05000280/LER-1998-004, :on 980206,fire Watch Was Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Planning of Repair Activity.Work Orders Will Include Ref to Applicable Procedures Developed to Assist in Repairs

:on 980206,fire Watch Was Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Planning of Repair Activity.Work Orders Will Include Ref to Applicable Procedures Developed to Assist in Repairs

ML18153A230
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	03/06/1998
From:	Christian D VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18153A229	List: 05000280/LER-1998-004, :on 980206,fire Watch Was Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Planning of Repair Activity.Work Orders Will Include Ref to Applicable Procedures Developed to Assist in Repairs
References
LER-98-004, LER-98-4, NUDOCS 9803130131
Download: ML18153A230 (4)

LER-1998-004, on 980206,fire Watch Was Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of Ts.Caused by Inadequate Planning of Repair Activity.Work Orders Will Include Ref to Applicable Procedures Developed to Assist in Repairs

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
2801998004R00 - NRC Website

text

NRC f:ORM 366 (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/98 LIC~NSEE, EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: so.a HRS.

REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-8F33),

U.S. NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (31 Sl>01 G4).

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND

BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

PAGE (3)

SURRY POWER STATION, Unit 1 05000 - 280 1 OF4 TITLE (4)

Fire Watch Released Prematurely Resulting in Violation of TS 3.21.B.7 EVENT DATE (5)

LER NUMBER (6)

REPORT DATE (7) !

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITY NAME MONT.H DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR DOCUMENT NUMBER 05000-NUMBER NUMBER 02 06 98 1998

-- 004 --

00 03 06 98 FACILITY NAME DOCUMENT NUMBER 05000-OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE(9)

N 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

50. 73(a)(2)(ii)

50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 100,,

20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 OTHER

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.~

~...

20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4)

50. 73(a)(2)(iv) f--t-::-:20::-.2=-:2:-::0 7

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0-:-.3-:-6(:-,c):....(1....:.) ______

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7_3..:..(a..:..)(:....2):....(v....:.) ___ ---l Specify,n Abstract below 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) or,n NRC Form 366A LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

D. A. Christian, Station Manager (757) 365-2000 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES X

NO (If yes. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE MONTH DAY TO NPRDS YEAR On February 6, 1998, a fire watch, which was established as a technical specification required action for a non-functional fire barrier, was released prematurely. This event occurred with Units 1 and 2 operating at 100% power.

On February 5, 1998, a crack was discovered between the frame of a fire door and the wall. The fire door between the Unit 1 Cable Vault and Auxiliary Building was declared inoperable, and a continuous fire watch was posted.

Following repair of the crack, the fire watch was released. The fire watch was re-established on February 9, 1998, when it was identified that the cure time for the caulking used for the repair had not elapsed. The* cause of this event was that the planning of this repair activity failed to identify that an approved procedure, which provided the manufacturer's cure time, existed and should have been used. Model work orders, which will include reference to applicable procedures, will be developed to assist in the planning of fire barrier repairs. This event resulted in no safety consequences or implications and is being reported pursuant to 1 OCFR50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B).

9803130131 980306 PDR ADOC.K 05000280 S

PDR (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENT~EPORT (LE~

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET LER NUMBER (6\\

PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000 - 280 1998

--004 --

00 2 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 1.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On February 6, 1998, a fire watch, which was established as a technical specification required action, was released prematurely. Unit 1 was operating at 100% power at the time of the event.

During a walkdown by Safety & Loss Prevention and Corporate Engineering personnel on February 5, 1998, a crack approximately four feet long and approximately 1/8 inch wide was discovered between the door frame of fire door 1-BS-DR-22 [EIIS - NF, DR]

and the wall. This fire door between the Unit 1 Cable Vault and Auxiliary Building was declared inoperable at 1315 hours0.0152 days <br />0.365 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />5.003575e-4 months <br />, and a one-hour Technical Specification (TS) 3.21. B. 7 action statement was entered to establish a continuous fire watch. A station deviation report was submitted, a fire watch was posted at 1337 hours0.0155 days <br />0.371 hours <br />0.00221 weeks <br />5.087285e-4 months <br />, and the TS action statement was exited. At approximately 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> on February 6, 1998, repair of the crack was initiated using an approved caulking.

The repair was completed at approximately 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br />, and the fire watch was released at 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> on February 6, 1998.

While preparing to repair another fire door on February 9, 1998, it was identified that the Y:z inch depth of caulking used on door 1-BS-DR-22 requires 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to cure to achieve a three:..hour fire rating. The 96-hour cure time for the February 6, 1998 repair would not have elapsed until 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> on February 10, 1998. A one-hour TS 3.21.B.7 action statement was entered again at 1720 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.5446e-4 months <br /> and a station deviation was submitted. A continuous fire watch was re-established for door 1-BS-DR-22 at 1733 hours0.0201 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00287 weeks <br />6.594065e-4 months <br />, and the fire watch remained in place until after the 96-hour cure time had elapsed.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

2.0

SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

This event resulted in no significant safety consequences or implications. The caulking manufacturer has informed us that, upon installation, the caulking will prevent the passage of flame immediately, but may not satisfy other three-hour fire rating requirements (i. e., hose stream requirements) until cured. In addition, the Unit 1 Cable Vault and the Auxiliary Building are equipped with fire detection and suppression systems.

In the event of a fire, the detection equipment would have alerted the Control Room operators.

In turn, the Control Room operators would have notified fire brigade U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION rNRC FORM 366A II (4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000 - 280 1998

--004 --

00 3 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 2.0 members, who would have promptly responded to extinguish the fire.

Until the fire brigade's arrival, the caulking would have prevented the passage of flame. In addition, the Unit 1 Cable Vault is equipped with an automatic CO2 system (with sprinkler backup),

and there are several fire hose stations located in the Auxiliary Building.

These fire detection and suppression systems were operable during the time frame of interest. A fire in the area (i. e., Unit 1 Cable Vault or Auxiliary Building) would have been promptly detected, reported, prevented from spreading, and extinguished. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3.0

CAUSE

The cause of this event was that the planning of this repair activity failed to identify that an approved procedure existed and should have been used.

The existing approved procedure provided sufficient guidance to perform the repair of door 1-BS-DR-22, including the manufacturer's specified cure time.

4.0 IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION(S)

On February 9, 1998, a station deviation report was submitted, and a continuous fire watch was re-established for door 1-BS-:-DR-22 when it was realized that the cure time for the February 6, 1998 repair had not elapsed. The fire watch remained in place until after the 96-hour cure time had elapsed.

5.0

ADDITIONAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A Category 2 Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) was conducted to determine the cause of the prematurely released fire watch.

6.0 ACTIONS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE Model work orders, which will include reference to applicable procedures, will be developed for use in planning the repair of fire barriers.

r* (4-95)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

YEAR I SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER Surry Power Station Unit 1 05000 - 280 1998

--004 --

00 4 OF 4 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 7.0

SIMILAR EVENTS

None.

8.0 MANUFACTURER/MODEL NUMBER Not applicable.

9.0

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Unit 2 was operating at 100% power at the time of this event.