plants. -The NRC j 6 inspectors obviously cannot be-'everywhere at every moment in I

<  7 these highly-sophisticated operations..                                                                 )

i s To fulfill its mission, the NRC therefore must rely on l i 9 operation provided by its licensees and by others in.the l 'I 10 nuclear industry. To be able to rely on that informaticn, the ] i 11 NRC must'be able to verify its accuracy through inspections 1 $ 12 and through information obtained through more informal means i 13 from people in the nuclear industry. . 1 a 14 so whistleblowers.are there for a critical part of the 15 NRC's inspection and oversight activities, and they must be l 16 able to inform either their management or the NRC of safety 1 l 17 problems without fear of retaliation. l [  ! I 18 Now, because some of the statements and evidence that 19 will be put' forward today are critical of people who work in l i 20 the nuclear industry, let me say what is obvious but should be f l 21 said anyway. Most people in the nuclear industry are clearly ! 22 honest and dedicated to public safety; however, human nature 4 j' 23 is human nature, even at nuclear power plants. Sometimes i 24 people make mistakes. Sometimes people don't admit that they l 25 have'made mistakes or that they have had problems. l . e 4 1

I 1 9 l 1 Unfortunately, these hu=an weaknesses in the management 4' 2 of complex nuclear technologies can lead to very serious 3 accidents -- perhaps even disasters. i j 4 As we have seen over and over again in accidents i i 5 involving modern technology -- Three Mile Island is the most l 6 graphic example that comes.to mind - the compounding of small i 7 mistakes can lead to large tragedies. 1 j 8 I think of the words of James Madison in a broader i 9 context,.who questioned against relying solely upon the good j- 10 intentions of public servants to achieve good government,

11 concluding that
" Experience has taught mankind the necessity 12 of auxiliary precautions. That remains true of. Government, l j 13 and is also true in this area of regulating and providing i

l 14 safety of nuclear power plants. j 15 Let me stress that this is not a pro- or anti-nuclear . I l 16 issue. This is a public health and safety issue. Some vary. l 17 major safety problems have been identified by whistleblower.

                                                                                                  ^

'e

18 I know some may think that whistleblowers are pranks, but

} } 19 important safety problems have been revealed by I l 20 whistleblowers, and these include: safety problems of the , ! 21 nuclear power plants operated by the Tennessee Valley 22 Authority, the unreliability of Rosemount transmitters in 23 nuclear power plants, the inadequacy of the emergency lighting [ 24 system at the Palo Verde Nuclear Plant, and the unreliability f 25 of the thermalag fire retardant that is installed in many 1-i, i

                 .             __ _ - . - _ _ . ~ . , , , . . . , , , , . , , .. , . , .                           ., ,. ,,
    .                                              .                                   .-    -   -- .                     -. ..     . . ~ _    . . - _ . . .~

i 6

1 nuclear power plants.
                            '2                   On each of these issues, after.an initial whistleblower l

L ! 3 complaint the NRC has ordered corrective actions.- Sometimes, ! 4 ~ as in the Rosemount transmitter matter, and in the thermalag problems, the corrective actions have affected;a large number

                                                                                           ~

q 5 ! 6 of nuclear power plants throughout this country. t . ! 7 congress recognised the importance of whiistleblowers:in . i- a 1978'when it passed section.211 of'the Energy Reorganization [ ( . t i 9 Act, which prohibits discrimination against any esployee l 1 i lo because the employee has raised safety concerns. . j i i 11 The law is clear that this type of discrimination is s t l. 12 illegal; nonetheless, we are now hearing.a number of , criticisms that in practice the law is not working.  ! 13 , i ! 14 The most common complaint for whistleblowers is simpl>  ; 15 that it takes too long to fully investigate their allegations l i 16 and to resolve employee complaints about illegal ( ! 17 discrimination -- that is to say, retaliation. , i i ! 18 A number of these cases have, in fact, taken years to ! 19 resolve. A number of whistleblowers have been able to prevail l i ! 20 only through remarkable persistance and single-minded f i ! 21 determination. Many have suffered serious legal, financial, I l 22 and emotional consequences for speaking out.- 1 i L 23 The truth is that we may never know how many simply gave _ 1 l 24 up.in these circumstances, or never came forward in the.first

j. 25 place for feat of the consequences. .

j-  ! i  !

l 7 l' 1 Serious problems of isaf ety may exist today that we' will not be. warned about because workers may feel unprotected if

                                                                                                                                                     ~

l 2 j -3 they blow the whistle. If that is the reality, obviously it i 4 is unacceptable and we must do better. Justice delayed here, i j' 5 as elsewhere, is justice denied. And in this case publie l l 6 safety any be jeopardized.- Clearly the status quo.is not ' l 1 I ! 7 enough. I 4 i I i 8 Today we are going to hear testimony from two  ; i ! 9 whistleblowers who will' relate their personal experiences'in ^ I i .

10 raising safety issues. These cases provide examples of some 4

2 j 11 of the types of problems that whistleblowers have had. ')

1'
j. 12 Although we are hearing testimony from whistleblowers to

[ 13 give us examples of the problems with the current process, I

                                                                                                                     ,      e

) ~ 14 vant to stress that we are not here to resolve any particular l 15 case. This hearing does not represent an attempt to reach i i 16 conclusion on any of these cases either by the subcommittee or j j 17 by myself. l 18 A number of the whistleblowers say that they would advise i j 19 other workers in the nuclear industry not to come forward with i i 20 safety concerns that their management does not want to hear. 4 1 21 These whistleblowers actually believe that the law, as ) 22 implemented, does not provide adequate protection ~to 23 whistleblowers. .- 2 1 24 The NRC's Inspector General, as indicated in the report J 25 issued today, talked to a number of whistleblowers and NRC l i I

[ s .

1 staff who believe that the current process' simply does.not

$ 2 adequately protect whistleblowers, and that is a very i

3 disturbing conclusion.

I 4 The law is not working _if people who have raised valid I 5 safety concerns would recommend to others that they not speak- .l i j 6 out if they see that something is wrong. l 1 ,{ 7 The law is not working if people cannot speak out when j l 8 they see situations that they fear are dangerous because of. j-  ! i 9 greater fears of the legal, economic, or bureaucratic l j 10 consequences. . 2 . . ! 11 so I look forward to hearing the reaction of the.NRc to I j 12 the Inspector General's recommendations, and hope, as in other l 1 ! 13 matters that we have dealt with in this subcommittee and.the i l 14 NRC in the last four or five months, that we can create a i ! I

15 climate of change - a climate, in this case, in which al.1 i i

16 workers will feel free to blow the whistle on safety conoarns 17 and know that they will do so without dager,of suffering l l l 18 . Wrong by doing what they thought was right. l J 19 I will say here that if the NRC either does not act or i i j 20 feels that it does not have the authority to act to correct i j 21 some of these situations, clearly congress can and should. l 22 cases brought to this committee's attention at their j 23 worst, I would say finally, occasionally reminded me of the i j- 24 English court of chancery described by charles Dickens in j i 25 Bleak House. I quote from Dickens, just as a warning of the i i u_ . _ _ _ _ . . - _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . ~ _ . _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ _ - . ~ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ - - .

                                                                                            -l l

l l 1 extreme of what may happen here, when he wrote of that court- ) i 2 which has "its room suitor, with its slip-shod heels.and 3 threadbare base, borrowing and begging through the round of

  • 4 every man's acquaintance, which gives to monied might the 5 means of abundantly wearing out the right, but so exhausts 6 finances, patience, courage, hope, so overthrows the brain and i
7 breaks the heart, that there is'not an honorable man among its
                                                                                              )

I e praetitioners who does not often give the warning, ' Suffer any , 9 wrong that can be done to you rather thap come here. 10 obviously, that is a nightmare statement, and'it is one , 11 that all of us want to act to make sure is not the reaction of 12 those who blow the whistle about safety problems in the 13 nuclear industry. 14 With that, I yield to my colleague and friend from Ohio, 15 Senator Metzenbaum. 16 Senator Metzenbaum: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman 17 I am very interested in this subject because I view that i 18 across tho' board whistleblowers in Government have, at the 19 very best, been tolerated, but not welcomed with open arms by 20 their superiors. ) 21 I am frank to say, Mr. Chairman, that I don't know much 22 about the issues that will come before this committee today. 23 I do know I an interested in the subject..

                                                             ~

I 24 But I would hope that if you come to a conclusion after. j 25 you'have heard the testimony that this committee should be l i l

i i 10 i j -1 taking some action, whether some determination should be made, l i j ,

                            '2   I-would hope you would not hesitate to move forward, because i,                                                                                                      :

I-t. 3 if the whistleblower can't:get recourse.by dealing directly ! 4 with his or her employer, and then comes-to Congress as a last: i j= 5 alternative, and we don't back-him or her up if:that be the i 6 f right thing to do, then I would say.it would be disappointing.

                             .7          I don't know anything at'all about these cases, and'I-       d l                                                                       .   .

i, 8 intend -- I'm not going to be.able to stay because.I have~two l 9 .other committees meeting immediately, which I hope to attend. ( lo I must attend one of them. 11 But I will say this. My feeling with respect to the-

                          '12    Nuclear Regulatory Commission and my concern about its 13    attitude on these matters goes back not one week,:not one
                                                                                                ~

} j 14 month, but before I ever came to the United states senate --

j. 15 certainly not the responsibility of the present chairman, who I

16 is a friend of mine, and the other members of the Commission. ' 17 It goes back to the time when a-Doctor John Gulfman at is the Livermore Laboratory in California was called upon to make 19 an evaluation of the safety and security of the nuclear plants i 20 of this country, and he made that determination, and he came 21 to the conclusion that they weren't~ safe. 22 You would have thought that the HRC would have said, 23 "Thank you. Let's get into it further. -Let's see what we can 24 do about it, because we are not dealing with some 25 unimportant detail but we're talking about nuclear emissions

4 i j 11 1 into the air -- in some instances, not all. We are talking i l 2 about the possibility of. nuclear accidents.- I j 3 Doctor Gulfman was rewarded for his efforts in that

  • j 4 direction for exposing the fact that so many nuclear plants i

j 5 were unsafe. He was terminated. Terminated.. He has never i l 6 been able to get back into the Government's good graces.ever-i ! 7 since. i i l l s I happen to know the man. He was the valedictorian'of my i l .

9 high school class and a friend of mine. But I'm not looking j 10 2or a job' for him. obviously, it is beyond that point.

1 ! 11 But what bothers me is that Government is unwilling to f

                                                                                                                      ~

i 12 accept responsibility in too many instances when a i 13 whistleblower stands up, has the courage to speak out and say, ! 14 "This is wrong. Instead of doing something about it,

. 15 Government either fires the individual, discriminates against i

j 16 the individual, but in very few instances pats him er her on

17 the back and says, "Thank you for a job well done. You have i

! 18 contributed. 19 I don't know what the witnesses will say here.today, but j 20 I have to assume that that's part of their complaint -- that 21 for their efforts in whistle-blowing and bringing some facts ! 22 to the attention of their employers they wound up on the

23 streets or else being discriminated against.

= l 24 I think we in congress have a very strong responsibility l t 25 in this area particularly. And I will say to you, Mr. i l'

v d

12-h '1 chairman,-that.although I won't.be present you may be certain
                                   ~

j' 2 sy staff will. I vill look at the record. I will read the-3 record. And ' I would- hope to work with yom: With your i { 4 background as'a former attorney general, I think'there a ! ~5 couldn't be a more appropriate person to be chairing this 1

                     .6      committee.                                                                  .

{- 7 I say to you that we must share some responsibility if i . .

j. s whistleblowers are discriminated'against.- I don't know the
f. 9 facts in this case. They any or may'not'have been.- But.if i

j- 10 that.be the case, then we do have some responsibility to take i i- . . 11 some aetion. > 12 I thank you for holding the hearing. l ! l i 13 senator Lieberman: Thank you, senator Metzenbaum. I 14 Thanks for your statement, and thank you'for your support. I 3-15 look forward to working'with you on this matter. - 1 i I 16 The first witness today will be Mr. Paul Blanch of West 17 Hartford, Connecticut. l l 18 Mr. Blanch, I'd ask you to stand if you would and raise - i

19 your right hand. We are going to administer the oath to the

! 1 i 20 witnesses today. l i l 21 Do you solemnly swear that the testimony that you will c ] 22 give before this subcosmittee will be the truth, the whole 4 l 23 truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? ! 24 Mr. Blanch: I do. a 25 Senator Lieberman: Thank you. s 1

  -.,.,,_-.,__,_.,._..i,_.',         , . - . . . .  .._-....m,,_m,....,_,_..._....._._.m                         ..     . . , . .       ___.__.m.          - _ _ . , _ _ ,

13 1 Mr. Blanch, I'm going to try, if I.can, and enable you to 2 use your time more effectively, to just briefly state the 3 facts in your case before I ask you to begin testimony 4 yourself.

                                   -5         Mr. Blanch was the senior manager for Northeast Utilities 6    at the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in Connecticut.

7 In 1989, he discovered that certain instruments in' l 8 nuclear power plants were unreliable. Those instruments, 9 which were. called Rosemount transmitters, are used to measure I lo pressure _ level and flow of water in a nuclear power reactor. 11 A fmilure of one of those transmitters could result in the 12 failure of important plant-safety systems. 13 Mr. Blanch brought to his management and to the NRC his 14 concerns about the reliability of the Rosemount transmitters. 15 Northeast Utilities corrected the problems with those 16 transmitters promptly that Mr. Blanch had identified; however, 17 in October of 1989 Mr. Blanch did file a complaint with the i 18 Department of Labor, alleging that he was harassed and 19 intimidated at his work place because he had raised this 20 safety issue. 21 The initial Department of Labor Investigation found in 22 Mr. Blanch's favor. In January of'lt90, he signed a 23 settlement agreement with the utility and withdrew his 1 24 complaint. In February of 1993 he signed another settlement 25 agreement and resigned from the utility.

'T . 4 1 j 14 1 In May of 1993 the NRC concluded that Mr. Blanch had been i- 2 subjected to intimidation and harassment for raising a , l i 3 potentially significant -- and I might say generic - safety i ] 4 issue. The NRC fined the utility $100,000. The utility. paid j 5 the fine, but also, for the record, filed a 100-page response  : 1 6 denying the NRC's interpretation..of many of,the facts ]

.                                                                                                                                           l 7     underlying the fine.                                                                                                      J

! l

a overall, it took the NRC flrca 1989 to 1993 to 1

} 9 substantiate Mr. Blanch's' allegations of intimidation and j 10 harassment. The length of time it took to resolve his I ' 11 complaints has raised questions about the process here.. I

        .12           With that, Mr. Blanch, I am going to.save you froa                                                                   l

~ j i 13 needing to go over those facts as part of your statement. I

                                                                                                                                           +

14 now welcome your testimony. ' ! J 15 (

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j 16 17 18 19 20 21 I 22 23 24 25  !

                                                        -,-.,-.m...-m-..-_   . -, - . _ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - "

a i 19  ; t ' [ 1 #09 TESTIMONY OF MR. PAUL BLANCH, WEST HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT i j 2 Mr. Blanch: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. l 3 As you mentioned before, I am Paul Blanch, former 4 engineering supervisor for Northeast Utilities. Accompanying i j 5 me this morning is Mr. Ernest Hadley, the attorney for We The j ! 6 People, an organization that' advocates. nuclear safety and j 7 provides legal assistance to nuclear whistleblowers such as . I

j. a myself. He is.also my personal attorney. j l

l 9 I appreciate this opportunity to provide this j i < ] 10 subcommittee my opinions concerning the NRC's handling of l 11 nuclear whistleblowers. At this time'I would also like to l I 12 personally thank you, senator Lieberman, for your unwavering H

13. support, and also thank We The People for their legal and
14 moral support, without which I would-have wound up like every 15 other whistleblower -- unemployed and destitute. Thankfully, )

16 I am presently only unemployed. , 17 I am not here to tell my personal story, but to comment is on the pathetic abuse suffered by all whistleblowers at the 19 hands of the licensees and the Nuclear T Wlatory Commission.

