ML20206U142
| ML20206U142 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1999 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206U133 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905250069 | |
| Download: ML20206U142 (18) | |
Text
F-Attrchmint 1 i
, UPDATED PAGE CHANGES FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING l
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AOTS i
(JPTS-95-OO7) l l
l l
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FitzPatrick NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 l
9905250069 990519
~
PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
j PM 1
~
~
t d
r p
n o
n it b
c it g
r l
n o
e a
t h e c
h a
g t
t hll a
le n
e it le ni a
wb it a
n t
r e
g oin i
d n s icw n
ea ag eG itn n s a
ee h
r n
e e mt wd l ae c e od ihm tsib ti e
,c np l in le es t
r u
e sl n a
e t
o e
o p
wr t t ir r
r el e d
eaaos t
sa eui r
e g
inr d qd la u ebumni e
r on t
r q oh n ed D o
ni nh e
nef ae ct l a r in n
ur ops c
la ey e
et ha nr me hmee c
f t
n isr a o c
ed s
hn n n
it m oo eg s
ia ce i
yt a
we pf n ymb mg:
e iomprb sy mre f
n r
it yh l
oi dl e
me ou st it e ef r t
i esoer r
t e o t
d sh c
ebt suys n
eh cil r n t
y oi y m t
,s oo nyt e ala t t a
ri l
e ia s
t eaShiSE u yr lef e
oSt t
tam c
aa p b
m sf be r
o r
rh pvr8a rdd r
ad nh h t le ee eot e
oao oe net t le e
t t
o r
re s
t et t ae eh ge ai acb it pl t
v or em ct nhrhpr e u
r t gg
,eac n t et oef a n
pia yn.
lei h nr ai i
s r
n e
,ni nf e e
uf l
os ewe e a v
s t
b e s
,s
- 3. G e T l hn p
t r
h p
r t
Geo e
e ~r nmo s u nGntrd s
e i B. l dmt edo r
e id o
l oaa a
c lbo d
memtsl o 9. s n
.eti o
r e
r s
ogsf e d
a m s, n o d
e ye el t
e c n ck 4e y
c3e niei m e
r r
idi l
c a
i di l d
n e no pl e nc 2D own nDee De a n
pot eiga ee e o c
a o
a dt y yt s it ae nmr n nl e
r yt l yt gh ala r
e e
crb lp imn i e s g
r c e cd cr r
e a r
r e e v ne o e hc nt a nt e
n oe n oie t
s s
mb e et t ei g n p egnm ti e r
ga am P
Acg A pd f
e l
ce ue e l
r cr o er oe er l
ie emc emt e la mn e s
h nmieh pme mey b
c r
hh WSEdfEdS
)
o d
Ts OE sgt a
't n
o c
3 4
5
(
9 PP 4
N 7
F 1
A 2
J l
t r e
oe y
e sie nw a
h Ded o d
t l
op nr e
bi 4o o r
e4 t
a ec2 y
r gl 1 it a
a e
i r s ol na cr e n
n e pi sed p g e
epamieh n n mt n
t ri go oD oe es r nr f
t a ow eio c cg me ingo s eso f
n dl yl r
l 2
l idl e St uo e
Eb lb ce r
onn os aof 3
eoiwie i
oeh e a
2 ht st me ad t r s
ao oh t di eeh ind r t wt 2
f t
nmh r
e es t dt ne in 9
o t
u t eAe r
cer inh eoet 1
er h
t nf pat cf e Gehi or h
w 0
af n t
t alel a o l
lbi oist t 9
p e awn aendhb e o sr 1
hd o et aeh s iee o
si t i bt t aid d e l sl r
Dotpui t
3 e
e m a v n pl d
S r oa o as b yna n 1
m er s
h e a c i t r
s o it ippe isslne ne c
l eb le 1
so sb up d
3 e
r h mr ylamo
,o g obl r
1 t e o aietcse et ao a
tcd vsa ud md e 5,
t r
r c r t esya4aye o E npe a
t 9
f e
eSr h m uoh aSr 1
r e
h o t
rdd t f o n 9,
d o a rh4s nt ee o
i bo t i d
r 3
t st
,2 aaue m
omr r nc e a o
e rd n c eoie neet s t
o meix niht ed t c t
r r
e n n e u u
l N
r t s h a s a o e o oo eiy e
ye o e
Wmsrh D
)
r d
FGct sGpws tn
't e
n m
o c
3 4
5 dn
(
e 9
m 3
A l
l
J le b
a ic
)
lo d
p
't A
n P
o t
P c
oN 0
(
N F
9 2
A 4
D 2
J s
s le
.k a
g ei d
s e
s n
n in
.ht n
t le l i e
e io mr v
l ie lya i
l e
t n od o
b o
ia bC e
n b
a nD pt le e n s e it dr rA e
l et a
a r a pe u
u o amscea t
a u s a
a ehe ag f
f e
eSnlen3 pthnt a e
rd ehniah lc pd e
i t
f r
r ye r
R n
bhame ieoe t
r os oo o r
n eb ie B.
