ML20117D341

Detailed Control Room Design Review Final Summary Rept

ML20117D341
Person / Time
Site:	Dresden, Quad Cities, 05000000
Issue date:	05/31/1985
From:	COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
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ML17195A777	List: ML20117D341
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 NUDOCS 8505100083
Download: ML20117D341 (420)

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COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY QTJAD CITIES STATION.

DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FINAL STJMMMY REPOR'"

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION VOLUME 1 MAY 1985 4

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h f PREFACE The following document was prepared jointly by the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) ahd Human Factors Technology Group of the Advanced . Resource Development (ARD) Corporation. The ARD Cornoration assisted CECO throughout all phases of the Control Room Design Review (CRDR).

This report contains - the Commonwealth Edison Company's Quad

{ Cities Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) final summarv renort, as per CECO's April 14, 1983, response-to NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, and to the NRC's subsequent June 12, 1984, confirmatory order (Docket Numbers 50-254/265) to Mr.

Dennis L. Farrar from Mr. Domenic B. Vessollo

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SECTION ~

PAGE VOL. 1 DCRDR FINAL

SUMMARY

REPORT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION PREFACE ii k-

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1-1 1.1 Objectives 1-1 2.0 OVERVIEW 2-1

{ 2.1 Review Phase 2-1 2.2 Foundation Processes 2-3 2.3 Investigative Processes 2-3 2.4 Assessment Phase 2-4 2.5 Reporting Phase 2-4 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING 3-1 3.1 DCRDR Team 3-1 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENTATION CONTROL 4-1 4.1 Output Documentation 4-2 4.2 Document Control 4-3 4.3 Database Management System 4-3 5.0 COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES 5-1 6.0 REVIEW PROCESS 6-1 6.1 Historical Event Review 6-1 6.2 Operating Experience Review 6-7 6.3 Task Analysis 6-14 6.4 Control Room Inventory 6-20 6.5 Verification of Task Performance 6-32 6.6 Validation of Control Room Functions 6-38 6.7 Control Room Survey 6-43 7.0 HED ASSESSMENT 7-1 8.0 HED IMPLEMENTATION 8-1 8.1 General 8-1 8.2 Labeling _ 8-3 8.3 Annunciator 8-4 8.4 Enhancements 8-4 8.5 Verification of Corrective Actions 8-5

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e TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) b SECTION PAGE APPENDICES A FORMS B NUM9ER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR 9URVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DI9CREPANCIES C MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING: PERSONNEL D CODES f E RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUREG-0700 SECTION 6 AND CECO CHECKLIST l

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

SECTION PAGE VOL. 2 DCRDR FINAL

SUMMARY

REPORT REVIEW FINDINGS

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1.0 CHECKLIST 1.1 Control Room Workspace 1.2 Communications 1.3 Annunciator Warning systems 1.4 Controls 1.5 Visual Displays 1.6 Labels and Location Aids 1.7 Process Computers 1.8 Panel Layout 1.9 Control Display Integration f 2.0 HISTORICAL REVIEW 3.0 OPERATOR SURVEY 4.0 VALIDATION 5.0 VERIFICATION

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l.0 INTRODUCTION The detailed control room design review (DCRDR) is part of a broad program designed by the nuclear industry and the federal

( government to ensure consideration of human factors in nuclear-power plant design and operation. The purpose of the Quad Cities DCRDR- was to review and evaluate the control room workspace, instrumentation, controls and other equipment from a human factors standpoint, taking into account both system demands and operator capabilities. Secondly,-the human factors review identified, assessed and will implement control room design modifications which correct inadequate or - unsuitable items.

1.1 Obiectives The following were the DCRDR objectives identified for the Quad Cities _ Nuclear Generating Station:

1.1.1 Determine whether the control room provides the system ' status information, control capabilities, feedback, and analytic aids necessary for control room operators to. accomplish their functions effectively.

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I 1.1.2 Identify characteristics of the existing control room

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instrumentation, controls, other equipment, and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance.

1.1.3 Analyze and evaluate the problems that' could arise from the f aforementioned human engineering discrepancies, and to analyze means of correcting those discrepancies which could lead to

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1.1.4 Define and put into effect a plan of action that applies human factors principles to improve control room design and enhance

, operator effectiveness; particular emphasis should be placed on improvements affecting control room design and operator performance under emergency. conditions.

1.1.5 Integration of the control room design review with other areas of human factors inquiry identified in the NRC Task Action Plan.

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2.0 OVERVIEW The CECO Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) evaluates the control room workspace, instrumentation, controls and other equipment from the human factors engineering perspective. Both system demands and operator capabilities were taken into account. The Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) identified in the review phase were assessed by the Human Engineering Discrepancy Assessment Team (HEDAT). For those HEDs signif-icant enough- to warrant- a corrective action, this team identified and assessed control room improvements which would correct the problems described in the HEDs. A tentative corrective action schedule based upon the safety significance and human factors importance was also established. As indicated in the CECO response to the NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, this schedule is dependant upon the NRC's response to this report and the results of the integration of all Supplement 1 initiative modifications.

2.1 Review Phases The control room were reviewed to determine if-the control room provides the. operator with the system status. information, control .- capabilities, feedback, and performance aids necessary to accomplish- this function -and task ef fectively. Characteris-'

tics nf - the existing control room instrumentation, controls, other equipment and physical arrangements that may detract from operator performance were also - identified during this phase.

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These review processes were used to collect pertinent information and/or to identify human engineering discrepancies

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within the control room.

2.1.1 Operating Experience Review - An operating personnel survey and a review of historical reports was conducted to identify conditions which affect probability for those operator errors which could affect safe operation of the generating stations.

f Industry-wide Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for similarly designed control rooms that have generic applicability, were included in this review. Operating personnel were also interviewed to obtain feedback based on previous operating experience.

2.1.2 A review of system functions and an analysis of the tasks involved in contiol room operator functions -

this using the BWROG EPGs as the base document established information requirements, and performance criteria for the tasks which operators must accomplish.

2.1.3 An inventory of control room instrumentation and equipment -

Itemized and described the existing control room components for comparison with the information, control, equipment, and material requirements identified in the system functions review and task analysis.

2.1.4 A survey of the human engineering acceptability of control roon components and environmental conditions such as lighting, noise / sound control, etc. -.This identified whether the control 2-2

L room components and environment were designed to accommodate basic human characteristics such as physical size and perceptual-motor capabilities.

2.1.5 Verification of task performance capabilities - Assessed the adequacy of workstations to support the execution of control room operator tasks. The verification was made by comparing the information and control requirements derived from the task analysis to the inventory of existing instrumentation, controls and their equipment.

2.1.6 Validation of control room functions - Was conducted to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be accomplished within the structure of the defined Emergency Operating Procedures and the design of the control room as it exists.

2.2 Foundation Processes The first three are foundation processes in which frame of reference and benchmark for identification of discrepancies were established. The last three are investigative processes with which the benchmarks were used to identify Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).-

2.3 Investigative Processes The investigative processes used the data collected during the foundation processes to determine the adequacy of control room operators' tasks and functions from a human engineering perspective by comparing the data against the human factors benchmarks - established during- these processes. Deficiencies 2-3

were identified and documented during this part of the review.

L It was during this part of the review that the control room survey of the control boards was conducted. This survey was

( followed by a verification of task performance capabilities, including the verification of instrumentation and control availability and suitability.

1 Subsequent to the verification process, a validation of the control room functions was conducted to determine whether the functions allocated to the control _ room operating crew could be accomplished within the structure of operating, emergency operating procedures and the design of the existing control room.

2.4 Assessment Phase Upon completion of the DCRDR investigations, a review of the HEDs was conducted by the human engineering discrepancy assessment team (HEDAT). The review served to identify the significance of each of the HEDs, as well as provide the review team the opportunity to determine the appropriate actions necessary to correct'the HEDs. A schedule was then developed.

2.5 Reporting Phase The following report represents the methodology, findings and conclusions from the Quad Cities Generating Station Detailed Control Room Design Review. The review was conducted by Commonwealth Edison Company with extensive human factors engineering support from ARD Corporation, Columbia, Maryland.

This report was prepared to show compliance with NUREG-0737 Supplement 1.

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. l 3.0 MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING The purpose of thy Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was to identify and correct those features in the control room environment'which were not in concert ' with the safe and effi-  ;,

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cient operation of the facility. The DCRDR ' activities were implemented by experienced operatigns, nuclear systems, and human factors engineering personnel.

3.1 DCRDR Team s I The Quad -Cities DCRDR team consist ed of a group of professionals from various disciplines with the wide range of skills necessary for' the perfofmance of, the design review and included:

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o I&C encineering s o . Nuclear systems engineering  ;,,

-o Human factors engineerihg ,

o Operations i

This core group was supplemented, as. required. During the course of -the review, any additional. specialists ( e .lg . , -

lighting, - ac'ous tic s ) required for specific tasks were' madeN available as needed.

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, Prior to beginning the review, team members were selected and familiarized with the methods and content of relevant NRC documents, general human factors engineering principles, and methodology. Team members were also provided the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the general design and operation of the plants. Any general or specific procedural issues were resolved at this point.

The review team members were encouraged to document dissenting opinions, regarding ~HEDs, if appropriate. They were also provided access to plant facilities, personnel, necessary documents, and information required to perform their assigned tasks.

A statement of responsibility and qualifications was provided for each team member under agreement with the NRC at the commencement of the station's DCRDR within the Commonwealth Edison system, and this statement is included in Appendix C.

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( 4.0 DOCUMENTATION AND DOCUMENT CONTROL This section describes the documentation system (input / output documents) and documentation management / control procedures which CECO used to support the Quad Cities Detailed Control

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Room Design Reviews.

From the beginning of the review, the team had at its disposal the following reference documents:

, o System Lists o System Descriptions o Piping and Instrumentation Drawings o Control Room Floor Plan (Lighting, HVAC, Acoustics, etc.)

o Panel Layout Drawings o Panel Photographs o List of Acronyms, Abbreviations o Description of Control Room Coding Conventions o Samples of Computer Printouts o Procedures (Emergency, Abnormal and Operating) o Guidelines for Procedural Development o Other Human Factors / Control Room Studios

.As additional documents were acquired or written, they .were added to the library.

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L 4.1 Output Documentation In order to facilitate systematizing and recording Control Room

( l Design Reviews, a series of standard forms was developed. The forms used are listed below and appear in their entirety in Appendix A.

o Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record o Questionnaire Item Summary Form o Personnel Survey Summary Form o Index of Reviewed Reports

( o Historical Report Problem Status Report o Historical Report Review Error Analysis Problem Analysis Report o Control Room Review Task Development o System Review Summary Reference o Instrument Control Form o Validation Review Worksheet o Pre-assessment Form o Sound Survey Record o Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record o Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record o Humidity / Temperature Record o Air Velocity Survey Record o Photographic Log o Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement form o Control Room Design Review Operator Survey o Inventory Form o Controller Inventory Form 4-2

1 L 4.2 Document Control The Commonwealth Edison Company recognized that a data collec-(

tion / analysis effort, such as that inherent in a DCRDR, can generate volumes of paperwork which, if managed improperly, could result in a great loss of time and money. CECO, therefore, implemented a database management sytem (DBMS) to collect, update, analyze and provide the information necessary to fulfill the requirements of DCRDRs on a dedicated com-puter. An example of a method used the CRDR DBMS is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Implementation of the DBMS

( minimized the number of manual transformation steps required in the data collection / analysis effort. Furthermore, it afforded the DCRDR team the capability of real-time data analysis.

{ Through the use of the DBMS parameters, any number or combination o5 data points was accessed and analyzed on an as-needed basis.

4.2 Dy abase Management System The D9MS was implemented on CECO's Prime 2250 computer using INFO /INFOTEXT. It consists of a master program with memory storage devices to hold the - data extracted from various source documents. Because manual handling of data is largely elimi-nated after data is entered into the system, the DBMS greatly i

reduced duplication of efforts, document loss and errors resulting from unnecessary handling of data.

After the DBMS was implemented, the series of data files and records was created using information derived from the various source documents. Each source document contained specific ,

I forms, charts, schedules, etc., required for the DCRDR and each

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constituted a single data file. Data files, in turn, comprised individual records which represent the specific parameters l

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DATA BASE USER (S) SOFTWARE DATA BASE STORAGE CONFIGURATIOR

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OUTPUT REPORTS a SCREENS Figure 4.1 Sample Human Factors Evaluation

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L contained in the file forms, charts, etc. The file then served as a model of the document from which it was created, as well as an area to store data records. The source documents in-cluded those reports and forms listed previously in this chapter. To avoid file damage or unauthorized data manipula-tion, access to the DBMS was restricted by limiting user training and by issuing passwords to a limited number of users.

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l L t 5.0 COORDINATION WITH OTHER SUPPLEMENT 1 NUREG-0737 INITIATIVES 1

( Commonwealth Edison Company has a coordinated program to I

address each of the Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 initiatives.

k This program extends throughout its system of nuclear generating stations and has specific provisious for each

( station. This program is headed by CECO Station Nuclear Engineering Department which provides the necessary coordination _anel support to ensure that a systematic approach is adopted for the inclusion of each of the recommended design changes resulting from these initiatives. This integrated approach is intended to optimize the interface within the control room network. Details of this process, including schedules were provided in Commonwealth Edison's April 14, 1983 submittal to the NRC.

The design of the Safety Parameter Display System '(SPDS), the R.G. 1.97 based instrument displays, the development of function-oriented emergency operating procedure, the training of the operating staff,' and the DCRDR are being coordinated in a manner which takes full advantage of the scheduling of each of these initiatives, and is being integrated with respect to the overall improvement of .the operator's ability to comprehend plant conditions and cope with emergencies.

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Design changes will be coordinated with the informational

! database collected as a function of the DCRDR. In addition, the corrective action modifications resulting from the DCRDR will he evaluated for their effects on these programs. The coordination of the DCRDR and these other programs include provisions for operator retraining and upgrading of operating procedures when necessary to reflect the physical changes made in the control room.

Functions and tasks have been analyzed to determine information and control needs and identify operator tasks during emergency operations. This analysis will be used to verify the complete-ness of the emergency operating procedure, and will serve as the basis for verifying the SPDS parameters.

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F 6.0 REVIEW PROCESS The DCRDR -review process resulted in the identification of a number of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs). These HEDs were evaluated to determine the extent to which they may affect

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the potential of operating crew errors. Also requiring consideration were the recommendations for improvement or correction that the Human Factors Specialists made for the discrepancies discovered in the DCRDR investigative processes.

Once the HEDs were evaluated and a recommended improvement (if appl.icable) agreed upon, most improvements will be implemented according to a schedule based on the relative significance of the HED.

6.1 Historical Event Review-6.1.1 Introduction The objective of the Historical Event Review was to utilize L

! archival documentation of control room problems to identify areas to . investigate to ensure that the man-machine interface perspective was adequately addressed in order to significantly reduce or minimize the potential for subsequent human error.

Human error in performing- complicated -tasks is a. well.

documented fact and the potential for it- is always present. In the nuclear power industry, ; human error can combine with poor design features and contribute ~ to serious operational problems. Fortunately,.'in. the industry, . instances of past 6-1

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L human performance error and equipment / design arrangement problems are documented in plant and industry records and can be used as a database for recommending design improvements.

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i wetion presents the process used to review several such docume.: 'n to identify areas of potential human performance probleme at Commonwealth Edison Company's Quad Cities Units 1 and 2.

Th.sre were five sources of historical reports available for this review at Quad Cities station. Three of the sources were in-house - documentation and consisted of Quad Cities Licensee Event Reports (LERs), Quad Cities Deviation Reports (DVRs), and

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Quad Cities Professional Committee Reports (PROS). The other two sources of documentation were industry-wide sources and consisted of Significant Event Reports (SERs) and Significant Operating Event Reports (SOERs). These latter two sources were

-NSAC/INPO reviewed reports available to the review team through Commonwealth Edison Company. All five sources were utilized at Quad Cities station for the Historical Event Review.

6.1.2 Methodology The following paragraphs delineate the .. processes used to collect, screen, prioritize, and evaluate .the documents identified above.

6.1.2.1 Collecting the Historical Reports i

In its- archives, Quad Cities station has a copy of every LER, DVR and PRO report generated at that station. A Human Factors Specialist ,HFS) ( reviewed each of the above reports for Quad Cities's Units 1 'and 2 from January of 1979 to October of 1984. In addition, every NSAC/INPO SER and SOER. report -from their beginning in 1979 following the accident at Three Mile Island Unit . 2, until March of 1984, . was reviewed by an HFS.

The purpose of the review was - to identify those reports that 6-2

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involved control room operator, procedural and/or control board equipment failure and/or design arrangement errors. Copies of reports so identified were made for further screening. Over 1,250 reports were reviewed for Quad citier station.

6.1.2.2 Screening the Historical Reports After collecting all potentially relevant reports for Quad Cities station the reports were -screened by an HFS with the assistance of a Subject Matter Expert (SME) and the DCRDR Coordinator, to determine if the -report described and documented a control room problem. Because this was a Detailed Control Room Design Review, only reports applicable to the

( control room were retained for further analysis. Reports were considered to document a control room problem if they met any one or more of the following criteria:

A) Equipment referenced (valve / pump controls, displays, indicators, etc.) must be in the physical confines of the control room.

B) Procedure steps referenced must be accomplished within the physical confines of the control room.

l C) Personnel error referenced must have occurred in the.

d control room on equipment contained in the control room, or entailed a deviation from procedures that were to be accomplished in the control room.

r 6.1.2.3 Prioritizing the Historical Reports A detailed analysis of every report passing the collection and screening process would have been. very time consuming and of dubious value. The . reports were therefore evaluated and categorized in priority by an HFS and an SME to ellow the review team to focus the historical review effort. Reports t

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A) The consequences of the report either had a significant effect .on plant operation, or had the potential for having a significant effect on plant operation.

B) The report documented personnel injury, radiation exposure in excess of CECO limits, or had the potential for significant adverse effect on the public

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C) The report documeted a trip / scram, derating, or unit outage.

D) The report documented equipment damage in excess of

$100,000.00.

Reoorts not meeting any of these criteria were considered to be Low in priority. All high-priority reports were evaluated.

The evaluation of Low priority reports was left to the discretion of the DCRDR Coordinator pending time and manpower i constraints. At Quad Cities one low-priority report was evaluated.

A total of 42 in-house reports were selected and prioritized at Quad Cities. Of these, 28 were evaluated to .be High in

priority and 14 were evaluated to be Low in priority. A total of 18 non-in-house reports was selected and prioritized. All were evaluated as High in priority. Of these 18 reports, four were determined to be of potential applicability to Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) of Quad Cities' vintage, and consequently only these four non-in-house reports were evaluated at Quad Cities.

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7 L 6.1.2.4 Report Review and Evaluation I A Problem Analysis Report (PAR) was completed for each report investigated. A blank copy of the PAR can be found in the appendix. The following information was recorded for each report:

Investigators' names Station name

- Unit (s) on which the problem occurred DCRDR index number of the report' which was

( assigned by the HFS Type and number of the report involved Effect of the incident on the unit Problem as documented in the report Any corrective action taken or proposed as documented in the report.

A copy of each report and its PAR was put in a Historical Review project notebook, along with an index of all reports selected and prioritized. Though the low-priority reports were put in the notebook, no PAR was completed for them unless they were investigated. The project notebook was kept. and maintained by the HFS. At the conclusion of the Historical Event Review phase of Ouad Cities' DCRDR, the project notebook was delivered to the DCRDR Coordinator for inclusion in Quad Cities' DCRDR records, and is available for review.

t For each report investigated, the HFS obtained copies of appropriate documentation to allow the HFS to identify the .

individuals involved in the incident and the operating conditions of the unit / plant at the time of the incident. In most cases, the Shift Engineer's log was sufficient for this purpose. In some instances, however, additional documentation, such as the unit log, center desk log, and/or a SCRAM report, 6-5

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( was collected. Any and all such documentation was placed in the project notebook with the report and PAP. to which it  ;

related.

A preliminary investigation was then conducted by the HFS for each high-priority report. This investigation included the interviewing of individuals associated with or familiar with each problem, and the examination of equipment and procedures associated with the problem. These investigations continued until the HFS had amassed enough data to determine whether the i documented problem had been corrected from a human factors perspective or not. If the problem had been corrected, the

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"yes" line on the PAR was checked and no further investigations were made. If the HFS determined that the problem had not been adequately addressed from a human factors perspective, and hence was still uncorrected, the "no" line was checked and the investigation and analysis of that problem continued. These additional investigations consisted of a more in-depth examina-l tion of equipment and procedures and the interviewing of as many individuals associated with or familiar with the problem as possible.

Though interview notes were taken by the HFS, individuals were assured of complete confidentiality; consequently, these notes are not available for review. When the HFS felt he had collected enough data to determine the fundamental causes of the problem and ascertain its corrective status from a human factors perspective, the investigation of the problem ceased.

.If, at this point, the HFS determined that the problem had not been adequately addressed and that additional human engineering corrective action could be taken to minimize the probability of the problem recurring, a control room Human Engineering Discrepancy form (HED) was completed and the HED number entered in the appropriate space on the PAR.

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i The above process for report review and investigation differed

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slightly for the non-in-house reports. Since there were no 0

individuals on site who were involved in the incidents described in the reports, alternative individuals were interviewed. These alternative individuals were people knowledgeable with the Quad Cities systems and/or procedures i involved- in the incident and included' experienced reactor operators, shift engineers, nuclear engineers, shift foremen, and operating engineers. This was the only investigative

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6.1.3 Results A total of 29 reports and problems were investigated at Quad Cities. As a result of the investigative process described above, seven problems were evaluated as uncorrected and had HEDs written. These findings (HEDs) are contained in Volume 2.

6.2 Operating Experience Review 6.2.1 Obiectives The chiective of the operator survey was to obtain special, pertinent knowledge that operating personnel at Commonwealth Edison Comnany's Quad Cities plant possess regarding both positive and negative control room system features which they have experienced and/or observed in the course of preparing for operations or during operations themselves.

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6.2.2 Methods 6.2.2.1 Development of the Self-Administered Questionnaire U

The open-ended, self-administered questionnaire was structured to address the following nine content-topic areas as suggested in NUREG-0700:-

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L o Workspace Layout and Environment o Panel Design o Annunciator Warning System I o Communications o Process Computers o Corrective and Preventive Maintenance o Procedures o Staffing and Job Design o Training A draft questionnaire was prepared from a pool of survey

( questions assembled for each topic area. The question orientation was predominately like the Critical Incident

[ Technique to ensure as objective responses as possible.

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Items retained in the final questionnaire met the following criteria:

Simplicity -

questions were direct, enployed common everyday language and were as brief as possible.

Clarity - questions were unambiguous.

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Objectivity -

questions were free of emotionally charged words such as good / bad, strong / weak, etc.

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surveys are susceptible to social desirability, leniency, central tendency, and halo-type errors. Retained items were those' that had the minimum tendency toward these. error types.

?As an aid 'in the evaluation process, the team members used a rating ' scale to judge each item on each of the above criteria.

The questioh ratings were then averaged across the criteria to-determine which would be included in the questionnaire.

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H Finally, the questions were sorted into topic areas to ensure the area was sampled adequately as to item content. ARD personnel selected the finni set of items for inclusion in the questionnaire. The resulting questionnaire, with accompanying explanatory materials, was then distributed to the operators.

Copies of the diatribution packet are on file and available for review.

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Each question in the nine topic areas was posed as an open-ended question. Operators were encouraged to describe in detail the specifics upon which their responses were based. In the cover letter operators were reminded to consider all modes of plant operation, including start-up, hot standby, full power, and reduced power, in addition to possible abnormal or emergency operating conditions. Opinions regarding both

" problem" and beneficial design features of the control room were solicited.

l Each respondent was also asked to fill out a separate sheet detailing his background, level of experience, and current status at Quad Cities.

( 6.2.2.2 Distribution of the Self-Administered Questionnaire These questionnaires were distributed to sixty-three personnel, based on a list prepared by CECO. The participants included non-licensed operations personnel, licensed operations personnel, and licenced non-operations personnel at the Quad Cities. At the time of distribution, the questionnaire recipients received a briefing emphasizing major elements of the cover letter. These included an explanation of the 3

purpose, a general description of the questionnaire and 4 instructions for the questionnarie, assurance of confiden-tiality, explanation of what will be done with the results, and a request to fill.out the background / biographical information.

The operators were given two weeks to fill out the self-admin-6-9

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L istered questionnaire and to return it by mail to the Assistant Superintendant for Operation in a self-addressed, stamped envelope that had been provided. He gave the unopened

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envelopes to ARD. Confidentiality was assured by assigning each questionnaire a number. The list of potential respondents and corresponding numbers were kept in confidence by ARD personnel.

6.2.2.3 Analysis of Responses to the Self-Administered

( Questionnaire ARD personnel logged the twenty-six questi9nnaires that were returned (41.3%) and tallied t'a demographic information.

Written responses were reviewed for each question and then summarized on a Questionnaire Item Summary Form (OISF). A sample of this form can be found in Appendix A. Responses

( which addressed the same issue were collapsed into a summary h statement of the concern, with an associated count of the frequency with which that concern had been mentioned.

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Ambiguous responses were noted and during the follow up interviews clarification was obtained f om the relevant person j who aave the response.

6.2.2.4 Follow-up Interviews The objectives of the follow-up interviews were as follows:

o To clarify ambiguities in an individual's written responses to the self-administered questionnaire o To gather additional details (e.g.,- system or component information) pertaining to that individual's responses 6-10 t

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L Thus, there were a few issues that were discussed with each interviewee and these varied from one individual to the next, depending on each person's written responses on the self-administered questionnaire. The results of the interviews were recorded on the appropriate QISF.

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6.2.2.5 Integration of Interview Data with Self-Administered

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Questionnaire Responses The information compiled previously from the self-administered questionnaires was enhanced based on the follow-up interviews.

k Ambiguities noted previously were resolved and, where appropriate, specifics such as system or component names were

( added. The items were investigated further by the human factors specialist to determine whether responses were in accordance with sound human engineering conventions and practices. Positive and negative responses which were in compliance were designated as " Acceptable" in the appropriate space on the QISF. Positive responses and negative responses deemed not in compliance were designated as "Not Acceptable" on the QISF. Negative responses evaluated to be in compliance were designated as " Complaints" in the appropriate space on the QISF,. A human engineering discrepancy (HED) was generated for each "Not Acceptable" summary item. Subsequently, these prospective HEDs were evaluated by the assessment team to determine whether they were valid HEDs.

6.2.2.6 Biographical Information The biographical data information- collected with the questionnaries was summed and averaged by type of operator group. . .This provided the human factors specialist and the review team with an indication of the demographics of the population upon which the survey response data is based. This information is. provided on Personnel Survey- Summary Form (PSSF). . For a sample of a completed PSSF, see Figure 6.1.

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PERSONNEL SURVEY St9 MARY FORM

~

k 1. HFS Analyst: R. DUSEK

2. Ssation: nitan C TTTF9

( Population Demographics and Statistics PEAN STATISTICS Group N Sex Height Age Nuclear Control Board # Yrs fYrs M F Operation Operation R0 SRO Experience Experience Non-Licensed Operator Licensed Operators 16 16 5'11" 31.8 9.4 4.2 4.4 .8

( "',',d 7,g,,,, 8 8 5'10.3" 33.3 8.4 .9 1.1 3.5 o

Simulator Instructor 24 24 5'11.1" 32.3 9.1 3.1 3.3' 1.7

(

MEDIAN STATISTICS Group N Sex Height Age Nuclear Control Board fYrs fYrs M F Operation Operation R0 SRO Experience Experience Non-Licensed Operator Licensed Operators 16 16 6'0" 30.0 10.0 6.0 6.0 0

(*,'"'p'erations 8 8 5'10,5" 33.5 9.0 0.0 0.5 3.0 ,

o Simulator l'nstructor b'r811 24 24 6'0" 31.0 10.00 3.5 3.0 0.1 Figure 6-1 Completed Personnel Survey Summary Form 6-12

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6.2.3 Findings As a result of the operator survey, the human factors

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specialist identified ninety eight summaries to questionnaire items as prospective human engineering discrepancies. These were written up and later reviewed by the assessment team.

After their review, they designated sixty two valid human-engineering discrepancies (HEDs) which were elated to the results obtained from the operator survey.

The HEDs were associated with summaries based on responses to questionnaire items on the operator survey; however, since

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there was some redundancy with responses to different questions and to other parts of the CRDR review, there were more associations to the summaries than there were valid HEDs (62).

The largest number of associations to HEDs (7) were for the armaries of the questionnaire item " identify the system (s) in f which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be". Five associations were with summaries on the item

" identify any additional display which would be helpful in the main control room".

The following questionnaire items each had four summaries associated with HEDs: " identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are confusing or difficult to understand";

" describe any inconsistencies between training and actual control room operations".

There were three associations for summaries for each of the following questions: " describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other problems"; " identify any control device (s) that should be operated manually instead- of automatically or vice versa";

" identify equipment (controls, displays) in the main control 6-13

f 3

room which are difficult to read or monitor"; " describe any systems ( s) in the control room which you feel are difficult or

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confusing to operate"; " describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidentally

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activated"; " identify and describe these alarm tiles that have an inappropriate setpoint, that is, those that give the operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem".

The associations of summaries for other items on the operator f survey to HEDs are oiven in Appendix B.

6.3 Task halysis

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6.3.1 Method The objective of the Quad Cities Detailed. Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) task analysis was to establish the input and output requirements of control room operators' tasks under emergency conditions. The Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)

Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPGs) outline the steps necessary to mitigate symptoms associated with reactor control, primary and secondary containment, as well as radioactivity release. They generically orient the reader to follow various steps in sequence and/or concurrently in a success path, with contingencies for unsuccessful attempts at symptom alleviation. Because of their comprehensiveness -in outlining symptoms associated with such a wide variety of events and exercising all affected system modes, the EPGs were selected as a source document for task development. Developing task statements from EPGs takes full advantage of multidisciplinary efforts directed towards discerning system and subsystem functions and man-machine interactions. In addition, system ,

enhancements made in later generation plants than Quad Cities were taken into account during the time the EPGs were written.

6-14

L 5

This made available the opportunity to rev ew functions L possibly not addressed when the plant was constructed.

(- 6.3.2 Site-Specific EPG Develo; nent At the time of the Quad Cities review, a determination was made by Subject Matter Experts as to which sections of the generic document were applicable at Quad Cities and which systems should be utilized in a given situation.

A site specific document was therefore developed for the purpose of aiding task development. Each section of the now

( site specific EPG were read in context. Operator actions which were implied or stated were then written as task statements.

( The entire EPG document was examined and all unique tasks identified, coded with a task number, and grouped into the prevailing system being exercised or acted upon. The tasks

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were also cross-referenced to the EPGs by placing the task number next to the paragraph from which the task came. A direct link from the EPGs to the task listings was therefore created. This set the stage for additional questions to be asked about each task, and for task development into elements (action steps) to begin.

6.3.3. Development of Task Elements (Action Steps)

Action steps, or elements as they are referred -to here, are gleaned from subject matter experts (SMEs). This process was performed outside the control room as much as possibl9, albeit proximity of procedures, P& ids, electrical schematics, additional expertise and cues which would enable SMEs to be more thorough, necessitated frequent referral to resources which could ensure a comprehensive study.

Questions relating to conditions under which the tasks were 6-15

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5 performed were asked of the SMEs as well as those which F

L elicited initiating cues, the frequency with which the task was I

performed, and the performance criteria' and/or goal that each l'

task sought to fulfill. These questions provided additional

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information about task performance which gave the analysts and SMEs a context in which to discern operator actions. The task elements simply reflect a step-by-step procedural set of actions that must be carried out in order to accomplish the task. It is important to note that the task analysis performed for DCRDR purposes was not done from a "what exists" k perspective, but rather from the perspective of "what should be".

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If action steps needed to be taken inside the control room which, by design, are performed elsewhere, the steps were

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written as if an SME were not confined by existing design, An example of this variance from reality would be writirg an action step which requires an operator to open a valve by performing the action in the control room when the valve is actually a manual valve found in a remote location of the plant. Normally, such a valve must be opened or closed by an equipment attendant. The action step would then not read

" Dispatch an equipment attendant to open valve XXX" but rather, "Open valve XXX". In a parallel manner, non-existent' annunciators were created, positive indication of plant functions required (e.g., amp meters on important pumps) and other displays and control were born.

This informat ion was first collected on task development forms,.

later put on a database, and then sorted by task number. A completed - task development book resulted. It is comprised of all task statements analyzed, their task conditions, initiating cues, frequency performed, performance criteria and- -task elements. (For an example, see Figure 6.2).

9 6-16

-m e-, 7- , .m .

7-m r-n m_. m rm _ jx y 1 i

. \

--- JOR TITLE: MSO TASK NO. EDP-1-7500-4L STA. NO.: 4 / QUAD CITIES -

l PREPARED BY: SME / HFS .

. -l

. j ACTION: .

i

. -INITIATE THE $8GT SYSTEM. -- -

- ,-- -----7-- . . . _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ _ . . . . _ . , , , , , _ _ , , . , , . .

3C 5.00 ,

. 3 DANpERS 2/3-7594 A(BBCLOSED (ONE OR TE OTER AS APPROPRIATEl.

. - TASK CONDI.TIONS: (Givens, Dentals, Environm,e,nt) - - - ' -- - ' l (OUTSIDE AIR DAMPERS). - - - . - -- -*---

RI BLDS FANS TRIP. ..

. ... . . . ... . . . _ . _ ...s. .._ .. . . . . . . . .

30 7.00 M OUENCY: Once a MON M AIR M ATER 2/3 AlBI 7503 DN. ((M" OR TE OTER AE APPROPRIATEl.

' ~"" ~' ~ ~ ~ " ~ ~ ' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ' ' ~ ' ' "'

INITIATING CES: .(men does the task start). .

.- - I. sp II ISOLATION. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

...- ..... . ..... .- _... _. J.. . ... .. .

-r.t.

. 2. PER DOS'S. 3E 8.00 y

FAN 2/3 A (B) 7506 RUNNING (ONE OR THE OTER AS APPROPRIATEl.

• - PERFORMANCE CRITERIA: (met does the Job incumbant have to accomplish) m g . . .. . putINTAIN 1/4" VACUUM AIS PREVENT AROUND LEVEI. RELEASE OF RADIATION.

3F g. 98 q DAMPER 2/3 7507A(3) OPEN (ONE OR TE OTER AS APPROPRIATE) ne ._ . . - . . - - . .... .. . -- - -

un . . . .. . . . .. . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

m w

.'. c:p ACTION STEPS: . (Steps of what must be done to accomplish ACTIONS) 9 a . . - -

. . . . . ... . . ~ . . . . . . _ . . . . .. .. . . . . .

< I.88

• 1 38 18, Og PLACE THE DESIRED 58GT SYSTEM TRAIN MODE SWITCH IN TE SYSTEM DISCHARGE AIR FLOW IS APPROIIMATELY 4000 SCFM.

O

. START THE POSITION (A OR Bl. - - - -- -- - --

.g ..

m c+ . . . .-. . _ . - - . . . . - - . . m - -- - - - - - --

ri 2 2. OS 4 3 g,gg .

O CIDFIRM THE OTHER TRAIN IS IN TE PRIMARY POSITION OR SEND EA TO CHECK FOR SYSTEM ABNORMALITIES.

3 .

-PLACE IN THE PRIMARY POSITION. .-- -- --

3. AM .

CODFIRM TIE Fru e MING:

f I

DAMPERS 2-7503 AND 3-7503 OPEN eos m m .- -- - - ess ,

DACERS 2/3-75C5 A (E) OPEN. (ONE OR THE OTER As APPROPRIATEl.

(AIR Il4 ET DAMPERSI. . . . - - - - - -- -

s.

d' w

6.3.4 Instrument and Control Requirements L

While task development was still underway, the collection of instrument and control requirements began. The following

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variables were coded on Task Analysis Instrument and Control Requirement Forms such that they could be related back to a given element (action step).

1. Relational Number

2. Equipment identification number (EID)

3. Sequential Number

4. Sub Number

5. Sub Name

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6. Label Name

7. Match

8. Location

9. Communication with others

10. Display Requirements

a. Condition

b. Color

c. Type of Display

d. What measured

e. Units

f. Range

g. Divisions

11. Control Requirements

+ a. Type of Switch

b. Valve Control

c. Switch Action

d. Names of Positions

12. Controllers

a. Type of Controller ,

b Control Transfer Switch Type

c. Control Transfer Switch Position 1

i d. Tyne of Control 9

6-18

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e. Parameter Controlled

f. What Measured

g. Units Range

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i. Divisions Like the elements, the instrument and control requirements are coded from a "what is needed" perspective. For example, if one must get. an index of flow on the HPCI system from existing instrumentation at Quad Cities, one must observe it on an edgewise meter attached to a flow controller that is measured in percent flow. Existing procedures, training manuals,

, control room' custom and operator preference suggest that the

( parameter " flow" should be measured in units of gallons per minute (gpm) instead of percent. When completing the

instrument and control requirements for the action step

" Determine HPCI flow", what exists was discounted, and the item was coded requiring a meter. in gpm with an appropriate range and proper divisions. In a similiar manner, if a non-existent display, control or annunciator was needed, an instrument was in the wrong place for the task, or if some aspect of it was undesirable, it was coded in a fashion that indicates what

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should he there, or in the. location where itJshould be.

Items coded as such also have an additional flag attached- to them to the extent- tha't a "No" was placed in the " MATCH" y column. This indicates that some aspect of . the display or control does not match ' what physically exists in the control.

( room. The " MATCH" column served as a double check on keypunching and insured that no item was overlooked during the verification process because of erroneous data coding.

During the Quad Cities review, enhancements were made to ' the coding process. The concept of formats was introduced such that instead of coding alphanumeric data, each observation was 6-19 l

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5 r- given a unique code. This reduced the possibility of interpretation on the part of data entry persons as to what or how ' items could be abbreviated. If an observation was used more than once, the code for it would always remain the same.

Conversion from numeric codes to written alphanumeric was a base programming

( statements done at Printouts therefore were readable although comparisons between data level.

the inventory and the tasks analysis instrument and control

( requirements were done on a system level with numerics. (See Attachment 2 for I&C formats and Attachment 3 for sample forms.

Instrument and control requirements were put on a computerized database. Later in the DCRDR process, the "NO MATCHES" were sorted by EPN to group instruments and controls so that they could be scrutinized during the verification process.

6.4 Control Room Inventory The objective of the control room inventory for the Quad Cities station was to establish a reference set of data which identified all instrumentation, controls, and equipment within

, the control room, for comparison with the equipment requirements identified during the task analysis. All f displays, controls, controllers, annunciators and other equipment in the control room with which the operators interact were included in this inventory. Based on the guidance of NUREG-0700, human factors specialists (HFSs) from ARD Corporation and nuclear systems operators (NSOs) from Commonwealth Edison completed an inventory of the control room for Units 1 and 2 at the Quad Cities station. In . order to ensure that an up-to-date inventory was generated, the approach taken was that of direct observation in the control room.

Each piece of equipment on the control boards was identified by a unique code which was developed to meet the specific'needs of l l

6-20

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H .the Detailed Control Room Design- Review project. This code L served to identify the section of the specific control panel in which each piece of equipment was located, as well as equipment

[ components ' that were functionally related. Then the relevant physical characteristics of each piece of equipment, as they

( appeared from the front of the control panels, were coded.

characteristics noted were those which would determine, from a The human factors standpoint, the usefulness of the equipment to the operators in monitoring and controlling the plant.

The data was stored in the computerized data base management system (DBMS) developed by ARD for Commonwealth Edison's Detailed Control Room Design Reviews (DCRDRs). The data was then used to support the DCRDR verification process, whereby it was determined the extent to which suitable equipment was available in the control room to allow the plant operators to effectively perform emergency operating procedures. Having the

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inventory data stored in the DBMS along with the equipment requirements derived from the task analysis allowed an automated comparison of the two to be accomplished.

, 6.4.1 Methods f All equipment on the front panels, back panels, and common panels for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2, as well'as equipment on the desks and other workstations in the center area of the control room, was inventoried. The following steps summarize the approach taken in performing the inventory:

1. The most recent set of control panel elevation drawings was obtained. An HFS compared these prints, j component by component, to their respective control

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f panels. and penciled in any discrepancies on the prints.

c 6-21

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- 2. A grid matrix was superimposed on each corrected print y to provide a code that would uniquely identify the approximate location of each piece of equipment on the

(- boards. The unique identifier derived from the matrix was termed an Equipment Identification (EID) Number.

In tailoring this grid to particular control panel drawings, the placement of the cell boundaries was adapted to follow, as much as possible, the natural l

grouping of equipment on the panels. The cells for each panel were then numbered with an X value (abscissa) that identified the horizontal position

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(left to right) of a given cell across the panel and with a Y value (ordinate) that identified the vertical position (top to bottom) of that cell down the panel.

When the drawing for a particular panel spanned more than one print, the X values were continued from the first print onto the second.

The components within each cell of the grid matrix were numbered sequentially from left-to-right and top to bottom, starting with the number "one" in each cell. For example, indicator lights, control switches, meters, and individual components of

(

controllers, had a unique sequential number within the box.

The EID number was then derived from the marked up drawings. It consisted of the unit number, panel number, X then Y grid ' coordinates, and sequential number. (Example: 901-05-6-5-12 or, unit "one", panel "five", X coordinate six, Y coordinate five, sector sequential number " twelve".)

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There was a sub-identification number (Sub ID) scheme used to designate components that were functionally 6-22

s I

related. For example, given a control switch and its associated indicator lights, the control switch was given an EID to show location on the boards. Its indicating -lights were given the same EID to show

{ sequential number functional relationship, but the assigned to each was used as a Sub-ID. The control switch had a Sub-ID of 000. Sub-numbers were also used to distinguish between points on multiple-point recorders, different control and display components on a controller, and different components on a vendor-supplied panel inset.

3. The inventory was accomplished panel by panel.

Information as to which system each piece of equipment was in was preserved, by only entering components from a given system on a given inventory sheet. As each piece of equipment was inventoried, it was checked off on the appropriate print.

4. The Inventory form and the Controller Inventory form shown in Appendix A were used. The inventory forms were completed by HFSt, with input as needed by.NSOs, based on direct observation of the equipment in the control room. The data fields on this form were filled in with numerical codes as summarized in Appendix D. By utilizing these codes, data entry into

$ the computerized DBMS was facilitated and consistency in terminology was achieved among the various HFSs and NSOs collecting the inventory data.

o The EID and SUB-NUMBER were entered on the Inventory Form for each piece of equipment.

o The LA9EL name was taken verbatim from the control panel. The only distinction made was.when the labels 6-23

s 3

were not permanent (i.e., dyno tape, Kroy lettering, y pencil marks, etc.). A field in the inventory form was designated to make this distinction.

I L.

o The SUB-NAME was used for legends on indicating lights, names of points on multi-point recorders, names of pens for dual-pen or multi-pen recorders, or labels for components that were sub-numbered.

Detailed information about each piece of equipment (i.e. that which had been assigned a sequence or sub-number) was then entered with reference to the lists of codes in Appendix D.

( Some fields were appropriate for displays and others were appropriate for controls. Note (refer to the Inventory forms) that there could be multiplo entries in some fields in the detailed record of information about a given piece of equipment.

o The COLOR field was used for several purposes --

to identify the color of indicating lights, targets on breaker controls, or pens on multipen recorders.

o The TYPE OF DISPLAY field referred to anything that meters, or gauges or presents information other than a label name or a switch position. There could be only one type of display per _ detail record. Instruments that had more than one scale or point would have had these coded in separate sub-numbered records.

o WHAT MEASURED referred to the. parameter (s) being displayed on one physical-scale or continuum. In data collection, this was assumed or inferred from the I

display'in question. For instance, if the units were

" gallons per minute," then flow was postulated to be 6-24

s the WHAT MEASURED. If more than one scale existed on an L instrument (e.g., dual pen recorder), then each scale was inventoried on a separate detail record (and appropriately

( subnumbered).

o The UNITS field related directly to WHAT MEASURED, but was taken directly from the scale shown on the display.

o The RANGE of a meter or gauge was directly observable from the instrument. Any one instrument could have more than one range. Any change in the " DIVISIONS" on the meter indicated a new range. Some scales had multipliers generally increasing the range by a factor of 10 (e.g., x10; x100; x1000; x10E3). Some meters conveyed this multiplier as part of the UNITS (e.g.,

gpm x 100). This was one case in which the boards were not copied verbatim. The multiplier was always assumed to be associated with the RANGE.

o The DIVISIONS of the meter or gauge were directly observable from the instrument. DIVISIONS were always derived; they were defined as the absolute value of the smallest gradation on the scale to be read. Any

(

one instrument could have several different divisions. Whenever there was a change in the number of minor scale marks between the major scale marks, a i change in divisions was indicated. For ease of coding, divisions were assumed to have no multiplier.

Scales could have ranges with multipliers but it was only necessary to code multipliers for ranges.

o TYPE OF SWITCH referred any

( to control except controllers. Shape was the most important characteristic, with what was being controlled ranked 6-25

e second. Examples would be a J-handle valve control or y a pushbutton test or a keylock selector control switch. There was only one type of switch per detail

( line in the inventory.

o VALVE CONTROL referred to specific types of switches

-- those that control valves. This field was used to delineate whether or not a valve was seal-in (valve travels full open or closed) or throttleable (valve is.

able to be stopped - in a midposition of travel). For this parameter, there were only four possible variables --

throttle open, throttle close, seal-in open, seal-in closed. If a switch is throttle open but has an as-is function (see SWITCH ACTION) the valve will travel full open without any further operator action, therefore having seal-in features.

On the inventory, it was documented as both throttle open and seal-in open.

o SWITCH ACTION referred to what a control switch will do after it has been repositioned. It stays where it is put (as-is) or it returns to its mid-position (spring return). It is possible that one switch is both as-is and spring return (e.g., a pump control that is able to be locked "off" but normally.is spring return).

o SWITCH POSITION was the verbatim position labels taken from the escutcheon plate of a control. Pushbuttons were assumed to not have switch positions based solely on their action. All other controls were assumed to have more than one switch position. The inventory form was designed to handle this contingency on one detail record.

6-26

m.

o The EPN (Equipment Piece Number) is the station's component identification number. Entering the EPN for a component allowed it to be cross-referenced in terms typically used by the station to document information about components in the control room.

Controllers are pieces of equipment that typically contain both display and control functions. The controller received the EID number and all components were sub-numbered. A typical controller may take two different signals (e.g., flow and pressure) to directly control one of the parameters and, therefore, l

the other indirectly. The display may show the actual demand to the parameter, or it may meter the response of the controlled parameter. To inventory control-1ers, a Controller Inventory form was developed (see Appendix A for the form and Appendix D for codes).

o TYPE OF CONTROLLER referred to the controller unit as a whole. The code for the type of controller was entered on every detail record that was sub-numbered for the controller,

(

o CONTROLLER PARAMETER also referred to the controller unit as a whole. The formats were chosen from the WHAT MEASURED format list. It was possible to have more than one parameter controlled. The inventory form was designed to handle this contingency.

o TYPE OF CONTROL referred to a specific control on the f controller. This variable was always sub-numbered so there was never more than one per detail line.

