ML20071G018
| ML20071G018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1978 |
| From: | Woolever E DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-6405, NUDOCS 7812140109 | |
| Download: ML20071G018 (164) | |
Text
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i (412) 471-4300 435 Six:n Aven e Pittsburgh, Pennsy N ania I
15219 l
December 11, 1978 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
A.
Schwencer, Chief Branch No. 1 Division of Operating Reactors Uashington, D. C.
20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 Additional Information on Fire Protection Program Gentlemen:
Enclosed are three (3) signed originals and thirty-seven (37) copies of additional information on the Fire Protection Program for the Beaver Valley Power Station.
This additional information supplements our September 29, 1978 response and completes the information requested in your July 18, 1978 letter.
This inf ormation has been prepared by our Archetect-Engineer and it is our intent to comply with all included reco=nendations.
Very truly yours, E. J. Woolever Vice President At tachmen t 70RENCLOSURES"9SUF!N"S, R!QUESTBE!E :j d MT! RIAL
%U REQUISTBEHNDRE:ll IUTERIAL[
FOR ELC10SUR!STODOCLMEN"S,
A.
O (CORPORATE SEAL)
Attest:
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H. W. S taas Secretary COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
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SS:
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY
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On this
,/ '" day of 1978, before me, u
DOWM '9 - RTI A mintT
, a Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared E. J. Woolever, who being duly sworn, deposed, and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
J e
s a s DONAL D W. CHA*:';0:1 f: ;nr, Putt.c httkr:'n 1':< g e,
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F( tecim:sse.7 [.; ires j
Jur:e 7.1973 l
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4 FIRE PROTECTION PROGPAM REVIEW for Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 1 Duquesne Light Company t
November 1978 by Duquesne Light Company Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation Boston, Massachusetts s
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BVPS Unit 1 TABLE OF CONTEITS s
l Question Title A.1-1
' Combined Fire and Security Energency A.1-2 Personnel A.2-1 Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown A.2-2 Fire Induced Spurious Equipment Operation A.2-3 Instrument and Station Air System A.2-h Safe Shutdown Systems - Valves A.k-1 Failure Analysis A.5-1 Effects of Extinguishing Agents A.5-2 Safety-Related Systems Interlocked with Fire-Fighting Systems A. 5-3 Fire Suppression Systems B.3-1 Fire Brigade Equipment B.3-2 Shared Emergency Equipment B.k-1 Supplemental Fire Department B.5-1 Fire Brigade Organizational Chart B.5-2 Fire Brigade Physical Framination B. 5-3 Fire Protection Organization B.5-k Control of Ignition Sources B.5-5 Fire-Fighting Procedures C-1 Quality Assurance C.10-1 In-House Audit Plan D.1-1 Fire Barrier D.1-2 Steel Structures D.1-3 Drains D.1-4 Pipe and Ventilation Duet Penetrations D.1-5 Curbed Areas D.2-1 Piping Containing Combustibles D. 2-2 Diesel Fuel Transfer Shut-Off D.2-3 Combustible Fluid Reservoirs and Storage D.3-1 Interface between Safety and Nonsafety Equipment D.3-2 Fire Stops D. 3-3 Cable Insulation Materials T v
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TABLE OF CCNTDCS (Cont'd)
Ouestion Title D.k-1
!kthod of Heat and Smoke Venting f
D.4-2 Prevention of Fire and Smoke Spread D.h-3 Ventilation System Power and control D.k-h Preventing Recirculation of Ventilation Air D.5-1 Separation of Redundant Communication Systems-D.5-2 Proximity of Regular and Emergency Lighting Wiring E.1-1 Fire Detection System Design E. 3-1 Fire Suppression System Design E. 3-2 Requirements for Manual Hose Stations F.1-1 Fire Hazard?at the Containment Cable Penetration F.k-1 Fire Hazards Associated with the Plant Computer F. 6-1 Remote Shutdown Panels F.14-1 Radiological Consequences of a Fire PF-1 Fire Brigade Training PF-2 Control of Combustibles FF-3 Electrical Cable Penetration Qualification PF-4 Fire Detector in Control Room Cabinets and Consoles PF-5 Battery Roon Ventilation Air Flow Monitor 1
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BTPS Unit 1 QUESTION A.1-1
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Combined Fire and Security Emergency Describe the responsibilities of key plant personnel in the
-event of a combined fire and security emergency.
