ML20236L293
| ML20236L293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 06/07/1998 |
| From: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236L255 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9807100301 | |
| Download: ML20236L293 (21) | |
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ATTACHMENT I ta JPN-98-028 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE CHANGES (JPTS-98-003) i l
(NOTE: Proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are shown by a bar in the right hand margin) l i
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New York Power Authority l
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59 9007100301 900706 l
PDR ADOCK 05000333 p
PM L________________
ATTACHMENT I NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSE NO. DPR-59 DOCKET NO. 50-333 PROPOSED CHANGES TO RADIOLOGIC #.L EFFLUENT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Remove Pace Insert Paae 29 29 37 37 37a 40 40 42 42 I
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BASES 3.0 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS 3.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORS The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during planned or unplanned
- releases. The alarm / trip set points for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with methods in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm / trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20.
The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 60,63 and 64.
l-Rete to Appendix A Technical Specification Bases 4.2 for references pertaining to surveillance and allowable outage times for selected monitors listed on RETS Table 3.10-1 3
and Table 3.10-2.
}
3.3 GASEOUS DOSE RATES i
l-This specification is provided to ensure that the dose at or beyond the site boundary from.
gaseous effluents will be within the annual dose limits of 10 CFR 20. The annual dose limits are the doses associated with the concentrations of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 11, Column 1. These limits provide reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharges
-in gaseous effluents will not result in the exposure of a member of the public to annual average concentrations exceeding the limits specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 11
'(10 CFR 20.106(b]). The specified limits restrict, at all times, corresponding gamma and beta dose rates above background to an individual at or beyond the exclusion area boundary to s500 mrem / year to the total body or to s3000 mrem / year to the skin. _ These limits also restrict the corresponding thyroid dose rate above background to a child via the j
inhalation pathway to s1500 mrem / year.
1 3.3' AIR DOSE. NOBLE GASES This specification is provided to assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1, L
Section ll.B, Ill.A and IV.A are met.' The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Appendix 1, Section ll.B. The specification provides the required operating -
flexibility and, at the same time, implements the guides set forth in Appendix 1, Section
. IV.A, to assure that the releases of radioactive material in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable."
3.4 DOSE DUE TO LODINE-131. LODINE-133. TRITIUM AND RADIONUCLIDES IN
' PARTICULATE FORM L
, The specification is provided to assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1,
. Section ll.C, Ill.A and IV.A are met. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Appendix 1, Section ll.C. The specifications provide the required operating flexibility and, at the same time, implement the guides set forth in Appendix 1,Section IV.A, to assure that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low H
as is reasonably achievable."
1
' Amendment No. 03,211, 40
BASES 3.7 OFFGAS TREATMENT SYSTEM EXPLOSIVE GAS MlXTURE INSTRUMENTATION This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in portions of the offgas treatment system not designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion is maintained below the lower explosive limit of hydrogen. Operation
'of the offgas recombiner system ensures that the concentration of hydrogen in the offgas charcoal filters remains below combustible levels.
Thus it provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance 'with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion
- 60. The low steam flow trip point is based on 92% of design steam flow and reroutes the offgas to prevent overheating or ignition of the recombiner catalyst. The high steam flow
~ trip point isolates the recombiner on excess steam flow that may be associated with a pipe break downstream of the recombiner.
3.8 STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGTS)
Four radiation monitors are provided which initiate isolation of the reactor building and operating of the SBGTS.' The monitors are located as follows: two in the reactor building ventilation exhaust duct and two in refuel floor ventilation exhaust duct. Each pair is considered a separate system. The trip logic consists cf any upscale trip on a single monitor or a downscale trip on both monitors in a pair to cause the desired action.
Trip settings for the monitors in the refueling area ventilation exhaust ducts are based upon initiating normal ventilation isolation and SBGTS operation so that most of the activity released during N refueling accident is processed by the SBGTS.
The radiation monitors in the refueling area ventilation duct which initiate building isolation and standby gas treatment operation are arranged in a one out of two logic system. The l
air ejector offgas monitors are connected in a two out of two logic arrangement. Based on sxperience with instruments of similar design, a testing interval of once every three months has been found adequate.
3.9 MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP ISOLATION 3.10 MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR l
Amendment No. 0,5, io7,211, I-a-
42 l'
g
i ATTACHMENT 11 to JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION FOR PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (JPTS-98-OO3) l
('
i New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59
ATTACHMENT ll TO JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 10F 7 1.