h ot s
r o
ol ict et fdni afl f
r r
sfi nt nt aoo
,iu s
o e
ahosi o oGarb e
a s n
n c e h w c yi g g t sq yt el 9 cl t
al a
nc eio n
l s
n e
l o of ool w
wrub,ey innn emr i
l lnr e pla3 e
s i
o a
inl e
ti icdl a esohn
,idmt e ninis o o sae eg o
o t
r o
e r
t dspn n g
a nt anns r
d t
p C. f 0 ae o die er t
eD u
aiyo r
f t
ur c u
he mdnlomd ht s s aG dni se a
t t eoa e a pS 0. e 0 t
h go o e
nge h
sw,pminc c osd o n tl ari ehe ic it eola 3 r 0, S
t t
r af sr o
ldo uie e
d pt qest n u n stdri cf c
e oint4 e
o seb n
a a clio m i,i e c ne s
n o s6 lo ce
,eiscsy osot itDe npe l
odt hie y
s r
l bo op ler se c a
h l
t rf C
e i S yi emndnacn t
suc a o
e a S
s c
s l
od o
o h
acr nk snoui uoeTi m
i n otoeo eiat oaoec t
t f
r t nr oh r
i t nni tf f t r f
n t
ieet idu vt i cma t
a t
r pb c i er a e e m
u ie argw ndcr l
c e e
r ep ol aw s e e
e o nt e
s epwi D
isn t
r m
l e
en t
e oal sne f
o n m yh ear e i
y r
ubh ie amSon c
a it a
nt ch e aa dp sdc d
l of ee nr o e n Gs o" r
t ti
,am li t
l t
agos ehnit oG a
el nt r
dr n ik ot on aet mu c
he lo" sea i
aml b
eeiehr nd er nrt ocnci t r f
t sl dei usivio nwds r
ms nt t o r e a snao a
e uea i r y
r r e t
r n
snc eigo r c oles 3
e s
e e mi q n d u
el n e o a yoc vD mr y p
i rhr r o t
ahl eie l
t e 8
rFtfSca ef 0ae ut O
hnDee i
orWa a c pb r i no0r r ot ti r
ds od y
mc gwf o ei numce u o
e 0, n uhn r
r r
a e
e n
o hi a 4 e q8 u
.esesdms N
W p6 G r 4 q w
va nie ladd e
etl o s e
rbtiee p c
,semr t
P e
ner,go sl r r eaiie n
r a n ii u
)
d d
edepr euu s
u e
e qd w s
l pet qq s
't C o homupo n
3 A M WmEsopreeo e ue no m
rt vf r ap d
o n
c e
(
m 9
D A
3
rrg o:n a
s e
u t vi f
hh v
c u h
s a
c c n ah is b
o e
t ce aole at hh a
r dieth esVr e ef a
n c
sht a a ctOe ea r
re ot s n
e a rliwd seEftAme rhutMw eri r
i Go ee n
le n
e lyi C o t t r o
o swt ie yl aOfret onIP u
l r seC e o ed g lpem dnt r f
e e n prera amL v o r
v e
s ePC R
eww i r rd t
e uih pt roaeil e L -
io o t n cvc uaot adawe A t
o D pd r
t f
g ohe aino Sbnmol nit oanpth y t
bso ry yd t c n
c e ec pl rdset s e
n,n u
lu e ni t ni y s ei w
nrh tnd sf warseyr st ee ai o
ei s g
ah ya oriseyvl e aycg u
at l t e
P ef eat nbir d
r qd le lp v e
- r tt ca sre t
eelou ti ei s i
r n
s r
e t rclyeib' er u
t t e em h
m cf onwt d lo evr p eOah sE e
ya i ne e ph t Vl S
Ehed we ar a
t mtnbel p
dn unmh o
pe t
u ni,esI oTM n wf ld ethe t
r o e t
h t
mi ht g nf a
Astt i
S e rg
.t
.e uu o
ud c a n pe r ooni r
u o
id rqcabi C
eia ee dihwt amh.bom r
a t
dynr ecEea e
f f
t n
cotiaser mVir a
niei dd
.hre t
t s o l
r a
w I c n
aih t ee f
iet r p o ey ps ysyw tO y e
t b
g i
eawn lpi a eno P VrlpCdlp s o yM l r
rn s
y u
pl ci i
p l
ul wial t
O r, p - e t