RESPONSE
In the event of a combined fire and security emergency, there are no shared personnel or equipment between the fire brigade and the security team. Each group is responsible for actions directly related to the particular emergency that may arise.
During back shifts, weekends, and holidays, the shift super-visor has overall responsibilities for both groups in the event of a combined fire and security emergency.
b QA.1-1-1
Question A.1-2:
Parronn,1 s
Stato who in upper manngscant h s bscn occignzd tha rc'eptnaibility for the overall fire protection program.
State who has been delegated the authority for formulation f
and assurance of program implementation.
State his experience.
State the experience and qualifications of the fire protection engineer or consultant.
Response A.1-2:
Mr. G. W. Moor, Duquesne Light Company - General Superintendent of Power Stations, is responsible for the overall fire protection program.
l Mr. J. A. Werling, Beaver Va'lley Power Station Superintendent, is authorized for formulation and assurance of program implementation.
His experience and qualifications are as follows:
I J. A. Werling - BS in Chemistry.
Mr. Werling has over twenty years of nuclear power stations experience including eighteen years in responsible supervisory positions directing operations.
Certified by the Naval Reactors branch of the NRC for nine years. Ye held held the position of Station Operating Supervisor, responsible for directing all activities asscciated with the operation of the Shippingport Atomic Power Station for six years.
He has been associated with the Beaver Valley Project for.four years engaging in design review, quality assurance activities, licensing activities, station staffing and training, and the preparation of the station operating manuals. He received a Senior Operator License in October, 1975. Total nuclear experience:
twenty years.
L. E. Wagner - BS in Industrial Management.
Mr. Wagner is the Duquesne Light Company's Power Stations Department Safety Engineer whose qualifications include responsibilities for all activities associated with fire protection and safety for all DLC power generating stations including BVPS for the past 6 years.
He attended Duquesne University where he obtained his BS in Industrial Management. He is an activa member of the following associations:
(1) American Industrial Fire Protection Association, (2) National Fire Protection Association, (3) American Society of Safety Engineers, (4) American Industrial Hygeinist Association, and (5) Society of Fire Protection Engineers QA.1-2-1
7-BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION A.2-1 Equipment Required for Safe Shutdown The information provided in the Fire Protection Program Review is not sufficient 1yadetailed. Specifically, the Fire Protection Program Review and the fire hazard analysis cover major com-ponents such as pumps, heat exchangers and motor control centers needed for shutdown but do not cover such essential items as cable runs, valves, controls and other auxiliary equipment needed for the proper functioning of these major components.
The information does not indicate whether there are any fire areas in the plant containing equipment that perfornt: a function required for safe shutdewn that cannot be performed by equipment located in another fire area. For each fire area, provide a list of the equipment (including cable runs, valves, panels, breakers, etc) located in the area that can he used to perform functions required for safe shutdown. For each item on the list, indicate whether its function can be performed by equipment located in another fire area and identify the area.
In preparing the list for each fire area, the following functions should be considered to be required for safe shutdown:
1.
Placing the reactor in a suberitical condition and maintaining the reactor suberitical indefinitely.
2.
Bringing the reactor to hot shutdown conditions and maintaining it at hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i.e., longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only normal sources of cooling water.
3.
Maintaining the reactor coolant system inventory indefin-itely using only normal sources of makeup water.
4.
Bringing the reactor to cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
t If all the redundant equipment available to perform any of the above functions (assuming a loss of offsite electrical power) is located in a single fire arsa, identify the specific separa-tion that exists and any combustible material between the redundant equipment.
RESPONSE
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The results of the fire protection analysis are provided in the attached report.
R QA.2 1-1
e FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS
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INTRODUCTION A
fire hazards analysi:3 has been conducted to determine whether there are any fire areas in the plant containing equipment that performs a
function required for a safe shutdown that cannot be performed by equipment in another fire area.
This analysis is more detailed than previous fire protection reviews in that it includes an area-by-area investigation of
- pumps, valves, power supplies, cable' runs, panels, breakers, controls, ventilation and cooling support systems that are required for a
The following functions, coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power were considered in the analysis:
1.