;                   20                 The NRC's Inspector General's report released today cites 21           more violations of the rights of these individuals than those 22           cited in the recent Navy Inspector General report on the 23           Tailhook scandal.               I pray this subcommittee will cause similar
                                                                                                                  ~

24 action to be taken by these violators of innocent citizens, 25 who I submit, in their own way, have been every bit as ravaged , l i

                        . . . ..                  ,    , . ~ . . . , . , . ,.         -  , , , , , . . , , , . . . - . . ~ ,            .mm    ..,,.e,   ,  ..,,,...,_.,....,_m._.1

i i 16 l[ b 1' as the victims of Tailhook. 2 While the NRC and the industry have tried to make-this . i } 3 term "whistleblower a label of shame, I regard it as'a mark 3 4 of responsibility to my profession and'to my fellow citizens.- i I 5 The nuclear industry is what I classify as a " closed' 1 . 1 6 industry. Because this is a highly-technical industry, j j 7 little is known of its technical and regulatory problems by. i . 8 individuals outside of-this closed irAd-ky. And,;quite l 1 9 frankly, that's exactly how the irAa.hi would like to keep) , l . 10 it.- j 11 They prefer silence and cover-up to.'public disclosure and I i j 12 action. Consequently, the only credible. criticism comes from j - t i 13 within this closed industry from individuals they label as i { 14 whistleblowers.  ! } 15 These responsible critics of the industry, whether you 1 l 16 call them whistleblowers or ethical resisters, risk everything < l 17 in speaking out. 18 Through the NRC's inaction, by way of blatant character ! 19 assassinations, as recently demonstrated in the Gunderson :OI l 20 report; terminations by licensees, such as the Delcor and l. ! 21 0'Sullivan situations in Connecticut; buy-outs of many people, j- 22 without any enforcement action the industry systematically 1 l 23 eliminates its critics in a methodology not unlike ethnic a i l 24 cleansing -- or a more apt description in this situation, l i-25 a ethic" cleansing. l i i 1

     .,.~e..,     , . . . - .      -

j

,                                                                                                                                                            17 l
1 The industry's ethic cleansing seeks to silence the i

) 2 voices of those whose only concern is nuclear safety and , i j 3 ethics. Any individual who questions either the inaction of j_ 4 the NRC or the licensee is conveniently and. viciously 1 i j 5 discredited, demeaned, subject to psychiatric examinations, ) l j 6 portrayed as a radical or a disgruntled employee, and I 7 eventually is cleansed by termination or buy-out. j 8 This issue of whistleblowers is. grave, but only a symptom l l 9 of a much larger problem within the industry. That problem'is ' i 10 that the Nuclear Regulatory commission selectively ignores . 11 many significant regulations, thus putting the public at an i j i 12 unknown risk. i 1 ' ~' 13 We have no idea which or how many regulations are being 14 ignored, or if we have the potential for a Chernobyl type of I 15 accident. Imagine, if you will, the chaos and panic.;that l i j 16 would grip our citizens should it become necessary to evacuate i 17 the millions of residents living within a 30-mile radius of ( 18 the Pilgrim, Plant just outside of Boston or the Indian Point i 19 Plant just outside of New York City. [ 20 But why is this intimidation of_ employees permitted to ! 21 continue unchallenged by those in power to oversee our nuclear l 22 industry? Why must honest, responsible employees who speak

23 out about potential dangers in our system-be stigmatized as
l. 24 disgruntled employees and forced out-of their jobs and careers i 25 in disgrace?

I _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ ,_ _ _ . . _ . _ . _ ~ . _ _ _ _- . ,_ _ -, . __.

} 18 1 ! 1 I believe the answer is quite simple: the industry and 2 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are putting economic i 3 interests of corporate giants ahead of the safety interests of. ! 4 its citizens. . i l 5 In my 20 years of dealing with both the Atomic Energy

6 Commission and the Nuclear Regulatory ea==immien, I na firmly 7 convinced that the NRC will never take any significant action i .

4 l s which couldlpossible atfact the economic viability of the-  ; 9 nuclear industry. i

10 At the same time,. lass serious violations that pose no- l 1

l , 11 threat to the economic viability of plants are acted upon I i { 12 swiftly and severely by the NRC to dupe the general.public by  ; I ! 13 presenting an illusion of action. f l 14 It is clear, then, that the so-called "whistleblowers, i i  ! l 15 while they be an embarrassment to their employers, are j i  ; f 16 performing a vital service to our country. And yet their  ; I l 17 record of treatment by employers, as I believe has been ! la ' confirmed and documented by the Inspector General's report, l . 19 paints them as villains and turn-coats. , 20 I have taken the numbers from the Inspector General's  ! i 21 report and tailored them more to the utilities, and a'little I ! 22 clarification on your numbers that'you presented, Mr. i _ i 23 Chairman. But I understand there have been 609 cases of l 24 alleged harassment reported to the NRC, and most likely 609 l 25 ' careers destroyed. i l i

5 4 19 i 1 of these cases, it is my understanding that'only 44.have l 2 been investigated by the office of Investigation. of these j 3 44, only 14 have been decided in favor of the employee, and f 4 only two cases -- which is less'than-1/2 of 1 percent -- have i j 5 resulted in fines for the utilities, i 6 The fine.against Northeast Utilities was'not included in l j 7 these numbers because that' occurred after the report was l '. s completed. l 9 I have been contacted by many potential whistleblowers l 10 ~from Northeast Utilities and other. licensees for advice. ,I , i j 11 will never again in good conscience encourage these I j 12 . individuals to take on a losing battle and subject themselves 2 . I

13. and their families to the emotional and financial stress that I i 14 is certain to follow from speaking up.- sadly, my advice te i

l 15 them is, " shut your mouth, collect your paycheck, and pray 4 16 that somehow the failures will be corrected before-it is too 17 late. l 18 The cards are stacked against you. Unless you feel like F 19 gambling with your life and your family's security, your 20 chances of beating the system are akin to playing Russian 4 21 Roulette with only two empty chambers in a weapon loaded.with l j: 22 607 live rounds. The most you can hope for is survival.

.23 At least in Russian Roulette there is a possibility the.

i' 24 families will collect lite insurance. i [ 25' Mr. Salin, the chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory i i

                                 .              . .     , .        ___- _ , - .   - _ , , . . - . - . . _ _ . . - . . ~ . - . ~ . _ , . , - . . . . . . - .

, 20 I . l ! 1 : Commission, recently stated that, " Blanch should be Vice I i , 2 President for Engineering at Northeast Utilities -- I agree

                 ~3  with Mr. selin there -- for.my actions in. identifying the                                                                       l l

3 i- 4 Rosemount issue. Instead, I was conveniently _ cleansed from i 5 the industry with a silent acquiescence of the NRC. l 6 In May of this year I asked Mr. Salin if there were any i i 7 positions within the NRC that I could provide my'thoeghts on 8 regulations and actually influence the regulatory philosophy. ! 9 I was told by Mr. Selin essentially to review the job posting-i 10 within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ads. And this only 4 11 confiras my suspicion that the NRC opposes individuals-l 12 critical of the industry as unch as the licensees do. ! 13 Mr. Chairman, I have provided this suboeunittee some ! 14 additional suggestions to supplement those provided earlier to i 15 the subcommittee staff on what needs-to be done to ensure an-16 open and free exchange of.information that can be vital to the l 17 safety of the nuclear industry and all of us. is After personally observing the complete failure of the 19 Nuclear Regulatory Commission to enforce any significant 20 regulations, I as reluctant to advocate any additional 1 21 regulations or legislation. I greatly fear that new 22 regulations or legislatiott will give the illusion of action to ' l 23 correct the problem, and, with that illusion complete, the NRC will be back in business as usual. 24  ; 25 But I do support the legislative changes reconsended by l i

                                                                                        .._..___.__.-_._.____.__._~m.._--

c j 21' i 1 Mr. Hadley. By strengthening the remedies available to j 2 individuals, you can. send a clear message to the employees,.

                                                   ~

j 3- the nuclear industry, and the NRC that you truly value nuclear 4 safety over profits. l j 5 But new regulation or legislation alone will not correct

}                   6                 the problem.      What we need is a bold commitment within the i

l 7 Executive Branch that will transform the NRC fron'a nuclear j 8 lapdog to a nuclear watchdog.- ! 9 Mr. Chairman, I as a success story.- I survived, though i j 10- unemployed. I.was not terminated. -I was not~ financially _ i j 11- ruined. I could not be discredited,_even though my ex- ! 12 employer tried desperately. _l i j 13 But let me tell you in all honesty no one should ever 4 ~ 1 14 have to go through what as and my family have been through , i l 15 over the past several years. i-l 16 I am now isolated by the_ industry _that I have'given my I i 17 entire professional career to. There'is. virtually no chance 18 that I will ever work in my chosen field again. Mylpast 19 associates vacate the room when I enter. l 20 If the system truly works as well as'Mr. selin will tell j l j 21 you later, can he explain what happened to me? And what of  ! I i 22- the others here today who are not success _ stories? i

i. 23 Let as make this final point. If the nuclear industry
                                                                                                                                         ]
                                                                                                                                         ~

! 24 were half as effective in the disposal of radioactive vaste as  ; 25 it is in the disposal of whistleblowers our waste disposal i i L l 5 i

    . _ _ _ _ _ __    _ . . - _ _ _ _        .       _     __       ____ _.     . _ . _ . _   . . _ _ . . . . _ , _ _ . _ _ . - . ~ . .

22 1 problems would have been solved 20 years ago.  ; 2 I thank you, senator Lieberman, for this opportunity to l appear before this subcasaittee. At this' time, I would like l 3 J 4 to respond to any questions you any have. 5 [The prepared statement of Mr. Blanch follows:) 6 7 i 8 e t 10 , i 11 12 t 13 14 i 15 l 16 f i i 17 I 18 4 19 i ~ 20 1 4 21 22

  • 5 .

l 23 24

;          25

23 1 senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr Blanch. Thank you for 2 your statement. 3 Let me go back to what you did here, without getting into 4 the details technically. 5 Is it fair-to say that it.would have been unlikely that 6 anyone other than a person in your position would have 7 discovered the problems that you found with the Rosemount 8 transmitters'and the water level indicators? In other words, 9 is that something that - would the NRC inspections have been 10 likely to uncover that? Or is that really something that more 11 likely would have had to have been found by an employee of a 12 licensee? 13 Mr. Blanch: In response to that question,.thare are two 14 ways that particular problem could have been identified. 15 Certainly the manufacturer, who had been aware of the problem 16 for many, many years, could have come forward to the Nuclear 17 Regulatory Commission and said, "We have a problea. They 18 elected not to do that. 19 only employees with an understanding and the availability 20 of computer te hnology like we had at Northeast Utilities 21 allowed us to identity that particular probles. The NRC could 22 not have identified that problem. They don't have access to 23 the data that I had access to, and it baitically involved 24 researching historical computer records. 25 The other problem which I identified, which essentially

t i 24 ! i resulted in my departure f rom Northeast Utilities, was much { 2 more significant than the Rosemount issue.. This was an issue with the level transmitters, which is discussed in my full 4 ! 3 ] 4 testimony -- level transmitters on all boiling water reactors \ j 5 and many of the pressurized water reactors. This is a problem that has been around for 30 years. l 6 l 7 This is a system that was designed with'the top engineers of f l 8 General Electric. And I happened to discover that problem -- f i I f 9 again, using computer technology. i 10 We are not sure, but this problem was also identified in j l 1 j . 11 sweden in 1982. It is my w h .i.i.anding the. Nuclear Regulatory l 12 commission is presently looking into why the industry in the , i is United states never became aware of this problem when, in  ! l 14 fact, it was well known over in Europe. i l l l 15 This, again, is a very, very significant problem which l 1 i 16 could jeopardize many of the safety systems on many of the l 17 reactors, but yet they are still operating. l . i ! la senator Lieberman: These are difficult questions to i 19 answer without becoming highly technical, but could you just l- } ) j 20 try, in layman's language, to describe what the consequences 3 l 21 of the problems you identified were? What might have' happened i f 22 if you had not blown the whistle?

- 1

! 23 Mr. Blanch: With respect to the Rosemount transmitters, l - 24 these devices are need to measure flows, levels, pressures in i ! 25 the reactor. They are the largest manufacturer of . i I_. - . . . . . _ . _ , . . ___ . _ . _ _ . . . , - _ _ . _ _ . _ , _ . , _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _

I 25 1 instrumentation. They sense the pressure. They had a very high failure rate, and this failure ^ 2 't i 3- couldn't be detected by normal operator observation. It'could 4 only be detected by computer technology. 5 The consequences of the failure of the Rosemount 6 transmitter, and what we are -- I won't get. technical, but we j 7 are dealing with probabilities of failures here. It increased 8 the probability'that there would be an accident.. It increased 9 the probaJility, by our calculations, by 6,800 percent. 10 Senator Lieberman: What kind of accident would that have 11 been? 12- Mr. Blanch: It could.have been almost any accident, from 13- a loss of coolant accident.to a loss of flow to an overheating 14 type of accident. These devices are used everywhere within 15 the reactor systems, both on pressurised. water reactors and 16 boiling water reactors. 17 The potential consequences of the failure of the level is device are more dramatic. This isn't the most serious problem 19 in the industry, but the failure of the level device is a

20. phenomena that I uncovered at Northeast Utilities and 21 constantly kept the Nuclear Regulatory Commission informed. i 22 When- there is an accident on a boiling water reactor - of 23 which there are 37 in this country - we're not talking a 24 probability of 1 in 100 chance of failure. We have a 25 guaranteed fmilure of all level instruments.

i i~ j- 26

-1 The NRC and the industry will argue defense and depth, l' 2 redundancy. For this. system, Mr. Chairman, there'is no '

3 redundance. The ultimate -- i 1 4 senator Lieberman: In other words,.what you are saying-t, !' 5 is'that what you alleged.was wrong was guaranteed to create a i i~ 6 fmilure? or are we talking -- f 7 Mr. Blanch: ' Essentially guaranteed to provide the . ] a operator'information which would-indicate.to him that'the core-J. 9- is being covered when, in fact,:it may be melting. l 10 Now, people have become aware'of it~because of my i. i, 11 exposing this issue to the NRC through We The People, and i operators are now at least fa.miliar with how.to handle'this l 12 ( event.- I agree with that assessment. j 13

14 The NRC is eventually going to require most reactors to i . ..
15 fix it. The industry wanted to study.it. . I was attempted.to i
16 be discredited by various industry representatives that I 17 didn't know what I was talking about, this.oouldn't happen.

{ 18 Testing has concluded and proven what I said a_ year.ago 0 1 19 is, in fact, right on the money. > 4

                                                                                                                                                                               'f j-                                             20          Senator Lieberman:                       Who has done the testing?.                                       ,

j $ 21 Mr. Blanch: The testing was sponsored.by the Boiling 1 4 j 22 Water Reactor Ownars Group, working in conjunction with the i 23 Electric Power Res9 arch Institute, monitored by the Nuclear

)

i 24 Regulatory Commission. , I j 25 senator Lieberman: so, again, what you are saying here - 3 _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . . . _ . . _ ~ . . . . _ . _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . , _ _ ,

  - - .       .          .    . . . -   - . - . ~ .        - _ . .            _. ..       --

i t

_ 27 l_ 1 - just speak of it in layman's language - is that you i

l 2 uncovered a situation which at some point was guaranteed to i 3 fmil? Now, it could be that the operator would know how to 4 deal with.that to mitigate the effect of it, but this was a 5 device that at some point was going to let us down? ! 6 Mr. Blanch: Well, if there was an accident, which the 7 plants are designed for, and it was caused by a rapid a depressurization, the operator would see all indications of l 9 his reactor level. They would.. indicate that the reactor is i-l 10 covered when, in fact, testing has'shown that the actual level 11 could be 27 feet below what the indicated level is. 12 If it is 27 feet lower than the top of the. core, the. core l 13 is uncovered and the core is melting. That's how significant 14 it is. 15 senator Lieberman: So we are talking about a melt-down < 16 as we saw in the Three Mile Island? - 17 Mr. Blanch: It could be 'a melt-down. It could be worse 18 than Three Mile Island because what would cause this event 19 would be a rapid.depressurization or breach of the reactor, 20 and once that occurs then the fuel is exposed. 21 Now you have had both a breach of the reactor and a 22 breach of the fuel. You didn't have a breach of the reactor 23 at Three Mile Island -- at least not a najor breach. 24 Senator Lieberman: Right. 25 Mr. Blanch: The potential consequences are greater.

E - -2a i

1 senator Lieberman: So my conclusion, as a layman and as 2 a citizen and as a senator, is that you blew'the whistle.on

). 3 some serious problems here that would have been otherwise j f

   .                    4        difficult for'others:not in your position to have discovered.                                                                                                                          I 5                              Mr. Blanch:          These two instances, problems that'I.just j                        6         cited,'I believe would not have been exposed at this time

\ unless I had.done it. j- 7 l -s senator Lieberman: Are you satisfied at this point that i 9 the technical deficiencies that you found and complained'of i 10 have been addressed satisfactorily?- i .. 11 Mr. Blanch: Now-I am 95 percent setiefied. I met'with a l j . .

