ML20097A227

Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing RCS Pressure Tests to Be Performed While Remaining in Cold Shutdown Mode

ML20097A227
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	02/01/1996
From:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20097A185	List: JPN-96-005, Forwards Application for Amend to License DPR-59,allowing RCS Pressure Tests to Be Performed While Remaining in Cold Shutdown Mode ML20097A192 ML20097A227
References
NUDOCS 9602050216
Download: ML20097A227 (62)

Text

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l JAFNPP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS P_a2A 1.0 Definitions 1  !

LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1.1 Fuel Cladding Integrity 2.1 7 l l 1.2 Reactor Coolant System 2.2 27 SURVEILLANCE LjMITING Cl)NDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.0 General 4.0 30 3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.1 30hl )

l 3.2 Instrumentation 4.2 49  !

A. Primary Containment isolation Functions A. 49 B. Core and Containment Cooling Systems - B. 50 initiation and Control C. Control Rod Block Actuation C. 50 D. Radiation Monitoring Systems -Isolation D. 50 l l

and Initiation Functions E. Drywell Leak Detection E. 53 l F. Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip F. 53 G. Recirculation Pump Trip G. 53 H. Accident Monitoring instrumentation H. 53

1. 4kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip 1. 53 J. Remote Shutdown Capability J. 54 3.3 Reactivity Control 4.3 88 A. Reactivity Limitations A. 88 B. Control Rods B. 91 C. Scram insertion Times C. 95 D. Reactivity Anomalies D. 96 3.4 Standby Liquid Control System 4.4 105 A. Normal Operation A. 105 B. Operation With Inoperable Components B. 106 C. Sodium Pentaborate Solution C. 107 3.5 Core and Containment Cooling Systems 4.5 112 A. Core Spray and LPCI Systems A. 112 B. Containment Cooling Mode d the RHR B. 115 System C. HPCI System C. 117 D. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) D. 119 E. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) E. 121 System Amendment No. 22,130,131,183,190,210,225,227 9602050216 960201 i PDR ADOCK 05000333 P PDR

JAFNPP

. . TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont d)

SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS Eggg F. ECCS-Cold Condition F. 122 G. Maintenance of Filled Discharge Pipe G. 122a H. Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) H. 123

1. Linear Heat Generation Rate 1. 124 J. Thermal Hydraulic Stability J. 124a 3.6 Reactor Coolant System 4.6 136 A. Pressurization and Thermal Limits A. 136 B. DELETED C. Coolant Chemistry C. 139 D. Coolant Leakage D. 141 E. Safety and Safety / Relief Valves E. 142a F. Structural Integrity F. 144 G. Jet Pumps G. 144 H. DELETED

1. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 1. 145b 3.7 Containment Systems 4.7 165 A. Primary Containment A. 165 B. Standby Gas Treatment System B. 181 C. Secondary Containment C. 184 D. Primary Containment isolation Valves D. 185 l

3.8 Miscellaneous Radioactive Material Sources 4.8 214 )

3.9 Auxiliary Electrical Systems 4.9 215 '

A. Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems A. 215 l B. Emergency AC Power System B. 216 C. Diesel Fuel C. 218 D. Diesel-Generator Operability D. 220 E. Station Batteries E. 221 F. LPCI MOV Independent Power Supplies F. 222a G. Reactor Protection System Electrical Protection Assemblies G. 222c 3.10 Core Alterations 4.10 227 A. Refueling Interlocks A. 227 B. Core Monitoring B. 230 C. Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level C. 231 D. Control Rod and Control Rod Drive Maintenance D. 231 3.11 Additional Safety Related Plant Capabilities 4.11 237 A. Main Control Room Ventilation A. 237 B. Crescent Area Ventilation B. 239 C. Battery Room Ventilation C. 239 D. Emergency Service Water System D. 240 E. Intake Deicing Heaters E. 242 Amendment No. 20, iS,9S,113,1SS, ii

...- - . - = . . . - . - . . ~ . --.. _ - - . - . . _ - - - - - - . . - _ . . - . .

JAFNPP TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS EaQR 3.12 Special Operations 4.12 244a l A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation A. 244a l

5.0 Design Features 245 l

l 5.1 Site 245 5.3 Reactor Pressure Vessel 245 5.4 Containment 245 5.5 Fuel Storage 245 5.6 Seismic Design 246 6.0 Administrative Controls 247 6.1 Responsibility 247 6.2 Organization 247 6.2.1 Facility Management and Technical Support 247 l

6.2.2 Plant Staff 247a 6.3 Plant Staff Qualifications 248 6.4 Retraining and Replacement Training 248 6.5 Review and Audit 248 6.5.1 Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) 248a 6.5.2 Safety Review Committee (SRC) 250 6.6 Poportable Event Action 253 6.7 Safety Limit Violation 253 6.8 Procedures 253 6.9 Reporting Requirements 254a 6.10 Record Retention 254g 6.11 Radiation Protection Program 255 6.12 Industrial Security Program 258 6.13 Emergency Plan 258 6.14 Fire Protection Program 258 6.15 Environmental Qualification 258a i

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l Amendment No. 7, 22, 32, Si, 37, 33,110,130,137, 218, iii

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JAFNPP 3.0 Continued 4.0 Continued G. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with the Special Operations LCOs is optional. When a Special Operations LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO shall be met. When a Special Operations LCO is not desired to be met, entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition shall only be made in accordance with the other applicable specifications.

4 i

i Amendment No.

30b

JAFNPP 3.0 BASES A. This specification states the applicability of each specification D. Continued ii in terms of defined OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) and is provided to delineate specifically when each specification is the status of the plant before or after an OPERATIONAL applicable.

CONDITION (mode) change. Therefore in this case, entry into ,

an OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified This specification defines those conditions necessary to condition may be made in accordance with the provisions of B.

constitute compliance with the terms of an individual Limiting the ACTION requirements. The provisions of this specification  !

Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirement. should not, however, be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise good practice in restoring systems or components to This specification delineates the ACTION to be taken for OPERABLE status before startup.

C.

circumstances not directly provided for in the ACTION i statements and whose occurrence would violate the intent of Exceptions to this provision may be made for a limited number l the specification. Under the terms of Specification 3.0, the of specifications when startup with inoperable equipment facility is to be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN within the would not affect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. It is assumed that the unit is brought to the ACTION statements of the appropriate specifications.

the required OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) within the required times by promptly initiating and carrying out the E. This specification delineates what additional conditions must appropriate ACTION statement. be satisfied to permit operation to continue, consistent with the ACTION statements for power sources, when a normal or D. This specification provides that entry into an OPERABLE emergency power source is not OPERABLE. It specifically CONDITION (mode) must be made with (a) the full prohibits operation when one division is inoperable because its complement of required systems, equipment or components normal or emergency power source is inoperable and a i OPERABLE and (b) all other parameters as specified in the system, subsystem, train, component or device in another i Limiting Conditions for Operation being met without regard for division is inoperable for another reason.

allowable deviations and out of service provisions contained in

' the ACTION statements. The provisions of this specification permit the ACTION statements associated with individual systems, subsystems, .

The intent of this provision is to insure that facility operation is trains, components or devices to be consistent with the not initiated with either required equipment or systems ACTION statement of the associated electrical power source.

i inoperable or other limits being exceeded. Compliance with it allows operation to be governed by the time ACTION requirements that permit continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation without the regard to Amendment No. 83,131,181, 30c l i

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JAFNPP 3.0 BASES - Continued E. Continued E. Continued limits of the ACTION statement associated with the Limiting As a further example, Specification 3.9.A. requires in part that ,

Condition for Operation for the normal or emergency power two 115KV lines and reserve station transformers be available. '

source, and not by the individual ACTION statements for each The ACTION statement provides a 7 day out-of-service time system, subsystem, train, component or device that is when both required offsite circuits are not OPERABLE. If the determined to be inoperable solely because of the inoperability definition of OPERABLE were applied without consideration of of its normal or emergency power source. Specification 3.0.E., all systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable normal For example, Specification 3.9.A. requires in part that both power sources, both of the offsite circuits, would also be emergency diesel generator systems be OPERABLE. The inoperable. This would dictate invoking the applicable ACTION ACTION statement provides for a 7 day out-of-service time statements for each of the applicable LCOs. However, the

when emergency diesel generator system A or B is not provisions of Specification 3.0.E. permit the time limits for OPERABLE. If the definition of OPERABLE were applied continued operation to be consistent with the ACTION without consideration of Specification 3.0.E., all systems, statement for the inoperable normal power sources instead, subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the provided the otler specified conditions are satisfied. In this j inoperable emergency power source, diesel generator system case, this would mean that for one division the emergency A or B, would also be inoperable. This would dictate invoking power source must be OPERABLE (as must be the components the applicable ACTION statements for each of the applicable supplied by the emergency power source) and all redundant Limiting Conditions for Operation. However, the provisions of systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in the Specification 3.0.E. permit the time limits for continued other division must be OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy operation to be consistent with the ACTION statement for the Specification 3.0.E. (i.e., be capable of performing their design inoperable emergency diesel generator system instead, functions and have an emergency power source OPERABLE).

provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. If they in other words, both emergency power sources A and B must are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this be OPERABLE and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, specification. components and devices in both divisions must also be OPERABLE. If these conditions are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this specification.

i in Cold Shutdown and Refuel Modes, Specification 3.0.E. is not applicable, and thus the individual ACTION statement for -

each applicable Limiting Condition for Operation in these ,

j OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS (modes) must be adhered to.