D rasld qo ot a n
pr pS I pc M gseuArg u vt u
u e Cue y
o a s
nn e o pi m d I r n
e oI i
yas wtCPsr it r
l s
ea c
ar chr PLrd i
evh is ef r
- e n
Ca e n ce o yL e
ho vmo b
rehe n r
P h n
e Lcweywpt hwd a
t r
p wtde e
s eog e o gl oCahaoz i
c e
r eeh m
wlys st a
l ce e
ort n d o
prup-e pig p
puaw e
opoerdi ef A pt t
y n wfot manycoon O
sl s
ppl el I
t n
t af rt r e
e r
n ud y
uadzp V ge e
e ct n de f e n e
it et n S
Cs nisp e
n s
ga a
u O r nd eid n n s
od w
o Don f
ai nh yn eeie n mps v
r em t
e s M t
o s f
il set e gi t d e b r
v wa ge ei p epr P e oe e
e d omrl r
I ic ai p e d
e smd i
r s emt eef rveyt t
t 5 el rah C en t
e s
t C o nyo o a
2zl oh P
hodo admfuproday AM OSfrm B
1 sf ncwL io nr n
n T c i f b i E s o pi m S P
P D
E F
N 4
F 2
A 2
f e
o J
tn h
ee t
7 f
f n
e t n n
r t
ah o
o c
ue or
,o o
fi o m io 8
lpo lbl c
t o v tf t
e u
r e
a 4
eb e yd oke eh rd t
n s
n h
abc gt e a in de ran a nist e r
n a
po h
t eh epe e
emn o ol it f
f
,d t pagm.
t o k
ei ocres a
mipa nd w
n bvn ett tlatu e u M )n o e l
a oo t s sn t
oimye ispogq o e
ki da r
re pd n
e m
i nn st e
it esd ae r
oya is ed yc moe nfic s
ps st a oR e a a s
s e
k t nac od y p le et aMkn bs h
t ab msara b s at so e t c t
em n
s eSsst ia y
kiiv S pysrti e
o 4i t
d n
r i
at a
t is1is srr ea le mlsRt ra s
t yoarl r
riu n ur s
d rh St u oo o
t t y eonags ns re mot agco ly t
li ef rr c
a h e o pfi er e
e e-h n
rt ni ni oe v
t t
roCom mto i
re f
nf ig e
a y
a es o-h n et a n t n a sel o
ea le Swb eG s
e uu rl r
u d
r r a
t d
t Gsmice(
iu e nlds s is g
a or e a o rpe sif ah qn e
o p
eer aa o Gselel r
le asnpt l
e 1
e e b
tt s
o rg 0
ee la w
ot mf2 ll an 9
nCio..
eDia o
iet r
int ee e l
ie 1
nt s
g(
p Dt e 6n o
e een s
c r
e a a ieynsa nmhhonio lei le t
e c
y a pT t i r
)
r r
iot Ge e Dn ed g e a
ud u
6 t
ctiu spt c f
f 1
ai pw yet
)
s o
cgeloi it t
n leo o
s e
.eici y
le n
mf p q r
dt cei e c f
g e
r t
d e op n e rm e a sSc in s
0 f
icm o o
ei rsu e e
se e
it e
't e
esladnp ng i
3 Dd gmfiet
(
v reft e
mshe n
r d
v iS le o
yer e
u s )p v
Ei t s oe eAsil u
m m l
o t
mgsysm e
ni c
ct e t os a
r a
N ni s
(
s a,d am.mc F e
n n
eme Eignngu e i u
o.
e ne a t
S gr eiinp e
r nc ic an le me it s n
E r ef iR ei abr r
r S
e p o :g n a yl r
v g v gh s
ihs ir e
Wsteh a r e r e ie int y du m
A mesn omro e
hr isn oro c aoH h a do cPsPT D Mfod Ah d
e B
Ebei f
rccR T cw I
n nl ro e
l m
9 aaul holo 3
I ssf 1
2 3 C
A f
i JAFNPP i
6.21 CONFIGURATION RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
.The Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) provides a proceduralized risk-informed assessment to manage the risk associated with equipment inoperability.
