ML20082C012
| ML20082C012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 04/04/1995 |
| From: | Bockhold G GEORGIA POWER CO., SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082B958 | List: |
| References | |
| 93-671-OLA-3, OLA-3, NUDOCS 9504060123 | |
| Download: ML20082C012 (22) | |
Text
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9:
5RTED CORRESPONDENCE D0CKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
% APR -4 All :06 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENE 1_ ' DC...[F SE GLIARY.
~
KEi m LLW!iCf Ei ANi;H In the Matter of Docket Nos. 50-424-OLA-3 GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, 31 gl.
50-425-OLA-3 Re: License Amendment (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, :
(Transfer to Units 1 and 2)
Southern Nuclear)
ASLBP NO. 93-671-OLA-3 i
PREFILED TESTIMONY OF GEORGE BOCKHOLD, JR.
i ON DIESEL GENERATOR REPORTING ISSUES 9504060123 950404 PDR ADOCK 05000424 T
7
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TESTIMONY OF GEORGE BOCEBOLD, JR.
i
-2
'Q:
PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME FOR THE RECORD.
3 A:
My name is George Bockhold, Jr.
4 Q:
PLEASE STATE YOUR-WORK
- POSITION, BUSINESS ADDRESS AND
-t 5
QUALIFICATIONS.
6 A:
I an ' employed by Southern Nuclear Operating. Company, Inc.
7
(" Southern Nuclear"), as General Manager, Nuclear Technical 8
Services. My business address is 40 Inverness Center Parkway, 9
Birmingham, Alabama 35242.
A summary of my professional 10 qualifications is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
11 Q:
WHAT ARE YOUR PRESENT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES?
12 A:
My responsibilities include corporate support for work control 13 reengineering, associated with Plants
- Farley, Hatch and 14 Vogtle, advance reactor activities and other special projects.
15 Q:
TO WHOM DO YOU REPORT?
16 A:
I report to Mr. Louis B.
Long, Vice President, Technical I
17 Services, Southern Nuclear.
18 Q:
WHAT WAS YOUR POSITION ON MARCH 20, 19907 19.
A:
I was Georgia Power Company's ("GPC") General Manager of the 20 Vogtle Electric Generating Plant ("Vogtle") in Waynesboro, 21 Georgia.
~~
1-Q:
WHAT? OCCURRED ON MARCH 20, 1990 AT VLAFf. VOGTLE?
~
2 A:
During a refueling outage Vogtle Unit en0 lost off-site power 3
and when Unit one's "A" Diesel Generoke J"DG") failed, GPC 4
declared a Site Area Emergency ('SAEM) ht that time, the 5
other Unit One DG "B"
was unava) h?k 3 (
R4e to scheduled 6
maintenance during the outage.
7 Q:
WHAT WAS THE PLANT'S RESPONSE TO THE SAE7 8
A:
Our first priority was to place the Plant into a safe 9
condition. and then plan the " recovery" of the ant in 10 accordance with an approved schedule of activities.
In 11 addition, I and my staff at the Vogtle site investigated the 12 event.
We also responded to a Confirmation of Action (" COA")
13 letter to GPC (S.gg McCoy Exh. B; GPC Exh. 4) which the NRC 14 issued on March 23, 1990.
We further responded to two NRC 15 inspection teams, an Augmented Inspection Team ("AIT") and an 16 Incident Investigation Team ("IIT").
17 Q:
WHAT ISSUES DID YOU AND YOUR STAFF FOCUS ON WHILE 18 INVESTIGATING THE EVENT?
19 A:
Technical reviews needed to be conducted in many areas, 20 specifically, truck and vehicle access to the switch yard:
21 off-site emergency notification; personnel accountability 22 during emergency events; communication difficulties between 23 the site and corporate office; loss of core cooling 24 capabilities during the loss of off-site power due to reduced,
1 water inventories as a result of planned outage activities; 2~
and diesel generator performance.
3 Q:
WHAT' INVOLVEMENT DID YOU HAVE WITH THE IIT?
4 A:
As General Manager, I was the primary person responsible for 5
Georgia Power's response to the IIT.
Most of my. contact with 6
the IIT was with Mr. Al Chaffee, the team leader.