Amendment No. 33,198, 30d l l t

JAFNPP 3.0 Bases - Continued i

F. LCO 3.0.F establishes the allowance for restoring G. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified  ;

equipment to service under administrative controls when it TS requirements to be changed to permit performance of  !

has been removed from serwce or declared inoperable to special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, comply with required actions. The sole purpose of this all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will Specification is to prowde an exception to LCO 3.0.B to ensure all appropriate requirements of the OPERATIONAL allow testing to demonstrate: (a) the operability of the CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition not equipment being returned to service; or (b) the operability of directly associated with or required to be changed to  :

other equipment. perform the special test or operation will remain in effect. i The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment The applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a 5 is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal  !

the required actions is limited to the time absolutely requirements of TS. Compliance with Special Operations i necessary to perform the allowed testing. This LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed Specification does not provide time to perform any other either under the provisions of the appropriate Special  :

preventive or corrective maintenance. Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special An example of demonstrating the operability of the operation under the provisions of the Special Operations j equipment being retumed to service is reopening a LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall  ;

containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires l with the required actions and must be reopened to perform another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO the testing. statement are required to be met (i.e., should the  !

requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS i An example of demonstrating the operability of other of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out the other LCO). However, there are instances where the of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other l

occurring during the performance of testing on another LCOs' ACTIONS be met. l channel in the other trip system. A similar example of i demonstrating the operability of other equipment is taking Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, -

an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If  ;

condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other i appropriate response during the performance of testing on LCO is met, all the other LCOs' requirements (ACTIONS l another channel in the same trip system. and SR) are required to be met concurrent with the  ;

requirements of the Special Operations LCO.

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, Amendment No. Gab  ;

30e

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JAFNPP 4.0 BASES i

A. This specification provides that surveillance activities C. Continued i necessary to insure the Limiting Conditions for Operation are ,

met and will be performed dunng the OPERATIONAL interval, defined by the provisions of Specification 4.0.B, as a CONDITIONS (modes) for which the Limiting Conditions for condition that constitutes a failure to meet the OPERABILITY  ;

Operation are applicable. Provisions for additional surveillance requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. Under the activities to be performed without regard to the applicable provisions of this specification, systems and components are OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS (modes) are provided in the assumed to be OPERABLE when Surveillance Requirements individual Surveillance Requirements. have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval However, nothing in this provision is to be construed B. Specification 4.0.B establishes the limit for which the specified as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when time interval for Surveillance Requirements may be extended. they are found or known to be inoperable although still it permits an allowable extension of the normal surveillance meeting the Surveillance Requirements. This specification also interval to facilitate surveillance scheduling and consideration clarifies that the ACTION requirements are applicable when of plant opeating conditions that may not be suitable for Surveillance Requirements have not been completed within the conducting the surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other allowed surveillance interval and that the time limits of tne ongoing surveillance or maintenance activities). It also ACTION requirements apply from the point in time it is provides flexibility to accommodate the length of a fuel cycle identified that a surveillance has not been performed and not for surveillances that are performed at each refueling outage at the time that the allowed surveillance was exceeded.

and are specified with a 24 month surveillance interval. It is Completion of the Surveillance Requirement within the not intended that this provision be used repeatedly as a allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements convenience to extend surveillance intervals beyond that restores compliance with the requirements of Specification specified for surveillances that are not performed during 4.0.C. However, this does not negate the fact that the failure refueling outages. The limitation of this specification is based to have performed the surveillance within the allowed

, on egineering judgement and the recognition that the most surveillance interval, defined by the provisions of Specification probable result of any particular surveillance being performed 4.0.B. was a violation of the OPERABILITY requirements of a is the verification of conformance with the Surveillance Limiting Condition for Operation that is subject to enforcement Requirements. The limit on extension of the normal action. Further, the failure to perform a survaillance within the  !

surveillance interval ensures that the reliability confirmed by provisions of Specification 4.0.B is a violation of a Technical surveillance activities is not significantly reduced below that Specification requirement and is, therefore, a reportable event obtained from the specified surveillance interval. under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because it is a condition prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

C. This specification establishes the failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the allowed surveillance Amendment No. 83,1SS,190, 22S, 227, 30f l

i JAFNPP t

4.0 BASES - Continued C. Continued C. Continued if the allowable outage time limits of the ACTION requirements Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on I are less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a shutdown is required to comply inoperable equipment because the ACTION requirements with ACTION requirements, a 24-hour allowance is provided to define the remedial measures that apply. However, the permit a delay in implementing the ACTION requirements. Surveillance Requirements have to be met to demonstrate that This provides an adequate time limit to complete Surveillance inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.

1 Requirements that have not been performed. The purpose of this allowance is to permit the completion of a surveillance before a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION D. This specification establishes the requirement that all requirements or before other remedial measures would be applicable surveillances must be met before entry into an required that may preclude completion of a surveillance. The OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other condition of operation basis for this allowance includes consideration for plant specified in the Applicability statement. The purpose of this conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the specification is to ensure that system and component time required to perform the surveillance and the safety OPERABILITY requirements or parameter limits are met before significance of the delay in completing the required entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified surveillance. This provision also provides a time limit for the condition associated with plant shutdown as well as startup.

completion of Surveillance Requirements that become applicable as a consequence of OPERATIONAL CONDITION Under the provisions of this specification, the applicable (mode) changes imposed by ACTION requirements and for Surveillance Requirements must be performed within the i completing Surveillance Requirements that are applicable when specified surveillance interval to ensure that the Limiting an exception to the requirements of Specification 4.0.C is Conditions for Operation are met during initial plant startup or allowed. If a surveillance is not completed within the 24-hour following a plant outage.

allowance, the time limits of the ACTION requirements are  !

applicable at that time. When a surveillance is performed When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION within the 24-hour allowance and the Surveillance requirements, the provisions of this specification do not apply Requirements are not met, the time limits of the ACTION because this would delay placing the facility in a lower requirements are applicable at the time the surveillance is CONDITION of operation.

terminated.

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! Amendment No.

2 3Og l

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JAFNPP i

i 3.1 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM 4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM Apolicability: Anolicability:

Applies to the instrumentation and associated devices which Applies to the surveillance of the instrumentation and associated  !

initiate the reactor scram. devices which initiate reactor scram.

Obiective: Obiective:

To assure the operability of the Reactor Protection System. To specify the type of frequency of surveillance to be applied to the protection instrumentation.

Soecification: Specification:

A. The setpoints and minimum number of instrument A. Instrumentation systems shall be functionally tested and channels per trip system that must be operable for each calibrated as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 position of the reactor mode switch, shall be as shown in respectively.

Table 3.1-1.

The response time of the reactor protection system tnp functions listed below shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Each test shall include at least one channel in each trip system. All channels in both trip systems shall be tested within two test intervals.

1. Reactor High Pressure (02-3PT-55A, B, C. D)

2. Drywell High Pressure (05PT-12A, B, C, D)

3. Reactor Water Level-Low (L3) (02-3LT-101 A, B, C, D)

4. Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Closure (29PNS-80A2, 82, C2, D2)

(29PNS-86A2, B2, C2, D2)

5. Turbine Stop Valve Closure (94PNS-101,102,103,104)

6. Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure (94PS-2OOA, B, C, D)

7. APRM Fixed High Neutron Flux

8. APRM Flow Referenced Neutron Flux Amendment No. 42h 30h l

JAFNPP 3.5 (cont'd) 4.5 (cont'd)

a. From and after the date that the HPCI System is a. When it is determined that the HPCI System is made or found to be inoperab!o for any reason, inoperable the RCIC, both LPCI subsystems, both  ;

continued reactor operation is permissible only core spray subsystems, and the ADS System during the succeeding 7 days unless such system actuation logic shall be verified to be operable is sooner made operable, provided that during such immediately. The RCIC System and ADS System 7 days all active components of the Automatic logic shall be verified to be operable daily thereafter.

Depressurization System, the Core Spray System, LPCI System, and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System are operable.

b. If the requirements of 3.5.C.1 cannot be met, the reactor shall be placed in the cold condition and pressure less than 150 psig within 24 hrs.

2. Low power physics testing and reactor operator training shall be permitted with reactor coolant temperature

s212*F with an inoperable component (s) as specified in 3.5.C.1 above.

i Amendment No. 4,107,134,'iS,'79, 118

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JAFNPP t

3.5 (cont'd) 4.5 (cont'd)

2. If the requirements of 3.5.D.1 cannot be met, the 2. A logic system functional test.

! reactor shall be pieced in the cold condition and pressure less than 100 psig within 24 hr. a. When it is determined that two valves of the ADS are inoperet'e, the ADS System actuation logic for the operable ADS valves and the HPCI System shall be verified to be operable immediately and at least weekly thereaf tsr.

b. When it is determined that more than two relief / safety valves of the ADS are inoperable, the HPCI System shall be verified to be operable immediately.

3. Low power physics testing and reactor operator training shall be permitted with inoperable ADS components, provided that reactor coolant temperature is .g_212 T and the reactor vessel is vented or reactor vessel head is removed.

Amendment No. 22, 'iS,

• 79, 209, 217, 120

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t JAFNPP .

3.5 (Cont'd) 4.5 (Cont'd)

Reactor Core isolation Coolina (RCIC) System E. Reactor Core isolation Coolina (RCIC) System E.

1. The RCIC System shall be operable whenever there 1. RCIC System testing shall be performed as follows is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel and the reactor provided a reactor steam supply is available. If pressure is greater than 150 psig and reactor coolant steam is not available at the time the surveillance temperature is greater than 212*F except from the test is scheduled to be performed, the test shall be i time that the RCIC System is made or found to be performed within ten days of continuous operation i i

inoperable for any reason, continued reactor power from the time steam becomes available.

operation is permissible during the succeeding 7 l jlem Frecuency days unless the system is made operable earlier ,

i provided that during these 7 days the HPCI System

is operable. a. Simulated Automatic

• Once/ operating

' Actuation (and Restart ) cycle

2. If the requirements of 3.5.E cannot be met, the Test

reactor shall be placed in the cold condition and pressure less than 150 psig within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. b. Pump Operability Once/ month

3. Low power physics testing and reactor operator c. Motor Operated Once/ month training shall be permitted with inoperable Valve Operability components as specified in 3.5.E.2 above, provided that reactor coolant temperature is s212*F. d. Flow Rate Once/3 months

e. Testable Check T6sted for operability Valves any time the reactor is  :

in the cold condition ,

exceeding 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, if operability tests have '

not been performed i during the preceding . i 31 days.

f. Logic System Once/ operating Functional Test cycle .

• Automatic restart on a low water level signal which i is subsequent to a high water level trip.

Amendment No. 40,107,120,'79,

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i JAFNPP 3.6 (cont'd) 4.6 (cont'd) i

a. s20 F when to the left of curve C.

b. s100*F when on or to the right of curve C.