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o For every type of control there was a WHAT CONTROLLED. These were taken from the WHAT MEASURED 6-27

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J list of codes and included parameters such as flow, k' level and position.

o SWITCH POSITIONS were taken from the switch positions E list but generally were one of the following: Manual, Balance, Auto, or 0-100. These codes referred to the control -listed in TY?E OF CONTROL.

o The display characterls cics (r.OlOR, TYPE OF DISPLAY, WHAT MEASURED, UNITS, RANGE and DIVISIONS) were synonymous with their counterparts in the standard inventory form.

Miscellaneous instrumentation in the control room was also inventoried. These included phones, radios,

-reference books, logs, tables, chairs, desks, fire extinguishers, ladders, file cabinets, CRTs, and emergency lighting. Each type of instrument was appropriately coded and entered in TYPE OF DISPLAY.

Each item was assigned an EID. If a given piece of miscellaneous instrumentation was associated with a unit and panel, it was documented as such. A sequential number starting with "one" was assigned as a unique identifier in the sequence number field. As

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there were no drawings of the layout of this equipment, a list of the numbers used were made to keep the EIDs unique.. Instrumentation was sub-numbered, if applicable. The label name field

. was, in general, used to describe the component. For example, a phone was coded under TYPE OF DISPLAY, its color was coded under COLOR, and how it was used was written in the LABEL (e.g., direct line to operations support center).

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5. The unique numbers by which annunciators were identified were derived from the position of each 6-28

s r annunciator tile in a window box. The columns of k tiles in a given window box were numbered sequentially from left to right. The rows of tiles in a given window box were lettered sequentially from top to bottom, starting with A. Each tile was thus uniquely

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identified by the combination of panel number, row letter and column number.

For annunciators, the following information was entered on the inventory forms o Equipment name (the label engraved on the tile) o Panel location:

number of the entire window box of annunciator tiles X --

number of the column in which the tile was located Y --

letter of the row in which the tile was located

) 6. The information that had been entered on the s Instr g nt/ Control Inventory Forms by the NSOs in the control room was typed by data entry personnel into f the computerized data base management system. Two files were created, one for displays, controls and annunciators, and one for controllers. The computer file that was created to store the display / control /

annunciator data consisted'of the following variables, which follow the lef t-to-right order of columns on the inventory forms.- These variables were formatted in

t. fields of varying width and variable type as indicated below. The width is the number of words of computer f storage space allocated to each variable. The variable type is as follows:

f C Character, i.e. Ascii code 6-29

s H.

j I Integer, i.e. Decimal number code L L Floating point code, with leading zeroes

( Of course, only some of these variables were relevant to a given piece _of equipment, so data was entered for only those relevant fields in each a record in the computer file.

Variable Number of Variable Item from Name Characters TZEe Inventory Form SYS$ 5 I System number EID 9 L Equipment Identification #

SUB# 3 C Sub-number SUBNM 30 C Sub-name

( EPN 15 C Equipment Piece #

( LABEL 120 C

• Label COLOR 1 2 L Color COLOR 2 2 L

( COLOR 3 DIS-TYP 2

2 L

L Display Type PARAM1 2 L What Measured

[_ PARAM2 2 L 5 UNITl 2 L Units UNIT 2 2 L

/

DIV1 2 L Divisions DIV2 2 L DIV3 2 L DIV4 2 L DIV5 L

( SW-TYP 2

2 L Switch Type V-CON 1 2 L Valve control V-CON 2 2 L

{ V-CON 3 2 L V-CON 4 2 L SW-ACTl 2 L Switch Action SW-ACT2 2 L RANGE 1 3

• L Range RANGE 2 3 L RANGE 3 3 L RANGE 4 3 L RANGE 5 3 L

[\ SW-POS1 SW-POS2 3

3 L'

L Switch Position SW-POS3' 3 L SW-POS4 3 L

( SW-POS5 3 L SW-POS6 3 L i SW-POS7 3 L SW-POS8 3 L 6-30

a Variable Number of Variable Item from Name Characters Type Inventory Form SW-POS9 3 L

^

SW-POSlO 3 L SW-POS11 3 L SW-PO912 3 L SW-POS13 3 L SW-POsl4 3 L

'SW-POS15 3 L SW-PO916 3 L The corresponding file that was created to store the controller data consisted of the following variables, which likewise followed the left-to-right order of columns on the inventory forms.

Variable Number of Variable Item from Name Characters Type Inventory form SYs# 5 I system number EID 9 L Equipment Identification #

SUB9 3 C Sub-number SUBNM 30 C Sub-name EPN 15 C Equipment Piece #

7 LABEL 120 C Label

( CONTLR-TYP 2 L Controller Type

! PARAM-CL1 2 L Controller Parameter l

PARAM-CL2 2 L CONT-TYP 2 L Control Type

( PARAM-C 2 L What Controlled PARAM-D1 2 L What Measured PARAM-D2 2 L

[ COLOR 2 L Color DIS-TYP1 2 L Display Type DIS-TYP2 2 L f UNIT-01 2 L Units UNIT-D2 2 L DIV-nl 2 L Divisions DIV-D2 2 C RANGE-D1 3 L Range RANGE-D2 3 L CTS-PO91 3 L Switch Positions CTS-POS2 3 L CTS-PO93 3 L CTS-POS4 3 L

( CTS-POS5 3 L 6-31

s

[ 6.5 Verification of Equipment Availability and Suitability 6.5.1 Objective

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The objective of the DCRDR verification process was to assure that operator tasks can be performed in the existing control room at the Quad cities station with minimum potential for human error. The focus was on instruments and equipment, not on operator skills and knowledge. The verification was accomplished by comparing the operators' perceived requirements for information and control capabilities during emergency

( operations, which were derived from the DCRDR task analysis, with the equipment that is present in the Quad Cities control room, as identified by the control room inventory.

There were two aspects to this verification process. First it was determined whether or not appropriate equipment was l available in the control room to perform each functional task required by emergency operations. Second, for equipment that had been identified as available, it was determined whether or not the characteristics of each piece of equipment made it suitable for the task, i.e., whether it offered the operator sufficient control and display capabilities to efficiently

[

accomplish the task. The characteristics addressed were those physical aspects of the equipment that were apparent from the f

\ front of the control panels and which, from a human factors perspective, determined the equipment's useability by the plant

( operators.

f As detailed in the summary of the Quad Cities control room inventory, a thorough compilation of relevant equipment characteristics was completed for all displays, controls,

[

controllers, and annunciators on the front, back and common panels at Quad Cities Units 1 and 2.

6-32

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L The inventory identified each piece of equipment with a unique code, the Equipment Identification (EID) number, so that

( specific equipment could be referenced during the task analysis and all pertinent characteristics of each piece of equipment could be retrieved from a computerized data base.

As detailed in the summary of the Quad Cities task analysis of emergency procedures, the operators ' need for specific display information or control capabilities was identified at each step l throughout sequences of emergency operations. The tasks to be performed during emergency operations were derived from the

( General Electric Owner's Group Emergency Procedure Guidelines.

The equipment requirements implied by these tasks were categorized in terms of the same equipment characteristics that were identified during the control room inventory.

The verification process involved the collaboration of human factors specialists (HFSs) from ARD Corporation and nuclear systems operators (NSOs) from the Quad Cities station. The availability and suitability of appropriate equipment in the f .

control room to meet the needs of each emergency task was judged by 9MEs, and noted by HFSs, as part of the task analysis

( data collection effort. To ensure that the equipment requirements that were determined from different tasks did not place conflicting demands on specific pieces of equipment, the HFS, using the computerized data base from the task analysis, grouped all references to each piece of equipment that had been judged to be unsuitable and, in consultation with the SMEs, determined the equipment characteristics that were desirable.

f Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) documented where L equipment was perceived to be required but was unavailable or ,

f unsuitable. The HEDAT review finally determined whether these perceived requirements were in fact required.

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[

u 6.5.2 Method

( The following approach was used for conducting the verification of equipment availability and suitability for energency operations:

~

1. Af ter the equipment requirements for a given task were identified during the task analysis process, the SME made a judgement as to which, if any, control room instrumentation was presently used to perform that tank, and whether or not that piece of equipment was

( suitable in each of its relevant characteristics.

The HFS noted on the Task Analysis Instrument / Control Requirement Form the EID number of the equipment that was available for the operator to perform each task.

1 Whether or not this piece of equipment was suitable for the task (i.e., had characteristics that matched those specified on the task analysis form for that task), was also indicated on the form in the column f labelled " Match". If this needed equipment was unavailable or unsuitable, a "no-match" was designated

{ on this form.

For meters, recorders and digital displays, suitability was determined on the basis of the following criteria i o What measured -- Does the display provide the

( operator with the needed information in the form of a parameter that does not require mental

( transformation? (e.g., if the difference in temperature between two points is needed, a delta T display would be suitabler whereas, separate displays for the two absolute temperature readings would not be suitable.)

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o Units --

Do the units in which the display is

(' scaled correspond to that expected by the operator? (e.g., temperature in degrees F) o Range --

Does the range of the available display span the range required by the operator to perform the task?

o Divisions --

Do the divisions in which the display is graded allow the operator to read the display with the level of precision required by the task?

o Type of instrument --

Is the type of display appropriate for the task at hand (e.g., if trend information is needed, a chart recorder should be

(

available)

For indicator lights (including those that provide feedback to the operator regarding control switch actuation) and annunciators, suitability was implied

, by availability. There were no separate criteria for

( the suitability of these types of displays.

For controls, suitability was determined on the basis

{

of the following criteria:

( o Type of switch -- Does the type of switch used allow the control task to be performed in an

\ unambiguous manner? For example, a continuously adjustable rotary switch would be unsuitable for

( an on-off control function.

o Name of switch positions -- Do the switch positions labeled on the escutcheon plate include

(' the control function that is to be performed? '

o Type of valve control -- Is the type of valve consistent with the degree of control required by the operator? For example, if graded control of valve position is required, a throttleable valve l

l l

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p would be suitable; whereas, a seal-in valve would L not be suitable.

o Type of switch action -- Does the control switch allow the operator to perform the control function unambiguously and in a reasonable duration of time? For example, if the task calls J for a switch to remain in the actuated position for a long period of time, an "as-is" switch would be more suitable than one that spring returns.

For controllers, suitability was determined on the

( basis of the following criteria, which were applied similarly to the corresponding criteria for displays i and controls listed abover o Type of switch type for the control function (s) o Range of setpoint (demand) display o Divisions of setpoint (demand) display o What measured by status (response) display o Units of status (response) display o Range of status (response) display o Divisions of status (response) display

2. The EIDs of available equipment and the " match" or "no match" designation for each task was entered as part of the task analysis data into the computerized data bane management system (DBMS) developed by ARD for Commonwealth Edison 's DCRDRs. An automated comparison was then done between corresponding records in the task analysis and inventory data files. Failures to find appropriate information in the inventory file for equipment needs that were documented in the task

(

analysis file, resulted in task analysis records being flagged as "no matches." The data base was then sorted on this " match" field. Computer print-outs of 6-36

)

5 these selected data were then used by the HFS to r'

L further investigate apparent discrepancies between the equipment requirements from the task analysis and the equipment characteristics identified during the

{

inventory.

3. Required but unavailable equipment was identified from those records in the task analysis data base that had been specified for which no EID number had been specified. After SMEs confirmed the validity of these l f discrepancies, the HFS documented them as HEDs.

( 4. Unsuitable equipment was identified from those records in the task analysis data base for which "no match" had been specified, but an EID number had been entered. "No match" records were sorted by EID number, in order to group all of the tasks which had referenced a given piece of equipment as being unsuitable. The equipment might have been judged f unsuitable for different reasons in different tasks.

Moreover, conflicting requirements for a given piece of equipment might have been generated across tasks,

(

implying that in addition to changes being required in some aspect of the available equipment, a new piece of

{

equipment might be needed.

5. The validity of the "no match" items was confirmed by an HFS by checking the requirements specified during f the task analysis against the actual piece of equipment in the control room. Any conflicting

( requirements for a given piece of equipment were I

resolved with input from SMEs. An HFS then documented the valid discrepancies as HEDs.

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( 6.5.3 Findings One hundred and fifty-four HEDs resulted from the Quad Cities verification process. These HEDs were given to the Human Engineering Discrepancies Assessment Team (HEDAT) for resolution. This team determined whether missing equipment was in fact required and, if so, what was required. Similarly, they determined what was necessary to resolve " unsuitable" equipment.

6.6 Validation

(

6.6.1 Introduction The objective of the validation review was to determine whether the functions allocated to the control room operating crew could be accomplished ef fectively within both the structure of the established emergency procedures and the design of the

( control room as it exists.

6.6.2 Methodology

(

The following paragraphs describe the processes used at Quad Cities to determine the validation approach to be used, secure

' operating personnel to assist with the validation, implement the approach selected, record the data, and evaluate the data collected.

(

6.6.2.1 Determining the Validation Approach Three possible approaches were open to the review team to conduct the validation at Quad Cities. These approaches were A) a control room walk-through talk-through using the appropriate procedures:

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- B) a talk-through on a control room mockup using uniform L

scale architectural drawings of the control room and the control room panels.

c) simulator Because many of-Quad Cities' systems, instruments and controls

( are identical to Dredsen's and the simulator's it was decided to apply the Dresden validation results to Quad Cities, as applicable, and to' perform a supplemental validation at Quad Cities for those systems unique to the station. Therefore, of the above approaches, approach A was considered to be the optimum approach for the Quad Cities supplemental validation because it would allow the review team to observe the dynamic interplay between the operators and the control panels, as well as minimize the review team's presence .in the Quad Cities control room. The week of December 3, 1984, to December 10, 1984, was allocated to the review team to conduct a control room walk-through/ talk-through of events of the Quad Cities

{

supplemental validation.

6.6.2.2 Securing Operating Personnel l 9pecifically requented were two reactor operators, a shift foreman, and a shift engineer. This is considered a minimal staffing crew in Quad Cities'

( Technical Specifications for operations. He was also given an overview of what would be requested of the crews during the validation. The Assistant

(

Superintendent for Operations agreed to provide the review team with the personnel requested. However, in lieu of a shift engineer he- proposed providing an additional SRO licensed shift foreman because he was not certain that of the limited number

( of shift engineers at the station that one would be available the week we had reserved.

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k' 6.6.2.3 Validation Events

[ The following emergency events were simulated for the Quad Cities supplemental validation. In the estimation of operating SMEs, they provided for the exercise of all major unit systems and every control room workstation:

a normal reactor startup

(' -

a normal reactor shutdown a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) inadequate core cooling an anticipated transient without reactor scram (ATWS) following the loss of offsite power a reactor scram a main steam line break inside the drywell 6.6.2.4 Implementing the Real-Time Simulator Run-Through Prior to the conduct of the Quad Cities supplemental valida-tion, a HPS an SME familiar with both Dresden and Quad Cities system and procedures reviewed the Quad Cities procedures to be used to identify the procedural steps that required the operator to use systems, controls, displays or procedural approaches unique to Quad Cities. Copies of these procedures were made and the unique diagram of the unit workspace and numerically identified unit workstations. The DCRDR Coordina-tor ensured that sufficient copies of the Validation Review Worksheet (VRW), a copy of which can be found in Appendix A, l were available and determined the sequences in which the events listed above would be validated. An HFS was assigned to question and observed each reactor operator and one HFS was assigned to questions and observe the foremen (SROs). These individuals reviewed the Quad Cities procedures to be used in the supplemental validation and the Commonwealth Edison Generic DCRDR Program Plan section describing the procedure to be followed in conducting the walk-through/ talk-through valida-tion.

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Because this was a supplemental validation and the Dresden validation employed the same events being validated at Quad Cities and its results were being applied to Quad Cities, it was decided that only those procedure steps unique to Quad Cities would be validated. However, to permit the HFSs to observe the dynamic interplay between the the operators and their control panels between procedural steps, both the step preceeding and following the Quad Cities unique step were observed.

At the start of each day's validation, the DCRDR Coordinator assembled all participants and briefed them on the purpose and specific objectives of the event simulation, identified any assumptions about the operating situation, and gave the operating crew time to review any procedures they fhlt a need to review. The operating crew was reminded not to actually manipulate any controls during the validation exercises (the validation was performed on Quad Cities unit 1, which was operating at 100% power at the time). When all participants were ready the validation commenced. As the control room crew walked through each procedural step the operators described the action being taken, the information sources used, any conver-sions or uncertainties involved, the controls used, the expected system response (s), how those responses would be f and/or may be verified, the actions they would take if the expected response (s) did not occur, and any additional support or assistance needed or desirable from personnel outside the control room. Each operator was accompanied by a HFS who observed the relations between operator performance and control board / control room design and evaluated the walk-through on the critera delineated in the Commonwealth Edison Generic DCRDR Program Plan. The HFS's step-by-step evaluations were recored on the VRW, along with work station work flow information. The HFS observing the shift foremen, who played the roles of foreman and shift engineer, also recorded the SROs' estimates of time criticality and actual time to perform each procedural sten validated.

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L The above process was followed for each of the events presented earlier in this summary. Different personnel were used for the events as possible, or the personnel were assigned different roles for different events.

6.6.2.5 Data Recording and Analysis

( Two sources of documentation exist for this phase of the Quad Cities review. They are the Validation video tapes and results from Dresden station and the Quad Cities procedures and completed VRWs from the Quad Cities walk-through/ talk-through.

Both sources of documentation are available for review. The review and analysis of the VRWs was done on a step-by-step, event-by-event basis by a HFS. If in the observation of an event the HFS accompaning the operator determined that no human enineering deficiency existed he would check the "yes" column

( on the VRW. When, on the other hand, in the opinion of the HFS an instance was observed in which equipment availability,

[ suitability or location could be enhanced, or in which operator l

uncertainty due to procedural ambiguity could be minimized, the "no" column on the VRW was checked. The HFS who performed the validation analysis concentrated the analysis on the procedural steps with the "no" column checked. For each of these steps he conferred with the MFS who made the observation and with SMEs familiar with the system and/or equipment involved to clarify any points of ambiguity. A control room human engineering discrepancy was then written for each deficiency observed and recorded during the Quad Cities supplemental validation. This process continued until each simulated event had been reviewed and analyzed.

6'.6.3 Results Nine events were simulated and evaluated. From the analyses performed, twenty-four HEDs were generated that were uniquely 6-42

H L

found during the validation. If an HED was observed during the

{  ;

validation that was discovered and documented as a result of another review phase, such as the checklist or historical event

[ review, a comment was added to the existing HED that it was also observed during the validation. In these cases, a duplicate HED was not written. Copies of the HEDs written from the' validation are included in Volume 2 and are kept on file at

( Commonwealth Edison. Validation HEDs for Dresden were reviewed for applicability to Quad Cities.

6.7 Control Room Survey

[ This survey considered the extent to which equipment and the environment in the control room are designed to accommodate basic human characteristics such as physical size and l perceptual-motor capabilities.

[

A comparison of instrument and control features to the CECO human factors guidelines was conducted. These guidelines were derived from those given in Section 6 of NUREG-0700 and closely follow them in format and content. The CECO guidelines do differ from those in NUREG-0700 in that some of the items were quantified, or reworded, so as to make them clearer and more f concise for evaluation. During the course of the Dresden DCRDR, an NRC audit was conducted and some objections to some f of the modified criteria were raised. The CECO checklist was then reevaluated for its soundness in basis on human factors principles and items were adjusted accordingly. This set of

{

guidelines was used for the Quad Cities Review.

( Human Factors Specialists, in concert with experienced Common-wealth Edison personnel knowledgeable of plant systems and control room instruments and equipment, and operations personnel, observed and measured control room features.

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L.

Instrumentation, controls and other cquipment items 'were examined for human engineering acceptability as components without reference to their specific uses in task performance.

Discrepancies were based on design incompatibility with human perceptual, motor, psychological or size characteristics.

Examples included controls too closely spaced for easy

( manipulation, meters with markings too small to be distinguish-able at a practical distance, and displays too high to be read. Environmental conditions were surveyed independently.

{

The guidelines included principles or explanatory statements followed by specific categorical or numeric statements. The procedure was to observe or measure, as required, and check compliance with each categorical or numerical statement.

( The review team members conducting the checklist survey placed a check in the "Yes" box to indicate compliance and a check in

( the "No" box to, indicate noncompliance. "Yes" was checked only if there is total compliance - i.e., only if every instance of the item is fully consistent with the provisions of the check-

{

list. If there was any instance of noncompliance, the "No" box was checked and a reference made as to where noncompliance occurred. A CR HED form ( Appendix A) was filled out for each non-compliant item and a photograph of at least one instance of f each type of discrepancy was taken.

6.7.1 Human Factors Engineering Checklist

{

The Human Factors Engineering guidelines were examined for the

{

nine topic areas listed belows

( l. Control Room Workspace addressed the general layout, availability and accessibility of operating equipment

( and materialst the anthropometric suitability of work stationst coordination and separation in multi-unit control roomst availability and accessibility of emergency equipment and environmental factors.

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L Compliance with most of the workspace guidelines was

[. determined by inspection. Certain sets of guidelines l required simple measurements, including measurements of distance, height and span; viewing angles; and reach radius. In addition, assessment of climate f control,. lighting adequacy and the auditory environ-ment required more specialized measurements or tests of temperature, humidity and air flow; luminance and

{

reflectance; noise and reverberation; and audibility of speech and signals. These measures are explained in section 6.7.2.

[ This portion of the survey resulted in the generation of 101 HEDs.

[

2. Panel Design Section addressed allocation of controls and displays to preferred panel areas; grouping of

(

controls and displays; spacing, demarcation and color j shading to enhance recognizability of individual components and of groupings; ordering of components within groupings; layout consistency within and between panels; and strings, clusters, or matrices of similar components. This section of the survey f resulted in 36 HEDs.

( 3. Annunciator Warning Rystem Section addressed overall concerns such as alarm parameter selection and set points, first-out alarms and prioritization; and

{

design features of the auditory alert, visual alarm and. operator response subsystem. It was necessary to assess the annunciator system on both. a general or control room-wide basis and a panel-by-panel basis.

f Guidelines concerning such design features as auditor alert signal intensity, automatic reset after silence, labeling of visual alarm tiles, etc., were applied equally throughout the control room.

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l Compliance with many of the guidelines was determined by inspection, review of annunciator system specifica- {

tions and questions asked of operating personnel. The annunciator system was tested so that its performance characteristics could be observed. Assessment of

( auditory signal audibility, discriminability and localizability were based on performance tests with

( sound measurements where there was any uncertainty (Section 6.7.2). There were 60 HED's cited in this section.

4. Communications Section addressed auditory communica- l tions equipment used in the control room. Communica-tions is a specialized topic which was treated

( relatively independently, on a control room-wide basis. Individual work stations were considered only

[ incidentally. This portion of the survey resulted in the generation of 22 HEDs.

5. Process Computer Section addressed software security and characteristics (dialogue / command language, prompting, structuring); procedures and other aids to computer user keyboard arrangement, function controls

( and other controls; computer response timer and design characteristics of displays and printers / printer f messages. The guidelines addressed generic qualities in a manner that did not require knowledge of specific uses. Compliance with most of the guidelines was

{

determined by inspection in the control room and review of software and hardware specifications. It was necessary to question control room operators or supervisors to make determinations about some of the criteria.

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L Measurements were necessary to assess response times,

{

keyboard key dimensions and separation and certain readability factors including character size and separation viewing angle, luminance contrast, )

geometric distortion and resolution of CRT displays.

This section of the survey resulted in the generation

( of 56 HEDs.

6. Controls Section addressed principles of selection, protection and designs and specifications for different types of controls. The guidelines were applied on a control room-wide basis and called for measurements of control dimensions, spacing and resistance. Measurement of displacement of key-operated controls was also included. Dimensions and

( spacing were checked on the panels themselves.

Resistance measurements were made with different devices depending on the type of control. This

{

section of the survey resulted in the generation of 48 HEDs. -

7 Displays Section addressed principles of displays including information to be displayed, usability of displayed values, readability, printing, markings and coding. Guidelines were also given- as to design characteristics of particular types o displays including meters, l'ight indicators, graphic recorders

(

and counters. Each display was checked for confor-mance to the applicable guidelines. After every display had been checked, they were considered from a system perspective to assure appropriate consistency in labels, markings and coding. This section of the survey resulted in the generation of 104 HEDs.

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H

8. Labels and Location Aids Section addressed labeling,

{

location, content and lettering; use of temporary labels; and use of location aids such as demarcation, color and mimics. Each label was checked for accuracy and conformance to guidelines. A system / panel- 1 oriented check was used to examine the labeling hierarchy and consistency of terms and abbreviations 4

( used to refer to system components.

Labeling and color coding was considered from a total

{

control room perspective to assure consistency. This section of the survey resulted in the generation of 74 HEDs.

9. Control-Display Integration Section addressed relative l

positioning of single control and display pairs and

( multiple controls and displays; function and sequence-of-use relationships; movement relationship and other aspects of compatibility of controls and displays

(

which are used together. The control-display integra-tion survey was conducted panel-by panel. This section of the survey resulted in the generation of 5 HEDs.

In total, there were 520 HEDs generated from the f survey and these are given by section in Volume 2.

( 6.7.2 Environmental Measurement Procedures 6.7.2.1 Sound Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected and marked where sound measurements were to be taken. Measure-ments were taken at each operator position that required verbal communication and/or auditor discrimination of a signal.

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s Measurements were made with the microphone at the center of the f head location. The microphone was located 5 ft. above the floor at positions where the operator stands and 4 ft. above the floor at seated positions. Measurement positions include:

o Senior reactor operator's desk

( o Reactor operator's desk o Operator work station or points near the center of each panel or console

{.

o Back panel areas requiring ' communication with the primary operating area Microphones having an essentially flat response at grazing incidence (90*) were used.' The microphone was placed vertically at the measurement location with the sensitive

( element up.

( These measurements'were for ambient noise levels (where ambient noise is defined as background control room noise _without the contribution of alarms, printers or communications equipment).

Integrated "A" weighted db(A) measurements were taken for all of the above positions. Octave measurements will also be-taken and include center frequencies from about 31.5 Hz to about 8000 '-

Hz. Measurements -were recorded on the Sound Survey- Record f (Appendix A) that specifies both location and direction. l f A second set of measures was ' taken ~ for. the annunciators and alarms using equipment and personnel from the CECO Operations and Analysis Department (OAD). These were taken at the seated-head level for the unit desk for each unit and at the center desk.- A .real-time integrating spectrum analyzer was used to obtain- the sound levels corresponding to one-third- and full octave. bandwidth frequencies. N

(.  ? ,

.A set of tests was perforned at' leach location. -First,. the

. control room ambient sound ' levels, were measured. The 3

~,

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measurements were taken while each annunciator, corresponding to the unit location, was activated. Finally a measurement was E

taken while all annunciators were activated simultaneously.

The following Section 6 checklist items reference sound level measurements:

[

o Ambient Noise (6.1.5.5) o Communications (6.2.2.3, 6.2.2.5, 6.2.2.6)

{

o Annunciator (6.3.2.1) o computers (6.7.3.2) 6.7.2.2 Lighting Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected

( and marked where the illumination measurements were to be taken. Readings were taken:

[

o In front of each front panel o In the center of the control room o In fronti of each back panel

{ At each position, measure:

s

( o Full AC ambient o Full DC emergency o Any typical combination or alternative For determining the variance in illumination levels across the boards, measures were taken at 1-foot intervals. vertically, and 2-foot intervals horizontally, so that . a matrix of the levels s

across the boards was developed.

(. Readings were recorded on the Lighting Survey --

Illuminance Record Form (Appendix A).

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L The determination of the luminance and reflectance ratios,

{

followed these procedures:

[ o The object was covered with a " perfect reflector" pad, with care taken not to block light.

o The . luminance reading on the pad was taken and i

recorded h o The reflector pad was removed o The luminance reading of the object was then taken and recorded.

(

At each panel, measurements were taken of:

o Reflectance of pad on panel o Panel background (where reflectance pad was placed)

( o Meter faces (with and without glare) o Other display faces (with and without glare) o Lights Readings were recorded on the Lighting Survey Luminance and Reflectance Record (Appendix A).

G.7.2.3 Humidity / Temperature Procedures

( Humidity and temperature were -measured by -setting up meters in an area where they were not disturbed. The locations (s) of the

[ meters were marked on a control room layout drawing. Readings were taken at floor level and at 6 ft. above floor level every hour for at least a 24-hour period. The -time and the temperature - and humidity values for both levels were recorded on the Humidity / Temperature Record (Appendix A).

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Is 6.7.2.4 Air Velocity Survey Procedures Using a control room layout drawing, locations were selected and marked where air velocity readings were taken. Measure-ments were taken at principal operator work stations.

Measurements were taken at an elevation of 6 ft. for standing positions,, and at 4 ft. for sitting positions. Measurements

{ were recorded on the Air Velocity Survey Record (Appendix A).

L L

[

[

(

(

(

{

l

{

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[

7.0 HED ASSESSMENT The assessment of HEDs for impact on plant safety and oper-

{

ability was accomplished by the HED Assessment Team (HEDAT).

At a minimum, the HEDAT consisted of the Lead Human Factors Specialist (LHFS), the DCRDR Coordinator, the IEC Engineers, the Station Nuclear Engineering Department (SNED) Station Project Engineer or designate, and the Station Assistant Superintendent for Operations. Each member meets or exceeds

[ the minimum _ requirements committed to in the CECO program plan. (Appendix C provides a list of all DCRDR participants )

( and their qualifications.) The team met and reviewed the HEDs generated in the DCRDR process. The objective was to categorize each HED in regards to the relative importance as it pertains to safe and productive operation of the plant. Three categories were identified:

Category I: Discrepancies associated with engineered safe-( guard systems or engineered safety features Category II: Discrepancies associated with plant systems not f

included in Category I Category III: Discrepancies not falling in either Category'I'or

[ II

(

Second, the HEDAT reviewed each HED to determine.at what level of severity each HED should be assigned within the categories, based on the following criteria:

7-1

L f A) Includes HEDs with documented errors, documented control-I based problems or, in the judgement of the HEDAT, may have a significant impact on plant safety and/or productivity.

[-

B) Includes HEDs which may have a moderate influence on plant performance (consequences may delay or impact, but not significantly, the efficient operation of the plant).

C) Includes HEDs with a relatively minimal impact on plant performance (consequence of human error will not lead to degraded plant safety system).

Level assignment was the determining factor in the recommenda- ,

tion to correct HEDs. The HEDs in level A will be corrected because they have been documented to have caused errors and/or performance problems in the past. The HEDs in level B or C may

( or may not be corrected, depending on their relative opera-tional significance. While it is desirable from sound human

{ engineering practices to rectify every discrepancy - discerned, it is recognized that the potential benefit to be gained may not offset the expected short- and long-term costs entailed, particularly in light of the fact that these HEDs have merely a moderate potential for impact on operating performance and/or plant safety.

The ultimate responsibility for addressing the HEDs discovered in the DCRDR process rested with the Station Operations and

( Station Nuclear Engineering Departments. The DCRDRs Review Team performed the review, documented the results and made recommendations to the aforementioned responsible departments.

Responsible representatives from the Station Operations and Station Nuclear Engineering Departments met with the LHFS, the IEC Engineer and DCRDR Coordinator to review the assessed HEDs 7-2

I s

and decide which to correct. During these meetings, the LFHS and the DCRDR Coordinator worked to ensure that the HED's potential for negative impact was given proper weight in ,

comparison to the overall benefit of the recommended

[ correction. Those HEDs to be corrected were differentiated j from those not to be corrected. The LHFS and the DCRDR Coordinator, with the assistance of the Station Operations Department and/or the Station Nuclear Engineering Department,

( have written a justification for those HEDs which warrant no further action. The justifications are recorded in Volume 2.

The HEDs were categorized to reflect function groups in order to facilitate cumulative effects of HEDs. The following is a list of each category:

1 A) Checklist - structured by Type (sub-category) and Level (I, II, or III)

[

1. Labelina

2. Annunciators

{

3. Communications

4. Lighting

5. Auditory

6. Environment

( 7. Validation

8. Documentation

9. Equipment

10. Workplace

11. Color .

12. Controls

13. Displays

14. Characters

15. Shading

16. Verification

17. Miscellaneous 7-3

m-I i

B) Operator Questionnaire / Interviews C) Historical F, vent Review D) Task Analysis E) Verification

1. Availability

2. Suitability F) Validation

[

(

[

7-4

[

8.0 HED IMPLEMENTATION

{

[ 8.1 General In coniunction with the assessments, the HEDAT reviewed the suggested corrective actions and/or selected recommendations

[ for the appropriate HEDs. No accepted recommendation will be implemented until the Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO) has NRC's

( received the reactions and comments concerning it, following the submittal of each station's DCRDR final report.

Upon receiving confirmation from the NRC regarding HED resolutions, CECO will resolve the HED corrective actions accordingly.

1) The HEDs to be corrected will be ordered according to the

( priorities set forth in the Implementation Schedule (Figure 8.1).

(

2) Equipment necessary to correct HEDs for Prompt and Near-Term Correction will be ordered after an HFS has reviewed their design specifications to ensure that the equipment meets applicable criteria and will in fact correct the discrepancy. (This assumes that the equipment is available on an "off-the-shelf" basis.)

For one-of-a-kind, "special order" pieces of necessary

[. equipment, CECO will select a vendor and supply them with the pertinent design specification criteria.

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LEVEL CATEGORY A B C

( ) ( ) ( )

{

1 First First Second

( ) ( ) ( ) l 2 First Second Second

[

( ) ( ) ( )

( 3 Second Second Second 5

f Figure 8.1.

Suggested Planned Plant Refueling Outages HED Corrective Actions Implementation s

8-2

1 L

( 3) Station operations and/or Station Nuclear Engineering Departments will review the station's upcoming outage work schedules and arrange manpower and time, as necessary, to

{

implement the corrections according to plant schedules.

4) The Station Operations and/or Station Nuclear Engineering Departments will deliver copies of each HED and supporting information to the DCRDR Coordinator for inclusion in the station's permanent DCRDR records file. An HFS will review and/or assist in the resolution of HEDs, as required.

5) Upon completion of each HED's recommended correction, the

{

responsible department will notify the DCRDR Coordinator who, in turn, will arrange for the corrections reviewed by

[ an HFS.

[ 6) An HFS will review the correction for compliance to sound human engineering principles and verify that additional h discrepancies were not created. Should the correction not be satisfactory, the HFS will complete a new HED form to be assessed via the procedure set forth above.

The rating scale, as identified in the program plan for supporting the assessment process, was not used. It was not necessary to utilize this technique in that a consensus was reached through discussion of each of the team members.

f 8.2 Labeling A detailed, coordinated labeling package will be designed and

( '

implemented to . correct labeling HEDs. This labeling package will be developed based on an extensive review of labeling requirements in the control room. Labeling requirements will be developed ~ to be consistent thoroughout the control room in style, use, ~ color coding, and summary requirements. The l

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8-3

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labeling package requirements will cover the entire control room, and address each labeling HED that could degrade the overall effectiveness of the control room labeling scheme. The use of labeling, as needed, will reduce the wordiness of the labeling, reduce reading time, and enhance functional re-lationships between controls and displays, thereby reducing

( search time. The labeling package will simplify and highlight the presentation of information such that functional component groups will be easily related and integrated at various levels.

{

8.3 Annunciators C

An Annunciator Enhancement Package will be developed to resolve HEDs related to the annunciator warning system. The  !

annunciator package will address discrepancies related to:

[ Inadequate functional grouping of windows, inconsistent message formats, inconsistent nomenclature, inadequate quality of 1ettering, and inconsistent coding schemes. Appropriate plant

{

personnel, operations experts, and human factors specialists will closely review the requirements placed on the plant annunciator system. The annunciator package will be developed so as to be consistent throughout the control room. Both' box-by-box and tile-by-tile requirements will be covered by the functional review of the annunciator system. The er.hancement

( package will be designed to facilitate rapid and accurate interpretation of annunciator warnings by the operators. For enhancing message format and content, the annunciator package will be correlated with the labeling package.

8.4 Enhancements Several enhancement techniques may be used for implementation of corrective action. These enhancement techniques will be

( reviewed closely by plant personnel, operations experts, and human factors specialists. Based on this review, the enhancement package will be coordinated over the entire control 8-4

Is room so as to ensure that all enhancement techniques will be consistent, interactive, and mutually supportive of one another. This coordination is important to ensure that an enhancement technique used in one area of the control room does not conflict with or degrade the effectiveness of enhancement technique used in other areas of the control room.

Several methods of enhancement may be used based on the enhancement requirements review. These methods may includes

( demarcation lines, background color shading, color coding, shape codi'ng, re-labeling (coordinated with labeling package),

re-sealing (of displays, mimics) and/or other location aids and enhancements.

Any, or all, of these methods used will be coordinated on a control room wide basis, and will be implemented to conform with good human engineering principles.

( 8.5 Verification of Corrective Actions

{ corrective Actions being implemented will be reviewed to verify their effectiveness from a human engineering perspective. This verification will utilize sound human engineering methods.

Verification will be performed using panel mock-ups incorpora-ting the corrective actions, consultation with operators and f systems experts, human factors specialist reviews, and possible use of the control room simulator. If the result of the verification determines a corrective action will result in a negative effect on control room operations, then the suggested corrective action will be altered or cancelled as appropriate.

If a corrective action is verified to be effective it may then be implemented in the control room.

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F L

APPENDIX A

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FORMS A-la/b Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Record A-2 Questionnaire Item Summary Form A-3 Personnel Survey Summary Form A-4 Index of Reviewed Reports A-5 Historical Report Problem 9tatus Repqrt A-6 Historical Report Review Error Analysis Problem Analysis Report A-7 Control Room Review Task Development A-R System Review Summary Reference A-9 Instrument Control Form A-10 Validation Review Worksheet A-ll Pre-assessment Form A-12 Sound Survey Record A-13 Lighting Survey - Illuminance Record A-14 Lighting Survey - Luminance and Reflectance Record

( Humidity / Temperature Record A-15 A-16 Air Velocity Survey Record

{

A-17 Photographic Log A-18 Task Analyis Instrument / Control Requirement Form A-19 Control Room Design Review Operator Survey A-20 Inventory Form A-21 Controller Inventory Form A-22 System Function Summary

