05000280/LER-1998-003, :on 980226,no Procedural Guidance for Maintaining EDG Minimum Fuel Supply During Loop,Was Identified.Caused by Absence of Procedural Instructions. Deviation Rept Submitted to Document Deviating Condition
| ML18153A234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Surry  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1998 |
| From: | Christian D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML18153A233 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-98-003, LER-98-3, NUDOCS 9803170360 | |
| Download: ML18153A234 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) |
| 2801998003R00 - NRC Website | |
text
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95)
EXPIRES 4/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST I MA TE TO THE INFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6F33),
(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 2055>0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104),
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
- BUDGET, WASHINGTON. DC 20503.
FACILITY NAME (1)
ER(2)
PAGE (3)
SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 05000 - 280 1 OF4 TITLE (4)
No Procedural Guidance for Maintaining EOG Minimum Fuel Supply During LOOP EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBER (6)
PORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER
~ DAY YEAR
',&lR MONTH DAY YEAR Surry Power Station, Unit 2 05000-281 NUMBER NUMBER 02 26 98 1998
-- 003
- 00 03 09 98 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER 05000-OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE(9)
N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
X
- 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL (10) 100 %
20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iv)
OTHER*
20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)
Specify in Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2)
- 50. 73(a)(2)(vii) or in NRG Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12 NAME I ~;;;;N;;;:;~;;e Afea Code)
D. A. Christian, Site Vice-President COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM CXM=l'.NNT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES IX I NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On February 6, 1998, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% power, an engineering review of the emergency power systems identified a* potential condition in which the shared emergency diesel generator (i.e.' EOG No. 3) would not have the design basis fuel oil supply available continuously. One of the fuel oil transfer pumps (FOTP) for EOG No. 3 is powered by the Unit 1 "J" (1 J) emergency buss and the other is powered by the Unit 2 "J" (2J) emergency buss. In the event of a loss of offsite power, EOG No. 3 will automatically start and energize either the 1 J or 2J emergency buss. Such a condition would result in only one of the FOTPs for EOG No. 3 being powered and would enable fuel to be supplied from only one of two underground fuel storage tanks. The fuel system design for EOG No. 3 includes the capability for each FOTP to supply fuel from either underground storage tank and for each pump to be powered by cross-tying the emergency busses. However, these manually initiated capabilities were not addressed by the station's operating or emergency procedures. Therefore, the NRC was notified pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(C) on February 6, 1998, at 17:59.
To correct this condition, procedures were developed to provide instructions for maintaining a fuel supply to EOG No. 3 during accident conditions. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 73(a)(2)(ii)(C).
9803170360 980309 PDR ADOCK 05000280 s
PDR (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER 6)
YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000 - 280 1998
-- 003 --
00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (17) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT PAGE (3) 20F 4 On February 6, 1998, with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% power, an engineering review of the emergency power systems identified a potential condition in which the shared emergency diesel generator (i.e., EOG No. 3) would not have the design basis fuel oil supply available continuously.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.16.A.1 specifies a minimum on-site fuel supply of 35,000 gallons to be available for the EOGs [EIIS-EK,OG]. To meet this requirement, each EOG is equipped with a day tank [EIIS-EK,TK] that is supplied by two fuel oil transfer pumps (FOTP), each of which takes a suction on one of two 20,000 gallon underground fuel storage tanks [EIIS-OC,TK].
The system design also includes the capability for cross-connecting the suction of the FOTPs [EIIS-OC,P].
Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1-EE-P-1C Power: 1J Buss Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1-EE-TK-2A 1-EE-5 EOG No.3 Day Tank Simplified Diagram EDG No. 3 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1-EE-P-1F Power: 2J Buss 1-EE-1 Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank 1-EE-TK-2B Fuel Oil Supply System EOG No. 3 is shared by both units, providing power to the Unit 1 "J" (1 J) and Unit 2 "J" (2J) emergency busses [Ell$-EB,BU]. One of the FOTPs for EOG No. 3 is powered by the 1 J emergency buss and the other is powered by the 2J emergency buss. The 1 J and 2J busses may also be cross-tied to the Unit 1 "H" (1 H) and Unit 2 "H" (2H) emergency busses, respectively, as described in the TS 3.16 Basis.
NRG FORM :x;tiA \\4-~5) (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
Surry Power Station Unit 1 DOCKET 05000 - 280 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Form 366A) (17) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT (Continued)
LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 1998
-- 003 --
00 PAGE (3) 30F 4 In the event of a loss of offsite power (LOOP), EDG No. 3 will automatically start and energize either the 1J or 2J emergency buss. Such a condition would result in only one of the FOTPs for EDG No. 3 being powered and would enable fuel to be supplied from only one of the two underground tanks. As a result, the TS required minimum on-site fuel supply for EDG No. 3 would not be available continuously.
As described above, the fuel system design for EDG No. 3 includes the capability for each FOTP to supply fuel from either underground storage tank and for each pump to be powered by cross-tying the emergency busses. Although these capabilities could be manually initiated, this condition was not addressed by the station's operating or emergency procedures.
Therefore, the NRC was notified pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(ii)(C) on February 6, 1998, at 17:59. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(C).
2.0
SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
Although specific procedural instructions were not in place for utilizing the EDG No. 3 fuel system alternate design features (i.e., FOTP suction cross-connect and 1 J/1 H, 2J/2H emergency buss cross-tie), the training and knowledge level of the Operations and Engineering staff would have enabled these features to be placed in service in the event of a LOOP.
Therefore, this event resulted in no significant safety consequences or implications.
3.0
CAUSE
The absence of procedural instructions that address the EDG No. 3 fuel system alternate design features resulted from an oversight in the development of the original plant operating and emergency procedures.
4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)
A Deviation Report was submitted to document the deviating condition and to initiate
corrective actions
Abnormal procedures 1[2]-AP-10.14, "EDG 3 Fuel Supply During Accident Conditions,"
were developed to provide instructions for maintaining a fuel supply to EDG No. 3 during accident conditions.
NHC FUl'<M 366A (4-95)
" (4-95)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000 - 280 1998
-- 003 --
00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRG Forin 366A) (17) 4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S) (Continued)
PAGE (3) 40F 4 As a conservative measure, Operations issued a standing order that requires EOG No. 3 to be immediately declared inoperable for the respective unit if the associated fuel oil flow path or transfer pump becomes inoperable. TS 3.16.B.1.b allows one flow path to be inoperable for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> before the EOG must be declared.inoperable.
5.0
ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
As an enhancement, Engineering is evaluating a modification that will enable power to be maintained to both of the EOG No. 3 FOTPs in the event of a LOOP.
6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE The corrective actions described in Section 4 are sufficient to preclude the recurrence of this event.
7.0
SIMILAR EVENTS
None
- ,Rt: FORM 356A (4-95)