The program applies to technical specification structures, systems, or components for which a risk-informed allowed outage time has been granted. The program is to include the following:
a.
Provisions for the control and implementation of a Level 1 at-power internal events PRA-informed methodology. The assessment is to be capable of evaluating the applicable plant configuration.
b.
Provisions for performing an assessment prior to entering the plant configuration described by the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO)
Action Statement for preplanned activities.
c.
Provisions for performing an assessment after entering the plant configuration described by the LCO Action Statement for unplanned entry into the LCO Action Statement.
d.
Provisions for assessing the need for additional actions after the discovery of additional equipment-out-of-service conditions while in the plant configuration described by the LCO Action Statement.
e.
Provisions for considering other applicable risk-significant contributors such.
as Level 2 issues and external events, qualitatively or quantitatively.
Amendment No.
258f
Attschm:nt il REVISED SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AOTS (JPTS-95-007) l i
)
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FitzPatrick NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
. 1 Suonlemental information Supportina Revision i
Page 1 of 5 Emeroency Diesel Generator LCO at Power The purpose of the revision to the proposed TS change is to extend AOTs for an inoperable i
"EDG system" to provide increased flexibility in scheduling " individual EDG" maintenance activities. ~ Current plant maintenance practice is to perform on-line EDG maintenance on a single EDG and maintain the other " individual EDG" in the EDG system available foi operation. The Authority considers this to be a prudent approach to EDG maintenance in minimizing plant risk during on-line repair or planned maintenance of a single EDG. This also provides the operators with an " individual EDG" capable of supporting certain loads (e.g. one core spray pump and one residual heat removal pump). The " individual EDG" is capable of supporting 2600 kw load with manual action required by the operators.
TS section 3.9.B.3 currently allows an EDG system to be taken out of service for repair or maintenance for a period up to 7 days. It applies when either an individual EDG or both EDGs within an Emergency Diesel Generator System is inoperable.
The proposed 14 day EDG AOT would allow an " individual EDG" within an EDG system to be taken out of service for a period up to 14 days to perform repair or preplanned maintenance during power operation. The condition when both EDGs within a system are inoperable establishes the bounding 14. day AOT. The Authority does not plan on performing EDG maintenance on both EDGs in an EDG system concurrently (i.e. plant maintenance practice is to perform preplanned maintenance on only one EDG within an EDG system, while maintaining the other EDG in the system "available"). In the event that an emergent condition renders both EDGs in a system inoperable, (e.g. EDG bus tie-breaker inoperability) the Authority would minimize the repair time and minimize the risk in accordance with the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP).
Emeroency Diesel Generator LCO Durina Plant Shutdown TS section 3.9.D and its associated Bases is changed to require the operability of an "EDG system" capable of supporting required emergency equipment. This change is consistent with the NRC Improved Standard TS for BWR-4 plants (reference 5).
1 Confinuration Risk Manaaement Proaram (CRMP)
As stated in reference 1 the Authority proposed a CRMP consistent with guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.177 (reference 2 ). The CRMP evaluates the impact on risk of equipment out of service during on-line EDG maintenance activities.
Risk evaluation of an EDG System Out of Service An evaluation (reference 3) was performed to determine the potential increase in risk resulting from an EDG system extended allowed outage time (AOT) from 7 to 14 days using the latest revision of the FitzPatrick IPE update (reference 4). This evaluation assesses the proposed TS configuration of loss of an EDG system. This evaluation conservatively assumes that concurrent maintenance could be performed on other systems as long as it falls within the scope of the current TSs.