I, and my 7
staff n.et with members of the IIT on an on-going basis to keep 8
them apprised of progress made in the investigation of the SAE 9
as well as the testing of the DGs.
There was a voluminous 10 amount of information delivered to NRC personnel during this 11 period to facilitate the NRC's involvement in investigating 12 the SAE and the special testing conducted on the DGs.
I 13 specifically recall reviewing with the IIT members the type 14 of, and schedule for, the testing to be conducted on the DGs.
15 Because the level of detail was so great, to adequately inform 16 the NRC, I
assigned several Vogtle employees, who were 17 familiar with specific issues, to assist in my preparations 18 and provide information directly to different members of the 19 IIT.
20 Q:
DID GPC GIVE A PRESENTATION TO THE NRC IN SUPPORT OF RESTART 21 OF VOGTLE UNIT 17 22 A:
Yes.
On April 9, 1990, GPC made an oral presentation to the 23 NRC in the Region II offices.
The presentation was in 24 response to a verbal request by the NRC and the March 23, 1990,
- 7..
~1 COA letter and was in support of GPC's request for Vogtle Unit 2
1 Restart Approval.
3 Q:
WHEN DID YOU LEARN THAT A PRESENTATION WAS TO BE MADE TO THE 4
NRC AND WHAT WAS THE PRESENTATION TO ADDRESS?
5 A:
Prior to the weekend of April 7 and 8, 1990, I was informed 6
that GPC had been requested to make a presentation to the NRC 7
in support of its request to restart Unit 1 and that certain 8
issues raised by the NRC had to be addressed as well as 9
lessons learned by GPC from the SAE event.
The DGs were 10 clearly one of the issues that had to be addressed.
Other 11 issues just as important were access control; mid-loop 12 configuration and outage planning; ENN functions; emergency 13 director actions; and accountability of personnel.
14 Q:
WERE YOU FAMILIAR WITH ALL OF THE DETAILS REGARDING THESE 15 ISSUES?
16 A:
No, I was not.
During the course of time that the IIT was at-17 Vogtle, many issues and facts were discussed with different 18 members of the IIT.
I was aware of the general aspects of the 1
19 issues, but was not knowledgeable of all of the details of 20 each issue.
I relied upon my staff to provide me with j
21 necessary information, particularly details, in order to 22 propurly prepare for the presentation. -
y b
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j 1?
Q:
HOW DID YOU PREPARE FOR THIS PRESENTATION AND IN PARTICULAR, e
2-WHAT_DID YOU DO TO PREPARE FOR ADDRESSING THE DG' ISSUE?
! 3_
-A:
_.The materials that were used during.the presentation were 4
assembled -on transparencies the.. weekend : prior to the.
5 presentation by myself with the help of various staff members.
6-In reference to the'DGs, I assigned Mr. Jimmy Paul Cash, thG.
7-Unit Superintendent, who was a senior' member of the Event' 8
Critique Team and a degreed and licensed SRO, to provide'me 9
with the' supporting DG start data for the meeting..
10 Q:
WHAT DID YOU INTEND TO PRESENT WITH RESPECT TO THE DGS?
11-A:
I knew GPC had to address the issue of operability of the DGs.
12 Also, since the root cause of the 1A DG failure was still not j
13 conclusively known, there needed to be some discussion about 14 the suspected cause, which was thought to be problems with the 15 Calcon sensors.
As a result, it was my intention to present 16 an overview of the special testing of the DGs that had been
~
17 conducted immediately after the SAE.
Two transparencies,
'18 attached hereto as composite Exhibit B,
were prepared 19 addressing the DGs.
The first described the testing of the 20 DGs and contained a~ statement as to the number of successful 21 starts for the 1A and 1B DGs.
The second transparency set 22.
forth the quarantine components and identified the various 23 temperature and pressure switches that malfunctioned following 24 the March 20 SAE.
-- \\
h;
((r-j 11 With respect to the. testing of the DGs, I. intended.to
.2 present a-number of' consecutive successful starts as support-3 for the-position that the DGs would perform their intended i
4 function.
I did not intend to.present a. complete accounting e
{
5 of all the DG starts since the SAE..
Generally, the 6-presentation was to present - a ' review of the comprehensive
.l
~ 7 testing of the DGs and demonstrate that Georgia Power had used 8
the best industry practices to declare the DGs operable.