                                                                                                                                             .                                                                          )
12 task force two weeks ago at White Flint. With respect to the I .

i 13 Rosemount I think they are 95 percent there.. I think that 1 there is very little risk associated with the use of Rosemount 14 i 15 transmitters. The manufacturer has improved the product.  : j 16 However, there was a long period of-time where the NRC i l 17 would take no action and the. utilities would do nothing. j 18, senator Lieberman: Right. ,, i l 19 Am I right that Northeast Utilities was funded. fairly i j 20 rapidly in this case? I j 21 Mr. Blanch: Northeast's response to both'.of these issues i 22 was nothing short of outstanding. I pushed it. They { b 23 responded. We did fix it at all four of-our nuclear power i l

 ;                     24            plants.                                                                                                                                                           .

1 3 25 Senator Lieberman: But your concern about time-has'to do i k , a

l l 29 , i l' with the rest of the industry, because these are two systems 2 that are widely used throughout the nuclear power industry'.in 3 the country? 4 Mr. Blanch: Yes. They are used in every reactor, and Ii 5 don't even know what the status of overseas reactors is at 6 this time, and it is not really my. concern., j 7 Senator Lieberman: Let me go to eene of the 8 prescriptions -- some of the reactions to the problems,that 9 you have had that you described - not the technical problems 10 now, but really the way the system responded to your blowing 11 of the whistle.

                                                                                                                ]

12 In Mr. Hadley's June 10th letter:to me, which contained 13 your comments, you suggested having the NRC undertake quick 14 investigations and to attempt to come to a decision within i 15 about 90 days, undertaking quick enforcement action whenever a 16 retaliation is found. 17 Do you want to talk a littles bit about that and about how 18 - feasible you think that is? 19 Mr. Blanch: I am not sure that.it is even feasible to 20 accomplish with the present structure.within the Nkc. 21 Certainly, it won't be -- nothing will. occur unless we 22 have a significant change in the attitude of the leadership.of

                                                                   ~

23 the NRC. I believe that -- and it may be somewhat cynical'-- 24 that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not want 25 whistleblowers to come forvard because they don't want to

                                                                                                                                           ^

i )  ! i- j i 30  ! Y l 1 address large problems. i t i 2 The probles"with the' reactor water level clearly violated 3 .every basic requirement of the NRC's 10 CFR requirements, and i 1 j 4 yet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, from the chairman down, ! 5 refused to even respond'to the particular question: will j 6 these devices work? They_ knew they wouldn't' work. They l 4 i j 7 wouldn't ask the question.  : 1 I s The:se 36 power plants lare still operating clearly outside-  ! t i

!                               9      of regu'tations,'and I'm not'even sure that the NRC has the                                        f a
  • i j lo authority to allow plants.to operate outside of regulations. l i

j . 11 They have admitted they are operating outside of regulations. l 1 - t !. 12 senator Lieberman: Let me just have you clarify that. 13 The 36 power plants are operating outside the regulations in  ! 4 14 vhat regard?  ! l  : L  !

15 Mr. Blanch: With respect to reactor water levol on all l l  !

l 16 General Electric reactors.  ! ! l l 17 Senator Lieberman: The second problem that :you l i 18 discussed?  ; 19 Mr. Blanch: Yes. And they have acknowledged that fact l 1 20 in their most recent bulletin of May 28. l l , a { 21 Senator Lieberman: So, in part, what you are saying is j a i j 22 that, while the more rapid the response that a whistleblower i 4 l l 23 gets, the better it will be, nonetheless there has to be what l 5 24 might be called a change in impression, a change in l 25 credibility for whistleblowers, not to be skeptical about how f i WF'e TF" -g Sr - w=r* w g , er- +a-.-y 4-,,.. 9- , - y , . , , , -

                       . . ~       _     _   . _ _ _                      _          _ _ _ _ _ . _ _              _                    _. ~                      -_

i-1 1 J i 31 . i f 1 their complaints are going to be handled? At least that's i 2 based on your own personal experience. ? 3 Mr. Blanch: That is exactly true, Mr.' chairman. Many of 4 us out there see what happens to people like me, people like j 1 i - l 5 Don Delcor, and some of the other -- Linda Mitchell and Ann j j 6 Harris. l 7 There is an unbelievable chilling effect. Why would

1 s anyone in their right mind.dare go through this?
                                                                                                                                                                      ]

' 9 I had a call two weeks ago from an individual who had a j j 10 problem at Millstone, and I said, "You can't win. I said, 11 "Give up. I am 100 percent serious. I told them, " Don't 12 push it. You are going to wind up dead. You are going to ] l 13 wind up unemployed. You are going to wind up, if you are a l 14 lucky, to get an oI report which will' wind up probably doing a 15 character assassination on you. l 16 Senator Lieberman: That's obviously a sad story. Did i  : l 17 you have any ability to judge the credibility of the concern i j 18 that the potential whistleblower had? , j 19 Mr. Blanch: The concern was a programmatic concern. It { 20 had to deal with quality assurance - not my area. i i l i 21 I don't know how significant the. concern is, but the

22 problem we have here is that the law states it doesn't have to

[ 23 be a significant concern. In fact, it only has to be a I j 24 perceived concern. 25 Senator Lieberman: Right. L l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

                                                                . _ . . _      _   . . _             _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . . .              _ . _ . _ _ . _ - . ~ ,
i b

4 32 l 2 1 Mr. Blanch: The law doesn't protect them. 2 I talked to some high-level NRC officials. They. l l 1 . l ) 3 prioritize their investigations by the potential safety j 4 significance of the issue. j 5 We could have an individual who has a relatively small i j l 6 issue that got fired, and the-office of' Investigation will ~ i \ l 7 never look at it. j ! l j s senator Lieberman: Right. j

i

! 9 Let me ask.you a final question here about tho' process. 10 The process ~is somewhat ornate - almost too ornate to - 1 i i 11 describe in detail at the hearing. But, speaking just 3 j 12 . generally, what we have here is a situation where you can i 13 bring complaints to'the Department of Labor about retaliation { 14 for whistleblowing. The NRC proceeds to investigate in regard 15 to safety issues. And the Department of Labor has the ability 1 i 16 to try to make the whistleblower whole,' ordering compensation i i f 17 or damages or the rest. NRC can take action.against.the 1

la licensee for either safety problems or for retaliati': . sgainst

] l 19 the whistleblower. i j 20 There has been a lot of concern that this is a much too-j 21 complicated process and somehow it ought to be condensed, put i j 22 together. Some have said that it would be good for the

!         23     whistleblower to have the results of the NRC investigation                                                                                                                      '

i j 24 before they have to present their case to the Department of 25 Labor. I i i

)

1

N I. l I 33 j J 1 Based on your experience -- and I know this is sort of -- , 2 let's assume for a moment that we could raise-up the - I 3 confidence level that potential whistleblowers have in the j } 4 process, ts make it function better would you want to put ]

5 together Department of Labor /NRC?

l 6 Nr. Blanch: I'm going to have to respond to that in two I j 7 different ways. ] j s There are whistleblowers that bring forth issues like I 9 did and receive retaliation that results in essentially no i lo adverse employment action - threats, poor performance l 11 reviews, suspension of subordinates, like what happened in my i case. I really didn't have adverse employment action taken l 12 i l 13 against me. i

14 I alleged to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that I was i 15 retaliated against. This is a violation of NRC regulations.

{~ l 16 I didn't want the Department of Labor in there. The [ 17 regulationa say I may go to the Department of Labor, the NRC I 18 tells me I have to go to the Department of Labor. The NRC { I l j- 19 will do nothing unless you do go to the Department of Labor.

!     20         That's-one problem.
]     21                  In my case, I alleged a violation of NRC requirements.-

f l 22 It is the MMC's responsibility to enforce their own  ! 1 I 23 requirements. They should have investigated it, made an a j 24 initial finding. If they had to call in the' office'of i , 25 Investigation, that might be fine. But the NRC, when there is l !I . i } i _, _ _ _ . . ..-n.--

l

                                                                                                                           '34     l 1  no adverse employment action, should be able to investigate 2  those allegations and take appropriate enforcement action.                            t 3        I have'sent to you a copy of my comments with respect to 4- the total: complete ineffectiveness of the enforcement' action 5  that they took with respect to Northeast' Utilities..

I 6 We need enforcement action that really has.some teeth, 7 that really-is a deterrent--- enforcement action that will put-a people betore the Justice Department. That will really. I 9 penalite them monetarily by taking away their license for a 10 period of time. That will be a deterrent. i 11 You will have whistleblowers coming' forward. You will'. I 12 have safety issues identified if there is true deterrent. 13 Right now it is a good business decision for a utility to fire 14 an individual. 15 Senator Lieberman: Mr. Blanch, thanks'so very much.for 16 your testimony and, in a more personal way, thanks for all 17 that you have done to make nuclear power plants in connecticut is safer -- and, in fact, nuclear power plants around the country 19 safer. 20 I do want to state for the record that we offered 21 Northeast Utilities the opportunity to come in and testify 22 today, and they indicated that they would stand by their 23 previous statements and did not want to testify. 24 I thank you very much for being here. Thank you, Mr. , 25 Blanch. .

i

  .                                                                                            i l
  }                                                                                            l 1                                                                                  35

! 1 Mr. Blanch: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. i i 2 Senator Lieberman: I will now call the second witness, ) who is Allen Mosbaugh. ) 3  ; I 4 I'd also like to, at this point, anter into the record a 5 stamment from the chairman of the Consmittee, senator Baucus, 3 I 6 on the subject at hand. f 7 [The prepared statement of Senator Baucus follows:) , i 4 I . 1 I 10 - i i

11 1

i 12 I 13 14 i 15 i i 16 i 17

18 , 1 i

19 1 a 20 21 22 23 - 24 25

                                             .    - , . . , . . . . , - . . - = < ,    n -. ,

i , a I  ! 36 j j l' Senator Lieberman:~ While Mr. Mosbaugh is coming to the l

!       -2     table, I am going to attempt also to summarise..his' case so he t

i

3 can deal as much as possible with the process. He's somebody
4 even more complicated, but I'll try to do it in a'few pages..

i ~l 5 Mr. Mosbaugh was one of the; top managers-at the Vogtle i i  ! OnMarch20ok1990,Vogtle

                                                                                    ~

6 Nuclear Power Plant in Georgia. zi lj 7 Unit I was not in operation because it was.being' refueled. ' i . i i 8 Unit II was at 100 percent. power. l !. 9 At 8:20 a.m. a truck accidentally backed into'and broke. l 3 l 10 an electric utility pole at the site, which' caused.the loss of 1 i 11 all off-site power coming-into the plant. l j 12 Unit II shut down:and a site area emergency was declared. , i 13 Each nuclear power plant has two. emergency diesel' generators 'I 14 to provide electricity for vital safety systems such as  ! i . l i 15 coolant pumps in case all other sources of electricity are l 16 lost. f 17 Even during refueling, a nuclear reactor core produces a i { 18 lot of heat,. and the coolant pumps must be kept running to i i 19 keep the temperature down. [ 20 The Unit II diesel worked properly. At the time of the

21 emergency, one of the two emergency diesel generators for Unit i l l 22 I was in maintenance. The other diesel was the only source of  !
23 emergency electricity to keep Unit I cooled. l I 24 During the emergency, the I-A diesel generator would not  !

! I I 25 work properly. It could not be started until 36 minutes after {

                                                                                                                                               ^

l 3

i i~

                                                                                                                 .37 l

5 1 the start of the emergency.  ! I i f 2 During this time, the temperature of the water in the i reactor core increased by about 50 degrees. . That was during . 3 e 1 i 4 only a 36-minute period.

j. 5 Several weeks later, on April 9, 1990,- Georgia Power i

6 Company, which operates the Vogtle unit, wrote to the NRC-7 requesting permission to restart the plant. 8 Regarding the reliability of the diesel' generators,'in 4 { 9 its official sukaission the company wrote.to the NRC that, l ., j 10 asince March 20 the I-A diesel generator has been started.18 1 j 11. times and the I-B diesel generate has been started it' times. ] 12 No fmilures or problems have occurred during any'of these i j 13 starts. ! 14 This information was part of the basis for the NRC's j 15 decision.to allow the. plant to. restart. . In fact, this ! 16 information was in error.- i . 17 Four and a. half months later, on August.30,,1990, Georgia 18 Power Company submitted to the NRC a document it called "a

I

{ 19 clarification of the April 9 letter. Georgia Power company l l l l -20 infarmed NRC in that communication that between March 20th and I <. 1 i i 21 April 9th there actually were a total of 29-start attempts, 3 ! 22 and 21 of those attempts were considered successful. There 23 were eight attempts that were not considered successful, which

                                                                                   ~

! 24 obviously means that the previous statement "no failures or i ! 25 problems have occurred during any of these starts was not i.

i j 3s

1 correct.

2 Among the attempts that were not considered successful. I j 3 were two unplanned trips of the.I-B diesel. generator -- one'on-l 4 ' March 22nd and one on March 23rd. An unplanned trip in this l 5 case means the machine unexpectedly quit working. i 6 In this case, Georgia Power accepted our invitation to l 7 testify after Mosbaugh. .Since Mr. Mosbaugh will'be testifying l i a about his experiences with the company, we felt in his case,' -

i. .

! 9 as well as in Mr. Blanch's, we would offer the company an I lo opportunity testify also. i j 11 I do want to indicate that the purpose of hearing.Mr. l l l i 12 Mosbaugh's testimony is to hear first-hand reports on how our 13 nuclear safety and whistleblower laws are being implemented. I i l 14 The fact that some.of the issues that may be raised here l 15 today are also issues in proceedings before other agencias I l j 16 have concluded does not affect the capacity of the Congress or 1 l 17 of this subcommittee particularly,to carry out its ! 18 , responsibilities. j 19 If Congressional oversight can be accomplished in a l

20 manner which will not interfere with any pending proceedings, i

l 21 that clearly is the appropriate course to take.- ) i ). 22 I want to say that this subcommittee has been very l t i j 23 careful.to structure the hearing so that it will not interfere 4 1 24 with any other proceedings; therefore, I do not intend to l 25 draw, as I indicated earlier, any conclusions about the marits j i i , 1

i l l 39 l l 1 of Mr. Mosbaugh's allegations, nor do we want to influence any 2 pending investigatory or adjudicatory issues. We are here to i 3 really talk about his experiences and about what they say l l 4 about the process. i 5 I also want to enter into the record of the hearing a

- 6 letter dated July 6, 1993, to the subcommittee from the 7 Nuclear Regulatory Commissiott in which the NRC states, "The
8 Director of the office of Investigations has concluded that' -

5 9 public discussion by the subccanittee of information relating i 10 to Mr. Mosbaugh's allegations with either Mr. Mosbaugh or that 11 Georgia Power Company will not adversely affect any current 12 matter under investigation by his office. 13 The point here is that this is a matter still under 14 investigation, and in that sense a cloud still hangs over 15 everyone involved.- And the public is rightly concerned about 2 16 nuclear safsty and allegations relating-to those who operate 17 nuclear power plants. That is why we proceed with this matter i la at this time. l 19 Mr. Mosbaugh, I would again ask you to stand if_you would  ! 20 and raise your right hand. l 21 [ Witness sworn.) u 22 Senator Lieberman: Thank you very much. Thank you for 23 being here today. I would now ask you to, proceed with your 24 prepared statement. 25

1 i- l i i 40 1' #09 TESTIMONY.OF MR. ALLEN M05BAUGH, AMELIA,.ORIO j 2 Mr. Mosbaugh: I would like.to thank the senator and the ! 3 -subcommittee for the opportunity to'come~before you and i j 4 testify on these important issues. 4-l 5 I an a nuclear' engineer, a nuclear professional. I have i  !

i 6 'a bachelor's degree in chemical and nuclear engineering, a 7 master's degree in chemical and nuclear engineering, and I 3
                                                                                                                      \

l 8 have completed coursework toward a doctorate in nuclear ! 9 ' engineering. At that point I was recruited to enter'into the j 10 commercial nuclear industry. There I spent 16 years working ' j

11 for five'different utilities.