3. Non-Nuclear Heatup and Cooldown 3. Non-Nuclear Heatup and Cooldown i

During heatup by non-nuclear means (mechanical), During heatup by Non-Nuclear means, cooldown followmg ,

cooldown following nuclear shutdown and low power nuclear shutdown and low power physics tests, the reactor l physics tests the Reactor Coolant System pressure and coolant system pressure and temperature shall be recorded ,

temperature shall be on or to the right of the curve B every 30 minutes until two consecutive temperature readings shown in Figure 3.6-1 Part 1,2, or 3 and the maximum are within 5*F of each other.

temperature change during any one hour shall be i s100*F.

4. Core Critical Operation 4. Core Critical Operation ,

t During all modes of operation with a critical core (except During all modes of operation with a critical core (except for low '

for low power physics tests) the reactor Coolant System power physics tests) the reactor Coolant System pressure and pressure and temperature shall be at or to the right of temperature shall be recorded within 30 minutes prior to  :

the curve C shown in Figure 3.6-1 Part 1,2, or 3 and withdrawal of control rods to bring the reactor critical and every the maximum temperature change during any one hour 30 minutes during heatup until two consecutive temperature ,

shall be s100*F. readings are within 5*F of each other.

Amendment No. 29, S S, ' 13,158, ' 79, 137  ;

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JAFNPP l t

3.6 (cont'd) 4.6 (cont'd)

2. If Specification 3.6.E.1 is not met, the reactor shall be 2. At least one safety / relief valve shall be disassembled and  ;

placed in a cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. inspected every 24 months.

3. Low power physics testing and reactor operator training shall 3. The integrity of the nitrogen system and components which be permitted with inoperable components as specified in provide manual and ADS actuation of the safety / relief valves l Specification 3.6.E.1 above, provided that reactor coolant shall be demonstrated at least once every 3 months. '

temperature is .5212 Y and the reactor vessel is vented or  ;

the reactor vessel head is removed.

4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.D are not applicable. 4. Manually open each safety / relief valve while bypassing steam to the condenser and observe a .;>_10% closure of the turbine bypass valves, to verify that the safety / relief valve has opened. This test shall be performed at least every 24 months while in the RUN mode and within the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> j

! after steam pressure and flow are adequate to perform the test. >

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Amendment No. 13,70,130,134,*70,105,217,219,229, 143

JAFNPP 3.6 and 4.6 BASES (cont'd)

Fig. 3.6-1, curve B, provides limitations for plant heatup and cooldown when the reactor is not critical or during low power physics tests. The thermal limitation is based on maximum heatup and cooldown rates of 100*F/hr in any one-hour period.

Fig. 3.6-1, curve C, establishes operating limits when core is critical. These limits include a margin of 40*F as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix G.

The requirements for cold boltup of the reactor vessel closure are based on NDT temperature plus a 60*F factor of safety. This factor is based on the requirements of the ASME Code to which the vessel was built. For Fig. 3.6-1, curves A, B and C, margins are only added to the low temperature portion of the curve where non-ductile failure is a concern. The closure flanges have  !

an NDT temperature not greater than 30*F and are not subject to any appreciable neutron radiation exposure. Therefore, the minimum temperature of the flanges when the studs are m t tension is 30*F plus 60*F, or 90*F.

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no Amendment No. "' '

• o 148 l

JAFNPP 3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 4.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS i

Acolicability: Apolicability:

Applies to the status of systems during special operations. Applies to periodic testing of systems during special operations.

Obiective: Objective:

To allow performance of special operations. To verify operability of required systems during special operations.

Specification:

Specificalign:

, A. Inservice I ==k and Hydrostatic Testina Operation A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina Operation The reactor may be considered to be in COLD SHUTDOWN Perform the applicable surveillance requirements for the with reactor coolant temperature between 212*F and 3OO*F required LCOs.

and the reactor vessel not vented, to allow performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic testing provided the following LCOs are met:

1. LCO 3.5.F, "ECCS-Cold Condition," a minimum of I two low pressure subsystems shall be operable;  ;

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2. LCO 3.7.B, " Standby Gas Treatment System;"  :

3. LCO 3.7.C, " Secondary Containment;" and

4. LCO 3.9, " Auxiliary Electrical Systems," the necessary systems shall be operable to support ,

equipment required to be operable.  ;

4

5. With the above requirements not met, immediately i

suspend activities that could increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure and reduce reactor coolant temperature to less than 212*F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Amendment No. 31, SO,134,135, 218, 244a

t JAFNPP 3.12 and 4.12 BASES .

A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina Operation

, The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow in the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling I COLD SHUTDOWN when the metallurgical characteristics of systems to operate. The capability of these systems, as required the reactor pressurs vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing by this Special Operations LCO, would be adequate to keep the core l at temperatures greater than 212* F (normally corresponding flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system to HOT SHUTDOWN). leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant  ;

inventory loss occurred.

Allowing the reactor to be considered in COLD SHUTDOWN during hydrostatic or leak testing, when reactor coolant For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally temperature is > 212*F, effectively provides an exception to required COLD SHUTDOWN applicable LCOs,in addition to the '

HOT SHUTDOWN requirements, including operability of requirements of this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable primary containment and the full compliment of redundant consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during >

Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or postulated accident conditions. i leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, the i l

stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these  !

conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. In addition, secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and the '

secondary containment will be capable of handling any '

airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required i i

pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively  ;

bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment. ,

I Amendment No.

244b j

l l

Attachment 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION (JPTS-95-004)

New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59

Attachment 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 1 of 20

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES Section 1 describes technical changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications that affect system operability requirements during hydrostatic and system leakage (pressure) testing of the reactor coolant system. These changes, with minor exceptions, adopt the Special Operations section from Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1433). ,

l in addition to the technical changes, Section 2 describes editorial changes to improve the table of contents, relocate text, use consistent terminology, and reflect the addition of new pages to the Technical Specifications.

1. Technical Changes l l

Paae 30b l

l Add Specification 3.0.G as follows:

"G. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified Technical Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with the Special Operations LCOs is optional. When a Special Operations LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO shall be met.

When a Special Operations LCO is not desired to be met, entry into an OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition shall only be made in accordance with the other applicable specifications."

Attachm:nt 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 2 of 20 Paae 30e Add Specification 3.0.G Bases as follows:

"G. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations.

Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect, i The applicability of a Special Operstions LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of TS.

Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special j operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO '

shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met.

Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCOs' requirements (ACTIONS and SR) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO."

Paae 118 Delete Specification 3.5.C.3, which states:

"3. The HPCI system is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures between 212 F and 300 F and irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel provided all control rods are inserted."

Attachmsnt il to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 3 of 20 t

Paae 120 Delete Specification 3.5.D.4, which states:

"4. The ADS is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures below 300 F and irradiated j fuel in the reactor vessel provided all control rods are inserted."

l l Paae 121 l

l Delete Specification 3.5.E.4, which states:

"4. The RCIC system is not required to be operable during hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures between 212 F and 300 F and irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel provided all control rods are -

inserted."

Page 137 Delete the following from Specification 3.6.A.2:

" Specifications 3.5.C,3.5.D,3.5.E and 3.6.E which would become effective because of an increase in reactor coolant temperature above 212 F or pressures above 100 and 150 psig are not required while conducting the RCS hydrostatic j pressure and leakage tests between 212 F and 300 F provided all control rods 1 are fully inserted." l l Paae 143 )

i Delete Specification 3.6.E.5, which states: l l

"5. The safety and safety / relief valves are not required to be operable during i hydrostatic pressure and leakage testing with reactor coolant temperatures i between 212 F and 300 F and irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel provided all l control rods are inserted."

l l

l Attachment ll to JPN-96-005 l SAFETY EVALUATION Page 4 of 20 l'

Paae 148 Delete the following from Specification 3.6 and 4.6 Bases:

" Specification 3.6.A.2 identifies four LCOs that become effective with increased i reactor coolant temperature or pressure but are not in effect during the  :

hydrostatic and leakage tests. This is necessary because, as reactor fluence increases, the minimum test temperature and pressure rises into ranges normally associated with startup or hot shutdown. RCS pressure and temperature are used throughout the Technical Specifications as a basis for establishing plant mode and system operability requirements. Some LCOs and restrictions cannot  !

be satisfied during the test at elevated temperatures. For example, Specifications j 3.5.C.1 and 3.5.E.1 require that HPCI and RCIC be operable when reactor i pressure exceeds 150 psig and 212 F. HPCI and RCIC cannot be made j operable during the test because piping normally filled with steam is filled with water during the test.

Hydrostatic and leakage tests shall be terminated before the reactor coolant temperature exceeds 300 F. This temperature limit is based on providing a 50*F ,

band for operating flexibility between the 300 F limit and the highest estimated  ;

minimum testing temperature at 32 EFPY (approximately 250 F). i The protection provided by LCOs applicable during cold shutdown plus the requirement that all control rods be fully inserted are adequate to ensure protection of public health and safety. The hydrostatic test is performed once every 10 years while the leakage test is performed after each refueling when conditions are similar to cold shutdown (i.e., after the reactor has been shutdown )

and decay heat and the energy stored in the core is very low). The consequences of accidents (small and large break LOCAs, MSLB, etc.) are bounded by analyses that assume full power operation. Specification 3.5.A requires the low pressure ECCS systems to be operable. Specifications 3.7.A, j 3.7.B and 3.7.C require the containment, SGTS and secondary containment to be j operable. Specifications 3.2.A,3.2.B and Appendix B, Specification 3.8 require l instrumentation that initiate containment, low pressure ECCS, SGTS and secondary containment be operable. Emergency power is required by Specification 3.9.B."

l l

l l

1

Attachmsnt ll to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 5 of 20 Page 244a Add Specification 3.12 as follows:

"3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS Anoticability:

Applies to the status of systems during special operations.

Objective:

To allow performance of special operations.