1 4
Att:chment 11 Suonlemental information Supportina Revision Page 2 of 5
- The results are presente'd below:
conditional core conditional core EDG Combination Change in CDF Damage Probability Damage Probability per Yr.
for 7 Days for 14 Days l
93EDG-A and 93EDG-C 4.18E-06 8.02E-08 1.60E-07 l
93EDG-B and 93EDG D 4.23E-06 8.11 E-08 1.62E-07 The conditional core damage probability of an extended EDG system outage to 14 days is not risk significant. This evaluation is performed for a conservatively high bounding case.
Planned maintenance will not be performed on both EDGs in a system concurrently (i.e. an individual EDG will be maintained "available") and any additional equipment problems during the 14 day EDG AOT will be evaluated for risk impact by the CRMP.
Planned Condition to Support On-line EDG Maintenance
- The Authority has administrative controls governing maintenance during LCOs and requirements for documenting entry into, and exit from TS LCOs. The Authority plans the following conditions to support a 14 day AOT for individual EDGs:
The Authority will verify through TS, procedures, or detailed analysis that the a.
required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that are required to mitigate the consequences of an accident are available and operable before removing an EDG for extended preventive maintenance (PM). In addition, controls will be provided to preclude subsequent testing or maintenance activities on these systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices while the EDG is inoperable, b.
When an individual EDG is removed from service for repair or planned maintenance for an extended 14-day AOT, the remaining "EDG system" must be operable and the remaining " individual EDG" must be "available".
c.
The removal from service of safety systems and important non-safety equipment, including offsite power sources, will be minimized during the extended 14 day AOT.
d.
The primary intent of extending the EDG AOT is that the extended EDG AOT from 7 days to 14 days may be needed to perform preplanned EDG maintenance that would otherwise extend beyond the current 7 day AOT.
e.
Voluntary entry into this LCO action statement will not be scheduled if severe weather conditions are expected which could affect the reliability of the offsite power sources.
y Attichment il Sucolemental Information Supportina Revision Page 3 of 5 f.
The overall unavailability of the EDG should not exceed the Maintenance Rule performance criteria value.
g.
Any component testing or maintenance that increases the likelihood of a plant transient should be avoided. Planned plant operation should be stable during the extended 14 day AOT.
Evaluation Of Sionificant Hazards Consideration Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the additional changes to the proposed Amendment discussed above, would not involve a significant hazards i
consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not:
- 1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications will allow longer Allowed Out of Service Times to perform necessary repair and maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generators while at power. This extended AOT will enhance scheduling of preventive maintenance of individual EDGs without significantly increasing the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The risk evaluations for the EDGs determined that the probability of an accident by increasing the AOT for an EDG System from 7 days to 14 days is non-risk significant.
Increasing the EDG AOT does not involve physical alteration of any plant equipment and does not affect analysis assumptions regarding functioning of required equipment designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents.
Further, the severity of postulated accidents and resulting radiological effluent releases will not be affected by the increased AOT for an EDG System.
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
Att2chment 11 Fupolemental Information Supportina Revision Page 4 of 5
- 2. create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Extending the AOT for an EDG system does not necessitate physica!
alteration of the plant or changes in parameters governing normal plant operation. Thus, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kirid of accident from any accident previously evaluated for JAF plant.
- 3. involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
As discussed above, a Fitzpatrick evaluation determined that the change in risk associated with extending the AOT for a EDG System is non-risk-significant. In addition, the design provides adequate redundancy for safe shut down during the AOT with an EDG System out of service. This is supported by the LOCA analyses including analyses for long term suppression pool cooling and reactor shutdown cooling.
Implementation Of The Proposed Channes implementation of the proposed changes will not adversely affect the ALARA or Fire Protection Program at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will the changes impact the environment.
These changes will not result in any new releases to the environment. The changes pose no radiological or fire hazards and, therefore, can have no impact on the Fire Protection Program or the environment. The Authority request 60 days to support implementation of this amendment.
Conclusion Based on the preceding discussions, the Authority believes that the proposed increase in the individual EDG AOT from 7 days to 14 days is acceptable provided adequate compensatory measures are in place. The compensatory measures include requirements for necessary SSCs to be operable. In addition, procedures are in place that will prohibit entry into an extended EDG outage time of 14 days, for scheduled maintenance purposes, if severe weather conditions are expected. The CCDP values for each EDG system out of service for 14 days remain below the 1.00E-06 EPRI PSA Application Guide threshold.
j
Att chment 11 Suonlemental information Supportina Revision Page 5 of 5 The ch:nges involve no significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.
