ML20217K039
| ML20217K039 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1998 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217K026 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1433 NUDOCS 9804070107 | |
| Download: ML20217K039 (21) | |
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Attachment I to JPN-98-011
. REVISED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCY 1
(JPTS-96-013) i l
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New York Power Authority i
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 9804070107 900330 DPR-59 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
PDR i
- LIST OF PAGE CHANGES l
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCY (JPTS-96-013) l
. Revise Appendix A as follows:
Remove Paae Insert Page 2
2 l-79 79 81 81 f
i Revise Appendix B as follows:
Remove Paae Insert Page 38 38 l
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!i-Att chm::nt 11 to JPN-98-011 SAFETY EVALUATION LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCY l
(JPTS-96-013) l l
l l
l l.
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 i
Att:: chm:nt ll to JPN-98-011 l
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 1 of 7 1.
DESCRIPTION This section provides a description of the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS).
Minor changes in format, such as type font, margins or hyphenation, are not described in this submittal. The proposed changes to the TS will extend the Logic System Functional Test (LSFT) interval from semiannually to.once per 24 months (30 months with allowable grace period). The
' changes apply to the following instrumentation groups:
e Primary Containment isolation System (Table 4.2-1) l e
Core and Containment Cooling Systems (Table 4.2-2)
Radiation Monitoring Systems (Appendix B, Table 3.10-2)
L The LSFT definition is revised to bring it into agreement with the industry standard contained in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications (STS) (Reference 1). The specific changes are as follows:
1.
Definition 1 O.F.7, page 2 i
Revise LSFT definnion to read as follows:
" Logic System Functional Test - A logic system functional test shall be a test of all required logic components (i.e., all required relays and contacts, trip units, solid state logic
)
elements, etc.) of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify operability. The logic system functional test may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested."
2.
Table 4.2-1, Primary Containment Isola'6 ion System Instrumentation Test and Calibration Requirements, page 79 I
Change LSFT frequency from "SA" (semiannually) to "R" (Once/24 months) for the-l following isolation functions-i l
1)
Main Steam Line Isolation Valves
(
Main Steam Line Drain Valves Reactor Water Sample Valves 2)
RHR - Isolation Valve Control Shutdown Cooling Valves 3)
Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation j
l
[
4)
Drywell isolation Valves TlP Withdrawal l
Atmospheric Control Valves 5)
Standby Gas Treatment System Reactor Building Isolation 6)
HPCI Subsystem Auto isolation 7)
RCIC Subsystem Auto isolation l
r
.4 Attichm:nt 11 to JPN-98-011 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 2 of 7 3.
Table 4.2-2, Core and Containment Cooling System Instrumentation Test and Calibration Requirements, page 81 Change LSFT frequency from "SA" (semiannually) to "R" (Once/24 months) for the following subsystems:
3)
Containment Cooling Subsystem 4)
HPCI Subsystem 4.
Appendix B, Table 3.10-2, Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Radiation Monitoring Systems, Page 38 Change LSFT frequency from " Semiannually" to "Once per 24 months" for the following instrument channels:
Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors, Recorders, and Isolation e
e SJAE Radiation Monitors /Offgas Line isolation Liquid Radwaste Discharge Monitor / Isolation e
SBGTS Actuation 11.
PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE 1.
Revised LSFT Definition The revised LSFT definition is consistent with the requirements of BWR STS (Reference 1).
The revised definition (1) eliminates the requirement to test the actuated device as part of the LSFT, and (2) clarifies the definition by stating that "The test may be performed as a series of sequential, overlapping or total system steps such that the entire logic system is tested," and the test will be performed "as close to the sensor as practicable."
2.
Change in the LSFT Frequency The proposed change in the LSFT frequency from semiannually to 24 months reduces the potential for inadvertent safety system actuation and plant transients, and reduces the unavailability due to testing for the applicable safety systems as discussed in Section ill -
Safety implications of the Proposed Changes.