Placing the reactor in a
subcritical condition and maintaining the reactor subcritical indefinitely 2.
Bringing the reactor to hot chutdown conditions and maintaining it at hot shutdown for an extended period of time (i.e.
longer than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) using only normal sources of cooling water 3.
Maintaining the reactor coolant system inventory indefinitely using only normal sources of makeup water 4.
Subsequently bringing the reactor to cold shutdown conditions The analysis defines the systems required to perform these functions and the redundancy existing within each system.
For example, if only parts of a system are needed for a safe shutdown function these components alone, and their associated cables, and support
- systems, are evaluated in detail.
In order to directly analyze the effects of a fire in any of 30 fire areas the physical location of the safe shutdown components, and more importantly the associated cables had to be determined.
This undertaking typically involved either three or six cables for a MOV (depending on whether or not auxiliary shutdown panel operation is possible), six cables for 4 kV pump motors, and 381 cables for the Class 1E distribution system.
Some of a total of approximately 1,000 safe-shutdown cables are found in each of 30 fire areas and therefore a total of 30,000 combinations of safe shutdown related locations and fire areas had to be investigated.
A detailed discussion of this investigation is provided in the first section of this response.
RESULTS The analysis demonstrates that a loss of one or more shutdown functions is possible as a result of a postulated fire in each of the following fire areas:
CR-1, CR-2, CR-3, CR-4, CS-1, CV-2,
_ CV-3, PA-1F, PA-1H, PT-1A, and RC-1.
The most severe 0
consequences of a fire are associated with the complete loss of the 1E distribution system and concurrent loss of offsite power.
e The following equipment and components may be jeopardized by a single fire:
s 1.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and Motor Operated Valves, Fire ares PT-1A 2.
Motor Operated Valves, CH 115B D
(charging pump suction) Fire area PA-1H 3.
Component Cooling Water Pumps, Fire area PA-1F 4.
Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Equipment, Fire area CR-2 5.
Residual Heat Removal Pumps, Fire area RC-1 6.
Safe Shutdown Instrumentation, Fire area RC-1 7.
Safe Shutdown Instrumentation, Fire area CR-4 A discussion of the component physical location and separation and the consequences of a given fire is provided on a system-by-system basis.
Primary and backup fire protection detection and suppression systems are provided to limit the effects of fires.
The analysis assumed complete loss of an entire fire area.-
In some cases additional detection and suppression capability is reconsnended where redundant or alternate functions may not be available.
1.
PT-1A Add detection and suppression systems for the auxiliary feedwater system 2.
PA-1F Add detection and suppression systems for the component cooling water pumps 3.
RC-1 Add detection and suppression system for the RHR pumps 4.
CS-1 Add detection to meet NFPA72D coverage recommendation to the cable spreading area 5.
CV-3 Add fire detection and suppression to the cable vault In other
- areas, the existing detection and suppression systems are considered adequate based on the system-by-system cable location analysis and the available manual and automatic actions which may be taken to provide safe shutdown functions.
For
- example, the control room is continuously manned and human detection supplements the installed detection system and a rapid i
response can be expected without the addition of more suppression systems.
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METHOD OF ANALYSIS This analysis may be divided into two general parts.
The first part of the analysis defines the safe ahutdown functions, the degree of redundancy required and the system diversity available x
for safe shutdown.
The second part determines the cables and components required for operation of the system and compares them with all cables in a given fire area to demonstrate whether or not redundant and diverse functions are vulnerable to a fire.
Within vulnerable fire
- areas, the location and functional relationship of cables is identified in order to evaluate existing separation, fire detection and suppression.
Manual operations and recommendations are based on the NRC " defense in depth" concept and they are presented in each system summary table.
The five areas referenced in this report are the same as those listed in the initial Fing Hazards Analysis of the Beaver Valley Unit Power Station. 'J In one
- case, a
fire area was subdivided into subareas to simplify the inspection of that fire area.
The fire area is PA-1, the auxiliary building.
The building was sectioned at the center and new designations applied to each section floor by floor.