Soecification:

A. laservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina Ooeration The reactor may be considered to be in COLD SHUTDOWN with reactor coolant temperature between 212 F and 300 F and the reactor vessel not vented, to allow performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic te-sting provided the following LCOs are met:

1. LCO 3.5.F, "ECCS-Cold Condition," a minimum of two low pressure subsystems shall be operable;

2. LCO 3.7.B, " Standby Gas Treatment System;"

3. LCO 3.7.C, " Secondary Containment;" and

4. LCO 3.9, " Auxiliary Electrical Systems," the necessary systems shall be operable to support equipment required to be operable.

5. With the above requirements not met, immediately suspend activities that could increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure and reduce reactor coolant temperature to less than 212 F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."

~

Attachm2nt 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 6 of 20  !

Page 244a Add Specification 4.12 as follows:

"4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS Anolicability:

Applies to periodic testing of systems during special operations.

Obiective:

To verify operability of required systems during special operations.

Snecification:

A. Inservice Leak and Hvdrostatic Testina Ooeration l l

Perform the applicable surveillance requirements for the required LCOs." -

1 l

1 I

i

.. . - _ =. -- - -- . . - --

1_

Attachment 11 to JPN-96-005

! SAFETY EVALUATION j Page 7 of 20 Paae 244b (new page) l Add Section 3/4.12 Bases as follows::

"3.12 and 4.12 BASES A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina Ooeration

)

The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor coolant  !

pressure tests to be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN when the metallurgical I characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at temperatures greater than 212 F (normally corresponding to HOT SHUTDOWN).

Allowing the reactor to be considered in COLD SHUTDOWN during hydrostatic or ,

leak testing, when reactor coolant temperature is >212 F, effectively provides an exception to HOT SHUTDOWN requirements, including operability of primary containment and the full compliment of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. In addition, secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with this I S,oecial Operations LCO, and the secondary containment will be capable of I handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the l performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing l conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam lins break outside of primary containment.

In the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly l depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The  !

capability of these systems, as required by this Special Operations LCO, would i be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. I Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required COLD SHUTDOWN applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions."

l Attachment ll to JPN-96-005 i SAFETY EVALUATION i Page 8 of 20 Editorial Changes  !

2.

Pagei j Change page number for LCO/SR 3.1/4.1 from "30g" to "30h."  :

Page il l Move the section headings " LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" and ,

" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS" to the top of the page.  ;

Delete blank line between "3.9 Auxiliary Electrical Systems" and "A. Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems." '

Relocate LCO/SR 3.11/4.11.D and E from page lii. t Pace iii Add the section headings " LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION" and  :

" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS" to the top of the page.

Delete " DELETED" for page 244a and replace with LCO/SR "3.12/4.12 Special Operations" and LCO/SR "A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation."

Pace 30b Relocate Bases for LCO 3.0.A,3.0.B,3.0.C,3.0.D, and 3.0.E from page 30b to page 30c.

Pace 30c Relocate the remainder of the Bases for LCO 3.0.E from page 30c to page 30d.

Page 30d Relocate Bases for LCO 3.0.F from page 30d to page 30e.

Pace 30e Relocate Bases for SR 4.0.A,4.0.8, and 4.0.C from page 30e to page 30f.

Page 30f Relocate the remainder of the Bases for SR 4.0.C and the Bases for SR 4.0.D from page 30f to page 30g.

Pace 30g Relocate LCO/SR 3.1/4.1 from page 30g to new page 30h.

Attachmsnt 11 to JPN-96-005 +

SAFETY EVALUATION

- - Page 9 of 20 Page 118 l Revise SR 4.5.C.1.a as follows:

Change "HPCI subsystem" to "HPCI System," "the LPCI subsystem" to "both LPCI subsystems," "RCIC system" to "RCIC System," and " ADS subsystem" to " ADS System."  ;

i Revised Specification to read: ,

"When it is determined that the HPCI System is inoperable the RCIC, both LPCI subsystems, both core spray subsystems, and the ADS System actuation logic shall be verified to be operable immediately. The RCIC System and ADS System logic shall be verified to be operable daily thereafter."  !

Paae120 ,

Revise SR 4.5.D.2.a as follows Change " ADS subsystem" to " ADS System" and "HPCI Subsystem" to "HPCI System."

Revised Specification to read:

"When it is determined that two valves of the ADS are inoperable, the ADS System actuation logic for the operable ADS valves and the HPCI System shall be verified to be operable immediately and at least weekly thereafter."

Page 244a Delete "Pages 244a-244w DELETED." i 1

i l

-__-- _,w . , , - - . ,... yy -. - 4., , 59.= y. -- y.

Attachment ll to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION '

Page 10 of 20 ll. PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES

1. Technical Changes The Authority uses the guidance in NRC Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Materials and Its impact on Plant Operations," for calculation of the reactor vessel pressure and temperature (P-T) limits for hydrostatic and system leakage (pressure) testing of the reactor coolant system. The P-T curves defining these limits are periodically recalculated to consider the results of analyses of irradiated surveillance specimens to account for accumulated reactor fluence. At the current point in FitzPatrick reactor vessel life, P-T curve limitations are such that reactor coolant temperatures above 212 F are expected during pressure tests.

The purpose of the proposed technical changes is to allow reactor coolant system pressure tests to be performed while remaining in the Cold Shutdown Mode. Primary containment integrity is not required in the Cold Shutdown Mode thus allowing unrestricted access to the primary containment for the performance of inspections.

The changes will also allow outage activities on other systems to continue. The changes, with minor exceptions, adopt Special Operations Section 3.10.1, " Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation," from Standard Technical Specifications (STS), NUREG-1433. Minor exceptions are required to ensure consistency within FitzPatrick TS, reflect differences between FitzPatrick TS and STS, and ensure the same level of ECCS redundancy afforded by STS during pressure testing. These exceptions will be eliminated when the FitzPatrick TS are converted to STS.

Technical Specification Amendment 179 was issued on March 9,1992 to allow the High Pressure Coolant Injection, Reactor Core isolation Cooling, Safety Relief Valves, and Automatic Depressurization Systems to be inoperable during the performance of reactor coolant system pressure tests at temperatures up to 300 F.

These exceptions to the normal system operability requirements are permissible because pressure tests are performed with the reactor shutdown, in nearly water solid conditions, with low decay heat (i.e., heat flux is approximately 1 percent of the full power value within a few hours of shutdown). The proposed changes will retain the exceptions for these systems because operability of these systems is not required with the reactor in the Cold Shutdown Mode. The effect of the proposed changes is to expand the list of exceptions to the normal operability requirements to be consistent with STS (NUREG-1433).

2. Editorial Changes Editorial changes improve the table of contents, relocate text, ensure consistent use of terminology, or reflect the addition of new TS pages.

- -. - - - .- . - - . - ... . . . .~ .. . - - . - .. . .__ - - - . . - - - . - _

2 Attachmsnt il to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION j - -

Page 11 of 20

]

l lIL SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES

1. Technical Changes i

Allowing the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during reactor coolant system pressure tests, with reactor coolant temperature between 212 F.and

, 300 F, effectively provides an exception to Hot Shutdown requirements, including maintaining primary containment integrity and operability of the full compliment of

redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since pressure tests are performed nearly water solid,'at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized.

l An analysis of a High Energy Line Break (HELB) was performed (Reference 1) to )

determine the response of the secondary containment to a HELB during a reactor coolant system hydrostatic test. Reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were conservatively assumed to be 350 F and 1250 psia, respectively, for this analysis. In addition, the primary containment, including the drywell head, was assumed to be open during the test in order to maximize the energy release to the l secondary containment. The analysis demonstrates that in the event of a HELB during a hydrostatic test, the secondary containment will remain intact and environmental qualification of equipment within the secondary containment will not be i jeopardized. Since secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in l accordance with the Special Operations LCO, the secondary containment will be  !

capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing, i l

The requirements of the Special Operations LCO provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the l consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will limit

];

potential radiation releases to the environment. )

In the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly I depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of these systems, as required by the Special Operations LCO would be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

During reactor coolant system pressure tests, the protection provided by normally required Cold Shutdown applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of the Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal testing conditions and during postulated accident conditions.

Attachm:nt il to JPN-96-005 l SAFETY EVALUATION

. - Page 12 of 20 Technical Specification Effects 1

i The proposed changes allow reactor coolant system pressure testing to be performed in Cold Shutdown when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing be performed at temperatures greater than 212 F (normally corresponding to Hot Shutdown). TS requirements for the following systems or components are affected by the proposed changes:

• Primary Containment isolation System o Accident Monitoring instrumentation l

• Core Spray System i

e Low Pressure Coolant injection System  ;

l e

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Cross-Tie Valve Position )

e RHR Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

• RHR Containment Cooling l

e Reactor Coolant System Chemistry  !

e Reactor Coolant System Leakage e Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) e Primary Containment

• Auxiliary Electrical Systems e Control Room Ventilation e Crescent Area Ventilation The specific requirements that will no longer be in effect during reactor coolant system pressure testing and their potential safety significance are discussed below.

Specification 3.2.A: Requires that instrumentation which initiates primary containment isolation be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required.

Primary containment integrity will not be required per Specification 3.7.A.2; therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.2.A is not required.

1 4

Attachm:mt 11 to JPN-96-005 l l

SAFETY EVALUATION l Page 13 of 20 l l Specification 3.2.H: Requires the stack, turbine building ventilation, radwaste building ventilation, and containment high range radiation monitors be operable whenever the reactor is in the Run, Startup/ Hot Standby, and Hot Shutdown Modes.

Proposed Specification 3.12.A will allow the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown during hydrostatic and system leakage tests; therefore these radiation monitors will not be required to be operable during testing. These radiation monitors provide information to the operator for use in assessing plant conditions following an accident. Since the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant l activity is minimized during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.2.H is not required. The containment high range radiation monitors also provide primary containment isolation signals; however, since

, primary containment integrity is not required during hydrostatic and system leakage l tests, the isolation function provided by these radiation monitors is not required.

Specification 3.5.A.1: Requires both Core Spray Subsystems be operable ,

whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition. Since the core will remain in a subcritical condition during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.1 is not required. Proposed Specification 3.12.A will require a minimum of two low pressure emergency core cooling subsystems be operable per Specification 3.5.F.1 during hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant system.

l I

Specification 3.5.A.3: Requires both LPCI subsystems be operable whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and prior to reactor startup from a cold condition. Since the core will remain in a suberitical condition during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.3 is not required. Proposed Specification 3.12.A will require a minimum of two low pressure emergency core cooling subsystems be operable per Specification 3.5.F.1 during l hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant system.