DESCRIPTION A review was performed on James A. FitzPatrick Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS) as a result of corrective actions associated with License Event Report (LER-98-01) " Partial invalid Isolations of Reactor Building Ventilation". It was determined that performance of certain surveillance and preventative maintenance may result in short periods when radiological monitoring instrumentation is inoperable. During these periods, RETS requires tripping of the initiation logic associated with the instrumentation to be tested. The other alternative to tripping the logic is to take the RETS LCO action associated with inoperable instrumentation.
Amendment 227 dated September 15,1995, incorporated instrumentation Surveillance Test Interval (STI) extensions from monthly to quarterly and Allowable Outage Times (AOTs) up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in Technical Specifications (TS). The change was justified based on General Electric Topical Reports which are referenced in TS Bases 4.2. Prior to Amendment 227 submittal, an evaluation was performed on TS and RETS instruments to determine GE Topical Reports applicability. The evaluation determined GE Topical Reports could be applied to RETS Table 3.10-2 ' Minimum Test and Calibration Frequency for Radiation Monitoring Systems'. However, since the RETS STI was quarterly, it was decided not to apply the Topical Reports to RETS. The proposed changes are based on the guidance contained in the GE Topical Reports previously approved in Amendment 227, and are consistent with the philosophy of improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS),
NUREG-1433, " Standard Technical Specifications General Electric Plants BWR/4," Revision 1.
Additionally, editorial and administrative changes are proposed to provide clarification of the minimum radiation monitoring instrumentation requirements and add an additional LCO reference during applicable conditions.
II.
PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES Paae 29 Incorporate editorial change to RETS LCO 3.5.b to include action 3.5.b.2.
Add a six hour Allowable Outage Time (AOT) for required surveillance to RETS LCO 3.5.b.1, Main Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE).
j Incorporate administrative change to delete "in the downscale position" in RETS LCO l
3.5.b.1.
ATTACHMENT ll TO JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 2 OF 7 Paae 37 incorporate editorial changes to RETS LCO Table 3.10-1 " Radiation Monitoring Systems that initiate and/or Isolate Systems" to clarify that the " minimum number of operable instrument channels" refer to each trip system and add RETS 3.1.c to note (f).
Add a six hour AOT for surveillance testing and up to 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> AOT for repair to RETS LCO Table 3.10-1 " Radiation Monitoring Systems that initiate and/or isolate Systems" for selected instrumentation.
Revise RETS LCO Table 3.10-1 " Radiation Monitoring Systems that Initiate and/or Isolate Systems' Notes For Table 3.10-1 for SJAE Radiation Monitors to add note (j) to reference RETS LCO 3.5.b.1, Main Condenser Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) for minimum number of operable channels requirements.
Revise RETS LCO Table 3.10-1 " Radiation Monitaring Systems that Initiate and/or Isolate Systems' Notes For Table 3.10-1 for Main Control Room Ventilation to add note (k) to allow a six hour AOT for surveillance test ng.
Paoe 40. 42 Revise RETS Bases 3.0 Gaseous Effluents to reference changes above.
Ill. SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES RETS LCO 3.5 Main Condenser Steam Jet Air Eiector (SJAE) system radiation monitors Adding e. Dri numb? 2 to LCO 3.5.b is editorial and does not alter the original intent of this TS and will provide additional consistency within the RETS.
A six-hour surveillance AOT for the Steam Jet Air Ejector (SJAE) radiation monitors is being proposed in LCO 3.5.b.1. These radiation monitors are arranged in a two-out-of-two logic; therefore, both must trip to initiate the required action (closure of the off-gas isolation valve to the main stack after a time delay). A high radiation condition sensed by the monitor in service would provide sufficient time to take corrective actions. Since this instrument was relocated from NUREG-1433, there is no corresponding requirement for comparison. The GE Topical Reports referenced in current TS Bases 4.2 address similar instrumentation. A six-hour AOT is deemed acceptable for instrumentation in the Reactor Protection System and Emergency Core Cooling System. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply a six-hour AOT to SJAE radiation monitors which are non-safety related. Also, the six-hour test duration provides a reasonable amount of time for testing without placing undue time constraints on maintenance personnel.
Deleting "in the downscale position" from LCO 3.5.1.b does not alter the intent of the specification and will provide administrative flexibility on how to place a channel in trip.