The Plan. Operating Review Committee (PORC) and the Safety Review Committee (SRC) have reviewed these proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and have concluded that they do not involve an unreviewed safety question, or a significant hazards consideration, and will not endanger the health and safety of the public.
EffEfflGAR 1.
NYPA Letter, J. Knubel to the NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding JPTS 95-007, (JPN 98-054), dated December 30,1998 2.
Regulatory Guide 1,177, "An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications," August 1998 3.
JAF Evaluation for AOT Extension on Loss of an EDG System, RE-99-166, dated March 24,1999 4.
JAF-RPT-MULTI-02107, " Individual Plant Examination," Revision 1, dated April 1998 5.
NRC NUREG-1433, " Standard Technical Specifications in General Electric Plants, BWR/4", Revision 1, April 1995 l
1
Attachment lli
' MARKED-UP PAGE CHANGES FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDIN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AOTS (JPTS-95-OO7) i 1
New York Power Authority JAMES A. FitzPatrick NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59
I l
d le n n
e a
s
~
~
o h e c
a t
t b n
n e
i i
i g
e rDn a.
l hd d u do t tns iw nq e
.yi c
t ee h
ae s 2. c rnt 0
t a
nt wdle s
- 8. g es r
r esl u o ed wet e m 9. e r
r t t r
e ui r
sa d qd a b o
ie n ef er p';3 m nr r i c
.E n
ur ops me e'
1 c '- [8 s sr i ie e eg n
acp n
y r
t impr o
sy oe b
o l
yh it l
e ef e t
d m.
r st dtsh
,h s o e
n nyt e at t
r t n ec-aa s
oo oSt l
em c
a ai e
t r c t o ~~
t rhr ee eotle s at s6 r
^
d nh ht ea de-np op t ae co nh et rt atM a
m ea cl gg fe e s
n hnr ay
^^ d e r e r
l et
,c ei t
l s
ui ;"
r s u nGnt n oh h
hwf"2 r
ed omioae w
i e
g smt d
e h
sr d
ye 4eeN e n
t s
dim o
w ;.
m i
^
ck i
nc 2D owe n
ee n
le ee y yt se h
chr a i
gh r
r c e cdrh nt o e
v ne ot o 3. t mb e et t e
d s
ga at p
r s r 8. n l r e
er uee r o e
l ce mnc u c 9. e l
ea nmiec oc hh d
Ts OE sga ha3Gi
)
't s"
no c
3 4
5
(
9 y
PP 4
7, l
N F
2 A
l t
J e
o r
e s
ne y
h e
edw
_ dnr e
T a
t iDl oo o
r e4 pl/e d r o
aec2 A
bi t
ya e r
i e
t a ne E
cr s
gs s
i oig u
nep p
ne e
mt n
epaiihn n f
go mDt o e esri r
f t a ow eioogo cg se so r n f
h f c n dl yl me nidl e St uo l
rl Eboinn os aof d
oie ce roehe eoi t
a i
ht swme ad t rao oh dist ehnd t
a t
w e
r t o nmerti e es f
n eoeturheAetdt net
+
i er nh c
h er t
Gehw i i nf pt t cf e o
s at
.ef n l
or l bi e
t oihaleie o e
een hb eo s awn 4
p t
t r
aehs ee o
t hdod si m
ipui rbt t
aiede e
Dot t
t d
emadnpEesb ynan sl ie o m
r voe he a cit o s e r
s prl ssl ne ne c
t i
i t
r up ebe a
i s o pb e
d amo,o gobl l
hmr sl t
r o yi e tcse et a o t
et et r c s
ard mde yaGeye t c vs r
u es o a Enpe o
uoh t
e eSr hm ho t
e aSrjfa f
r e
tf o n a
rh4s o
ti dorde-ot2 br i
d nt st m
omo r
aau-e rdn a
e o
ei=
ce oie neet s t
r n edt c r e
n mn n=
u niht t
r r t s ha se u l
yo o e
t o e on o e eiy Wmsrh D
n.
d FGci sGpws
)
r
't m
n o
n o
c 3
4 6
m
(
9 A
3 g
e l
ba d
c e
i u
l n
pp i
t A
n t
oc oN 9
4 D
l t
+
5 p
.e y g l a pr po at ts onl e
i s o.