9 Q:
WHAT DIRECTIONS DID YOU GIVE MR. CASH WHEN YOU ASSIGNED HIM TO 10 GATHER THIS INFORMATION FOR YOU?
11 A:
I instructed Mr. Cash ' to review the operators' logs and 12 determine how many consecutive successful DG starts had been 13 made with no significant problems.
14 Q:
WERE YOU AWARE OF THE NUMBER OF DG STARTS THAT OCCURRED DURING 15 THE TESTING PERIOD?
l 16 A:
No'.
I was aware of the general activities of testing and was j
17.
briefed on the testing status contemporaneous with those
.l 18 events.
I had also discussed these activities with members of i
19 the IIT on a daily basis.
However, while I was aware that 20 there had been numerous DG starts, an exact number was beyond 21 my knowledge at that time.
.l I ]
7 _.
'4 I
l'-
Q:
DO YOU KNOW WHAT INFORMATION MR. CASH ' REVIEWED _ IN ORDER TO -
1 2'
OBTAIN THE NUMBER OF DG STARTS?
4 ;3 -
A:
Yes.
Mr. Cash obtained the DG. information from renewing the 4:
control room's ' Unit Control Logs and. the Shift Supervisor 5
Logs.
I believed at the time that 'Mr.
Cash,-- with his
'6 experience.in. operations, would be-able to obtain-the
'7 information that I
requested, especially since he had 8
previously reviewed the control room logs to obtain DG start.
9 information for the Event Critique Team.
I 10 Q:
DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE LOGS WERE UP TO DATE AT THE TIME YOU i
11-REQUESTED MR. CASH TO REVIEW THEM?
12 A:
I, along with Plant personnel, was generally aware'that the
.13 Engineering Department DG Start Log was not up to date.- The 14 primary reason I requested Mr. Cash to review the logs was 15 because the Start Log was not up to date and the utilization i
16' of Operations Department logs was necessary.
In fact, had 17 there been one current single source record containing updated 18 information about the DGs, I doubt that the problem that later 19 developed would have occurred.
-20 Q:
WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE INFORMATION REGARDING DG STARTS THAT 21 MR. CASH GAVE TO YOU?
22 A:
That information was included on the draft transparency 23 (Exhibit B, p. 1) and used during the presentation to the NRC 24 on April 9, 1990.
4 1
Q:
AT THE TIME MR. CASH GAVE YOU THE INFORMATION, DID YOU KNOW 2
THE STARTING POINT WHERE HE BEGAN COUNTING STARTS?
3 A:
I do not recall whether I knew the exact point where Mr. Cash 4
began his count.
However, at the time, I understood the 5
starting point was after overhaul and after sensor call' oration 6
and logic testing.
This was consistent with the DG testing 7
transparency (Exhibit B, p.
- 1) presented on April 9,
- 1990, 8
which included the 1B DG starts after sensor calibration and 9
logic testing.
10 Q:
IN THE PRESENTATION, WAS IT YOUR INTENTION FOR THE STARTS TO 11 RELATE TO THE TERM " VALID TEST"?
12 A:
I did not intend the number of DG starts to relate to DG valid 13 tests as that term is used in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.108.
14 This, I believe, was evident during the April 9 presentation.
15 The starts largely occurred prior to the time the DGs were 16 declared operable and the Diesel Testing transparency (Exhibit 17 B,
p.
19 Q:
WHAT WAS THE RELEVANCE OF THE NUMBER OF DG START COUNTS?
20 A:
A number of starts on essentially identical DGs, coupled with 21 surveillance tests and other special
. testing provided 22 sufficient evidence that the DGs were operable and reliable 23 and would be able to perform their intended function if called 24 upon in the future.
s 1
Q:
WHAT WAS THE IMPORTANCE OF..THE NUMBER OF STARTS TO YOU IN THE y'
2 APRIL 9,.1990 PRESENTATION TO THE NRC?
-3 A:
I did'not believe a specific number of successiul DG starts
~#
was necessary to demonstrate that the DGs were reliable... If 5.
the number had been 10 or 12, that would have been sufficient 6
'for me for the message that I intended to convey.
7 Q:
IS THERE ANY OTHER REASON THAT YOU FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE 8
INFORMATION THAT YOU PRESENTED ON APRIL 9, 1990 TO THE NRC?