Specification 3.5.A.3.b: Requires the motor-operated and manually-operated RHR cross-tie valves be locked closed whenever reactor water temperature is greater than 212 F. The intent of this specification is to prevent a loss of both LPCI subsystems during a DBA LOCA due to a diversion of all LPCI flow to the severed recirculation loop. Proposed Specification 3.12.A will allow the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown during hydrostatic and system leakage tests; therefore these valves will not be required to be locked closed during testing. Due to the low reactor coolant I temperature and decay heat loads during hydrostatic testing, sufficient time would be available to close the subject valves, if required to ensure core cooling. Therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.3.b is not required.

l

Attachment 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 14 of 20 i Specification 3.5.A.4.b: Requires that the RHR System shall not supply cooling to the spent fuel pool when the reactor coolant temperature is above 212 F. The intent of this specification is to ensure availability of both LPCI subsystems in the event of a LOCA. Due to the low reactor coolant temperature and decay heat loads during hydrostatic testing, sufficient time would be available to realign LPCI, if required to ensure core cooling. Therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.A.4.b is not required.

Specification 3.5.B: Requires both subsystems of the containment cooling mode (of the RHR System) be operable whenever there is irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, prior to startup from a cold condition, and reactor coolant temperature is greater than or equal to 212 F. The function of the containment cooling mode is to remove heat energy from the containment in the event of a LOCA. This function ensures primary containment integrity is maintained following a LOCA by maintaining containment l pressure and temperature within design limits. Since primary containment integrity j will not be required during hydrostatic and system leakage tests per Specification 3.7.A.2, the safety function provided by Specification 3.5.B is not required.

Specification 3.6.C.1: Establishes limits for reactor coolant system specific activity limits. Specification 3.6.C.5 requires the reactor be placed in the cold condition if limits are exceeded. Allowing the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown with reactor coolant system temperature above 212 F effectively provides an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.6.C.1. The intent of Specification 3.6.C.1 is to limit the exposure at the site boundary in the event of a main steam line break outside the primary containment. During hydrostatic and system leakage tests of the reactor coolant system, the main steam line isolation valves remain closed in order to pressurize the reactor coolant system. Therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.6.C.1 is not required.

Specification 3.6.C.4: Establishes limits for reactor coolant water conductivity and chloride concentration. Specification 3.6.C.5 requires the reactor be placed in the cold condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if limits are exceeded. Allowing the reactor to be considered in Cold Shutdown with reactor coolant system temperature above 212 F i effectively provides an exception to the requirements of Specification 3.6.C.4. The intent of Specification 3.6.C.4 is to minimize corrosion of the reactor coolant system.

The major benefit of cold shutdown is to reduce the temperature dependent corrosion rates and provide time for the Reactor Water Cleanup System to reestabhsh purity of the reactor coolant. Since hydrostatic and leakage tests of the reactor coolant system are infrequently performed tests (normally once per operating cycle) of relatively short duration (normally less than 3 days) an exception to the requirements of this specification will have minimalimpact on corrosion of the reactor coolant system.

Attachment ll to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 15 of 20 Specification 3.6.D.1: Requires that reactor coolant system leakage rates be within specified limits whenever irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel and reactor coolant temperature is above 212 F. Leakage limits are based on the predicted and experimentally observed behavior of pipe cracks. The intent of this specification is to provide early indication of potential flaws in the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Since the reactor coolant pressure boundary is visually inspected to detect leaks during hydrostatic and system leakage testing, the safety function provided by Specification 3.6.D.1 is not required.

Specification 3.6.D.4: Requires the Primary Containment Sump Monitoring System and the Continuous Atmosphere Monitoring System be operable when the reactor coolant leakage limits are in effect. Since reactor coolant leakage limits will not be in effect during hydrostatic and system leakage tests, leakage detection systems will also not be required to be operable. Visual inspection of the reactor coolant system during hydrostatic and system leakage tests satisfies the safety function provided by leakage detection systems. l Specification 3.6.1: Requires all snubbers to be operable except during cold shutdown and refueling. During cold shutdown and refueling, only those snubbers shall be operable which are on systems required to be operable. Since proposed Specification 3.12.A allows the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during hydrostatic and system leakage testing with reactor coolant temperature above 212 F, an exception is provided to the snubber operability requirements.

Snubbers are designed to prevent unrestrained pipe motion under dynamic loads as might occur during an earthquake or severe transient, while allowing normal thermal motion during startup and shutdown. During normal operation, a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is allowed for repair or replacement of an inoperable snubber prior to taking any other action. Since inoperable snubbers are permitted for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> during normal operation, providing an exception to snubber operability requirements for the short duration of hydrostatic and system leakage testing is not safety significant.

Specification 3.7.A.1: Requires that torus water level and torus water temperature be maintained within specified limits whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 212 F and irradiated fuel is in the reactor vessel. Since proposed Specification 3.12.A allows the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during hydrostatic and system leakage testing with reactor coolant temperature above 212 F, an exception is provided to the torus water level and water temperature limits.

The purpose of these torus water level and water temperature limits is to ensure that peak primary containment pressures and temperatures do not exceed maximum allowable values during a postulated DBA or any transient resulting in heatup of the torus. Since primary containment integrity will not be required during hydrostatic and system leakage tests per Specification 3.7.A.2, the safety function provided by Specification 3.7.A.1 is not required. SR 4.5.F.3 requires that torus water level be maintained greater than or equal to 10.33 feet whenever a low pressure emergency core cooling system is aligned to the torus. This SR ensures sufficient water is available for core cooling.

1 Attachmsnt 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 16 of 20 Specification 3.7.A.2: Requires that primary containment integrity be maintained at all times when the reactor is critical or reactor water temperature is above 212 F and fuel is in the reactor vessel. Since proposed Specification 3.12.A allows the reactor to be considered in the Cold Shutdown Mode during hydrostatic and system leakage testing with reactor coolant temperature above 212 F, an exception is provided to the requirement to establish primary containment integrity. Since the hydrostatic or leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Cold l Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity above the limits specified in LCO 3.6.C. " Coolant Chemistry," are minimized. In addition, secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and the secondary containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing (Reference 1). The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment described in Reference 2. Therefore, these requirements will conservatively limit potential radiation releases to the environment.

Specification 3.7.A.4: Requires the pressure suppression chamber - reactor building vacuum breakers to be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. Since primary containment integrity is not required to be maintained during hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant system, the safety function provided by the vacuum breakers is not required.

l Specification 3.7.A.5: Requires the pressure suppression chamber - drywell l vacuum breakers to be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. j Since primary containment integrity is not required to be maintained during hydrostatic and system leakage testing of the reactor coolant system, the safety function provided by the vacuum breakers is not required.

Specification 3.7.D.1 Requires that primary containment isolation valves and all instrument excess flow check valves be operable whenever primary containment integrity is required. Primary containment integrity will not be required per i Specification 3.7.A.2; therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.7.D.1 is not required.

l

Attachment 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 17 of 20  ;

l Specification 3.9: Includes operability requirements for the Normal and Reserve AC l Power Systems, Emergency AC Power System, Station Batteries, and LPCI MOV independent Power Supplies. This specificatian does not specifically address operability requirements for power systems other than Emergency Diesel Generators  ;

during Cold Shutdown. In order to assure adequate power sources are available I during reactor coolant system pressure testing, proposed Specification 3.12.A requires that necessary power supply systems be operable to support equipment required to be operable. This proposed change is consistent with the requirements of Standard Technical Specifications (Reference 3) for shutdown power sources. j Since Specification 3.12.A will ensure adequate power source availability, the safety 1 function provided by Specification 3.9 is not required. l Specification 3.11.A: Requires the control room emergency ventilation air supply fans and fresh air filter trains be operable whenever reactor coolant temperature is above 212 F. The purpose of the control room emergency ventilation system is to supply clean air for breathing and to maintain a positive pressure in the control room in the event of a LOCA or other design basis accidents. During reactor coolant system pressure testing, the reactor will be maintained subcritical, there is minimal potential for fuel failurs, and secondary containment integrity will be maintained.

Therefore, the safety function provided by specification 3.11.A is not required.

Specification 3.11.B: Requires crescent area cooling and ventilation equipment be l operable whenever Specifications 3.5.A,3.5.B, and 3.5.C are required to be satisfied.

Since the reactor will be considered to be in Cold Shutdown during reactor coolant pressure testing, Specifications 3.5.A,3.5.B, and 3.5.C will not be applicable and thus crescent area ventilation and cooling equipment will not be required to be operable. During reactor coolant system pressure testing, the reactor will be suberitical, at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions; therefore, the safety function provided by Specification 3.11.B is not required.

Comparison With Standard Technical Specifications l

These proposed changes, with minor exceptions, adopt Special Operations Section l 3.10.1, " Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation," from Standard Technical l Specifications (Reference 3). The differences between proposed Specification 3.12.A and Standard Technical Specification (STS) Section 3.10.1 and the basis for the differences are discussed below. I I

e STS provide an exception to normal Hot Shutdown requirements by modifying the j definition of Mode. Proposed Specification 3.12.A provides an exception in terms i of reactor coolant temperature. This differenw is required because FitzPatrick TS typically define system operability requiremems in terms of reactor coolant  !

temperature.

i I

l Attachment ll to JPN-96-005 l SAFETY EVALUATION l'

Page 18 of 20 e STS provide an exception to the requirements of LCO 3.4.9, " Residual Heat  !

Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown." This exception is not included in proposed Specification 3.12.A because FitzPatrick Technical l Specifications do not address shutdown cooling system operability requirements.

• STS do not place an upper limit on reactor coolant temperature during reactor J coolant system pressure testing. Proposed Specification 3.12.A limits reactor I coolant temperature to 300 F. This is more conservative than STS and provides an additional margin of safety by limiting the stored energy in the reactor coolant system. The 300 F limit is consistent with current FitzPatrick Technical i Specification requirements for reactor coolant system pressure testing.  !

e STS require that certain functions of LCO 3.3.6.2, " Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation," be operable during reactor coolant system pressure testing. Proposed Specification 3.12.A does not specifically mention the subject  ;

instrumentation because operability of instrumentation is implicit by the i requirement to establish secondary containment integrity, including standby gas treatment system operability.

