ML20087A005
| ML20087A005 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1991 |
| From: | DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20087A002 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9201080117 | |
| Download: ML20087A005 (14) | |
Text
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ - _
3/4.3 EMERGENCY C0.R1 COOLING SYSTEMS 3/_4. 5.1 ECCS - GrERATING LLMlll1NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 The emergency core cooling systems shall be OPERABLE with:
a.
The core spray system (CSS) consisting of two subsystems wi b each subsystem comprised of:
1.
Two OPERABLE CSS pumps, and 2.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring the water through the spray sparger to the reactor vessel.
b.
The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system of the residual heat removal system consisting of two subsystems with each subsystem comprised of:
1.
Two OPERABLE LPCI (RHR) pumps, and 2.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.***
c, The high pressure cooling injection (HPCI) system consisting of:
1.
One OPERABLE HPCI pump, and 2.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the suppression chamber and transferring the water to the reactor vessel.
d.
The automatic depressurization system (ADS) with at least #ive OPERABLE ADS valves.
APPllCABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2* ** # and 3* **.
- The HPCI system is not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 150 psig.
- Upon receipt of an LPCI initiation signal, operator action is required to manually open the torus suction valves to facilitate LPCI operation if the LPCI system is in the RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation per
- pecification 3.4.9.1.
S See Special Test Exception 3.10.6.
0 9 IIM3 cklulof 011 6 0379 %
&nd-FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 5-1
~
JEERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
. LlM 11NG CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)
El ON:
a.
For the core spray system:
1.
With one CSS subsystem inop rable, provided that at least one LPCI pump in each LPCI subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable l
CSS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the M iowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHU100WN within the next 24 h ars, b.
For the LPCI system:
1.
With one LPCI pump in either or both LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI pump (s) to OPERABLE _ status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUIDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2.
WithoneLPCIsubsystemothgrwiseinoperable,providedthatboth CSS subsystems are OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI l
subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12-hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3.
With a LPCI system cross-tie valve closed, be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4.
With both LPCI subsystems otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.*
5.
.The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for the purpose of establishing the RHR system in the LPCI mode once the reactor vessel pressure is greater than the RHR cut-in permissive setpoint.
For the HPCI system, provided the CSS, the LPCI system #, the ADS and l
c.
the RCIC system are OPERABLE:
1..
With the HPCI system inoperable, restore the HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 150 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
- Wnenever two or more RHR subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature
- as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.
Except-one CSS subsystem and one LPCI subsystem may be inoperable due to a lack l
of EECW cooling provided the ACTIONS of Specification 3.7.1.2 are taken.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. E, l
i I
- PLANT SYSTEMS
[hERGENCY E0VIPMENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.2 Two independent emergency equipment cooling water (EECW) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
7 a.
One OPERABLE EECW pump, and b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of removing heat from the associated safety-related equipment.
APPLICABIllTY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
ACTIDN:
a.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2 or 3, with one EECW system subsystem i
inoperable:
l 1.
Within 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s:
I a)
Verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, I
components and devices that depend upon the remaining f
OPERABLE EECW system subsystem are also OPERABLE, and l
b)-
Verify that the ADS
- is OPERABLE.
Otherwise**, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
I
=2.
Declare the associated. safety-related equipment inoperable and take the ACTIONS required by the applicable Specifications.
l 3.
Restore-the inoperable EECW system subsystem to OPERABLE I
I status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within I
the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the-following 24
- hours, b.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5, determine the OPERABILITY of the I
I safety-related equipment associated with an inoperable EECW system I
subsystem and take any ACTIONS required by the applicable Specifications.
l l
l i
I I
- ADS is not required to be OPERABLE when reactor steam dome pressure is less than or equal to 150 PSIG.
- Except for an inoperable Drywell Cooling Unit, required by Specification l
3.7.11, that depends on the remaining OPERABLE EECW system subsystem.
In this case, take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.11 for the inoperability l
of both required Drywell Cooling Units.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. ES, //,
t
b Pl. ANT SYSTEMS SVRVEllLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.2 The emergency equipment cooling water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position, b.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve servicing nonsafety-related equipment actuates to its isolation position and the associated EECW pump automatically starts on an automatic actuation test signal.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-3a Amendment No.
l u
PLANT SYSTEMS
-ENERGENCY E0VIPMENT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.3 Two independent emergency equipment service water (EESW) system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
a.