CONTROL ROOM HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCY RECORD HFS Date No:

~~~

Plant:

Unit System

[ Panel Component Component Name ID6 ID#

[

Description of Discrepancy

[

Photo Log No. Photography Instructions

[

r Photo Caption Guideline No. E

( C 1. Workspace 6. Labels & Aids Caption:

O 2. Communications 7. Computer /CRT

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D 3. Annunciators 8. Panel Layouts E 4. Controls 9. C/D Integration

[ S 5. Displays Other:

Comments:

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( Assessment Category / Level: I II III f A1 - a

RECOMMENDATION (S) RECORD

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REVIEWERS:

( RECOMMENDATION (S):

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ACCEPT RECOMt!ENDATION NO.: REJECTION SIGNATURE REJECT RECOMMENDATION NOS.:

REJECTION JUSTIFICATION:

(

l IMPLEMENTATION AND SCHEDULING

( TENTATIVE SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE:

PROJECT ENGINEER APPROVAL:

STATION ASST. SUPT. OPS. APPROVAL:

( DCRDR COORDINATOR:

HED COMPLETED:

A1 - b

QUEDTIONAIRE ITEM

SUMMARY

FORM HFS ANALYST:

CONTENT AREA:

QUESTION

• 2  : CHECKLIST REFERENCE +'s:

' QUESTION:

F/%

SUMMARY

RESPONSE / CHECKLIST INVESTIGATION 44 SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT REFERENCE

+ 4+ g4 REFERENCE NUMBER (s)

G OMISSION - NO RESPONSE GIVEN s

h3 i

PERSONNEL SURVEY SupetARY FORM

1. HFS Analyst:

L z. Station:

Population Demographics and Statistics

[ PEAN STATISTICS

- Group N Sex Height Age Nuclear Control Board # Yrs fYrs M F Operation Operation R0 SRO Experience Experience Non-Licensed Operator License i Operators Licensed Non-Ope-ations Siw;ator Instructor

~

Cve-all E DIAN STATISTICS Group N Sex Height Age Nuclear Control Board # Yrs fYrs M F Operation Operation R0 SR0 Experience Experience Non-Licensed Operator

(

Licensed Operators Licensed Non-Operations Simulator Instructor

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Overall

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Il0EX OF REVIEWED REPORTS Inded Problem Title Priority

• Report Report Disposition ***

[ Type Number

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• Priority: H= high, L = -low

• • Disposition: C = Proble demed CORRECTED, (no additional investigation warranted)

UC = Problem deemed UNCORRECTED, (additional investigation warranted) f A-4

M Plant: Status Resort J Date:

Page:

5 HISTORICAL REPORT PROBLEM STATUS REPORT Problem Anay1 sis Status Index # Problem Title Report Type Report # Started Completed Distributed

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7 HISTORICAL REPORT REVIEW ERROR ANALYSIS PROBLEM ANALYSIS REPORT Apparent Cause(s) of Problem: -

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Recomendations for Corrective Action:

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P Control Room Human Engineering Discrepancy Log /Index thaber:

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W CONTROL ROOM REVIEW p TASK DEVELOPMENT L

JOB TITLE: TASK NO.

PREPARED BY: STA. NO.

TASK DESCRIPTION ACTION:

AGIl09 SitPS: (Saquence of @at must he done to accomolish AGTIONS) l TASK CONDITIONS: (Givens, Denials, Environment)

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Frequency: Shift Day Nk. 90. 81. Quar. 6 Mos. Year Cycle Other Once A Mo.

I Initiating Gues: (When vioas the task start)

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( Performance Criteria: (What Does dob Incumbant Have to Accomplish)

A-7 .

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L SYSTEM REVIEW Sup9tARY REFERENCE

1) Station haber

2) System Name

3) System Designation Identifier

4) Piping and Instrtssentation DiaFans Used

5) References 5.1 System Procedures Used:

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[ 5.2 Systen References Used:

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( 5.3 System Characteristics Described:

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5.4 System Function (s):

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6) System Functions Verifled:

Human Factors Specialist

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[ Procedure Step Yes No Comment HED Index

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H PRE-ASSESSl(NT FORM HED Index Number: HFS:

System Name: SME:

System Number:

Equipment Piece Number (EPN):

[ l Task Associated With Equipment Task Frequency

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Human Performance Modality Involved (Check Those That Apply)

[ 1. Visual 3. Tactile S. Informatten Processing

2. Auditory 4. Motor 6. Other(Specify)

Specify Type of Human Error That Could Occur Substitution Interpretation

[ Adjustment Locating Difficulty .

Forgetting Reading Difficulty Reversal Parallax Unintentional Operation

( Inabiltiy to Reach Misconnunication Other (Specify)

Potential Consequences of Human Error

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Equipment Damage Personnel Fatigue Personnel Injury thit Derating

[ Systen Malfunction Contaufnation thit Trip / Scram Tech. Spec. Violation Systen Damage System Stress Containment Breach

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SOUND SURVEY RECORD Plant: Date: Time: Sheet i of _

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Measurements made by:

Equipment / Instrument used:

4 So Serial f: Calibration date:

Octave Band Center Frequency Operator Idork Station db(A) 250 500 IK 2K 4K Remarks

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LIGHTING SURVEY ILLUMINANCE RECORD .

Plant: Date: Time:

Measurements made by: Sheet i of Equipment / Instrument used:

[ Serial #: Calibration date:

Location Other Ref. Panel Full AC Full Conditions No. 1.D. No. Ambient Emergency (Spec'i fy)

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( HUMIDITY / TEMPERATURE RECORD Pl ant: Date: Time:

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Measurements made by: Sheet i of Equipment / Instrument used:

Serial #: Calibration date:

Time Height Temperature Humidity Remarks n .,

6 ft.

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n, 6 ft.

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L AIR VELOCITY SURVEY RECORD Pl ant: Date: Time:

Meaturements made by: Sheet i of Equipment / Instrument used:

Serial f: Calibration date:

.. Location 6 ft. 4 ft.

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W '

H PHOTOGRAPHIC LOG f

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Station: Photographer:

Uni t: Dete:

Slide HED Photo Sequence F Shutter Index Location Caption Description Number Stop Speed Number Code Code Caption

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A - 18 f - - - -

L Control Room Design Review Survey The Nuclear Regulatory commission is requiring that a detailed human factors review of every nuclear power plant control room be perfomed. Part of the guidance docuatent pihlished to suonort these reviews, NTIREG-0700, suqqests the use of your operating experience to help the review team identify operator /

control board interface problems.

The Comnonwealth Edison Company and the management of this station support the spirit of the NRC's directives. As a result, we are asking for your support and assistance in the program by comoleting the attached questionnaire. For this program, the Company's goal is to improve the operating crew's capability l

B to recognize, control and manage plant abnomal and emergency conditions. A by-product, of course, is that some changes and corrections will be made which will make the operating crews' job easier to perform.

The questionnaire contains 52 questions that cover nine general topic areas dealing with different aspects of control room design and operating crew job duties and ta'sks. The questions deal with " problem" areas as well as good or beneficial features associated with the control room. In completing the questionnaire, please read each question carefully and then answer it as fully as you can based upon vour experience. In precaring your answers, consider I the questions from all the various modes of plant operation, e.g., startup, hot stani-hy, full power, etc. Give detailed answers so that someone not as familiar with the area as you are will be able to understand exactly what you mean.

Though the questionnaire is long, clease take the time you need and answer all the questions you can. Your viewpoints and experiences are important to this review. ftse additional pacer if necessarv and attach it to this question-I naire. If you do use additional paper, please be sure to match your answer to the sopropriate questinn. If vou feel that we have left anything out or i failed to cover an area in which you have a concern, please tell us by attaching comments to the questionnaire. If you are unable to answer a particular question, please indicate this in the space provided for your resoonse.

In asking for your support in this program, we feel it is important for you to know what we will do with your answers. As the questionnaires are returned, a i non-Ceco contractor will sumarize your answers on a question-by question basis and compile results for each. The team conducting the control room design review will then be infomed of each problem area identified so that I they can pay special attention to it during the review process. Should the team verify the area as a problem, they will document it on a fom made for that purpose.

Though the NRC may eventually be told of the problems you help identify, we want to assure you that your answers and comments on this questionnaire will be kept in strict confidence. Your answers will be summarized so that your exact words do not appear. Further, your answers will in no way effect your l B careers, standings or promotions in Commonwealth Edison. Therefore, in I answering the questionnaire, be as open, honest and straightforward as you can.

I A-19a

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L In addition to completing the questionnaire, we would like you to supply us with the additional information requested on the following page. It will help us to integrate your responses with other information we must collect as part of this project. The contractor who will be summarizing your answers may contact you privately for additional information or clarification, if neces-sary. %en vou have completed the questionnaire, place it in the envelope provided, seal the envelope, and return it within four weeks to the individual indicated on the next page. Thank you verv much for your cooperation and assistance.

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( NAME:

PRESTNT POSITION: ,

NUCLEAR OPERA"ING EXPERIENCE: YE4RS CONTROL BOARD OPERATING EXPERIENCE YEARS NMT,0 A Rgge: TOR OPER% TOR (Rn) t,ICEN99 YEARS NELD A SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR (SRO) LICENSE YEARS AGE: l SEX:

NMIGHT:

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A-19e f,,

L C.1 Identify and describe those areas in the main control room where back-grotmo noise levels interfere with annunciator alarms. Describe any

[' incident (s) in which the background noise delayed an operator in detecting an annunciator alarm in a timely mannar.

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[ C.2 Describe any incident (s) in which the annunciator warning system was ine*7ecti're in belotng onerators respond to a problem.

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C.3 Identify and describe those alarm tiles that have an inappropriate set-point, that is, one that gives the operator either too much or too

[ little time in which to respond to a plant problem.

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C.4 For alarms with multiple inputs, is the computer printout capability sufficient for you to determine the cause? If not, which alarms should be solit into single inouts?

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L C.5 Identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are confusing or difficult to understand. Exclain why.

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L D.1 Identify any auditory signal (s) presented in the control room which are confusino.

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[ D.2 Identt'v any aree(s) in the main control room where messages arosented over the P4 or radio systems cannot be heard clearly.

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D.3 Describe any instance (s) in which the use of the PA or radio systems by non-ooerating cersonnel interfered with control room use of the system.

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i D.4 Describe any situation (s) in which problems with the PA or radio systems prevented or interfered with an operators ability to communicate with individuals in other areas.

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b' D.5 Describe any incident (s) in which use of walkie-talkies have interfered with plant instrumentation.

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( A-19e

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.1 Identify any in,ormation or calculations not presently provided by tse proce.n computer that wmtid he useful.

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L E.3 Identify any words or symbols used on the computer that are difficult to understand or internret. Suggest improvements.

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E.4 Describe any incident (s) in which a delay in computer response to a request has detractei from or interfered with job performance.

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L, E.5 Is there any information presented on the CRT's that would be more useful if it was presented differently? Explain.

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E.6 Identify any CRT's located in the control room which are difficult to use from normal operating positions because of their placement in the control room.

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(.._ . , _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _

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E.7 Identify any information presented or the computer pri. iter that is not useful to control ronm ooerations and exclain why. Describe any

( situation (s) in which presentation of this information interfered with main control room oersonnel receiving information from the printer.

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[ E.R ' Identify any computer system procedures which are difficult to under-stani. Describe anv incident (s) in which this hat. caused a problem. .

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E.9 Identify any key (s) on the keyboard for the computer which are not used by main control room personnel. Describe any incident (s) in which these keys have caused problems in using the computer.

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F.1 Describe any incident (s) in which maintenance activities contributed to an operational problem.

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[ F.2 Describe any incident (s) in which the station maintenance program was particularly helpful in preventing an operational problem.

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F.3 Identify and describe any characteristic (s) of the main control room preentative maintenance program or corrective maintenance crocedures

(- that are a) very effective, b) not effective.

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( F.4 Describe any occasion (s) in which renlacement equipment such as fuses, bulbs, or ink was unavailable for corrective maintenance.

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Describe'the method used to determine lamp failure on the control F.5 panels. Describe a method that you feel would be more effective.

Explain.-

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G.1 Identify any procedure (s) which are unclear or difficult to use..

Explain. Describe any incident (s) in which this led to an operational problem.

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G.2 Identify tables / checklists / status boards, etc. which could be redesigned

{ to improve their usefulness. Explain.

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L G.3 Identify the log (s) that you feel are difficult to update or maintain.

Exnlain whv.

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/ G.4 Identifv any mathematical calculation (s) that are time consurning and/or difficult to perform. Explain.

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G.5 Identify the testing procedure (s) that should be performed more or less frequently (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.) than they are now.

( For each, state why.

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L H.1 Are there any job duties which are performed by others in which you feel main control room personnel should be more directly involved or vice

( versa? Explain.

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( H.2 Describe any individual responsib'Itties which are not clear 1v understood. How could they be improved?

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L, A.1 Identify any additional controls which would be helpful in the mai

{ control room. Explain why.

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4.2 Identify any additional displays which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why.

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h 4.3 Identify the area (s) in the main control roces where direct voice communication is difficult.

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A.4 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where the air quality (temperature, humidity, air flow) makes it uncomfortable or distracting to work.

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L i A.5 Describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other eroblens.

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A-198

B.1 Identify any control device (s) that should be operated manually instead of automatically or vice versa. Why?

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,o B.2 l Identify any throttleable valve (s) that would potentially restrict your time to respond during emergency operations because of their throttle-

. ability.

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B.3 Identify the system (s) in which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be.

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i B.4 Describe hov the layout of the control board eq'tipment can be improved to allow operators to perform more effectively.

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L B.5 Identify areas on the main control boards where your use of a control is interfered with by other equinment surrmanding it (e.g., controls, displays, telephones, radios, etc.).

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B.6 Tdentify equinment (controls, disolavs) in the main control room which are difficult to reach or monitor. Describe any incident (s) in which this dif*iculty has had an imoact on operator job nerformance.

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A-191

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B.7 Identify any control (s) on back panels that should be on front panels or vice versa. Please explain why and be specific.

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B.8 Describe any system (s) in the control room which you feel are difficult or confusing to operate. Describe any incident (s) in which these have

, affected operator job performance.

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B.9 Describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidently activated. Why?

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M.3 Describe any instance (s) in which distractions, in the form of unnecessary nersonnel, traffic, etc. , interfered with vour main control room duties.

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H.4 Describe how the shift turnover process can he improved.

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H.5 Describe any incident (s) in which the operating crew staffing structure affected control room operations. How can this be improved?

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P I.1 Describe any inconsistencies betveen training and actual control room operatinns. '4 hat can be done to make the two more consistent?

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Y I.3 Describe any incident (s) involving control room personnel in which additional training would have been helpful.

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SYSTEM FUNCTION SUHARY System Name System Number Design Basis Function I

I Emeroency (EPG) Related Function (s) i i

References /P&ID's/ Electrical Diagrams l

EPG Sten Number Task Ntnber Symptom Function l

I1 .

Emergency (EPG) Functions Identified and Associated Tasks Analvized HIPiAN FACTORS SPECIALIST l

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APPENDIX B

{

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES I

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m NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES l

Question No.

No. Associations Question

(

B.3 7 Identify the system (s) in which controls and/or displays are not grouped together but should be.

A.2 5 Identify any additional display which would be helpful in the main control room. Explain why. I c.5 4 Identify any alarm tile (s) in the main control room which are '

confusing or difficult to understand. Explain why.

I.1 4 Describe any inconsistencies between training and actual control room operations. What can g be done to make the two more M consistent?

A.5 3 Describe areas in the main control room where lighting causes glare, reflections, dark areas, or other problems.

I B.1 3 Identify any control device (s) g that should be operated manually P instead of automatically or vice versa. Why?

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5 NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Ouestion No.

No. Associations Question P

B.6 3 Identify equipment (controls, displays) in the main control room which are difficult to read or monitor. Describe any incident (s) in which this difficulty has had an impact on operator job performance.

I B.R 3 Describe any system (s) in the control room which you feel are difficult or confusing to operate. Det.cribe any incident (s) in which these have affected operator job performance.

I B.9 3 Describe any incident (s) in which controls located in the control room were accidently activated.

Why?

C.3 3 Identify and describe those alarm tiles that have an inappropriate setpoint, that is, those that give the operator either too much or too little time in which to respond to a plant problem.

A.1 2 Identify any additional controls which would be helpful in the main contol room. Explain why.

n 1

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES e

Question No.

No. Associations Question A.3 2 Identify the area (s) in the main control room where direct voice communication is difficult.

I B.4 2 nescribe how the layout of the control board equipment can be P improved to allow operators to perform more effectively.

I B.5 2 Identify areas on the main control boards where your use of a control is interfered with by other equipment surrounding it (e.g.

controls, displays, telephones, radios, etc.).

E.3 2 Identify any words or symbols used I on the computer that are difficult to understand or interpret.

I Suggest improvements.

G.2 2 Identify tables /checkisits/ status boards etc. which could be redesigned to improve their usefulness. Explain.

A.4 1 Identify any area (s) in the main control room where the air quality (temperature, humidity, air flow) makes it uncomfortable or distracting to work.

B3

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question A.6 1 Identify any obstacle (s) in the main control room that interfere with movement.

I B.2 1 Identify any throttleable valve (s) g that would potentially restrict F your time to respond during emergency operations because of i their throttleability.

C.2 1 Describe any incident (s) in which the annunciator warning system was ineffective in hekping operators respond to a problem.

I D.1 1 Identify any auditory signal ( s) presented in the control room which are confusing.

D.3 1 Describe any instance (s) in which the use of the PA or radio systems by non-operating personnel interfered with control room use of the system.

D.4 1 Describe any situations (s) in p which problems with the PA or radio systems prevented or interfered with an operators I

ability to communicate with individuals in other areas.

B4

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question e

E.1 1 Identify any information or calculations not presently provided by the process computer that would be useful.

E.5 1 Is there any information presented F on the CRT's that would be more useful if it was presented I differently? Explain.

F.1 1 Describe any incident (s) in which maintenance activities contributed to an operational problem.

H.2 1 Describe any individual responsibilities which are not clearly understood. How could they be improved?

H.3 1 T1escribe any instance (s) in which distractions, in the form of unnecessary personnel, traffic, etc., interfered with your main control room duties.

B.7 0 Identify any control (s) on back panels that should be on front panels or vice-versa. Please explain why and be specific.

I B5

J NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question e

C.1 O Identify and describe those areas in the main control room where background noise levels interfere with annunciator alarms. Describe any incident (s) in which the g bakground noise delayed an P operator in detecting an annunciator alarm in a timely I manner.

C.4 O For alarms with multiple inputs, is the computer printout capability sufficient for you to determine the cause? If not, which alarms should be split into single inputs?

D.2 O Identify any area (s) in the main control room where messages presented over the PA or radio systems can not be heard clearly.

D.5 0 Describe any incident (s) in which use of walkie-talkies have interfered with plant instrumentation.

E.2 O Describe any feature (s) of the computer system that you feel are helpful.

B6

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question E.4 0 Describe any incident (s) which a i delay in computer response to a request has detracted from or interfered with job performance.

g E.6 0 Identify any CRT's located in the F

control room which are difficult to use from normal operating I positions because of their placement in the control room.

E.7 0 Identify any information presented on the computer printer that is not useful to control room operations and explain why.

Describe any situation (s) in which g presentation of this information y interfered with main control room personnel receiving information from the printer.

E.8 0 Identify any computer system procedures which are difficult to understand. Describe any I incident (s) in which this has caused a problem.

E.9 0 Identify any key (s) on the keyboard for the computer which I

are not. used by main control room personnel. Describe any

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NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question incident (s) in which these keys have caused problems in using the l

computer. l F.2 O Describe any incident (s) in which the station maintenance program F was particularly helpful in preventing an operational problem.

I F.3 0 Identify and describe any characteristic (s) of the main control room preventative maintenance program, or corrective maintenance procedures that are a) very effective b) not effective.

F.4 0 Describe any situation (s) in which g

p replacement equipment such as fuses, bulbs, ink, were etc.

l unavailable for corrective maintenance.

F.5 0 Describe the method used to determine lamp failure on the control panels. Describe a method g that you feel would be more y effective. Explain.

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NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question G.1 O Identify any procedure (s) which are unclear or difficult to use.

l Explain. Describe any incident (s) in which this led to an operational problem?

G.3 0 Identify the log (s) that you feel are difficult to update or I maintain. Explain why.

G.4 0 Identify any mathematical calculation (s) that are time consuming and/or difficult to perform. Explain.

I G.5 0 Identify the testing procedure (s) g that should be performed more or p less frequently (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, etc.) than I. they are now. For each, state why.

H.1 0 Are there any job duties which are peformed by others in which you feel main control room personnel should be more directly involved or vice versa? Explain.

H.4 0 Describe how the shift turnover process can be improved.

I B9

NUMBER OF ASSOCIATIONS OF OPERATOR SURVEY

SUMMARY

ITEMS TO HUMAN ENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES Question No.

No. Associations Question H.5 0 Describe any incident (s) in which the operating crew staffing structure affected control room operations. How can this be improved?

I.2 0 Describe any emergency situation (s) for which you feel you have not received enough training.

( I.3 0 Describe any incident (s) involving control room personnel in which

{ additional training would have been helpful.

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APPENDIX C MANAGEMENT AND STAFFING: PERSONNEL I

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

t The management and administration of the Quad Cities Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) was the ,

responsibility of the Technical Services Nuclear Department.

F Within this department, the DCRDR Program Administrator reports i to the Technical Services Nuclear Department Manager who i reports directly to an Assistant Vice President and hence to a CECO Executive Vice President.

The nCRDR activities were implemented by experienced Operating, Engineering and Human Factors Engineering personnel. These individitals performed the DCRDR with input from other CECO studies, analyses and concerns involving human factors engi-neering considerations.

The DCRDR review team consisted of a select group of profes-sionals with the wide range of skills necessary for the performance of the design review and included o An I&C engineer o An engineer / architect with control room design experience o A senior reactor operatort or operations technical advisor with operating experience o A human factors specialist Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) participated in every phase of the review. They worked closely with all review team members C-1

to provide the appropriate level of plant design and opera-tional knowledge.

The following sections summarize the qualifications of each of the Quad Cities Station DCRDR review team participants. Two categories of involvement are listed: DCRDR review team participants (Section 2.0), and SME Support Personnel (Section 3.0).

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2.0 DCRDR REVIEW TEAM PARTICIPANTS l

The qualifications of the DCRDR review team members are summarized below. The responsibilities and duties of each member is discussed in Section 3.0, of Volume 1 of the Quad Cities Station DCRDR Final Summary Report.

l The Program Administrator position was originally filled by Mr.

Richard J. Squires. During the second half of the Quad Cities DCRDR, the Program Administrator position was filled by Mr.

Gary Abrell. Mr. Squires qualifications are as follows:

Education: M.S., Nuclear Engineering, University of Illinois, 1962.

B.S., Metallurgical Engineering, Illinois

? Institute of Technology, 1953.

Experience: For the past three years Mr. Squires has served as the CECO human factors program administrator and for the past four years, has participated in CECO control room design reviews. He has 29 years of engineering experience, of which 22 has l been in the nuclear power area. Mr. Squires has held positions in engineering, construction, operations, quality as'surance and training at Ceco over the past 13 years. From 1975 to the present he has had an SRO license at the Zion Station. Since 1977 he has a Professional Engineers License in the State of Illinois. j C-3 ,

- N Mr. Abrell's qualifications are as follows:

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Education: B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1961.

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Experience: Mr. Abrell has served as the Supervisor of y Station Support Services for the past 11 months.

3 Prior to that he was the Director of Quality Ass.urance for Operations for 6-1/2 years. He has 23 ' years of engineering experience which includes 20 iI the nuclear field. He has held positions in Nuclear Licensing and Nuclear Station opera-tions at Commonwealth Edison. He has had 3-1/2 years in the Navy Nuclear Power Program. He has held an SRO license for Dresden Station since I 1970 and has been a Registered Professional Engineer in Illinois since 1978.

In the Human Factors area, Mr. Abrell adopted the i " Green Board" for Dresden Station in 1973 and was responsible for its implementation. This concept is in use at LaSalle, Byron, and Braidwood sta-tions.

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The position of DCRDR Program Coordinator was originally filled by Mr. Phillip A. Lau. During the second half of the DCRDR, the Program Coordinator position was filled by Mr. Robert E.

{ Howard. Mr. Lau's qualifications are as follows:

Education: B.S., Nuclear Technology Program. Enrolled in Northern Illinois University.

Experience: For the past two years Mr. Lau served as the CECO human factors group supervisor developing the program plan for the DCRDR. He spent the prior r two years developing and conducting a job posi-tion task analysis for plant operating posi-tions. He has 23 years of supervising and management experience, 20 of which have been in the nuclear power area. Mr. Lau has been a reactor operator in the navy nuclear program. He I has held positions in fuel handling, operating and training at CECO over the past 13 years.

From 1971 to the present he has had an SRO l license at the Quad Cities Station.

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( Mr. Howard's qualifications are as follows:

Electrical Engineering, University of

{ Education: B.S.,

Wisconsin, 1955.

Experience: For the past four years, Mr. Howard has assisted 1 in the Human Factors Reviews of CECO's Zion, LaSalle, Byron, Braidwood, Dresden, and Quad Cities nuclear stations. For the past three years he was Coordinator of the Byron /Braidwood Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) and for the past two years assisted Mr. Squires and Mr. Lau in the development and implementation of the DCRDR Generic Program Plan for CECO nuclear plants. For the past seven years Mr. Howard was i assigned as Staff Engineer in the Control and Instrument group of the Station Electrical Engineering Department and as of September 3, 1984, is a Staff Engineer in Tech Services Nuclear Department. For eight years prior to that he was Operating Engineer at the Zion Station (SRO license from 1973 to 1979).

Twenty-three of his 40 years experience with power plants have been in the nuclear power area, I including assignments in operation, maintenance, construction and engineering.

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I The position of Senior Subject Matter Expert (SME) was filled by Mr. 'T'om '"amlyn of CECO.

Mr. Tamlyn's qualifications are as follows:

( Education: B.S., Electrical Engineering, Iowa State University, 1964.

Experience: For the past five years Mr. Tamlyn has served as the Assistant Superintendent of Operations at l Quad Cities. For the 6-1/2 years prior to that he served as Operator Engineer at Quad Cities and for the 4-1/2 years prior to that he served as Instrument Engineer at Quad Cities. Prior to this 16 years of nuclear experience, Mr. Tamlyn worked 3-1/2 years in the Communications and Instrumentation group of CECO's Operational Analysis Department. He has had a SRO license for the past 11-1/2 years.

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The individuals filling the Human Factors Engineering positions were made up of individuals from outside contractors.

The position of-Lead Human Factors Specialist (LHFS) was filled by_Mr. . Robert L. Kershner from Advanced Resource Development

( (ARD) Corporation. Mr. Kershner's qualifications are as follows:

[ Education: M.A., Human Factors Psychology, the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., 1977.

{ B.A., Applied Psychology, cum laude, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, Maryland, 1975.

Experience: For the past three years Mr. Kershner, Director

[ of Human Factors Technology for ARD Corporation, has worked in the nuclear utility industry pro-

{ viding support in a number of human factors areas including program plan development, SPDS design and evaluation, control room design reviews, and EOP validation. Prior to that time,-he spent six years designing, conducting and evaluating human factors research in vibrotactile codes, traffic management, driver -information systems, low-h fidelity simulation aids, information presen-tation to time critical materials, visual search

[ patterns, and military systems design, analysis and improvement. Most recently Mr. Kershner participated in underwater acoustical testing of

{ nuclear submarines serving as assistant trial director.

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The Human Factors Specialist (HFS) positions were filled by ARD

{ Corporation personnel, the names, affiliations, and educational and experimental qualifications for these individuals are as follows:

Individual: Mr. Stephen H. Cooley

[ Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation i Education: M.A., Industrial / Organizational Psychology, Uni-versity of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois, 1980.

B.A., Psychology with minors in Business Admini-stration and Statistics, George Washington I University, Washington, D.C., 1976.

Experience: For the past three years Mr. Cooley, a Senior Human Factors Specialist for ARD, has worked in the nuclear power industry. He has provided support in a number of human factors areas that include: program plan development, control room design reviews, procedure writing and evaluation, training, and human error as a result of inade-I quate man-machine interfaces. Prior to that he has three years of experience in the design, conduct and evaluation of both applied and theo-retical research in leadership emergence, person-nel selection, personnel staffing patterns, stress management, group dynamics, market research, management assessment, and the psycho-logical factors associated with addiction.

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Individual: Mr. Joseph B. Winter Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia, 1979.

B.S., Psychology, Virginia Commonwealth

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University, Richmond, Virginia, 1974.

I Experience: Mr. Winter has over two years experience in the power industry conducting task analyses on I nuclear jobs for training purposes. In addition to utility employment, he has three additional I years of human factors experience utilizing a variety of analytic techniques in the areas of test validation, selection, classification, compensation, performance appraisal and multi-purpose job analysis. He is an accomplished SAS programmer and has used task analysis approaches to create computerized classification systems, tying them to human resource development projects which factor geographic differences in pay. He I has experience developing job evaluation systems and has worked extensively as a job analyst.

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W Individual Mr. Michael A. Boggi

{

Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Industrial Engineering, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, expected completion: December 1984.

( B.A., Psychology, LaSalle College, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1981.

[ Experience: In 1982 Mr. Boggi supervised a group of researchers conducting a noise control project for the regional headquarters of the Amoco Oil Company of Raleigh, North Carolina. In addition, Mr. Boggi worked on a team that evaluated aspects of safety, biomechanics, and the man-machine

( interface at specific work locations at the ITT plant in Raleigh, North Carolina. Besides his Boggi has conducted

{ applied experience, Mr.

observational research in freight management and traffic control. Presently he is applying his training and experience to complex man-machine interface issues in the nuclear industry.

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Individual Mr. Christopher C. Plott

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Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: M.S., Industrial Engineering, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 1983.

B.S., Kinesiological Sciences, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 1981.

I Experience: For the past 2-1/2 years Mr. Plott has been involved in various applied research projects I conducted at Texas Tech. These included work in the areas of work physiology, biomechanics, anthropometry, task analysis and work load measurement while under contract to the nureau of Mines, the State of Texas, and the McDonnel Douglas Corp. His responsibilities included the design, conducting and analysis of various aspects of these projects. Mr. Plott has also done work in the areas of human-computer inter-I face and sofware development. He is currently applying his background to complex man--machine I interface issues in the nuclear industry as well as helping to develop the computerized data base management system being used for a DCRDR.

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Individual: Ms. Kimberly R. Siler Affiliation: Advanced Resource Development (ARD) Corporation Education: B.S., Human Factors Psychology, Wright State

[ University, Ohio, 1982.

For the past two years Ms. Siler was a research

{ ' Experience:

psychologist responsible for the design, imple-mentation and analysis of applied research in the areas of Behavioral Workload Assessment and Bio-magnetism in the Visual Evoked Response Labora-tory of the Air Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories / Human Edgineering at Wright Patter-son Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. In addition to her research activities, Ms. Siler was continu-

{ ing her education in the Graduate Program in Human Factors at the Psychology Department at Wright State University. Since joining the ARD

{ Corporation, she has been involved in the conduct of nuclear power plant CRDRs.

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Individual: Mr. Andrew T. Bayer

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Affiliation: Commonwealth Edison Company

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Education: B.S., Human Factors Engineering, Wright State L University, Dayton, Ohio, 1981.

( Experience: For the past two years Mr. Bayer has supported projects under the auspices of CECO's human factors engineering program. he has

{ Projects worked on include operator error analysis, SPD9 design and evaluation, program plan development, l control panel design, and CRDRs. 4

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I 1 Other Review Team Members l The position of System Design Engineer was filled by Michael S.

Tucker of CECO. Mr. Tucker's qualifications are as follows:

Education: B.S., Electrical Engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology, 1977.

Experience: For the past three years Mr. Tucker has been in the Station Nuclear Engineering Department pro-viding support for modifications to Dresden and I Quad Cities Stations including the control room.

Prior to that time, he was in the Station Elec-trical Engineering Department providing support in the design of nulk Power switching stations.

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s The Instrument and Control Engineer position was filled by James J. Krass (assisted by Robert Howard) of CECO. Mr. Krass' qualifications are as follows:

Education: B.S., Electrical Engineering, Technology from Purdue University, 1968.

Experience: Presently Mr. Krass is assigned to the Control and Instrument section in the Station Electrical Engineering Department of CECO. From February 1979 to April of this year he was assigned to the 1 Electrical Instrumentation and Control Branch of g

the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project at Oak B Ridge Tennessee. And, for the ten years prior to that, Mr. Krass was in Ceco's Operational Analysis Department working on Instrument and Control Sys- tems in both fossil and nuclear plants.

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( 3.0 SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS (SME's) b Ten (10) SME's participated during various phases of the Quad Cities Station DCRDR. The qualifications of each are summar-imod in Table C-1.

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I Years of Years Years of Senior of Years Reactor Reactor Nuclear I of Operator Operator Plant SME Education Experience Experience Experience Stortz 12 1.5 4 i McConnaughay 12 6 3 13 Kool 16 4 9 Warren 12 1 4 Huisingh 12 8.5 14 i e _ xe 12 , 15

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m_ m 4 e Li Hou 12 3 10 eh _ _ m , 4 14 l

l l ,ah1e c_1. o ae citi.. eceo ,se ea,ticipa.e o.a11ficaeio..

C-18 1 . .

E E

APPENDIX D

[ CODES l

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I 01 YES 11 YES COMMENT 02 NO 12 NO COMMENT l LOCATION 01 901-3H 20 901-13 38 902-7H 57 902-36 02 901-3V 21 901-15 39 902-7V 58 902-37 03 901-4H 22 901-16 40 902-8V 04 901-4V 23 901-17 41 902-6 59 912-1 05 901-5H 24 901-18 42 902-54H 60 912-2 06 901-5V 25 901-19 43 902-54V 61 912-4 07 901-6H 26 901-20 44 902-55 62 912-5 08 901-6V 27 901-21 45 902-56 63 912-7 I 09 901-7H 28 901-36 46 902-2 64 912-8 g 10 901-7V 29 901-37 47 902-10 g 11 901-8H 48 902-11 19 901-8V 30 902-3H 49 902-13 13 901-54H 31 902-3V 50 902-15 14 901-54V 32 902-4H 51 902-16 15 901-55 33 902-4V 52 902-17 16 901-56 34 902-5H 53 902-18 l

5 17 901-2 la 901-10 35 902-5V 54 902-19 36 902-6H 55 902-20 18 901-11 37 902-6V 56 902-21 COMMtRIICATION 01 Electrical Mechanic (EM) 08 Maintenance Mechanic (MM) 1 02 Electrical Mechanic Foreman (EMF) 09 Maintenance Mechanic Foreman (MMF) 03 Equipment Attendant (EA) 10 Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) 04 Equipment Operator (EO) 11 Shift Control Room Engineer (SCRE) 05 Instrument Mechanic (IM) 12 Shift Engineer (SE) 1 06 Instrument Mechanic Foreman (IMF) 13 Shift Foreman (SF) 07 Load Dispatcher (LD) 14 Station GSEP Director (GSEP) 15 Operating Engineer (OP)

I 16 Rad Waste Equipment 17 Center Desk Operator (RWE)

(CDO) .

18 Station Superintendent (SST)

CONDITION 01 ENERGIZED (EN) 02 DEENERGIZED (DEN)

COLOR 01 Amber (A) 07 Red (R) 02 Black (Dk) 08 Red / Green (RG) l 03 Blue (D) 09 White (W)

E 04 Green (G) 10 Yellow (Y) 05 Orange (0) 11 Clear (C) 06 Pink (P) 12 Gray (GY) 13 Deige (BG) 14 Brown (DR) 01 1.

) -

TYPE OF DISPLAY METERS COUNTERS 01 Edgewise Meter (EM) 20 Drum Counter (Integrator) (DC) 02 Rotary Meter (RM) 21 Electronic Counter (EC) 23 Light Emitting Diode (LED)

RECORDERS INDICATOR LIGHTS 10 Single Pen Recorder (SP) 30 Legend Light Indictor (LLI) 11 Dual Pen Recorder (DP) 31 Non Legend Light Indicator (IL)

[ 12 Multi Pen Recorder (MP) 13 Multi Point Recorder (MPT) OTHERS 14 X-Y Plotter (XYP)

I 15 Printer (P) 40 Target (TAR) 16 Tape Recorder (TR) 41 Relay (REL) 42 Annunciator (ANN) 1 43 Timer (TIM)

CONTROLLERS 50 Responne Edgewise Meter (REM) 51 Demand Edgewise Meter (DEM) '

52 Deviation Edgewise Meter (DEV) 53 Moving Tape with Fixed Index (MTFI)

$4 Knob Skirt (KS)

I WHAT IS MEASURED 01 Concentration Conc 02 Conductivity Cond 03 Continuity Cont 04 Current Cur 1 05 Deviation Dev 06 Dif ferential Pressure DP 07 Displacement Dis 08 Eccentricity Ecc 09 Electrical Power E1P 10 Plow Flow 11 Frequency Freq 12 Humidity Hum 13 Level Lev 14 Period Per i 15 Phase Angle PA 16 Position Pos 17 Pressure P 18 Purity Pur 19 Radiation Rad 20 Reactive Load Vars 21 Reactor Power RxP 22 Rod Position RPos

[ W11AT IS MEASURED (cont.)

23 Speed Spd 24 Start up Rate SUR 25 Temperature Temp 26 Time T 27 Vacuum Vac 28 Vibration Vib 29 Voltage V 30 Volume Vol 31 Expansion Exp 32 Wear Wear

- 33 Load Load 34 Rod ID Number RODID 35 Rod Group Identification RODGP 36 Direction DIR 37 Setpoint (STPT) 38 Units 39 VARS l 60 Phone 61 Radio-Base Station 62 Radio-Portable 63 Portable Radio Charger 64 Sound Powered Phone 65 Sound Powered Phone Jack 66 Radio-Receiver only 70 Graphs, Tables, Charts, Instructions 71 Procedures 72 P&ID's, Drawings 73 Reference Book 74 Log i 75 Board 76 Timer-Portable 77 Clock 78 Thumbuster Aid 79 Date Stamp 80 Chair 81 Table '

82 Desk 83 Cabinet 84 Book Case 85 File Cabinet 86 Paper Tray 87 14dder, Stepping Stool 88 Trash Can 89 Cart 90 Fire Extinguisher 91 Emergency Air i

92 Emergency Air llose 93 Self Contained Breathing Apparatus 94 Emergency Lighting 95 Keyboard 96 CRT 97 Dec Writer 98 Calculator D3

UNITS 01 Amperes Amps 02 counts per Minute CPM 03 Counts per Second CPS 04 Cubic Feet CF f

l 05 06 Cubic Feet Per Minute Decades Per Minute CFM DPM 07 Degrees Dog 08 Degrees Centigrade DegC 09 Degrees Farenheit DegF 10 Feet Ft

- 11 Feet of Water FtW 12 Gallons G 13 Gallons Per Hour GPH I 14 Callons Per Minute GPM 15 Hertz Hz 16 Hours Hr i 17 18 Inches Inches of Mercury In InHg 19 Inches of Water InW 20 Ka I 21 Kiloamperes Kilovars Kvar 22 Kilovolts KV 23 Kilowatts Kw I 24 25 Megavars Megawatts Hvar Hw 26 Microanperes ua 27 Microcuries Per Cubic Centimeter uCi/cc 28 Microcurites Per Second uCi/s 29 Micro Mhos umho 30 Miles Per Hour sph 31 M111 amperes ma 32 M111troentgens Per Hour ar/hr 33 Millivolts av 1 34 35 Mils Minutes mils min 36 Notches Notch .l 37 Parts Per Billion PPD 38 Parts Per Million PPM 39 Percent t 40 Percent by Volume W 41 Percent by Weight &W 42 Percent Thermal Power %P(T) 43 Pounds Per Hour PPH 44 Pounds Per Square Inch PSI 45 Pounds Per Square Inch Atmospheric PSIA 46 Pounds Per Square Inch Differential PSID 47 Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge PSIG 48 Revolutions Per Minute RPM 49 Roentgens Per Hour R/hr 50 Seconds sec 51 Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute SCFM

UNITS 52 Steps Steps

[ 53 54 Units Volts Units V

55 Watts W 56 Watts Per Square Centimeter W/sqcm

{ 57 Standard Cubic Feet Per Hour SCFH 58 Million Pounds Per Hour MPPH

- 59 Percent Deflection %Def k 60 ROD ID Number RODID 61 ROD Group Number RODGP

- 62 Centimeters of Mercury cmHg I

63 Points Pt 64 Voltage-DC VDC i 65 Megawatts "hermal Mwt i

I I

I l

i I

1 1

05

s WHAT MEASURED UNITS

[ 01 Concentration (CONC) 37 38 Parts Per Billion Parts Per Million (PPB)

(PPM) 40 Percent by Volume (%V) 41 Percent by Weight (%W) 02 Conditctivity (COND) 29 Micro Mhos (umho) 03 Continuity (CONT) 31 Milliamperes (ma)

~

04 CurIont (CUR) 01 Amperes (Amps) 20 Kiloamperes (Ka) 26 Microamperes (ua) 31 Milliamperes (ma) 05 Devir tion (DEV) 06 Differential Pressure (DP) 44 Pounds Per Square Inch (PSI) 46 Pounds Per Square Inch Differential (PSID) 08 Eccentricity (ECC) 34 Mils (Mils) 09 Electrical Power (ELP) 23 Kilowatts (Kw) 1 25 Megawatts (Mw) 55 Watts (W) 10 Flow (Flow) 05 Cubic Feet Per Minute (CFM) 13 Gallons Per Hour (GPH) 14 Gallons Per Minute (GPM) 39 Percent (%)

43 Pounds Per Hour (PPH) 50 Standard Cubic Feet Per' Minute (SCFM) 57 Standard Cubic Feet Per Hour (SCFF) 58 Million Pounds Per Hr. (MPPH) l 59 Percent Deflection (%Def) 11 Frequency (FREQ) 15 Hertz (Hz) 12 H'imidity (HUM) 39 Percent (%)

13 Level (LEV) 10 Feet (Ft) 12 Gallons (G) 17 Inches (In) 39 Percent (%)

14 Period (PER) 50 Seconds (Sec) 15 Phase Angle (PA) 07 Degrees (Deg) 06

1 l

WHAT MEASURED UNITS 16 Position (POS) 39 Percent (%)

, 63 Point (Pt.)

17 Pressure (P) 11 Feet of Water (FtW) 18 Inches of Mercury (InHg) 19 Inches of Water (InW) 44 Pounds Per Square Inch (PSI) 45 Pounds Per Square Inch 1 Atmospheric 46 Pounds Per Square Inch (PSIA)

Differential (PSID) 47 Pounds Per Square Inch Gauge (PSIG) 62 Centimeters of Mercury (CmHg) 18 Purity (PUR) 39 Percent (%)

19 Radiation (RAD) 02 Counts Per Minute (CPM)

I 03 Counts Per Second 27 Microcuries Per Cubic (CPS)

Centimeters (uCi/cc) 28 MicroCuries Per Second I 32 Milliroentgens Per Hour (uC1/cc)

(mR/hr) 49 Roentgens Per Hour (R/hr) 53 Units (Units) 39 Percent (%)

20 Reactive Load (VARS) 21 Kilovara (Kvar) 22 Megavara (Hvar) 21 Reactor Power (RxP) 01 Amperes (Amps) 03 Counts Per Second (CPS) 42 Percent Thermal Power (%P(T))

1 53 Units (Units) 56 Watts Per Square .

Centimeter (W/sqcm) 22 Rod Position ( RPOS) 36 Notches (Notch) 52 Steps (Steps) 23 Speed (SPD) 30 Miles Per Hour (mph) 48 Revolutions Per Hour (rpm) 39 Percent (%)

24 Start up Rate (SUR) 06 Decades Per Minute (DPM) 25 Temperature (TEMP) 08 Degrees Centigrade (DegC) 09 Degrees Farenheit (DegF) 26 Time (T) 16 Hours (hr) 35 Minutes (min) 50 Seconds (sec) 07

4 WilAT MEASURED UNITS 27 Vacuum (VAC) 11 Feet of Water (FtW) 18 Inches of Mercury (InHg) 19 Inches of Water (InW) 28 Vibration (VIB) 34 Mils (Mils)

- 29 Voltage (V) 22 Kilovolts (Kv) 33 Millivolts (Mv) 54 Volts (V) 30 Volume (VOL) 04 Cubic Feet (CF) 39 Percent (%)

31 Expansion (Exp) 17 Inches (In) 32 Wear (Wear) 34 Mils (Mils) 33 Load (Load) 39 Percent (%)

34 Rod TD Number 60 Rod ID Number (RODID) 35 Rod Group Identification 61 Rod Group Number (RODGP) 36 Direction (DIR) 07 Degrees (DEG) 37 38 Units (UNITS) 34 Mils (Mils) l I

I I

l I

I D8

[

RANGE

{ 003 004 1

1999 006 10 009 -1200-3400 E- 010 -1200 to 2400 012 15 014 -191-60 015 -150-150 l5, 016 017

-199.9-199.9 20 018 -243-57 020 0 1 021 022 25

-250-50 023 -250-60 024 0 1 025 -240-0 026 .25 to -1.0 027 30 1 030 -300-300 031 -300-60 011 -334-66 034 1 036

-350-75

-184-116 038 160 039 40 040 30 042 -400-800 045 358 1 048 051 0

5 054 -5.25-5 056 0 057 40 060 60 ,

063 -600-1200 '

066 70 069 00 070 -99999-99999 071 -9.99-9.99 072 .01-100 075 .01-10E2 076 .1-10E3 078 .2-1.2 081 .5-5.25 083 0-9999x10 E-6 004 0 .2 005 0-0 007 0 .5 ,

009 0 .9 l 090 0-1 09

RANGE 091 0-1 x 10E3 092 0-2 x 10E3 093 0-10 094 0-10 x 100 095

( 096 0-1.2 0-100 097 0-1 x 100 098 0-10 x 1000

[ 099 0-1000 100 0-1100

- 101 0-1040 102 0-1050 103 1040-1050 1 105 0-10E6 100 0-12 111 0-12 x 100 1 114 0-12 x 1000 11.7 0-12 x 10E6 120 0-120 121 0-1200 1 123 0-125 126 0-125 x 10E6 127 0-130 I 129 132 0-15 0-15 x 100 135 0-15 x 10E2 138 0-150 1 139 0-1500 141 0-160 142 0-1999 1 143 0-180 144 0-2 145 0-2.5 I 146 147 0-180 0-2 x 100 148 0-2 x 10E2 l 150 0-2 x 1000 152 0-20 x 1000 153 0-20 154 0-20 x 100 1 155 0- -20 156 0-200 159 0-2000 I 160 162 0-22 x 10E3 0-24 163 0-2400 I 165 166 168 0-25 0-25 x 100 0-250 I 171 174 177 0-28 0-3 0-3 x 10E6 010

RANGE 180 0-30

[ 181 183 0-30 x 10 0-30 x 100 186 0-300 187 0-3000

{ 189 0-32 190 0-335

~

191 0-35 192 0-35 x 100 193 0-35 x 10E5 1 195 0-3500 l 198 0-36 l 201 0-360 l 204 207 0-4 0-40 i