9 A:
Yes.
After the.SAE and during the DG testing period, IIT 10 members and Region II inspectors were present at Vogtle 11 observed various aspects of the DG testing sequence.
- Also, 12 there were many discussions with IIT and Regien II personnel 13 regarding the testing program, including the results and 14 problems that were encountered during the testing period.
A I
15 number of those NRC representatives attended the April 9 16 presentation.
l 17 Q:
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU WERE JUSTIFIED IN RELYING ON MR.
18 CASH'S INFORMATION AS IT WAS PRESENTED TO YOU?
19 A:
I believed at the time that Mr. Cash had the experience to 20 obtain the information I requested. As General Manager, I was 21 aware of a lot of general information, but not the minute 22 details of the DG testing.
This is true of a lot of the 23 issues that were investigated during the period of time 24 following the SAE.
As a result, I relied upon Mr. Cash to -,- -
'l obtain for me. the detailed information that was requested.
1 I
2
- However, I
realize that as General Manager,- I had a
3 responsibility to assure that I understood the factual basis 4
of the information Mr. Cash obtained for me and which I
'5 subsequently communicated to the NRC.
I realize that I failed 6
to ensure that the data provided to me was the information 7
that I asked for and intended to present to the NRC on April 8
9, 1990.
9 Q:
AT THE TIME OF THE PRESENTATION DID YOU KNOW THAT THERE WERE 10 NOT 19 CONSECUTIVE, SUCCESSFUL STARTS FOR THE 1B DG7 11 A:
No.
At that time, I had no indication that Mr. Cash did not 12 follow or understand the instructions for his assignment and 13 there was nothing to indicate to me a reason to question Mr.
14 Cash on the information he presented to me.
15 Q.
DID MR. CASH ATTEND THE APRIL 9 PRESENTATION?
16 A.
Yes.
17 Q.
DID YOU AND MR. CASH DISCUSS THE DIESEL STARTS INFORMATION AT 18 THE END OF THE PRESENTATION?
19 A.
Yes.
Mr. Cash mentioned to me at the end of the presentation 20 that the starts indicated on the Diesel Testing transparency 21 (Exhibit B, p.1) were not " valid successful tests" as defined f
f 22 in Reg. Guide 1.108.
I responded to him by explaining that I'
23 everyone was aware of that because a number of the starts i
l
1 shown were clearly prior to the time that the diesel was 2
declared operable.
3 Q:
WAS THE INFORMATION THAT WAS PRESENTED TO THE NRC DURING THE 4
PRESENTATION EVER REDUCED TO WRITING?
5 A:
Yes.
Basically, the same information that was presented to 6
the NRC during the presentation on April 9,
1990 was also 7
included in GPC's April 9, 1990 COA Response letter to the 8
NRC.
.9 Q:
WAS IT INTENDED THAT THE APRIL 9,1990 LETTER CONTAIN THE SAME 10 DG START COUNT INFORMATION REFERRED TO IN THE PRESENTATION?
11 A:
Yes.
The April 9, 1990 letter stated that the IB DG had been 12 started 19 times and that no failures or problems occurred 13 during any of those starts.
This is essentially the same 14 information that was presented orally to the NRC.
15 Q:
WAS A LICENSE EVENT REPORT ("LER") SUBMITTED TO THE NRC WITH 16 RESPECT TO THE SAE?
17 A:
Yes.
On April 19, 1990, LER 90-006 was submitted by GPC to 18 the NRC addressing the SAE.
I 19 Q:
WHAT WAS YOUR INVOLVEMENT IN THE PREPARATION OF THE LER?
20 A:
I reviewed drafts of the LER.
The LER was based primarily on 21 the data that was presented to the NRC on April 9, 1990 and 22 also included in the April 9,
1990 letter to the NRC.
In i.
E
'1 addition, I was aware as of April 19, 1990 that there had been 2
additional starts of the DGs between April 9, 1990 and' April
.3 19, 1990, although the specific number was not known to me..
4 During-a group telephone conference on April 19, 1990 which 5
was recorded by Mr. Mosbaugh (333 transcript of Tape 58, GPC 6
Exhibit 2, at p. 8), I was informed that the Technical Support J
7 Department personnel were in.the process of reviewing the 8
control room logs to verify the DG start count number.