One OPERABLE emergency equipment service water pump, and b.
An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the associated ultimate heat sink and transferring the water through the associated EECW heat exchanger.
APPLICABIllTY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.
ACTION:
With one EESW system subsystem inoperable, declare the associated EECW Nstem subsystem inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.7.2.2.
SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.7.1.3 The emergency equipment service water system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a, At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed,- or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
b.
At least once per 18 months during shutde !n, by verifying the EESW pump automatically starts upon receipt of-an actuation test signal.
I FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 7-4 Amendment No. ES, //,
l
ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES
-QuC. SOURCES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.2.1 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:
a.
Division I, consisting of:
1.
130 VDC Battery 2A-1.
2.
130 VDC Battery 2A-2.
3.
Two 130 VDC full capacity chargers, b.
Division 11, consisting of:
1.
130 VDC Battery 28-1, 2.
130 VDC Battery 28-2.
3.
Two 130 VDC full capacity chargers.
APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION:
a.
With a battery charger in either Division 1 or Division 11 of the above D.C. electrical power sources inoperable, restore the inoperable battery charger to OPERABLE status or replace with the spare battery charger within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b.
With either Division I.or Division 11 of the above required D.C.
electrical power sources otherwise inoperable, restore the inoperable division to OPERABLE status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN withinthgnext12hoursandinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthefollowing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, j
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.8.2.1 Each of the above.equired 130-volt batteries and chargers shall be demonstrated CPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 7 days by verifying that:
1.
The parameters in Table 4.8.2,1-1 meet the Category A limits, and 2.
Total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 130 volts on float charge.
b.
At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 105 volts, or battery E
overcharge with battery terminal-voltage above -150 volts, by j
verifying that:
1.
The parameters in Table 4.8.2.1-1 meet the Category B limits, FThis ACTION may be delayed for up to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> for battery chargers made inoperable due to loss of EECW cooling provided the ACTIONS of Specification l
3.7.1.2 are taken.
i l
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 8-10 Amendment No.
~
ELECTRICAL-POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS DISTRIBV110N - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.3.1 The following power distribution system divisions and busses shall be energized with tie breakers open between redundant busses within the_ unit:
a.
A.C. power distribution:
1.
Division I, consisting of:
a) b) _
4160V RHR Complex Busses llEA and 12EB.
4160V Reactor Building Busses 64B and 640.
c) 480V RHR Complex Busses 72EA and 72EB.
d) 480V Reactor Building Busses 72B and 72C.
e) 120V Division I I&C Power Supply Unit, MPV 1.
2.
Division II, consisting of:
a) 4160V RHR Complex Busses 13EC and 14ED.
b) 4160V Reactor Building Busses 65E and 65F.
c) 480V RHR Complex Busses 72EC and 72ED.
d) 480V Reactor Building Busses 72E and 72F.
e) 120V Division II I&C Power Supply Unit, MPV 2, 3.
Swing Bus, consisting of:
a) 480V MCC 72CF.
b.
D.C. power distribution:
1.
Division I, consisting of:
-a) 130-volt D.C. Distribution Cabinet 2PA-2.
b) 260-volt D.C. MCC 2PA-1, 2.
Division II, consisting of:
a) 130-volt D.C. Distribution Cabinet 2PB-2.
APPolCABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3.
' ACTION:
a.
With one of the above required A.C. distribution system divisions not energized, reenergize the division within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the withinthefollowing24 hours.gext12hoursandinCOLDSllUTDOWN l
With one of the above required D.C. distribution system divisions e.
not energized,'reenergize the division within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
c.
With_the swing bus not energized or the swing bus automatic throwover scheme inoperable, declare both low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) system subsystems inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification 3.5.1.
"This ACTION may be delayed for up to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> for A.C. distribution system components made inoperable due to loss of EECW cooling provided the ACTIONS of f
Specification 3.7.1.2 are taken.
FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 8-14 Amer.dment No. 79,
T.
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES 3/4.5.1 an: 3/4.5.2 ECCS - OPERATINC and SHUTDOWN The core spray system (CSS), together with the LPCI mode of the RHR system, is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled follo ing a-loss-of-coolant accident and provides adequate core cooling capacity f,r all break sizes up to and including the double-e ded reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depr. turization by the ADS.
The CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the reactor vessel is depressurized and a source for flooding of the core in case of accidental draining.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CSS will be OPERABLE when required.
Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.
If LPCI injection is required when the LPCI system is in the RHR shutdown cooling mode of operation, the motor-operated torus suction valves will require manual operator realignment to facilitate this ECCS operation.
All other LPCI components will automatically realign or start as necessary.
The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR system is provided. to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a loss-of-coolant accident. Two subsystems, each with two pumps, provide adequate core flooding for all break sizes up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressurization by
'the ADS.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI system will.be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown, The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.
The high pressure coolant injecti m (HPCI) system is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break-in the reactor coolant system and loss of coolant which does not result in rapid depressurization of th; reactor vessel.
The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut down while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized.
The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the pressure.at which CSS system operation or LPCI mode of the RHR system operation maintains core cooling.
FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-1
~~
DEGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RA_SES ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continued)
The capacity of the system is selected to provide the required core-cooling.
The HPCI pump is designed to deliver greater than or equal to 5000 gpm at differential pressures between 1120 and 150 psid.
Initially, water from the condensate storage tank is used instead of injecting water from the suppression pool into the reactor, but no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank water.
With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABillTY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CS and LPCI systems.
In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken :n the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition.
The HPCI out-of. service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor shutdown.
The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.-
Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coo? mt accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automaticalb causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200'F.
ADS is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig.
This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure. cooling systems can provide adequate core cooling.for events requiring ADS.
ADS automatically controls five selected safety / relief valves although.
l the safety analysis only takes credit-for four valves.
It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve to be out of service f or up to 14 days without materially reducing system reliability, The Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system provides necessary i
L
. support to all ECCS equipment except the-ADS. When a divisional EECW I
l-subsystem is. inoperable, the affected ECCS systems are all located in the same l
division.
This situation is aadressed by a footnote which makes the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> i-ACTION time of Specification 3.7.1.2 limiting if no other equipment is l
inoperable. This is acceptable since the unaffected ECCS division contains I
sufficient capability to safely shutdown the plant. The check of opposite division equipment required by Specification 3.7.1.2 and the ACTIONS of this FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.
LMfJ101EL10BLfa0111!G SYSTEM basis L(CS - OPER&U1IG and SHV_lDAWll (Continued)
Specification issure that a loss of safety function does not go undetected.
l 3Zh b 1_ lyEPRESS10N CHAMDJR The suppresalon chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure th.t a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI, CS and L."1 systems in the event of a LOCA.
This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recirculation cooling flow t'
">e ct The OPERABill1Y of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL COND111U4S ', :, or 3 Is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.
Repair work might require making the suppression chamh r inoperable.
This specification will permit those repairs ta b( made and t the same tiw" give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adequate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 er 5.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required water volume is reduced because the reacter coolant is maintained at or below 200*F, since pressure suppression is not required below 212*F. The minimum water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus a 2.4' safety margin for conservatism.
FERMI - UNIT 2 0 3/4 5-3 Amendment No.
l i
3/4.7 PL ANT SYSTEMS j?SES l
I 3/4.7.1 SERVICE WAUR SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the service water systems ensures that sufficient cooling capacity-is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity.of these systemt, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.
The Emergency Equipment Cooling Wat'.. (EECW) system supports a wide range of. safety related equipment. To assure the proper ACTIONS are promptly I
taken the ACTION rcquires that the associated safety related equipment made I
inoperabie by the loss of EECW support be immediately declared inoperable and I
the ACTIONS of the applicable Specifications be taken.
It is not intended I
that equipment associated with the EECW subsystem which is not made inoperable I
by the loss of EECW be declared inoperable.
When one EECW subsystem is inoperabic, there is an additional ACTION I
requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, I
components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE EECW subsystem.
I are also OPERABLE.
The ADS is also verified to be OPERABLE due to its close I
association with EECW supported systems. These requirements are intended to provide assurance that a complete loss of safety function of critical systems does not exist during the period one of the '7fW subsystems is inoperable.
The term verify as used in this context reans to administrative 1y check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out of service for maintenance or other ;easons..It does r%' mean to perform the surveillance requirements needed tn 9emonstrate the OPERAblLITY of the I
component, f
The Ultimate Heat Sink consist of-two 50% capacity Residual Heat Removal (RHR) reservoirs which must be capabie of beir.g cross connected.