• STS require that LCO 3.6.4.2, " Secondary Containment isolation Valves," be met during reactor coolant system pressure testing. Proposed Specification 3.12.A does not mention the subject valves because FitzPatrick Technical Specifications do not specifically address operability of secondary containment isolation valves.

Isolation valve operability is implicit by the requirement to establish secondary containment integrity.

• Proposed Specification 3.12.A includes the requirement to have a minimum of two low pressure emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) operable during reactor coolant system pressure testing. FitzPatrick TS Section 3.5.F.1 requires only one low pressure ECCS be operable during Cold Shutdown, provided that no work is being performed with the potential for draining the reactor vessel.

STS Section 3.5.2 requires two low pressure ECCS be operable at all times during Cold Shutdown. Therefore, proposed Specification 3.12.A ensures the same ECCS redundancy afforded by STS during pressure testing.

• Proposed Specification 3.12.A includes the requirement to have the necessary power supply systems operable to support equipment required to be operable during reactor coolant system pressure testing. FitzPatrick TS Section 3.9 addresses only emergency diesel generator operability during Cold Shutdown.

STS Section 3.8 addresses operability of all power supply systems during Cold  !

Shutdown. Therefore, proposed Specification 3.12.A ensures the same power supply system redundancy afforded by STS during pressure testing.

l 1

Attachment Il to JPN-96-005 l SAFETY EVALUATION Page 19 of 20 l l l

l

2. Editorial Changes l

Editorial changes do not alter the intent of any operability or surveillance requirements contained in the TS. Therefore, these changes have no effect on j safety. j IV. EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed Amendment would not I involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not: l l

l

1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The probability of a leak in the reactor coolant pressure boundary during reactor coolant system pressure testing is not increased by considering the reactor to be in Cold Shutdown. Since the pressure tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. In addition, secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with the Special Operations LCO, and the secondary containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment. In the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate. The capability of these systems would be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are not significantly increased.

2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident initiators or failure mechanisms since the changes do not involve any changes to structures, systems, or components, do not involve any change to the operation of systems, and alter procedures only to the extent that the 212 F limit may be exceeded during reactor coolant system pressure testing with certain systems inoperable. There are no alterations to plant systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents.

The only difference is that a different subset of plant systems would be utilized for accident mitigation than those utilized during the Hot Shutdown Mode. Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from those previously evaluated.

i Attachm:nt 11 to JPN-96-005 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 20 of 20 1

3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Since pressure tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and i near Cold Shutdown conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low.

Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. Since secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with the Special Operations LCO, the secondary 1 containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that i could occur during the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. '

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES 1

Implementation of the proposed changes will not adversely affect the ALARA or Fire j Protection Programs at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will the changes impact the environment.

l VI. CONCLUSION Based on the discussion above, the reactor may be safely considered to be in the Cold Shutdown Mode during reactor coolant system pressure tests, with reactor coolant temperature between 212 F and 300 F. j The Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and Safety Review Committee (SRC) have reviewed this proposed change to the Technical Specifications and have concluded that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question or a significant hazards ,

consideration and will not endanger the health and safety of the public. j Vll. REFERENCES l

1. JAF-CALC-MULT-02238, Revision 0, JAF-HELB Analysis During Hydrostatic Test

2. James A. FitzPatrick Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 14 ]

3. NUREG-1433, " Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)," Revision 1, dated April 1995 1

4. James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications, Sections 3.2.A,3.2.H,3.5.A,3.5.B, 1 3.6.C, 3.6.D, 3.6.1, 3.7.A, 3.7.0, 3.9, and 3.11

5. AEC Safety Evaluation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Docket No.

50-333, Dated November 20,1972, and Supplements

6. NRC letter, B. C. McCabe to R. E. Beedle, dated March 9,1992, issuing Amendment 179 to the Technical Specifications

7. NYPA letter (JPN-92-002) R. E. Beedle to NRC, dated January 9,1992, regarding

" Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications Reactor Vessel Hydrostatic Testing (JPTS-91-014)" ,

Attachment lil to JPN-96-005 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES INSERVICE LEAK AND HYDROSTATIC TESTING OPERATION (JPTS-95-004)

New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59

Attachmsnt til to JPN-96-005 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES l l

Insert i A "G. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified Technical i Specification (TS) requirements to be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless otherwise specified, all other TS requirements remain unchanged. Compliance with the Special Operations j LCOs is optional. When a Special Operations LCO is desired to be met but is not met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO shall be met.

When a Special Operations LCO is not desired to be met, entry into an l OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition shall only i be made in accordance with the other applicable specifications."

l B "G. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.12 allow specified TS requirements to l be changed to permit performance of special tests and operations. Unless i otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the OPERATIONAL CONDITION (mode) or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect. l The applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of TS. Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements.' If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed.

When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met.

Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is rnet, all the other LCOs' requirements (ACTIONS and I SR) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special l Operations LCO."

Page 1 of 4

I

- 1 Attachm:nt ll1 to JPN-96-005 l MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES i l

insert '

C "3.12 LIMITING CONDITIONo, r-OR OPERATION I 3.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS ,

1

> Acolicability:

Applies to the status of systems during special operations.

1 Obiective- '

i To allow performance of special operations. I Soecification: i A. Inservice Leak and Hvdrostatic Testina Ooeration The reactor may be considered to be in COLD SHUTDOWN with reactor  ;

coolant temperature between 212 F and 300 F and the reactor vessel i not vented, to allow performance of inservice leak or hydrostatic testing i provided the following LCOs are met: I

1. LCO 3.5.F, "ECCS-Cold Condition," a minimum of two low pressure i subsystems shall be operable; l

2. LCO 3.7.B, " Standby Gas Treatment System;" <

3. LCO 3.7.C, " Secondary Containtnent;" and i l

4. LCO 3.9, " Auxiliary Electrical Systems," the necessary systems shall be operable to support equipment required to be operable.

5. With the above requirements not met, immediately suspend activities that could increase reactor coolant temperature or pressure and reduce reactor coolant temperature to less than 212 F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />."

1 l

1 Page 2 of 4

Attachment lli to JPN-96-005 l MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES l insert  !

D "4.12 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l 1

4.12 SPECIAL OPERATIONS A.colicabilitv:

Applies to periodic testing of systems during special operations. l I

Obiective:

To verify operability of required systems during special operations.

Soecification:

A. Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testina Ooeration l

Perform the applicable surveillance requirements for the required LCOs."  !

E "A. Inservice Leak and Hvdrostatic Testina Ooeration The purpose of this Special Operations LCO is to allow certain reactor coolant pressure tests to be performed in COLD SHUTDOWN when the metallurgical characteristics of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) require the pressure testing at temperatures greater than 212 F (normally corresponding to HOT SHUTDOWN).

Allowing the reactor to be considered in COLD SHUTDOWN during hydrostatic or leak testing, when reactor coolant temperature is >212 F, i effectively provides an exception to HOT SHUTDOWN requirements, including operability of primary containment and the full compliment of redundant Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Since the hydrostatic or leak tests are performed nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near COLD SHUTDOWN conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be low. Under these conditions, the potential for failed fuel and a subsequent increase in coolant activity is minimized. In addition, secondary containment integrity will be maintained, in accordance with this Special Operations LCO, and the secondary containment will be capable of handling any airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that could occur durino the performance of hydrostatic or leak testing. The required pressure testing conditions provide adequate assurance that the consequences of a steam leak will be conservatively bounded by the consequences of the postulated main steam line break outside of primary containment.

Page 3 of 4

Attachmant lil to JPN-96-005 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 10S2 0 E (cont'd) in the event of a large primary system leak, the reactor vessel would rapidly depressurize, allowing the low pressure core cooling systems to operate.

The capability of these systems, as required by this Special Operations LCO, would be adequate to keep the core flooded under this low decay heat load condition. Small system leaks would be detected by leakage inspections before significant inventory loss occurred.

For the purposes of this test, the protection provided by normally required COLD SHUTDOWN applicable LCOs, in addition to the requirements of this Special Operations LCO, will ensure acceptable consequences during normal hydrostatic test conditions and during postulated accident conditions."

4 Page 4 of 4

4 JAFNPP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS EASA 3

1.0 Definitions LIMITING SAFETY SAFETY LIMITS SYSTEM SETTINGS 1

1.1 Fuel Cladding integrity 2,1 7 1.2 Reactor Coolant System 2.2 27 SURVEILLANCE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS

\

4,o 3.0 General 3.1 Reactor Protection System 4.1 30f l 4.2 de 3.2 Instrumentation 4g A.

A. Pnmary Containment isolation Functione 50 8.

8. Core and Containment Cooling Systems -

Instistion and Control C. 50 C. Control Rod Block Actuation Radiation Monstoring Systems - Isolation D. 50 D.

and Irvtiation Functions 53 E.

E. Drywell Lesk Detection Feedwater Pump Turbine and Main Turbine Trip F. 53 F.

Recirculation Pump TrID G. 53 G. 53 Acci6ent Monitoring instrumentation H.

H. 53 4kV Emergency Bue Undervoltage Trip i.

1.

Remote Shutdown Capabsty J. 54 J.

4.3 88 3.3 Reactiwty Control 88 A.

A. Reactiwty Umitations 91  !

8.

8. Control Rods 95 C.

C. Scram insertion Times 96 Reactivity Anomalies D.

D.

4.4 105 3.4 Standby Uguid Control System 105 A.

A. Normal Operation 8. 106

8. . Operation With inoperable Components 107 C.

C. Sedum Pantsberets Solution 4.5 112 3.5 Core and Containment Cooling Systeme 112 A.

A. Core . Spray and LPCI Systems 8. 115

8. Containment Cooling Mode of the RHR System 117 C.

C. HPCI System 119 Automatic Osg:: -Lh S';o < o (ADS) D.

D. E. 121 E. Reactor Core isolation Cooling (MCIC)

System Amendment No.

i

1. -iHhT'-

. JAFNPP

.M TABLE OF CONTENTS (CorWd) W F.

