ML20086S573

AO-S2-74-08:on 740912,neither Fuel Oil Supply Flow Paths for Emergency Diesel Generator 2 Operable.Caused by Solenoid Valves Disconnected in Terminal Box.Personnel Instructed in Procedure ADM-37

ML20086S573
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/01/1974
From:	Stallings C VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	Moseley N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
AO-S2-74-08, AO-S2-74-8, NUDOCS 8403020437
Download: ML20086S573 (5)

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Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Serial No. 293 Directorate of Regulatory Operations P0&M/JTB:clw United States Atomic Energy Com:nission Region II - Suite 818 Docket No. 50-281 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest License No. DPR-37 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Elect.ric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copics of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0-S2-74-08.

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

f Very truly yours,

. 4?$bh e C. M. Stallings Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations Enclosures 40 copies of A0-S2-74-08 cc: Mr. K. R. Goller, Assistant Director for Operating Reactors 105 %

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s ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT REPORT NO. A0-S2-74-08 THE FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CAUSING Tile INOPERABILITY OF THE FUEL OIL FLOW PATHS TO AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR SEPTEMBER 18, 1974 DOCKET No. 50-281 LICENSE NO. DPR-37 SURRY POWER STATION VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

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-I. INTRODUCTION In accordance with Technical Specification 6.6.B.1 for Surry Power Station, Operating License Number DPR-37, this report describes an abnormal occurrence which occurred on September 12, 1974. The Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region II, was notified on September 13, 1974.

The occurrence reported herein is classified as an abnormal occurrence pursuant to Technical Specification 1.0.I.7 which states that: "An abnormal occurrence is defined as: Any observed inadequacy in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls during the operation of the facility which would significantly affect the safety of operation."

The occurrence described herein involves the inoperability of the fuel' oil flow paths to Emergency Diesel Cencrator. No. 2.

II.

SUMMARY

OF OCCURRENCE On September 12, 1974, at approximately 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />, with the reactor' at cold shutdown, it was discovered that neither of the fuel oil supply flow paths for Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 was operable. Because station personnel failed to follow' administrative procedures, solenoid-operated valves were unknowingly left electrically disconnected, rendering them in-operable.

'III. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE-I -

Solenoid-operated valves are used at thel discharge of the underground-fuel' oil transfer pumps to prevent the overfilling of-the auxiliary fuel i

oil tank due to the head placed on the underground fuel oil tanks by'the.

1 aboveground fuel' oil tank. On September 6, 1974, the subject valves.were!

-suspected to be leaking. e Each sol'noid valve was electrically disconnected I

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4 O O by electricians at two (2) points: (1) in the terminal box, and (2) at the solenoid valve itself. The terminal box was subsequently closed by replacing the cover as a safety precaution. No notation about the lifted leads was made in the jumper log, as prescribed by Administrative Procedure (ADM-37).

The valves were removed, repaired, and re-installed. The responsibility for re-cannecting the valves was given to a different group of electricians than that which had disconnected them. The valves' solenoids were re-connected at the valves themselves, but not in the terminal boxes. Flow path operability.

was erroneously verified by an operator and an electrician by energizing each fuel oil transfer pump, one at a' time, and listening for solenoid valve operation.

Based on information provided to him, the Shif t Supervisor noted in his September 6, 1974, log that two (2) flow paths had been re-established.

On September 11, 1974, Periodic Test 22.3B, " Emergency Diesel' Generator Monthly Test," was performed satisfactorily. The periodic test does not require that the auxiliary fuel oil tank level be verified.

, on September 12, 1974, it was noticed that both the underground fuel oil transfer pumps were running in automatic, but' that the auxiliary fuel oil ~

tank level was not increasing. The pumps were placed in the manual mode; still the auxiliary tank oil level did.not increase. It was at this time that -

the solenoid valves were found to be disconnected in the terminal box.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The occurrence could have been prevented if.the jumper' log' Administrative Procedure'(ADM-37) had been followed. The' involved station personnel have been re-instructed in the'use of this' procedure.

i Also, a procedure has been writtenLfor'use_in verifying: operability of l emergency diesel. generator; hiel oil flow paths following maintenance activities.

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The pericdic test procedure will be' revised by October 1, 1974 to assure i that the level in the auxiliary fuel oil tank is maintained following a i

test.

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V. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF SAFETY 1MPLICATIONS OF THE OCCURRENCE The emergency diesel generators provide an independent, automatically starting power supply to vital auxiliaries if a normal source of power is j not available.

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The base tank contained at least 190 gallons, as required by'the-4 Technical Specifications, since the' low level alarm did not actuate.

Emergency Diesel Generator No. 2 could have run for one (1) hour on the available fuel in the base tank alone. Emergency Diesel Generator-

No. 3 could have supplied the required safety related equipment in an accident condition if it had been necessary.

V1. CONCLUSIONS

, The licensee concludes that:

1. The occurrence described herein was' caused'by the failure of station personnel to follow an

-Administrative Procedure.

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2. The corrective action taken is deemed appropriate ~

to prevent recurrence.

3. The. occurrence reported herein did not affect

the safe operation of the station.

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~4. The occurrence described herein did not adversely

affect the health or safety of the general' public.

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