In 9
fact, Mr. John G. Aufdenkampe, the Vogtie Manager - Technical 10 Support informed me that his staff came up with greater than 11 20 starts by using numbers from the April 9, 1990 letter and
'12 adding the number of starts that occurred between April 9,
13 1990 and April 19, 1990.
Id. at 7.
14 Q:
DID YOU GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THE 18 AND 19 DG STARTS OCCURRED j
15 AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE COMPREHT.NSIVE TEST PROGRAM 16
("CTP")?
17 A:
Yes, as the transcript of Tape 58 indicates (ggg GPC Exhibit 18 2,
at p. 8), I informed the other individuals that Mr. Cash 19 had verified the start count number I used at the presentation 20 and assured everyone that the start count numbers were not 21 before the CTP. ;
y v
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]
s 8
- Q '
u 1
Q:
AT THE' TIME, WERE YOU AWARE OF ANY INFORMATION THAT WOULD 1
- ?.
INDICATE THAT YOUR REPRESENTATION WAS INACCURATE?.
j
\\
3-A 7.
No.
I understood the comprehensive test program of the diesel 4
control systems ended with the~ final recalibration of the 5
sensors and logic testing, i.e., after all the " bugs" had been 6'
worked out of the DGs.
There had been additional starts l
7 between April 9,1990 and April 19, 1990.
The LER stated that 8
there were at least 18 starts.
At the time, this'information i
9 and my knowledge from April 9,
1990. led me to provide the 10 strong assurances that I did on April 19, 1990.
11
'Q:
WHAT DID THE LER STATE AS TO THE NUMBER OF DG STARTS?
12 A:
The final signed LER stated:
13 Numerous sensor calibrations (including jacket water 14 temperatures),
special pneumatic leak testing,-
and 15 multiple engine starts and runs were performed under 16 various conditions. After the 3-20-90 event, the control 17 systems of both engines have been subjected to a 18 comprehensive test program.
Subsequent to this. test 19 program, DG1A and DG1B have been started at least 18 20 times each and no failures or problems have occurred 21 during any of these starts. In addition, an undervoltage 22 start test without air roll was conducted on 4-6-90 and 23 DG1A started and loaded properly.
24 Q:
WAS THE "AT LEAST 18 TIMES EACH" STATEMENT ACCURATE?
25 A:
Only when the term comprehensive test program ("CTP") of the j
26 control systems is understood to end with recalibration of 27 the Calcon sensors.
. l
.~
~
F t
1
.Q:
DO YOU BELIEVE THE TERM CTP WAS. CLEAR AND THAT THERE WAS AN 2
UNDERSTANDING OF ITS MEANING?
3 A:
At the time I believed it was clear.
My understanding of the 4-term was after recalibration of the calcon sensors.
I now 5
believe the term CTP could reasonably be interpreted to 6
include testing which continued beyond the point of the sensor 7
rscalibrations and logic testing.
8 Q:
DO YOU BELIEVE YOUR ACTIONS CONTRIBUTED TO A LAX VERIFICATION l
9 OF THE INFORMATION.
10 A:
I do now, yes.
When I reviewed the April 19,.1990 LER, I j
11 relied upon the prior count used on April 9, 1990.
On April 12 19, 1990, I should have made sure my staf f completed the 13 verification effort. I now realize my statements contributed 14 to a lax verification effort.
More importantly, I relied on 15 my own understanding that as of April 9, 1990, there were at 16 least 18 consecutive, successful starts after' overhaul and 17 sensor calibration and logic testing, and that any " problem" 18 starts would be excluded from the count.
Knowing the 19 information was to be communicated to the NRC, I should have 20 applied a higher standard of care.
21 Q:
WHEN WAS IT BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION THAT THE START COUNT 22 INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO THE NRC WAS INACCURATE?
23 A:
On April 30, 1990, Mr. Allen Mosbaugh gave me a memorandum 24 with an attached listing of 1B DG starts, wnich,- when
V 1'
confirmed on May 2,1990, showed that the start count reported' 2.
in the April 9,
1990 presentation, ' the April 9,- 1990 COA 3-letter response and the April 19, 1990 LER were incorrect.
i i
4 Q:.
WHAT DID YOU DO WHEN YOU WERE PRESENTED WITH THIS INFORMATION?