G.

ECCS Cold Corustion Montenance of Filled Discharge Pipe F.

G.

ylY 122 122a H. Average Planer Unser Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) H. 123

1. Unser Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) 1. 124 J. Thermal Hydraulic StatWity J. 124a UMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION REQUIREMENTS 3.6 Reactor 4.6 136 A. Pressunzation and Thermal Umits A. 136 B. DELETED C. Coolant Chemistry C. 139 D. Coolant Laakage D. 141 E. Safety and Safety /Releef Valves E. 142a F. Structuralintegnty F. 144 G. Jet Pumps G. 144 H. DELETED

1. Shock Suppressors (Snubbers) 1. 145b 3.7 Containment Systems 4.7 165 A. Primary Containment A. 165 B. Standby Gas Treatment System B. 181 C. SwwiContenment C. 184 D. Primary Containment leciation Velves D. 185 3.8 Miscellaneous Rec $oactive Material Sources 4.8 214 3.9 Auxiliary Sectrical Systema 4.9 215 / l C narry WNe N M

A . Normal and Reserve AC Power Systems A. 215 B. Emergency AC Power System B. 216 l C. Diesel Fuel C. 218 D. Diessi. Generator operehmty D. 220 E. Station Batteries E. 221 F. LPCI MOVIndependent Power Supplies F. 222a G. Reactor Protection System Electrical Protection Assemblies G. 222c 3.10 Core Alteradons 4.10 227 A. Refuelinginterlocks A. 227 B. Core Monitoring B. 230 C. Spent FuelStorage PoolWater Level C. 231 D. Control Rod and Control Rod Drive Maintenance D. 231 3.11 Additional Safety Related Plant Capabieties 4.11 237 A. Main Control RoomVensadan A. 237 B. Crescent Area Ventilation B. 239 C -

- C. .

la ~ G. N G.

uG Amendment No. f, ,f,1 y bb P['N

~

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) s D. Emergency Service Water System 240 242 WW E. Intake Deicing Heaters - -

l ELETED 244 ,

5.0 Design Features. 245 5.1 Site 245 5.2 Reactor 245 5.3 Reactor Pressure Vessel 245 5.4 Containment 245 5.5 Fuel Storage 245 5.6 Seismic Design 246 6.0 Administrative Controls 247 Responsibility 247 6.1 Organization 247 6.2 Facility Management and Technical Support 247 6.2.1 247a 6.2.2 Plant Staff Plant Staff Qualifications 248 6.3 Retraining and Replacement Training 248 6.4 Review and Audit 248 6.5 6.5.1 Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) 248a 6.5.2 Safety Review Committee (SRC) 250 Reportable Event Action 253 6.6 Safety Limit Violation 253 6.7 253 6.8 Procedures Reporting Requirements 254a 6.9 254g 6.10 Record Retention Radiation Protection Program 255 6.11 6.12 Industrial Security Program 258 258 6.13 Emergency Plan Fire Protection Program 258 6.14 258a 6.15 Environmental Qualificaten Add 60tuetuANc6 L_tmM1NG e6NbrD6N5 Fof. OkfhfibN faudemrers 4.IS h 1 3,14 $recial Opuahms

.losmae Leak. Awl %fic %shg A. J44*

A.

opalm m

Amendment No. 7, C, T M, T, Z,110,1%,101

9 9

d 1

a C

i l

+

ko  !

2 A k O l

l 1

O

-e 4

2 C D t

+]

q 2 to

f i

JaFeser  !

s 3.0 B MiES D8 Qc- l A. This specificaton states the appbcab6ty of each specification D. Contsnued in terms of desned OPERATIONAL CONDfTION imodel and is prevedad to deEnsegg @ when each ap=anaat is the status of the plant before or efter en OPERATIONAL applicable. CONDITION imodel change. Therefore in this case, entry into ,

en OPERATIONAL CONDITION (model or other specified '

8. This ;: 1- " ; defines these candlesens necessary to condason may be made in accordance with the provisions of consatute compbence with Wie conns of en indivedual Lensang the ACTION ressurements. The provisions of this specification Condition for Operesien and associated ACTION sesgurement. shondd not, however, he interpreted as endorsing the failure to .

smarcise good procace in restoring systems or components to -

C. This specificesien doEnsetes the ACTION to be taken for OPERA 8LE esseus before startup.

cercumetences not directly provided for in the ACTION  !

statements and whose occurrence wondd violate the intent of Exceptions to this prowesson may be made for a hmetod number i the = pac.ame=a===. Under the tonne of SpecHicateen 3.0, the of :;- _* cions when startup with inoperable equipmerg facdity le to be pieced in COLD SHUTDOWN withm the would not effect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in fogowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. It is soeumed that the unit is brought to the ACTION statements of the appropriate specihcotions.

the resguired OPERATIONAL CONDITION tmodel within the l' required einess by prompey inleiseing and cosrying out the . E. This specificatiese dehneates what addtional conditions must appropdees ACTION eletament. he satisfeed to persnet operation to continue, consistent with i the ACTION statesnents for power sources, when a normal or  !

This :; _ -: " 1 provides that entry into en OPERA 8LE emergency power source is not OPERABLE. It specshceNy D.

CONDfTION imedel must be made with tel the hse prehshits opesesion when one abwesson is inoperoide because its complement of seguised eyeseos, equipment er components nenned er emergency power source is snoperable and a OPEnA8LE and ed as seher parameters es speedied in the systen, subsystem, train, component or device in another  !

~

Limiting Condneens for Operesien being meet without regard for divessen is inoperelde for enether reason.

- eBoweblo devisesens and out of sendce provisions conseined in .

ghe ACTION =ama=====a= The prowessons of this specification permit the ACTION statements === ara = sed with individual systems, subsystems,

,@ trains, components or devices to be consistent with the bir The intent of this provision is to insure that facility operation is  !

r not initiated with esther required equepment or syseesns ACTION stesoment of the associated electrical power source.

inoperable er other Emits bonne exceeded. Comphence with it allows operation to be governed by the twne  :

ACTION requerements that pennst continued aparatiosi of the j facility for en unionited pened of time provides en acceptelde level of safety for congnued operation without the regard to M'\

Am.ndment No. p(, i .-4ee-

' C3 3% i

)  ;

JAs-NPP i

3.0 HASES - Continued _

E. Continued E. Continued limits of the ACTION statement associated with the Limiting As a further example, Specification 3.9.A. requires in pari that

Condition for Operation for the normal or emergency power two 115KV lines and reserve station transformers be available.

source, and not by the indhiduel ACTION statements for each The ACTION statement provides a 7 day out-of-service time system, subsystem, train, component or devece that is when both required offsite circuits are not OPERABLE. If the determmed to be inoperable solely because of the inoperability definition of OPERABLE were apphed without consideration of of its normal or emergency power source. Specification 3.0.E., all systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices supplied by the inoperable normal For example, Specification 3.9.A. requires in port that both power sources, both of the offsite circuits, would also be emergency diesel generator systems be OPERA 8LE. The enoperable. This would dictate invoking the applicable ACTION ACTION statement provides for a 7 day out-of-service time . statements for each of the appbcable LCOs. However, the when emergency diesel generator system A or 8 is not prowissons of Specification 3.0.E. permit the time limits for OPERABLE. If the defirutson of OPERAKE were applied continued operation to be consistent with the ACTION without consideration of Specification 3.0.E., all systems,- statement for the Inoperable normal power sources instead.

subsystems, trains, components and devices supphed by the provided the other specified conditions are satisfied. In this inoperable emergency power source, diesel generator system case, this would mean that for one division the emergency A or B, would also be inoperable. This would dictate in'voking power source must be OPERAKE ies must be the components the applicable ACTION statements for each of the opphcable supphed by the emergency power sourcel and all redundant Limiting Conditions for Operation. However, the provisions of systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in the Specification 3.0.E. permet the time limits for continued other devissor; must be OPERAKE, or likewise satisfy operation to be consistent with the ACTION statement for the Spacefecation 3.0.E. (i.e., he capable of performing their design snoperable emergency thesel generator system insteed, functions and have en emergency power source OPERABLEl. M proveded the other specified condetions are satisfied. If they in other words, both emergency power sources A and B must g are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with this be OPERABLE and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, specification. ,

components and deveces in both devisions must also be OPERAKE. If these conditions are not satisfied, shutdown is required in accordance with 'his specification.

in Cold Shutdown and Refuel Modes. Specification 3.0.E. is not applicable, and thus the indeveduel ACTION statement for each apphcable Limiting Condition for Operation in these i OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS Imodes) must be adhered to.

]

Amendment No pd, l 30gi b y=

i JAFNPP t

3.0 Baasa - Continued LCO 3.0.F estattshes the auswance for restwirg jngg "$"

i F.

equgunent to sorwece under admuustrative controis when it has been removed hoen aerwece er deciered inoperatie to comedy with requwed modens. The note purpose of this Specsfecation'is to pnevide en excepson to LCO 3.0.8 to allow testene to demoneerees: lei the spesebsty of the aguepment beene returned to setwice; er ibl the operehtty of other espapment.

m m stra- c.r.r.is .r e it - 1,se _

is resumed to service in con 5ct with the requirements of the rogured actions is heited to the time aboniusely mm to perform the atowed testing. This -

Specsfication does not provide time to perfonn any other pseventwo or correcews momeenonce.