! I j 12 ' coming betare this subcommittee and testifying about my j' 13 whistleblower experiences is absolutely the':last thing'in the 14 world I would have ever envisioned that I would have done in i i 15 ny life. l 16 In 1984 I was recruited by the Georgia Power company to t i 17 come and becess a superintendent of engineering for them. I i f 18 had responsibility for 60 or 70 of the permanent Georgia Power i j 19 engineers. I believed it to be a good place to work, and I J

20 accepted the job.

i i 21 Then, in 1988, there was a wholesale management change at I 4' ' 22 the executive level over Plant Vogtle. I moved up in the i

;  23   organization in my career with Georgia' Power.      I was promoted                                             l i                                                                                                                       l j   24   three times within four years.                                                                                 j i
! 25 At the time that I blew the whistle, I was the second- )

J i 4 i . - - . ~ , , . . - . _ . - . , - - . . . , - , _ _ . . .

_ _ - . _ ~ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ i 1 f '41 i' 1 highest level of managesent on the Plant'Vogtle site., with' l j 2. responsibility for approximately 350' employees, including all i 3 engineering and quality control. a ! 4 Late in last I discovered --

5 senator Lieberman:- Let me just interrupt'you and just i

! 6 say what is obvious for the record. I think this is important i j 7 to say. E a

a 'It may be a popular impression that the typical 9 whistleblower is a low-level employee in a planti but you were l

l 10 right up there in management at.this time? i ! 11 Mr. Mosbaugh: Yes. I reported directly to the plant t i i 12 manager. . 13 Senator Lieberman: Go ahead.- i 14 Mr. Mosbaugh: Late in 1989 I discovered'a violation of'

                   .15              technical specifications associated with some. valves that I'll j                      16            just label " dilution valves.              I additionally concluded that i

l 17 the violation had occurred willfully and knowingly. !< I 1 ! is The willful violation of a technical specification or  ; i 1 l j 19 other NRC regulations is a criminal felony. l

20 I drafted an allegation. anonymously and I sent it to-the j 21 NRC. I did not go forward personally to the NRC for fear that j

) 22 somehow my identity, being a high-profile person, would leak i

23 back to my employer. -

1-24 I went so far as to prepare this allegation on a computer  ! [i 25 handling the document with gloves so that my fingerprints were s

4 ! I 42 1

1 not on it. I took the envelope to a remote post office and 2 mailed it there.

i 3 Additionally, in this allegation I expressed a concern i j 4 that management's change in attitude towards safety could lead i 5 to.a major accident at Plant Vogtle. This was in .Tanuary of ! 6 1990.. - l 7 The initial NRC response'to receiving this anonymous i l s allegation was prompt and appropriate. The office of ) ! J l 9 Investigation initiated an' investigation on site doing f 4  ! {_ 10 interviews within 30 days. OI thereafter found and confirmed l- 11 sy allegation that the technical specification was violated  ! i 8 l 12 wilfully. j i j 13 Then the NRC actions -- l i j' 14 Senator Lieberman:- Was it your conclusion that willful l

15 violation was by another employee or by the management of.the i 16 --
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  -l t                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     ,
                                                                                                                                                                  .                                                                                   I 17                Mr. Mosbaugh:                  It was by other employees - a high-level

!. 18 operations manager and some high-level operations. shift i 19 supervisors. ) i 20 Senator Lieberman: If you don't mind -- and I don't mean l 21 to break the trend of your thinkingi but it may be more l'

 !                                                        22         helpful, just in a few cases, to ask you questions as you are 1

l 23 going along -- did you at any time consid ar bringing this i

^

24 concern to the management of Georgia Power?

 !                                                        25                Mr. Mosbaugh:                   I did bring the violation of technical
)

i _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . _ . . . _ _ . . . , . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . ~ _ . . . _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ . . . _ . . . . .

4 i 43 I i 1 specifications immediately, the same day as I learned about i 1 l 2 it, to the management. I never brought to the attention of i j 3 Georgia Power my belief of willfulness. 4 senator Lieberman: Right. And the response?.

5 Mr. Mosbaugh
The response was they sent it through 6 channels. It went to the plant review board. A r'eview was i
j. 7 conducted in-house, and it was decided that Westinghouse i t

! a needed to review it, and then it was decided-that corporate

  • j 9 needed to review it. Corporate came back'and had a very vague i

j 10 determination on it. And so it went about several months of-1 j 11 these internal reviews. ! 12 Senator Lieberman: Did you notify.NRC at the same time f  ; l 1 13 you notified management, or did you wait until you were j 14 frustrated by management's response? l 15 Mr. Mosbaught I only stuck my neck out and subeitted an l l 16 anonyat..s allegation to the NRC after I had gathered enough

17 evidence.to convince me that it had been willful. I would not 18 have notified the NRC of a mere violation without criminal i

j 19 intent, i j 20 Senator Lieberman: Okay. Go ahead. 21 Mr. Mosbaugh: The NRC actions then slowed.- The report 22' became watered down. The willfulness went away. '.And the NRC j 23 eventually issued a civil penalty of $100,000 with a !L 24 conclusion of no willfulness. l

25 After I had submitted this initial allegation and an NRC

l' i l 1

l t

44 investigation had begun within a week or so, I noticed'an-

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~

1 p j 2 attitude change toward me.: I was-invited to a meeting with 1 ] 3 the general. manager in which "backstabbing was written'on 4 4 the board. I was essentially accused of backstabbing the i j 5 other top manager, and I was told that I did'not support the j 6 common resolution and common position of the company. 1 , f j 7 Senator Lieberman: Let me' understand. 'Did they;at that, )

,                                                         a                        point tell you that they knew that you had filed the anonymous i

f 9 complaint with the NRC7

i. .

i 10 Mr. Mosbaugh: They did not tell as they knew, but the  ; I j 11 manager did come and parsonally question me as to the source.- . 1 i 12 He asked, "Where did,this allegation.come from? Why is CI i j , ! 13 coming? Do you know where this started? Be said it came from  ! i 14 an allegation. He was looking for my reaction. l ! 15 senator Lieberman: And your' reaction?- i i 16 Mr. Mosbaugh: I said I don't kncW. But I'm sure my .; l 17 emotions may have given it away. . j i 18 Senator Lieberman: But you were convinced that they knew 19 that you -- l l 20 Mr. Mosbaugh: I was convinced they knew. i l 21 senator Lieberman: Yes. j 22 Mr. Mosbaugh: I was questioned to the source. I was e i 23 also responsible for Quality concerns Department'under me, who 24 received hundreds of allegations. This was the first instance i j 25 where I had ever been queried by my manager as to the source l I l

     -.                        _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . . _ . . _ . . . . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ - _ . _ _ . . . ~ . . _ . . . . _ . _ _ _ . . . . _ . , _ _ _ . . _ _ . . . . . _ - _ _ . - - . _ _ . . . .

i 49 j 1 .of an allegation. 1 2 Senator-Lieberman: Let me just ask, because it relates 4

3 to one of the other complaints we hear from whistleblowers,'

! 4 and something that is suggested in the IG's_ report, which is: 1 1 ' 3 5 when you went into the meeting and "backstabbing was written 1 j 6 on the blackboard did you conclude that in some way somebody-7 at the NRC had suggested that you had been involved in the

8. . complaint even though it was anonymous? .Or was it a situation j

! -9 where your co-workers had concluded,that only you would have-j j 10 done this because.only you were in a position to know about i { 11 it? 12 Mr. Mosbaugh: Senator, I' don't specifically know. It i 13 could have come from either. I do know that the NRC residents 14 at the plant very shortly began 1 M ing into it and gathering i

15 information. The observation of personnel of them could have

} 16 led somebody to believe that the NRC had this allegation. 17 Senator Lieberman: Okay.

1 l 18 Mr. Mosbaugh: Then I was in another meeting with the i 19 general manager, and.the general manager says to me, "Al, I l 20 have professional training in the Navy in saying 'Yes, sir.

4 21 He said, "If you can't conform and submit, you need to get i ! i ! 22 out. 23 What happened next was the Office of Investigations f 3 j 24 interviewed me on the dilution valves issue. The company I j 25 attorney represented both me and the company. During the 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . . .______._.:.__.....__..._...

         - _ _      _ _ _ - _              _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-                   .        .  .  .         ~ _ .    ..

i 4 . 46 4; 1 course.of that investigative interview we went off the record. j j 2 'I had a~ discussion with the attorney, divulged information to j him about my first-hand knowledge of some things,. reasons I

                                                                                         ~

f 3. J l 4 had concluded willfulness on this. violation, and he advised me" , 5 not to offer that information up to the, investigators, i 6 Following his advice, I-did not. s ! 7 with all that having happened in the course of two or i l s three weeks after filing this first anonymous allegation, I l 9 became concerned. I only had my orah- these were oral-j lo transactions. I only had my. memory of what had' happened._ I. i j 11 had scribbled down a few notes. I felt that insignificant and' ? 12 weak evidence in protecting myself,'in documenting my safety 13 concerns, and in documenting these potential' harassments of me l j- 14 telling me I had to get out. That's all I had, and I felt l s - 15 that was too little. i V j 16 I considered the need to get hard evidence - evidence 17 that was unrefutable. I considered tape recording. l 18 I supervised the Security Department, and whenever Georgia Power had a concern about health and safety Georgia

     ~

19 i j 20 Power utilized one-party tape recording to document l l 21 conversations. In fact, Georgia Power recorded continuously I l 22 on numerous telephone lines at the Georgia Power Plant and had l 23 [ for many, many years. _ 24 When they had additional concerns, additional one-party-l 25 tape recording devices were placed on the office phones of i i j.

4 e 47 4 i 1 many managers and their home phones. Radio communications l' t- 2 were continuously recorded, and Georgia Power litarally 1

3 recorded tens of thousands of hours of communications. j l
j. .4 I might add that later I-found'out some of their ,

l 5 recording was illegal' wire tap. _ l ! 6 I had seen a meno prepared by the company. law-firm that,  ! $ i b l j addressed one-party tape: recording. -That's tape recording i >7  ; l 8 where you only record conversations that you are present and , q l 9 party to. 1 4 10 I reviewed this legal memo from the company's law firm,; ) 11 and the meno fully justified and authorised the one-party tape 1 12 recording by mangers. 13 I reviewed all the policies and is.,cet.ses, all the  ! i j l 14 security prohibitions and contraband about' tape recording -- j 15 and I determined there was none. I began to make a few j 16 initial tape recordings. t l 17 on March 20, as you indicated,'vogtle had.the site area l 18 emergency. That was the very accident that I had feared in my 4 j 19 written correspondence with the NRC earlier. A major 20 accident. A total blackout of all safety-related electrical f 21 power at mid-loop - only one-third of the volume present in . 1 22 the reactor. i , j , 23 Had that not been mitigated and given the plant .J 24 conditions of a breached reactor vessel and a breached i 25 containment, that would have led to an accident within, in my l 1 I ,

;                                                                                                                                                        da t

j l' judgment, approximately 10 hours that would have bean far f t ! 2 worse than Three Mile Island, and perhaps a hair less than i l' i j 3 Chernobyl. 'There would have been' major off-site consequences t 4- because the radioactivity would hava'left the containment j 5 through a 20-foot diameter hatch. i j 6 As bad as the site area emergency was, what I learned j 7 after that ces esen worse. The problems that caused the i >

;                   a  fmilure of the diesel generator had been known about ior                                                                                            ,

i l 9 years. This i's what I had learned. These problems had not i t 10 been-related to the NRC and the required reporting mechanisma. i 11 Then Georgia Power submitted falso statements to the NRC i . !: 12 to gain permission to start the plant back up. They had been  ! j 13' under an order of shut-down to not resume power operations. i l 14 senator Lieberman: This shut-down order was for

1 15 refueling, or was it because of the'- '

{ i 16 Mr. Mosbaugh: The plant was already down when the

17 accident occurred, so the shut-down order said, "You may not
!                                                                                                                                                                             i
18 resume power operations until you convince us that these t

l 19 diesel generators are reliable. 4 j 20 Senator Lieberman: Right. Again, the purpose of the 4. l 21 diesel generator? j 22 Mr. Mosbaugh: The diesel generator - a plant is { 23 designed to lose its off-site power - a tornado, lightning i j 24 strikes. Upon the loss of that, the diesel generators must j 25 supply the electricity for all the safety-related equipment. ! 4 i

i 'i I i i \ L 49  ; 1 1 The plant runs on electricity. j 2 senator Lieberman: Right. And.in this case -- just go l

3 back over it, because you said obviously some haunting, f i i
4 unsettling things - comparisons to Three Mile Island, or even' i \

l 5 close to Chernobyl. What do you mean? In other words, I l e i 6 indicated that --  ;

7 Mr..Mosbaugh
I'll indicate the progression of the t

I j 8 potential accident if it wasn't mitigated. . 9 Senator Liebernan: Yes.  ! ! I ] 10 Mr. Mosbaugh: The reactor core began to heat up upon the I ! -l i 11 loss of the diesel generators which provided tti cooling 12 pumps. 1 l 13 Senator Lieberman: That's the key. That' constantly i 14 needs to be cooled. l

15 Mr. Mosbaugh
The heat you indicated earlier is 16 constantly generated. Not even God can stop that. so the i

! 17 water heats up. ! is only one-third of the normal volume was present. The l i

19 water inventory cooling the core is one-third normal so things  !

i i 20 will happen faster. The water begins to heat up. The reactor l 21 vessel -- some of the hatches are off, and the containment. , i I 22 hatch is off. 23 The water heats up to boiling. Within an hour or so it i 24 goes to boiling. 1 l 25 senator Lieberman: It went up 50 degrees in -- what was. 1 i.

n - ~ . - - - . . . . , _ - . . . - , . ~ --- . - - - - a l I ! 50 l' it? i l 2 Mr. Mosbaugh: In 30-some minutes. It started at 100. i .

3 It only.needed'to go another 100 to boiling. Then it boils.

1 . . i 4 Then steam belches out these hatches. The whole containment } 5 fills up with steam and becomes a'212-degree environment. l 6 Nobody can do anything in there. Nobody can' mitigate. 4 3 1 7 Then the water boils away, like a pot boiling down. The .< 4-  ! a top of the. core goes high and dry. After the water.. drops f b j 9 several feet the rods themselves would go to red heat,-.could , f I a 10 pop, fail. 'Then millions upon millions'of curies of I j 11' radioactivity would come out, go right out with the steam into

;                                                                                                         i I

l 12 the containment, right out the containment 'out'the hatch to i i i a 13 the public.  ! i i

14. It would have been horrid.

l 15 Senator Lieberman: And that would have taken nine or ten  : l 1-1 j 16 hours by your estimate?  !

17 Mr. Mosbaugh: In my estimation. Again - )

i + 4 I 18 Senator Lieberman: If the diesel generators or some j 19 other source of power to start the coolant moving to reduce i l 20 the temperathre had not been working? i' j 21 Mr. Mosbaugh: That's correct. 4 i 22 Senator Lieberman: Okay. Why don't you go ahead. ) 23 Mr. Mosbaugh: These false statements were important.. i 24 They were false statements about the key cosponent, the diesel ] l 25 generators, and its failures. And some of the failures that l l i i k I  ! l

, i i i 51 1 4 1- had occurred, contrary to what Georgia Power told the NRC, 2 were from the very galcon switches that had caused the site , area energency, itself. j 3 4 After they submitted the first written correspondence tot 5 he NRC, I informed them -- and they acknowledged -- that that , 6 first written correspondence was false and incorrect. 7 There was a second written correspondence. I put them on 8 notice that the first one was false, and I put them on notice 9 that there had been these failures. 10 They went ahead and signed-out the second written 11 correspondence just like the first with the same words, "No 12 problems or failures have occurred on any of these starts. 13 They did that after I told them that was false, after I told 14 them the first written correspondence was false. I told then 15 the dates and times of the specific failures, and I told these 16 to important and high-level corporate people who were-17 responsible for writing these LERs. 18 Senator Lieberman: Is this recorded on the tapes that -- 19 l l 20 Mr. Mosbaugh: Yes, it is. l 21 Senator Lieberman: Do you want to -- do you have those  ; 22 with you? l 23 Mr. Mosbaugh: Yes, I do. 24 Senator Lieberman: Do you want to play them? Again, I'd l 25 say, if you do, that we are not -- we can't at this moment

I , 1 r 52 1 testify to the accuracy of the tapes; is that correct? You l

2 testify that they are accurate. I gather that they have been i

They have been listened to by the company. j 3 entered. Do you ? , j 4 know the company's reaction? j 5 Mr. Mosbaugh: No, I don't. 6 Senator Lieberman:. I'll wait and ask the representative.  ; 1 7 In the interest of time - and I know this is not easy -- ) s I hope you can focus in on the key sections here. l 9 [ Transcription of Mr. Mosbaugh's tape recordings i l 10 follows:)

i 11 Voice
The next page, over 20 starts?