ATTACHMENT ll TO JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 3 OF 7 RETS LCO Table 3.10-1 Radiation Monitorino Svstems and associated Bases Based on the STS instrumentation guidelines and the RETS Bases that refers to prior to Amendment 227 Appendix A Technical Specifications (TS) Bases 4.2 that assumed l
channel bypass during testing and repair, new notes for RETS LCO Table 3.10-1 and l
associated RETS Bases are being proposed. The change adds a six-hour period for i
surveillance and up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for repair for selected instruments. This will define the "brief interval" as described in the TS Bases 3.2 during which a channel may be inoperable without placing the trip system in the tripped condition. For systems with only one channel (Main Control Room Ventilation) or two-out-of-two logic system (SJAE System Radiation Monitor) a six hour surveillance AOT is being prcposed. This is consistent with GE Topical Reports referenced in current TS Bases 4.2 and STS.
RETS Table 3.10-1 requires a minimum number of channels of protective instrumentation in each trip system to be either operable or tripped. RETS Table 3.10-2 requires periodic surveillance testing of these protective instrumentation channels to demonstrate operability. Surveillance testing causes the channel being tested to be inoperable during performance of the surveillance tests. Therefore, the channel under test cannot be relied upon to perform its safety function. Verbatim compliance with the current RETS permit making an instrument inoperable for testing, but do not explicitly state the length of time for the AOT in this condition.
l The proposed changes provide an allowance to not place a channel's associated trip i
system in the tripped condition for up to six hours during the performance of required surveillance and up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for repair, as long as the associated function maintains trip capability. For those trip systems with only one channel (Main Control Room Ventilation) or two-out-of-two logic system (SJAE System Radiation Monitor), the repair AOT is not applicable.
The existing RETS do not specify an AOT for entry into an LCO when testing the J
associated instruments. TS Appendix A Bases 3.2 states, "When necessary, one channel may be made inoperable for brief intervals to conduct required functional tests and calibrations." The proposed RETS for selected instrumentation effectively defines a "brief interval" as six hours for surveillance and up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for repair and explicitly permit a-delay in entering the actions for this poriod. This change is required since entering the I
corresponding LCO when testing thes! instruments would prevent compliance with existing TS definitions. The definition for Instrument Functional Test and Instrument Calibration requires that the test " verify proper instrument channel response,' alarm, and/or initiating action" or " encompass the entire instrument including actuation, alarm or trip" respectively.
The alarms and trips cannot be tested if the logic is in the tripped condition.
l j
~
ATTACHMENT ll TO JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 4 0F 7 Tripping a channel to perform surveillance testing required by RETS increases the
'suscep'tibility to inadvertent plant trips, scrams, transients, and challenges to safety systems if a spurious trip signal occurs in the coincident trip system. However, for selected instrumentation reliance on one remaining operable channel does not prevent the required protective actions from being initiated (assuming no single failure) if a trip setpoint is exceeded during a surveillance test while the redundant channelis being tested. The allowable out of service time interval of six hours for performance of surveillance and up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for repair is smallin compaiisr4 witn a normal operating cycle so that the impact on the function of the affected trip function is relatively insignificant. Therefore, not placing a trip system in the tripped c'.,ndition for the proposed allowable out of service time will have a negligible effect on the reliable operation of the protective systems and will decrease the likelihood of inadvertent plant trips, scrams, transients, and challenges to safety systems.
Taking the actions associated with inoperable instruments in RETS Table 3.10-1 during the short testing and repair AOTs (6 and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> respectively) is undesirable. This would place the plant systems associated with the instrumentation in abnormal configurations during normal plant operations (e.g., Secondary Containment isolated with SGT el2 tem in service) placing additional challenges on the Operators.
The existing " Minimum No. of Operable Instrument Channels" column for RETS Table 3.10-1 is being clarified to add "per trip system". Adding RETS 3.1.c to note (f) specifies action for inoperable monitors. These changes are editorial and do not alter the original intent of the RETS and will provide additional consistency within the RETS.
IV.
EVALUATION OF SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, since it would not:
1 involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The inherent redundancy and reliability of the protective instrumentation trip systems ensure that the consequences of an accident are not significantly increased. In addition, the restrictive Allowable Outage Time (AOT) interval limits the probability of the protective instrument channel being unavailable and an accident requiring its function from occurring simultaneously. The requirement that the associated trip function maintains trip capability for selected instrumentation ensures that the protective instrumentation response will occur such that the consequences of an accident are not different from those previously evaluated.
ATTACHMENT ll TO JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 5 0F 7 The proposed changes provide AOTs for test and repair of plant instrumentation.
'The changes do not introduce any new modes of plant operation, make any physical changes, or alter any operational setpoints. Therefore, the changes do not degrade the performance of any safety system assumed to function in the accident analysis.