Ill.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE The proposed change to the LSFT definition adopts wording consistent with the definition contained in the improved BWR STS. The elimination of the requirement to test the actuated device as part of the LSFT is consistent with STS, as the operability of these devices is verified on a more frequent basis by other TS surveillance requirements. The change clarifies the existing LSFT requirement by stating that the test may be performed as a series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps such that the entire logic system is tested. This clarifies the LSFT requirement without changing its intent.
I I
+
Atttchm:nt ll to JPN-98-011 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 3 of 7 Chahging the performance interval of the LSFTs from semiannually to 24 months enhances plant l
safety and reduces the unavailability due to testing for the applicable safety systems for the l
following reasons:
i A.
Certain LSFT procedures require the installation of jumpers and the lifting of leads to perform verification of relay and contact operability. These factors increase the potential for inadvertent safety system actuation and plant transients that may result from personnel error or equipment malfunction, inadvertent scrams impose unnecessary cycles on reactor I
l equipment and unnecessary demands on plant safety systems. Scrams are also potential initiators of accident sequences. Changing the LSFT interval from semiannually to 24 months will reduce the potential for plant transients by reducing the number of times the j
(
tests must be performed. Although the current performance frequency of LSFT is not expected to be a major factor in component wear, it is prudent to maintain the number of trip actuations at a low level in order to reduce any potential incremental wear.
B.
Results of a FitzPatrick Surveillance Extension Report (Reference 2) show that safety j
system reliability is not dominated by the reliability of the logic systems, but by that of the mechanical components, (e.g., pumps and valves), which are tested on a more frequent basis. The results contained in the Reference 2 report demonstrate that there is no j
significant change in the logic system unavailability due to equipment failure by changing j
the test interval from semiannually to 24 months. This conclusion is based on the l
following factors:
l 1.
Logic circuit unavailability is influenced predominantly by relay coil failure and l
testing rates. Unavailability due to contact failures is less significant. Testing of l
plant safety system instrumentation and controls through methods other than LSFT i
(e.g., functional test), as required by the FitzPatrick TS, demonstrates relay coil L
operability but not necessarily operability of all associated contact configurations.
L LSFT relay coil testing is therefore somewhat redundant to these other tests, offering little extra benefit while increasing logic circuit unavailability and the
. potential for plant transients due to testing. The principal benefits of LSFT are end-to-end contact operability verification. The worth of any such added benefit of l
higher frequency testing is completely outweighed by the consequent increase in unavailability due to testing.
2.
The largest contributor to circuit unavailability is the amount of time a circuit is out-of-service due to testing. A 24 month LSFT interval minimizes the amount of time a circuit is unavailable due to testing.
The above considerations together with the use of highly reliable components have aided FitzPatrick in achieving a very high LSFT success rate. LSFT results, where possible and applicable, have been reviewed for a period of approximately 22.5 years. Reviews covering shorter time periods were due principally to components being replaced, thus, reducing the availability of historical data.
lsolation Instrumentation on Table 4.2-1 (Pace 79)
There were 11 test failures due to failure of the components that receive the actuation signals.
The failures did not involve the logic systems that were being tested, therefore, zero logic failures were identified. As per Generic Letter 91-04 (Reference 3), the Reference 2 report confirms that the effect on safety of extending LSFT performance interval to once per 24 months is insignificant and is supported by plant historical and maintenance data. The Authority has concluded that the isolation instrumentation LSFTs can be extended to once per 24 months without any adverse l
consequence to safety, reliability, or availability. Drift was not addressed for the Isolation L
Instrumentation since no analog or digital (numerical) setpoints are addressed in these LSFTs.
l
I Att chm:nt 11 to JPN-98-011 SAFETY EVALUATION j
j Page 4 of 7 1
Corb and Containment Coolina System Instrumentation on Table 4.2-2 (Paae 81)
The report (Reference 2) concluded that the LSFT period for the Core Spray Subsystem (Item 1),
the Low Pressure Coolant injection (LPCI) Subsystem (item 2), and the Automatic Depressurization (ADS) Subsystem (Item 51 could be extended to once per 24 months, regarding logic testing only, i
i without any significant effect on safety and reliability. However, the results of drift studies, l
related to timers, for the ADS, Core Spray, and LPCI systems show that the LSFTs for these systems can not be extended from semiannually to once per 24 months. The drift studies conclude that the timer setting for the sequencing timers associated with these systems could potentially exceed design requirements.