5
'A:
I requested Mr. Mosbaugh to obtain the correct information and.
-6 prepare appropriate documentation to be sent to the NRC and 7
correct the previously filed documents.
8 Q:
WHAT ELSE, IF ANYTHING, OCCURRED DURING THAT TIME?
9 A:
During May of 1990 the Plant staff had problems determining an 10 accurate DG start count and in early June I learned that Mr.
11 Hairston had requested an audit of thL DG start data.
12 Q:
WAS THE NRC ORALLY ADVISED OF THE ERROR IN THE DG STARTS 13 STATEMENT?
.14 A:
I know that in May, 1990 George Hairston called Stewart 15 Ebneter of the NRC and advised him that the original start i
16 count numbers were correct, and that Mr. McCoy called the NRC 17 as well.
In addition, either I called the NRC Resident 18 Inspector or requested John Aufdenkampe to inform the NRC 19 Resident Inspector of the error.in the statement.
i 20 Q:
WAS A REVISED LER 90-006 AND COVER LETTER PROVIDED TO NRC?
21 A:
Yes.
On June 29, 1990, GPC submitted a cover letter and 22 revised LER, which I reviewed. The cover letter corrected the a
{
. + -
-r.
1 DG start data previously-included in the LER which was the 2
same data included in the April 9, 1990 letter and therefore, 3
I believe that the correction of the LER acted as a correction 4
of the April 9, 1990 letter.
5 Q:
DID YOU BELIEVE THAT THE JUNE 29, 1990 LETTER WAS ACCURATE AND 6
COMPLETE?
7 A:
Yes.
I believed at the time that it was consistent with my 8
personal knowledge.
I now realize I missed an opportunity to 9
rectify any misunderstanding associated with the phrase 10 comprehensive test ' program of the control systems.
In 11 hindsight, I should have told the drafters, and the cover 12 letter should have specifically indicated what my original 13 meaning of that phrase was at the time.
If I had assured that 14 their information was complete, it is very possible that we 15 might have recognized that the correction of June 29 did not 16 address and correct the underlying problem in the April 9,
17 1990 letter.
18 Q:
WHY DIDN'T YOU POINT OUT TO THE DRAFTERS OF THE JUNE 29 LETTER 19 THAT THERE WERE OTHER CAUSES OF THE ERROR IN THE APRIL 19 LER?
20 A:
At the
- time, I
believed that the Safety Analysis and 21 Engineering Review Group audit report did identify the cause.
22 However, had I been aware at the time of Mr. Mosbaugh's 23 comments, recorded on June 29, 1990 (gpe transcript of Tape 24 187, attached to Mr. Greene's testimony as Exhibit B; GPC Exh.
I I
F
}
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l 1J 44), I' would have realized that another cause should also have.
j l
2-been set forth in the letter, personnel. errors as contributing i
3 to the failure to resolve the underlying error in the April 9, 4
1990 letter and the April 19, 1990 letter.
l j
5 Q:
WERE ANY OTHER LETTERS SUBMITTED TO THE NRC ' REGARDING THE 6
DIESEL GENERATOR START COUNT INFORMATION?
7 A:
Yes.
On August 30, 1990, GPC submitted a further letter to 8~
the NRC.-
333 McCoy Exh. P (GPC Exh. 18).
l l
9 Q:
WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE AUGUST 30, 1990 LETTER?
-j 10 A:
The purpose of the letter was to respond to a requent from NRC 11 inspectors during the August, 1990 OSI inspection to clarify 12
- the information included in the April 9,1990 presentation and 13 letter.
I 14 Q:
WHAT WAS YOUR ROLE WITH REGARD TO THIS LETTER?
15~
A:
I, along with the Plant Review Board reviewed this letter 16 prior to its submission to the NRC.
17 Q:
WHAT CHANGES DID YOU PROPOSE TO THE LETTER?
18 A:
I changed the wording in the first sentence of the third 19 paragraph in the letter from " errors" to " confusion."
In j
i 20 August 1990, I did not believe that Jimmy Paul Cash, the Unit 21 Superintendent was confused when he performed his original 22 count prior to the April 9,
1990 presentation.