The top level was divided into PA-1A and PA-1B, the third level into PA-1C and PA-1D, the second level into PA-1E and PA-1F and the bottom level was divided into PA-1G and PA-1H.
Figure 1 summarizes the components, system diversity, and functions required for safe shutdown.
A brief description of each function follows.
There are four primary f unctions to be maintained for a safe shutdown.
They are as follows:
1.
Negative reactivity insertion 2.
Reactor coolant system volume control 3.
Reactor coolant pressure control 4.
Decay heat removal In order that the above functions can be implemented, the secondary safe shutdown functions must also be available.
The secondary safe shutdown functions provide the necessary support for the primary safe shutdown function.
The secondary safe shutdown functions are as follows:
1.
Motive power 2.
Auxiliary cooling The basis of the analysis of those functions used to achieve safe shutdown are:
1.
Fire in a single fire area 2.
No coincident occurrence of natural phenomenon 3.
Only fire-induced failures are to be considered Negative reactivity insertion is provided by the control rods for hot shutdown and by the Boron Injection system for the additional
negative reactivity needed for cold shutdown.
The Reactor Protection system includes a means of initiating fail safe control rod insertion.
This ensures the availability of this function for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown.
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The reactor coolant system volume control function is required for safe shutdown.
The make-up function is provided by the safety injection system.
The letdown function is achieved through either natural shrinkage of the reactor coolant syctem during
- cooldown, or the use of the pressurizer powered relief valve, or manual operation of the letdown valve.
Reactor coolant pressure control function is accomplished by use of the pressurizer heaters and the pressurizer spray valves.
Since fire-induced failures are the only type of failures considered, no breech of the reactor coolant system or of any other system is censidered to occur at the same time.
Systems and components which are exclusively used for LOCA or steam line break mitigation are not required for safe shutdown and they are not included in the analysis (Quench Spray, Recirculation
- Spray, Low Head Safety Injection, etc).
Systems or components which provide a
safe shutdown function as well as an accident mitigation function are included in the analysis (Charging /High Head Safety Injection system, Auxiliary Feedwater systems, etc).
The decay heat removal function is accomplished through the use of the auxiliary feedwater system for hot shutdown and the residual heat removal system for cold shutdown.
The secondary safe shutdown functions include electric power, ventilation and cooling water systems.
Motive power is provided by the IE Electrical Distribution system.
Cooling of safety related structures and components is provided by the following systems:
1.
Control room HVAC 2.
D/G ventilation system 3.
Emergency switchgear ventilation system 1
4.
Intake Structure ventilation system l
S.
River water system 6.
Component cooling water system t
Instrumentation used to monitor reactor system volume and heat removal from the steam generator are as follows:
1.
Pressurizer level monitors 2.
Pressurizer pressure monitor 3.
Steam generator level monitors 4.
Steam generator pressure monitors A list of components used for safe shutdown is given in Table 1.
The second part of this analysis lists all safety related cables l
associated with the components required for safe shutdown.
This tv l
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step is accomplished by reviewing electrical one-line diagrams, electrical elementary
- drawings, wiring
- diagrams, and logic diagrams.
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Through the use of the machine location drawings and the electrical tray and conduit location drawings; all
- trays, conduits and components used for safe shutdown in each fire area are listed.
The electrical raceway information system identifies all cables in a given fire area.
Through the use.of the electrical raceway information system, the analysis now determines if any of the cables associated with a
safe shutdown component are routed through a given fire area.
If so, the analysis lists all safe shutdown components which have cables routed through a given fire.
This procedure is repeated for each fire area for each system.
The sort (cable / component by fire area) forms the basis of the evaluation of the impact of a potential fire.
The sorts and a flow diagram for each system and for each fire area is then used to determine if a fire will potentially reduce a
system availability to a level below that required to assure minimum safe shutdown capability.
In areas where the analysis indicates the potential loss of a shutdown function, a detailed review of the cable sort and flow diagram is performed.
Rather than performing a fault tree analysis or failure modes and effects analysis to determine the actual effect produced by the loss of a
cable, it is conservatively assumed that the loss of any safety related cable directly associated with a
caaponent will result in the loss of that component.
If a loss of function results from this assumption, the failure mode of the ast.ociated component is re-examined to see if there would be an actual loss of function.