Surveillance Requirement 4.7,1.5.b.2 assures that the ability to cross-connect the two reservoirs is not compromised in the event of a failure of a single electrical power source.-
3/4.7.2 CONTROl, ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of tm ontrol room emergency filtration system ensures that-(l)-the ambient air temps ature does not exceed the allowable temperature-for continuous duty rating for tne s,, ' - + and instrumentation cooled by this system and (2) the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all design basis accident conditions.
Continuous operation of the system with heaters OPERABLE for 10 ho1rs during each 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rem or less whole body, or its equivalent.
This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50.
FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-1 Amendment No. AI,
e
=
11BIL.S_UilWS.
MMS 1/4.7.3 SEDRE BARRIER PR01ECT10!i lhe purpose of the shore barrier is to protect the site backfill from wave erosion.
Category I structures are designed to withstand the impact of waves up to 5.4 feet.
So long as the backfill is in place, waves greater than 5.4 feet cannot impact Category 1 structures because of the lack of sufficient depth of water to sustain such waves.
The shore barrier can sustain a high degree of dam;ge and still perform its function, protecting the site backfill from erosion.
Thus the operability condition for operation of the shore barrier has been written to ensure that severe damage to the structure will not go undetected f or a substantial period of time and provide for prompt NRC notification and corrective action.
3/4.7.4 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION CQQLING SYSTEM The reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system is provided to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without requiring actuation of any of the Emergency Core Cooling System equipment.
The RCIC system is conservatively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor pressure exceeds 150 psig.
This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cooling systere can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring the RCIC system.
The RCIC system specifications are applicable during OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3 when reactor vessel pressure exceeds 150 psig because RCIC is the primary non ECCS source of emergency core cooling when the reactor is pressurized.
+
FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 7-la Amendment No. 51 l
~
3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES JL M J. 3/4.8._2 and 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCES and ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTI0il SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety related equipment required for (1) the safe shutdown of the facility and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility.
The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criteria 17 of Appendix "A" to 10 CFR 50.
The ACTION recuirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provice restriction upon continued f acility operatio':
commensurate with the level of degradation.
The OPERABILITY of the power sources is consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and is based upon maintaining at least one of the onsite A.C. and the corresponding D.C. power sources and asscciated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. or D.C. source.
The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, " Availability of Electrical Power Sources". December 1974.
When one diesel generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION
- requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source-of emergency power, are alsn OPERABLE. - This requirement is intended to prwide assurance that a loss of offsite power event will not result in a com)lete loss of safety function of-critical systems during the period one of t1e riiesel generators is inoperable.
The term verify as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-servi e for maintenance or other reasons.
It does'not mean to perform the surveillance requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.
The OPERABillTY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems _during shutdown and refueling ensures that i
(1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.
l-The surveillance requiremenu for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accorc'ance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9, " Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies", December 1979; Regulatory Guide-1.108, " Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Powcr Plants", Revision 1, August 1977; and Regulatory Guide 1.137, " Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators", Revision 1, October 1979.
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[LECTRICAL P0.MER SYSTEMS BASES A.C. SOURCES. D.C. SOURCl u d ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS (Continued)
The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the unit batteries are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129 " Maintenance Testing and Peplacement of Large Lead Stora450 1972, "ge Batte Nuclear Power Plants," February 1970, and IEEE Std IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."
Verifyinf avorage electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of tne charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates and compares tha battery capacity at that time with the rated capLity.
Table 4.8.2.1-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity.
The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 beloct the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery cb n er current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a char;
' ell with adequate capacity.
Re normal limits for each connected cell )
.loat voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.
Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8.2.1-1 is permitted for up to 7 days.
During this 7-day period:
(1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's. recommended full charge specific gravity ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity ensures that an individual cell's specific i
gravity will not be more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge
-specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an
-individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.
1 The battery chargers and A.C. distribution systems rely on the Emergency l
i l
Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system to coc1 the associated rooms where this i
equipment is located.- These components retain substantial capability without I
I l
cooling following an accident.
Based upon this capability, provisions have I
l_
been made to delay the ACTION requirements for the inoperability of these I
components if caused by the lack of EECW cooling.
l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3/4 8-2 Amendment No. J,
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