Consequently, there is no effect on the probability of occurrence of an accident.
Regarding the consequences of an accident, the GE Licensing Topical Reports (References 1 and 2) conclude that the proposed AOT for the safety system instrumentation results in an insignificant change in the core damage frequency.
The AOTs result in a slight increase in the unavailability of the safety functions.
The overall effect on the probability of an accident is negligible. The NRC concurred in their SERs (References 3 and 4) with this conclusion. Consequently, there is not a significant increase in the consequences of an accident.
Since the editorial and administrative items do not alter the rneaning or intent of any requirements, they do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
2.
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed changes to the protective instrumentation trip system specifications do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident because they do not introduce any new operational modes or physical modifications to the plant.
For systems with only one channel (Main Control Room Ventilation) or two-out-of-two logic system (SJAE Radiation Monitors) a six hour surveillance AOT is being proposed and a repair time AOT is not allowed. This is consistent with GE Topical Reports referenced in current TS Bases 4.2 and STS and therefore, will not introduce a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated.
Since the editorial and administrative items do not alter plant configurations or operating modes, they do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.
3.
involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
The protective instrumentation surveillance requirements provide verification of the operability of the trip system instrumentation channels. In addition, the redundant channel that monitors the identical Trip Function maintains trip capability for the relatively short duration of the test or repair time period. This ensures that protective instrumentation reliability is maintained. The proposed change provides
ATTACHMENT ll TO JPN-98-028 SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 6 OF 7
,for a specific time period to perform required surveillance on instrument channels without trips present in associated trip systems. This time allotment tends to enhance the margin of safety by decreasing the probability of unnecessary challenges to safety systems and inadvertent plant transients. The evaluations presented in the referenced GE Licensing Topical Reports concluded that the overall effect of the proposed changes provides a net increase in plant safety.
The only action resulting from the proposed changes to RETS is to add AOTs for selected instrumentation. Spurious signals during testing could initiate plant transients. These transients are bounded by the current transient analysis. These tests do not subject the instruments to any conditions beyond their design specifications and are performed in accordance with approved testing standards.
This testing ensures equipment operability by identifying degraded conditions, initiating corrective action and properly retesting them. Therefore, the proposed RETS do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
Since the editorial and administrative items do not alter the meaning or intent of any requirements, they do not affect the margin of safety.
Based on the above evaluation, the Authority has concluded that these changes do
{
not involve a significant hazards consideration, j
I V.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED CHANGE l
I This amendment request meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set j
forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) as follows:
J 1
(i) the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.
As described in Section IV of this evaluation, the proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration.
(ii) there is no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite.
i The proposed change does not alter the margin of safety because the chango does not introduce any new operational modes or physical modifications to the plant. Therefore, there is no change in the amounts of effluents which may be released offsite.
(iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The proposed change does not alter the margin of safety because the change does not introduce any new operational modes or physical modifications to the plant. Therefore, there will no change in individual or cumulative radiation exposure.
I l
ATTACHMENT 11 TO JPN-98-028
{',.
SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 7 OF 7
' Based 'on the above, the Authority concludes that the proposed changes meet the criteria E
specified in 10 CFR 51.22 for a categorical exclusion from the requirements of 10 CFR 51.21 relative to requiring a specific environmental assessment by the Commission.
VI.
CONCLUSION l
Based on the discussions above, this change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, or an unreviewed safety question, and will not endanger the health and safety of the public. The Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) and Safety Review Committee (SRC) have reviewed this proposed change to the TS and agree with this conclusion.
VI.
REFERENCES:
i 1.
GE Topical Report NEDC-31677P-A, " Technical Specification improvement Analysis
' for BWR isolation Actuation Instrumentation)," July 1990.
l 2.
GE Topical Report GENE-770-06-1-A, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance' Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," December 1992.'
l 3.
NRC Safety Evaluation Report, letter from Charles E. Rossi, NRC to S.D. Floyd, BWR E
Owners Group, " General Electric Company Topical Report NEDC-31677P, Technical L
Specification improvement Analysis for BWR lsolation Actuation Instrumentation",
June 18,1990.
4.
NRC Safety Evaluation Report, letter from Charles E. Rossi, NRC to R.D. Binz, BWR Owners Group, " General Electric Company Topical Report GENE-770-06-1, Bases
- for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-Of-Service Times for
- Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," July 21,1992.