) { 12 Voice: Yes. f I 13 voice: I struggle with that one. i ) 14 (senator Lieberman: Do you want to describe what we4s s l 15 got?) ! 16 Voice: You have trouble with that, huh? ! 17 Voice: I am struggling with that one. I'm trying to i 18 verify that still. ] I 19 Voice: Okay. All right. i i 20 Voice: okay? We think that's basically a material false l 21 statement. 1 I 22 Voice: Really. k- 23 Voice: Yes. i 24 (Senator Lieberman: Is that you, Allen?) 4 l 25 [Mr. Mosbaugh: No. That's the man that works for me. 4 2

_ _ _ . __ _ -- . .~ _ - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - - _ _ - - - _ - - - - 53 1 I'll speak later.)_ 2 voice: Well, we know for a fact.that the B diesel 3 tripped at least once after March 20th.- l 4 Voice: Actually it tripped twice after March 20th, or at 5 least two separate' problems. 6 voice: Well, do we need to take this more than 20 times 7 each out then? 8 voice: That's what we.are thinking. I've got someone 9 reviewing the direct operator's log in sooounting. j 10 [End of tape recording.) .

 .      11           Mr. Mosbaugh:      This is a conversation.between me, a man 12      that works for me on site, and a corporate representative who 13       was preparing this document to be signed out to the NRC.

14 At this point, we have put him on notice that: one, we 15 think it is a material false statement - 16 senator Lieberman: The statement that had earlier.been 17 made in the response of April 9, 19907 ,

                                                                                                                              )

18 Mr. Mosbaugh: No. We are actually talking about a new 19 statement that is going to be made. l 20 Senator Lieberman: Okay. But this conversation occurred 21 -- an I right? -- after that lattar was written? l 22 Mr. Mosbaugh: After that letter was written, but before 23 the second response was signed on.- 24 Senator Lieberman: Second letter. Right. And the

      -25       consequence of all this is that it was on the basis of these

) 54 1 1 representations you are saying that the NRC gave the company J. I the authority to restart the facility? ) f 2 1 3' Mr. Mosbaugh: That's correct. And certainly these' l  : 4 statements are the core of the-basis of the' decision.  ; i i 5 -(Transcription of Mr. Mosbaugh's tape recordings l i ,I 6 fallows:) l t 7 voice: Are you there still? } l 8 Voice:. I'n'here. l 9 Voice: We don't know yet.  ; l i j 10 Voice: -We don't know yet. It just dawned on me what Al i 11 was saying a minute ago. In other words, if we say "No i L 12 failures or problems have occurred'in any of these starts, j i t 13 you are saying that's not true? 4 l . 14' Voice: Yes.' I'm saying that's not true'- . l l l 15 voice: Wonderful. Okay. , f l . . . 16 Voice: Which also tells me -- it is telling me something . ! 17 else, I imagine. Because you know we have' written to the NRC } 18 once already. l I  ! 19 Voice: Yes. I know. That's exactly what I was l 20 thinking. i. l 21 (Senator Lieberman: That's a reference back to the 22 letter.) _ l-3 23 Voice: I'm working on that. 1 l 24 Voice: All right, John. j 25 Voice: Okay. Well, I'll be patiently waiting, or i h i_.________ .. -. _. . . . - . , . _ - . . - . _ . --

95  !

         . impatiently waiting, or however you sc ~ to look at it.
                                                        ~

1 2 voice: Well, I must be off. i l 3 [End of tape recording.]  ! 4 senator Lieberman: Okay. So your. concern here -- and, 5 again, this goes -- again, at tne heart-of the NRC's ability l 1 i 6- to function properly is'the truthfulness of statements and the 1 $ 7 relations between the licensees and the NRC,'so this is a

I i s serious allegation that did have consequences, and you,'as a l s i 9 .whistleblower, were in an obviously unique position to break 10 through it.

i j j 11 Do.you want to go back to your statement? 4 I 12 Mr. Mosbaugh: I can play one other segment, or I can

i. l l 13 resume.

I i i 14 Senator Lieberman: Do you think it'is helpful to play 15 ene other? l 16 Mr. Mosbaugh: At this point it has gone'one level higher , 5 l l 17 in corporate -- yet another man above them. . j ! 18 Senator Lieberman: So this all led to a second 19 correspondence. I'm looking at the chart. That was on April 20 19th, ma I correct? I 21 Mr. Mosbaugh: Yes. ! 22 Senator Lieberman: And after these conversations j, j 23 occurred that you have just played us. And do you allege that i l 24 the representations made in the April 19th correspondence were l 25 either untruthful, or at least incomplete? i

56 l } 1 Mr. Mosbaugh: They are equally false. ! 2' Senator Lieberman: Okay. Why don't you'go ahead with i '

l. 3 your statement.
4- Mr. Mosbaugh After the April 19th I pursued getting.the
i 5 statements corrected. I issued written menos to my management .

. 6 alerting them to the statements being false. i 7 As an acting chairman of the Plant Review Board -- that's i

                                                                                            .                                   ~

the plant's on-site board that reviews safety issues -- I t 8 I i 9 issued-an action ites to the general manager to correct the ' f 10 first document. ( F ! 11 The very next day I was removed from the. Plant Review 12 Board and all my job responsibilities'were removed from me. I-13 had nobody working for me, and I was told to report.directly  : 14 to the general manager. ' l 15 If you recall, when I first.came to Georgia Power I had - 16 60 or~so employees working for me. , ! 17 Senator Lieberman: I do want to state for the record b. f 18 .that you have submitted a copy of your note of April 30, 1990, 19 in which you make these statements -- the ones that you just l 20 referred to. 21 Mr. Mosbaugh: Yes. I submitted that. 22 Senator Lieberman: I just wanted to indicate that we 23 have seen that. Right.

                                                                                                          -                       I 24                                       Mr. Mosbaugh:                     Based on my removal from the Plant Review 25                     Board and my removal free all my job responsibilities that I

_ ._. _ _ . _. _ _ _ ~ - - _ _ . - - - - . - - _ _ _ . . _ - - - - _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l i ! 57

   ~

1 previously held, I felt I'had'been discriminated against for l' l l 2 making safety allegations and pursuing my concerns. . J

             '3           Early in June -- around June' 6th - I filed a complaint

{ l 4 with the Department of Labor. On June 13th I initiated 5 meetings with the NRC Office of Investigations, wherein I gave l 6 them allegations that I.had been: drafting"in'the time' frame i f 7 that some of these events were occurring. ;I had utilized'some i j s of my tape ~ recordings to draft those detailed; allegations. ] 4 1

9 on June 13th 2 gave the NRC all that documentation and I.

j 10 gave them oral testimony. 'l ! I l 11 At this point I did not tell the NRc of the' existence of L

12 my tape recordings.- Like with my. anonymous allegation, which i 'l 13 I didn't even put my fingerprints on, I knew that tape l l

14 recordings could be high profile, that people would' learn and l

15 know about them. I already believed Georgia' Power suspected i

l 16 me as a whistleblower. They.Certainly.would link.the two. 4 1 17 I was pursuing these issues'in-house. They certainly 1 18 would link 'this up. And I felt that if I did that-I would not ! be able to complete the job of documenting these concerns'to 19 20 their completion and their ultimata correction, which took- 1 3 i

21 until late August.

22 Then, as the Department of Labor proceeding proceeded, it ! 23 ~ comestoapointwheredepositions-aretEken. In those i 24 depositions, which.were in early September, I told Georgia 25 Power of all my protected metivitv. which'had included the i. 1_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _. _ -

i L r p

  • 5s I

j 1 tape recordings. I. told them of my tape recording activity. i l- 2 Georgia Power immediately tried through the legal process - i - i 3 to get possession of the tape recordings. When'I learned of j ! 4 that, I contacted the_NRC and I made arrangements'to turn all . i $ j 5 of my tape recordings over.to the NRC, and an individual from , k 6 th's Office of Investigations received _those fras me as j fi evidence. 'That happened oii; september.13th.

                                           ~

l 7 ) i s I knew it was wrong that Georgia Power should.have these. l 9 Georgia Power should not have-this evidence. This evidence Y l 10 had to be in the hapes of law enforcement. f 11 -As soon as Georgia. Power learned that I:had turned these i j 12 tape recordings over to the NRC, two days later I was i j 13 suspended, and three weeks after that I was fired with no i 14 additional communications. I was. suspended _and fired for j 15 making the tape recordings. l l 16 I want to indicate not only the importance that I have 4 l 17 already indicated about the physical issues here, but about is' the issues of trustworthiness and the issues of the people j j 19 that would make falso statements to the NRC and that would i i 20 harass and discrisiinate against individuals. t j 21 These people are the highest level, and some of_tha most t 22 powerful members of the nuclear industry. They are ] ~

                                                                                                                               )

- 23 responsible for the operation of six nuc1 ear power plants.  ! i j 24 But, additionally, a number of these individuals are key 25 members of the Advanced Reactors Consortium -- the utility i 1

59 j i group that is proposing to usher in the next generation of I i  ! 2 safe nuclear power plants. l 3 I as a nuclear engineer, a~ nuclear. professional. I i l 4 followed my nuclear. training -- document, document, document. 5 No detail is too small that it doesn't make a difference. i 6 That was Georgia Power's supposed mind set. i 7 I fallowed my conscience. I am proud of what I did. I i j s did the right thing. I didn't do it to benefit myself. I i ~ j 9 would have-never done it if it hadn't risen to the leveliof 10 being criminal.' I had to do it.- They had crossed the line.

                                                                                                                                   ~

] 11 I an a very good engineer, and for blowing the whistle 12 and doing the right thing I lost 2y job, I lost my career. I 13 have been unemployed since. I live.off my vife's salary of i

. 14 $24,000, who now has to work full-time to support my wife and 15 sy four school-aged children. I fear for my family's future.

l 16 My dreams are brokan. !- 17 Senators, this law is brokan, too.- It doesn't work. The

j. 18 burden for the individual is too great. The climb is too i 19
  • long, and the mountain is too high.  !

i 20 Thank you, Senators, for this important opportunity to 21 testify. 22 (The prepared statement of Mr. Mosbaugh follows:) 23 i i b 24 I 25 l i l

>                                                                                                                                                1 4

i i

I

! 1 so 1 senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Mosbaugh. I know that i 4 2 was difficult for you, and I appreciate the sincerity and the i 1 3 strength of your feeling, and I know what you have been j l  : ) 4 through. t . 1

5 Ag'ain, without reaching judgment on the merit of the 6 various claims you have filed, nonetheless it does. appear to
;             7     se that certainly the topic about which you were blowing the                                                                      ;

i j s whistle was a very serious one that had serious consequences. . 1 i i 9 In fact, ultimately it was corrected, as you had based. It i was corrected as you had desired; is that right? i j lo 11 Mr. Mosbaugh: They issued a correction, and ultimately. ) l 12 they also fixed the underlying problem with the galcons,.which i j 13 is not -- they didn't do it until it had failed'again seven

14 more times in May, and it had become essentially a complete i 15 embarrassment. And they didn't do it only until after I was t

Y. j 16 raising a'hig stink about it. I

17 senator Lieberman
so when was it - the date of the 4

18 incident that we have started this story was March 20 or 21;

f. 19 is that right?

i i 20 Mr. Mosbaugh: The 20th. i ! 21 senator Lieberman: The 20th of 1990. And when were I 22 these problems that were the basis of your complaint -- ) 23 Mr. Mosbaugh: The physical design changes -- and we are 24 only talking about hardware -- the physical design changes of eliminating these defective switches that caused the diesel to j 25 F

61 1 trip were instituted in about June. 2 Senator Lieberman: Right. 3 Mr. Mosbaugh: Obviously, the rest of my concerns'about 4 the integrity of individuals and == king falso statements has 5 yet to be corrected. 6 senator Lieberman: Yes. So I guess the question that I 7 was going you really answered, but that is to say, in regard a to the whistleblower process, that you clearly feel that,.as a-9 result of having blown the whistle about something that you lo felt was a very serious safety problem, that.you were harassed 11 and ultimately lost your job. But I take it that you feel 12 that the Governmental process let you down, too.. 13 Mr. Mosbaugh: -It is amazing, but the Governmental 14 process was most effective when I submitted the concern 4 15 anonymously. After it was known that it was me and a 16 whistleblower it has gone much more slowly. 17 senator Lieberman: say a little bit more about what you 18 sean. In other words, the NRC responded rapidly -- 19 Mr. Mosbaugh: To a piece of paper. 20 Senator Lieberman: -- to a piece of paper about the 21 safety -- 22 Mr. Mosbaugh: About the first. safety concern with 23 dilution valves. _. 24 senator Lieberman: Right. 25 Mr. Mosbaugh: of course, later that also slowed down.

a I 62 i 1 But when I came to the NRC in person, a reputable and 2 knowledgeable professional, with detailed'information,

3 documentation, logs, oral-testimony, highly-accurate, the l 4 . process on that -- the.NRC has yet to issue any action or' fine 1 i

j 5 or civil penalty on the failure of the diesels in the site j 6 area emergency, on the making of the fmise statements to the l 7 NRC, in a verbal presentation, in these written communications ! 8 on the known and repeated failures of these switches. They i 9 have yet to issue any enforceirdnt action, or against any of 10 'the individuals that are implicated. j l j 11 Senator Lieberman: And in your own case, in terms'of l i i - 12 your own position, which occurred through the Department.of l !~ 13 Labor, I gather you made the allegation and were not f i 14- successful, that you were retaliated against? l i ' 15 Mr. Mosbaugh: Initially the Department of Labor ruled in l l 16 my favor and ordered me reinstated. The Georgia Power Company 17 appealed that first step. It went to the second step, and was 18 recommended that my complaint be dismissed. 19 My complaint and that recommendation is currently before 20 the Secretary of Labor. 21 Senator Lieberman: You are on appeal, so that is not 22 over. And the question there is - and you correct me if I'm 23 vrong, and I'll ask the company, as well -- is whether the 24 company had the right to terminate you based on the taping-I 25 that was done? Is that correct? Their allegation is that l

_ _ _ . . _. . -_ ~_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ . _ _ _ l i ) 63 l l 1 they terminated you because of the taping. l- 2 Mr. Mosbaugh: That is the reason why they say they 2

3 terminated me.

! 1 3 4 senator Lieberman: Right. And, of course, your l i 5 allegation is that you were terminated because you filed the i l 6 complaint? i j 7 Mr. Mosbaugh: That's correct. l 8 senator Lieberman: Because you blev tho' whistle. l I 9 Mr. Mosbaugh: And because I gave the evidence to the' ! 10 NRC. ! 11 Senator Lieberman: Right. Time is moving on. I note

12 that senator Alan Simpson, who is a ranking member of the 4
    ~~

i 13 committee, is here. Before going to the company, I would j 14 yield to him for any statements or questions that_he might i 15 have at this time. l 16 Senator Simpson: Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I won't i 17 take long. I know-I an in the midst of this activity. I-am ] 18 involved in two other hearings and work on the floor, and no j 19 one knows that better than those of us who serve. 20 But I thank you, Mr. chairman, for holding the hearing. I 21 obviously, whistleblowing is a serious issue. No one would 4 4 j 22 dispute that in Government. i 23 I want to crmmend'you for your leadership in this l 24 subcommittee in raising these issues of concern bearing on the 25 public health and safety. This is the third hearing now we i

  . _              . -    .    , ,             , . , _ _ _ . .    ,        ,_      ._ . . _ . _ _ .          . . _ . _ . _ , _ _ , . . , . , . . . .       ,.,..__.1

l t' 64 l' ! I have held this year on bringing forth important issues of I 2 nuclear power plant security and other issues, especially in !' 3 regard to recent terrorist activity. There will be more of*  ! l l- 4 that -- more activity-in that area -- until we resolve our own-domestic policies with regard.to immigration and refugee [: 5 I 6 issues.