l 208 0-4R I 210 211 0-400 0-4000 213 0-5 214 0-5.25 1 216 0-5 x 10 217 0-5 x 100 219 0-5 x 10E3 1 220 0-5 x 1000 221 0-5 x 10E4 222 0-50 225 0-500 1 227 0-59 228 0-6 229 0-6 x 100 1 231 0-6 x 1000 232 0-6 x 10E6 234 0-60 1 237 240 0-600 0-6000 0-65 243 .

I 245 246 0-65 x 1000 0-65 x 10E3 247 0-70 x 100 248 0-7 x 1000 1 249 0-75 252 0-75000 253 1.2 - 1.3 1 254 255 0-9.9 0-8 256 0-90 I 257 258 0-900 0-8 x 10E6 259 0-80 x 10E6 I 240 261 0-99.99 0-80 011

L RANGE 262 0-800

[-l 263 ~0-99 264 0-8000

'265 0-85 f 266 0-9999999 x 10 267 1-10 268 0-9 269 0-9999 1-10E6 270 271 1-4 x 10E3

[ 272 10-10E6 L 273 10-100 274 10-30 275 10-22 x 10E3'

( 276 277 10-35 100-0 278 10-35 x 100 279 100-200

[ 280 1-10E4 281 0-99 282 100-400

[ 283 100-500 284 0-999  ;

285 100-600 286 1-10E5

( 287 100-300 288 1000-4000 291 1900-5250

[ 294 1100-6000 297 10E-1-10E3 300 10E-1-10E6

[ 303 10E-7-10E-2 306 10E0-10E8 309 10El-10E5 311 15-75

( 312 150-1050  !

315 150-200 316 150-200 x 1000

[ 317 150-250 317 2.5-22.5 318 2-12 x 100

( 320 321 2.000-2.500 2-5 122 2-5 x 10E3 324 2-6 x 1000

{ 325 20-100 326 200-420 x 1000 327 20-150

[ 328 2000-5000 329 250-2000 330 27-32

( D12 L - - - - - - - - - -

RANGE 331 25-200 I

[- 332 25-125 333 280-420 316 3-15 h 337 3-15 x 1000 339 30-150 340 30-150 x 10 341 30-35

{ 342 30-70 x 100 343 3000-5000 *

[L 345 30-80 348 32-132 351 35-70 x 100

.352 3600-4400

( 353 354 4-10 x 10E3 40-160 l

355 40-150 356 5-15 x 10E3

{ 357 420-438 358 420-438 x 1000 359 5-10

[ 360 5-5 361 5.6 x 1000 - 5.6 x 1000

[

[

[

[ .

[

[

[

[

t'

['

( D13 f __

~

RANGE 360 5-22 x 10E3 363 5-22.5 365 5-35 h 366 5-50 367 5.6 3A9 50-100 -

• 372 50-150 373 50-150 x 1000 374 50-200

[ 375 50-250 L 378 50-300 381 50-400.

382 50-438 x 1000

( 383 384 500-4000 500-2000 385 5000-5200 386 5200-5250

[ 387 55-65 390 555-595 391 56-65

[ 393 58-62 396 59.5-60.5

{

399 595-607

{

( 401 402 60-245 68-82 403 60 i 404 70-80

[ 405 75-125 407 750-1100 408 75-85 409 9-15 x 10E2 410 9-12 x 100 411 8-73 412 950-1200

( 413 940-1060 l 414 940-1064 415 940-1500

[ 416 A O-R6 417 PERIOD 418 9500-11000 g

[

[

( D14 L .

DIVISION 01 .001 48 18 03 .002 51 2 04 .005

[- 06 .01 52 2.5 09 .02 54 20

- 12 .05 57 200

( 15 .1 60 25 18 .2 61 250 21 .25 63 3 64 3.33 24 .4 66 30 27 .5 69 4

30. 1 72 5

[ l L 31 1.5 75 50 l 32 1.25 78 500 33- 10 79 6 36 100 81 8 42 1000 84 LOG 45 12 87 PERIOD 46 12.5 88 EACH

{

[

[

[

[

[

[

[

[

[

D15

[

f .

TYPE OF SWITCH

[- 0- Other 01 Discrete Rotary Control (DRC)

[- 02 Joy Stick

~

(JS) 03 Circuit Breaker (CB) 04 Key Pad (KP)

[ 05 Knife Switch (KS) 06 Continuous Rotary Control (CRC) 07 Rocker Switch (RKS)

Removable Handle

(. 08 09 Other (Non-Switch /Non-Display)

(RH)

(NS/ND) 1- J-Handle Control Switch 10 Valve (JHV) 11 Pump (JHP)

[ 12 Circuit Breaker (JHCB) 13 Fan (Blower) (JHF) 14 Selector (JHS) 15 Other (JHO) 16 J-Handle with a Key 2- Star, Egg, Oval and Other Rounded Control

[ Switches 20 Valve (RV) 21 Pump (RP) 22 Circuit Breaker (RCB) 23 Fan (Blower) (RF) 24 Selector (RS)

[ 25 Other (RO) 26 Manual Valve control 3- Thumb Control Switch (Thumb Buster) 30 Valve (TBV) 31 Pump (TBP) 32 Selector (TBS) 33 Reset (TBR) 34 Other (TBO) .

{

4- Key Lock Switch

_40 Valve (KLV)'

'41 Pump (KLP) 42 Selector (KLS)

( 43 44 Reset Other (KLR)

(KLO)

[

D16

s TYPE OF SWITCH

[ 5- Toggle Switch 50 Selector (TSS)

[' 51 Power (TSP)

Jack' 55 Female (JF) 56 Male (JM) 6- Slide Switch 60 Selector (SSS)

( 61 Power (SSP)

Card 65 .LPRM/APRM Card (CARD)

Thumbwheel

( 7-70 Selector ('tWS )

71 Power (TWP)

[- 75 Rocker Switch Valve Control (RSVC) 8- Pushbutton 80 Reset (PBR) 81 Test (PBTE) 82 Trip (PBTR) 83 Trip Lock (PBTL) 84 Silence (PBS) 85 Acknowledge (PBA)

[. 86 Initiate (PBI) ,

87 Deactivate (PBD)

• 88 Other (PBO) 9- Legend Light Push Button 90 Reset (LLR) 91 Selector (LLS) 92 Control (LLC) 93 Test (LLT)

[ 94 Acknowledge (LLA) 9- Non-Legend Light Push Button 95 Reset (NLLR) 96 Selector (NLLS) 97 Control (NLLC)

{ 98 Test- (NLLT)  !

99 Initiate (NLII)

D17

[

s t VALVE CONTROL

[ 01 Seal.Open (SO) 02 Seal closed . ( SC )

03 Throttle Open (TO)

[ 04 Throttle Closed (TC)

SWITCH ACTION 01' AS IS (AI) 02 Spring Return (SR)

[

[

[

c

[

{

[

[.

( 018

[ l

7. . . . , , . . . . _ . , . _ -

s F.

L NAMES OF SWITCH POSITIONS 001 -15V 002 +15V 003 0-10%

[. 004 0-100%

t 005 0 006 0-25%

009 0-54 012 1 013 1-2 015 1 ELEM CONT

{ 018 10 019 100 021 10E-1

[E 024 10E-2 027 10E-3 030 10E-4 033 10E-5

( 036 10E-6 039 10E-7 042 10E-8

[~ 045 10E-9 048 10E5 051- 11

[ 054 12 057 125 060 13 063 14 066 15 069 16

[ 072 2 073 2-3 (i 074 21 077 22

[ 079 23 ,

000- 24 .

075 3 076 3-1 077 '22 078 3-ELEM CONT 079 23

[. 080 24 081 4 084 40 087 5 090 6 093 7 096 8

{. 099 9 102 -A 105 A BUS +

[' 108 A BUS -

( D19 i

NAMES OF SWITCH POSITIONS

( 111 A LEVEL 114 A OFF 117 A PRIM 120 .A START 123 A STBY

[ 176 A-B

( 129 AB 132 ADD 180 134 ANALYZE

( 135 138 APRM ARMED 141 AUTO 144 AUTO OPEN

{. 147 AVERAGE 150 AVG 153 B

[- 154 BALANCE 156 B BUS +

159 B BUS -

162 B LEVEL

( 165 B OFF 168 B PRIM 171 B START

[- 174 B STBY 177 B-C p 180 BC

( 182 BLOCK 183 BMTOM 186 BUS 21 B-C 3 189 BUS 22 B-C 192 BUS 23 B-C 195 BUS 23-1 B-C 198 BUS 24 B-C 201 BUS 24-1 B-C 204 BUS 25 B-C I 207 BUS 26 B-C 208 BUS 27 209 BY 210 .BYP 213 BYPASS

[ 216 C 219 C-A 222 CA 225 CAL 228 CALIB 231 CH 1 234. CH 10

-237 CH 11 240 CH 12 243 CH 13 246 CH 14 l

l 1

{ D20

[

NAMES OF SWITCH POSITIONS

[ 249 CH 15 252 CH 16 255 CH 17 258 CH 18 261 CH 19 264 CH 2 267 CH 20 270 CH 21 273 CH 22 276 CH 23 279 CH 24 282 CH 3 285 CH 4

[ 288 CH 5 291 CH 6 294 CH 7 L. 297 CH 8 300 CH 9 302 CHECK 303 CHK 306 CLOSE 309 CLOSED 312 CONTROL

[ 313 CONVERPER OUTPUT 315 COUNT 318 CV TEST

[

321 324 D

DCR 327 DECR 330 DECREASE 333 DISARMED 334 DISCH 335 DOWN 337 DRAIN 338 DRYWELL .

339 DW 340 DW l 341 DW 2 342 EMERG ROD IN 343 DW 3 345 ENGAGE

'346 EXPAND x 10 348- F5 351 FAN J

354 FAN A 357 FAN B 360 FAST 363 FAST TDWER 366 FAST RAISE 369 FILTER IN 372 FILTER OUT D21 b - - - . .

NAMES OF SWITCH POSITIONS

[ 375 FIRE 378 FIXED f 381 FLOW L 384 FWD 387 GAIN 390 GR 1 AND 4 393 GR 2 AND 3 396 HAND 399 HI CAL 400 HI CAL 10E5 402 HOLD 405 HOTa

'408 I 409 IN 411 INBD 414 INCR 417 INCREASE 420 INHIBIT 423 IRM 426 ISOL 429 ISOLATE 432 LO CAL 435 LO CAL 10 438 LO CAL 10E5 441 LOCAL 444 LOWER 447 MAN 450 MAN OPEN 453 MANUAL 456 MANUAL OVERRIDE 459 MANUAL OVERRD 461 MON A

( 462 MON C

( 465 MON D 466 MON B 468 MONITOR 471 NEU L

472 NEUT 474 NEUTRAL 477 NOR 480 NORM 483 NORMAL 485 NORTH 486 NOTCH OVERRIDE 489 OFF 490 OFF OFF 491 ON OFF

[ 492 ON 493 ON ON 494 OP 495 OPEN l

I

( D22 r

I L

NAMES OF SWITCH POSITIONS 497 OPER 498 OPERATE 499 OUT 501 OUTBD 504 OVERTEST 507 OVERRIDE

, 510 PERIOD 513 POWER OFF 516 POWER ON 517 PRIM (PRIMARY) 519 PROGRAM 522 PSA 525 PSB 528 PULL TO LOCK 531 PULL TO STOP -

534 PUMP 1

{ 537 PUMP 2A 540 PUMP 2B 543 PUMP 2C

[ 546 PUMP 2D 549 PUMP 5 552 PUMP ON 555 PURGE 556 PWR 557 PWR FLOW 558 RAISE 559 PWR & FLOW TEST 560 PWR TEST 561 RAMP

[ 564 RBM 567 READ 568 RECIRC 570 REF 573 REFUEL 574 RELEASE l 576 RESET 579 REV 580 REVERSE 582 RFP 2A 585 RFP 2B 588 RFP 2C21 591 RFP 2C22 594 ROD IN 597 ROD OUT NOTCH 600 RUN 603 SAMPLE 606 SET 609 S*fUTDOWN 611 ~ SLOW 612 SLOW I4WER 615 SLOW RAISE

(- D23 I _

[

NAMES OF SWITCH POSITIONS

[

618 SOU 619 SOUTH 621 SPAN

( 622 SPAN 1 623 SPAN 2 624 STANDBY 627 START 630 START H0r STBY 631 STOP 633 SUPP 636 SV TEST 639 SYS* 1 642 SYST 2

[' 645 T 646 TEST 648 TOP

[ 649 T1 650 T2 651 TORUS 652 T3 654 TREAT 657 TRIP 660 TRIP A

[ 661 TRIP AIAT 663 TRIP B 666 TRIP TEST

[ 669 TURB TEST 670 UNLABELED MID POSITION 671 UNLABELED POSITION 1 672 UP 673 UNLABELED POSITION 2 675 VALVE A 678 VALVE B

[ 681 VAR 684 X1 l 687 X3.16 690 ZERO 693 URO 1 696 ZERO 2 697 ZERO NO 1 698 ZERO NO 2 699 ZERO CECK 710 BUS 28 AB 712 BUS 28 BC 714 BUS 28 CA 716 BUS 29 AB 718 BUS 29 BC 720 BUS 29 CA

{ D24 f.,

[

CONTROLLERS

[

TYPE OF CONTROLLER 01

( 02 Setpoint Potentiometer (on dial)

Manual controller (POT)

(MAN) 03 Manual / Auto Transfer Station (M/ATS) 04 Automatic Controller w/o setpoint Adjust (ANSP) 05 Automatic Controller with Setpoint Adjust (ASP) 06 -Automatic Controller w/o Manual Function (ANM) 07 EGC Controller (EGCC) i TYPE OF CONTROL 01 Continuous 'Ihumbwheel Control. (CTW) 02 Continuous Rotary Control (POT) (CRC) 03 Pushbutton Increase (PBI) 04 Pushbutton Decrease (PBD)

[ 05 Control Transfer Selector Switch (CTSS) 06 Control Transfer-Pushbutton (CTPB)

CONTROLLER PARAMETER (FROM WHAT MEASURED LIST) 01 Concentration (Conc) 06 Differential Pressure (DP)

[- 10 Flow (Flow) 13 Level (Lev) 17 Pressure (P)

( 23 Speed (Spd) 25 Temperature (Temp) 37 Setpoint

[

SWITCH POSITION (FROM SWITCH POSITION LIST) 453 Manual (MAN)

{ 154 Balance (BAL) 141 Auto (AUTO) 004 0 100 (0-100)

TYPE OF DISPLAY (FROM TYPE OF DISPLAY LIST) 50 Response Edgewise Meter

( 51 Demand Edgewise Meter (REM)

'(DEM) 52~ Deviation Edgewise Meter (DEV)

[ 53 Moving tape with fixed index (MTFI)

% 54 Knob Skirt (KS)

WHAT CONTROLLED (FROM WHAT MEASURED LIST) 05 Deviation 17 Pressure 10 Flow 23 Speed

( 13

-16 Level Position 25 37 Temperature Setpoint

'D25

[.

( APPENDIX E RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUREG-0700 SECTION 6 AND CECO CHECKLIST

\

l l

[.

[

(

(

[

[

E

[

L Resolution of Differences Between h NUREG-0700 Section 6 and CECO Checklist Checklist Item

{

Different From

- NUREG-0700 Resolution 1.2.2.d(2) Change value to 29" which is accepted extended functional reach for 5th percentile female.

, 1.2.2.e(2) NUREG-0700 ruggests that the measurement for

( eye referenca be taken from the leading edge of the benchboard. ARD takes the stand that the operator has some maneuverability when

{

reading displays and his eye is closer to 4 inches farther back from the benchboard.

Similarly, ARD suggests that the operators reference point for annunciators is 16 inches in lieu of the 12 inch nominal distance provided as guidance in NUREG-0700.

1.2.3.c The reach criteria has already been estab-lished in 1.2.3.b. The 0700 criteria does not provide guidance for an acceptable slope angle. The optimum angle of the benchboard surface would depend upon its use. If the surface contained a keyboard the angle should be within 0-15% (Van Cott) whereas for viewing s the optimum angle is 45 (Van Cott).

McCormick provides desirable ranges for the

[ angle of the benchboard as 15 -30 for writing and typing surface and 30 -50 0 for

{ benchboard containing primary controls and some related displays. Since the criteria refers to a benchboard and infers a slope of some kind, a reasonable range is 15 -45 (as shown in Exhibits 6.1-6). The optimum would depend upon the activity performed at the benchboard.

E-1

f' J

w t

1.2.3.e(2) Delete "The upper limit is 56 inches".

( Include Exhibit 6.1-10 and the words (see Exhibit ).

[

1.2.3.f(2) See 1.2.2.d(2). Change value to 29".

l.5.3.b Greatly is too subjective of a term. Our

[

experience is that 15fc is a good value for this quantification.

1.5.5.a(2) This value is again selected based upon our k- experience with noise measurements. This is to quantify a subjective requirement.

( 2.1.1.b " Effective" cannot be measured during ppriodic 3 testing.

( 2.1.1.c(2) "and are known to operators" is a redendant statement. It is assumed that if procedures are in place, they are covered in t; raining.

2.1.2.b(6) "by passing traffic" or by anyone, the concern is with knocking the phone out of the cradle.

3.1.2.c(1) Instead of using the word " avoided" you can use the multiple annunciator alarms if you

[ have some backup information. See 3.1.2.c(2).

3.1.4.b(1) 90 dB(A) is the accepted threshold of pain for auditory signals. This is provided to quantify checklist item.

3.2.-l.d Incremented steps in loudness are slightly noticeable at 2 dB steps and fully discernable at 5 dB. However, since different frequencies are being produced by the different alarms, the NRC did not specify a value. In order to

( evaluate the item RD s e l e c t e d _+ 2 . 5 which will result in approximately equal sounding

{ detection levels.

4.1.1.d . Easily is a subjective, not quantifiable term.

4.2.1.e MIL STD 1472, the reference for the guideline,

.f makes no distinction- between increase and raise and similarly between decrease and lower.

E-2 l

f. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - . - - _ - -

L 4.2.2.c(4) Typo on thickness. Original source (McCormick) states that 3/8" in thickness can be identified very accurately by touch. These values were converted to decimals in MIL STD 1472 and it was more convenient and conserva-tive for them to use .4. The experimental L

evidence actually. suggests 3/8" as a limit.

4.3.2.a(1) i

, Van Cott suggested a lower limit on pushbutton k controls as 0.5. However, MIL STD 1472 suggested 3/8" or 0.375". 0.385 has no sig-

[ nificance and it is believed that it is a misprint in NUREG-0700.

4.4.1.b There are other types of coding other than

{

shape which could serve the same purpose.

4.4.3.g(1) 80 for the minimum was a typo in 0700. MIL STD 1472C states 30 for this value.

4.4.4(c) Thumb and finger encircled is omitted because it is practically never used in nuclear power applications and the term is very confusing

( without a diagram demonstrating what it is.

The fingertip actually refers to the generally accepted continuous rotary control used in the nuclear industry which is grasped between the thumb and the forefingers. The thumb and finger encircled is larger because it is grasped using the thumb with the forefinger wrapping around the circumference of the knob similar to grasping a door knob.

( 4.5.1.d(2) Change the values to reflect the updated values from MIL STD 1472 C. Affects minimum

{ diameter and maximum trough distance only.

4.5.4.a Statement for 4.5.4.a(1) was changed from 0700 to provide guidance for vertical orientation.

• The statement in 4.5.4.a(2) provides addi-tional guidance based on MIL HDBK 759 A when horizontal orientation is used.

1 E-3 f . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -_ _

L 4.5.4.b(1) An integral light is best but should not be

[ the only acceptable light feedback for a rocker type switch. A separate light located adjacent to the switch would also suffice.

4.5.4.e(l) These values are the updated values from MIL STD 1472 C.

f 5.1.1 .The numbering scheme has been changed from 0700 to provide more logical grouping of items.

5.1.3.a Delete preferred visual angle reference. Not I a checklist consideration.

[ 5.1.6.c.2(b) Added to provide industry standard not acknowledged by 0700.

Delete " Amber (yellow): Auto trip". This is not an industry standard.

5.3.2.b The intent of the criteria is to ensure the light intensity is sufficient to accurately determine if the indicator is lit. A spot

( photometer will give a very accurate reading of the intensity, however a simple photometer

{ provides an accurate enough measure to meet the intent of the guideline.

5.3.3.a(1) See 5.3.2.b.

5.4.1 Typo.

5.4.1.1 Format (numbering scheme) change.

5.5.1.a(5) A matte finish is one good way to minimize glare and it is a good design criteria to have f in MIL STD 1472, etc. However, the intent should be to evaluate whether the surface is

( free from glare regardless of the type of finish.

5.5.2.a Typo.

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6.1.1 This guideline refers to the physical presence of a label for every control, display, or other equipment.

6.2.3.a(1) "and read from left to right" is redundant to oriented horizontally.

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Exhibit 6.3 Grass green is not very descriptive. Dark F

green is a more familiar statement to describe the intended color.

6.5.1.g Tag outs cannot physically prevent actuation of a control. The best it can do is indicate which controls should not be actuated.

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L 6.6 The "Need for Location Aids" section is I tutorial and does not contain guideline

( checklist material.

6.6.3.b The fact that differential line widths may be

( used to code flow is tuitorial. There is nothing to say other methods cannot be used or that this is the preferred method.

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7.1.2.a(4) Operators speak in terms of acronyms not (5) syntax as do computer operators.

7.1.4.g Cakir, et al. in the VDT Manual recommends a 5 -15 keyboard slope based on experimental evidence. Galitz in Human Factors in Office Automation recommends 10 -15 and MIL STD 1472 C, 15 -25 .

The 10 -25 range is a good compromise range between the conflicting documents.

8.1.1.b The last part of the 0700 guideline is tutorial.

8.1.2 " Effective Panel Layout" section is tutorial and does not contain guideline checklist material.

8.2.1.a(3) Symmetrical is too limited for this guide-( line. They are appropriate, logical patterns that are not necessarily symmetrial which could relate a set of controls to displays.

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8.3.2.b Less than two inches wide is a reasonable definition of small displays. Added for quantification.

8.3.2.d Add "Large matrices are subdivided by appropriate demarcation".

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9.1.2.e(1) Typo.

9.2.2 Control / Display packages is deleted since modular construction not used in typical CRs.

9.3.1.b(4) Added to give sufficient guidance for display types.

9.3.1.c(1) " Apparent" added because there must be a time lag, but it should not be significant for operator feedback purposes.

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. . COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY l ' QUAD CITIES STATION DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FINAL

SUMMARY

REPORT 5

REVIEW FINDINGS '

VOLUME 2 ~ SECTIONS'l-6

.MAY 1985 l

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1.0 CHECKLIST i

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I Section 1 Control Room Workspace e

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9 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0081 04 HED NO.: 1.1.3.A-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Daaks an'd' consoles.placed in the primary operating area do not allow oparators full view of all control and displays (including annunciators).

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r RE9PONSE:

Thore is no adequate instification for rearranging control room desk / console layouts, as there are a sufficient number of operators on duty to view all nanels. Also, the time required for an operator to position himself to view all controls, starting from a desk position, is ntqliqible.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept,as is.

- 4404/c/6

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

'INDEX NO.:: 0082' l.:04.HED.NO.: 1.1.3.F.1-1 L

! . CATEGORY: 3- LEVEL: C FINDING:

l-A minimum separation of 50 inches is not maintained between some opposing-i curfaces.

RE9PON9E:

Soacing probl. ems occur in areas of infrequent use or in low traffic areas. There'is no adequate justification for, rearranging panels.

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-IMPTN1ENP ATIq*T :

Accept ~as is.

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, 4404/c/R

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS f 1

INDEX NO.: 00R3 l l

-04 HED NO.: 1.1.3.G-l'

! CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:~

~93varal panels were found which are not designed to prevent the acci-dhntal introduction of foreign substances or other unwanted objects.

The panels involved include panels 902-10 and 902-11.

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RESPONSE

Panel bottons will be installed on panels 902-10 and 902-11.

IMPLEMENTATION:

, By the completion of the second refueling outage.

L4404/c/1

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- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l IMDEX NO.: >0085

04l hen

MO. l'.ll4.D-1 CATEGORY - 3 LEVEL: JC t-FINDING:

Although1 documents are protected by binders, the pages are loose and torn. .The potential for information to become lost or_ destroyed increases each time the procedures are used. Photo Log (A-6)

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RESPONSE

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The control-room procedures will be reviewed periodically by the personnel assigned:to-the Operating Department Communication Center and

j. replaced as-necessarv to maintain them in a quality condition. ,

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l IMPLEMENTATION:

'By the' completion'of'the(second refueling outage.

14407/c/62 c r -e r ( 'T vy %-' y - e M- W 3 e- g -e> T

j. , , CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0083, 0034 l

04 HED.NOJ: 1.1.4.E-1, 1.3.1.D-1 l

-CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C-FINDING:

There are-not. separate' dedicated sets of procedures for each unit in the

, control room. Separate sets of procedures allows the operator to have

j. acesss to any procedure at any' time.

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RESPONSE

Saparate sets of procedures and required documents will be made available for each unit.

I IMPLE'iENT ATION :

By-the.comnletion.of the second refueling stage.

4403/c/55

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: -0086 04 HED NO.: 1.1.5.C-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

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'Not allispecial replacement tools needed to install expendables and spare

-parts are available-to' operating personnel. A special wrench is needed L to remove the back portion of the annunciator boxes to distinguish fires. .This particular wrench is not located in the control room.

RE9PON9E:

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Control room personnel will be provided with a wrench to remove the back portion of.the annunciator boxes.

IMPLEMENTATION:

I' By, the' completion of' the second refueling outage'.

4404/c/49.

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX'NO.: 0084

.04 HED NO.: 1.1.5.F-1

' CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

R3 cords are not kept as to the status of expendables and spare parts.

f Having inventory' records would ensure that expendables and spare parts

[. .cro adequately monitored as to their quantity and distribution.

RESPON9E:

The nersonnel assioned to the Operating Department, Communication Center will be assigned the responsibility to monitor the status of expendables (e.g.: charts, bulbs,-out of service cards). The Operating Department does not maintain an inventory of spare' parts, since this would be a maintenance function.

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Bv the connletion o# the second re#ueling outage.

~04/4405/c/9

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i

HED NO.: 0088 GUIDE NO.: -1.1.6.B.1 CATEGORY: -2~ -LEVEL: B FINDING:

Ths shift supervisors office is not within the. control room, and there in l -no. dedicated communications links between the primary operating area and the shift. supervisors office. <

' RESPONSE:

A dsdicated communication system between the control room and the shift cupervisors office has been provided.

l IMPLEMENTATION:

~ Completed 4418/c/28

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

, . INDEX-NO.: 0090, 0140,.0142, 0145 04 HED No.: 1.2.2.B.1-1,-1.2.2.D.2-1 1.2.2.C-1, 1.2.3.C-1

.CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

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~ Any-controis-on the vertical nortion of the benchboard are beyond of the

- reach

radius of the 5th percentile female.

1 RE9PONSE: '

Round knobs will be-installed on all controls close to edge of the horizontal-benchboard. This will prevent the inadvertent-actuation of ,

thece controls.when the operator leans over.to reach' controls on the vertical-portion of the benchboard. The 5th percentile person can reach the appropriate controls by leaning . slightly across. the benchboard.

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IMPLEMENTATION:.

ByDthe conpletion of the second refuelingfoutage.

4404/c/9

F CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

INDEX.MO.: 0089,. 0315 04 HED NO.: 1.2.2.D.1-1 1.2.3.D.1 OS 2.

! CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C l

I JFINDING:

! Savoral controls are not set back a minimum of 3-inches from the front of

! the boards. Many of these are J-handles. The operator survey indicated that~several of:these have been bumped. This presents a problem of

. accidental activation when' leaning over to operate controls higher on the

. boards.

RESPONSE

Roun+ knobs will be installed on those controls in the front row.that-present a problem. This will prevent inadvertent actuation of these controls.

i IMPLEMENTATIO'T:

By'the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/10

' CORRECTIVE ' ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 143 04 HED ' NO . : l . 2. 2. E.1. B ' CATEGO RY: 1 LEVEL: C' FINDING:

Savaral displays (34) have a face angle of less the 45 degrees to the lina of sight of the 5th percentile female.

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RE9PON9E:

The' cited disclavs are not difficult to see or read. 9horter operators have to tilt their head or step _back to look at these displays, but this is only an inconvenience, it does not impair operation.

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' IMPLEMENTATION:-

Accept as is.

04/4409/c/4 i

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-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS LINDEX NO.: 0092 04 HED NO.:' l.2.2.G-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C 1 FINDING:-

Savaral' consoles do not provide a 4-inch horizontal toe clearance.

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RESPONSE

The absence of foot room is, acceptable, since it prevents operators from

otanding.too close to controls, and thereby prevents inadvertent actua-tion of controls near'the front of the consoles (refer to HED 0089).-

Also, all of the discrepant panels do not have controls which' require bending to coerate.-

~ IMPLEMENTATION:

Acespt as is.

4404/c/11-

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.:- 0144-04 HED NO.: 1.2.3.B-1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C l FINDING:

19oma controls are located outside the maximum seated reach distance of

.tha 5th_ percentile female.

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] RE9Do'T9E :

1 The1only sit-down work station on the benchboards is on the 5 panel in front of the control rod drive controls. The controls that would be out-of-reach forna 5th percentile female'can be reached from a standing

position. Neither the-frequency with which an operator would have to rice in order to operate these controls, nor the criticality of control function is adequate to justify relocating these controls. The time it takes to rise, stand and reach for a control is negligible,~and would not affect control room operations.

IMPLWiENT ATION : -

Accept as is.

04/4405/c/1

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-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0145 o04 HED NO.:- 1.2.3.C-l' CATEGORY: 3 , LEVEL:- C FINDING:'

- Tho 'benchboard slope -and depth does not place all controls within the crecch radius of.the~5th percentile female. Inability to easily reach all rcquired controls could resultfin a delay or failure in operation of the control.

RE9PON9E:

Round knobs will be installed on all controls close - to the edge of the horizontal section of benchboard. This will prevent the inadvertent

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actuation of these. controls when the operator' leans over to reach controls on the vertical portion of the benchboard.- l 9

s L IMPLEME'ITATION :

By theLeonpletion of'the second refueling outage.

.4404/c/53

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0146' H04 HED No.: 1.2.3.'E.2-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C.

FINDING:

Tha angle of some display faces relative to the line of sight of the eccted 5th percentile. female is less than the minimum 45 degrees.

RE9PO'iqE The 9 panel is the oniv henchboard that is operated from a seated position. The displays associated with the full core display on panel 5 are the oniv disniavs which violate this criterion. These violate the criterion by less than 1 degree, .so it is questionable as to whether or not these displays would oose any readability problem for even a 5th parcentile female. If so, the displays-can easily be read from a otanding position, and no operation would be impeded if the operator had to rise to read these displays.

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IMPLF.M E'7T AT IO'T :

Acccpt as is.

04/4405/c/5

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.~ 0094

.04 HED No.: 1.2.3.H.1 I CA*EGORY: 3 LEVEL: 0

~ FINNING:

A writinq surface.of at least.15 inches in depth is not provided at the control room console. The. console presently provides a 15 1/2 inch depth.

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RESPONSE

Tha_present writing surface is sufficient to accommodate log books and provide arm support. If more writing surface area is needed for particular' operations, the unit desk, which is adjacent.to the console, can.txe used. Therefore, the 1/2 inch discrepancy poses no impediment to offective operations and requires no corrective action.

IMPLEMENTATION '

Acccpt as is.

04/4405/c/3

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f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0095 "04 HED NO.: 1.2.5.A.1-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

A number of controls are placed outside of the 34-to-70 inch (above floor) preferred range.

RE9PON9E:

Most of the cited controls are on back panels and are not operated

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-Therefore, by op0rators, but used by. equipment operators and technicians. Most of the no corrective action will be needed for these controls.

controls involved are on the back panels and are positioned so that they will-not be bumned or accidentally changed. Guardrails will be used on vartical panels wherever necessary to protect controls against accidental activation.

IMPLEMENTATIOM:

By the ~ connletion of the second ref ueling outage.

4404/c/12 ]

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I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS-JINDEX NO.:

0098 0'4 HED No.: 1.2.5.9.1-1 C ATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C-FINDING:

i Savaral displavs' are .not located in an area between 41 and 70 inches

'(cbove the floor).  ;

-RE9PONSE: .

l The majority of these' displays are located on back panels and are rarely, or never, used by the operator. Most.are used by equipment technicians.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4404/c/13 ".=

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s CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: -0147 04 HED NO.: 1.2.8.D-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:-

Th'a' cushioning of the operator chairs' seat pans is less than the one inch minimum'.

RE9PONSE:.

-The operators are generally not seated for extended periods of-time. The current chairs provide adequate comfort, and do not need to be replaced.

IMPLEMENTAPION:

Acc;nt.as is.

04/4405/c/6

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0035 04 RED NO.: -1.3.1.E.4-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Thare-are no administrative procedures in place which assign responsi-bility'for allocation of use of controls for the swing diesel between i

units._ clear responsibility for use of controls for shared equipment halps to prevent conflicts in the use of the equipment between units.

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Tha conduct of Shift Operations will be revised to assign primary and cacondary responsibilities for the operation of the common diesel generator durinn an emergency.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By.the completion of the first refueling outage.

4407/c/58

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0148 04 HED NO.: 1.3.2.A-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Bcdicated crews are not used on the mirror imaged units or the center desk.

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RESPONSE

Tha major systems are mirror imaged on their respective panels, but the controls and instrumentation within the major systems are arranged in the same laft to right order. Therefore, when an operator is operating equipment within major systems, all equipment is in the same relative position on both units.

Tha ctation has not encountered problems during its operating life with the control panel arrangements. The operators rotate through the three control rann positions (Unit 1, Unit 2, and common service) on a daily basis which kaap2 them current on the panel differences.

IMPLEME'1TATION :

Acccot as is.

4416/c/30

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0149 04 HED NO.: 1.3.2.9-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

l h; dictinction between the mirror imaged units is not heightened as much as ocaible.

PE9PON9E:

Pha dictinction between the units is clearly made by having the unit numbers on ecch of the panels as well as within some of the labeling. This alctinction will be enhanced as a result of relabeling the control room.

IMPLEMENTATION:

qv the connletion of the second refueling outage.

4416/c/29

t-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX MO.: -0108 ,

'04 HED MO.: 1.4.1.A-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Optrator protective clothing is not kept in the control room. Operators cro supplied with adequate breathing apparatus.

RE9poN9E:

Plant design and control room procedures oliminate the need for protective clothing in the control room. Protective clothing can be obtained from the. RAD-CFEM Department, if needed.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is . -

04/4405/c/8 1

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0396 04 HED NO.: 1.5.3.A-1, 1.5.3.B-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

tha following locations have lighting levels which fall below the minimum rcquircd:

LOCATION REQUIREMENT FRONT OF UNIT 1 EXCEPT FOR THE ENDS OF THE 3& A PANEL 20 FC UNIT 1 55 & 56 PANELS 20 FC UNIT 2 MIDDLE OF 3 PANEL 20 FC

' UNIT 2 TOP OF ALL FRONT PANELS EXCEPT 5 20 FC UNIT 2 55 & 56 20 FC COMMON PANELS 20 FC UNIT DESK FOR BOTH UNITS 50 FC

N ADDITION THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS HAVE ILLUMINATION LEVELS WHICH EXCEED

?HE REQUIREMENTS:

LOCATION REQUIREMENTS UNIT 1 21, 36, 37 13 PANELS 50 FC UNI

• 2 20 PANEL 50 FC tE9PONSE:

In apnarent nroblems exist as a function of the lightino levels. The sparators indicated the lighting was satisfactory.

1 i MPLEMENT ATION :

tec;pt as is.

>416/c/32

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX.NO.:- 0394 04 HED NO.: 1.5.3.C-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Suoniemental lighting is not provided at the unit desks where reading and writing tasks that require higher levels of illumination occur.

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RE9PONSE:

Sufficient lighting is available at the unit desk to support reading and writing tasks.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acccpt as is.

4418/c/22

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0389, 0390, 0180 04 MED NO.: ').5.3.E.1-1, 1.5.3.E'2-1-.

1.5.3.F-1 ICATEGORY:' 2 LEVEL: B

{ FINDING:

LAtbient. illumination is not provided via indirect or diffuse lighting.

!Proccntly,-the light source is direct and is causing a glare problem. The ifluoroccent light tubes in the-control room run parallel to the 6, 7, and 8 lp nolo and as a result cause a glare problem for the edgewise meters located

!on tha vertical- portion of the boards. Equipment is shadowed within the primary operating area.

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RESPONSE

Variouc design options-will be examined to determine the optimum methods to lraduce glare and shadowing while maintaining illumination levels. The jcolected design options ~will then be implemented.

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l IMPLEMENTATION:'

Av the comnletion - of the second refueling outage.

l4416/c/35

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I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0369 04 HED NO.: 1.5.3.G-1 3ATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C l FINDING:

she beige Lower Wall in the Control Room has a reflectance of 49% which is t.bovs the specified 20% maximum.

l RE9PONSE:

This does not appear significant since only very small portions of the wall are visible to the operator and the effects of the reflectance are negligible.

k MPLEk1ENT ATION :

4cccpt as is.

4416/c/34 mi

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0370 04 HED NO.: 1.5.3.G-2 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha white display faces and recorder paper have reflectances between 35 and 40% which is below the minimum of 80%.

RE9PON9E:

The contrast of the characters on these displays nakes them acceptable for reading.

IMPLE*1ENT ATION :

Accept as is. l l

4416/c/33

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0397

-04.HED NO.: 1.5.4.C-2

- CATEGORY : - 2 LEVEL: B L FINDING:

-Tha battery powered emergency lighting, in general, provides illumination

of less than-the 10 footcandles requirement throughout both Unit 1 and

. Unit 2 control rooms.

RESPONSE

The problem will be reso1.ved so that emergency lighting is above the 10 footcandle minimum requirement in both Unit 1 and Unit 2 control rooms.

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I M PLEPtE'IT AP IO'T :

By the connletion of the second refueling outage.

-4407/c/51

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0393 04 HED NO.: 1.5.5.A-1 2 LEVEL: A CATEGORY:

l FINDING:

Thn DB(A) levels at each of the work stations in the primary operating

crca are between 60 and(unit 67 DB(A). Given the communication distances which nav he required desk to center desk; 3 panel to 8 panel),

only a very loud voice or a shout can be alternate for the used to communicate HVAC system, which has offcetivelv. This'is also true (See HED values from 63 to 68 DBA in-the primary operating area.

Oln 212- 03 R 8- 1550-1. )

901-3 Avorage ambient noise levels at each work station are as follows:

.(61 DBA); 901-4 (60.33 DBA); 901-5 (60 DBA); 901-6 (61 DBA); 901-7 (61.33 DBA); 901-8 (61.33 nBA); 901-54 (62.67 DBA); 901-55 & 56 (61.67 DBA);

Unit 1 desk (61.67 DBA); Unit 1 computer console (63.67 DBA); 902-3 (60.33 OBA); 902-4 (61.33 DBA); Unit 2 computer console (66 DBA); 902-54 (64 DBA); 902-55 & 56 (65 DBA); 912-7 (66.67 DBA); 912-5 (66.67 DBA);

912-1 (64 DBA); 912-8 (63 DBA); 912-2 (63 DBA); center desk (61.5 DBA).

RESPONSE

The noise levels at the work stations in the primary operating area will ba reduced to within reconmended levels to enhance communication ability batween operators.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

04/4405/c/10 l

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f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0338 04'HED NO.: ~1.5.5.B.1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL:- A FINDING:

C ckground. noise levels exceed 65dB(A). Areas near the following panels hava an average dB(A) level above 65dB(A): 901-15 (67.3dB(A)), 901-17 (670dB(A)), computer terminal console (Unit 2) (66dB(A)), 902-15 (66dB(A)), 902-17 (66.3dB(A)), 912-7 (66.6dB(A)), 912-5 (66.6dB(A)),

902-8 (66dB(A)). This is true for the alternate HVAC system.

RESPONSE

The noise levels will be reduced to enhance communication.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the first refueling outage.

4418/c/30 i

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' CORRECTIVE. ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0098 04 HED No.: 1.5.7.9.3-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

l There is no provision for communication to the kitchen and restroom fccilities. The public address system can be heard from the kitchen but not from the restrooms. However, the operators cannot communicate dircetly to the control room from either area.. Having adequate communication-to these facilities allows operators to be aware of control room status and ensures adequate contact between control room personnel.

RE9POM9E Parsonnel do not enter the kitchen or restroom facilities without formal rolief from their work station. Control areas are not left without proper coverage so there should be no need to communicate with personnel in the kitchen or restroom.

IMPLEMEVTATION:

Acespt as is.

4403/c/24

i Section 2 Communications l

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l CQRRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0036

'04 hen NO.: 2.1.1.C.1-1 CATEGORY:- 2 LEVEL: C' FINDING:

No procedures are provided for giving priority to transmission of emer-i .gsncy messages from the control. room. .This may result in the delay of nocded communications from the control room.

RE9PONSE:

There are several means of communication # rom the control room so that thcre are alternatives available to the operator if one medium is already in use.

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t I MP T.E"ENT ATIO*1 : -

Acccnt'as is..

4407/c/59

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0099 04 HED NO.: 2.1.2.B.4-1 CATEGORY: ~2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Th2 center desk telephone cord is,not long enough to permit reasonable l cparator mobility. The center desk is elevated and has a steel railing hatween the desk phone and the panels. The operator often is required to com unicate with technicians in the plant while monitoring a display and Canipulating a control on the panels.- The cord is not long enough to l parait such simultaneous operations.

RE",PON S E :

An additional phone will be installed on the common service panel to facilitate operator mobility between the center desk and the panels.

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't IMPLE*1E'IT ATIO'T :

~By;the connletion'of the second refueling outage.

14403/c/25

F CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX_MO.: 0115 04 HEO NO.: 2 .~ 1. 2 . D CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

k i Tho loudness of'the telephone ringing is'not adjustable for all ~

- talcphones in the control-room. Having a loudness control will ensure an

-cccIptable and comfortable level of loudness for the operators and will holp control the noise level of the control room.

I RE9PON9E Following the installation of the new private branch exchange (PBX), the ringing level of the telephone in the. control room will be reviewed and cdjusted as necessary..

l

(- IMPLEMENTATION:

LRV-the comoletion of.the'second refueling outage'.

4403/c/46'

h.

i' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0100 04 HED No.: 2.1.6.C.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Loud sneakers are not provided in restrooms. Having adequate communication to these areas allows control room personnel to be aware of tho control room status and will ensure that personnel are adequately ptqcd.

f RESPON9E:

'Parconnel do not enter restrooms without formal relief from their workstations. The control areas are not left without proper coverage, so there should be no need to-communicate with personnel in'the restrooms.

I IMPLEMENTATION:

Acccpt as is.

4403/c/47

V I

CORRECTIVE-ACTIONS

-INDEX NO.:

0102 04 HED NO.: 2.1.6.F-1 CAT 5 GORY: 2 . LEVEL: C FINDING:

Control room inputs to.the plant announcing system have no priority over

~

othsr input. The control room input is not capable of interrupting an

-announcement in progress orcof bypassing queued announcements. Providing an cnnouncing system which gives priority to control room inputs will sncure quick public notification to plant personnel of control room ototus and will ensure immediate paging of and requests to various oparating personnel'during daily operations and in emergencies.

b

! RESPONSE:

The telechone-naging system' wi11 he modi fled to give priority to the control room.

t

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IMPLEMENTATIOM:

~

By.the comoletion of,-the second refueling outage.

4403/c/4R u _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS t

INDEX NO.: 0101 04 HED MO.: 2.1.7 L.

CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

k A point-to-point intercom system-is not provided to interconnect the

) control room with important plant areas such as the shift supervisor's

. office, plant-security office, operators lounge, restrooms or training crocs. Having this type of system will ensure direct and quick communication between key operating personnnel at any time. At present, tolophones_'are utilized to communicate between these areas except the

{ rostrooms, kitchen and training area.

RESPONSE

1 A point-to-point intercom system to interconnect the control l room with important plant areas has been installed.

t IMPLEMENTATION:

Completed.

4418/c/16

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0117-04 HED NO.: 2.1.7.B-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

I Whsn control room personnel are wearing protective masks they cannot cufficiently communicate information over the present. communication cquipment. Voice communication is distorted in reception and trans-

'Diccion. This may result in operators unable to perform duties as raquired.

I i

RESPONSE

A coarch of available technology will be performed to identify equipment ,

which'might be used to reduce the problem. If satisfactory equipment is  !

available it will be made availabe to the control room. )

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+

IMPLEMENTATION:-

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/74-

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  :

INDEX NO.: '0116

-04 HP.D NO.: 2.1.8.A-1 l CATEGORY :- 2. LEVEL: A l FINDING:

lTha cmargency communication system (walkie-talkies and other radios) do not

'Oncura complete internal and external communications. Operators have reported that the ' radio system is poor and unreliable. These radios are utilized svardcy, and in an emergency, having a reliable-workable radio system will

,Gnsure communication as required among operating personnel.

' RESPONSE:

Tha radio communications system has been completely tested with new antennae inatolled in critical' locations.

6 l

IMPLEMENTATION:

Comolcted.

4416/c/52

l' COR) ?CTIVE ACTIONS LINDEX NO.: 0325 04 MED NO. 2.1.8.0.9-2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: 9

[ FINDING:

Oparator response indicates that.if the essential services. bus is lost on

-unit 2, emergency phones throughout the plant are lost. Also, if AC powar is. lost, the transmitters throughout the plant _become inoperable.

It is' essential to have a back-up communications system.

f.

RE9FO*TSE :

Will review the current communications systems and will implement modifications as necessary.

J I .

L IMPLEMENTATION:

By.the.conpletion of the second refueling outage.

!4kO3/c/16

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0109, 0110, 0256 04 HED NO.: 2.2.1.B-1, 2.2.1.C.2-1 1.5.5.01 09-1 CATEGOP.Y :  ? LEVEL: C

-FINDING:

Auditory signals do not provide localization cues that direct operators to those. control room. work stations where their attention is required.

Auditory signals in the control room are not coded. Several panels will chore one alarm. Alarms on Unit 1 are not easily distinguished from alarms on Unit.2 or the common panels. Telephone bells on the center dock and the SCRE's desk are'not easily distinguishable.

I l RESPONSE:

I Ao c function of the control room annunciator review package, the station

! will-review, with the aid of the Company's Operational Analysis Daoartment, the frequencies, bandwidths, signal-to-noise ratios, intensities and coding. Following this review, the station will

( imnlement any'necessary changes.

1

)

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)

l I IMPLEMENTATION:

f.

By the conpletion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/48

)'

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

( INDEX NO.: 0111

_04 HED NO.: 2.2.2.A CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: -C FINDING:

Auditory signal are in the form of annunciator alarm and telephone balls. These types of alarms can easily be distinguished from one enother. The ambiguity lies within each type of signal. Telephone

'cignals are not coded for localization or meaning within and across work stations. Annunciator alarms are not coded and one signal alarms for

.three different panels.

1 I RE9POMSE:

Ao a-function of the control room annunciator review package, the station will review, with the aid of the Company's Operational. Analysis Dcpartment, the frequencies, bandwidths, signal-to-noise ratios, intensities and coding. Following this review, the station will implement any necessary changes.

L i

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IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/38 l .

w

- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS LINDEX HO.:- 0399 04 HED NO.: 2.2.5.A-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B' FINDING:

Tha frequencies of the auditory signals for the annunciator system are

-not.between 200 and 5000 Hz.

ALARM IMCATION FREQUENCY (Hz) 901-3 125-4000 901-7 500-16000 901-54 250-16000 901-56 500-8000 I 902-3 250-8000 902-6~ 500-8000 902-55 250-16000

) 4n2 46 250-16000 912-1 2000-16000 l 912-? 2500-4000

( 912-7 1000-16000 i

912-R 250-16000 Tha 912-1, 902-55, 902-56 alarms have tape on them to reduce the intensitv. Tane was repoved #or frequency evaluation.

I Alarms with frequencies between 200 and 5000 Hz will ensure that the 1

alarms will be heard c14arly.

f f

RESPONSE

f y As.a function of the annunciator review package, the station will review, l with.the aid of the Company's Operational Analysis Department, the

)~ frcquencies, bandwidths, signal-to-noise ratios, intensities and coding.

Following this review, the station will implement any necessary changes.

IMPLe'1ENT ATIGN :

Rv the.conoletion of the second refueling outage.

04/4405/c/11

CORRECTIVE' ACTIONS INDEX'NO.: 0398 04 HED NO.'s- 2.2.5.9-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL:- B' FINDING:

Tha bandwidth of the' auditory alarms for the annunciator system are grecter than 200 Hz.

~

' Alarm Location Frequency (Hz) 901-3 125-4000 500-16000 901-7 901-54 250-16000 901-56 500-8000

.902-3 250-8000 902-6 500-8000 902-55 250-16000

}

902-56 250-16000

.912-1 2000-16000 912-2 2500-4000 912-7 1000-16000 I 912-9 -

250-16000 l

Alorms with narrower bandwidths provide much clearer signals at lower intsnsities and allow operators to easily differentiate between alarms.

RESPONSE

l Ao a function of the control roon annunciator review package, the discrepant auditory signals will be reviewed.

i~

l l

)

/

f IMDLE*tE'IT A? IO*T :

'By the connletion of the second refueling outaqe.

04/4405/c/12

t i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX-NO.: 0400 04 HED No.: 2.2.6.A . CATEGORY: -2 LEVEL:- 4 FINDING::

Tha sound levels of annunciator signals at workstations 901-55, 902-54, i 902-3-and 912-2 do not have a signal to noise ratio of at least 10 DBA.

D;panding on.the background noise characteristic, it.could be difficult

', to detect the annunciator signal. Relates to Guideline 3.2.1.A.

i t-i I

RE9PONSE:

As a function of the control room annunciator review package, the dicerepant auditory signals will be reviewed.

i

).

i 4

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):

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion' of tho' second refueling outage.

04/4405/c/13

g.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0401 04 HED NO.: 2.2.6.C-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Soma auditory signal intensities exceed 90 DB(A). The signal at 902-56 hoa an intensity of 92 DB(A). When all of the Unit 2 annunciator signals  !

cre1 simultaneously initiated, the DB(A) level is 92.2. When all of the j common panel alarms are activated, the DB(A) is 91.5. Also relates to guideline 3.2.1.C.

i i

i I RESPONSE:

As a function of the control room annunciator review package, the dicerepant auditory signals will be reviewed, h

)

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L I MPLEM EN* AT IO'I :

9v . tho uconoletion of the second refuelina outage.

04/4405/c/ld'

t

)..

r i

Section 3 Annunciator Warning Systems  ;

)

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I I

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/

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

j. 'INDEX NO.: 0010 H04 HED NO.: 3.1.2.A.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

I' Thore are alarms that occur so frequently as to be considered a nuisance by the-operators. The " ROD OUT BLOCK" alarm (901-5 C3 and 902-5 C3) and tha "APRM UPSCALE /HIGH" (901-5 A6 and 902-5 A6) are never reset by the oparators because they-promptly alarm again because the system normally runs above their setpoints.

RESPONSE

This problem is being reviewed and will be corrected.

L I

I j.

I IMPLEMENTATION:

Bv the conpletion of'the second refueling outage.'

4403/c/69

Y

)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS t- INDEX No.: 0011, 0319, 0318 04 HED MO.: 3.1.2.A.2-1, 3.1.2.A.2-2/OS, 3.1.2.A.2-3 CATECORY: 2 LEVEL : 9 FINDIMG:

901-7 G3 and 902-7 G3 (1) " Turbine Bypass Valve Open". The established cotpoint for this alarm does not give the operators adequate time to rospond. The alarm sounds when the bypass valve is 100% open. At that -

point the operator has only a few seconds to make corrective action bafore the unit scrams. The alarm should be set to sound when the valve ic 10% open. During a scram ~this particular valve will bounce open and close and the operators have no indication how open or closed the valve

1o. The noisture separator high level alarm goes off 10 seconds before

-ths turbine trips. (Moisture separator system is located on the 6 panel)-

tha operators have no indication of the moisture level hence they can navar monitor the level at any time. The alarms for the " rod out block" and "APRM_ upscale /high" (901-5 C3 and as 902-5 C3 and A6) are always illuminated because the system normally runs above their setpoints.

RESPONSE

(1) *he turbine bypass valve alarms are being modified to resolve the problem.

(2) The moisture seoarator alarm has an associated moisture separator drain tank high level alarm that provides adequate warning to the coerator.

(3) This problen is being reviewed and will be corrected.-

1 I

)

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the first refueling outage.

4403/c/28 i

r CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0027, 0074, 0323

~

04 HED NO.: 3.1.2.C.1-1, 3.3.4.C-1, 3.3.4.C-2.-3.3.4.C-3, 3.3.4.C-4 CATEGORY:- 1 LEVEL: C j I

. FINDING: {

}

Thure are several annunciators with inputs from more than one plant l 'parcmeter. .These include "High-Low", "A/B",-and non-specific " trouble"

.clarms.

).

o-

RESPONSE

A caneral human factors review of the annunciators will be undertaken and I cppropriate corrective actions will be incorporated in an annunciator I dasion chanqe packaae.

[

\ .,.

i IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling ~ outage.

4'403/c/38

.a