1 1
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ATTACHMENT lli ts JPN 98-028 MARKUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 1
(JPTS-98-OO3) i 1
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New York Power Authority JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333 DPR-59 1
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C _ _ _ _ _ _ ___________ ____.____. _ _
J
l ATTACHMENT 111 to JPN-98-028 MARKUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES (JDTS-98-003)
INSERT A i
A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition provided the other OPERABLE channelis monitoring that Trip Function. Otherwise, in lNSERT B A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of j
required surveillance without placing the Trip System in the tripped condition provided the other OPERABLE channel is monitoring that Trip Functionf that is, trip capability is maintained.
An inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or the indicated action shall be taken.
INSERT C (j)
See RETS LCO 3.5.b.1 and 3.5.b.2 (k)
The channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to six hours during periods of required surveillance without placing the Trip Function in the tripped condition, or the indicated action shall be taken.
INSERT D i
Refer to Appendix A Technical Specification Bases 4.2 for references pertaining to surveillance and allowable outage times for selected monitors listed on RETS Table 3.10-1 j
and Table 3.10-2.
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BASES D
3.0 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS 3.1 GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORS The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous affluents during planned or unplanned releases. The alarm / trip set points for these instruments shall be calculated in accordance with methods in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm / trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 20.
The operability and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of ggp 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 60,63 and 64.
3.2 GASEOUS DOSE RATES This specification is provided to ensure that the dose at or beyond the site boundary from gaseous effluents will be within the annual dose limits of 10 CFR 20. The annual dose limits are the doses associated with the concentrations of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 11, Column 1. These limits provide reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharges in gaseous affluents will not result in the exposure of,,
a member of the public to annual average concentrations exceeding the limits specified in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table 11 (10 CFR 20.106(bl). The specified A
limits restnct, at all times, corresponding gamma and beta dose rates above d
background to an individual at or beyond the exclusion area boundary to 1500 mrom/ year to the total body or to 13000 mrom/ year to the skin. These hmits also restrict the correspondag thyroid dose rate above background to a child via the inhalation pathway to 11500 mrom/ year.
3.3. AIR DOSE. NOBLE GASES
~
This specification is provided to assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
~
I, Section ll.B, lit.A and IV.A are met. The Limitmg Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Appendix 1, Section ll.B. _The specification provides the required operating flexibility and, at the same time, implements the guides set forth in Appendix 1,Section IV.A, to assure that the releases of radioactive material in gaseous affluents wiB be kept 'as low as is reasonably achievable."
3.4 DOSE DUE TO IODNdE-131. IODINE-133. TRITluM AND RADIONUCUDES IN PARTICULATE FORM This specification is provided to assure that the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1, Section ll.C, III.A'and N.A are met. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides act forth in Appendix 1, Section ll.C. The specifications provide the required operating flexibility and, at the same time, implement the guides set forth in Appendix I,Section IV.A. to assure that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous l
effluents will be kept 'as low as is reasonably achievable."
l l
Amendment No. 48,fhi 40
BASES 3
w) 3.I OFFGAS TREATMENT SYSTEM EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE INSTRUMENTATION This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in portions of the offgas treatment system not j
designed to withstand a hydrogen explosion is maintained below the lower
)
explosive limit of hydrogen. Operation of the offges recombiner system ensures that the concentration of hydrogen in the offgas charcoal filters remains below f
combustible levels.
L)
Thus it provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 60. The ;ow steam flow trip point is based on g2% of design steam flow and reroutes the offgas to prevent overheating or ignition of the recombiner catalyst. The high steam flow trip point isolates the recombiner on excess steam flow that may be associated with a pipe break downstream of the recombiner.
3.8 STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGTS)
Four radiation monitors are provided which initiate isolation of the reactor building [
and operating of the SSGTS. The monitors are located as follows: two in the
'^
reactor building ventilation exhaust duct and two in refuel floor ventdation exhaust duct. Each pair is considered a separate system. The trip logic consists of any upscale trip on a single monitor or a downscale trip on both monitors in a pair to cause the desired action.
Trip settings for the monitors in the refueling area ventilation exhaust ducts are based upon irutisting normal ventilation isolation and SSGTS operation so that most of the activity released during the refueling accident is processed by the S8GTS.
The radiation monitors in the refueling ares ventilation duct which initiate building isolation and standby eas treatment estion are arraH in a one out of two logic al a
fhe ejector of"ges snensters em connectec m a two out of two logic arrangement. Based on experience with instNments of similair design, a testing interval of once'every three months has boonTeund adequate..
l 3.9 MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP ISOL TION l
3.10 MAIN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION RADIATION MONITOR m
%j l
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Amendment No. 93r445, M 42
_ _.