For example, if a motor operated valve was normally open and designed to fail open upon the loss of power, a fire affecting the power cable along would not cause the valve to close even though the analysis would indicate a
component failure.
In addition, even if the valve were to reposition as a
result of a
fire, actual loss of the function would not result provided the valve is accessible, since all MOV's can be locally operated.
(See Appendix A for further details).
The analysis thus identifies the minimum safe shutdown function available in the event of a fire.
The system summary table lists only those fire areas which would jeopardize a safe shutdown function.
It indicates the associated failure mode / degree and indicates whether or not manual and/or automatic control is available to the plant operators.
Each problem area is evaluated with respect to the potential consequences of a fire and the results or that analysis are presented on a system basis with a corresponding summary table.
If the redundant and diverse methods for safe shutdown are jeopardized due to a
fire in the listed fire area, then the
physical location and separation of the components or electrical cables and the manual and automatic alternatives were examined.
The analysis identified three possible failure modes / degrees.
f 1.
The potential loss of redundant components necessary for s
a safe shutdown function 2.
The potential loss of primary (control room) or secondary (auxiliary shutdown panel) control of redundant components 3.
The p8tential loss of control and/or power cables to redundant component The recommended position is included in the system-by-system analysis tables.
Where less than 20 ft of separation
- is available, or where there is less than a 1/2 hour rated barrier *,
additional fire protection is recommended.
Fire areas that do not contain system components / cables or where redundant or diverse functions were not jeopardized were excluded from the tables.
- Recommendation based on NRC field audit, 11/78.
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SPECIAL DESIGN FEATURES Essentially all devices needed for safe shutdown have two control r'
points, one is the control room, and the other is the auxiliary shutdown panel located in CR 4.
Control f rom both stations is simultaneously prohibited by the use of a transfer device.
The actual transfer device is located in the appropriate emergency switchgear room.
The transfer device control point is the auxiliary shutdown panel located in CR-4.
Since the actual transfer devices are located in fire areas ES-1 and ES-2 a firein CR-1, CR-4 or CS-J will not effect manual operation of these devices locally.
Each circuit, the control room side, and the auxiliary shutdown panel side are separately fused so that failures in one path can be cleared by operation of j
the transfer device.
This transfer device makes each system control path independent of the other.
All motor operated valves are designed for local manual control and this analysis takes credit for this feature provided the valve is not located in the fire area which caused its f ailure.
Loss of offsite power causes loss of the station air system since the air compressor is operated from a nonsafety electrical bus.
Air operated valves in the letdown path from the reactor coolant system normally fail closed.
In the event that the normal letdown path is
- used, several air operated valves would be manually opened by operator action.
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TABLE 1 ACTIVE COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDCWN HVAC Components Emergency Switchgear Diesel Generator VS-F-16A VS-D-SSA VS-D-2A VS-D-2C VS-F-16B VS-D-SSB VS-D-2B VS-D-2D VS-D-16A VS-F-55A VS-F-22A VS-D-22-1B VS-D-16B VS-F-55B VS-D-22-1A VS-F-22B Control Room Intake Structure VS-D-40-1A VS-F-40A VS-F-57A VS-D-40-1B VS-F-40B VS-F-57B VS-D-40-1C VS-AC-1A VS-F-57C VS-D-4 0 -1D VS-AC-1B RBR Components RH-P-1A MOV-RH-700 MOV-RE-720B RH-P-1B MOV-RH-701 MOV-RH-783 FCV-RE-605 MOV-RH-720A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System ED-P-1A EE-P-1B EE-P-1C EE-P-1 D Comconent Cooling Water System CC-E-1A MOV-CC-112A2 CC-E-1B MOV-CC-112B2 CC-E-1C MOV-CC-112A3 CC-P-1A MOV-CC-112B3 CC-P-1B CC-P-1C Chemical and Volume Control System MOV-CH-310 CH-P-1 A MOV-CH-289 CH-P-1B MOV-SI-836 CH-P-1C MOV-SI-869A MOV-CH-115B FCV-CH-122 MOV-CH-115D f