r .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS F

INDEX NO.: 0012 04 HED NO.s 3.1.2.C.2-1 t

' CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B 1

. FINDING:

)

~

An alarm printout capability is not provided for all multi-input annun-s .cictors. Printing.the specific alarm of all multi-input alarms would allow for ready-clarification of the nature of the alarms.

s.

RESPONSE

The' alarm nrintout capability will be reviewed as part of the annunciator

-pnckage. The-annunciator system will be examined to ensure the printing of cpecific alarms for all multi-input alarms.

f f

IMPLE!!ENTATION:

By.the completion of.the second refueling outage.

-4403/c/68 ~

i... . .

i.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1

INDEX NO.: 0013

'04 HED MO.: 3.1.2.C.3-1 l'

CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: R-FINDING -

For alarms with inputs from more than one parameter, a reflash capability

.io not provided which allows subsequent alarms to activate the auditory alcrt' mechanism and' reflash the visual tile even though the first alarm has not cleared.

RESPO*19Et f

Tha installation of this option will be investigated to determine'the feasibility with the existing annunciator system during the review conducted as a part.of the annunciator package.

1 IMPLEMENTATION:

9v'tha completion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/67

f L

b CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.:- 0075 04 HED No.: 3.1.3.B-1 f.

L:

CATEGORY: 2 ' LEVEL: C FINDING:

Thore'is no first-out annunciator panel for the turbine-generator system l' in'the control room. The-first-out panel should consist of separate tiles for each of the. turbine-generator trip functions. In the event of a turbine trip, .the tile associated with the precipitating event, and no othnr, should he illuminated.

f i

RESPONSE

f The operators are-provided with adequate information regarding generator trip via alarms and displays on the 7 panel as.to the trouble. In addition a first hit box for the turbine-generator system is available locally.

I r

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acc;nt as is.

.4403/c/30 LI . .. .. . . .. ..

(

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0014 04 hen ~NO.: 3.1.4-1 lCATEG')RY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

~

l- .Thore is'no prioritization system-in place-so that the operators can

\ differentiate between serious /important alarms and less important ones.

f j 1RE9PONSE:

.A prioritization scheme is in place which identifies low priority alarms, i:

I' ItiPLEMENTATION :

Acespt-as is.

J

-4403/c/26 l

f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0016/0015 04 HED NO.:__3.1.5.B.1-1-1, 3.15.A-1

' CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Thnre is no visual signal which indicates that an alarm has cleared.

Also, there is no dedicated distinctive audible signal to: indicate cicared alarms.- At present, the operator must periodically activate the cnnunciator reset control tx) find out which alarms have cleared.

f f

f RE9DONSE:

As a function of the control roon annunciator review package, the discrepant auditory signals will be reviewed.

l I

I MPT.EM ENT A* ION :

! Bv the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/63 1

r.

I-f k' .

. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I

(! TINDEX MO.: 0404 204 HED NO.: 3.2.1.D-1 CATEGORY: 2 . LEVEL: R TFINDING:

Tho? individual annunciators are not within + or - 2.5 DB of 90.2 DB (A),

which is the combined sound levelLof all the annunciators.

I l'

[ l l

- RESPO?IS E :

The annunciators'will be adjusted for equal detectability as a result of tha annunciator package.

l

[

IMPLDtENTATIO*1: -

'Bv the completion of the second refueling outage.

04/4405/c/15.

L-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.~ 0076-04 HED~NO.:- 3.2.1.E ' CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

{ThD cuditory alert mechanism for the annunciator system'does not automatically roCat when'it is silenced. The alarm is not reset until the reset button is procacd.

RESPONSE

Administrative 1y, the operator is required to no to the apnropriate panel, ccknowledge the. alarm and take appropriate action.

j IMPT7.NENT ATION :

Acc nt as is.

'4416/c/55

k

(

L-k CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0017/0323

-04 HED NO. 3.2.1.F-1 3.2.1.F OS , 2

-CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:'

~

Individual-work stations do not have separate distinct auditory. alarms.

-At present,.each unit (901 and 902) has two separate alarms. Individual diotinct alarms at-each panel 1would aid the operator by allowing a quicker response to the problem. . This is particularly true for reactor cerans where it is difficult for the operators to determine which station -

( 3, 4 or 5) has the problem.

RE9 PO*19E As a function of the control room annunciator review package, the

. discrepant auditory signals will.be reviewed.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Ry the completion of the.second refueling outage.

4404/c/4 s 4.

- _ ___ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ . . - _. - .)

i.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0018 04 HED NO.: :3.3.1.A-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Th2re are visual alarm tiles which are not located above related controls cnd' displays required for corrective or diagnostic action in response to thO alarm.- This'may cause a delay in performing the actions needed to rG; pond to the alarm.

RESPONSE

L Tha annunciators cited will.be reviewed during the development of an cnnunciator package. The annunciator tiles will be examined to ensure proper technical content, wording and control room location.

IMPLEMENTATION:

dBy the-completion of the second refueling outage.-

4403/c/64 l

i I-L.

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX:NO.: 0103 04 HEDMIO.: 3.3.1.B.1-1

CATEGORY: 3 -LEVEL: C' FINDING:

J Annunciator panals:are not identified tar a label above each panel. .

(Photo Log B-29).

RE9PO*iSE :

Characteristics of11abels will be addressed in the' implementation of a

. consistent labeling: package.

1 i

IMPIMIENT ATIO*1: -

~

'ByLthe completion of the second refueling' outage.-

1 14404/c/28

L h; CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0019 04 HED No.: 3.3.1.C.1-1 CATEGORY: 2- LEVEL: C

' FINDING:

h.Thore.arenoprovisionstoensurethatan.annunciatortileis replaced in tha correct location after tile removalffor' lamp replacement.

I RE9PTT9E Ecch tile is identified, on the tile face, by its matrix location, but' not the panel it cameifrom. Given the separation between annunciator p nels and the' unlikelihood that corresponding tiles from different panals1would be~ removed at the same time.- There does not seem to be a-oignificant potential _for-confusion.

< ' IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept.as is.

4403/c/27

L i-L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS-

{-

IIIDEX !!O. : - 0020

.04 HED NO.: ' 3.3.2.B CATEGORY: 2' LEVEL: C FINDING:

The. alarm flash; rate does'not. meet'the 3 to 5 flashes per second

. criterion. :The existing,' flash rate is approximately 2 flashes per second.

RE9PTT9Er.

Ao a function of the control room annunciator review package, the

-discrepant auditory signals will be reviewed.

IMPLEME'7? A*Imi:

By;the completion of tha second refueling outage.

4403/c/33 L

f- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: -0023 104 HED NO.: 3.3.2.F.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

~

Annunciator' tiles which must be lit for extended periods during normal

{~ op; ration-because of such things as. equipment repair or replacement are not distinctively.-identified.

RESPONSES-A conduct of onerations procedure will be developed and implemented which requires coding of annunciator tiles which must be lit during periods of normal operation.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By'.the'comoletion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/36

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

~INDEX MO.:' 0031 OE HED No.: 3.3.3.B-1 CATEGORY: 7 LEVEL: 9 FINDING:-

Vicual alarm tiles within an annunciator matrix are'not, for the most part, grouped by function, system, subsystem or other logical order.

Arranning the alarm tiles in logical-groups may facilitate localization

-ond response to alarms. Alarms listed on the attached sheets are exa ples of those not logically grouped'and are of concern to the oparators.

I RE9PONSE:

Functional grouping of tiles will be addressed as.part of an extensive raview of the annunciators, and any necessary corrective actions will be incorporated in an annunciator package.

. IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/32

)

L

f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'NDEX NO.:

. 024 14 HED MO.: 3.3.3.C.1-1 7ATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

'INDING:

i l

'o u;o a single annunciator procedure book for both units, the grid for the l knnunciator tile coordinates must be the same for both units. The sequence of innunciator coordinate numbers on Unit 1 and Unit 2 is different due to the  !

nirror imaging of the control room. This may cause confusion in identifying (

nnnunciators.

1ESPONSE:

'ha prosent system is acceotable. An operator responding to an alarm Ldantifies it by the coordinates to reference the response in the annunciator proc dure book. If Unit 2 annunciator tiles were renumbered in sequence, all s1crm procedures for Unit 2 would have to be revised. Revision of hundreds of arocedures merely to place annunciator coordinates in sequence is not worth tha offort when there is a negligible improvement in the operator's ability to idsntify the alarm response procedure.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acc;pt as is.

4416/c/37

\

. CORRECTIVE. ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0024

-04 HED NO.: 3.3.3.C.1-2

, CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C 1

-FINDING : -

Th3 vertical and horizontal axes of the following annunciator panels are 902-55, 902-56, 901-55 and 912-7. The axes labeling on

.nst labeled:

501-% -is white adhesive lettering ' attached to the metal surrounding the f

'ennunciator tiles..

RE9PON9E:

This will be reviewed and modified as part of the labeling package.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second ref ueling outage.

4403/c/37

L

f. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0025 04:HED NO.:- 3.3.3.D.1-1

= CATEGORY: 2= -LEVEL: C FINDING:

.Tha maximum number of alarm. tiles'in an annunciator matrix exceeds 50.for the.following panels:

-901-07-04-1-01; 901-07-11-1-01; 901-05-03-1-01; 901-04-03-1-01;

> 901-04-07-1-01; 901-04-11-1-01; 901-03-04-1-01; 901-03-09-1-01; CO2-07-05-1-01; 902-07-11-1-01; 902-05-17-1-01; 902-04-03-1-01; 902-04-07-1-01; 902-04-11-1-01; 902-03-12-1-01; 902-03-18-1-01.

There'is a total of 64 tiles per annunciator panel. They are oraanized in an.9.x 8 matrix. .

\

RESPON9Et l Each alarm' tile has a coordinate number engraved on it, which allows the oparator to identify-individual ~ tiles without' confusion and cross roference them to the annunciator response documentation.

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t

' IMPLEMENTATION:

Acceptcas is.

4403/c/31

p..,.. _

V

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t CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.:~ 0026 0 4 :llE D PIO'. : >3.3.3.E-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Th2 design of the annunciator system does not include cues for prompt rccognition ofLan out-of-service annunciator. Yellow "Out-of-Service" ctickers'are rarely and inconsistently utilized.

e MESPONSE:

A conduct of operations procedure will be developed and implemented which rcquires coding of out'of service annunciators.

i l.

L

+

IMPLF,"1ENT A* ION :

By the comnletion of the second refueling outage.

L 4403/c/29

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS f INDEX NO.: 0032 04'HED NO~.: 3.3.4.A-1

. CATEGORY: 2 . LEVEL: A FINDING:

Thore are some visual tile legends which are ambiguous and non-specific.

Th;y-alert the operator to system " Trouble" and fail to elaborate on the Cpecific trouble. The operators are provided with little or no indication as to what the trouble is and have no other means to invasticate the . problem further (other than sending EAs and EOs out to -

idsntify the specific trouble).

(

RE9PON9Et Non-specified " Trouble" alarms on the common panels will be enhanced with alcrms that provide the operator with more specific information regarding ,

tha nature of the alarm where required. Other " Trouble" alarms do not i

. poco a problem, because there is adequate time for the operators to ,

dicpatch appropriate individuals to evaluate the trouble and take corrective action. In most cases, the corrective action must be done

)

outoide the control room. To install more specific indication of the j trouble in the control room would add to the complexity of the control f, panels and could thereby lead to other human factor problems.

4 i

IMPLEMENTATION:

'By the completion of the second refueling outage.

~4418/c/24

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.INDEX NO.: 0240 04 HED NO.: 3.3.5.A.2-1.

CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

! FINDING ~

Tho letter. heights are not identical for all annunciator tiles. The i hoights vary from.20" to .28". Although this aimallest height is within

[

quidelines, having so many different size characters may make the tiles difficult to read.

i RE9POM9E f

Tho letter heights, while not identical, meet the minimum requirements

)f for readability; and in fact, pose no readability problem when viewed from a typical operating position.

i 1

IMPLEMEMTATION:

Accept as is.

4403/c/41

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0028 04 HED NO. : 3. 3. 5.11. 2 CATPMORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

.Typa styles of-letters on annunciator tiles are not consistent. There oro some. tiles which have tall thin letters, others with short thin.

lottering, others with-tall thick lettering, and others with short thick lotters. Examples 901-4 G14; 912-1 D9; 902-3 E15; 902-4 A22; 902-5 D9;

-902-3 C10; 902-3 C9; 901-7 G6; - 901-7 AlO. Also, some lettering is darker th n others.

RE9PONSE:

DOGpite the slight inconsistencies in letter type, all annunciator cngravings are readable from the distances and viewing angles from which thcv are typically viewed.

)

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4403/c/44

C; CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l INDEX.NO.20029/0232/0233/0234/0235/0236 f '04 HED NO. 3.3.5.C.1-1/C.1-2/D.1-1/

D.2-1/D.4-1/D.5-1/D.6-1 C

-CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: ._

j FINDING:

(Dynotape). There Thore are some annunciator tiles with temporary labels oro some engraved annunciator alarm tiles in which the lettering isTher h ve a stroke width-to-height ratio between 1:6 and 1 8, other tiles on w aring off.

which the letter width-to-height ratio is not between 1:1 and 3:5, least one character width, and/or lines are words are not seoarated by-at is.one-half the character height.

not separated by a space that

{

RE9PO'ISE:

Annunciator standards will be developed as part of the annunciator package.

)

1

• l IMPLEMENTATION: i Bv the completion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/45

y ,

' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0072 04 HED'NO.: -3.3.5.C.2-2

> CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C 1 FINDING:

Tho-legend _on this annunciator tile is.dynotape. The lettering is white

(' . on a black background. 901-08-08-1-01 A10: "1/2 250 VOLT BAT CHRG".

t RE9PO*19E :

Tho dynotape will be removed and the annunciatoritiles will be engraved with appropriate lettering describing the alarm in dark letters on a light background.

4 t

IMPLEMENTATION:

?

By the comnletion of'the second refueling outage.

4403/c/43 i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 04 IIED MO.: 3.4.1.A.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Not every set of annunciator response controls includes a silence control. Controls on the following panels are discrepant: 912-8, 902-55, 902-56, 912-2, 901-55, 901-56, 901-54, 902-54 and 912-7. The teknowledge control silences the horn and terminates the flashing alarm wh;n it is pressed.

GESPOMSE:

Tha panels in question have very few alarms on them. Information r:garding new incoming alarms is still available to the operator when ccknowledging the alarms.

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4403/c/39 i . . .

k

~

L' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX-NO.: 0070 04 HED NO.: '3.4.1.A.2-1 CATEGORY:- 2' . LEVEL: ~C

~

II FINDING:

It-is not possible-to silence an auditory alert signal from any set of cnnunciator response. controls in.the primary operating area.

k. -

RE9PON9E l Tha Quad Cities control room is small and the operator is never very far from the annunciator' response controls. In addition, it is preferable

, that the operators he required to get to the . specific- panel to acknow-ledge the alarm.

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. IMPLE'iENT ATION :

Accept as is.

4418/c/23

, i g- . .. .. . .

r CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0030 04-HED Nois 3.4.2.A-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C y FINDING:

Croups of annunciator controls in the primary operating area are not Orranged the same. Also, annunciator controls are not placed in-the same rolative location across panels.

XESPONSE:

f Rackground' shading will be used to distinguish annunciator controls from other controls.

h

(

f i

t IMPLEMENTATION:

By the comoletion of the second refueling outage.

'4403/c/40-1 g-

f.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0071 04 HED NO.: 3.4.2.n.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha annunciator controls are not coded by means of color coding, color chtding, demarcation or shape coding. There are some annunciator controls which are colored' red, others are silver, others are black.

Sono silence controls have mushroom caps.

(

k RE9PONSE:

k Tho controls will be re-positioned to conform to a control room ctereotype. In addition, the annunciator controls will'be background chtded in a consistent fashion to differentiate them from the remainder of controls.

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IMPLEMENT ATION :

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/36 4

l Section 4 Controls

=

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9

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C _ --- --- - -- - -- ---- - - - - - _ - - - - - - - -

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0194 04 HED NO.: 4.1.1.C.2-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C PINDING:

Tha licted controls are not of the type normally used for the functions which ph;y p;rform.

LA9EL COMMENTS COND. DEMIN. BYPASS SHOULD BE THROTTLEABLE VALVE INSTEAD OF SOSC WITH STOP PUSHBUTTONS NORM MAKE UP VLV 3301 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE AT *HROTTLEA9LE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE POSITION i

EMER MAKE UP VLV 3302 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE AS THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE NOTHI'7G TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE PO9ITION NORM OVERFLOW VLV 3303 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE AS THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE I NOTHING TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE POSITION EMER OVERFLOM VLV 3304 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE AS THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE NOTilING TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE POSITION NORM MAKE UP VLV 3301 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE AS THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE POSITION EMERG MAKE UP VLV 3302 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE AS THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE POSITION NORM OVERFLOW VLV 3303 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE A9 THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH AC~.'UAL VALVE POSITION EMER OVERFLOW VLV 3304 CONTINUOUS ROTARY CONTROL WHICH BEHAVE j AS THROTTLEABLE VALVE GRADUATIONS HAVE j NOTHING TO DO WITH ACTUAL VALVE PO9ITION l CO'ID . DEMIN. BYPASS SHOULD BE THROTTLEABLE VALVE INSTEAD OF SO9C WITH STOP PUSH 90* TONS STOP PUSHBUTTON FOR SOSC VALVE 4416/c/38

s l

PESPONSE:

I 11 . Pho condensate demin bynass valve is designed to allow the operator to

'oporate the valve without having to hold the control switch in the event of a

' failure in the flow control system for the condensate demins. Heater valves have a similar control circuit.

'2 . The condenser makeun and overflow valve controls allow the operator to tako manual control of these valves. He/she adjusts these controls for Socired flow as indicated on associated flow recorders. These controls must pe potentiometers since each provides an electrical loading signal to an bicctronic to oneumatic converter which supplies an air signal to an air oporated valve.

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IM PLE'1ENTATION :

Tecept as is.

!1416/c/39

k.

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX.NO.:- 0137 04'HED NO.: 4.1.2.A-1

' CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

C ntrols are located and/or oriented so that the operator may possibly ctrike er move them accidentally in any sequence of control movements.

(Photo Log R-20). Gen Voltage / Control Transfer; Generator 1 Governor; GCn. Voltage Control / Transfer; Generator 2 Governor.

i I

RE9PO'19 E r t- Tha equipment is not safety related. _There are no significant consequences to the plant as a function of an inadvertent actuation and in the entire history of operating no incident of such actuation has ever bocn reported.

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i IMPL91ENTATION :

Accept as is.

4418/c/5

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NDEX NO.: 0199 04'HED NO. . 4.1.2.C.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B

{ FINDING:

.Th;ro are some controls, guarded with movable barriers, that interfere with tho operation of adjacent controls when the guard is in the open position.

Thio tay cause accidental activation.of a control or prevent the activation of a c ntrol. Photo Log (B-21).

PA'IEL FE'.DWATER rVN* MAN / AUTO

. STATION A FMrDMATER CONS MA*T/ AUTO 1 '9TATION B RESPON9El lie plastic covers over controls, when opened, may interfere with c:nipulation of other controls, once the control has been activated it is no longar necessary to keep the cover opened. Covers are only opened when the controls beneath'it are to be activated. .

)

i IMPLEMEN*ATIO'i Acc;nt as is, k

4416/c/10

I (3

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX - NO. : 0160 04 HED NO.: 4.2.1.A-1 CATEGORY: '3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

,Tho listed controls have the start or open position to the lef t.

This is inctncistent with standard control action and may result in inappropriate use of tha control. Photo Log (B-14)

EID SUB LABEL COMMENT 010302504 000 RELIEF VALVE f 203-3A 010302511 000 RELIEF VALVE 203-3B

( 010302512 000 RELIEF VALVE

\ 203-3C 010302607 000 RELIEF VALVE 203-3D RELIEF VALVE 010302608 000 203-3E 010803506 000 DIESEL GEN 1/2 START TO LEFT START-STOP AUTO TO RIGilT

! STOP MIDDLE 020319504 000 RELIEF VALVE 203-3A 020314511 000 RELIEF VALVE 203-3B 020319512 000 RELIEF VALVE 203-3C 020319607 000 RELIEF VALVE 203-3D 020319608 000 020R06503 000 DIESEL GEN 2 START- START TO LEFT I STOP AUTO TO RIGilT STOP MIDDLE RESPONSE: ,

Th000 controls are arranged with the switch positions in the following order (from'left to right): START / MANUAL (lef t), STOP/OFF (middle) and AUTO

'(right). This is the only possible configuration for these controls which tvoids inappropriate activation of automatic control function.

, I MDLEME'1PATION :

.Acc:nt an is.

1 -

'4416/c/06 l J

N.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0213

-04 HED MO.: 4.2.2 A-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C '

FINDING:

( Tho oniv coding of controls in the control room is the coloring of J-i h;ndle controls. Yellow =Throttleable open/throttleable closed valves, rcd =throttleable open/ seal in closed valves, Black = seal in open/ seal in cicsed valves. There are rotary valve controls with the same function as 010ck J-handles and there are thumbuster rotary valve controls with the 1

ccce function as yellow J-handles.

( GEspoN9E:

f Coding of controls will be examined during the labeling review.

Appropriate coding strategies will be developed and implemented in the control room.

t IMPLEMENTATION:

By the comnietion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/4 l . . . . . . . . .

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

~

INDEX NO.: 0215 LO4 M'.D MO.: 4.2.2.E.3-l'

-CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B PINDING:

' - All discrete controls on the General Electric ' controllers- (example =

r 01-03-10-3-01) are circular with square notches. Or.e notch has a red circle' indicating knob position. Photo Log Ph). (B-24I).

RESPONSE

Although discrepant from the guideline, an individual can readily id ntify the distinct' control detente indications.

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. IMPLEM ENTATION :

Accept as is.

I 4418/c/14' i

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r CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

NDEX NO.: 216 04 HED MO.: 4.2.2.P.1-1 CATEGOPY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Pho color coding of the J-handle controls do not follow the recommendations of tho guideline.

I RE9PONSE:

Color coding of control handles will be reviewed with the development of a rolor standard. When a color standard is established, it will be applied to

ontrol handle, and all controls not in compliance with the standard will be

.: hanged.

1 i

( MPI,EMENT ATION :

ly the completion of the second refueling outage. l 4416/c/42

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0217' 04 HED NO.: 4.3.1.n-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

?R)t all pushbuttons have positive indication of activation in the form of snap feal, an audible click, or an integral light.

1 I

RE9PONSE:

In all cases, the onerator is required to verify that the intended plant lesponse has occurred as result of pushing these pushbuttons. This veri-fication provides the operator with feedback concernino control actuation.

'forcover, these pushbuttons are used primarily in testing situations. Thus, imnact on niant safety is negligible.

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i TMPLEMENTATION:

Ncccpt as is.

4416/c /1. 3

w f s CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0371 04 HED NO.: 4.3.3.B.2-1 l

CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL:- C l

FINDING: , --y

[ Th2 legend light pushbuttons on the turbine control portion 90X-7 panel era not 10% brighter than the surrounding panel.

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RE9PO'19E : '

They can be readily_ distinguished. No apparent problem exists in readily i diotinguishing the legend light pushbuttons on the turbine control

-portion of the 90X-7 panel.

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IMPLE*iENTATION:

Accept as is.

4419/c/21-L _

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I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

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INDEX NO.: 0219 04 HED NO.: 4.3.3.C.3-1 CATEGORY: 1 L5: VEL: R FINDING:

(Legr.ndoushbuttonsaresusceptibletoinadvertantactivationduring lamp rcpitcement. The entire pushbutton light assembly is removed for lamp renlacement. Re-inserting the assembly for proper sealing can activate the control.

l l.

RE9PONSE:

Th3 consequences for plant safety, of inadvertently activating the controls for which legend pushbuttons are used, is negligible, l

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l IMPLEMENTATION:

Accant-as is.

4416/c/07 l- - - -

s l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0292 04 HED NO.: 4.3.3.E.5-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

iLcqend pushbuttons have a resistance greater than the recommended forty I

ounces. Fifty ounces was measured. These are on the legend pushbuttons on the turbine panel for both units (7 Panel).

RE9PONSE:

Tha measured resistance deviates insignificantly from the recommended resistance. In addition, none of the operators indicated that this deviation l caused any errrors.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4416/c/14

s-(!

L f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0224 04 HED NO.: 4.4.1.B-1

g. CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C l

FINDING:

Wh2n rotary controls used for widely different functions are placed on f thn same panel, no shape coding is employed. J-handles are used.to control valves and pumps on the same panel. Key-operated controls l' control valves'and compressors on the same panel. Thumbusters operate ,

I valves. {

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RESPON9E:

Labeling oackage will be developed. As a function of this program, various coding techniques will be examined to delineate the functions of the various controls. An appropriate coding technique will then be implemented.

l IMPLEMENTATION:

-- By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/15 L - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4 I

L .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

{.

INDEX NO.: 0202

( 04 HED MO.: 4.4.3.A-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Thare are several key-operated controls that have the keys inserted in

{~ them during all operations. Key-operated controls should be used when Gystem requiremen A dictate that the function being controlled should be

( cecured against activation by unauthorized personnel. Relief Valve

[ 203-3A; Relief Valve 203-3B; Relief Valve 203-3C; Relief Valve 203-3D; Ralief Valve 203-3E; Suppression Pool to Pump V-1-100-0-7A; Containment Cooling 2/3 Level-ECCS Initiation Bypass; RHR Service Water Start Parmissiver Suppression Pool to Pump V-1-1001-7B; Shutdown CLG. to Pump V-1-100-43A; Cross Tie North V-1-1001-19A; Shutdown Clg. To; Cont.'Clg.

2/3. Level And ECCS Initiation Bypass; RHR Serv. Wtr Start Permissive; Cross Tie South V-1-1001-19B; Reactor Mode; RWM Bypass; Adsorber Inlet l 5414; H2&O2 Monitor Inlet Viv. Select 1-2477A; CAM /ACAD Power Control; H2 &O2 Monitor Inlet Viv. Select 1-2477B; CAM /ACAD Power Control.

RESPONSE

Does not present an operational problem. No need to make any changes.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4418/c/12

s-f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS f

INDEX.NO.: 0223 04 HED NO.: 4. 4. 4.E -1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tho . A'N9 manual scram turn pushbuttons have a small red knob indication to indicate if the switch is in the " armed" or " disarmed". position. The red indication is nainted on the side of the control and is difficult for l operators to see. Also, the " disarmed" label is displaced approximately an linch from the knob indication. Precise indication of switch position will cncura proper use of these controls as required. Photo Log (B-23).

l l

l RESPr)NSE :

A high contrasting arrow will be added to the knob and the " disarmed" and "crmad" labels relocated to the proper position.

'IMPLEME*ITATION :

By thel completion of the.second refueling outage.

.4416/c/16

r L

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0293 f 04 HED NO.: 4.4.4.C.1-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

( Fingertip grasp knob height of the Continuous Adjustment Rotary Controls

[ ic less than the recommended 0.5 inches. The heights _of the knobs of the

-ganeral electric potentiometer rotary controls and setpoint meter i controls are 0.2 inches. Some setpoint adjustment meter controls are 0.33 inches.

f.

RESPONSE

These rotary controls historically have not been.an operational problem.

{. Thorefore, adequate justification does not exist for changing these knobs.

IMPLE'tENTATION:

Accept as is.

4403/c/17.

4 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

{

INDEX NO : 0294 04 HED NO.: 4.4.4.E.1-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha continuous adjustment rotary controls with skirt knobs do not have a skirt dicnater of 2 inches. All setpoint adjustment controls on the 18 and 19 Panalo have skirts with a diameter of 1.22 inches. The continuous rotary

[ controls on the turbine panel (7 Panel) have a skirt diameter of 1.8 inches.

(Photo Log (C-7).

LABEL LOAD LIMI* SET

RESPONSE

While the current controls do not conform with recommended guidelines, the dsgree and type of deviation is expected to have minimal impact on plant

.cafety.

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Acetpt as is.

4416/c/22.

7.. . .

[-

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0296 04 HED NO.: 4.4.4.E.4-1

. CATEGORY: 1 . LEVEL: C FINDING:

Continuous adjustment' rotary controls do not have rotary knob heights of f . 75 inches. Control on the 18 and 19 panels have a' knob heights of .345 inches. ' Controls on the 7 panels have knob heights of .41 inches Photo

' Log (C-9).

RE9 PO'T",E :

( Although below the minimun prescribed in NUREG-0700, the controls on panels 18 and- 19 have' knob heights which are adequate for operations. In addition, these controls are non-time critical and non-safety related.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as.is.

'4410/c/11 I _ _ _ _

(

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: '0297 04 HED NO.:~4.4.4.E.5-1 CA*EGORY: 2 LEVEL: C.

FINDING:

Continuous-adiustment rotary controls with knob skirts do not have a knob dicmeter of .75 inches. Control ~ knobs on the 18 and 19 panels have a diameter of .57 inches. Knobs on the 7 Danel have a diameter of .9

~

inches and continuous rotary knobs on the 55 and 56 panels a diameter from .6 increasing to .7 inches. Photo Log (C-10).

RESPONSE

( The diameter of the knob skirts for the continuous adjustment rotary controls on the 18, 19, 7, 55, 56 panels are adequate for safe operation.

' IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4418/c/10

s

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I's CORRECTIVE ACTIONS k

INDEX NO.: 0204 f04HEnNo.: 4.4.5.B-2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

=

FINDING :

JP ointers on rotary selector' knobs are not mounted close to the settings to (which they_ point. _These controls have engraved arrows on the top of the knob tho same color as the knob. Photo Log (B-26).

(

) RESPONSE:

Thio will be reviewed and modified as part of the labeling package.

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IMPLEMENTATION

By the -connletion of the second refueling outage.

4416/c/21

s t

-CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0207 f04HEDNO.: 4.4.5.B.4-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C iFINDING:

[ Positions 13, 14, 15, and 16 on the channel selectors listed on the attached lchact are not used and there are no stops to prevent their use. This may rocult in inappropriate placement of the control.

f LABEL VI9 RATION PHA9E ANGLE

' VIBRATION PHA9E ANGLE

{.

RESPONSE

The functions-for which this instrumentation is used are not safety-related.

In addition, if the positions 13 - 16 are selected, no action is performed.

I

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acccpt as is.

4416/c/20

L l'

.- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0298

.04 HED NO.: 4.4.5.E.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

TGardrop shaped knobs on rotary selector switches are below the rtcommended minimum length of 1 inch. There are 36 of these controls c located on the 37 panel for both units. Measured lengths were .75".

Photo Log (C-ll).

k RE9PON9E:

The teardrop shaced knobs on the Rotary 9 elector 9 witches on the 37 panel are 3/4" long which are sufficient for safe operations.

IMPLE'1ENTATION':

Accent as is.

4418/c/09

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

NDEX NO.: 0299

@d HED MO.: 4.4.5.E.3-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C PINDING:

2everal rotary controls do not have a minimum diameter of 1 inch. Some thumbucters have diameters varying from .94 to .96 inches. All "REA MONITOR POWER SUPPLY" controls on the 11 Panel have a diameter of .7 inches.

LABEL TRAP BYPASS V 2301-31 kESPONSE:  !

The measured control diameter deviates an insignificant amount from the recommended diameter. The impact of such a deviation on plant safety is considered to be negligible.

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' IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4416/c/15

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0300 04 HED NO.: 4.4.5.E.4-1 CA*EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

All thumbuster-type rotary selector switch finger grasp heights are below the recommanded height of .625. Photo Log (C-2).

RE9PONSE:

The present design, while deviating from recommended guidelines, is adequate given that the operators use an additional tool to operate these controls.

IMPL".'1ENP ATION :

Accept as is.

4416/c/23

l L -

/ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0205

'04 HED MO.: 4.4.5.F-1 CATEGORY: 1- LEVP,L : C.

FINDING:

Thumhuster rotary selector controls may be dif?icult to hold against the cpring torque for as long as necessary to acccaplish the control action.

RESPO'ISE:

Opsretors use a switch handle, with a larger finger area, to operate these controls. Thus, difficulty in maintaining control position against the spring torqua is minimized.

}1setEsENTxT10N, Acc;pt as is.

4416/c/11

'I I

/

l 4-f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

INDEX NO.: 0302

]

04 HED NO.: 4.5.1.n.2-C-1

' CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha width of the discrete setting thumbwheels for the economic generation control (EGC) is .05". The guideline states that the width should be a minimum of .1 inch. Photo Log (C-3).

RESPONSE: l l

The width of the thumbwheel is adequate for operations. The consequences of a wrong setting is-negligible.

t IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4418/c/8

s CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

(

INDEX NO.': 0303 04 HED NO.: 4.5.2.n.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

[ FINDING:

5 The hsight of the slide switches on the Leak Detector Monitor on the 21 Panel fare bslow the recommended height Photo of .25 Log inches. The height of these switches (50 on each unit) is .12 inches. (C-17).

1 r

NESPONSE:

While the height of the slide switches deviates from the recomnended height, phis is not considered a significant problem. The switches have only two ,

positions so that on1.y an error on omission (leaving the switch in its present position) could occur as a result of the operator's hand slipping off of the awitch.

t T MPLE'1ENT ATION :

Accept as is.

4416/c/19

I s

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX.NO.: 0304 04 HED NO.: 4.5.2.B.2-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

! FINDING:

Tho length of the slide switches on the 21 panel are below the rccommended length of 1 inch. The length of these switches (50 on each unit)~is .3 inches (leak detector monitor). Photo Log (C-17).

t

RESPONSE

A1.though these switches are slide switches they are used to select dichotomous positions. All the way left or right are the discrete esttings which can be selected. The length of this switch is adequate for this purpose.

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l IMPLEMENT ATIO'T :

Accent as-is.

4418/c/7

)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS k

INDEX NO.: 0305 04 HED.NO.: 4.5.3.C.1-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Toqq1o switches for " ACOUSTIC DETECTOR MONITOR" located on the 21 Panel have arm isngths of .4 inches. This is below the recommended minimum of .5

'i ncha s . Photo Log (C-18).

1 RESPON9E:

Tha arm length of_these toggle switches deviates from the recommended arm length by. 1 inch. This deviation is not expected to significantly compromise plant safety.

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Acespt as is.

'4416/c/18

/

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

[

INDEX NO.: 0306 04 HED NO.: 4.5.3.C.4-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

The resistance on large toggle switches exceeds the maximum recommended rosiotance of forty ounces. A resistance of forty-eight ounces was measured

' n vibration phase angle toggle switches (for both units on 7 Panel).

o

't b.ESPONSE:

The resistance of the large toggle switches exceeds the recommended resistance by eight ounces. However, the current resistance is well within the canabilities of all operators and, moreover, the higher resistance impedes inadvertant actuation. Thus, the higher resistance should have no signifir at impact on plant safety.

l IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is. l l

4416/c/17 l

3

/

[ Section 5 L Visual Displays 1

l 3

/

s

/

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS iEDEX NO.: 0152 04 HED NO.: 5.1.1.A.2-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C

{

l 1

FIMDING:

Particular disniays are not hooked up and are not used by the operators.

I I

kESPONSE:

Inactive displays will be reviewed and removed as necessary.

l IIMPLEMENTATION:

Bv the completion of the second refueling outage.

4416/c/60

\

/

s.

r h

1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0169 04 HED NO.:~ 5.1.1.B.1-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

.Tha ACAD/ CAM temperature displays are not identified as to whether they roflect demand or actual status. Knowing which is being shown gives the oparator a clearer understanding of the display. (Photo Log B-13)

RESPONSE

The labeling package will ensure these displays identify the appropriate information.

l 1'

IMPT7/1ENT ATION :

By the conoletion of the second refueling outage.

'4403/c/76'

f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0158 ,

04 HED *TO.: 5.1.1.C-1 )

I CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C j FINDING: -

Whan the electrical distribution panel instruments f ail or become inoperative, the failure is not apparent to the operator. Being aware that an instrument has failed indicates to the operator that he must dspand on other sources for the information.

RE9PON9E:

Process instruments fail down scale and electric meters are interelated with another meter or have diverse indication.

\

l t IMPLE'iENTATION :

Accept as is.

I

- 4403/c/71

r CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 20182 04 HED No.: 5.1.2.D.1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: 9

-FINDING:

The-listed disolays were found to have inappropriate ranges.

RESPONSE

Tha meter scale will be reviewed as part of a comprehensive evaluation of mater displays.

IMPLEME?iTATION :

4 By the' comnletion of the second refueling outage.

l .4404/c/64 f

(-

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS '

INDEX'NO. - 0137, 0134

-04 HED No.: 5.1.2.E.1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

. FINDING:

Scale ranges'are expanded by multiplying indicated scale values by two or five. Expansion should be performed by multiplying scale values by powers of. ten to avoid the need for a time-consuming operator conver-cion.

EID LABEL 010712202 Lift Pump No. 1 Amps 010712203 Lift Pump No.-2 Amps 010712204 Lift Pump No. 3 Amps {

015409101 Absorber Train Diff Press I 020703201 Lift Pump No. 4 Amps 020703202 Lift Pump No. 5 Amps 020704203 Lift Pump No. 6 Amps 025409101 Absorber Train DIff Pressure

^

RESPONSE

.These are not tine demanding, non-critical systems with 1.imited degree of accuracy necessary to be read from the meters, r

l I MPLE*1ENT ATIO'T :

Accept as is.

-4404/c/65

s

.- 'j CORRECTIVE ACTIONS \

t INDEX NO.: 0136, 0133 _

04 HED NO.: 5.1.2.E.1 2 LEVEL: C CATEGORY:

FINDING:

Tha Drum Counter Measuring Flow in pounds per hour scale ranges are expanded by multiplyng scale values by powers ofLog Photo ten (A-18) to avoid the'need for a time-consuming operator conversion.

RESPONSE

Non-time dependent, non-critical. The operators can function adequately with this information.

l

' IM'LE*iE'IT ATION :

Accept as is.

1 4404/c/66

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0135 04 HED NO.: 5.1.2.E.1-3 CATEGORY: 2 ' LEVEL: C FINDING:

Scale ranges on the rotary setpoint temperature meter. The ranges are Gxpanded by adding 10 to the indicated scale value. This conversion tokes time-and may lead to confusion.

RESPONSE

Infrequent 1v used meter with no significant operational impact.

(

c r

I MPLEMEN" API O'i : ,

I' Accent.as is.

4407/c/67

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0140 h 04 tied NO.: 5.1.2.E.2 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C l FINDING:

Thsse scale ranges are expanded-by multiplying indicated scale values by five. Unit 1 meter is not labeled to indicate this. Unit 2 meter is labeled with dynotape (not permanently engraved). Photo Log (A-22)

(

f

(

RESPONSE

Problem will be resolved as a function of the control room wide labeling program.

l I

l I'iPLE' TENT A* ION :

By the comnletion of the second refueling outage.

)

4404/c/67

{

r L

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0264 04 hen NO.: 5.1.3.A-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

-The guideline states that the character height on displays should subtend

{ c visual-angle of 15 minutes. This means that at a viewing distance of 30 inches (the depth of the benchboards), the character height must be at r 1 cast .132 inches. Listed are examples of displays that are not in

[ accordance with the cuideline. This guideline is stated to ensure that lotterino on displays is legible.

EIn Sub # Label Comment

(~

010318401 000 Reactor Water Level Required Char Ht .132 Measured Char 9t .090

[ 010319301 000 Containment Pressure Required Char Ht .132 Measured Char Ht .000 010701401 000 BPV-1 Required Char Ht .132

( Measured Char Ht .075 RESPO'ISE:

Labelinq of these scales will be reviewed to determine whether or not they present readability problems. The appropriate corrective action will be taken to ensure that scale labeling can be read by the operators.

~IMPLEMENTATIO'i 9v the conolation of the second refueling outage.

l 4407/c/8

t CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ~

INDEX NO.: 0129

$04 hen No.: -5.1.3.C.1-1 CATEGOUV: 2 T,EVEL : C

~

. FINDINGS Pha <11snl.sys contain white markings on a black background. Black markings on a white background are easier for the operator to read.

Photo Log (A-23)

[

[

[-

RESPONSE

The LPRM indication meters are. black with white markings. When at power,-

{~ they give the local power indication-at a point in the core. This is a non-time critical requirement. Visibility is adequate.

[ ,

[

[

[

[

[:

[ IMPLEMENTATION:

. Accept'as I's . -

2 4407/c/14

[

i1 -

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX-MO.: 0260, 0257-OA HED NO.: 5.1.3.0.2-1, 5.1.3.D.3-1

-CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C

. FINDING:

j Tha quideline states that display letter characters are to have a width-

l. to-height ratio between 1.00 and .60. .Severmi displays are not in accordance with the guideline. This guidel...e is stated to ensure that dicplays are legible and somewhat consistent.

I l I R E S P O'T 9 E : I The width-to-height of display letter characters and numerals will be f reviewed according to guidelines as part of a consistent-labeling

. package. Displav-letter characters which are difficult to read will be

. changed, l

l L

f

{

'ItiPLE?iENT ATION :

f By..the comnletion of the second refueling' outage.

4407/c/46 (L

i - - - - _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0255, 0261 f 04 HP.0 *10.: 5 . l'.1. 0. 4 - 1, 5.1.3.0.1-1 CAPEGORY: 3 LP, VEL : C FINDING:

Dicerecencies have been found regarding the characters on the f aces of displays. .The cited displays do not conform to the guidelines regarding snecifications for character stroke width-to-character height ratio

.167 and .125) or space between characters (one stroke f w(chould idth). be between l

l

RESPONSE

Despite these discrepancies, there is no difficulty in reading the labels on the meter face.' The characters on-display faces usually represent the units beinq disniaved, which the operators perceive at a glance. There is usually a space constraint, requiring that the unit label fit into an allocated area on the meter face..

I L l

l l-IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept.as is.

44n7/c/7

h. . . . .

s CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX MO.:~ 0129/0131/0130

( 04 HED No.: 9.1.4.A.1-3/1-1/1-2 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

, Scales do not have labels or required information to use the scales. In

[. come instances', the information is inappropriately located.

l l

RESPONSE

Characteristics'of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a

( consistent labeling package. The new labeling package will meet human factors standards concerning completeness and adequacy of information,

[

usability of displayed values, readability, and-presentation of brief l -printed material on display face.

I I

I IMPLEMENTATION:

By.the. completion of the second refueling outage.

-4404/c/17 L _ _ _ - _

-+

s CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

(.

INDEX NO.:- 0127 f 04 HED NO.: 5.1.5.A.1-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C

' FINDING:

More than'9 graduations are used-between major numerals on displays.

Having more than 9 graduations can make accurate reading of the display difficult. Photo Log (A-27)

\

RESPONSE

These meter scales will be reviewed in depth to determine the appropriate l

( change to'be implemented. Units being displayed, accuracy required, and {

frequency of use will be criteria used to determine appropriate corrective action.

l l

IMPLPJ1ENTATION :

By conpletion of-the second refueling outage.

4404/c/36

4

. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0267 04 HED HO.: 5.1.5.B-1

' CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha quideline states that graduations marking display scales should be of

[

l- tha following height for a viewing distance of 36 inches:

Maior Grad = '.40" Intermediate Grad = .28" Minor = .17" Tho displays in the control are not in accordance with the guideline.

{. REqPON9E:

Daspite these discrenancies, there is no difficulty in reading the labels

( 'on the meter face. The graduation markings have adequate stroke widths to enhance viewing of these graduations, l

p IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

'4407/c/47 l . .. .

e l

f. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS g INDEX NO.: 0125 -

-04 hen No.: 5.1.5.C-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Successive values indicated by unit graduations are not multiples of 1, 2

{ or 5, or.those values multiplied by some power of 10. These values are quickly and easily interpretable, which leads to less chance for error in th2ir reading. Photo Log (A-29)

{

l RE9PONSE:

( These meter scales will be reviewed to determine the problem. Units boing displayed, accuracy required, and frequency of use will be criteria usca to determine the nature of any problem and when applicable the appropriate corrective action.

l l

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/37 l

f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS I NDEX NO. : 175, 181, 183, 1 35 04 HED MO.: 5.1.6.C.1-1, 5.1 6.C.2-1 5.1.6.D.1-1, 5 . 3 .' 2 . A . 2- 1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDIi4G :

Tha m aning assigned to a particular color is not consistent across all applications within the control room. This type of consistency allows for cicarer understanding and interpretation of colors regardless of where they ara uned.

RESPONSE

A ctandard for the use of color in the control room will be established and implemented. This color standard will be applied to labels, background l shadina, lights, mimic lines, and any other applications were color provides tha operator with cues to the status or identification of components. Colors will be consistently employed in accordance with the Quad Cities color l I

2tandard.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the comoletion of the second refueling outage.

4416/c/44

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0151-041HED NO.: 5.2.1.B CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Vartical' straight scale values do not' increase with upward movement of tha pointer. Some of the vertical meters have a negative and positive ccale around zero but are not marked so. Photo Log (B-10) i

(

RE9POMSE:

k Tha vertical meters will be reviewed to determine the appropriate changes to be made. Every effort will be made to insure that scale values

,' increase with upward movement of the pointer.

I 1

l

(

IMPLEMENTATIOM:

By the completion of the.nacond refueling outage.

4404/c/39 L -

/ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS k-INDEX MO.: 0169

(' -04 HED NO : 5.2.2.A.2-2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C I'

l FINDING:

p Pointer tips on the scales of the meters and recorders are covering the L ccale graduations. Being able to see the graduation which is being pointed at allows for easier and more accurate reading of the scale.

Photo Log (B-4)

RE9PONSE:

The nointer tips and scales on these meters and recorders will be reviewed-to determine the appropriate changes to be implemented. Units baing displayed, accuracy required, and frequency of use will be criteria uccd to determine appropriate corrective action to minimize concealment l of scale graduation narks or nunerals by pointer tips.

(

l s

IMPLEMENTATION:

d.

By conoletion of the second refueling outage.

(

4404/c/41

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0391 04 T4ED MO.: 5.2.3.A-1 f'

CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C l

FINDING:

It is not Thore are two meters on each unit that utilize (samezone marking.

for Unit 2).

Generally, clear where the normal range is locatedZone marking makes the reading of displays zone marking is not utilized.

Iccs confusing and quicker, l

i

RESPONSE

Zone marking will be implemented in the control room where applicable.

d-The meters will be reviewed to determine if colorbanding a i Otatus information.

(

1

(

IMPLE*iENTk"' ION :

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/42 I - - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

L INDEX NO.: 0154

-04 HED NO.: .5.2.4.B.2-1

~ CATEGORY: -2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tho null. position or zero point between positive and negative values is

~

.'not at the 12 o' clock position for the cited neters. This position conforms with population stereotypes, which facilitates quick and Occurate reading of the meter. Photo Log (B-9)

( RE990'ISE :