n e s
t' ke a
ol n e
n
\\
f r o de o r
l e
e h
i e
s b
m D
l d
c s
L ul r
ae n
n C
a i
e a sGc.f a
a r h yi e
g aset r u
e en
- 0. r 0 e
pt p a
ps bi r
n i d.iosd mi t
o olf 0
t an 3 o 0, u
l nnn f sl ei ehoc u
l t pm l oio rl scnt h
l b a
e ac i
eoae s4 s
a h
r gi e o hrtth et tt D pi e 6 l c o
t esasdba i a dodli f yh n
c sr0 Str f l
ah,e esSt mali e0e a
o oe h w r
mn e
l f i c o cn s
eo n n 0, h i ar
,t eai t r o e slh c G4 ai t m o
sc oe t
u e
t s
l 6f cf m
hf rn ea ttl yb s e e
abSa p
el oii di y
t oo v
hl ra rnS uen nc en t
t r
ti erreo f
s a nh e wi nma geod i
o n e o pi h ehoticpom l
iur nh e
r e pt ott.
li me it
,r i
el Goanaie eD tesl a b
si n e
di s a T ",l t e rirwv s
a in bgev sr ao r
i f ul ee e
o ef nro af ebndpeb oeet t
e rm y
iie i
s eeoca d
l p s e p
o c
nur deeoGr n
r o et ry O t a n
iq nnit era 3 eio e
t c
se aes n
dod hatf m ai r
a eg rri aoD l
e deit t p o-myansscor B.
t o
e irod s
msn t
r Dew sm ol uenac9 reeto era a
m ie t
rnnoioec el sl r u u r
e yey t
FoifDcra3 v b a u" i o q e
s c
n t s eaes n
nda ny d
nrre suhk e
gee es e
eecr rq n
G n gt ram u
hpe oe8 a ei r a ei n g o
n c
W o d at r 4 xnuE t
l vl ei v t n
N i
e eemcen i
t one l
t s
n e
ef set o
n o
i h ef sho o
e C
3 DTWroawpcc m
dn 9
em 3
D A
)
d 3
m e
1 s
z e
u iadd o
h v
s e neg hhf ce a s
b r
hn az n ccd ah h esVr i
i et cnl si aa ee a
y r
ct Oe ew rl eEf hAme eri Mw semep s
yt Cotrhut o
gp n
r et on r
slefoor u eyH oiOf v o v
r h
pemtaLdnt seC P I
nas h r i
ePC r
e rf pt t t eo cle r na ei e
l L
/
ueoi t
ef adawe A
i ws ah Sbn ni ohe teboshw moloanpt hy t
rds t s e
pot e
t c ie nioniysein
,n t
l nnt wt war t eyr st ee a
e e
agn t e aycg ori mvl l
l i
t eat nbi pseds Pef r
v e i
r e s
t t e cesr e er r
od udd e
4-r ct eib' er wt cvie h
ee sht Vt e em anog n
f n r-s mheOah sE c
1vr yt a l
t or a u
n i e yI oTMn wfoe r
n mt cp h S
h gl Ast n
r eaisc r p
.t e
uu t
o u
m h yly e
-;e apeam.h.bom r
r i
f fihut t
as er mVirso f
w rt cst dpt rl i
ei ieu c
t o
- eyr sys ee f
Os h uwt t f Vrl edl ywt y
P s
p q O r, p w e pp s o yM epl e a petnb ns n
t t
p PSI pc eu ogu r
ud e Mgspa r
e Cu e s ed h id e
oI s wt CPst cye d
r e
ri r o n
Ca eChr o yP L r d I
sica r
u cE et e
P h ce e
i LcwAywpt Lhwd r qa tt g e
i ee
.en s
ce c e
m wr o yl oCahaoz l
t rbit d
o apcfup-n e a
n wfoa n a Apt e pig e
oe a e
ta phi whe af r
r I
t rea ycoor4e v
t c ot p V
eg gnf ct n f e f : n S
Cyop nf r Dl c no O
ai-e nn od r
i y
pf eial M
mry eeie-
_em t
vpovt a s :
r gi t r caid ;b e ei e
u I
r s:;ee ;ef t
5sseenm
- r ir v : yt a
2 sser C
enf et f mf t
t e
s of ay o
P ho-he upr o oemn L
Tck tbkE s'o p k m S B
1 t l
r P
P E
F N
A F
2 A
dn e
e 3
f J
o eo bct y
l N
did e nn no ve pee i7 8
os a gi ar 4
a cr c t
t e o r o o
b simc ef m
n s
p mef od h
i o
s o
t ie e d s-i no w
s s
d t ns old e
m7 yao l
de t
er Ss e
et is t ol d
l r
b sa sf a o a a
r ar e
y n
t bt h
Sn a
t uio a u h
9 r g e
e r rt r
r s o
o o a eo nf c y
3 a m at e e
l t
t r
s e d
rdp G
o h
t g
tnt e
e eo wt h
i s
r nt ey e
et e
- n ms v
Gur
- e s
l e
ma i
l m
er e
1
/
j r
l r o d
eo er
.p e
i y
uf spw y
.u w
I e
i qr e
e c
q o
+
ee h
e o N
iDbp n-e p
r n n
r et e
il e o
yl e gn e
l l
S og c
ce v r e t
g nhr ei i
4 l l l
c s
ee e
ese mf f
i f
us u
gt sn e Ef f
I f e us o
f r
i e
r
(
ed l
a e sg f
t e
ml
)
l e
d iy s
p bgn v
s E
a
't c
e r nli r
sgen eiot e
e' n
nn d
e i
o l
oe h
ci pryon s
o w
or ce e
N c
m g