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TABLE 1 (Cont 'd)
Auxiliary Feedwater System MOV-151A FW-P-3A MOV-151B FN-P-3B MOV-151C EW-P-3C MOV-151D MOV-151E MOV-151F Riverwater System CH-P-1A VSE-14A MOV-RW-113A MOV-RW-116B CH-P-1B VSE-14B MOV-RW-113B MOV-RW-102A1 CH-P-1C WR-P-1A MOV-RW-113C MOV-RW-102A2 VS-P-3A WR-P-1B MOV-RW-113D MOV-RW-102-B 1 VS-P-3B WR-P-1C WR-P-9A MOV-RW-102-B2 VSE-4A EE-E-1 A WR-P-9B MOV-RW-102-C1 VSE-4B EE-E-1B MOV-RW-116A MOV-RW-102-C2 Boron In-iection MOV-SI-867A MOV-SI-867B MOV-SI-867C MOV-SI-867D Instrumentation Utilized for Saf e Shutdown LT-FW-474 LT-FW-494 PT-MS-484 PT-RC-455 LT-FW-475 LT-FW-495 PT-MS-485 PT-RC-456 LT-FW-476 LT-FW-496 PT-MS-486 PT-RC-457 LT-FW-484 PT-MS-47 4 PT-MS-494 LT-RC-459 LT-FW-485 PT-MS-475 PT-MS-495 LT-RC-460 LT-IW-4 86 PT-MS-476 PT-MS-496 LT-RC-461 IE Distribution System 480 v Substation 1N 125 v DC SWBRD 1 MCC-E1 480 v Substation 1P 125 v DC SWERD 2 MCC-E2 DG1 125 v DC SWBRD 3 MCC-E3 DG2 125 v DC SWBRD 4 MCC-E4 4 kV Bus 1AE Vital Bus 1 MCC-E5 l
4 kV Bus 1DF Vital Bus 2 MCC-E6 Vital Bus 3 MCC-E7 Vital Bus 4 MCC-E8 l
MCC-E9
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AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ANALYSIS The Auxiliary Feedwater System is a
system available for
(
emergency shutdown of station.
The auxiliary feedwater safety
- function, in the event of loss of offsite power, is to deliver water to the steam generators at a sufficient rate to initially remove both sensible and decay heat for hot shutdown and to later remove decay heat until the transfer to the Residual Heat Removal System (RRR) is accomplished.
One auxiliary feedwater pump and the flow paths to two steam generators is required.
The only devices which,are considered active are the auxiliary feedwater pumps since the' discharge valves are normally open and need not open to perform this safety function.
The steam admission valves to the steam drive auxiliary feed pump are air operated and fail open to the safe shutdown position with the loss of offsite
(
power.
A summary of the fire protection analysis for the Auxiliary Feedwater System is presented in the attached table.
The analysis demonstrates that a fire in fire area PT-1A could jeopardize this system's availability; however, a fire in and of itself would not result in the loss of station control.
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AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL FUNCTION: Decay and Sensible Neat DIVERSITY: 2 Motor, 1 Steam Driven Remova1 Pusnpi Main Contto1 Room /
Aux. Shutdown Panel Normal Feedwater Asstened Not Available FEY SYSTEM COMPONENTS:
EW-P-3A MOV-151A FW-P-3B MOV-151B IW-P-3C MOV-151C MOV-151D MOV-151E
- i MOV-151F I
Failure Manual Autosnatic Critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Rectmanen. led Fire Are4' Degree Available Available Separation Position s
CR-1 Primary Yes Y(a N.A.F.
Use auxiliary shutdown Control /2 panel CH -4 Remote Yes Yes N.A.F.
Manual control fross control /2 switchgear room
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CS-1 Primary Yes Yes N.A.F.
Use auxillary shutdown control /2 panel 1
PT-1A Component No No
<20' A&l detection 8 sup-(735'-6a)
Loss /1 pression system t
NOTES:
)
- The redundant and diverse methods and autcusatic and saanual alternatives for a saf e shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area.
See the text.
r H.A.F. = Not a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the existing seperation.
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4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM I
i The Boron Injection System flow path is required to provide the negative reactivity shutdown margin at cold shutdown.
The flow path consists of two sets of parallel valves, with one valve in each set required to open in order to establish the flow path.