The.neters cited as rieficient are electrical meters where nost of the J usoful scale consists of positive values. This scale layout is a convention for electrical meters; the operators are not using the zero position as a balancing point between positive and negative reading.

,' tiovina zero to the 12 o' clock position would reduce the operators ability to read these scales accurately.

l l I MPLE'tE'IT ATI'yi :

Accent as is.

(

4404/c/43 I . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - - -

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 171-04 hen $10. : 5.3.1.A.1-1 i

C APPT-oRY : 1 T.EVEL : C FINDING:

No method is-provided'#or determining lamp failure in indicating lights, j f.

$ Cxcept by visual inspection.

i i

(

RE9PO'19Et Tho operators are cognizant of their responsibility to inspect the control panels for non operative indicating lights. This is included as part of the panel inspection performed at the beginning and end of each chift. The indicating light systems on all controls except for the l turbine control nanel. were not designed to accommodate this feature. A backfit to accomplish this objective would be prohibitive and provide littla additional assurance that the bulbs are inoperable.

I IMPLEMENTATIO!!:

f Accept as is.

4407/c/l1 l _ - _ - - - - - - - - --

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 172 04 HED NO.: 5.3.1.A.3-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C r

k FINDING:-

/ Burned out bulbs in indicator lights are not always easily replaced. The

( cockets are aging and they have a tendency to fall apart when removing or inctalling new bulbs. Due to the heat generated by the lamps, the plastic lamp covers are melting to one another (typical of lights olde-by-side), making it impossible, to replace bulbs.

( ftE9 PO*1SE :

The onerators are coqnizant of their responsibility to inspect the control panels for damaged indicating lights. This is included as part o* the panel inspection nerformed at the beginning and end of each I ahift. Damaged light sockets are replaced on an as-needed basis. A proqram to reolsce all the sockets would be prohibitive and provide little additional assurance that the sockets are operable.

. I* TDT,E'tEs!T AP TO'T :

Accent 89 is.

4407/c/12

( . . . .

L !

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0039 04 HED MO.: 5.3.1.C.2-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Provisions are not made to prevent the interchanging of lenses on indi-cator lights. This may result in the lenses being interchanged during caintenance which, in turn, could lead to erroneous interpretation of the indicator.

(

RE9PP19E The lenses on the indicating liqhts are opened (removed) in sequence and rcplaced prior to the removal of other lenses. There is no significant potential for interchanqing lenses.

1 i

r IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4407/c/61-l

[-'

(

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0162 04 hen No.: 5.3.2.A.1-1 L

CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

A number of non-legend light indicators, there is no labeling, or labels are temporary (Photo Log 3-2).

l l

L RE9PONSE:

Characteristics of labele will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package.

t

( ,

IMPLE'tE!!T ATIO'T :

By the comnletion of the second' refueling outage.

4404/c/29' l . . ..

(.

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0102 04 HED MO.: 5.3.2.9-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha small amber and red indicating lights on the back panels are less than 10% brighter then the surrounding panel.

l 1

QE9Do'ISE :

They can be readily distinguished. No apparent problem exists in readily dictinguishing the small amber and red indicating lights on the back panels.

( l

(

IMPLWJIT ATION :

Accent as is.

4ll8/c/19 .

l- - - _ _ _ - _ - - - - - - -

L i

i.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 373 04 HED NO.: 5.3.2.B-2

-CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

. Tha LPRM liqhts on the full core display are not 10% brighter than the currounding panels.

(

RE9PONSEs ,

Th0y can be readily distinguished. No problem exists in readily distin-guiching the LPRM lights.

b IMPLEME*1TATION :

Accept as is.

4418/c/20 I . .. .. . .

h CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0374 04 HED NO.: 5.3.3.A.1-1 b -CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C

. FINDING:

(-Thestandardsquarelegendindicating lights room do not meet the criteria of being 10% used throughout brighter than the the control surrounding panal. This is always true of the blue and yellow lights, sometimes true of the white, green, and red lights and never true for the amber lights.

Tha legend lights on the turbine nanel also have this problem.

(

RESPONSE

Thsy can be readily distinguished. No apparent problem exists in readily diotinguishing the lights from the background or one another.

(

(

[

(

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4418/c/18

(. .

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0163/0164 04'HED NO.: 5.3.3.A.2-1/5.3.3.A.3-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C

+

FINDING:

The legend lettering does not contrast well with legend background for i legend lights. The legends are difficult to read under ambient lighting whnn the . indicator light is extinguished. Photo Log (B-1 and A-34)

\ .

l

[

RESPONSE

( The station will examine the legend light indicators in the control roon

] and systematically replace those whose legends contrast inadequately with background and consequently are difficult to read with the indicator light off.

(

(

(

(

( -

I MPLE*1ENT ATION :

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/38 f _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0269 04 hen NO.: 5.3.3.N 2-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

The nuideline states that legends for legend light indicators should be

{ in accordance with the character dimensions stated in paragraph 5.1.3.

Tha letter width-to-height ratio of 3:5, the space between characters of f ono stroke width, and'the visual angle subtended by characters to be 15 l minutes. Legends'of two different type fonts were found for legend t

lights and legend light pushbuttons. Deficiencies are noted'in examples of both type fonts.

[

RESPONSE

The character dimension of legends for legend light indicators will'be rcviewed as part of the implementation of a consistent labeling package, and appropriate changes will be made.

[

(

[

(

(

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the connletion of the second refueling outage.

,4407/c/48 L

r

]

) CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NDEX NO.: 0186 04 HED NO.: 5.3.3.C-1 ATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B PINDING:

Some legend lights are not distinguishable from legend pushbuttons.

i

RESPONSE

As part of the Control Room Enhancement Package, highlighting and/or coding techniques will be employed to make legend lights distinguishable f rom legend puchbuttons.

i IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

l 4416/c/12 1

l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: Olla, 0119, 0124 04 4ED MO.: 9.4.1.A-1, 5.4.1.9-1,

[ 5.4.2.B.3-1 CA*EGORY: 1 LEVET,: C FINDING:

There are. recorders in which cens, ink and paper do not provide clear and.

( ~ distinct markings. The ink is bleeding. making discrete recordings difficult. Blue orids on paper make it difficult to read light blue onrkings. Dark green-grids make it difficult to read light markings.

Dual pen recorders typically have one color marking over another color.

Some markings are recorded on the border of the grid. For multipoint recordern, multiple points are not readable. Points are being recorded

[

on top of one another, and ink is too light or-is bleeding, making l csveral points appearJas a large smudge. Grid-to-marking contrast typically is poor. Some recorders have paper that does not match the scale on the recorder. Photo Log (A-7, A-10, A-8)

RE9PONSE:

~

Ths recorders will be reviewed to determine the appropriate changes to be implemented. Corrective action taken will be made on a case-by-case bamis, depending on the nature of the problem. The adequacy of the ink pans and the appropriateness of the paper and scales will be examined.

k l IMPLEMENTATION:

By the comnietion of the second refueling outage.

.4407/c/3 l

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 387, 122 04 HED MO.: 5.4.1.C-1, 5.4.2.A.1-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Rtcorder scales are not marked and numbered according to the specified.

guidelines. Some of the recorders have been cited for inappropriate graduation marking and numbering, others have been cited for a lack of lobaling to identify parameter being recorded.

I

RESPONSE

Rscorder scales will be reviewed to determine the appropriate change to be implemented for each recorder.

1 IMPLEt1ENTATION :

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

l 4418/c/26

t CORRECTIVE ACTIONS L

INDEX NO : 0121 04 HED NO.: 5.4.1.K-1 CATEGOD,Y: 3 ,. LEVEL: C FINDING:

Not all data is visible through the window of the recorders listed 1balow. Photo Log (A-9)

EIn Sub # Label 010408201 000 Conductivity Reactor Demin

.010706101 000 010709301 000 01.5403401 000 015404401 000 Adsorber Vessel Temps 020307202 000 020405201 000 Conductivity Reactor Demin 020706301 000 Expansion and Metal Temp 020700301 000 Eccentricity and Vibration 025403404 000

{ 025408401 000 Adsorber Vessel Temps RE9PONSE:

Racorders will be reviewed during development of the labeling package.

. Changes needed to make recorder data visible to the operators will be implemented.

.. IMPLEMENTAT ION :

Rv the connletion o' the second refueling outage.

t 4407/c/4 m

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0123 04 HED NO.: 5.4.2.9.2-1 CA*EqooV: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Not all.Miserate recorders disolay the channel being plotted in an easily

{ ,vicwed-manner. Multipoint recorders located on the 54 panels have the channel indicaton located behind the scale, and the operator has to open-tha door to read the channel indication. This causes a delay in the use of the reenrder. Photo Log (A-11) c

RESPONSE

f The recorders cited are not indicating time critical items. The infor-mation regarding the channel being plotted can be obtained by watching the recorder as it prints or by opening the window and examining the rccorder.

\

i t '

' I MPLE*iE'T? ATIO*T :

Accent as'is, t

4407/c/5

--- -_-______-__.__x._________ -

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0165, 0285 04 HED NO.: 5.4.2.B.4-1, 5.4.2.B.4/OS 2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Thare is no channel selection capability for some recorders. This causes

( tha operators to have to wait for needed information until completion of the next sampling cycle.

RE9PONSE:

Thase recorders are not time critical. However, the recorders will be reviewed and recorders requiring changes will be identified and resolved.

k IMPLEMEN"% TION :

By the conpletion of the second refueling outage.

I 4407/c/2' l _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

, INDEX NO.: 0272, 0155 c

l- 04 HED No.: 5.5.1.A.2-1/4-1 C fem RY:  ? T,EVEL: C

[

FINDING:

Dicerepencies have been identified with drum counter displays. (1) The

cp;cified width-to-height ratio of numerals, approximately 1

1, has not

~baen met. (2) The numerals are white against a black back- ground, which does not provide good contrast. Photo Log (B-ll)

RE9POtiSE:

Drun counters are not frequently used. There are only three drum counters for each unit, all of the same type._The present drum counters o are adequate for the~ purpose for which they are used. They are not

-: . difficult to read.~

j L

. l IMDLE* TENT ATIOti:

k -' Accent ~as'is.

~

-4407/c/9

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.:- 0141, 0157 04 HED NO.: 5.5.1.A.3-1, 5.5.1.C.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

The numerals on drum counters are in groups larger than four, without a k comma or decimal point separating the groups, and numerals change by a continuous motion instead of by the recommended snap action. Photo Log (B-11) ri p.s n o n s e : l These da#iciencies cause no imnairment to plant ooeratinn. The numerals on drum counters are easily read, the operators have no difficulty obtaining the required information without commas separating groups of

[

digits. The movement of the drum counters is slow enough that it does I not interfere with the reading of the digits.

o__

f

. Accept as is, 4407/c/6 N - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.:. 278

-04'HED.No.:- 5.5.2.A.5-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

The riuideline states that spacing between numerals for electronic

{- counters should be between one-quarter and one-half the numeral width.

Listed are examples of electronic counters that are not in accordance with the guideline criteria. This guideline is stated to ensure that electronic counter numerals are easily read.

EID. Sub 4' Label Comment 01050420? 000 Reactor Pressure Char Width .34 Space Between Char .250 010518402 000 Rod Worth Minimizer Char Width .28 Space Between Char .23 l RE9PONSE:

In the de#iciencies cited, the numerals are farther apart than speci-ficd. Despite this discrepancy, the numerals are easily read and there 10-no doubt that-the string of numerals are easily read.

{

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)

I l

l I*1PLEMENTATION :

Accept'as.is.

4dO7/c/10

(

(

l l

Section 6

[

Labels and Location Aids I

I

{

(

l i

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS j INDEX NO.: 0159 04 HED NO.:' 6.1.1-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL:- C

, FINDING:

l Equipment is not properly labeled.

i 4

i f RESPONSE: .,

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package. The new package will insure ~that controls, displays and other equipment items are appropriately and clearly labeled.

i i

i l

l r . .

IMPLEMENTATION:

~

' .Bv the'comn1'etion o# the secondt refueling outage.

4404/c/22

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0159/0187 04 HED NO.: -6.1.1-2/6.1.1-3 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C l

FINDING:

Controls and displays do not have corresponding labels. Controls have improperly labeled switch positions, related displays and controls do not have corresponding labels. Photo Log (B-15)

RESPONSE

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent. labeling package. The new labeling package will insure that controls and dispisys are appropriately and clearly labeled.

1 IMPLEMENTATION:

Bv'the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/18

[

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ,

INDEX No.: 0087 04 HED NO.: 6.1.1-4

. CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

i

'Ralcy fuses located on the control room panels are not clearly labeled, making thsir identification for replacement a time-consuming and confusing process.

RE9PO*T9E :

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package.

l IMPLE*1ENT ATION :

[Bv the comoletion of. the : second refueling outaae.

4416/c/47 L

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i3NDEX NO.:. 0403 34 HED NO : 6.1.1-7 sATEGORY: _

-3 LEVEL: C JINDING:

%n the 902 Panel annunciator tile G5 reads

"'T' URB BLDG EQUIP DRN TANK", it 2hould read'."TURB BLDG EQUIP DRN SUMP".

[SEAPO'4SE

-l l

1 Characteristics of labels will be addressed in'the implementation of a l

Sonsistent labeling package.

i l

~

t.

IMPLE'1ENTATION:

By tho' completion of the~second refueling outage.

4416/c/48:

I

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX.NO.: 0288 04 9ED No.: 6.1.1.H-5 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

i-On the A recirculation controller, the Manual / Auto Deviation Meter is not labeled,-the Speed Demand Meter has labels "open and closed," which are maaningless for a pump,~and both have values-but no parameters. These factors lead the operator to use the wrong meter.

RESPON9E:

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package. This new package will insure that controls, displays and other equipment items are appropriately and clearly labeled.

f IMPLEMENTATION:

By-the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/19

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0336 04 HED NO.: 6.1.2.A.2-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C r

FINDING:

l The guideline states that subordinate labels of a hierarchical labeling scheme.are to be used to identify subsystems or functional groups.

Subsystem labels are used on some parts of panel 3 and 4, but most of the control room has no hierarchical labels. Hierarchical labels should be u;sa throughout the control room to inform the operators of groupings of controls and displays.

RE9PO'19E :

A labeling program will be developed and implemented control room wide.

Summary lead label will be considered and applied where feasible during this procram.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/37 i

f.

~

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO. - 0337 04 HED'NO'.: 6.1.2.A.'3-1 CATEGORY: ~3 LEVEL: C

. FINDING

-

l

! Some panel elements do not have labels, or have Dynotape or handwritten

temporary labels.

i l.

4

'RESPON9E:

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a conoistent labeling ~ package.

i 1

.i

-o,

, IMPLEMENTATION: H 4

c- Bv.~the comnletion of'the'second refueling outage.

)

i 4404/c/31 .

l i

~

l

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I

,, .v6 ,- . .. --

'l

r f

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0338 04 HED NO.': 6.1.2.8.3-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL : -C FINDING:

Lettering-on component L labels is often not 25% larger than the lettering that designates switch positions.

r RE9Po*19E :

Characteristics of. labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package.

~ IMPLE' TENT ATIO'T :

-By the completion'of the second refueling. outage.

4404/c/32

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0339

-04 HED NO.: 6.2.1.A-1

' CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C E_4 DING:

Hany labels are placed below the panel elements throughout the control room.

i 4

RE9PONSE:

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package. This package will insure labels are placed

-above the panel elements they describe whenever possible.

'IP1PLEMENT ATION :

^

By ' the completion ' of the second ' ref ueling' ~ outage.

.4404/c/25

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0336/0340/0351 04 HED MO.1:6.2.1.B-1/6.1.2.A-1/6.3.7.A-1

- CATEGORY : 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

LLbsis do not= follow a hierarchical scheme throughout the control room.

Component labels are not always located above the components to which they'nertain.

RESPONSE

Hierarchical labeling will be considered during the development of a labaling package.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion'of the second refueling outage.

L4404/c/26

)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0402/0380 04 HED-NO.: 6.2.2.A-1/6.6.1.B-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Temporary labels and lines of demarcation are used and can be removed

-ocoily.

RE9POKI9E:

' Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent labeling package. An enhancement package.will insure that labels and lines of demarcation are mounted in such a way as to preclude accidental or easy removal.

IMPLWiENTATION:

'IBy ' the completion of.the second refueling outage.

4404/c/24

CORRECTIVE. ACTIONS L- INDEX NO.: 0341 04 4RO No.: 6.2.4.0-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Labels were dirty when the control room was reviewed.

1 1

t 1

i

RESPONSE

Administrative proceduresLwill be put in place to insure periodic cleaning of labels.

N 4

IMPLE*1ENTATION :-

By-the completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/23 c ~ ~e

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX:NO.: 0342, 0345, 0346, 0347, 0348 04 fen PTO.: 6.3.1.A-1, 6.3.2.R-1 6.3.1.c-1, 6.3.2.D-1 6.3.2.E-1 CAPEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Labals are not clear, direct,'and'are~ ambiguous.

7 1

RESPONSE

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a concistent labeling package.-

4 1

1' s

IMPLE'1E'IT ATIOti :

.Rv1the completian' cf the second refuel ngi outage. -

4407/c/50

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX.,NO.: 0349, 0365 04'HED NO.': 6.3.3.A-1, 6.3.3.A-2/OS CATEGORY: 3- LEVEL: C FINDING:

Thsre is no list of standard names, acronyms, and_ abbreviations to reduce cmbiguity regarding the meaning of labels, controls and displays, and <

annunciator tiles. Use of names is not consistent across-labels, controls and displays, and annunciators.

RE9PON9E:

~

, A list of standard acronyns and-abbreviations will be developed and implemented as part of the implementation of a consistent labeling package.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the conpintion of the second refueling outage.

4407/c/49

/

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0040, 0385-04 HED NO.: 6.3.3.C-1, 6.3.3.C-2 CATEGORY:- 3 LEVEL: C-FINDING:

Nomanclature on labels and annunciators is not consistent with that in procedures. This may result in confusion as to which instrument is being cddressed when working from the procedures.

RE9PONSE:

Tha procedure used to provide guidance during the periodic procedure' review process will include a requirement to verify that the_ nomenclature used-in the onerating procedures agrees with the control board and annunciator tile labels.

IMPLEMEN'ATIOM:

By the completion-o* the second refueling outage.

4407/c/63

1

! CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

'INDEX MO.: 0350 04 HED No.: 6.3.4.E-1 i CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C l

FINDING:

Roman numerals'are used on several labels. Roman numerals should be cvoided because of the possible confusion with certain characters. For example, "I" can be interpreted as the number 1 or the letter I; "II" can be interpreted as the number two or eleven.

RE9PONSE:

The Roman numerals identify narrow plant systems and are used as codes to cupport system identification.

i 4

IMDLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4403/c/22

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0352 04 HED NO.: 6.3.8.A-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

%11 diccrete functional control positions are not identified.

RESPONSE

The positions of all discrete functional controls will be clearly marked. All temporary labels will be replaced with permanent ones.

IMPLP>1r.NMT IO'I :

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4416/c/04

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0353 04 HED NO.: 6.3.8.9-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B l

i FINDING:

Direction of motion of some continuous motion rotary controls is not marked.

RESPONSE

While direction of motion is not marked, the directions and corresponding control functions conform to plant and general population expectations (i.e.,

slockwise for increase, counterclockwise for decrease).

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accspt as is.

4416/c/05

p E

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

-iNDEX NO.: -0354 04 HED.MO.: 6.3.9.A-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:.

Labels _are not used to identify components within closed cabinets. For example, Panel 901-37 has a series of thumbwheels within a closed cabinet that-is not labeled, and Panel 901-21 has leak detectors in a cabinet

, that'must be opened for_ access, but which is not labeled.

RE9PONSE:

The characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consistent. labeling package.

IMPLEMENT ATIOfi:

By_the-completion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/27-

/.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0383/0382/0381 04 HED NO.: 6.5.1.F-1/G-1/H-1 3 LEVEL: C CATEGORY:

FINDING:-

label. They also obscure Tag-outs obscure the out-of-service equipmentFinally, inactua-tag-outs do not prevent Itbals of adjacent components.

-tion of a contrnl.

RESPON9E:

They do not obscure The new taq-outs have been reduced in size.

significant amounts lof information.

I I MPLP.*1P.'7* A"ITI : .

Accent as is.

4404/c/16

~ CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0041 04 HED NO.: 6.5.2 1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING: --

Thore are no-administrative or review procedures in effect to control and regulate the use of temporary labels.

'1,

~ '

j .

e. - .,

L

< ,s RP9PON9E:

A nrocedure will be established for the handling.of temporar9. labels.' .

I 5

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5

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s

.s s

A %

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Rv . the completion'o# the second refueling outage.

4418/c/25

s' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS NDEX NO.: 376, 377 -

1 4 HED NO.: 6.6.3.A.3-1/A.2-1 .

ATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C INDING:

here is inadequate contrast between the different color mimic lines and etween mimic lines and the beige panel. Sufficient contrast can improve flow ath identification.

KE9PONSE:

l

$vstem mimics will be reviewed for the appropriate use of color. A standard, for use of color, will be established, and mimics will be made to conform to the color standard for consistency of meaning. Visibility of nimic lines will be ensured.

s I MPLE'1E*1T AT ION :

My the connletion of the second refueling outage.

J 4416/c/41

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

[NDEX NO.: 375,~378 34 HED NO.: 6.6.3.A.4-1, 6.6.3.A.1-1 2ATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C PINDING :

41mic flow paths are not color coded and mimic lines depicting the flow of the sema' contents are not the same color. Proper color coding of mimic lines h21p3 to reflect functional relationships and decrease operator decision time.

RESPONSE

The une of color on mimics to identify flow will be reviewed with the development of a color standard. The mimics will be examined to ensure that the use of color is consistent and conveys the proper information to the onarators.

l

}IMPLE'9EN* ATION :

y the , completion' of the second refueling. outage.

4416/c/45.

f CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0392 0

'4 H9D No.: 6.6.3.B.3-1

-CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

l Arrows are not used to indicate flow direction on mimics.

RESPONSE

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a concistent labeling package. The'new package will insure-that flow dire'ctions are clearly indicated by arrows.

I i

1 IMPLEMENTATION: .

l

. By the~comoletion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c'/21 l

• y &

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY OUAD CITIES STATION DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FINAL

SUMMARY

REPORT REVIEW FINDINGS VOLUME 2 SECTIONS 7-13 MAY 1985

l Section 7 Process Computers

p l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0001 04 HED NO.: 7.1.2.C.3-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Abbreviations are used for output text in the operator / computer dialoque. *his may lead to ambiguity or lack of clarity in the messages beino disniayed.'

RESPONSE

Abbreviations are used in those situations where the width of the field precludes display of the full text. In these situations, abbreviations are consistent with those used throughout the control room, thus reducing potential operator error.

l l

I I'4PTAMPTTATIO'T :

Accent as is.

'4407/c/29 le

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i INDEX NO.: 0002 041 hen No.:-7.1.3.A-1 CA*EGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

.Tha comouter system does not contain prompting and structuring features which allow the operator to request additional information. -The only information available is what is displayed on the menu. This may result i in thel operators inability to continue using the system as required.

Operator frustration with the system and. subsequent lack of use of the system may also occur.

RE990N9E:

Because the system is a menu-driven one, all prompting is-implicit in the ontions available to the operator at any point in the menu structure.

Additional. information.is also available to the operator fron the procedures.

i IMPLEMENTATION:

Accent as is.-

T4407/c/30 r

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0003 04'HED NO.: 7.1.3.E-1 CAPEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

. FINDING:

Tha computer system does not contain a-file of available operator 3 rsqueats. Such a file provides an easy reference _of requests and is particular1vfimportant i# the request options are numerous or infraquently used.

i R E 9 P otI 9 E :

- Virtually all of the operators interaction with the system takes place through menus. Thus, the need for a' file of operator entries is obviated. At all points in the menu hierarchy, all operator options are displayed.

i

'f 1.-

,.TMPLEP1EFITATION:'

Accept as is.

, -4407/c/31

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0004 04 HED NO.: 7.1.4.E.1.A-1

'CATEGOR : __

2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

. Total displacement of-numeric keys on the Ampex keyboard is 0.25 inches which exceeds-the maximum limit of 0.18 inches. Proper displacement can snoure rapid actuation;of numeric keys.

I

RESPONSE

Key contact closure occurs at a disolacement of 0.125 inches which is within the recommended displacement limit. Since possible inadvertent actuation is the prime consideration here, the deviation from recommendei dicplacement is not considered serious.

IMPLEMENTAPIO'T :

Accent as is.

4407/c/20

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

INDEX NO.

-0005

)

v- MO.: 7.1.4.M.2.A-1

.CATEG^'~ 2 LEVEL: C FINDINr Registance of Amoex keyboard numeric keys are 3.0 oz which is below the 3.5'oz guideline. Having suf fir tent key resistance reduces the 1

raa.9thility of inadvartant actuation.

I

RESPONSE

The resistance of the Ampex keyboards is 0.5 oz below the recommended i guidaline. This minimal difference is expected to have a negligible impact on plant safety. l I

l

)

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acespt as is.

4407/c/21

._ _______.m__m_ _ . _

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

~INDEX NO.: 0006 04 HED NO.: 7.1.4.G-1 CATEGORY: 3- LEVEL: C

' FINDING:

Tha Ampex keyboard has a slope'of 6* which is below the minimum guideline

-eritoria of 10*. Keyboard angle should be between 10* and 25* to provide comfortable and efficient use of the keyboard and a better viewing angle of tha key labeling.

RE9POM9E:

Keyboard slona is a Mesiqn feature which reduces user fatique and hence user errors, when the keyboard is used for an extended period of time.

9ince tha Amnex koyhoards are not used frequently by the operators or for en extended period of time, the impact of'the deviation of the keyboard s1.one fron reconmended.quidelines is considered to have a' negligible effect on plant safety.

'- ' IM PLEME't'" AP I ON :

1 ,

Accent as is.

'i 4407/c/22 Sy.- g- -

9

-l o

I i' l I

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1BEX NO.: 0008 L

)HEDNo.: 7.1.5.C-1 LTEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C lNDING:

ta Ampex Terminals at the unit desk and pointer table can both call up

,Cplays on either of the Compac' color CRT's. These have equal procedures id , tharefore, may result in the display of screens which the operator did it rcquest. It can-also result in the clearing of a screen the operator did equDst.

lSPONSE:

Loco terminals are only about 10 feet apart and the unit operator can see lyonn working at the terminal or printer table. He/she can thus determine to proper selection of display screens. Therefore, no corrective action will t nesdad.

IPLEMENTATION:

iccpt aa is. <

ll6/c/40

4 i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0009 04 hen No.: 7.1.5.n.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Several'o* the keys on the Amnex keyboards are used as function keys.

.Thogo are standard alphanumeric keys that have been assi gned functi ons as

onnosed to true function keys. These keys are F, 9, N, C, and O which cro acattered across the control board. These keys should be grouped 2 toqethar.-for ease of use and easy identification.

l

RESPONSE

The.-F, s, N, C, and O keys are used as mnemonics for several menu-related commands. 'That is, the first letter of~the menu option corresponds to the letter on the appropriate key. By taking advantage of the' traditional full QWERTY keyboard arrangement, operator location of the desired key is not comoromised. Moreover, since these keys deal only with menu selection, and no values in the data base are changed, the innact of any notential error, on plant safety, is negligible.

l IMPLEMENTATION:

LAccspt as is.

, 4407/c/23

. j

~

I w

e kt CORRECTIVE-ACTIONS .

EX NO.: 0046 HED NO.: 7.1.5.D.5-l' PEGORY: 2 LEVE':

L C RDING:

affunction keys on the. alphanumeric,keyb'oards are not physically separated.

Ving them physically separated allows for easy recognition.

i 9pON9Et 0 function keys and number keys on_the keypad are-the only functional keys tha keyboard and, therefore, already physically segregated from the chanumerics.

PLEMENTATION:

c3pt ao is.

16/c/25

- + , - p ~ -me r +

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0047

'04 HED Mq.:-7.1.7.A-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Racponse time for the parameters listed below exceed the listed critoria. This may cause a delay in the retrieval of information from the computer.

. Query Type Required Actual Complex Request 5 sec. 2-3 min.

Loading a Restart 15-60 sec. At least 2 min.

Next Page .5-1 sec. 1-3 sec..

RESPONSE

The delavs described occur infrequently, when the computer system is

~ heavily loaded.. The information provided by the computer system ir redundant with that disnlaved on the control boards. Thus, under tihose rare circumstances where response time is excessive, operator access to reqttired information is not comoromisad.

IMPLEMENTATIO'i:

AccOpt as is.

.4407/c/32

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0080 104 HED No.: 7.1.7.A-2 CAPEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

.The computer noint for a condensate pump trip does not indicate the-trip

- until the. thermal couple to which it is wired cools down. Timely indication of system status provides for timely response to changes-in the Gtatus.

I RESPOt19E:

Immediate indication of a condensate pump trips are given by the con-trols, displays and annunicators associated with the breakers for that pump. Thus, the computer' system is not.the primary indication for a condsnsate pump trip. In this situation,'the operators use the annunciator as their primary indication of a-condensate pump trip.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accapt as is.

4407/c/33

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS J

INDEX NO.: 0048 O A HED NO. : 7.1.7.8-1

, CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C l FINDING:

Tharo is no response delay message for any query when response time

- Gxcssds three seconds. This may result in confusion as to the status of the computer system.'

4

RESPONSE

The lack of a del.av message only becomes noticeable during those infrequent periods when computer system useage is heavy. During those neriods, operators use the computer systen as a redundant, backup source of information and the control boards as their primary source of information.

k IMPLEMENTATION .

Acctpt as is.

4an7/c/34"

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO.: 0049 HED NO.: 7.1.8.A.2-1 TEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FIDING :

occduras for the computer system are not prepared from the point of view of e operators. They contain much more information than required by the erators. This nakes them sonewhat cumbersome and complex for use by the erator and as a result they are rarely used.

I 1

S PO'49E t l e procedures completely cover the usage of the system. The operators use ly a very few of the programs in the procedure. These are:

00-3 & 00-5 CORE THERMAL POWER CALCULATION 00-7 CONTROL ROD POSITION PATTERN 00-26 CORE THERMAL LIMITS CALCULATIONS 00-30 & 00-51 INFORMATION ON SELECTED COMPUTER PRINTS 00-56 & CO-57 ALARM AND BAD INPUT SUMMARIES e onsrators are trained on the use of the system and these programs only.

e simolicity of their use requires limited use of the procedures.

natheless, the operations department will review the procedures to determine e level of information necessary for successful operation and where coccary, will modify these procedures.

PLEMENTATION:

the completion of the second refueling outage.

16/c/26

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS rDEX NO.: 0050 l HED NO.: 7.1.R.B.l.C-1

,TEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C NDING:

ccific codes or addresses by which data may be called up on the computer atem are not cross-indexed by system / subsystem identification. This type of one-indexing helps in readily identifying needed information.

i l

SPONSE :

311owing the installation of the new process comouter, a letter was written i Computer Services addressing problems with various program options. The idex will be provided as hard copy.

!PLEMENTATION:

the comnletion of the second refuelinq outage.

16/c/27 mmi iinmii iii

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

-INDEX NO.: 0366, 0367, 0368 04 HED No.: 7.2.1.C.1-1, 7.2.1.C.4-1 7.2.1.D.1-1

"~ CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Ambicnt illumination contributes more.than 25% to screen illumination for tha following colors on the color CRT's:

Uni t 1-CRT 1 - Blue 33%

Unit 1 CRT 2 - All Colors 25-67%

Unit 2 CRP 1 - Purple 50% Viol.et 33%

Unit 2 CRT 2 - Purple 57% Violet 29%

RE9PONSE:

The CRTs on Unit 1 have deteriorated and will be. replaced with new CRTs

~during an outage when they can be safely moved over the control panel.

The new SPDS CRTs have not been installed yet.

d f

i L. '

E IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the1second refueling outage.

'4407/c/15 i t H

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.:-- 0241 04.HED NO.: 7.2.1.F.2-1 l CATEGORY:- 2 LEVEL:: C

-FINDING:

The color CRT's have 20 resolution elements per' inch which-is less than thaJ100 identified in the guideline.

'RE90mT9E: ,

The granhics r11gplayed on these monitors are not considered to be complex cnough to. require 100 resolution elements per inch. The. current value of.

20 r esolution elemants'ner inch was judqed to be satisfactory'given the relatively simple graphics which-are displayed on these monitors.

. I'9DT,E*1Et!"' A"'IO*T -

Acennt as is. ,

4407/c/16 1

a.;..

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0242 04 hen No.: 7.2.1.H.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

t.

Control room operators are not allowed to adjust brightness and contrast controls even though these controls are active. Operators should have tha capability to adjust contrast and brightness to their individual profsrence.

R E 9 D O 579 E :

The nresent orocedure is that OAD.makes all brightness and contrast adjuatments. This is preferrable, in particular to maintain sufficiently h i.qh luminance levels and contrast ratios consistently on all CRTs.

'IMPLEMEN?ATION:

Acceot as is.

' 4407/c/18

M

• lr 1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IBEXNO.: .0246-b.

I MED NO.: 7.2.2.B.1-1.

LTEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C NDING - l fcharacter' heights for the large and small characters on the color CRTs_

ibtend a visual angle of 1.3 minutes of arc.and 2.6 minutes of arc, '

cpactively,-*or a viewing distance of:22.5 feet. This is less than the-tquired minimum of 12 minutes of arc.

l9PONSE:

1 li viewing distance was determined for operators at the computer console for la unit. At Dresden, it was determined from in front'of the 7 Panel above lich the monitors are placed. Since the monitors are in the same relative ications at both stations'the-problems will be comparable. This seems to be

. function of the location of the CRTs more than the characters being

cplayed.. The visual angles when standing directlylin front of the displays

'st the guideline.

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i' '

i T

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l NLEMENTATION:

1 Scpt an'is, l

16/c/28 '

i.. _ . ~ . . _ . . _ - . - ._.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: '0243 04 HED NO.: 7.2.2.C-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL:- C FINDING:

Tha large characters on the conrac color monitors are tall and narrow and do'not meet the character width to height ratio criteria of being bc; tween 3:5 and 1.rl. Proner width to height ratio helps to improve readabi'tity.

RESPONSE

I This is not considered a serious problem provided that the monitors are 1 cot up and adjusted properly and these are checked periodically.

)

)

)

l l

l l

IMPIM4ENTATIOti:

Acc;pt as is.

-4405/c/27 l t b l -

I ,,, ._____-_m_.-__.__..2__m__._a _ _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDFJ NO.: 0244 04 MED NO.: 7.2.2.D-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tho large characters on the conrac monitors do not meet the stroke width to chcracter height ratio guidelines of being-between 1:5 and 1:10.

Propar stroke-width to character height ratios help to improve read-obility.

RE9PO779E:

'Ph i s is not considered a serious problem provided that the monitors are cet up and adjusted properly and these are checked periodically.

)

l IMPLEMENT AT1051:

Accant as is.

4405/c/28

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0248 04 HED *TO.: 7.2.2.E-1

.CA*EGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha Conrac color CRT's have 20 resolution elements per inch for graphic lina presentation'which is less than the recommended 50.

RE9PON9E:

The indicated CRT's are not used to present displays comprised of fine graphic detail. The 20 elements / inch resolution for these monitors is judged to be sufficient and to have a negligible impact on plant safety.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acc;pt as is.

4407/c/19

< 1 l

l 1

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS lINDEX NO : 0249

04 HED NO.

7.2.2.G.2-1

' CATEGORY: ' 2 LEVEL: C

! FINDING:

Tho AMPEX monitors use a 5 x 7 dot matrix as opposed to the preferred 7 x -

l5.

9E9pON9E

,The indicated CR' is not used to present aisniays comprised of fine graphic detail. The 5 x 7 dot matrix is judged to be sufficient.

I I MPLEM E'4* APIO'T :

Acccpt as is.

4405/c/26 e

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0237 04 HED NO.: 7.2.3.9-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

The viewing angle between the operators line of sight when sitting at the computer console and the display face of the color CRT's is between 3 and 4 degrees which is less than the 45 degrees identified in the' guidelines.

RE9PON9E:

These CRT disolays are not viewed for extended periods of time. They are -

nonitored for short periods and then other control room instrumentation is attended to. The present layout is adequate for the purpose it is used for, it is not a terminal used for data entry that the operator constantly attends to.

/

4 IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

4407/c/57

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0238, 0239

04 HED NO.

7.2.3.C.2.A-1, 7.2.3.D.2.A-1

CATEGORY: 2 -LEVEL: C

! FINDING:

Tha color CRTs are located between 115 and 120 degrees to the side of the (csoted operators' line of sight. This exceeds the 95 degree guideline.

R E 9 P O'T S E :

The operator does not need to remain stationary, and the control roon is Wecigned for easy freedom of movement. There are no control room entrations that woul.i be compromised by the operator turning, and if eccessary, moving to a vantage point from which to view the CRTs. Moving ghe CRTs could also violate seismic qualifications. Therefore, there is Ro adequate justification for relocating the CRTs.

l i-I

[ *tPLEM ENT ATION :

hccentas is.

I f4/4405/c/2

(

I I

- - ~ .. _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l

DEX NO.: 0384 HED NO.: 7.2.5.H-3 TEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C 4 DING:

en data is contained on multiple pages or when there are multiple pages of splaya, each page has a display number, but the total number of pages or splays are not shown.. Photo Log (M-28)

SPONSE:

as in not a problem since the multiple pages of displays are interspaced by ny unused pages, so there is not one continuous. sequence. Also, the total mber of pages or displays would have no meaning to the operator.

PLEMENTATION: ,

I ccpt an is.

1 36/c/50 1

1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0079 04 M*.n NO.: 7.7.5.K.1-1 CA*EGORY: 0 LEVEL: C FINDING:

The alarm nessages on the alarm CRT are nnt highlighted to distinguish th m from other messages printed on'that CRT. Highlighting of alarm teccages allows for rapid distinguishability and location of the alarm j massages.

Y RE9pON9E:

- Alarm messages will be highl'ighted by use of' reverse video, color, or location to distinguish _them from other messages displayed on the CRTs.

)

4 IMPLEMENTATION:

By'the.connletion of the second refueling outage.-

4407/c/35

~ . _ . . . . . - .- . _ _ - ..

~

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0055' 04 HED NO.: 7.2.7.M-1 ~

i.

, CATEGODY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

, Colors and-types of lines used'for piping and electrical lines on the icolor CRTs are not used consistently. Consistent use of~ graphic coding allows-for easy recognition and interpretation of graphic displays.

i

• RESPONSE:

CRT disolay guidelines will be established which address, among other issues, the colors and types of' lines to be used for piping and i electrical lines. All computer mimics will conform to these guidelines.

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)

1 1

J IMPLEMENTATION: i 7

MV tha concletion of thefsecond refueling outage, j

! 4407/c/36 \

j i

1 I

< . . . . . __ -- ~ ~ _ . _-. . .. _ .

t r

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS *

~INDEX NO.: 0057 1

-. 04 ' HED ' NO . s ' 7. 2 . 7.' K .1- 1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C- ,

FINDING:

i ,

Cn1. ors used on CRTs are not consistent in meaning with colors in the rest "of-ths control room. Consistent meanings for colors allow for easy rOcoqnition and interpretation .

I i

i I RESPONSE:

I A color standard will be established for use throughout the control room, i including color CRT displays.

i

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1

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}

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i i

i 4

+

i l IMnLE*tE*1TATIO*i Byf:the completion of the ~second refueling outage. .

'4407/c/37 t

. - - , - - ~ < ,

7 9 ,. -

,,33. my w ,c~+, wsee--,-.e----x -c- - y--tt%=,- e.**--v -*W-t-e-- - - - - - - -t w'We' -'wr---

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1 CORRECTIVE. ACTION 9 INDEX NO.: 0057 04 ilED STO.: 7.2.7.L.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha color red has meanings of "ON" and "IN USE" as well as an indicator of alcrm on color CRTs. The color red as defined by the checklist should

~Ccans unsafe condition immediate operator action required or parameter is out of' tolerance.

RE9PON9Er C9m disniay quidelines will be established which address, among other iscuss, the colors and types of lines to be used for piping and electrical linen. A1.1 computer mimics will conform to these guidelines.

IMPLEMENTATION:

9y the connletinq o# the saconi. refueling outage.

I 4407/c/3A

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0058 04 HRn No.: 7. 2. 7. L. 2.-1

CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

-FINDING:

'ThD color crean is used to mean "OFF" as well as " NORMAL" on the color

CRTc. The color green as defined by the checklist should meant safe l condition no operators action required or parameter value is within

!tolcronce.

' RE9PO'ME :

ICRT display guidelines will be established which address, among other

.iscuos, the colors and types of lines to be used for piping and Iolectrical linen. All. computer mimics will conform to these guidelines.

! IMPLEMENTATION:

l

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

'4407/c/39

i l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0059 04 HED No.: 7.7.7.L.3-1 iCATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

FINDING:

Th2 color yellow is used on the color LRTs *or requiar lettering as well

~co to indicate caution or warning. Tha color yeltow as defined by the

ch:cklist' should mean t hazard potentially unsaft caution attention

rcquired marginal parameter value exists. The use of yellos for the

rcgular lettering may imply unintended sig-ificance to the letters.

i

RESPONSE

' CET display quidelines will be established which address, among other icouac, the colors and types of lines to be used for piping and

!alectrical linen. All connuter mimics will conform to these guidelines.

a i

I i

IMPLE*iENTATION:

My tha completion of the second refueling outage..

4407/c/40

~ _ . .. . ..

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i INDEX NO.:' 0060

04 HED NO.

7.2.7.M.1-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Rad and green are used in combination in displays on color CRTs. This is not discriminable to people who are red-green color blind and they may nicun-lerstand or misinterpret displays with red-green combinations.

4

.i 1

f l RESPONSE:

The use of rr'd and green is intended as a supplemental attention-getting mcchanism. Other information is presented in displays which makes clear the safety status of the pisnt.

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4 4

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acc pt as is.

l 4407/c/41

I l

I

^

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

INDEX No.

0061 1.04 H'.D MO.: 7.2.R.A.2-1 l C ATP. GORY: 2 TE. VEL : C

FINDING

IA'll data relevant to a specific operator entry are not displayed on one

! pag 2. Having all relevant data on a single page assists in quick

!cccurote entry of requests.

4 I

I t

i l RESPONSE:

4

.lTho menus are p esented on several pages because of the number of ipomoible selections. These pages can be reviewed in a circular manner.

!The lavnut of indiviudal menu pages will be changed to increase the lnumbarofoptionsperpageandhence, the number of pages.

k i

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l -

IMPLEMENTA* ION:

lBv thn connletion of the second refueling outage. .

4407/c/42

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0062 04 HED NO.: 7.2.8.B-1 CATEGottY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

A vicual audit trail of operator requests through the menu structure is n:t provided. This audit trail allows the operator to be aware of his location in the menu system as well as how he got there and where else he Dight be able to go within the system.

RESPONSE

A dicplay of this information will be provided to the operator.

IMPLD1ENTATION:

By th3 comoletion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/32

h CORRECTIVE ACTIONS i

,'INDEX NO. 0063

' 04 HED NO.: 7.2.8.C.1-1 1

CATEGORY: 2 IMVEL: C FINDING:

' Location references are not provided when scrolling through the menus.

This cssists the operator in locating and referring data in the menu.

I i

)

i 1

QE9PO5f9E

C1. car references as to location within the dispisy menu hierarchy will he

impicmented on all menu pages.

1 i

i I

I

(

IMPf, W,9*ATf00t By the completion of the seennd refueling outage.

4407/c/43

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0064

!04 HED No.: 7.2.A.0-1 2 LEVEL: C

] CATEGottY:

FINDING:

,Tho operator does not have control over the amount, format or complexity of information displayed. This capability allows the operator to request cnly the required information to perform his duties.

RE9PONSE:

While the operator does not have interactive control over the format and

. complexity of the displays (i.e. he cannot design a display on-line), the cnarator can choose among various formats for display of data. Moreover, oparctors were intimately involved with the design of the displays and provided input tom rds how much, and in what format, the information

would be displayed. ,

j IMPLEMENTATION:

Acc

;nt as in.

4407/c/44

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1

DEX No. : 0243 l

L HED No.: 7.2.9.E.2.A-2

,7EGORY: 2 LEVEL: B NDING:

lcictance of Ampex keyboard numeric keys is 3.0 OZ which is below the 3.5 oz

.id: lina. Itaving suf ficient key resistance reduces the possibility of i dvartcnt actuation.

9PON9E a actual key activation resistance is only slightly holow the recommended lidating of 3.5 oz. Operators indicate that they have no difficulty in

>eratino the kovboard keys and there is no confusion as to when a key has

n cetuated.

9 Pir.*t E*!* AT ION :

'ennt ca in.

L16/c/51

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SEX NO.: 0296 HED NO.: 7.3.1.C-3 "FAORY : 2 LEVEL: C (DING:

intout resultina from selecting OD 76 provides a list of codes that nust be sked up in a book in order for the operator to obtain all the information he ado. All information 9hould be displayed on the' screen. Photo Log (N-32)

BPONSE:

quired information will be provided on the printout.

PLEMENTATION:

the completion of the second refueling outage.

l6/c/64

T CORRECTIVE ACTION 9 INDEX No.: 0065 04 HED No. '7.3.1.0-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

' FINDING:

Tho computer system printer only prints 90 lines / min which is below the 300 lines / min criteria. 300 lines / min permits the printer to keep up with computer output.

i I

a RE9PON9E The main coal. of the guideline cited is that information not be lost due to incompatibilities between computer output rate and printer rate. On the Honeywell connutar thin problem does not occur. All information to lha printed is storei in a print buffer.so that the computer is freed up

for other tasks. If the alternative anoroach were taken (i.e. the

computer waited for each character to be printed before sending the i next), the coerator would be #orced to wait before performing his next itack on the system since the difference in speeds between computer

' transmission and nrinter line rates is on the order of several magnitudes for oven the highest speed printers.

J

' T M"TMiE't"' AP ION :

'Accant am 19 ,

I 4407/c/24 l

)

l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: :0066 04 HED No.:.7.3.1.E.3-1 CATEGORY:- -2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Printer instructions are not provided on an instruction plate attached to tho printer.. This asists in the proper and timely loading of the printer.

3,.

4%>2 RE9POU9E - .. .

i Operators are not responsible for maintaining printer ribbons and the papar supply. These functions are performed by OAD, who have extensive training. *hus, the instruction plate is not needed.

I i

i l IMPLEMENTATION:

Acccpt as is.

4407/c/25

l l