l t
a r
mr a
d r
d
(
t f
u o ec ei e
t e
n o
ol F
r c n
S u
E e
m m.
o e
hf oc slo l
i.
Toca W
e t s e s m
S s
iey dr rhf i
en u
ot e e
d A
s o
B D
Mha do poh i
n d
Ah obt 1
2 N
t I
e m
9 3
C D
A
I Attachment lli INSERTS (Pg.1 of 2)
Insert 1 While the reactor is being operated in accordance with Specification 3.9.B.3, the availability of the operable Emergency Diesel Generator System shall be demonstrated once j
within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> by manual starting and force paralleling. The operability of the remaining Emergency Diesel Generator System need not be demonstrated if the affected Emergency i
Diesel Generator System became inoperable due to:
a.
Preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, b.
An inoperable support system with no potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generators, or c.
An independently testable component with no potential common mode failure for the remaining diesel generators.
insert 2 AC Power Operability Durina Cold Shutdown or Refuelina Modes Whenever the reactor is in the cold shutdown or refueling mode, a minimum of one offsite power source and one Emergency Diesel Generator System, capable of supporting required emergency equipment, shall be operable whenever any work is being done which has the potential for draining the vessel, secondary containment is required, or a core or containment cooling system is required. When this condition is not met, initiate actions to suspend all work that could cause draining of the vessel, suspend core alterations and handling of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, declare required core or containment cooling systems inoperable and immediately initiate actions to restore required AC power sources.
Insert 3 If an Emergency Diesel Generator System is not operable, the plant shall be permitted to operate at power for 14 days provided both sources of reserve power are operable. This is based on the following:
1.
If one Emergency Diesel Generator System is not operable, the remaining Emergency Diesel Generator System is capable of carrying sufficient engineered safeguards and emergency core cooling system loads (at least one core spray system and one RHR pump) to mitigate all loss-of-coolant accidents.
I 2.
The reserve (offsite) power is highly reliable.
l I
1
Attachment lli INSERTS (Pg. 2 of 2) 3.
When an Emergency Diesel Generator system is taken out of service, it is important to assure the impact on plant risk of this and other equipment simultaneously taken out of service can be assessed. The Configuration Risk Management Program evaluates the impact on plant risk of equipment out of service. A description of the Configuration Risk Management Program is in Section 6.21 (administrative section) of the Technical Specification.
Insert 4 AC Power Operability Durina Cold Shutdown or Refuelina Modes One offsite power source and one Emergency Diesel Generator System ensure the availability of the required power to recover from postulated events when in the cold shutdown or refueling modes and when handling irradiated fuel.
(
Attachment IV Summary of Commitments Commitment No.
Description Due Date JPN-99-016-01 Update appropriate Prior to amendment i
I administrative control implementation procedures with " Planned conditions to support EDG on-line maintenance" l
l l
l l
i l
l l
l l
<