'                                                                                                                     i l             7                 I do commend you.          I regretted that I wasn't at the

!' s authorization hearing, because we haven't done that tor some . ! 9 time. So I appreciate'your initiative. 1 J 10 I have been on this committee for.14 years. Nothing we. i j e We are'in an area of emotiong fear, [ 11 do is taken lightly. E F 12 guilt. We labor in it all' day long. The duty of the NRC is 1 13 to protect the public health and safety, and they do.quite a .j j ' 14 job of it. l 15 There are mechanisms within the NRC to deal specifically  ! 16 with the issue that you are dealing with today. I don't want  ! l' i , i i 17 that to go unnoted. There is a procedure within the NRC to la handle just this type of activity. We are not interested in  ; l  ; 19 seeing people and industry get'away with something. That is 20 not what we are here for. We-are not interested in seeing l 21 people destroy the domestic nuclear power industry. That's i 22 not what we are here for. , i 23 It is here, and there are 111 reactors, and whether we f 24 like it or not we've got to see them work. We want to see i

25 things happen that are up front and above-board as to --

5 J r .- .. .. . . , - . . . . - - , . - - . . . . - - - , - - .-

65 1 either you like nuclear power er you don't... If you don't, say 2 so and then get up here and rip and snort. If you do, support 3 it. 4 I have said 150 times right here that I'm just as tired 5 as the people who say, " Hell, no, I' won't gl v I es those who 6 say, "Nobody has ever been killed. They are both stupid. 7 so I have to guide around somewhere in.the m$ddle of those two 8 remarkable views. 9 But I as aware there are' volumes of documents and tapes, 10 and I hope we can keep separate the issue of your litigation 11- and what we are trying to do here. This is critical. It is 12 not a place for evidence and tapes and stuff and evidence. It n , 13 is not the place. 14 I an here to discuss the process, and I'll help this 15 chairman in any way, but I won't be part of listening to this 16 thing being litigated for that right there - for the media. 17 This is not a seven-camera hearing, only three. And'I think 18 we want to be very, very careful about that. 19 I feel very uncomfortable. I practiced law for 18 years. 20 This issue is being litigated. It is in a highly 21 controversial arena. And I think - where is the other side? 22 Where is the Department of Labor? They were tho'ones with the 23 primary part in this. I would ask: have they even been-24 invited? Has the Department of Labor - where are they? 25 The first function on the long step here was with them.

i

  • 66 ,
- 1 I don't see them here. I have learned long ago in my  ;

i 2 legislative' activity there is no good in having one side  ; 3 presented. 1 ! 4 When I chaired the' Immigration Refuges subcasmittee I  : j 5 said to my staff,."Go get me the toughest cookie on the other ! 6. side of this issue and bring him in here and let's hear him. ) i  : ~ i 7 Let's be.able to ask him questions. And go find the ones that l- i z - i 8 are the worst and most egregious and even offensive l i !, 9 opponents. '.That's the only way to hold a. hearing. - i so I as wondering about that. I as wondering ~about the

10

! 11 timeliness of the IG report. What is the stimulus of it 12 suddenly arising? Is it this? I don't~know. Good question. s 13 But it is troubling to me because obviously these things are , l i 14 not simple. There is no simple remedy. If we correct one s 15 area, what do you do on the other side? ' Modifications with 16 the process need to be balanced and weighed carefully. l 17 What are.we really looking at? Is this the nors'in the ! 18 industry? Does this happen all the time? It doesn't. 19 A majority of these cases are successfully resolved, and 4 4 l 20 there are a lot of them. Unfortunately, we don't read about ( ,

j. 21 those. And I think these are very sensitive issues due to j i

l 22 pending proceedings, and I think we have to focus on..~the broad 23 policy issue. - i

i. 24 I have very strongest concerns, Mr. Chairman. I should 2 25 have shared them with you personally before, but things move l

. l I i ( l

             - . .        e   _           _ .              _ ._.              - -     _           _                   . . -         _      _      _            ._

i i l

. 67 '

j 1 along. But.I do not think that it is appropriate for this l 2- subcommittee to provide a fcrum for plaintiffa or defendants i j 3 to publicly litigate the details of pending cases under l 4 consideration in various administrativeLand judicial forums. l l 5 Knowing Joe Lieberman as I do, I believe he would feel 6 the same. So if wegare going to have this,'let's ' stick with { 1 1 ! 7 what it'is we are trying to develop, and that's the process, I

8 and not get"into the emotion and the heartbreak and the

! 9 anguish of what this man has gone through. That's a subject p' 10 of'a separate' place. 11 This is going to be' highly prejudicial to all. concerned

12 if not done in a very sensitive way. There will'.be-l

! 13 compromises all along the line in this one,-and no wcander t 14 people want to appear or don't want to appear -- because of l 15 that. That is a poor way, in my mind, to do the Nation's i i 16 business. j 17 Senator Lieberman: I thank my friend and colleague. l 18 Because we are friends and colleagues and have a good l

          '9       relationship I-do want to briefly - and I value his

{ 1

20 involvement and experience in this committee -- I do want to  ;

-: l 21 briefly respond to a couple of the points;you have made. l 22 The first is that the IG report is.actually a response to d[ 23~ a request that I made -- it appears-to me to be almost a year ) 24 ago -- before I came to the chairmanship of this subcommittee. 25 And the request was based on my own surprise at the number of I d

  *T -'

7 y -

                                                  = , , .-       1     e --4---v  - ,   --sw,       -,ww ,-- w,-  - - =     -n--w,-   F- e      +e- +- we6--e,    -,

6a f 1 whistleblowers in Connecticut who had.come to me with concerns [ 2 about how their complaints were being-processed by the l 3 timeliness of.that. So it is that really that engendered the

                                                                                                                                                                      ']

l 4 report. 1 l 5 on the second question - a very sensitive question -- l l'

                                                                                                                                                                        )

6 which is: h0V to bring forward the relevant testimony of I ! 7 whistleblowers about their experience without compromising j s other proceedings going on. I just do want to state -- and ) , . 1 !' 9 I'll.ahare it with my friend -- that'Z.did have at'least a 5 . j' 10 letter from the NRC indicating that they_.falt that proceeding

  • i j 11 with this. testimony both by Mr. Moebaugh and Georgia Pacific j i i l

12 would not' compromise the matters that are' currently before the I i

13 NRC. '

? 14 I do want to indicate again that I' stated at the outset, 5 j 15 and again before Mr. Mosbaugh's testimony, that our function i l 16 here was not to reach a conclusion on the merit of his case, l 17 but to try, through his sharing his~ experience and hearing the j 18 same from Georgia Power, to have some sense of how this

                         ~

( 19 process has worked. l .

20 It happens - and, again, I will be happy to hear other i

! 21 testimony on it - that both Mr. Mosbaugh and Mr. Blanch blew i 22 the whistle in a way that ultimately led to changes'that say 23 that at least the underlying complaint that they made about 24 the fact that there was a safety problem was correct because i j 25 it was acted on -- in some cases in rather short order -- once 4 ) 1

      - - . - . - , . , - , -        , , . . . . , ~ _ .          .  +. . .--- --.                 - . . . . . - .                     -    -~

i

69 d

l 1 they blew the whistia, which was my way of trying to show that l 1 ~ 2 these were complicated plants. t - ! 3 I said, Alan, earlier that this shouldn't.be taken as a_ 1 4 pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear hearing. It is really a question i j 5 of public health and safety. j 6 I don't mean to put words in-the souths of these two i 7 . whistleblowers, but these are people who are trained in this l a field. I don't want to say that they are pro-nuclear, but l l 9 they have lived their lives in this field. They are committed' i ' j 10 to it, so they are not anti- in that sense. ) ! 11 Mr. Mosbaugh: Senator, if I any speak, I as pro-nuclear. l I j 12 Senator Lieberman: Yes. And, finally,'on-the Department i l 13 of Labor, it is a good point. I guess the answer to it is  ! i 14 that we didn't call them because of time constraints because I i l 15 wanted to hear these two, hear the IG, hear the NRC, and hear i i 16 the nuclear power industry, and still.get home by sunset i 17 tonight. j- 18 But I do think you make a good point. We probably should j 19 bring in the Department of Labor-at'a subsequent hearing to . 4 l 20' hear how they proceed on this. 21 senator simpson: Well, Mr. Chairman, I have deepest l _ ! 22 . personal respect for you, and I say I feel remiss that I } 23 didn't get an opportunity, but I didn't-know what course this i 24 was going to take. I was doing these other things, and.then, ) 25 because I said, "Would you please monitor the cosaittee, and 4

1 }. 1 70 L [ 1 then when I heard that the tapes were being played I think 2 that's inappropriate, sir. I do not believe that is part of j 3' what we are doing here, and'I say that with most complete b 4 respect and admiration. I do not'believe, if we.are going to l i- 5 due process, tapes do not fit here. 5 . i 6 senator I.ieberman:- Unmerstood. i-

7 Do you have any questions.of Mr. Mosbaugh.or-should we go

] j s oc to -- 1

. 9 senator simpson
No. I think that there-are many l 10 questions I have, and the first is to just say that I'can l

! 11 understand your pain and your anguish and your frustration and i j 12 irritation. I have looked back through the records and I find l j 13 how long this has been going on and how you talked with your i ) 14 supervisors and how they said', " Notify.the NRC in July of 15 1990 after you said you didn't want to work with Georgia Power l 16 in addressing your concerns. i l 17 Do you not recall a meeting with your plant. general p l 18 manager giving you a written manager directing you to 19 "immediately. notify the NRC of any legitimate concerns that i 20 you may not have identified, give that to. Georgia Power? i 21 And he said you should give that .>st.gnment-yove immediate and 1 22 highest attention, didn't he? l 23 Mr. Mosbaugh: I recall a meeting that you reference, and ! 24 that meeting, of course, only occurred after I had filed my ( g 25 complaint with the Department of Labor.and had exposed my 4 _ , , , _ - . - _ , . . . , - , _ - _,...~,., _. ,,. . ._.-. __ _ ....._.. ._,..._._ _ .,_____ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _

4 l' 71 1 concerns. Of course, at that point-I had already gone'to'the 2 NRC. 3 Senates Simpson: And after you filed several complaints 4 with the Department of Labor,'after you had been openly 5 working with the NRC to raise issues, without involving your 6 management, that the company advised you it would assign you-7 to your first career choice,' manager-in-training, senior a reactor, operator license program? 9 Mr. Mosbaugh: Yes. Again, I would like to note that 10 action by the company only occurred _after I had'been removed

  . 11 from my previous jobs, only after I had filed the case with 12 the Department of Labor and the Georgia Power Company.needed 13 an explanation to give to the Department of Labor as'to why 14 they had no future plans for me. They had put me in limbo.

15 They had taken all my responsibilities away. And, indeed, 16

                                                        ~

they told me time and time again that it made no sense to send 17 you, Al Mosbaugh, to SRO school. l 18 But only after I filed the case with the. Department of 19 Labor on June 6 -- what you are referring.to occurred in early , i 20 July. Only then did the Georgia Power Company fitp-flop, 21 change its mind, and say, "Now, A1, you are going to go to SRO 22 school. That's what we planned for you all along. _That was 23 the explanation that they gave to the Department of Labor to 24 explain their previous actions. 25 Senator Simpson: 14 : se ask you a final question.

5 i - 72 ' ) 4 1 I understand that before you filed your first Department . l 2 of Labor complaint in June of 1990, and even before you signed .{ 3-4 3 your confidentiality agreement with the NRC that same, month -- t i 4 correct me or interrupt - that your : lawyer spoke to Georgia-1; ! $ Power company's lawyer about your clain? . 6 Mr. Mosbaugh: I have no knowledge, Senator,.of that  ; l , l 7 event. I have the knowledge that Georgia Power,.in my ! 5 l S. hearing, claimed'that occurred, and they indicated they -- the , j:' 9 one who testified indicated that he had no first-hand' j 10- knowledge'of that either. ' ( -- i- 11 Senator Simpson: Apparently a.Mr. Dahlberg,.who is here [ to testify today -- is'that correct?'

f. 12 ,

( Mr. Dahlberg: Yes.

13  ;
_ 14 Senator Simpson: In looking at his testimony, it would i

l 15 indicate that your lawyer sent a copy.of the Department of  ; i 16 Labor complaint that he threatened to file,-and said he-had- ! 17 concerns that you had still not raised with'the NRC and that a; i 3 i is your lawyer ande it clear that things could get expensive and j f 19 difficult, and that he offered - I assume perhaps on your j [ . - !- 20 behalf -- certainly'as a lawyer would -- that.if Georgia Power ! i { 21 wanted you "out'of their hair =for good that could be 22 accomplished by some compensation. At least that is a part of ,

23 Mr. Dahlberg's testimony. The offer of $445,000 to get out of

1 24 the company's hair -- that was explained as $100,000 in l i i j 25 attorney's fees and $345,000 for you - and, in exchange, no l' 4

1 i- 73 filings were to be made at the NRC or with DOL. ' ^ 1 1 $ 2 Did you authorize your attorney to make that offer? Do 4 , 3 you -- . j 4 Mr. Mosbaugh: Senator, I did'not authorize my attorney i i 5 to make that' offer. I have no knowledge of what you are i 6 speaking of. I would further indicate that I would not drop j 1 . 7 my allegations with the NRC. And, in fact, I was aware and am j 8 aware that this committee was an important influence'in i . lawmaking.that made a ruling that employees couldn't or j 9 i ! 10 shouldn't dismiss complaints with the'NRC based on any j

11 settlement.

i' I ! 12 Now, maybe there is some confusion here, but you must I i 13 know that there was a settlement initiative made by the 14 Department of Labor, the investigator, Franklin. Pierce.~ He-l 15 approached my attorney, and I'believe he approached the other i j' 16 attorney about some settlements. It is my understanding that i 17 is what he is supposed to do,-and that,is recommended as part 18 of filing claims with the Department of Labor. l- 19 Yes, Mr. Franklin Piarce did make-that initiative. Now, l { 20 maybe there is-some confusion with that event. ~ ~ 21 Senator Simpson: Well, I'm going to cease. Mr. Dahlbarg i I 22 is here. But this is part of the peril. I wanted to ask you [ 23 that question, because this is the peril of litigating in a 24 hearing. You don't have your lawyer here. Mr. Dahlberg- ! 25 doesn't have his lawyer here. We are going to hear i ,8

    - --                               - <       ,      -     -  -_...-.- ----- _ __----.--- _ . . -+ ...                     s w,s..n- - -- .- .
  .                                                                             I
                                                                                                                                                        .74 4

1 controverted and controverting evidence of all types and J i 2 amounts, and no ability to cross-examine, no ability to  ! l 4 3 present evidence, no ability to do anything except appeal t6

i 1-j- 4 emotion for fear or guilt. J i 5 Mr. Mosbaught I would like'to' indicate that Mr. McCoy l *

! 6 testified about what you have just alleged. , i . . . l 1 7 senator.Lieberman: Would you identify who Mr. McCoy is? 4 Mr. Mosbaught: Mri McCoy is Southern Nuclear Vice j 8 i j 9 President over Plant Vogtle. -Me is Mr. Dockholt's boss. Me

1. -

1 10- testified about'this in the' Department of Labor hearing --- i. i 11 about my allegedly attempting to get a buy-out. And he said 1 1

l in his testimony, he admitted that it was a-far-fetched idea 4

J 12 i t

     ~ ~~

13 of his that that was a motive of mine. That's his testimony. J 14 senator simpson: I sey, sir, that's what happens in i 15 these kinds of hearings without appropriate counsel. If'you i 16 can do it, others can do it. It is not a good place to do it. i ! 17 That's a good saying. ! l j- 18 Mr. Mosbaugh: And his comments are on the record. j 19 Senator Lieberman:. Mr. Mosbaugh. Thank you. Thank you 20 for your testimony. We wish you well. i ! 21 Mr. Mosbaugh: And thank you. .  ; 1 ! 22 Senator Lieberman: . Thank you. j-23 We'll now call Mr. Dahlberg, who is representing Georgia i.

j. 24 Power Company.

1 25 'Mr. Dahlberg, again, as we have done with the other r i . j.

                                         ...,,-.,.,~._,,,,,,,...,,n,_                 , , , . ,, . , , . , , , , . , . , , , . _ , . , . , , , , , , , . , , . . . .

d I i

75 l 1 witnesses, please raise your right hand.

i i 2 (Witness sworn.) ! 3 senator Lieberman: Thank you, sir. We. appreciate your 1 f 4 being here. j 5 As indicated, for the record, although we are pursuing 6 the process, because the process of handling whistleblower l 7- complaints inevitably will intersect with the specifics of the l s complaint, in this case serious both as to the. technical' i i j' 9 problem with tho' generators that Mr. Mosbaugh referred to, but i 1 10 also as to his allegation, which was based on the tapas, that , 11 there was a willful concealing of information by Georgia - i { 12 Power, we very much wanted to give you~the opportunity to i 13 testify both in response to the specific facts and to anything 1 j . 14 you want to say about the process of handling whistleblower j f 15 complaints, as well. , i + 16 We welcome you and look forward to your testimony. i ! 17 l 18 l 19 ! 20 , 3 I 21 l 22 i 23 s I 24 $ 25 i 3 i

76 1 #09 TESTIMONY OF MR. A. W. DAHLBERG,.III, CEO, GEORGIA POWER

     -2 COMPANY                                                                                                         j 3        Mr. Dahlberg:     Senator, thank you.'     I' appreciate the 4 opportunity to be with you.