There were four test failures associated with the Containment Cooling Subsystem (Item 3) and the High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) Subsystem (item 4). The failures were due to f ailure of the
{
components that receive the actuation signals. The failures did not involve the logic systems that were being tested, therefore, zero logic failures were identified. As per Generic Letter 91-04, the Reference 2 report confirms that the effect on safety of extending LSFT performance interval to once per 24 months is insignificant and is supported by plant historical and maintenance data. The Authority has concluded that the Containment Cooling and HPCI LSFTs can be extended to once per 24 months without any adverse consequence to safety, reliability, or availability. Drift was not addressed for the Containment Cooling and HPCI Subsystems since no analog or digital (numerical) j setpoints are addressed in these LSFTs.
]
Radiation Monitorina Svstems Instrumentation on Aooendix B Table 3.10-2 (Paae 38) i There were four test failures associated with the Reactor Building Area Exhaust Monitors, j
recorders, and Isolation LSFT and the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) Actuation LSFT.
l The failures were due to failure of the components that receive the actuation signals. The failures did not involve the logic systems that were being tested, therefore, zero logic failures were identified. Drift was not addressed since no analog or digital (numerical) cetpoints are addressed in these LSFTs.
There were two test failures associated with the Liquid Radwaste Discharge Monitor / isolation LSFT. The failures were due to failure of the components that receive the actuation signals. The failures did not involve the logic systems that were being tested, therefore, zero logic failures were identified. Drift was not addressed since the radiation monitor included in this LSFT is calibrated quarterly.
There were 44 satisfactory tests and 2 logic system test failures identified over a 22.5 year period regarding the Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) Radiation Monitors /Offgas Line Isolation LSFT. Both Failures involved a Category 11/111 timer (i.e.,17RTM-157). The first test failure involved the i
controller time adjustment being set too high. As a corrective action, the controller was manually adjusted to actuate in less time. This controller is only adjusted to actuate before an upper limit is reached, thus, the failure was not accounted for as requiring further investigation of similar parts or further consideration in the Reference 2 report. The second test failed when a circuit fuse blew upon 17RTM-157 initiation. The Reference 2 report concluded that this failure was a isolated occurrence with no generic implications. Drift data associated with 17RTM-157 has been analyzed in a drift study contained in Reference 2. The results show that the LSFT can be i
extended from semiannually to once per 24 months as long as the field setting for timer 17RTM-157 is lowered.
As per Generic Letter 91-04, the Reference 2 report confirms that the effect on safety of extending LSFT performance interval from semiannually to once per 24 months is insignificant and is supported by plant historical and maintenance data. The Authority has concluded that the Radiation Monitoring System Instrumentation LSFTs can be extended to once per 24 months without any adverse consequence to safety, reliability, or availability.
. 1 to JPN-98-011 SAFETY EVALUATION Page 5 of 7 IV.
- EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not:
1.
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The only significant change proposed by this application involves the extension of the surveillance test interval for the LSFTs required by the TS. The other changes involve editorial, format, and clarification changes, which by their nature are of no safety 1
significance.
Extending the LSFT interval from semiannually to once per 24 months does not involve plant physical changes, change any TS setpoints, or introduce any new mode of plant operation. Therefore, the change does not degrade the performance of any safety system assumed to function in the accident analysis, and therefore, will not increase the consequences of an accident.
Extending the LSFT interval from semiannually to 24 months results in no significant change in the logic system unavailability due to equipment f ailure. The reliability of safety systems subject to the LSFT are dominated by that of the mechanical components, and the logic system circuit relay coils which are subject to the more frequent functional test requirements. These factors are confirmed by the availability record of the affected safety system based on the past surveillance test history. Furthermore, the longer test intervals reduce _the unavailability due to testing for the applicable safety system while the plant is operating. For these reasons, there is not a significant increase in the probability of an accident.