CORRECTIVE-ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0077 04.HED MO.: 7.3.2.A.2-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL:' C F I tI D I N G :

All onnunciator alarms are not recorded on the alarm printer of the computer. Having.all alarms printed provides for a permanent readily retrievable record for the alarms that can be referred to as needed.

RESPOM9E:

As a function o' the control room annunciator review package, the diccrspant auditory signals will be reviewed.

I'9 Pip. pie *TPAPIO*T:

RV the conn 19 tion of the qecond refuelina outaqe.

4407/c/26 4

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

.EX D NO.: 0067 HED NO.: 7.3.2.F.1-1 TP. GORY: 2 LEVEL: C NDING -

l clarm messages do not clearly relate to the annunciator tile that is p

lusinated. This may result in confusion as to the annunciator being listed rticularly if there are several going off at once.

SPONSEt a alarn messages do have.the same wording as the tile but this requires that 2 oparntors know exactly where the tile is at. Printing of the panel and ordinates of the annunciator tile will b-4 implemented to support operators.

PLEMENTATION:

the cor.pletion of the second refueling outage.

16/c/24

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO.: 0300 HED NO.: 7.3.3.D.1-2 TEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C BIDING:

Rumn h;adinqs are not provided on alarm printouts. Columns should be balcd on all printouts. Photo Log (M-25) 9PONSE:

arma print out almost continuously. Programming to add column labels would Eb10 the output of the printer and slow the system response. For the most rt, alarm printouts are self evident. Column labels can be printed on qua;t.

PLE*1ENT AT ION :

c pt ao is.

16/c/62

a ._

a Section 8 Panel Layout 4

4 I

e I

l i

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0166 04 hen No.: 4.1.1.n-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

' The ACAn and CAM syntens located ~ on the 901-55 (902-55) and 901-56 .

-(902-56) panels are not grouped as separate systems on these panels.

Having controls and displays arouped by system helps to clarify this

'rolationship. Photo Log (A-32) .

(

i 4-

! I J

)RE9POMSE:

Background shading, mimics, and/or hierarchial labeling will be used on

.ltha 901-55 (902-55) and 901-56 (902-56) control panels to ensure that the

.ACAn and CAM systems are distinguishable and obvious to the operators.

e

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i

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IMPLEMENTATION:

9v the . connletion of - the second refueling outage.

'04/4405/c/17

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0166-1 04 HED MO.: 8.1.1.9-2

CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C ,

FINDING:

d

.Somo controls and displays are on the vertical portion of the benchboards and cre part'of the pressure suppression system. They are not located ovar, or clearly related to, the controls and displays associated with tha pressure suppression system on the horizontal portion of the

!banchboard which are grouped.

Gro2 ping by system helps to clearly show this relationship.

i I

i l

4

! RESPONSE:

IBackground shading, mimics, ind/or hierarchical labeling wil be used to

{oncuro that the pressure suppression system is clearly distinguishable

,and obvious to the operator.

1 i

i J

f 4

.i i

IMPLEMENTATION:  !

My tha completion of the'second refueling outage.

i 4404/c/50 I

li L1, i=

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0166 l04 p.n MO .' : 4.1.1.B-3

! CATEGORY 3 LEVEL: C i

l FINDING:

9avarol displays and controls are~not grouped with the systems to which-

thsy belong. Grouping by system helps to clearly show this relationship.

I i

1 i

4 4

l

]RE9PONSE:

{ Background shading, mimics, and hierarchical labeling will be used to-Idictinguish systems from one another. A package of control panel

!snhancements will be developed to provide clear demarcation of instru-Jmantation by systems.

i 2

e n

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i a

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> IMPLEt1ENTATION :

j By the comnletion of the second refueling' outage.

!O4/4405/c/19

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0166

' 04 HED NO.: 3.1.1.B-4 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

4 Tha instrumentation on the 901-2 (902-2) and the 901-10 (902-10) panels cro interrelated and not organized by system, both across and within the

_ panolo. . Proper organization by system helps to clearly show this relationship. Photo Log (A-33)

I i

, RE9PO999. : I

The 901-2 (902-2) and 901-10 (902-10) panels consist of recorders and

monitors. The arrangement of this instrumentation does.not interfere with system operation because there is no control actuation on these pansle. These are not time critical displays and can be located by the onorators with little difficulty, i

t 1

l 2

IMPLEMENTATION: i AccOpt as is.

04/4405/c/20 l

q

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS "INDEX NO.: -0208

04 HED NO.: 8.1.2.A-1

! CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

^ FINDING:

Functional groups of controls on the horizontal portion of panels 3 and 4 and the common panel 1 are separated by only 2 inches, as opposed to.the rcquired 2.5 inches. This detracts from clearly defining the functional groupings. Another method of functional grouping enhancement needs to be '

uccd. Photo Loq (C-15).

RESPON9E:

Panels 3 and 4 and 012-1 will have demarcation lines added to show

, functional groupings.

IFiPLE'iENT AT TO'T :

Hv the connletion of the second refueling outage.

4404/c/2

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0209 o04 hen NO.: R.1.2.A-2 iCATEGODY: 2- LEVEL: C FINDING:

Functional groups of displays are not separated by a minimum width of at

1coct'one display width.

!RESPON9E:

lD;marcation lines will be.used to enhance functional groupings.

A 4

IMPLEMENTATION: l

By tha completion of the second refueling outage.-

4404/c/5

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1

INDEX NO.: 0193 04 HED NO.: '8.2.1.C.1-1

- CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B FINDING:

It would be helpful to have reactor pressure indication over controls for ths. Auto Blowdown System. Having-functionally related displays and controls crouped together facilitates their usage.

1

RESPONSE

B2ckground shading of-the Auto Blowdown System will be used to show the functional relationships between controls and displays. The panel around the RCIC Turbine Inlet Pressure Indicator, the HPCI Turbine Inlet Prsaccure Indicator, and the 5 panel pressure indicators will be shaded the same color to indicate that they relate to the same system.

a IMPLEMENTATION:

By tha completion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/58

1.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0193 04 HED No.: A.2.1.C.1-2 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha valve control for the suppression chamber dump is functionally related to the suppression chamber test and spray valve control and may ba more appropriately. located next to it.

RESPONSE

The controls cited in the HED will be background shaded the same color to designate their functional relationship.

4 5

t

\

'4

1,

'I IMPLE'iENTATION

1- p,. 3

~

By the comoletion of the second refueling outage. 't'- Q;- '

% ' ~(

+

p ,

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.4403/c/59 , i

~

A e

. 1 s?

t,1 -

- . . .i , _

4 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

. INDEX NO.: 0197 04 HED NO.: A.2.1.C.2-1

'CAPEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C I FINDING:

Tha listed disniays and controls are not grouped with other displays and Econtrols to which they are functionally related:-

.RCIC Reset Pushbuttons RCIC Manual Initiation RCIC Steam Line Break Reset Initation Signal Seal-in.and Reset RCIC Pumn Suction and Discharge Turbine Inlet Turbine Exhaust

RESPONSE

Raarrange RCIC displays and turbine displays to reflect proper grouping.

f i IMPLEMENTATION:

! Bv ths completion of the second refueling outage. .

L-i 44Q7/c/66 t

Y A

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0191 04 HED MO.: >R.2.2.A-3 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tho controls and displays for the IB instrument air compressor on panel 912-1 is not arranged in a logical sequence, nor is it consistent with the other instrument air compressor instrumentation.

RESPONSE

~

The 1R' instrument air conpressor will be reviewed and background shaded ao necessary.

3 i

IMPLEMENTATION:

pBy'the comnletion of the second refueling outage.

I l 4404/c/3 c

k

1 l

l 1

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0191 04 HED MO.: 8.2.2.A-4

. CATEGORY: 1- LEVEL: B FINDING:

.Tha organization and layout of the 8 panel does not clearly show the hiorcrchy of_the system from power sources down through the various

bu2cca that are fed as well as the interrelationships among the bases and

.cources.

IRE 9PONSE:

,This nroblem seems to be a function of crossing mimic lines without clear directionality similar nomenclature in labeling and board space limitations. There is reasonable grouping of bus feed control and indication otherwise. Clearer mimic directionaltiy will be shown.

I MPLE*1EN'"APION :

By the completion of the first refueling outage.

4418/c/31

i: CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0211 04 HED NO.: A.2.4.B-1

, CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Comolete standardization between control room and simulator does not OXiGt.

RESPONSE

The current simulator contains the major systems incorporated into the control room and is adequate for current training. Although the RCIC cycten is not represented on the simulator present operator training is adequate for this system.

t IMPLEMENTATION:

Acespt-as is.

4404/c/7 2

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0212 04 HED NO.: 8.3.2.C.1 1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVP,L : C FINDING:

The displays are grouped in rows which have more than 5 similar components. Having too many similar components impacts search time, digeriminability of components and selection errors. Photo Log (C-ll6).

j

' RESPONSE:

'The systematic layout of displays has grouped displays that-must be observed in sequence or in conjunction with one another in rows on the

, control nanel. The displays cited are primary area radiation monitoring mators are vertical displays. The radiation monitoring meters are grouped to allow the operator to observe radiation conditions from one portion of the panel. The vertical meters provide data regarding system performance that is significant in relation to the other vertical meters in tho-row.

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IMPLEME'IT ATION :

I Accent as is. j 1

4407/c/55

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0214 04 HED NO.: 8.3.2.0.1-1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Tha axes of full core display matrix are labeled on the right and bottom na wall as the top and the left sides of the matrix (Unit 2 is not lahalcd across the top). The Control Rod 9 elect Matrix is also labeled acro;c the bottom instead of the top. Proper labeling of the matrix helns to assure label visibility and clarity of the matrix organization.

RE9POilSE :

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a consietent labeling package.

. 6 t

i e

9

)

I i

t IMPLEMENTATION:

Ry the completion of the second refueling outage.  ;

1 4404/c/30 .; .

• i 9

• e

, t F (

1 i

Section 9 Control Display Integration

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0167 04 HED NO.: 9.1.1.A-1 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Particular indicator lights on the 3 Panel should be moved closer to the indicated controls since they are functionally related. This

-ralationshin is not readily apparent by their current position on the board. Photo Log (A-31)

RE9"ON9E:

The control switches and indicator lights in question are only used for in-service testing of the testable check values during a refueling outage at zero reactor pressure.

i IMPLEMENTATION:

Acc;pt as is.

4403/c/63

' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO. : 0477 HED NO.: 9.1.1.E-2 SEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C.

NDING:

ich dicplay for- steam flow associated with .each steam isolation valve is not ccted close to the controls. The controls are located on the horizontal rction of.the 3. panel and displays are located on the vertical section of the penal. Photo Log (P-21, P-22)

9PON9Er

.can flow on 90X-5 is used in conjunction with the reactor feed water introla on that panel. MSIVs are not used to control or adjust steam flow, iDT E*1ENTATIOM Ocept as is.

416/c/61

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0201

04'HED NO.

9.1.2.A.1 (CATEGORY: LEVEL:

IFINDI*iG:

i Tha indicator -lights for the listed controls are located below the jcontrol. This may cause some confusion in relating the display to the control.and the displav may be lowered during operation at-the control.

j Photo Log (B-35) 4 i

RE9PONSE:

, Background shading will be used to distinctively show the control /

dispicy relationships.

1 4

IMPLEMENT ATIOti s By tho completion of the'second refueling outage.  !

s 4404/c/68 l

j

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0173 04 HED NO.: 9.2.2.D-1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C FINDING:

RM7 S3rvice Water Heat Exchange Valve position lights are not grouped in la fochion consistent with the rest of the control room. (Photo Log No.

B-18).

RESPONSE

Tho indicator lights will be rearranged so that they conform to the lighting convention employed throughout the control room.

IMPLE*tENTATION :

By the completion of the second ref ueling outage.

4403/c/66 4

SECTION 10 HISTORICAL REVIEW i

l 4

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS hEXNo.: 0308/0425 HED NO. 4.1.1.E.3 HR.1/1.1.1.A V, 19 PP.GO RY: 1 LEVEL: A I

3 DING:

Dt 1 cxperienced a scram while the operator was closing the MSIV's after h cing.the mode switch in hot standby. It was determined that all the tccto in the switch were not made for hot standby and that the unit was 11 in the run mode. The only feedback available to the operators on the ctor mode is the nointer on the switch. If all contacts are not made, that g db2ck is incorrect. Similar events have occurred at Drer. den, and there and

[Outd Cities Unit 1, the mode switch has been replaced. It has not been leccd on Unit 2 at Quad Cities.

l 2PONSE:

l

'bicmc with this switch are infrequent. The switch has been replaced and irsd.

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PLEf1ENTATION :

Scpt cs is.

86/c/54 3

2

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0280 04 HED NO.: 5.0 4R 1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

On numerous occasions, the suppression chamber level indications between tha control room and the local sight glass have not corresponded with loval being determined.to be outside of technical specification operating liaits. ' Instrumentation that is unreliable or inaccurate will not be rolicd upon, which could contribute to operational delays or problems ocpncially in a transient situation. An often cited reason for the unrollability of the control room suppression chamber level indicators is that censing lines in the chamber become clogged with crud due to the warm, moist, dark and stagnant environment typically present in the chambar.

RE9PONSE:

A cchadule of weekly surveillances and additional attention by the Instrument Department has improved the reliability of this equipment and the discrepancies between the control room indication and the local sight gicca are now minimal. When discrepancies do occur, they are small and corrected within one working day.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acespt as is.

4418/c/6

.J

. . . - . .- , _ _ - ~. - - . - - - . .- . - . . _ - -

I' CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

, 1 INDEX NO.: 0328  ;

l0'4HEDNO.: 5.0 HR2 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: A

FINDING -

f DVR . 4-2-R4-62 documents a reactor scram in which one rod did not move

- from position'48. This. misplaced rod went undetected for a half hour.

lThn full core rod position display has position indication lights that ora difficult to read and occasionally nonfunctioning. A secondary

! courco of rod position information is a computer printout called the 00-F l display, which mimics the full core display. It has two, printout

! options: one orints out the numbers for all rod positions; the'seconi

! prints out the numbers for all rod positions except the fullout position,

!which is represented by double plus signs (++). This option was in

effect during this event. However, in a scram situation when all rods

!are sunposed to be at the "00" position, the double plus sign can get lost in the matrix of "00"s, particularly when operators are scanning the j

display for non-zero numbers. For these displays that must be quickly

. monitored to detect instances of deviation from some norm, the deviation j should be highlighted to facilitate accurate and rapid detection. In iaddition, the RWM was problematic in this event. The system has one

)displaywindowforthepresentationofbotherrormessage~numbersandrod tposition, and it is not readily discernible, particulary at a glance,

! which data are being displayed. The_ alarm and acknowledge for the system iare on the vendor panel and are not part of the " annunciator" system.-

' Moreover, the al. arm only signifies hardware problems and not.. rod position orrors.- The indicator lights, which are' alarms, are not distinguished

{ f rom the control selector pushbuttons which they are in series with. If

]the' system loses track of a rod, there is no automatic reset'to allow it

• to locate the " lost" rod again. Finally, the system has.at most two

. windows to display errors. If more than that number are detected, it iwill attempt to store them for sequential display. In the past, if too

{many errors were stored, the system would lose the error and occasionally

the. rod would position itself. .The disclav and system' problems 1

idsntified above also contributed to the rod insertion vent, documented

,in nVR d-1-83-22. l

RESPONSE

iThe Rod Worth Minimizer (RWM) is being. upgraded. The new RWM will be.

i nors reliable and have a larger memory. Also,-the' process 1 computer will 4

ba changed to reprint the-full core display until all rod positions'are

"00" or the print is cancelled by-the operator. This will. effectively lolert the operator. to select the second print option. if - no non-zero i numbars are found while scanning the full core display. following a '

i SCRAM. This is a major-design ch'ange and will require additional time to implement. .

1 l IMPLEMENTATION:

l 4

j By tha comoletion of the.second-refueling outage.

l4403/c/2

i i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 274 04 hen $10.: - R . 2 .1. A . 2 .HR-l'

' CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

While' Unit 1 was at reduced load to take the 'C' reactor feedpump OOS, tha discharge valve of the 'B' feedpump, which was oper' . ting, was inadvertent 1v closed. On Unit 2 the respective feedpump discharge valves are located;directly above the feedpumps. On Unit 1 these valves are ~

' displaced to the right of their respective feedpump control switches by_

'ona control space. This does not conform to' accepted human factors principles concerning left to'right, top-to-bottom sequential control relationships; and can,-as in this instance (DVR 4-1-79-97), lead to inadvertent control actuation. Photo Log No 'C-12.

RESPONSE

4 Mimico and background shading will be installed in the Unit 1 control room for the.feedpump and feedpump discharge valve portions of the 90X-6 panel, i

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l IMPLEMENTATION:

LBy the _ completion of second refueling outage.

J4404/c/46 1

..a e

I SECTION 11 OPERATOR SURVEY s

h. m . _ ,_ _ . . - _ , _ _ -

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0361 04 HED NO.: 0.0 OS,3 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

Oparator survey results have indicated that shift foremen pass out

.cquipment attendant jobs without informing other centrol room personnel.

This causes confusion and is poor policy.

+

RESPONSE

The Conduct of 9hift Operations will be reviewed and the Shift Forenen will be instructed to assure that the Nuclear Station. Operators are kept in#ormed of work to he performed in.the plant by the operators but not

,dicpatched by the NSO.

IMPLEMENTATION:.

By the :comoletion of : the = first refueling outage.

4403/c/1

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l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

!INDEX NO.: 0176, 0406

04 HED NO.

-1.1.1 OS, 2, 1.1.1.A.V,3

CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B iFINDING:

Jonarator survey results. indicate the need for controls in the CR'to

control the CRD pump discharge valves. Such control is currently done

locally.

J fRESPONSE:

!The CRD discharge valves will be'made motor operated valves, and controls

'will be placed in the CR in proximity to the CRD pump controls.

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1 IMPT,5:M Ekf* ATION :

By the connletion of the second refueling outage, i

1 4403/c/11

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i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS lINDEX NO.: 0106 i

04 HED NO.: 1.1.1.8 OS, 1

. CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Oparator survey had indicated that there should be a bypass control twitch for the condensate system from the recirc to condenser (FCV-3401) in ' the control room. This is currently operated locally.

i

RESPONSE

The oneration of this valve will be reviewed by the station and corrcetive actions taken to either assure proper operation of the valve cutomatically or provide the operator with manual control.

. IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4418/c/27

I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

INDEX NO.: 0188

04 RED No.: 1.1.1. 9-3/09

'CAPEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B

- FINDING:

Rasponse to the operator survey revealed that the control roon has no amp motors _for any station battery. Moreover batteries are emergency cquinnent and the operators in the main control room need an indication

of the charge float and load (drain) on an emergency battery. If offsite

power is lost and each would.have to be sent to the auxiliary electrical room to observe information that the operators need.

RE9PON9E Thore is adequate information concerning station battery condition available to the operators in the control room. The battery voltages are i matered, undervoltaqe conditions alarmed and battery charger condition alarmed in the control room. If additional information is required, an oporator can be dispatched to the hattery charqer room.

4 1

, IP1PLEMENTATION:

Acccpt as is. .

4407/c/92

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0334

.04 HED NO.: 1.1.4.A.1 OS 1

{ CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C l FINDING:

! Racponse to the ooerator survey indicated that instrument mechanics doing work in the balance of plant (BOP) have asked to remove equipment from cm:vice that is on emergency systems. An emergency equipment catalog that describes ~which equipment affects what and whether it can be taken

'out of service without the RX being shut down would be helpful.

a

RESPONSE

For the short period of time these instruments are taken out of service for calibration or functional testing does not affect the safe operation

'of the plant. As a result this additional documentation is not necessary.

1 J

IMPLEMENTATION:

Acccpt as is.

4403/c/73

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX MO.': 0263 04 RED NO.: 1.1.7 09, 1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: B-FINDING:

Operator survey resoonses indicated that excess nersonnel in the MCR, particularly during major events, are a primary obstacle. This is the typ3 of situation that can contribute to control room noise levels and confusion.

RESPON9E:

Ocarators themselves have the authority through procedures to clear the control room of any unauthorized or unnecessary personnel.

IMPTE.ME'1TATIOPT :

'Acccpt as is.

4407/c/60

(

l  !

l l- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  ;

INDEX NO.: 0283, 0038

04 HED NO.

1.2.6-1 OS, 5.1.4.E-1

CATEGORY

3 LEVEL: B

' FINDING:

. Rasponse to the operator survey stated a need for a portable stand to i hold procedures and surveillance sheets. Currently extra procedures are

placed on adjacent controls. This is a very poor procedure which runs a irick of inadvertently moving a control and violates human engineeirng 4 cafety nriciples.- In addition it is possible that important valve

{ position and/or pump status indicator lights may be temporarily covered.

d RE9PONSE:

1 A portable stand has been obtained.

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1 IMPLEMENTATION:

Completed.

4403/c/56 m--

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.:- 0309 04 HED NO.: 1.5.1.D OS, 1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Operator survey results indicated that the main control room was unsatisfactory in terms of temperature (climate).

i RE9PON9E:

l

, Maasures will be taken to control MCR temperature within a recommended i comfort zone. This may be done by modifying the HVAC as necessary.

Refer to the Control Room Habitability Package.

4 L.

~%

W

+

At

. IMPLEMENTATION:

4 By the completion of the second refueling outage.

([l '

4403/c/13

~

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0310 L04'HED NO.: 1.5.2.B-1/09 x

CFEGORY: $ 2 t-LEVEL: 9 FINDING: j ,

2 -.,.

, Ragno'iIgg to the operator survev indicated that air flow in the MCR is I unsatistact(ry wherever one stando. Air velocities in primary operating areas shoulp not-exi:eed 45 -feet / minute measured at operator head levels, cnd-chould not produce a,' noticeable draft. Comfort of the operator enhances vigilance and r4 duces-distraction and supef*1uous activity. ~

~

Oparators nsy tend to'avQid uncomforYable but critical areas of the

, control room, s+ ,. -

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~

, r+ .:

RESPONSE: ~4 ',-

+-

cy 4 A complete " control room habitability , review will be conducted to datormine the*, appropriate design retrrsfits necessary to support -

~

(operations 7 *

,. ~ # ,

ye ,.

s

~~

-/ .,

-A.

, e +

\ -

l  %-

v .. .,

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.. s

,e w , q?q --

., y n g, . #-

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.:.- l . .1 ' ,

~  % , ,,, '

,y -

IMPLEMENTATION:

t s . .- ,, y -.

i ~ . .

By tha completion ofl tie second refueling _odtage. '

s s'

. -t * - 4 04/44057c/7

~

ah ' '~ - 5 l

l c

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0258, 0259, 0262 HED NO.: 1.5.3.F OS 2/OS 3/OS 4 EGORY: 2 LEVEL: B DING:

rotora indicated that all vertical panels and the 90X-5 Panel have glare bicma. Also, the CRTs mounted between the ceiling and control panels are i

ficult to see.

4

PONSE s lous design options which will sufficiently diffuse the direct source of tht which causes glare will be examined. The optimum design option will an be installed.

PLEMENTATION:

the completion of the seconel refueling outage.

16/c/36

>k-s.

r 4

t CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

- INDEX-NO.: 0254 04-hen NO.: 2.1.3 09, 1

-CATEGORY: 2- LEVEL: 9

. FINDING:

Racponse to operator surveys indicates poor quality of communications

-bEtwarn Balance'of Plant Operations personnel and the Main Control Room.

1

RESPONSE

i

Radio equipment has been repaired and modified to improve communications 2 capabilities.

i

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IMPLEMENTATION:

Completed.

4 4403/c/14

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0326 04 HED NO.: 2.1.4 OS, O-

' CATEGO RY : 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

Op3rator survey results indicate that radios used at the station are unrollable.. This-impairs communications capabilities.

4 1

-RE9PON9E

Portable radios and the radio system have been repaired.

f I

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IMPLEMENTATION:

h Completed.

4403/c/15

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0321 04 9ED NO.: 3.1.'.n.1 09,2 CAPEGonY: 2 LEVEL: 9 FINDING:

,Racponse to the coerator survey indicated that the turbine building and

, rsector building pump should alarm only when the level gets higher than the first pump can handle and when the second pump starts rather than wh2n the first pump starts. Currently, alarms sound so often that operators do not pay attention to it. The human engineering principle involved is that_ alarms should not occur so frequently as to be considered a nuisance by the operator. Photo Log (139).

i i

RESPONSE

Tha turbine building and reactor building pump alarm circuitry will be

, reviewed to determine if it can be redesigned to sound only when level gets hiqh onough that the second pump starts.

1 IMPLEMENTATION:

RV the comoletion of the second refueling outage.

4407/c/56

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0322 04 HED NO.: 3.3.4.A OS 2 CATEGORY _

2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

R2cponse to the operator survey indicated that some abbreviations are uccd on the annunciators that are not well explained; e.g., window-D-ll on 90X-8 panel reads " Relay STV Trip." The QOA, 900-8-D, says " generator trip from STV relay." Some operators were unclear as to what "STV" m0 ant. Further, tiles A-16 on 90X-3,.H-9 on 901-3, G-20 and H-20 on 901-4, and C-8 on the 90X-5 panels were identified as being ambigucus ond/or not containing enough information.

RE9PON.9E:

To eliminate operator confusion regarding the meaning of some visual tilsa, clear unambiguous legends will be provided for annunciator tile D-11 on panel 90X-8 and OOA 900-8-D, as well as tiles G-20, and H-20 on tha 90-4 panel and tile C-8 on the 90X-5 panel as a function of the annunciator package.

IMPLEMENTATION:

• ny the completion of the second refueling outage.

i 4403/c/21

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0265' iO4 HED NO.:' 4.1.1.B.1 OS, 2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: A

' FINDING:

Racconse to the operator survey indicated that a pull-to-stop type throttle switch would be an improvement on the feedwater isolation valves (totor operated). The current feedwater regulating isolation valves throttle ability operation unduly restricts operator movement and avialability to respond to other operationsi concerns. This restriction hoc the potential for contributing to operational problems.

RE9PO'T9 E Fcodwater Isolation valves will be changed so that the valves are seal in opOn and close. The ability to throttle the valve will be retained by installing valve controls which stop valve movement when the control handlo is pulled out.

IMPL91E'TTATTGM By the completion of second refueling outage.

4404/c/55 e - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ - - _ __ _ --- - - - - - - - - _ - - - - - - - . - - - -

c .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX No.: 0360 04 HED NO.: 5.1.2 OS, 1 l CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B l

FINDING:

Oparator survey results have indicated that the contaminated containment otortge tank-level should read in gallons.

f RE9PON9Er Tha indicator will be marked with the appropriate units.

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i IMPLEMENTATION:

l.

By the comnletion of the first refueling outage. (Completed) 4403/c/3 L_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

!INDEX NO.: 0364 IO4 HED No.: 'i.l.2 OS, 2

CATEGORY

3 LEVEL: C.

FINDING

Op".rator starvey results have indicated that units of measure are not iconoictent in the control room (CR) or between the CR and training.

I L

l RE9PO!!SE:

Unito of meastare used in training and in the control room will be made conciatent.

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IMPLEMENT ATIO!!:

By tho completion of the second refueling outage. ,

!4403/c/4 l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

' INDEX NO. : 0253

'04 HED Mo.: 5.1.?..n.2-1/OS

, CATEGORY: 3 T,F VEL : C

FINDING

'ROcponse to the onerator survey suggested that all RX water level indicotors should use the same increments from the reference. If side

, rang 2 and narrow range level meters do not use the same increments from

<tho roference, there is a danger of misreading the level'on some iindicator particularly when under the stress of emergency opera-jtions. Photo Log (D-3).

l RE9Poti9E To avoid the possibility of misreading the RX water level indicators, all

' indicators will be changed to reflect a consistent labeling of increments j fron the re*erance.

4 l

lIMPLEMENTATIO?1:

By the completion of the second refueling outage.

4 4407/c/54

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ,

L i INDEX.NO.: 0102 l 04 HMD MO. : 5.2.3 Os, 1 1 LEVEL: il ,

l CA"'EGORY:

FINDING: l lOparator survey results showed that MCR indicators that have alarm points s cr cetion levels displayed on the meter face should have the information dicplayed on the scale itself.

I RESPONSE: i Solseted control room indicators will be banded.

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l IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of the first refueling outage.

4403/c/6

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

,INDEX NO.: 0314 04 MED NO.: 5.2.4 OG, 1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C 7

. FINDING:

Op3rctor survey results indicated that the display for condenser vacuum s

10 in back pressure in the main control room, but during training it is

'roforred to as vacuum. This can be confusing, especially to new

,oparators.

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i t ME9PO'1SE:

i i Units for training will, be made consistent with those.in the main control 1 room. ,

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j I MPr.EMENT ATio't :

j 4.My__the completion.of the second refunling outage.

4403/c/5' i .

4

.__ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ __m._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - . _______.__._.__.____..__m___._______. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _

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i i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  !

INDEX NO.

0289

,04 HED_NO.: 6.1.1 09 6  ;

^ CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C I  ;

FINDING:  !

i

.Tharo is poor labeling on the 9JAE Suction Valve Isolation Bypass Switch. ,

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' RE9PON9Et  !

Characteristics of labels will be addressed in the implementation of a

, conciatent labeling package. The new package will insure that controls, l i displays and other equipment items are appropriately labeled. l 1

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IMPLDir.NTATION:

i

By the comnietion of the second refueling nutane.

4404/c/20 i

t

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS lINDEX NO.: 0107 l

l04HMn*TO.:6.6.3 Os, 1  ;

L l CATEGORY:- 3 LEVEL: B ,

FINDING: ,

0porator survey results indicated that mimic flow paths would be very  ;

lucoful on Panels 90X-3 and 90X-4. (Photo Log D-1)

L i

RE9PO?i9En A syctematic assessment of the effective use of mimics will be i

cddroceed. Appropriate flow path mimics will be installed on 90X-3 and 50X-4 panels where possible.

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IMPLE'tENTATION :

My thn completion of the second refueling outage.

I 4403/c/R t

l l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

>EX NO.: 379  !

HED NO.: 6.6.3 09, 1 '

PFAORY: 3 LEVEL: C ,

WDING: f het color is not dedicated to specific functions or conditions.throughout

• b centrol room. The use of color for grouping of related systems or ,

mettono enhances the operators ability to identify specific items. [

L i

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F RPONSEt attndard for the use of color in the control room will be established and plc20nted. This color standard will be applied to the labels where color is ed to cue the operator for component or system identification.

t i

l IPLEMENTATION: ,

P tha completion of the second refueling outage.

[16/c/46 ,

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0281 04 HED NO.: 6.6.3 OS, 2 CATEGO RY : 3 LEVEL: B PINDING:

Oporctor survey results indicated that particular switches should have a lmicic of the actual flow path, and there should be uniformity between icyctcm mimics.

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fRESPON9E:

l Current minien will be re-evaluated and re-designed as necessary as a I function of a systematic utilization of various enhancement techniques.

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! I MPtMt E't? A* t o*f :

I

' ny the conpletinn of the cocond refuelinq outnge.

l 4403/c/9

a i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDMX NO.: 0331 04 IIEn No.: 7.1.2.A.1/Oq, 1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: il PINDING:

R2cponse to the operator survey indicated that some of the nuclear calculation nomenclature on the computer is difficult to understand beccitae the operators have never been told what it is. Basically cperctors should understand the basis on nuclear calculation and should be trained on the computer calculations displayed and what they mean.

Thic is important for safe, reliable and efficient operation of the plant.

RF.9Po99E I Oparatorg will be trainarl en the nuclear calculation nomenclature dicplayed on computer Chrs.

1 L

r IM?tM9tM*APTON:

CV tha conpletinq of tha first refuelinq outaqe.

4407/c/28 4

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0333 04 ftEn No.: 7.2.2.B.1/09, 2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C

' FINDING:

RXponse to the operator survey indicated that on many of the Rx

'parcOcter displays on CRT's it is hard to read the numbers. More space

,chould be allotted for the values and less for the description. It is Iitportant that th'e operators be able to read the information on the CRTs Icccurately.

l

(

RE9PO-ISS:

This ntnblen will be evaluated and corrected in the course of the 9Pn9 review.

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I MDT."'iM*f* A* f o'f :

MV the connletinn o' the second refiteling outage.

4407/c/15 i

I 1

1 I

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0271 04 MED NO.: A.1.1.8 OS-5 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

A number of responses to the operator survey indicatei that half of the l twing diesel controls are on Unit 1, but that the diesel can be operated from Unit 2. This is a poor arrangement of controls and displays and may contribute to operator error / confusion / hesitation in an emergency cituation.

RESPONSE

A voltage regulator and governor for the diesel, presently included on Unit 1., will be added to Unit 2 on Panel 908-2. The controls for the otart/stop diesal will remain the same.

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I IMPLEMENTATION:

i ny the completion of the second refueling outago.

04/4405/c/21

L CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0276 104 HED NO.: 8.1.1.B 09-7 iCATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:-

ino:rstor survey responses indicated that Panel 90X-8, which is the

olectrical panel, is poorly laid out and should be redone. Currently the controls and displays on the electrical distribution panel are not

crrcnged according to function sequence, use frequency, or other obvious loqical expectation. A poorly arranged central panel can contribute to

oparator confusion / error in an emergency situation. Photo Log (D-4) 1 4

RE9PO'19E r

Background shading, ny9 ten mimics, and hierarchical labeling will be used on this panel as part of an enhancement package.

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T I MPLEM E'1T AS IO'i Ry tho completion of t'1e second refuelinq outage.

'04/4405/c/22

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

!INDEX NO.: 0277

[04 HED NO.: 8.1.1.R-OS-8 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: 9 FINDING:

iTho operator survey indicated that the following controls / displays should lbe grouped together: steam flow indicators currently on Panel 5, MSIV l(nain steam isolation valve) controls on Panel 3; and turbine throttle l proosure indicators on Panel 7. The operator needs to be able to use

! thoco controls while observing these indicators, and this control

function is difficult with the current configuration.

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l QF9PON9F:

' Tha enntrol and disniav relationships will be examined during the intcgration of the control room enhancement program. The system component functions will be effectively delineated.

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IMPt.EMENT AT ION :

IBy the completion of the first refueling outaqe.

04/4405/c/16

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS lINDEX NO.:- 0287

04 HED NO.

8.1.1.9-OS-9 i

CATEGORY

1 LEVEL: B t-l FINDING:

lR30 ponce . to the operator survey indicated that the turbine throttle lproccure indicator and the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) are used lin conjunction with each other. The MSIVs are currently on panel 3 and ltha turbine throttle pressure indicator is on panel 7.

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[

l T RE9PON9E This operation is not tino critical, and can he performed by a sinolo opsrator. When the MSIV's are re-opened, however, other personnel are '

cvailable to assist.

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InntEnESTATIO9 Acccpt as is.

l 4404/c/47 l

?

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0313

'04 HED NO.: 8.1.1.C 09-2 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: 9 FINDING:

Oparctor survey responses indicate that the 90X-54 panel (off-gas) ccntcins many switches that are not used, and those that are used are crowd:d into a corner. Efficient and safe operation is facilitated by i lcppropriate layout of switches which consider frequency and sequence of

.uso. Removing unnecessary switches from a panel makes room for others

'which may be needed by the operator.

L

]RE9 DON 9Et y l The extra controls on the off-gas panel, do not hinder plant operation.

Thio is not a time critical panel and is not frequently used. The 90X-54 ipanni does not contain emergency controls and does not warrant removing cparo switches.

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I MPLM'9ENTATION :

Ace':;nt an is.

4403/c/57

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

INDEX HO : 0307 l04 119D NO.: R.1.1.2.9-1 l CA?EG%Y: 3 _

L9 VEL: C l FINDINr;:

0norator nurvey results indicated that the HPCI and RCIC systems are l difficult to operate when being used to reduce reactor pressure. These l cyctcra are not laid out according to function, sequence of use, jfrequ ncy of use, or other operator expectations.

RE9PON9Et Ro-labeling, background shading and/or system mimics will be designed and itplemented to enhance the llPCI and RCIC system.

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l IMPLEMENTATION:

l My tha completion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/10

___.______.-_____._________.-m__

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ,

lINDEX-NO.: 0270 l 9.2.1.C.1 09-3 lO4HEnMO.:

l l CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B l FINDING:

Oporator survey responses pointed out that acoustic monitors for relief lond cofety valves are located on back panels. Photo Log (D-6) b

,RE9POM9E Actuation of the acoustic monitors is alarmed on the front panel along ,

with light indication of pilot valve operation. The light indication of the acoustic monitor is redundant and is not necessary to be immediately ovoilchte to monitor the acoustic monitor chassis on the back panel to vorify natisfactory oneration.

Reactor cressure la available as HPCI turbine inlet nressure, and itCIC turbine inlet pressure. Reactor pressure is also displayed on a digital dicolav on the reactor control pannt.

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i IMPf,EMENTATION:

l AccOpt as is.

l l4403/e/41 t

t W _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0284 04 HED NO.: 0.2.1.C.1 OS-4

CATEGORY

3 LEVEL: C i

l FINDING:

Oncrator nurvev response indicated that having the high pressure coolinq inicction (HPCI) components between the residual heat removal (RHR) loops (A&9) creates interference.

RESPON9Et Sub;y tem labeling and background shading will be used to highlight the R!!R Loops. The panel area around the A&B Loops will be color shaded the c mo color to make clear the rotationship between these components.

IMPLEMENTATION:

ny the conpletion of the second refueling outage.

4403/c/62

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0285 l l04 HED NO.: 8.2.1.C 09, 5 ,

l CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: 81 iFINDING:

lOparctorsurvey'resultsindicatedthatthe90X-3annunciatorcontrols chould be more centrally located on the panel, rather than at the end.

Tho present placement is awkward during manual startup of the loop-B RilR Oyct0m.

I nM9PO'Mn:

Tho GIR syson is not used frequently enouqh to justify moving the annunciator controls to the center of the panel. The time difference betw on activating an annunciator control in the center of the panel and activating the controls at the end of the panel is insignificant. This to not a timo critient operation.

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i IMPt.PJtENTAt t04 : l i

Acct;pt an is. ,

4403/c/19

I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PEX NO.: 0316 HED NO.: 8.3.1.8 09, 1

'EGORY: 1 LEVEL: B IDING:

ppon00 to the operator survey indicated that control switches with the same ape oro too close to one another though on difforent systems and can be hovertently actuated. Examples closing or opening drywell sump valves and steto closing a recirculation pump discharge valve.

MPO'19Et ero annropriato, linas of demarcation and/or background shading techniquen -

11 he used to differentiate between similar components belonging to  :

fforont systems. ,

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IPf#MMNTAT!ON  !

r tho enmntetinn of the second refuelinq outarin.

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS , [,

)EX NG'.:'0317' ,~ _-

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8. 3 .1' . 9 Ob2 ~

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MG%Y: 1 . '. - LPNEL: 'M -

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,J ,g Monco to tQ ooerator survey indicated that the esiin,pteam isolation valve ,,

Ithh00couldibaac'eidentallyactivatedbecauseofth'eir.proximityduring yoinrAntvalveoperations.

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i M o of demarcatien to denote system and subsystem integration and background

'oi'ng to denotb* system and subsystem differentiation will be implemented.

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4PLEMENTATION:

• o"

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.tha completion of the second refueling. outage. ,,

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16/c/09 1, y- 4* fi .- ,

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l SECTION 12 VALIDATION

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

~INDEX NO.: 405 u04 HED NO.: 1.1.1 VL-1 L CATEGORY : - 1 LEVEL: 9 l FINDING:

It was observed during the validation that some procedure statements do not match equipment availability range or sensitivity. Specifically

.obcarved were the following:

1. PROCEDURE # STEP #(S) DISCREPANCY

1. QGPl-1 DlF Step directs operator to monitor computer window displays which no longer function. Plans are in place to make these windows functional again.

2. -OOP 2300-1 8C & F16 Indication is not clear for turbine trip reset when activated. Procedure calls for the reset light to go out but there is no reset light.

3. OGA-12 C10 The range on both the RBCCW and TBCCW temperature indicators is from 75 to 125F but should go from 0 to 125F.

4 QGA-17 C3B There is insufficient tactile and visual feedback'that the ATNS arming pushbuttons have been fully depressed and that the system has been activated.. The addition of an engaged indicator light or-annunciator!would facilitate operations.

Thn non-availability or. lack of sufficient range or sensitivity of squipment can adversely affect operations particularly in instances where eith2r time or accuracy.are critical parameters.

RE9PONSE:

1

1. Plans are.in place to make these windows functional again.- -l

2. The procedure:will be mod"ified to clarify when turbine trip N reset is to be activated.

4418/c/l l

T 3.. -The range on the RBCCW and TBCCW temperature indicators will be rescaled and recalibrated.

4. Sufficient feedback' exists when ATWS manual actuation pushbuttons-are. fully depressed.

i I MPLEMENTATION : -

kMy the completion of seconti refuelina outage.

i 4418/c/2 .

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

INDEX NO.: 0420 04.HED NO.: 1.1.1 VL 2 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: A FINDING:

During the validation, it was observed that in operating the "A" loop of

RHR, flow indication must be obtained from a recorder located over the 1"9"-loop. It is very difficult to see this indication from the "A" loop work ctation which could contribute to operational problems in an I.cmargency event.

RESPONSE

.This is an automatic function in the emergency mode and not time critical

,in the test mode.

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1 IMPLEMENT ATION :

. Accept as is. j

{-4418/c/3 l

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 6NDEX NO.:- 0410, 0427 B4 HED NO. : 1.1.1.A VL, 1,-V. 21 2ATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: A FINDING:

During the validation it was observed that the RCIC trip throttle valve nay n ed to be reset. This would have to be done locally by an EA yet it 10 a time critical operation. The delay entailed could adversely affect opsrations. In addition, when manually operating RCIC, the. test valve hao to be throttled to present the turbine from tripping over speeding.

Thare is currently no indication of valve position so the operator must go on " Feel", as to how-long the switch must be held in the open position.

RESPONSE

An engineering evaluation will be conducted to address and resolve this problem.

IMPLEPtENTATION:

By the completion of - second refueling outage.

-4404/c/54

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS LEX NO.: 0421 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A VL 2

'EGORY: 1 LEVEL: B 4 DING:

l ring the validation, it was observed that a wide range reactor pressure lientor is needed on the 90X-3 panel near the ADS to facilitate control setor level with the HPCI and RCIC systems. The non-availability of this iication on the 90X-3 panel can contribute to delay and/or error in the cformance of operational duties particularly in an emergency situation.

9PONSE:

connuter driven indicator will be installed on the 90X-3 panel so that when ed:d the operator can display wide range reactor water level information.

' IDLE *1ENT A* ION :

V the comoletion of the first refueling outage.

416/c/59

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1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SEX NO.: 0445, 0102 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A VL,7, 1.1.1.B OS,7 TEGO'aY: 1 LEVEL: A

'I D I N G :

I rina validation, when the water level was beyond the range of the narrow nga GEMAC and YARWAY instruments and the feedwater system was being used to intain water level, it was observed that operators had to frequently avarce between the 4 and 5 panels to monitor water level. In addition, sponse to the operator survey indicated that better level indication is edad on the 90X-3 panel where the ECCS are located. Rx level indicators are panel 5, and it would be useful to have a redundant water level indicator tha 4 panel.

EPONSE:

2 information currently available to the operator is sufficient to perform is tack. The tasks associated with GEMAC and YARWAY instruments are not Re-critical and the level of information presently provided to the operator in tha detail necessary for the operator.

l iPLE:iENT ATION :

Ocnpt as is.

415/c/40

f i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 5EX.NO.: 0412/0266 HED NO.: 1.1.1.B VL 3/8.2.1.C.1 OS 2 FEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B 3 DING:

ting the validation, it was noted that HPCI turbine vibration must be titorcd when operating the HPCI turbine on the 90X-3 panel. However, the ordar which displays that information is on the 90X-7. Moreover, only the st 3 points on that multipoint recorder measure HPCI turbine vibration and e op3rator must wait for those points to cycle.through before he can obtain curront reading. It is desirable to have functionally related controls and splays grouped together and these factors of location and information cocaibility could adversely affect operations in an emergency event.

l 9PON9E e HPCI turbine vibration instruments are required for testing HPCI during n-cmargency conditions. The operator has adequate time to monitor the abine vibration durinq the slow roll start-up orocedure. There is no quirement to monitor turbine vibration during an automatic initiation when 2 controls will accelerate the turbine to full flow as fast as possible. A gher speed recorder has been installed on both units.

9 PLEME'IT ATIOST :

Smoloted.

Ll6/c/58

e. , . .~. -.- . -. -_-. -- - -- . - - . . _ . - .

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l, . CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HEX:NO.:: 0415 I

, men NO.:- 1.1.1.R- VL, 4 LEVEL:

1 B

{MGORY: '

l' RDING:

ting the validation, it was observed that controls and displays necessary to tignto a transient event were not functionally grouped to facilitate erotions,. Specifically, the. annunciators for low CCST level are on common sol 912-1. LThe CCST indicators are on the 901-6 Panel. .There is no CCST Sication on the 90X-3 Panel, yet the.CCST's.are,the' primary water source for

) HPCI system and are secondary water sources for the RCIC and CS systems,

~

it'2~has no CCST indication whatsoever.

SPONSE:

nee wa have automatic' changeover of suction valves on HPCI and - RCIC, it is t absolutely necessary for the operator to know the CCST level. .Also, Ting an accident, sufficient crew is available to support operators.

IPLEMENTATION:

copt ' es is.

L16/c/53

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

--INDEX NO.:- 0424

.04 HED'NO.: 1.1.1.B VL 5 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

During the validation it was observed that the containment pressure rccorder is located on the far_end of the 90X-3 panel but would facilitate operations more to have it more centrally located on the panel.

RESPONSE

This recorder is'sufficiently close to other related instrumentation and controls to not impact on emergency response.

-IMPTAM ENT ATION :

AccOpt as is.

~4418/c/17 j