I believed I -.
my
. s;r <, gm l
1 that the confusion arose later, after the NRC and GPC 2
personnel debated:the terminology that was used to describe l
3 the starts.
4 Q:
WHAT MESSAGE WERE YOU INTENDING TO CONVEY IN THE' AUGUST 30, 5-1990 LETTER?
6 A:
It was my intention to explain that the confusion in'the April-7 9,
1990 letter and the original' LER was a result of.two 8
factors.
The first was confusion in the distinction between 9
successful starts and a valid start, which I believed.to be 10 both a Georgia Power and NRC confusion.
The second was that 11 GPC had erred in its count of the DG starts.
l 12 Q:
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOUR CHANGES WERE CLEAR ENOUGH SO THAT THE i
13 NRC WAS ABLE TO UNDERSTAND WHAT " CONFUSION" MEANT?
14 A:
No.
I directed the changes in the letter.
The' wording that 15 I proposed was subsequently interpreted by the NRC as stating 16 that the start counter's confusion caused the error in the 17 April 9, 1990 letter.
This was not my intent.
I should have 18-taken greater care and provided a fuller articulation of the 19 matter using input from those members of my staff who had j
20 taken the time to comprehensively review the issue.
L' i
GPC EXHIBIT 20 BOCKHOLD EX. A Summary of Professional Qualifications for George Bockhold, Jr.
General. Manager, - Nuclear Technical Services, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Birmingham, Alabama 1992 - Present
- Corporate support for work control reengineering, associated with Plant Farley, Hatch and Vogtle, advance reactor activities and other special projects.
Electric Power Research Institute, Senior Manager, Palo Alto, California - 1990-1992
- Managed programs to establish new plant designs Georgia Power Company, General Manager, Nuclear Operations, Plant Vogtle, Waynesboro, Georgia - 1983-1990
- Directed startup and operation of Plant Vogtle Units 1 and 2.
Georgia Power Company, Manager, Nuclear Training, Atlanta, Georgia - 1981-1983
- Managed initial startup and operations of the Georgia Power Company training centers.
Vice President - General Physics, Chattanooga, Tennessee - 1976-1981 Nuclear Training Director, Con Edison, Indian Point, New York - 1975-1976 Production Engineer, Con Edison, Indian Point, New York - 1971-1974 Commissioned Naval Officer, U.S. Navy - 1966-1971 Earned a B.S. Degree in Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy - 1966 d
l l
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i GPC EX111 BIT 21 i
BOCKHOLD EX B DIESELIESTIN6
- NORMAL 36 MONTH OVERHAUL AND INSPECTION
- SPECIAL TESTING i
JA 11 3/20 EVENT IN OVERHAUL 5 STARTS, TROUBLESHOOTING SENSOR CALIBRATION LOGIC TESTING E-RUN BUBBLE TESTING
~
MULTIPLE STARTS (14)
UV RuN TEST 6 MONTH RUN SURVEILLANCE DIESEL OPERABLE UV RUN TEST SENSOR CALIBRATION LOGIC TESTING E-RuN BUBBLE TESTING LUBE OIL DCP RuN MULTIPLE STARTS (5)
DCP UV RUN FUNCTIONAL UV RuN TEST 6 MONTH SURVEILLANCE DIESEL OPERABLE HI JACKET WATER RUNS (3)
DCP UV RUN TEST 18 SUCCESSFtL STARTS 19 SUCCESSFUL STARTS
1 QUARANTINE C0ff0NENTS TDPERATURE SWITCES 1
e 1A PROBABLE TRIP CAUSE JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE (2/3 LOGtc) 1 INTERMITTENT 1 POST CALIBRATION LOW (186*FVENTING) e 1A OTHER TEMPERATURE COMPONENTS 1 LUBE Oil TEMPERATURE (SLUGGISH)
)
e IB TEMPERATURE COMFGIENTS 11 JACKET WATER TEMP (VENTING) 2 LUBE Oil TEMP (VENTING & CAL!B.)
PRESSURE SWITCES e 1A 1 LUBE Ott PRESSURE (TRIPPED) 2 LUBE Ott PRESSURE (CONSERVAT!YELY REPLACED) :
e IB 2 logic (WOULD NOT TRIP ENGINE) i