5 For the record, my name is Bill Dahlberg, and I am 6 president and CEO of Georgia Power' Company, a position I have 7 held now for about five and a half years. a I do appreciate the opportunity to be here to address

                               ~

9 this subcommittee and to'give you my perspective on this 10 issue. 11 I do want to spend most of my time talking about the i 12 process. I'll tell you a little bit about the environment at 13 Georgia Power Co:apany and how we try to; operate. I'll tell 14 you a little bit about this event - not as much about the 15 technical merits of the issue, because I do thin there are  ! 16 other forums that more properly address that, but I would like l 17 to describe the actions that I took with respect to this i is incident. 19 I made the decision to fire Mr. Mosbaugh, and therefore I ) 20 think it is appropriate that I be here to give you-my 21 perspective on the entire issue. 22 Senator Lieberlman: You were the CEO at the time at which 23 these incidents occurred? 24 Mr. Dahlberg: That is correct. 25 First of all, I guess I would say that I an here because

j i j 77 l '1 I as proud of our company. I as proud of the people that,we 1 2 have at our plant, the management that we have there. I think l 3 we have a taan-cf professionals that run cur plant in a 4 4 professional manner. j' _5 The operating certificates of our plant are good and 6 solid and have_ improved significantly over the.last several l i j 7 years. The ratings that we get from NRC are clearly superior. l

8 I think we run a good ship, and I am proud of the people that' I

9 make that a reality.  ! l l 10 so I an here really to talk on their behalf about what ) i I 11 they have done at that plant, and a little bit about the  ! i . l j 12 environment we have to raise issues, raise concerns, and how j is we seek to address then professionally, as we know how to do. } l 14 I don't be.lieve our system at Georgia Power Company is i 15 broken. I believe our system at Georgia Power Company does t 16 work. l 17 I do think that the industry and its employees have t { 18 recognized that they have a vital and mutual stake in the free l 19 flow of information, of safety-related information at the l 4 20 plant. I really think that's just enlightened self-interest. l 1 9 21 . Responsible licensees, including us, have made it clear ! I 22 to each employee that the raising of safety concerns is not an i 23 opportunity, it is an obligation.- - 1 l 24 Georgia Power Company has a management philosophy of 25 openly, frankly identifying and communicating potential _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - , _ _ _ . _ . ~ , . . _ _ .

) r j 7s i j 1 problems in order to resolve problems at the earliest-possible We, in fact, maintain a probles list.- The way we' 2 stage.  ! f 3 manage our facilities to improve is to maintain a problem list  ! l 4 -- not a list of things we-are.doing well, but things we can l i 5 improve on. And we communicate that throughout the plants.-  ! t i f 6 it is the philosophy of ours to' deal with problems to make our f l 7 operations better. That's a philosophy in-all-that'we do -- l i - i j s to improve the margins of safety, and also the efficiency of i i-l 9 the plants that we own and operate. l f 10 The plants'have several systems for raising concerns.- We . !. 11 have something called a deficiency card system. It is an i a . ! 12 established method for plant employees or managers to document ! 13 and notify their supervision of potential quality and safety  : ! 14 concerns at the plant level.  ! l 15 We also operate a quality concern program dedicated to accepting and investigating nuclear safety and quality 16 l 17 concerns. Yes, those concerns can be submitted anonymously. la separately from that program, but really as a result of i j 19 the success of the concerns program at the plant, we also have j 20 a corporate concerns program so that any employee, including j 21 employees at the plants, can raise a concern at levels 1 22 reporting directly to the senior officers of our company, but i j.. 23 outside of their normal chain of command._ 1 j 24 I personally review with the manager of that department 25 issues that are raised by employees through that concern

   ,-        ,     --        em   --m.  .,,-m...-     -.-_% -,,,n.,.%.-.-            ,- , ,-.,w,,,     ,- - .   .r. 7,s..-ce,       ,..q.a-+-* meew ww e  vw - ure-rivre--w---

t, 79 i- 1 program evary three weeks. 2 I guess the other thing I would say to you is that 3 employees can and do contact me directly by phone or by mail. i 4 to discuss the issues that they want to discuss. If-I an 5 there and available, I talk to them about those issues. 6 Finally, the company maintains and encourages, both at i 7 the plant and the corporate level, open and frequent I ^ i 8 communication with NRC and the resident inspectors. { ! 9 I don't intend to rehash all of the allegations and , i j - 10 claims that Mr. Mosbaugh made against Georgia Power Company. i i 11 I simply prefer to say that he is not a victim of company. i

12 reprisal. Instead, his actions demonstrate, I think, an i

! 13 aberration -- an employee who abused the system for personal ] ! 14 advantage. i 15 The company repeatedly responded to each of Mr. l

16. Mosbaugh's concerns in honest and straightforward effort.to l

i 17 fully resolve the concerns as soon as.possible. l l 18 In the summer of 1990 Mr. Mosbaugh, the Georgia Power i j 19 general manager, and the NRC resident inspector met at the i j 20 request of the general manager. At that meeting Mr. Mosbaugh . 21 was directed to. articulate for the benefit of his employer and 22 the NRC all of his safety concerns. He indicated difficulty l 23 in formulating those concerns. 3 24 so a sanager outside his chain of cEmmand was assigned to i i 25 work with him to collect information to fully develop all of i i 4 4 4 4

                                                          ,_.,_..m..,       ,,y,.~, , . . . , . o.,   .,,m_  _.,,~,,y_.m..,..      .,...,___,y.

l so 1 his concerns. When, just a week later, Mr. Mosbaugh indicated 2 reluctance to cooperate with this manager, he was instructed 3' in writing to take his concerns to the NRC.rather than  ! 4 inspector.  ; 5 senator Lieberman: I'm sorry. Could you tell me again 6 what the time of these meetings was? , 7 Mr. Dahlberg: In the summer of 1990. s senator Lieberman:. Okay. This was after the incidents 9 that he has testified to in March of 19907 10 Mr. Dahlberg: That's correct. 11 That was made his top job priority -- to take those , 12 concerns to the MRC. f 13 The point here is that Georgia Power didn't just ' 14 encourage Mr. Mosbaugh to do that. They didn't make it just 15 the corporate' philosophy. But, in fact, they mandated that ha 16 do so, and he wasn't punished for that activity. 17 I did make the decision to terminate Allen Mosbaugh 18 because he ignored a trust placed in him by his fellow workers 19 and destroyed the open, candid, and free flow of 20 communications at the plant. He conducted a'six-month long l 21 covert operation in which he secretly and continuously taped 22 conversations with virtually every person he came into contact 23 with. i 24 Simply put, I fired Allan Mosbaugh not because he blev 25 the whistle, but because his actions of secretly taping y... --.m . ,e.,,v ,v.,, , & .. v, ,~ ,-, ~ ,,- - -<*.....

4 81

1 conversations clearly jeopardized our goal of maintaining open

! 2 and free-flowing conversations that I believe are vital -- 3 absolutely vital -- to assuring the safety of our amployees 4

4 and the public.

1 5 I guess if I were giving you some comments on flaws that l

6 exist -- and I think there are some -- going'through'all of 7 the incidents that we have gone through, there'has not yet 8 been a finding of any willful violation. There has not been
I 9 any finding ~in favor of a DOL finding that didn't uphold what I d

10 the company did. But hare we are, three and a half years i l 11 later, still dealing with the same issue, and that issue has 12 not been resolved. 13 There are so many forums, so many people involved', that l 14 the time it takes to resolve it is frustrating. It is  ; 1 ] 15 impossible -- not just for the whistleblower, but for the

16 company,-as well, for the other. employees, as well. So there i 17 is a frustration. There is something that needs to be done.  !

1  ! l 18 There are too many forums, too many procedures, too many

                               .                                                                 . i 19     mechanisms, too much time to try to resolve these issues.

20 senator Lieberman: once somebody files a complaint, in 21 other words, or once somebody blows the whistle, it is taking 22 too long to resolve, in your opinion? 23 Mr. Dahlberg: It may not even be'just blowing the 1 24 It may be raising an issue of concern that needs to whistle. , 25 be resolved.

l. ! 82 - 1 .

;               1                  I'll say this:                                                   when somebody raises.an issue with us'at l                2     the plant level through our concerns program we deal with it l                3      immediately.                                  But once it goes beyond that and there are other l               4      fcrums, other agencies, other. procedures, time _goes.on.

i . [ 5 The other flaw that.I will comment.on -- and it'.is a 6 difficult one -- there is a very great difficulty in l 7 distinguishing the person who raises' legitimate, honest safsty' i j s concerns from'one who does it for personal' gain. That's. ! 9 ancther issue. It'is another flaw and another difficult thing i 10 to deal with.- 1 l- 11. I believe that Georgia Power Company has taken.the right 12 actions in this case. I won't discuss the merits of the. ,

13 technical issues, but I will say again that there has not been l 14 a finding of any willful violation on the part of Georgia i

! 15 Power company. We create an environment to deal with issues. i )' 16 We want to deal with issues. It is'in our interest to do. i i 17 that. We must resolve them.' l 18 So I will say to you that we are running a good shop. It 1

19 is unfortunate that this incident comes up, and it is L

l 20 unfortunate that three-and-a-half years later we'are still 1 l,- 21 dealing with that same. 22 I an anxious to get on with it. We'are running.a. good

. 23 plant, and I want it to be demonstrated.
                                                                                                                                       ~

24 Mr. Chairman, I do thank you for the opportunity to be 1.. l 25 here. I didn't want to be here either, but I do think that ) i i l._ _ _ _ . . _..__. _ .. . _. _ _ _ . . _ . . . . _ . . , _ . . _ - . . _ _ _ . . . . - . . _ _ . . _ _ . . , . . _ _ . . . - . . , , . . . . ._._

I l 83 i 1 since it involves our plant and I think we do have a grcup of 2 good employees there, dedicated employees, professional 1 1 3 employees that are dealing with concerns and trying to make i

4 our plant one of the safest.in the world, I had an obligation j 5 to be here, and I appreciate very much that opportunity.

I 6 Thank you very much. i. ! 7 [The prepared statement of Mr. Dahlberg follows:) , i  ! 8 9 4 9 10 j )

  .            11

} 12 i

13 14 1

j 15 1 16 17 s 18 ] 19 i 1

,              20                                                                            1 21                                                                            ,

l l 22 23 - 1

!              24 25

l i lL

s4 l-1 Senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Dahlberg. We wanted to give you that opportunity.

2 l

              ~3              clearly, in' telling his' story Mr. Mosbaugh.made some 4   serious allegations here, and I accept your desire-to                                                             !

5' essentially deny them and not go into great detail.on them -- 6 particularly in regard to what happened to hin-after he made 7 the complaints. 8 I am going to'try to tread a thin line here, because

              '9   basically I wanted you'to come and have the opportunity to 10   respond.

11 But my question is, if you are comfortable in responding _ j I to it, about these two technical problems.that he says-he-12 .

                                                                                              ~

l 13 brought to light about the dilution valves and then about the 14 diesel generators, which is the one that seemed most graphic 15 to me as I was listening to this matter -- the question that 16 you need these back-up generators to-keep the coolant moving 17 through the' facility, or else there is a danger that it would, i 18 ' ovarhaat. l 19 This really goes to -- I'm trying to do this-in a way -- 20 because his testimony went to me on this point to the 21 importance of encouraging people within a plant to raise 22 concerns that they have about safety because the 'NRC ~ just

                                                                             ~

23 can't be everywhere, and these folks are on the line. They 24 are experts in this field. 25 Do you want to talk a little bit about -- let's focus-in I

                                                             , . .   .. ...,-c .- -.-, , - - . - , s-,-. -- ~      w--, e4wreasv

l 85 1 on the diesel generator problem. In. fact, I' gather from his l

             ~2    testimony that some of the concerns he had, leaving aside the                 '

3 whole question, which you have denied, about what was said to 4 whom when -- but the concerns that he raised were, in fact, l 5 ultimataly responded to beginning in June,.and then in August, 6 and this physical, technical situation was, in fact, 7 corrected.  ;

                                                                                               .I Mr. Chairman, we would respond to concerns        I a            Mr. Dahlberg:

9 that were raised by any employee to try to resolve then.- If 10 an issue was raised by someone we call a whistleblower, or.any -l 11 other employee in our plant, regardless of level, from the- l general manager down to the first-day employee, we would try.

                                                                     ~

12 l

13. to resolve those. And if we find marit in the specific issue j l

14 that is raised, certainly we would deal with it. l 15 The specifics in this case had gone-on for a long time. 16 I guess the difficulty in responding is the fact that there 17 were many tapes. I haven't heard those tapes. In fact, is people at our company haven't heard those tapes until very, 19 very recently. 20 The tape that was played here this morning we received on-21 July 5 of this year, even though that tape was done in 1990. 22 It is difficult for me to respond to a specific on a-23 tape, for example, when that tape was done two-and-a-half 24 years ago and we get the tape on July 5th and I hear it for 25 the first time 30 minutes ago. L q ..g .,

86 1 Now, it'is my view that perhaps there was a statement

d 2 that was filed that may have had inaccurate information, but I f 3- 'will tell'you that there has not been-a willful violation. In l

[ 4 sy listening of the tape the people were seeking clarification I 5 to make sure that accurate information was filed.

  • 6 If you want to take the time'to listen to every single

!~ ! 7 tape to make sure we have the contents correct,'I think that's 1 8 a fair thing. But if we are talking about the specifics,,I j 9 just don't think I am capable of doing that.

10 . senator Lieberman
I don't need to pursue that. I do j

11 vant to state for the record that the 7. apes are now a matter l 12 of public record, and we did play them. My staff played then } ' ~ 13' for some of your folks in the last week or so, but I have no 14 reason to doubt your statement that you have not heard then 3 15 before. I accept that to be absolutely valid. 16 Mr. Dahlberg: Senator, that is correct. The first time l l 17 we got that tape was from your staff, as a matter of fact. l 18 Senator Lieberman: Right. And we wanted to do that in l 19 fairness. I 20 Let me just see if I can rephrase just briefly the 21 question -- and, again, leaving aside this process. On the ' 22 specific question of the conceras that Mr. Mosbaugh expressed , i 23 about the diesel generatu s, is it fair to say that he had a 24 good point? This leaves aside the question of retaliation or 25 firing or any of that. i 4

87 1 Mr. Dahlberg: Sure. Any time you have an outage at a 2 plant and you have an incident like the one that we had, 3 issues that are raised with respect to any safety system are 4 important. So I'd say yes, the issue is important. 5 I have no question whatsoever that.the issue shouldn't I 6 have been raised. The issue should be raised. The issue j 7 should be dealt with. If improvements should be made in~the

?
         >s       safsty system, they should be made.

9 In all cases that I know of, that's exactly what happens. t I 10 Senator-Lieberman: Okay. 11' senatior simpson? l J 12 Senator simpson: Mr. Chairakn, I thank you. 1 13 If the primary focus of the hearing -- and I deeply-l j 14 believe the chairman -- is to focus on the process and the . l 15 timeliness of the process, I commend him, as I surely an i )' 16 doing, and I know that's what he started'out to do. j i . l 17 But obvicusly this case is one.of timeliness, and I j i ' 18 pledge *pu, Mr. Chairinan, to help with legislation to somehow ] 1 19 bring this to a focus where we don't have something

i I

20 languishing with the Department of Labor for three to five 4 21 years. This is stupid if we are talking about health and i 22 safety. And the record up there shows that sometimes it takes j 23 five years. ! 24 I'd love to get the Department of Labor in here by the 1 25 nap of the neck anu ask them why it takes five years to do

i' ._ (

as 1 this. And then, when they finish, it has got
to go to the 3-

$ 2 NRC. 3 Where do we think this is going to lead? :All of us who' 4 j 4 practice law know what happens with witnesses and their memory 5 and every other aspect of litigation when it is stalled out. } 6 You can't do this. This-is a -- I will pledge to help you 7 with the process, and_I know that we will draft something l 8 appropriate that we can both support. l l 9 Yes, we can obtain more resources, and yes, then r; vili j 10 come at-the expense of other safety issues, but I thina vt i i 11 vant to remember the NRC, as I understand it, is undergoing a i l 12 comprehensive review to try to better this' process. -They are 13 in it right now, and the review will be completed in mid-14 october, as I understand. And the committee I think-will i 15 certainly want to review that. 16 But why is it taking so long for this case to be 17 resolved? Do you have any thought? . I 18 Mr. Dahlberg: senator, I can't fully answer that, but I  : i l ! 19 do know that there are several reason that I can cite. l 20 First of all, when you start a proceeding there are 1 l 21 processes of - there is a process to expedite matters. In ! 22 the DOL case that was not exercised by the complainant, Mr. Mosbaugh. 23 So there is a proceeding for an expedited 24 resolution. That was not pursued. 25 Some of the delays, in fact, come from the complainant. I 1 i

89 1 In the area of discovery, we had to file several motions to 2 compel him to produce documents during discovery. We'had to 3 file those motions. And we have gone through several 4' proceedings. I 5 Mr. Mosbaugh indicated that we went through one 6 proceeding at DOL and then it was appealed. It went to a full 7 jury. We von that case. We have now gone to a second case 8 with DOL and we went to full _ hearings. We had the-9 administrative law judge. We put up witnesses. It took a lo long time. And we got a finding. We got a finding in that 11 case favorable to the company that said yes, we had the right 12 to terminate Mr. Mosbaugh. 13 We still don't have a final decision, but we do have that 14 draft order. 15 Why it takes that long I can't tell you, but there are 16 many steps in that process. 17 senator simpson: Was your access to the.NRC or his, as-18 you know it, limited in any way? In other'words, was access 19 to any investigative body limited? Were you limited? Was he l l 20 limited, as far as you know? You can't speak. He can speak 21 better for himself. But were you? l 22 Mr. Dahlberg: I knsw of no limitations on anyone's part. 23 senator simpson: And you say you provided all  ! 24 infornation to the NRC that could have ever been provided by l 25 your company? Is that what you are saying essentially?