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0406 04 HED NO.: 1.1.4 VL, 1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C -

FINDING:

It was observed during the validation that some procedure statements were unclear, ambiguous, or incomplete. Specifically noted were:

No. Procedure Mo. Step No. (s) Discrepancy

1. OGP l-1 D3A Potential confusion and error could be avoided if the procedure step specifically identified the "A" pressure regulator as the controlling one.

2. OOP-1300-1 F4 The entire procedure could be written.nore clearly. This step for example, directs the operator to verify valve position but does not tell the operator the position to verify.

3 OGP 2-3 03D Procedure clarity would be enhanced, as well as consistency with labeling, if the word

" suppression" was inserted before the word

" pool".

4 nGP 2-3 03n The prcbability for error and uncertainty would be reduced if the procedure step referenced the. appropriate procedures for reactor pressure.

5. nop 9300-1 F7- No annunciators should be up at this noint and this step should therefore be deleted from the procedure.

6 Oop 2300-3 Fil This step is unnecessary and should be deleted from the procedure.

7 OGP 2-3 03 A&B Step B is redundant to Step A and should be incorporated into Step A as a reference on how to accomplish the first part of the step.

8. - OGP 2-3 D3C There should be a procedure reference for RHR suppression pool cooling.

4404/c/56

\

9. QOA 16'00-3 N/A This procedure referenced from QOA 201-2 has (QOA 201-2) (D1) only one statement of significance to a stuck relief valve and that statement referenced the operator to the suppression pool cooling procedure OOP 1000-09.

Operations would be facilitated and confusion reduced if procedure QOP 1000-09 was referenced directly from OOA 201-2 at step 01.

RESPONSE

Procedures will be reviewed and all ambiguous statements corrected.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of second refueling outage.

4404/c/57

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l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

!INDEX NO.: 0407 _

04 hen No.: 1.1.4 VL, 2

CATEGORY

1 LEVEL: B

! FINDING:

,During the. validation it was observed that in some procedures the

. proc 2 dural steps were out of sequence. Proper procedural step sequencing

'ainimizes the probability of error and reduces operational confusion.

Sp3cifically the following were noted: ,

No. Procedure No. Step tio. (s) Discrepancy

,1 .QGP l-1 D3H5 & 6 Step D3H5 should follow step D3H2 and step D3H6 should follow' step D3H4 because respectively steps H2 and H5 concern the opening of HPCI valve MO 2301-4 and steps H4 and H6 concern the opening of RCIC valve MO 1301-16.

2 OOP 2300-~1 F9 This step is in the wrong sequence in the-procedure which checks instruments

] as they are layed out on the panel not i as they are functionally used. In this instance the 4 and 5 valves must be reset before they can be opened.

(

3 nOP 1000-4 .5 & 6 .9tep 5 and 6 should be reversed. 9 ten 6 should preceed step 5.

RESPON9E:

Procadures will be reviewed and proper sequencing of procedural steps oncured.

s l

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of first refueling outage.

4404/c/58

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO e 0443 l

HED Nt). : 1.1.5 VL, 6 TEGORY. 1 LEVEL: B l

4 DING:

ring validation when the recirculation system was tripped, crews were sarvcd to have difficulty in quickly determining cool-down rates because mparature indication is lost and must be calculated / interpolated from eaturo. This caused a delay in performance of duties and could contribute operational problems.

SPONSE:

1 engraved nomograph will be fabricated and placed on the boards. A display

>proach will also be reviewed and a recommendation made for possible use.

MPLE'1ERTATION:

y tho conpletion of the first refueling outage.

415/c/l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS LEX NO.: 0444 HED MO.: 1.2.2.E VL, 5

'EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C JDING:

cing the validation in a number of events crew members were observed to have locn over the (Unit 2) 4 panel to accurately read the wide range reactor scal icvel display.

9POM9Es 30 is not a serious problem to operator performance or system integrity.

4PLEMENTATION:

I

'c pt as is.

e 415/c/51

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0422 HED NO.: 3.1.2.C VL 1 "EGORY: 2 LEVEL: B NDING:

rina the validation, it was observed that the Area High Temperature Steam ak D tcctor annunciator has 32 inputs, each with a different setpoint.

formation as to which detector annunciated must be obtained from the back nala and information as to the temperature can only be obtained by sending EA to the area.

BPONSE

<nunciators that are alarmed from more than one plant parameter will be vicw;d and corrected as appropriate. Some of these alarms result from introl roora recorders. These alarms are intended to draw the attention of a op;rator to the recorder and then he/she can make the determination of the amo. No action seems appropriate in these cases.

MPLEMENTATION:

cczpt es is.

stG/c/58

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l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0427 04 HED NO.: 4.3.1.'A VL l-CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B FINDING:

During the validation, it was observed that the LSS and HSS controls on tha cpeed changer and motor gear unit are not positioned logically. The LSS; control 11s on the right while the HSS control is on the left. These thould-be reversed.

RE9 POST 9E The control switches and indicator light lenses for the controls will be reversed to conform to the control room conventions.

IMPLEMENTATION:  :

Rv the completion of the first refueling nutage.

4418/c/13-

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0426 04 HED MO.: 5.2.3. VL 1

! CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL': B FINDING:

During the validation some indicators were observed with red grease p;ncil hash marks on the meter's face to indicate upper operating limito. This is a form of " Zone Banding" which when applied properly and conaistently can enhance and facilitate operations. Specifically obssrved were the 1, 2 and 1/2 diesel generator AC kilowatt indicators and the TR 18-and 19 AMP meters.

RE9PO'T9 E :

Zone banding techniques will be applied to the 1, 2, and 1/2 Diesel Gcnorator AC kilowatt Meters and the TR/18 and 19 AMP meters.

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IMPLE'tE'IT N"IO*1 :

i By 6.he completion of second refuelinq outage.

4404/c/59

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0414 04.HED NO.: 9.4.2.9.4 VL , 2 CATEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C FINDING:

During the validation it was observed that specific points, such as cupprossion pool temperatures and drywell temperatures on multipoint rccorders, must be monitored, but_the operator has no means of selecting a point to be printed. He must wait for the recorder to cycle through to tha point. This causes unnecessary delay, which could have negative '

impact on operation, particularly in a time critical situation.

RESPONSE

-The station is evaluating the recorders in the control room and is in the process of_ replacing those that create an operational / maintenance problem. Emphasis is on those recorders that monitor a significant number of points.

IMPLEMENTATION:

Accept as is.

'4404/c/44

'J

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO.: 0425 HED NO.: 6.1.1 VL, 1 PEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C

,NDING:

ring the validation, some 9earch time delay was observed with the instrument r cyaten on the 912-1 Panel.

S P O*I S E :

nart of the Control Room Enhancement Package, labeling, background shading,

.nsa of demarcation and, if appropriate, mimic techniques will be employed on to Inctrument Air System on the 912-1 common panel.

4PLEMENTATION:

e the completion of the second refueling outage.

416/c/03

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'INDEX NO.: 0419 04 HED NO.: 6.6.3 VL, 2 CATEGORY: 1 ' LEVEL: B FINDING:

During the validation it was observed that the core spray system, the LPCI injection made of RHR, and RHR i'n general do not have flowpath aimico. This' lack of mimics can contribute to operational delays in the uca of these systems. Proper use of mimics integrates system components into functionally oriented diagrams that reflect component relationships and thereby decrease operator decision making and search time.

RE9PONSE:

As part of the Control. Room Enhancement Package, flowpath mimics for the coro cpray, RHR systems will be reviewed and for the LPCI Injection Mode of the RRR system will be reviewed to determine effective utilization will be installed.

.IMPLEMENTA" ION:

Ry the comnl etion of the first re*ueling outage.

4404/c/61

I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0416-04 HED NO.: 8.2.1 VL, 1 CATEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C FINDING:

During the validation it was observed that the controls.and displays on tha 90X-4 panel are arranged without consideration of sequence of use, frcqucncy of use, function, or other logical expectations. This can contribute to delay and/or error in the use of the system contained on the panel.

RESPONSE

Ao part of the Control Room Enhancement Package, labeling, background ohnding, lines of demarcation, and mimics will be used to functionally.

differentiate the systems on the 90X-4 panel.

IMPLEMENTATION:

By the completion of second refueling outage.

4404/c/62

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SEX NO.: 0417 HED NO.: 8.2.1 VL, 2 TEGO'aY : 3 LEVEL: C I

NDING:

I iring the validation it was observed that the controls and displays in L RHR and Core Spray Systems are arranged without consideration of qu1nce of use, frequency of use, function, or other logical pectations. This can contribute to delay and/or error in the use of e syntcms.

SPONSE:

p;;rt of the Control Room Enhancement Package, labeling, background cding, lines of demarcation, and mimic techniques will be used to 2nctionally highlight and differentiate the systems.

'MPLEMENTATION:

ty tha completion of the second refueling outage.

>416/c/01

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO, 0418 HED NO.: 8.2.1 VL, 3 GEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C EDING:

Bing the validation it was observed that the controls and displays on the D-8 P:1nels are arranged without consideration of sequence of use, frequency ura, function or other logical expectations. This can contribute to delay 5/or crror in the use of the systems contained on the panel.

29 PON9E s

) nart of the Control P.com Enhancement Package, labeling, background shading, naa of demarcation, and mimic techniques will be used to functionally qhliqht and differentiate the systems on the 90X-8 Panel.

MPLEMENTATION:

l

!y the connletion of the second refueling outage.

416/c/02

i SECTION 13 VERIFICATION

~ __, - . . . .. .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS INDEX NO.: 0222 04 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 1 CATEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B FINDING:

lTho contaminated condensate demin storage tanks (CCDST) for Units 1 and 2 cro crosstied. Unit I has indicators for both the A and B CCDST's. Unit '-

2 doec not have these indicators. 'Then confirming or manually trans-forring HPCI and RCIC suction from condensate storage tanks to the cunnrossion pool, the operator must confirm CCST level. The Unit 2 op2rator does not have this ability from his unit.

DE9PTISE:

Condensa*.e storage tank level information in available from the Unit 1 oparator if it is needed for an event on Unit 2. The emergency pump

, cuctions normally supplied fron these tanks is automatically changed over to the suppression pool upon tank' low level or suppression pool high i level.

i l

I'iPLE'tESTT AT ION :

Accept as is.

4407/c/53

- - - , - - _,a su a a + +--- - v---.-. .aa..

I I:

i i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EXNO.: 0407 I

' HED NO . : 1.1.1.A V, 4 fMGORY: 1 LEVEL: R NOING:

l p Ex bitilding . isolation dampers reset and isolation on Unit 1 and 2 were QCdinthetaskanalysisasbeingneededinthecontrolroom, and If does not they do Grentiv exist there. The dampers isolate on a group 2 signal.

h.oporcteproperly, there.is no way to manually close them in the control Amt an equipment attendant must be dispatched to reset them locally _to allou do to reopen.

f MPONSE:

L gntrol cnd indication will be provided in the appropriate location in the

.ntrol room.

r I

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l NPLEMENTATIO'It i

@ tha completion of the first refueling outage.

415/c/27

w I s

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS JEX N'O..; 040p~~~

-~

HE0[NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 6

~

EEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B NDING:

Off Gas Filter hold up loop seal line drain valve control was cited in the sk analysis as being needed !.n the control room, and does not. cur'rently ist t~nere. This valve is exercised when the Off Gas Recombiner System is ing seshred.

s, 3

l

9 P O*1 9 9 : l l

10 Rtation Will i nvestigate the need and feasability Of providing an oDerator i this valve.

r, ,-

V

= m . ,

, t, a

t MPT75tENTAmION:

Lv th9 connletion of tha first refueling outage.

~

)415/c/28 6

4

( ,,

's

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX No.: 0411 i HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 8

'EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C I

TDIMG:

present, the ACAD/ CAM mode switches are not physically located in the itrol room.

SPONSE:

a product of the labeling programs, the present CAM /ACAD power control  ;

itch will be relabeled to conform to the procedures. This switch is I tually the mode switch and is located in the control room. l iPLEMENTATION:

y the completion of the second refueling outage.

(415/c/29 l

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS CEX NO.:- 0412 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A- V, 9 TEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B lNDING:

cro-is' presently one dual. pen recorder on the 55 panel and one on the 56

.nal which display H2 concentration with one pen and O2 concentration th tho other. Each pen has a " SPANS" of 0-5% and 0-20% associated with it.

10 not clear which SPAMthe recorder is indicating at any given time.

19PONSE:

idication for operation anplicable scale will he provided in the control roon.

?tPLEMENTATION :

hr the comnletion of the second refueling outage.

4415/c/30

I i

l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0412, 0179 HED NO.:1.1.1.A V,10, 1.1.1.9 OS,2 "EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C 4 DING:

mre is no. direct indication of jockey pump operation in the control room.

SPONSE:

arm and pressure indications are already available. No further feedback is coccary. This pump operates continuously and requires operator attention tan it trips to determine the cause before a restart can be attempted.

arefore, placing a control switch in the control room would serve no useful trpose.

HPLEP1ENTATION:

cccpt asLis.

015/c/31

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0414 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 11

' EGO ~iY : 1 LEVEL: C FDING:

l ero 10 presently no Drywell Water Level Instrumentation in the control 3m. In a worse case accident, it may benefit the operator to know the fwall Level if it needed to be flooded. Currently, vessel level indication a b: u ed as an indirect measure of Drywell Water Level.

9PON9E:

10 will be addressed as part of the required integration plan relative to G. 1.97 and EOPs.

'1PLE*1ENT ATION :

Sncurrent with R.G. 1.97 schedules.

415/c/32 1

1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1EX NO.: 0419 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 14 TEGOPY 1 LEVEL: B 9 DING:

ero 10 no indication in the control room to show if the LPCI Loop Select gic has been reset. The consequence of this may be the voiding of the LPCI op Salection process and inadequate cooling of the core may result.

SPONSE raluate as part of the integration of the Supplement 1 to 0737 initiatives, k particular, the EOP package.

t

?iDLP.'1E'TP A* ION :

his will. he addressed as part of the required integration nian relative to

..G. 1.07 and EOPs.

415/c/33

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

>EX NO.: 0418 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 15

'EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C IDING:

tre 10 presently no Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump control or licating lights in the control room. An EO is sent to the respective diesel Terator to start the cooling oump unless it started automatically. It would

/a to be stopped locally. The 1 or 2 diesel cooling water pumps supply 711ng water to the respective units ECC9 room coolers. The 1/2 can be tvcd into the supply room coolers. Indication that the pump has started is primary importance. The ability to start and stop it from the control room cacondary.

l l

SPON9Es

! I b recpective Diesel Generato: Cooling water pump indicating lights will be btalled on the 90X-8 panels.

I PLEM E*ITATION :

the completion of the second refueling outage..

15/c/34

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IDC NO. 0419, 0408, 0420, 0273 HED NO.:1.1.1.A-V-17, 1.1.1.B-VL-2 1.1.1.B V-9, 8.1.1.C-OS-1

[

EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C l

4 DING:

I e licte.d components were cited in the task analysis as being needed in the ntrol room, and do not currently exist there. Having all controls and Hplavc required during an emergency is essential for safely assessing and fccting the status of the plant.

LA9EL PANEL DRYWELL/ SUPPRESSION CHAMBER GAS VOLU'1E TEMPERATURE 01 URYMELL AREA TEMPS 53 DRYWELL AREA TEMPS 54 DRYNELL TE'iPERATURE 84 i addition, it was observed in a number of validation events that the Grators needed to know the torus water temperature.

SPONSE:

1rus water temperature and drywell air temperature will be displayed, but nir location needs to be determined. Station Nuclear Engineering, with HF, Lil datermine optimum placement and install appropriate instrumentation.

MPLEMENTATION:

!v the completion of the second refueling outage.

L415/c/53 l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0422 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 18 TEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B NDING precant the Rx Building Air Temperatures must be determined locally.

tarmining the Rx Building Temperature comes up in a number of control room Dko danling with SBGT ad the charcoal absorbers.

9PONSE:

tio HED will be resolved following integration review of the plant specific

)P upgrades.

MPT,EMENT ATION :

'his will. be addressed as part of the required integration plan relative to P .G . 1.97 and EOPs.

L415/c/35

, .. -. .. _. .. .. , - ~ . . . ,_. .-

k r.

i:

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ,

EX NO.

0426 i

HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 20

• EGORY: 1 LEVEL: A IDING:

singlo display l to show. that all rods have been inserted during a SCRAM toition would free the_ operator from having to scan the~ entire full core  ;

splay and the possibility of not seeing a rod.that had not inserted (looking ens indicator instead of 177).

9PO779E dification to the computer program is in progress. Rulbs have been placad. Procedures have been modified _to caution operators in the use of a Full Core nisolay as an aid to the operator in determining when rods are 11 in following a SCRAM.

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HPLEMENTATION:

V the completion of the first refueling outage.

415/c/37 i

i p"

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l CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0432 HED NO.: 1.1.1.A V, 24

"' GORY:

. 1 LtVEL: B 4 DING:

era ic presently no indication of Rx pressure on the narrow range scale in e ADS range on the 3 panel.

SPONSE:

tim in a small, compact control room. There is adequate instrumentation rcilable to safely and efficiently perform this task.

MPLEMENTATIOti:

,cccpt as is.

415/c/38

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0436 HED MO.: 1.1.1.A V, 25 "EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C

'1 DING:

l era la presently a single voltage display for both the 1 and 1/2 diesel narator which may lead to confusion as to which one is being displayed.

'9pnN9E:

inctional relationship is clear.

'iPLFJiENTAT IOti

,ccCpt c.s is.

A15/c/39

I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

'EX NO.: 0493 HED NO.: 1.3.1.E.3 V,1

'EGORY: 1 LEVEL: B IDING :

en control of plant equipment from one unit renders that equipment synilcble to the other units, availability status indications are not splayed on all units. At present, there are two CCST meters which are

ated on Unit One. These meters serve both units.

{

l 9PONSE:

ocedures are in place which support the operators' ability to determine allability of status indication for the two CCST meters. l l

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i IPLEMENTATION :

I

' cent ac is.

16/c/31

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO.: 0448 HED NO.: 1.5.3.F V, 5 TEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B

>! DING:

aro interferes with the readability of displays and indicators. This may 2d to confusion and the misreading of displayed information. These meters a at the top of a vertical panel (901-56) or (901-55). There is some glare ich might reduce visability.

MPONSE:

lighting modification approach will be established to address problems of Laro on meters as well as other lighting problems in the control room.

$4PLE'1ENT AT ION :

/ the completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/19

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1FX NO.: 0449 HED NO.: 3.1.2.A.2 V, 4 PEGORY: 2 LEVEL: B

'IDING :

nunciator setpoints are not established to give operators adequate time to spond to the warning condition before a serious problem develops.

e 1 ': n t l y , two annunciators are unused for the ADS valves being open (located tha 3 panel): D13-ELECT. RELIEF VALVE 3A.3B OPEN; E13-ELECT. RELIEF LVES 3C/3D/3E OPEN. The setpoints are such that 3B and 3C on different nunciators with other valves with different setpoints.

'9PON9E:

inunciator nackage will provide guidelines for the proper identification of atpointo.

MPLEMEMTATION:

ly tha comnletion of the second refueling outage.

L415/c/16

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

?EX NO.: 0450 HED NO.: 3.1.2.C.1 V, 2 FFGORY: 2 LEVEL: B JDING:

suncintors with input from more than one plant parameter setpoint are not Sid:d. At present, the following tile provides information about two shicmas CHANNEL A/9 TUR9-GEN LOAD MISMATCH / EHC LOW PRE 9SURE. When this hunciator goes off the operator is not immediately alerted to the exact

$hicm. *his may cause a delay in appropriate responses.

@POM9Et 1

puncictor package will provide guidelines and recommended modifications to

)1tiplo input annunciators.

l

'1PLE'1ENT ATION :

/ tha completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/17

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX MO.: 0451 lHED No.: 3.3.3.C.1 V, 3 PEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C

] DING:

p the vertical and horizontal axes of the annunciator panel on the

hrocent, 56 p nel are not labeled. Labeled axes aid in ready coordinate pignation of a particular visual tile.

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l 69PONSE:

hbolingandannunciatorpackageswillprovideproperlabelingofannunciator

)oo .

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l iMPLMMENTATIOM:

y the completion of the second refueling outage.

3415/c/18 l

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CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX.NO.: 0452, 0332, 0386 iHED NO.: 3.3.4.D V,2, 3.3.4.D-1/05, 3.3.4.D-1 GGORY: 3 LEVEL: C 3 DING:

hrOviations and acronyms are not consistent with those used elsewhere in the btrol room. There are annunciator tiles on the 3 panel withThis"RHRS" on can confuse

)C . The "S" at the end of "RHR" is not typical in the CR.

) cp0 rotor. Also, response to the operator survey indicated the need for a

)cription of all abbreviations used on the computer.

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EPONSE:

beting package will provide guidelines for proper abbreviations and acronyms.

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EPLEMENTATION:

@ tha completion of the second refueling outage.

!O15/c/15 i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX ' NO. : 0453-

!HED NO.: 4.1.l'.A.2 V, 1 PEGORY . 1 LEVEL: C WDING:-

3h control used for emergency operations is not adequate for the function it 3 fero 3. .It has been suggested that the " MINIMUM FLOW VALVE" (1301-60) have p c:pLbility of being throttleable.

l SPONSE:

i

) ora doan not apnear to be sufficient reason to make this a throttable

)lvo. Flow is controlled by the speed of the turbine.

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t

( HPTMiENT ATIO'!:

hecEntan in.

h415/c/45 i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0454 lHED NO.: 4.1.1.A.2 V, 2 FEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C (DING:

) all controls used for emergency operations can be adjusted with the buircd level of precision. At present, the " COOLING WATER PRESSURE CONTROL NVE" control is a J-handle " throttle-open/ throttle-closed", "as is" switch.

> valva must be slightly opened or closed (throttled) for purposes relating l controlling cooling water pressure. Because its action is "as is", meaning otcyc in the position in which it is placed, the operator must keep his/her M on the switch throughout the entire adjustment. If forgotten, the valve B1 remain open or closed.

f LA9EL l COOLING MATER P9E99 CO'iTROL VALVE 1-302-10 ESPONSE rConnel preference. No impact on performance. No action is necessary.

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IPLEMENTATION:

$ccpt cs is.

415/c/57 -

l

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO.: 0455 HED NO.: 4.1.1.A.2 V, 3 TEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C NDING:

't all controls used for emergency operations can be adjusted with the quircd level of precision. At present, the " DRIVE PRESSURE VALVE" control o J-handle ' throttle-open/ throttle-closed', "as is" switch. The valve must olightly opened or closed (throttled) for purposes relating to ORD Water accuro to the drives. Because its action is "as is", meaning it stays in

,a poaition in which it is placed, the operator must keep his hand on the ritch throughout the entire adjustment. If forgotten, the valve will fully aval open or closed.

l 19PON9E:

• rconal nreference. No impact on performance.

f i

l iPLEMEN*ATION:

I becnt ao is.

l 5/c/9A 41

1 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0479

'HMD NO.: 4.4.5.D.2 V, 2 EEGORY: 1 LEVEL: B WDING:

proscnt, the switch positions on these range selectors are closely spaced a tha pointer is partly obscured by ink and dirt which results in making the siticn it is in difficult to identify. What position a selector is in nuld be clearly identifiable to avoid confusion.

'9 PO'1",E t io switch pointer will he cl.eaneri.

$1PLEMENTATION: ,

ly the comnletion of the first ref tselino outage.

,415/c/22

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS HEX NO : 0421 lHED'NO.: 5.1.1.A.1 V, 1 PEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C DDING:

Lproc0nt there is-indication of percent tank level and pump discharge DCCuro for HTE standby liquid control boron tank from which actual tank pol can be determined. There is, however, no direct indication of the level lcnnunciation of high or low levels. In the task analysis it was required

' know when 200 gallons was left in the tank and this was not directly hortcinable. All information required in the task analysis should be Gvid:d in the control room.

19PON9Et i

horopriate indication is available, but metering label package will provide fpropriatelevelinformation.

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[ MPf.EM F.ti? AT IO*! :

Y the comnletion of the second refuelinq outage.

415/c/41 E

i CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  ;

hEXNO.: 0428

HED NO.

5.1.1.A.1 V, 8 i

PFA%Y: 3 ,

LEVEL: C 4 DING:

> lioted annunciator is not currently avialable in the control room and han

?n citcd in the task analysis as being required.

I LA9EL l

RCIC P'lHP C'JCTION CHANGE OVER ANNUNCIATOR OPONSE: '

'HPCI/RCIC PUMP SUCTION CHANGE OVER ANNUNCIATOR will be added to each unit.

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NPLEMENTATION:

$thecomnletionofthesecondrefuelingoutage.

t315/c/54

r CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0430 lHEDMn.: 5.1.1.A.1 V, 10 PMG%Y: 1 LEVML: C kDING:

hro10 currently no indication to show that the ECCS systems are in standby

?dinoco. Such indication would allow the operator to know the status of the Ctcmo at a glance.

lSPONSE :

i brrcnt procedure requires the operator to verify valve lineup at the

)ginningofeachshiftandfollowinganysurveillancethataffectsthesystem.

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MPLEttENTATION :

bec;pt es is.

L415/c/42

t CORRECTIVE ACTIONS hF.XNO.: 0433

.HED NO.: 5.1.1.A.1 V, 13 PEGORY: 1 LEVEL: C DDING:

'ro 10 presently one annunciator for all four steam lines.

D .

i

{

i ISPON9E:

thic annunciator comes up, the Main 9 team Line Indicating Lights on the Joup Icolation Mimic or the Main Steam System Indicating Lights could be used b identify the aporopriate line or lines. In addition, mimics are available

)colationvalves) for the indicators to show which steam line.is closed.

pic dotermination can be made by looking at the Main 9 team Line indicators.

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MPLEMENTATION:

iccOnt as is.

,41M/c/43

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DEX NO.: 0457 HED NO.: 5.1.1.A.1 V, 20 TEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C NDING:

uni displays provided in the control room do not give operators all of the

,fOrcation about system status and parameter values that is needed. At Octnt, the computer window (number 02) on the 901-5 Panel is not functional.

Cheuld be used to visually monitor selected process computer parameters.

LA9EL COMotlTER 11INDO'4 LED tRPON9E annutor-driven analoq trend displays will be installed on both unit control knolo.

IMPT.EMEN*AT ION :

%v the connletion of the second refueling outage.

4415/c/55

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

,EX NO.: 0459 MED NO.: 5.1.1.A.1 V, 22 G%Y: 3 LEVEL C NING hDrywallHighPressureannunciatortile is unclear. It can be misleading J'enuco confusion to operators. It does not provide sufficient information l provoke appropriate and timely response. This tile is identified in the

- cc it presently appears in the control room. The recommended' labelling becn identified in the EID comments.

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I SPONSE:

pcnnunciatorpackagewilladdress issues relative to misleading nomencla-go, cnd all ambiguous or misleading messages will be appropriately modified

conform to sound human factors principals and practices.

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I hPLEMENTATION:

tho completion of the second refueling outage.

N15/c/56

_._.:_____________________._____1_____..__________________________________._.__________...__...___

x __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .

m P

CORRECTIVE ACTIONG

)EX NO.: 04.67

,s HED NO.: 5.1.1.A.1 V, 23 -

PEGORY: LEVEL: -

2 B

'IDING:

s,..

e LED window #3 on the 401-7 panel has been used in the past'to display lve status from the process computer. It is not functional at the present ,

me. Additional. coerating information which can be called up at will by l erators might be an aid in an emergency situation.

9PON9E mputer-driven analog trend displays will be installed on the control panels

)r both units.

' ~

\

5 N

xn te i

,! L kiPLEt1ENTATION :

iy the completion of the second refueling outage.

.415/c/44 A )

4

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0476 HED NO.: 5.1.1.A.3 V, 3 PEGORY: 2 LEVEL: C 1 DING:

10 tile annunciates at 7 times normal radiation. It says HI when it should y "HI HI". In addition, it appears to be redundent to B09 and B16.

9PONSE:

inunciator package will address this issue of identification accuracy.

MPLEMENTATION:

y the completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/46

.- - .. .. - - . . ~

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX:NO.: 0460 1 ]

HED NO : 5.1.2.A V, 1-PEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C ,

NDING:-

• i als units on displays are not consistent with the degree of precision and curccy needed by'the operator to perform tasks'during emergency operations.

Opl'ays are discrepant in the following ways: units.are not labeled on the Jpley, units-are incorrect and/or labeling appears on the display face and 2 on-theLdisplay:itself. Conments and recommendations for each discrepant play is provided in'the EID comments.

l9PONSE: i rter 9eale' Design Package will address issues relative to proper labeling of eter scales. Appropriate changes will be implemented.

MPLEMENTATION:

ly the comnletion-of the secondl refueling outage.:

r415/d/59[

S! CORRECTIVE ACTIONS E EX NO.: 0465 2

4HED NO.: 5.1.2.A V, 2 w

k'EGORY : 2 LEVEL: B d

3 DING:

present, the following recorders read in backpressure: Single and dual pen sporders for " CONDENSER VACUUM 1A. 1B, IC". The range is 0-30 and units are in divisions of .5. Procedures and tech specs as well as d'b" INCHES ining OF HG" aids etc., always refer to , vacuum. A multipoint recorder was jhgested as well as keeping the existing recorders.

i

]

4 J_

3

_-SPOM9E:

ter scale design package will address issues of proper scale identification

-d a standard reference to back-pressure will be provided.

1 1

EM S

8 4

=

1

=

MPLEMENTA* ION:

.v the conoletion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/49

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0466 hen Nn.: 5.1.2.A V, 3 EGopY: 2 LEVEL: C DING:

sentiv, the follnwing meters show direction of flow to either the north or th: "MEST BRANCH CW DP" and " EAST BRANCH CW DP". The ranges are " SOUTH +30 0 *O +30 NORTH" the fact that one is actually looking at "DP" is not stated the meter.

{ PONSE-j /

ter scale design package will address issues relative to proper identifi-tion of scale units and nomenclature.

MPLEMENTATION:

y the completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/48

n CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

=

EX NO.: 0462

_=

~

HED NO.: 5.1.2.D.1 V, 2 -

EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C DING: _

les are not selected to span the expected range of operational parameters.

plays listed on the attached sheet have inappropriate scale ranges and/or isions. See individual EID's for comments and specific recommendations. q

\

}

SPON9E: d 2

ter scale design oackage will be develooed to address issues related to -

ale identification.

^

J A

a

=

a A

=4 -

-A -

MPLEMOTTATIOST :

v the comnl.etion of the second refueling outage.

asm 415/c/47 __

=

zu

%.f ' k ' .:

a ;. . 9, .

• .'- 'y (i.+. -

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4 .q, - :' . )?

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS r f. * .

=.>i. y. 4

7. . . .s.. .

1EX NO.: 463 ,- ' ~ . . .

, ~~

i,

. HED MO.: 5.1.2.n.1 V 3 [ 4i s.

se ys" "'

$. ~~

3 LEVEL: C C.s;,. . - %.

_'i ; .:

\.. JDING:

'. ' PEGORY: J,.

. .a . :

,. ales are not selected to span the expected range of operational parameters. :.

e "DW 02 CONO METER" has two ranges on th meter face, because of the use of  ?[. ..

range switch. It was suggested that only the range 0-5% O2 CONO. be kept 0 7./ ' '.

d the other removed. The range switch should have switch posit ons of  : '.,'.1 .

I._ L l', 'X 2', 'X 5'. This would supplant the need for 2 ranges. -

,A.. g . '.,-.

LABEL ^ -

DW O2 CONO METER

' ? '.:. ' . :.

, fi . . . -.- -

i :..- .

.3 . .-

SPONSE : y

• eter Scale Design Package will be developed to address issues relative to i' amenclature and input designation. The appropriate range will be selected 1.. ' .'

. la included on the neter face. gf ., : f

. . z ' . . ,,

sn

_,. f: . ;:.;

- . :..y

q. .

v.

1

-, +

4 J -.

, :- ,+

-: . v

... n ..

c 7-.

z- ')L,: . +,

. .y. .- * ,

.7

.a .;

D p .: -

- [MPLEMENTATION: g, -

[- ly completion of second refqeling outage. ,. . 7, .r'3

+

I 1415/c/60

.. s.

.4 ( *'

3 4 s .

,A ,)

• CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0464 HED NO.: 5.1.2.D.1 V, 4 EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C ING:

les are not selected to span the expected range of operational parameters.

present, the following meters have a range of -243 to +57 inches in isions of 6. Major tic marks and numerical notation are listed on the er from 57 to -273 every 30 inches. These are difficult to read. The al ranqe of 300 inches may be aporopriate to monitor Rx level after an ident.

LA9EL WR RX LEVEL (COLD CALIB) 'B' WR RX LEVEL (COLD CALIB) 'A' SE:

ter scale design package will be developed to address issues relative to ale unit designation and nomenclature.

1PLEM E'1TATIO'T :

the completion of the second refueling outage.

15/c/61

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX MO.: 0481 En NO.: 5.1.2.D.1 V, 5 EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C ING:

les are not selected to span the expected range of operational parameters.

core spray flow meters have a low range of 2000 GPM so that low range ration is difficult if the flow needs to be regulated below this level.

i PONSE:

le and meter read to required accuracy.

i &, . .

PLEMENTATION: { .[ . : _

ccept as is. g.

. ' -)._

415/c/50 .l."

-r .y- - c m .. .: _ . ; '- '

.a . _

3'

.3 : .

E ' ' .i.a;.' ]5[4'f ., -

,,e s,-..>.. , . ',

x

_ hi' "

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS .'."  ? " .?

=

m s.

f "

>EX NO. : 0494 . . g.

z-<- .~..

'HED No.: 5.1.2.0.1 V, 6 yf. l, X . :__

1

_ EG')RY: 3 LEVEL: C - < '- 1

,9 .x4 ,

IDING:

. '..Iw. .,

_sles are not selected to span the expected range of operational parameters. fy' . -

_ present, the turbine BPV 6 meter reads percent, range is 0-100 in divisions .?

2. All other (there are 9 total) bypass valves are in divisions of 5. ;s . ;.

-is meter is inconsistent with others having the same function as well as . . .; . .;. -

ose which are used in conjunction with it. 1l. .

.x..

p- ..

LABEL ". .

x.- y

~ * ' '

TUR9IME BYPASS VALVE 6 l.t WA-. h. - 7.)

SFONSE: - -

-' ^ 1 i ,

7, r. , ; .

ter 9cale Design Package will provide consistency across meters used for  :

r; , . .

milar functions. Appropriate change will be made. ...f '. ~(&

. . .; s . ,.

~

u g,

.s. ,

.s'.\ .

e: . 1,

. - .i s ,#~  ;..

- .. 5

.: . . ' _ $9

. .. _v .

.'  :. \ _ .l.f:

.4..: 7

-jf . , .}.Q~ ~,.- -

7.,.+ ,  :. -:

i .-

I 2,

. l y. ',,,

,-,.4, - .,

j*e<

2- ,,

,;. a 9,s.w .;.s. -

?.  :.%- .

iPLEMENTATION : .T . ' '.j2.

the completion of the second refueling outage.  ? '- < .

w- '

15/c/62 ('_. ..,

gR t.

.e, y ,.. .

s

-4 _=_

^'

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

-1 --

0495 5EX NO.: - -

M

,HED NO.: 5.1.2.D.1 V, 7 _ _

_m EGORY: 1 LEVEL: C l

a -

• EDING:

sently, the "RHR SERVICE WATER FLOW" meter has a range of 0-70 x 100 and 2

_re are no standard divisions. This meter is confusing to read or interp-te. -

m -

.R  ;

' ^

5 -

W --

=

=

m I -

PONSE: 4 5ter Scale Design Package will provide guidelines for proper unit designation el nomenclature. The scale will be modified appropriately. The meter scale 5

_ a square root scale eliminating the requirement for a square root -

2

-nverter. The accuracy would not be enhanced by making this scale linear.

~

J

=

^

. 5 -

_- -9 -

m 1_s m

a 1

_d -

iPLEMENTATION:

mi

~

ccent as is.

415/c/63

4

=

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX MO.: 0496 2 -

A

_s hen No.: 5.1.2.D.1 V,

== _

f"EGORY:

3 LEVEL: C  ;

_IDING:

_J present, the "EHC OIL PRESSURE" meter has a range of 0-35 x 100 in Visions of 1. The range appears to be too high for expected values of p ssure. Ranges should reflect possible values. Normal value of EHC _

=pssure is 1500 PSIG.  ; '

LABEL -

2

EHC OIL PRESSURE _

SPONSE:

9 rerating at mid-scale is optimum. Normal operations occurs at 1500 PSIG. ]

=

i 6 -

a 5

~

2 MPLEMENTATION:

.ccept as is. ,

=

415/c/64 ]

J

_=

='E

=

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SXNO.: 0461 l C

IED NO.: 5.1.6.D.1 V, 2 ~

2 w 2 LEVEL: B

~] GORY:

DING: 4

== -

J meaning assioned to particular colors is not consistent across all Glications within the control room. The indicating light associated with 7 "HIGH" condition in each area is cresently amber or yellow and contains no I jend. These are very small bulbs. It was suggested that they have legenas "

3 he the color red to indicate danger. -

2 2 9

-;;PONSE :

a

}

~^ or coding package will address the issue of proper and consistent use of l

_ or .

a 1

a -

2 ~

b

^

m '

i m

1PLEttENTATION : _

=

1 the completion of the second refueling outage. =

115/c/23 $

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BX NO.: 0497 HED NO.: 5.1.6.D.1 V, 3 EGORY: 2 LEVEL: B DING:

meaning assigned to particular colors is not consistent across all lications within the control room. At present, the listed lights are all a lowish faded white. This includes the "IN" light, the "OUT" light and the SELECTED" light.

4PON9E:

lor coding package will provide for consistent use of colors.

1PLEMENTATION:

/ the completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/24

f. . ,.. .

c  :. . .

.g. .. ; . 7,.,N/

, , , -.u s[;..-

4.,,.w. : .. ..

.y'2 '

,9 -

2-.

- - , ,e ,

~

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS  ;$ ," '-l'-Q .

~.

,< >v 0471 ^ . 3 ', "

)EX NO.: . :s n .- l-? .

HED MO.: 6.1.1 V, 8 4.

r ;.,,

. ,;p

" EGO RY : 3 LEVEL: C  : 7i .'- c

g. _- , c ,.-:

-y -_ ,. .

4 DING: C' x . *

.c. - ., .':

ntrols, displays, and other equipment items are not appropriately and h J ',. .

1'

~ "'

early labeled. The items have: Labels in dynotape, no label, or labels are J. , --

nciled or inked in. Also, items are mislabeled. q .. s

.;. = -f .,;

• ) e .a c .: . ,. .

+

.=..  :

i s . .

SPONSE: _

shelina nackage will address the issue of clarity and temporary labels. -

'f -

.y y~

. -- r * . /.

n. [, k ' ' .

-.; .1 =

~t q:- -. , .. r -

.', : t.,

,,.2

- s .

.N  ;'

L,.'

l ,

'4 9,b. +

W i .l . ; . ,i -

l ' .. . . -

.(..'.-_  ;._ _ ,

. ;.=,.,

e

. :,:3 : y .

. , c. s , .: y

.V,'-  ?,.

MPLEMENTATION:  ; ". - - ; .

the completi.on of the second refueling outage. -;-

, g ..

.;g _ .

415 /c /4

• \ .I.

t +-' . ' . , i

.l.

..c:.D',,

1

. - - J,b ,

I. . - . - .- ' _

J Y >

2

=

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

• p X NO.: 0472 a

6.1.1 V, 9

_RIED NO . :

-kGORY: 3 LEVEL: C d

i

'50ING:

4

• _e pieces of equipment were found to be inappropriately labeled in the

'ification. Proper labeling aids in quick, accurate identification of

'nonents.

g _

E 2 _

WPONSE:

.=

,elino package will address the issue of inappropriate identification of '

[6ponents. _

=

E-iPLE*iEN'" ATION :

f the completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/5

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS DC NO. : 0473 TED No.: 6.1.1 V, 10

< GORY: 3 LEVEL: C l OING:

legends on some valve lights do not give the valve numbers. Most valve trol switches in the control room have component numbers associated with n and this is useful information to have on the lights in that it aids in eral operations and could help in proper identification under emergency ditions.

PONSE

3elino package will address issues of valve identification numbers.

4PLEMENTATION:

v the completion of the second refueling outage.

415/c /6

T .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)EX NO.: 0474 HED NO.: 6.1.1 V, 11 PEGORY: 3 LEVEL: C  ;

i 1 DING:

' labels for these and all other area radiation monitors do not ontain =

formation about which point is referred to on the multipoint receeders.

ints are currently written on the rotary meters in pencil. Peru isnt _

.celing containing relevant supplemental information should be prtvided.

S P O 'T S E :

beling nackage will address issues relative to supplemental information for struments. ,

2

=

i a

d 5 -

i

'MPLE'iENT FION:

v the completion of the second refueling outage.

1 5415/c/7 -

.a

=

~

5 .

4

_=

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0476 h

'HED No.: 6.1.1 V, 13 1

A

-EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C -

2 -

-DING:

present this meter is labeled "RW BLD ATMOS". Whether there is a 2

_ference between the RX building or the atmosphere is not clear because _

-ther are marked on the meter face. Labeling should clearly identify what 5

- being displayed.

^

i _

]

_m _

_=,

i P O*I S E :

--neling nackage will address proper identification on labels.

dj 1

-s i

Y -

G

.PLDiENmATION :

the conpletion of the second refueling outage. -

15/c/s __.

= =i 3 (

-a .

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS y

== J

%EXNO.: 0479 =

HED NO.: 6.1.1 V, 14 5

=

=EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C _

m *

DING :

I_

y labeling on this meter makes no mention of it being different from other

gH2O level meters. It is actually cold calibrated and reads normal H2O

-4e1 at 6R inches instead of the hot calibrated 30 inches. Labeling should =

.p to clearly identify what is being displayed. _

w

-m ,

=5 M

I

-9 PON 9 E :

dbeling package will address issues relative to proper component j

entification.

=

.m 2

i S -

MPLEMENTATION:

-y the completion of the second refueling outage. t

=415/c/9 -

i

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS --

EX NO.: 0500

= -

IEn NO.: 6.1.1 V, 16 EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C _

DING:

listed indicator light for the turbine vacuum pump currently says "RUN" i ^

tead of "ON" which is normally used for pump indication. Nomenclature in eling should be consistent.

J PONSE:

beling nackage will address issues relative to consistency of use.

}

_=

=

1

_a 2

b _

2 2

MPLEMENTATION: _-

_z y the comoletion of the second refueling outage. -

415/c/10

R _

n d

- A

-m CORRECTIVE ACTIONS MEX NO.:

0482

-? -

7H9D NO.: 6.2.1.A V, 2 M

-EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C -

l -

_ DING:

helplacement for controls and indicating lights is not consistent -

- oughout the control room. The label for the following controls may be "

ind above the indicating lights: RHR HX SW disch valve 1001-5A and -

gl-5B. The convention in this g icating lights and above the switch.

control room is to place a label below the i

=

SPONSE: =

i -

-be li ng package will address the issue of labeling consistency.  !

i _

~

i -

)

i d

a

=

-m i

=

m 2

MPLEMENTATION: 6

~~

v the connletion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/2 _

p' c .. - . , ..

. Mr *=p ,

it. r ' ; . >

b ,- l. * .

. n].

% *l

.c.; (. p . . ...

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS .>

-vy, " J. ' .., - . ,

-_ .e.

EX NO.: 0499 ij:* :;.I . b~.-

a HED NO.: 6.2.3.A.1 V, 1 L'. .

./ ' O ' . '.

.y. . . .

p , "e EGORY: 3 LEVEL: B ' 10 . .."

.m ,y , . ,

IDING: .~., i ,.c. '.

.,c'

.j

. four sets of legend pushbuttons for the inboard and outboard vent and  : - -: - I' .

in valves have legends of "Close" and " Normal" which are written 2 s.h , -

tically. Horizontal orientation of legends facilitates their readability. I:. / - . . . . .,

' ' , . + '

-s - .;, ._-r, _ .,

y?, , c- ,.

. 7. * . .

9 .+

SPONSE: 'l.'A- ~

g_ e. .,}-',

c. .

Ives close automatically on a scram. Used infrequently. Lettering is easy J. l.". . . ; . . ,.

read. A change might create another HED. Best logical presentation for .5 i, u. .,

e application. ' "- -i-' -' . . . ~ .1 -

.- ;_. . . i '. .

.p'.,- ,

w' \.

..s..',.,- -

-i : .. .

l ,.' :l Y ', .

(' y i ,. .'

• .f .

%;. (. . '_: ,,';.., .,

i:. :' - .,.

$q ; . . ., ..

~

' . q, ,;.7. , . < -

- '.f l; _ _

Y l.: , .

PLEMENTATION: ..'

f . .. .

..b. -_

4 cept as is. '- < -

.,.t, .... . , ,

{

15/c/3 r/ 2.- a

., t

-g

g. .

'b,- "'s* .'

.- x.

R  % [.1l:-; .;

.s.

i S :h. . . "r l

. :n a '. >r m g-4 '.

=! .'[,1u.!*

g CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 4,,r u . .c

.'; . r ~,

R X NO.: 0484 4 5. J

+. ,:>. ... .. ..

2 -

t ,4 3 .-

-91ED NO. : 6.3.2.F V, 1 '.. s/d[.1.m.

) .,

.. xa. .- '

3 s GORY: 3 LEVEL: C '( ' b .5 f '-

-_i c y

~. = 1 :'-' . ,

-' DING: .

• -7::t'i

-r .. . .n.,,

}ds are not correctly spelled. " VALVES" is spelled wrong on the annunciator .' f'; i {~,

e listed (currently spelled " VALUES").

. c. +.

- LATIEL -

f n ,.-  :

m , ., . . .

" ACOUSTIC MONITOD SAFETY .

~,'" ,

=

RELIEF VALUES OPEN ' i - - i'

A;;,, '.'., : e g  ;, , .

z  :. . -

e ,. , . . , . . .

3 , .

= ,.,i,[,

i '

-3 PONS E : .. , * .

- F _

e eling package will address label nomenclature. - ",, : . .

5 .> -y.  %,:'. .

.. ' y " '; i.

-g 1, .. 1 2. 1

= .: _"

- ; 4 . .-: '

xx., ,

d

~

4 e '.: ..

s'.' ',.',;.,, ..

_ .,- e ..

.= .. r

,i '

'_4-

- :t ,'

o '= - +

^v

','., e~.

4._~.,.

'5 h.' ..

1

~

. s., .

.. ,4 ..; . * ,

i' .

+

_MPLEMENTATION: .. .

y the conoletion of the second refueling outage. -

415/c/11 '. f~ ~ '.

.' " . T e

. . . . ' f * .-

l'l N) I '.

. +.

'l'*.-.e;Q. , ., .

g;< . : . c -

~ I.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS $ .-> ". +., a$

,. 4 .

X NO.: 0485 1.~.,

g.

IEn NO.: 6.3.3.A V, 2 (i [ 1 :

Q: g ;'

LEVEL: C

~~ ' ~ , , .

GORY: 3 N

c

'.f-*

NG:

,, , ~ ' '

re is no list of standard abbreviations. The word " SPRAY" has been -:/

reviated " SPY" on the listed annunciator tile (010304101). This is an .

6 ommon abbreviation. .: . . . . .

. . ~ ~ }-. ':-,

~ :l t - . = , , .

a., - 6 .,

d ' '

's #

t 4.

,.,.3 "

PONSE: s . ,,

., c. r .

eling package will provide guidelines for proper abbreviations. ]7.. .i ' .,~

> : a. - '

, .;gs,(

. . .s. ...

,y . . ? .. -

i . .'_4

+

.x g., - :.

h' . _

x. . .

4 f,  :..,

}; Jt..

~

4 ..

i  %'t

. -3 .

- g ,,:

. . _. , - ..v 5.,~~

PLEMENTATION: .

the comoletion of the second refueling outage.

g ,",

15/c/12 p .1 ij

• ...ti

?< ,.

.* e .

w 1

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS M X NO.: 0486 2

_a

=HE D NO . : 6.3.3.B V, 1 3

_4 _

-d=EGORY : 3 LEVEL: C

__ DING:

els are not consistent within and across pieces of equipment in their use

= abbreviations. Service water pump is abbreviated on the listed annunciator Z 3e as "9NP". This is inconsistent with other service water abbreviations in -

_- control room.

_N_ b 1

= g 4 -

u i

4 -

.2 -

1 $

e=

_3PON9E: 9

~

moeling package will provide guidelines relative to abbreviations and fasistency.

1 =:

U Y E 3

? --

n 1 -

a tiPLEttFNTATION : -

y the conpletion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/13

a CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EX NO.: 0487 .

HED No.: 6.3.3.9 V, 2 EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C

, DING: '

els are not consistent within and across pieces of equipment in their use abbreviations. The listed annunciator tile has "RHRS" engraved on it. The vention used in the control room refers to residual heat removal as "RHR".

l was stated that the additional "S" may cause confusion with service water I f) . Other descrepant tiles include: H 7, B6, C6, D6, G7, H7, A8, B8, C8. _

3PONSE:

celing package will provide guidelines for consistent use of abbreviations. _

a d

SPLEMENTATION: _

the comoletion of the second refueling outage.

815/c/14 E

I m

=

==

-E

- CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

""EX NO . : 0488 HED NO.: 6.3.3.C V, 2

-EGO RY : 3 LEVEL: C l -DING:

. re are mismatches between nomenclature used in procedures and that printed the labels. Procedures commonly refer to the " PUMP DISCH VALVE 2301-8" as 9 "HPCl INJECTION VALVE". It is also commonly called this by operations isonnel. Labeling of equipment should match that found in procedures.

7 2

i 5

s

-9 PO'T 9 E :

_ocedures aeneration guidelines as a result of an INPO audit will be veloped for use in modifying existing procedures and developing new ones.

5 MPLEME'IT ATIO'T :

y the comnletion of the second refueling outage.

415/c/20

if >

g , ,,t - ..

,s

=1' T

4;

-s a

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS m

mm -

"fEX NO.: 0489 i

d HED NO.: 6.3.8.A V, 2 1

' EGORY: 3 LEVEL: C

-i DING:

_w

]} listed controls were found in the verification to have inappropriate or rpsing switch positions. The availability and accuracy of nomenclature for .

,i tch nosi tions is essential for positive identification of control functions.

.s M -

f L'

-J

$sPONSE:

=

~~_beling nackage will provide guidelines for ensuring the accuracy,of, menclature for switch positions.

4 T

b i

A

's r

i MPLE'1ENTATION:

-y the completion of the second refueling outage. ..

415/c/21

s J L,. ,.,1 i

'l : -t ., ;.

F t

^

? 7 .l  ;

Q:f;-; ,.

! CORRECTIVE ACTIONS f_ , .

4 - .

"'- CX NO;: 0491

~

-'i .

TED NO.: 8.2.1.C.1 V, 9 ....C,..,.. .-

3 GORY: 3 LEVEL: C .- .

]ING: ' '.e -

~ ~

~.

ctional.ly related controls and displays are not grouped together when they . :, .. c.l -

used together to perform tasks related to a specific function. The .

rqing water flow meter is located on the 901-5 Panel along with other CRD s: ;; - : ~' ' .

^

ers. The common placement is a flow meter with a pressure meter  ?!

ediately to its right. Many other meters follow this convention. A l. lh ~

2 c

sently, the flow meter is to the right of the pressure meter. '. .

LABEL

- c,

'.. CHARGING WATER FLOW METER

'.k.1 i .

PONSE

' . ',. - .-

) ..

j 5 w? ~ ' .:

s a function of the Control Room-wide labeling package, func'.ional relation- .

'l .

-l-ip will be clarified and systems / components appropriately i6entified. ' ...* +* , . .

'c > (I

• i

, -/.-

',&- ' .3.

.j.

3' t

' ' . , . ; j. '

l . .;; .'_i ;,

3 .- .. ,

.e9 . .

> gap .. ;

, y v. .

.. . 1 s -

~ '

.. Y.l v:

f ~l ci, ." ~

t ._.)- ..;

.'y.-'. N ; ',, ~ .

LiPLE'1ENT ATION : ', " ' -

.[y the completion of the second refueling outage. .. '~".." -

'~

415/c/52 .

l :d - ,

1,' .

n .

E CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

)DC NO. : 0492 HED NO.: 9.3.2.B V, 1 FP, GORY: 3 LEVEL: C JDING:

arc ars several problems associated with the following meters: Rx era / Total Steam Flow; Turbine Steam Flow /Rx Press; Vessel Level / Total FW 3w. The labels for Rx Press do not indicate an 'NR' of 'WR' difference aids # 6.1.1.). It was also suggested that the 'WR' have a listed range of 1.500 instead of 0-15 x 10E2 (Guide # 5.1.2.B). There are also functional 1/or operating relationships which could be formalized by grouping these rameters differently.

SPONSE:

lor 9cale Design Package will be developed to provide guidelines for proper it designation and nomenclature.

I

'iPLEME*IT AS ION :

1

/ tha completion of the second refueling outage. l 415/c/65