An example of demonstraung the operatuhty of the equipment beme retumed to sorwece le reopenme a conteenment iselomon volve that has been closed to comply I with the required actons and must be reopened to perform the testing. i An exampi.e 03 demonstrating the operability of other equepment is talung an inoperable channel or trip system out of the inpped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring dunne the performance of testang en another l channelin the other trip system. A asmder exampio of demoneerating the operability of other equipment is talung

• an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condiuon to permit the logic to function and indscate the  ;

appropriate response during the performance of tesene on another channel in the same trip system. t r

I am.non,.nt=(& tee.:.w.g t

.=. . . -

JARIPP I

4.0 BASES This specification provides that survedence activities C. Continued A.

necessary to insure the Lasuting Constions for Operatson are rnet and wiB be perfonned during sho OPERATIONAL intervel, defined by the prowissons of Specification 4.0.B. as a CONDITIONS imodoen for which the Usnetang Condetsons for condetson that conststutes a failure to meet the OPERABILITY requiresnents for a Leruting Constion for Operation. Under the '

Operation are appbcalde. Previelens for addtional survedence acewsmos to be perfanned without regent to the appbcalde prowseions of this :; N:= ion, systems and components are soeumed to be OPERA 8LE when Survedence Requirements OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS tesodeel are provided in the have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time indswedual SurveWence Requirostents, interval. However, nochene in this provision is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when j 8. Specification 4.0.8 estabbehos the Emit for whsch the specified time interval for Survedence Requussnents sesey be eatended. they are found or known to be inoperaide although stiN meetsng the SurvesNonce Requirements. This specification also it permets an agowelde extenaien of the nonnel surveiNonce clarifies that the ACTION requerements are appiscalde when interval to facetate survedence schedubne and connsderston Survedence Requerements have not been completed within the of plant operaens condaions that sney not be sustable for conducting the survedence ie.g., transient conditions or other ellowed survedence interval and that the time limits of the ACTION requemsnents apply from the point in time it is onecone survedence or snamemnence activieles). It also identdeed shot a surveseence has not been performed and not prowedes Nasutubty to accomsnedete the length of a fuel cycle for surweisances that are perfonned at each refueling outage at the time that the eBowed survesilence was exceeded.

and are specdsed with a 24 enenth surveiRence interval. It is CW:n of the SurveiNonce Requwement within the alloweble outage time lumts of the ACTION requirements not intended that this prowieson Ise used sepeatedly as a convenience to emeend survettence intervels beyond that restores compliance with the requirements of Specification 4.0.C. However, this does not negate the fact that the feeluse specdsed for survedences shot are not perfonned dunne to hows perfonned the survedence within the aNowed refuehng outages. The lisnisation of this :;- -W f n is bened survedence interwel, defined by the prowissons of Specification on enemoonne judgement and the recoensmon that the most 4.0.8. was a violation of the OPERABILITY requirements of a probolde result of any partscular survedence bonne perfonned Limiting Condition for Operation that is subl oct to enforcement is the verificassen of conformance with the SurveiBance action. Further, the failure to perform a survedence within the Roquerements. The limit on extensson of the normel survesEence interval ensures that the rehabdity confirmed by provisions of Specification 4.0.8 is a violation of a Tecimical survesNonce activities is not significantly reduced below that Specification requirement and is, therefore, a reportable event under the requwements of 10 CFR 50.73(aH2HiHB) because it obtaened from the specdsed survestance snearvel.

is a conditson prohibited by the plant Technical Specifications.

C. This specification estabbehes the failure to perform a Survestance Requerement wi the allowed survosllence b p Amendment No. 23, !S" L" -M-k - -- -. - -_--- -- J

)

JAFNPP 4.0 BASES - Continued C. Continued C. Continued ,

If the alloweble outage time limits of the ACTION requirements Survedience Requirements do not have to be performed on \

are less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or a shutdown is requwed to comply moperable equepment because the ACTION requirements with ACTION requirements, a 24-hour snowance is provided to define the remedeel measures that apply. However, the permit a deley in implementing the ACTION requeements. Surveellence Requwements have to be met to demonstrate tint '

This provides an adequate time Emit to complete Survedience inoperable equipment has been restored to OPERABLE status.

Requerements that hows not boon performed. The purpose of this snowance is to pennit the completion of a surveiNonce '

before a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION D. This specification establishes the requirement that all requirements or before other remedlel measures would be sapheah8= survediences must be met before entry into en required that may preclude ( ;-f . of a surveWence. The OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other condition of operation basis for this eBowance includes ceneideration for plant specified in the Apphcatulity statement. The purpose of this conditione, odequate planning, swomablety of pereennel, the specificellen is to ensure that system and component time required to perform the surweigence and the safety OPERA 81LITY requirements or parameter limits are met before segnificance of the deioy in completag the required ,

entry into en OPERATIONAL CONDITION or other specified survoisence. This prownesen sieo provides a time Emit for the condetion ==aamted with plant shutdown as wen as startup. i completion of Survedience Requwements that become oppiscatde as a consequence of OPERATIONAL CONDITION Under the prowessons of this specification, the applicable Imodel chenpes imposed by ACTION requwements and for Surveslience Requirements must be performed within the completing Survoegence Requirements that are applicatdo when specified surveeBance interval to ensure that the Limiting en exception to the en

• _._3 of Specification 4.0.C is Conditions for Operation are met during initial plant startup or anowed. If a surweisance is not completed witten the 24-hour foBowing a plant outage.  !

allowance, the time limits of the ACTION requerements are  ;

apphcalde et that time. When a surweWonce is performed When a shutdown is required to comply with ACTION  ;

within the 24-hour allowance and the Surve51once requwements, the prownesons of this specification do not apply ,

P.5_; ;.:s are not mot, the time limits of the ACTION because this would deley placmg the facility in a lower requirements are apphcable at the time the surveeBance is CONDITION of operation.

termmeted.

^

l 43, % T 00 - 6 Amendment No 1^, Si, "",1^^, t S2, t 23, 227 i 30/3 ,

JAFMP f

I 4.1 SURVFili ANCE REQUlflEMENTS l 3.1 i tuiTING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTru l 3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTFM  :

agghsatuhls Apphcatuilty.

Apphes to the survedlance of the instrumenlahon and associated Apphes to the instrumenlahon anti amandmand devices whKh devices whzit inshale reactor scram.

indsate the reactor scram.

Quesitifft.

To specdy the type of frequency of survedlance to be apphed to To assure the operatulity of tie Reactor Protecten System.

tie pratartariinstrumentaban

'& speassaman.

sossesman.

l l A. The setpomes and runsmum number of instrument channets per tsip system that must be operable for endt posillon of Bio A. Instrumentaten systems shaN be funchonally tested and calibrated as indicated in Tables 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 by \l i reactor modo sudch, shed be es shown in Tatile 3.1-1.

The response time of the reactor protechon system trip I

j lunctons Ested below shau be demonstrated to be within its Emit at loest once per 18 months Neutron detectors are exernpt item response time teshng Each test shat irw:lude at h loest one channel in each trip system AN channels in both l

i

}

trip systems shab be tested witun two test intervals.

1. Reactor High Pressure (02-3PT-55A, B. C, D) '

2. Drywet Hi@ Pressure (05PT-12A, B. C, D)

3. Raar*w Water Level-Low (L3) (02-3LT-101 A. B. C, D)

4. Main Steam Line isolaten Valve Ciosure (29PNS-80A2. B2, C2, D2)

(29PNS-86A2, B2, C2, D2)

5. Turtune Stop Valve Closure (94PNS-101,102,103, t04)

6. Turtune Control Valve Fast Closure (94PS-200A B. C, D)

7. APRM Fixed High Neutron Flux

8. APRM Flow Referenced Neutron Flux l

AmendmeniNo. e , 9

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.5 (cont'd) 4.5 (cont'd)

2. If the requirements of 3.5.D.1 cannot be met, the reactor 2. A logic system functumal test. fgk shall be placed in the cold conditon and presswa less than 100 psig withm 24 hr. a.

When it is determined that two valves of tim ADS at l moperable, the ADS eMstem actuahon logic for it operable ADS valves and the HPCI sMstem shaN be vendied to be operable inwnediately and at least weeldy thereafter.

fel

b. When it is determined that more than two relief / safety /Y valves of the ADS are inoperable, the HPCI System ()

(g, shaN be verified to be operable immediately.

3. Low power physics teshng and reactor operator traming shall be permitted with inoperable ADS components, provuled that reactor coolant temperstwo is s212Y and the reactor vessel is vented or reactor vessel head is -

f EtW j 4. fie ADS is not required to be operable during hydrostatic presswa and leakage teshng witi reactor coolant temperatwas below 300 T and irradated fuel in the reactor vessel provided au control rods are inserted.

I l

l l

Amendment No. 35'.14tr,.175,.20!r 44h 120

JAFOGPP 3.5 (Cont *4 4.5 (Cont'd) j E Reactor Core tenamaann Cootmg (RCIC) System E Reactor Core lesemainn Cootmg (RCIC) System  ;

1. The RCIC System shof be operable whenever there is 1. RCIC System testeg shall be pertosmed as follows l Irradiated luel in Sie reactor weseal and the reactor provided a reactor steam st@gdy is avadable N steam is pressure is yester Sten 150 peig and rearent coolard not avanaNa at the time the survedlance test is schedided .

lesaperahme is greater Sten 2127 escept Irem the time to be performed, the test shaN be performed withm ten that Sto RCIC System is made or Iound to be inoperable days of continuous operation trom the time steam I

- for any season, cordirtuod seactor power operasion is becomes avagebis.

permisetzte dusing Sto successAng 7 days urdeos Wie  !

system is modo operabis oester pseutded Sist durin0 Osses Item Frequency ,

7 days tioifCISystemio aparatile.

a. simimmed Ausomsec , once/operasing l

2. N the r= " _-_f. of 15.E cannot be met, the seactor Manninn (and Rossart ) cycle l sheE tm placed in the cold comSGon and preneum less Test then 150 pelgultiin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b. PurnpOperablEty Once/ month

3. t.aw power physics tesene and seecsor operasar training

c. msor Opwased Once/ month shes he pemened wah inoperable components se h 0perabany apare=8 in 3.5.E2 above, peculded Stel reactor cooient gkle akse M2W. d. Flow Rete Once/3 monshs I The RCIC syneem is not respied to be operable during e. Testable Check Tested for *P*'abadY bye- ^ ^" preneure and taske0s W wilh seactor t

any #to reactor s ennaans ternperatures behusen 2127 and 3007 and '""" C0"dd'""

irradated Guel in Sie seactor weseal provided a5 control exceedmg 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, d rods amineerted. operabihty tests have i not been pertormed during the precedmg 31 days.

f. Logc Syssem Once/ operating FunctionalTest cycle Automatic restart on a low water level signal wtuch is q subsequent to a twgh water levelinp.

Amendment No. ,t . .

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