ML20086Q939

AO-S1-75-02:on 750118,containment Isolation Valves 2-IA-446 & 2-IA-447 Found Open.Caused by Operator Error.Operators Advised of Importance of Following Procedures & Verifying Actions

ML20086Q939
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	02/24/1975
From:	Stallings C VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:	Moseley N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20086Q943	List: ML20086Q939 ML20086Q947
References
AO-S1-75-02, AO-S1-75-2, NUDOCS 8402280613
Download: ML20086Q939 (5)

Text

- - , a, x

, . . g 7i4- s

, /AY /N

. Vruo1Nz A EE.ECTHIC AND PO W E H C odt PA NY g

, , I" ' [

Rxcuxown.Vruotx A 23261 i>I[LR 5 :975: . "

February 24, 1975  : C]

N N t. ., Qyl

$7JT[

l Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director Serial No. 434  ;

Directorate of Regulatory Operations P0&M/JTB:clw United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 818 Docket Nos. 50-280 230 Peachtree Street, Northwest License Nos. DPR-32 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specification 6.6.B.1, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits forty (40) copies of Abnormal Occurrence Report No. A0-S1-75-02. -

The substance of this report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the System Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee.

Very truly yours, d.297.s// mayo /

C. M. Stallings Vice President-Power Supply and Production Operations Enclosures 40 copics of A0-SI-75-02

!I cc: Mr. K. R. Goller 9g ' ,#

l'

! 8402280613 750224 Il PDR ADOCK 05000290 S PDR .

l TF 81 d

s , y ,-

,- \

. (_d \ ./

+- .

ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT PSPORT NO. A0-SI-75-02 STATION INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY TO CONTA1NMENT INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM JANUARY 23, 1975 DOCKET NO. 50-280 LICENSE NO. DPR-32 SURRY POWER STATION VIRGINIA ELECTRIC ANu POWER COMPMW

T .

O. O I. INTRODUCTION In accordance with, Technical Specification 6.6.B.1 for Surry. Power Station, Operating License Number DPR-32, this report describes an ab-normal occurrence which was identified on Jenuary 19, 1975. The Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region II, was notified on January 20, 1975.

The occurrence reported herein is classified as an abnormal occurrence pursuant to Technical Specification 1.0.I.2 which states that "An abnormal occurrence is defined ar.: any unit condition that results in violation of a limiting condition for operation as established in the Technical Speci-fications."

The occurrence described herein was a breach of containment integrity while the reactor was above cold shutdown condition.

II.

SUMMARY

OF OCCURRENCE _

On January 18, 1975, Unit No. I reactor was in a cold shutdown con-dition with preparations in progress for starting the heat up. A part of the preparations is verification of the valve positions of the station systems.

The valve line up checkoff list indicated the following valves to be locked closed:

1-IA-446 Unit No. 1 Inst. Air to #1 Containment 1-IA-447 Unit No. 1 Inst. Air to #1 Containment 2-IA-446 Unit No. 2 Inst. Air to #1 Containment 2-IA-447 Unit No. 2 Inst. Air to #1 Containment On January 19, 1975, Unit No. 1 reactor was in the intermediate shutdown condition and the containment air partial pressure had been established. The Control Room Operator ~ noted the containment instrument air pressure was1

- . ._ _ ._ _~ . . ..

.Q O l I

the same as station instrument air instead of about 10 psig lower, which is normal. A check of the containment isolation valves revealed valves 2-IA-446 and 2-IA-447 were open.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE OCCURRENCE In establishing the valve line ups, the operator assumed that all valve numbers beginning with the number "2" were associated with Unit No.

2. He did not realize that there are two valves in series (1-IA-446/447) from Unit No. I station instrument air system to Unit No. I containment with two more valves (2-IA-446/447) from Unit No. 2 station instrument air system to Unit No. I containment.

He assumed the two valves, 2-IA-446/447, were at the Unit No. 2 i

containment boundary. He checked valves 2-IA-703/704 (Unit No. 2 con-

'l tainment boundary valves) as being locked closcd. He did not verify the valves by checking the valve tag numbers, but assumed the preceding "2" designation referred to Unit No. 2 contaiament.

i IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE h

The immediate corrective action to prevent a recurrence was to impress upor. the operators the importance of following procedures and verifying their actions to ensure what they are doing-is in accordance with the procedure. A change to the proceture has been initiated.to include a statement that valve identification tags will be visually i

checked and the valve number verified.

l

! -2 -

1

. 9< 9

[

V. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF THE OCCURRENCE Unit No. I reactor was at intermediate shutdown and Unit No 2 reactor was at power producing 800 MWe, There were no safety implications associated with this occurrence i since there were no accident conditions requiring containment isolation.

VI. CONCLUSIONS s f

The licensee concludes that: ,

t

1. The occurrence was the result of personnel error.

2. The occurrence described herein did not affect  !

the safe operation of the station.

! 3. The occurrence described herein did not af fect j the health or safety of the general public.

3 t

i 1

1 4

_ . , _ . _. ~ _ . . _ _ . - _ _ _