                                                                                                        ]

l

  • a l

i

l i i 90 l 1 Mr. Dahlberg: Any infornation requested was,provided, 2 and any cooperation sought was given. 3 Senator simpson: And then you are saying that Mr. }. ' 4 Mosbaugh did not provide all information and material'to  ! 5 either'you or the NRc on a timely basis? 1 6. Mr. Dahlberg: In the DOL case that is correct, and in'  ! l 7 the case of the NRC, with respect to the tapes, we have not i i i a received the tapes until recently. l

9 In fact, during the course of discussions with the NRC, 10 even several months after he had begun taping, he didn't .

l 4 i 11 volunteer to provide those tapas. Even at such time as the 12 NRC asked him about the possibility of wearing a wire, he e i

13 didn't even tell him at that time that he had tapes and they l 14 were available and they were not provided.

! 15 Senator Simpson: Have they been provided now? I 16 Mr. Dahlberg: Yes, they have. 17 Senator simpson: And to you they were provided in -- ( 18 Mr. Dahlberg: By the Senator's staff a wee' ago. i l 19 Senator Simpson: Do you think that the problems of i ! 20 breach of confidentiality have led to where we sit today? 21 Mr. Dahlberg: No, sir. l 21 Senator Simpson: You think that everythi,ng was done i 23 properly, or that there were breaches or lacks of _ i i 24 confidentiality which gave problems to you? i 25 'Mr. Dahlberg: I don't think so. i

1 91 1 Senator Simpson: so you felt that you were as open with j 2 your documents and presentation of evidence, if you will --
3 poor word used in a chamber like this -- but-that you were 1

J

4 forthcoming?

l 5 Mr. Dahlberg: Yes, sir. l 6 senator Simpson: How many hours of tape recordings were i 1

7 performed here? l i i

! a Mr. Dahlberg: I can't tell you precisely, senator, but j i l l 9 there were thousands of conversations. I don't know in l 1 j 10 minutes, but there were thousands of conversations. They were i 11 taped. They were taped with people anywhere from secretaries 12 to plant managers to the NRC resident inspector. I i  ! 4 13 Senator Simpson: Is this case representative of anything f 14 that has happened like this to your company before? i l 15 Mr. Dahlberg: Not like this. No, sir. 16 Senator Simpson: You called it --:someone called it an l 17 aberration. , r , 18 Mr. Dahlberg: I called it an aberration. 19 Senator, let me clarify one thing. I'm not sure it is i j 20 clear, and I want to make sure we understand it. 21 When I terminated Mr. Mosbaugh for doing the taping -- 4 22 and I have talked about the free flow of information -- it put 23 se in this position: if I hadn't taken some action, it would 24 have, in a sense, said that we tolerate that behavior. So '- 25 every other employee in that plant would never have known if I i j

   . - -      -            . - - -             .. = - - .                 - - .           .   . .      -         -.
]

92-1- 3 -1 we tolerated the employee right next to him alse'vearing a 2 ' tape recording. ,

'3 If you created an environment where any' employee could h

L 4 wear a tape recorder and that was tolerated and accepted by-i 3 5 management and.then expect there to be a free flow of .

                                                                                                                                     'l 6'    information to discuss problems or opportunities for-
                                        ~

f 7 improvement or anything else in'the plant, it just'seemed to i a me that it could not possibly exist, and that the violation of l.

!          9'    trust with all other employees just disappeared and that I                                                            ;
h. .

didn't have any other opportunity. j 10 1 3 11 Senator Simpson: 'Let me ask you another question which - l 4 i 12 people do understand. , i 13 You have been through a lot of stuff here. You have been  ; r I ! 14 through a lot.of administrative procedures. You have had your  ! l 15 arm up and sworn yourself to testify at various hearings. At l \ l 16 every step along the way you have won; is that correct? f I 17 Mr. Dahlberg: That's correct. We got a technical l, l 18 violation, but never a willful violation. In all the steps in I 19 the Department of Labor at this point we have run.  ; j 20 Senator Simpson: I think that needs to be part of the  ! \ 21 record. I don't know where it is going from here. Let it go l through whatever process it goes through. But to this point, j 22 i ! 23 to be the subject of one who has not dont it correctly I think 1 l 24 is an inappropriate assessment. i l- 25 I thank you, Mr. chairman, very much for your patience l ! l 2 l i  ! L_.__....-____._._.___.__.___ . . . , . _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ _ . . _i

                                                                                     )
                                                                           ~93 1 and courtesy.

2 Senator Lieberman: Thank you, Senator Simpson. 3 I do want to indicate, just for the record -- and you are 4 absolutely right that on the retaliation question that's on 5 appeal and you have won up until now. The NRC did issue a 6 fine against the company'for a violation based on one of the 7 allegations that Mr. Mosbaugh made. 8 Mr. Dahlberg: Yes, sir. 9 Senator Lieberman: Again, this is not with regard to why 10 you fired him. This is.with regard to the safety in the 11 plant, or technical conduct in the plant. 12 Mr. Dahlberg: That is correct. It was on the first 13 issue that was raised, and that issue was resolved on 14 September 19, 1991. We did receive a technical violation with 15 the finding, and that was the date of the enforcement 16 conference. They did not find a willful violation. 17 Senator Lieberman: Maybe I'm confused. Ist me.just -- 18 my notes indicated that on June 12 of 1992 the NRC imposed a 19 civil penalty of $100,000 on Georgia Power with regard to the 20 dilution valve matter. Is that a separate matter? 21 Mr. Dahlberg: I think that is the same one. The, 22 enforcement conference was in September, and the fine I think 23 would have been issued subsequent to that. 24 Senator Lieberman: Right. And in fairness to you, 25 Georgia Power paid the penalty but stated that the violation

        .         .                         . _ ~      _  .       .   .

94 1 was not the result of anything the company did wrong but was

                                                                                             .I 2    .the result of ambiguous NRC guidance; is that right?

3' Mr. Dahlberg: ' I believe that's correct. Yes, sir. 4 Senator Lieberman: And this was the result-of the 5 investigation of the allegations that Mr. Mosbaugh'had brought j 6 in 1990? . 7 Mr. Dahlberg: That's correct. ' l 8 senator Lieberman: Okay. Just to come back to the 9 beginning here and the general' point'--_and you have said it,. . In.a way tkis is just to punctuate what you have said.

                                                   ~

10 The l 11 whistleblowers, or whatever you want to call them -- the 12 employees of the facilities have an important role to play, 13 don't they, in not just maintaining the safety day to day, but i 14 in feeling comfortable in making these allegations? l 15 Mr. Dahlberg: That's correct. f 16 senator Lieberman: Just because these are such big 17 operations and they are right out there knowing about it. And j 18 also you have expressed some frustration about the time that . 19 it takes to resolve these matters, both before the Department 20 of Labor and the NRC; is that fair to say? 21 Mr. Dahlberg: That is fair.  ! 22 senator Lieberman: ' nd A particularly the amount.of  ! 23 paperwork that is involved? 24 Mr. Dahlberg: Yes, sir. 25 senator Lieberman: I have no further questions. I thank _____;f

4 j 95 i-1 you for coming in and testifying. 2 Mr. Dahlberg: Thank you and the other members of the subcommittee. 3 4 senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Dahlberg. 5 We will now go on to the Inspector General cf the Nuclear

i 4

i 6 Regulatory Commission, Mr. David Williams. 't i l j 7 Mr. Williams, would you please raise your right hand? ! 8 [ Witness sworn.) , i 9 senator Lieberman: . Welcome. I'd appreciate it if you j 10 would introduce yourself and the gentleman that is with you 1 j , 11 and then proceed to summarize the report that is the basis of  ; i > 12 the hatring today. f j 13 l 14 , , r , 15 h 16  ; l l 17 , i j 18 , r 19 1 20 21 22 23 - 24 25

4 4 i: .

                                                                                                                                                                                                          ~

96' i [ l' #09 TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID C t WILLIAMS, INSPECTOR GENERAL, t

2 U.S. NUCLEAR REGUIATORY ' COMMISSION j
   ,.                                                                                                                                                                                               t 3                  #46 ACCOMPANIED BY:                                                                                                                                                       1 i;

4 ~#47MR.-LEO NORTON, ASSISTANT INSPECTOR, GENERAL FOR a g i~ ' ! 5 INVESTIGATIONS,'U.S. NUCLEAR'REGUIATORY COMMISSION' z r i i i 6 Mr. Williams: Thank you, Senator.' , 4 . . I 7 I an here with Leo Norton.- Ba'is.the. Assistant-Inspector'  ! f r General for' Investigations for By Organisation.

 ;                        a                                                                                                                           .

F 4 9 Mr. Chairman and Senator Simpson,' I as pleased for this l ! 10 opportunity.to appear before you today to discuss our. - l 4 I

,                       11                   inspection report entitled,'"NRC Response to Whistleblower                                                                                                                 j l
!                       12                   Retaliation Complaints. -                                                                                                                                                ;

i i i i- 13 Our inspection, conducted at your request, discusses the j I l 14 NRC-process for handling allegations of retaliation against j 15 whistleblowers who report health and safety issues to.their .l ! 16 management or to the NRC. l 17 Our inspection was initiated in 1992 based on the' receipt !- 18 of serious complaints from current and former nuclear. licensee  ; l-l 19 employees.  : I j 20 The purpose of our inspection was to examine and better  ! 4 1 i 21 understand the nature of the complaints and the magnitude of r! - i f 22 the problem. f-4 1

.                        23                                     The inspection. disclosed substantial dissatisfaction                                                                                                   .

{ q 24 among the allegers, as well as many NRC staff involved with , 1 l l 25 the process. The NRC process of delaying action until the

!                                                                                                                                                                                                                       I i

t

97 1 Department of Labor concludes its proceedings contributes to 1 2 the untimely resolution of whistleblower complaints. This  ! 3 process essentially leaves the whistleblower with the feeling 4 of being left out in the cold. 5 Tne result is a chilling effect for'both whistleblowers l 1 6 and co-workers who say have additional safety concerns to;

                                                                                                           -]

7 report. Thess' findings'suggest the need'for substantial j 8 additional work by the Cosniasion and my_ office to reconsider-  ! 9 and attempt to improve the' manner in which we address

                                                                                                            \

10 whistleblower retaliation complaints in the_ nuclear industry.  ! 11 The NRC has the responsibility for regulating the 12 operation of 112 licensed nuclear power plants and more than 13 8,000 materials licensees. The magnitude of the licensed j 14 activities is so extensive that the NRC can only inspect a 15 fraction of them. Therefore,I he t NRC relies on licensee and i 16 contractor employees to report safety concerns. I 17 If employees are subjected to rethliation by their ] la employers for reporting safety concerns, there is a potential 19 chilling effect which has serious health and safety 20 ' implications. 21 Although the NRC can initiate an investigation at any . I 22 time during the DOL process, the agencies agreed in a 1982 23 memorandum of understanding that the NRC would not normally- j 24 conduct a parallel investigation. NRC regulations and Federal 25 statutes allow enforcement actions against licensees which-I

I-i 9a s .1 .could; include: denying, revoking,'or. suspending a license; 4 2 imposing various. civil penalties; and initiating criminal- j i; J 3 investigations. i 4 while the NRC enforcement authority is directed'at'the

j. 5 licensees, the DCL authority is directed toward restoring the 6 . employee's job status when appropriate.

l 7 Between October of 1988_-and April'of 1993 the NRC ) received a total of 609.rstaliation_ complaints and initiated j s i.. . . I 9 full-scalalinvestigations for 44 af-them. .Of these. (  ; i

          -complaints, 369 were also filed with the Department.of-Labor.

l 10 A l !' 11 Based on the complaints received, seven NRC enforcement' j i .. actions were taken against licenseer during.the period;

    -12                                                                                                                        l 5
                                                                                                                               /

! 13~ however, no individuals have been prosecuted. criminally.-

                                                                                                                               )

l ! 14 The two charts on display before you describe'a j I ! 15 description of the NRC and the DCL resolution of the l i 16 retaliation complaints. Based on our interview, several i- 17 issues surfaced that were common to the complaints received } j' 18 from the whistleblowers which I would like to describe. 19 First, I'd like to discuss the perceived lack of timely i' i j 20 NRC response to retaliation complaints. i 21 Whistleblowers felt that the Government.does little to l l l 22 protect them from retaliation or to investigate their ! 23 allegations of retaliation in a timely manner, They felt i ! 24 abandoned because the NRC waited for. the DOL to datermine i l 25 whether the whistleblowers were subjected to retaliation. i (

99 1- .A number of NRC staff interviewed by.OIG agreed that'a 2 lack of aggressive and timely NRC response to the complaints 3 of retaliation can send a message to whistleblowers that l 4 retaliation complaints are not a priority matter. 5 Further, the licensees received the message that acts- of

         '6  retaliation will not be met with firm and rapid response from 7  the NRC.              This lack of timely action results in a chilling a  effset for whistleblowers and.their co-workers.

9 Next, let me turn to the questionable impact of NRC's 10 chilling effect letter. . 11 When the Department of Labor finds for an alleger:in'a 12 retaliation case, the NRC sends the~ licensee a chilling. affect l 13 letter. The licensee must respond to this letter.and explain ), 14 its program to ensure that retaliatory acts have not had a i 15 chilling effect on other employees. , l 16 Several NRC staff felt that the letter was ineffective 17 and had no deterrent effect for licensees. Also, the staff

        ^18  told us that NRC did not routinely verify representations and 19   licensee responses to the chilling effect letters.

20 The next matter I'd like to discuss involves the 21 whistleblower's belief that their identities were being 22 compromised when they followed the very procedures that NRC 23 has in place to protect their identities. . The NRC encourages 1 l 24 licensee employers to first' attempt.to resolve their technical 25 concerns with the licensee management. If this attempt'is I

i 100 4 1 unsuccessfu.i, the employee is-encouraged to report the concern i' 2 to the NRC. 4 $ -3 If the employee follows this path,.the~ employee is ) j- 4 identified by management.'as being concerned about particular-5 safety issues.- Should the eaployee report the technical. L l 6 ' issues to the NRC and the NRC inspects these same issues, the 4 - 7 employee could easily be identified. l I } s Disclosurement alleges ~ identity through this process is  ; i-

9 known as' fingerprinting. i i

! 10 The individuals we interviewed offered suggestions for 11 changing the agency policy for responding to whistleblower i l 12 complaints. One idea offered was for the NRC to. vigorously: l J ! 13 use the wrongdoer rule. This regulation allows the NRC to j - - ! 14 order that a person be removed'from licensel activities. ! is substantial criticism was directed at the NRC practice of. 4 16 penalizing only the corporate entity for retaliation. [ 17 Allegers maintain that individual managers responsible ! 18 for willful acts of retaliation were net penalized and often i h 19 continued working in the nuclear industry. j 20 Attorneys representing both allegers and industry 21 licensees concurred that the use of the wrongdoer rule is a 22 potentially effective means of assigning responsibility.to 23 individuals found guilty of villful misconduct. I 24 Another suggestion focused on protection for actively i { 25 employed allagers during the NRC investigations. Many of l 1 i. __ _ _ ._ _ _ . -}}