2.
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes do not introduce any new accident initiators or failure mechanisms since the changes do not introduce any new modes of plant operation, make any physical changes, or change any TS setpoints. The changes reduce the probability of accidents initiated by' test-induced plant transients by reducing the number of times the tests must be performed.
3.
involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The proposed changes do not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings, or limiting conditions for operation are determined, in several aspects, the proposed changes may actually enhance the margin of safety by reducing the potential for test-induced plant transients, reducing the unavailability due to test of the applicable safety 1
system, and reducing any potential incremental logic system component wear. Fo, these reasons, the changes do not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety, l
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Attechmsnt 11 to JPN-98-011 SAFETY EVALUA TlON l--
Page 6 of 7 l
V.' ' IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE This amendment request meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) as follows:
(i) the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
- As described in Section IV of this evaluation, the proposed change involves no j
significant hazards consideration.
(ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
The only significant change proposed by this application involves extending the LSFT interval from semiannually to once per 24 months. The other changes involve editorial, format, and clarification changes, which by their nature are of no safety significance. The change extending the interval of the LSFT does not involve plant l
physical changes, change any TS setpoints, or introduce any new mode of plant
[
operation. Therefore, there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
(iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
I Changing the LSFT interval from semiannually to once per 24 months does not involve plant physical changes, change any TS setpoints, or introduce any new mode of plant operation. The other changes involve editorial, format, and l
clarification changes, which by their nature are of no safety significance. Therefore, there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Based on the above, the Authority concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria specified in 10 CFR 51.22 for a categorical exclusion from the requirements of 10 CFR 51.21 relativa to requiring a specific environmental assessmant by the Commission.
VI.
CONCLUSION This proposed change to the James A. FitzPatric.e TS will extend the LSFT interval from semiannually to once per 24 months. Additionally, the LSFT definition is revised to bring it into agreement with the industry standard contained in bNR STS. Based on the discussions above, the identified LSFT surveillance requirements can be safel, changed from semiannually to once per 24 months. The assumptions in the FitzPatrick licensing b, sis are not invalidated by performing the identified LSFT surveillances at an interval of once per 2s months (30 months with allowable grace period).
The Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and Safety Review Committee (SRC) have l
reviewed this proposed change to the TS and have cor.cluded that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question or a significant hazards consideration and will not endanger the health and safety of the public.
1 1
Attrchmtnt ll to JPN-98-011 l
SAFETY EVALUATION Page 7 of 7 Vll.'
REFERENCES 1.
NUREG-1433, " Standard Technical Specifications for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors (BWR/4)", Revision 1, dated April 1995 2.
JAF-RPT-MULTl-02903, " Surveillance Extension Report (St for Logic System Functional Testing," Revision 0, dated February 13,1998 l
3.
Generic Letter 91-04, Regarding Changes in Technical Specification Surveillance Intervals to Accommodate a 24-Month Fuel Cycle 1
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I Attachm:nt lli to JPN-98-011 t
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MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATl'JN PAGES 1
LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST FREQUENCY (JPTS-96-013)
NOTE 1:
Deletions are shown in sti;keout, and additions are in bold.
NOTE 2:
Previous amendment revision bars are shown and will be deleted.
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j New York Power Authority l
I JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
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" Logic System Functional Test - A logic system functional test shall be a test of all required logic components (i.e., all required relays and contacts, trip units, solid state logic elements, etc.) of a logic circuit, from as close to the sensor as practicable up to, but not including, the actuated device, to verify operability. The logic system functional test may be performed by means of any series of sequential, overlapping, or total system steps so that the entire logic system is tested."
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Attachment IV to JPN-98-011 j.
y LIST OF COMMITMENTS Commitment No.
Description Due Date JPN-98-011-01 Lower field setting for timer 17RTM-Prior to 157.
implementation.
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