The fire hazards analysis demonstrates that automatic control and manual control from the control room could be jeopardized by a
fire in each of the following areas:
CS-1, CV-1, and CV-2*
however, at least one valve in each set of valves would be accessible, thus allowing local manual actuation of the flow t
j path.
Boron inibction is not required until plant cooldown is 1
initiated.
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t, BORON ItUECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL WNCTION: Negative Reactivity ti1VERSITY: Parallel valves used to Control establish the fI m path MEY SYSTEM COf1PONENTS: MOV-SI-867A MOV-SI-8678 MOV-SI-867C HOV-SI-067D Failure Manual Automatic critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recommended Fire Area' Degree Available Available Separation Position p
CS-1 Primary Yes No H.A.F.
Manual valve operation control /2 l
CV-1 Remote Yes No N.A.F.
Manual valve operation I
Control /2 i
CV-2 Remote Yes No N.A.F.
Manual valve operation control /2 MYrES:
'The redundant and diverse methods and automatic and manual alters.atives for a sate shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area. See the text.
2 N. A.F. = Not a f actor. The resultas of the analysis are independent of the existing I
separation.
r I
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CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTD1 The safe shutdo m function of the Chemical and Volume Control F
System is to provide a source of reactor coolant grade water which would be available for Reactor Coolant Inventory control.
The system has three charging
- pumps, multiple system control
- features, two independent sources of water to draw on, the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and the Chemical and Volume Control Tank (CVCT) and two available flow paths which provide the diversity which ensures functional integrity of the system in the event of a fire.
+
The fire protection analysis demonstrates that the most severe consequence of a fire (in either PA-1G or PA-1H) would be the loss of automatic control and power to the motor operator valves on the charging pump suction lines.
These valves control the flow from either the CVCT or the
- RWST, and are physically separated by a concrete floor.
The MOV's to the CVCT could be operated
This provides a backup flow path to control the Reactor Coolant Inventory.
A fire in any other fire area would pose less severe consequences.
As indicated in the attached
- Table, manual operation of a valve or secondary control of the system would ensure the necessary functional integrity of the system.
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Q L1IEMICAL AND VOIAIME CotrrROL SYSTEM FtJNCTIONAL 11JNCTION: Reactor Coolant Volume Control DIVERSITY: Separate sources of supply; Reduradant in-dependent controls; Redundant pumps 3
EEY SYSTEM COMPONE.NTS:
Cil-P-1A FCV-CH-122 710V-Cil-28 9 CH-P-lh MOV-CH-115B MOV-CH-310 Cil-P-IC MOV-CH-115D MOV-SI-836 MOV-SI-869A i
5 Failure Manual Auton.atic Critical Skxle/
Alternatives Alternatives Recoeurended fire Aseas pegme_
Available Available Separation Poaition CR-4 hesnute Yes Yes N.A.F.
Primary Control avalla-Control /2 ble; manual control from switchgear room available CS-1 Primary Yes Yes M.A.F Use aux. shutdown panel Control /2 CV-2 Remote Yes No N.A.F.
Manual valve W.eration Control /2 PA-1E Control Yes No N.A.F Manual valve operation Power /3 PA-IF Control Yes 1:o N.A.F.
Manual valve op*. ration
. Power /3 PA-lG Control Yes Ib (20' Manual valve operation Power /3 PA-lil Component Yes No (20' Normal makeup water loss source available, manual (valves)/1 valve operation tar:TS:
8Yha redundant azul diverse srethods and automatic and manual alternatives f or a sate stratdown umsy be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area. See the text.
N.A.F.
Not a Factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the existing
=
seguration.
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COMPONENT COOLING WATER The Component Cooling Water System (CCR) safe shutdown function
/~
is to provide cooling to the Residual Heat Removal (RBR) heat exchanger.
To accomplish this the only active components needed to operate are one of the three CCR purps and a flow path to one of the RER heat exchangers.
For a flow path to be available, two Motor Operated valves (MOV) in one of two flow paths must operate.
Each valve is equipped with a manual operator to allow for manual operation.
Sufficient time is available for operator action since the reactor can be stabilized at the hot shutdown condition for an extended period of time prior to the switchover to RER for the final cooldown.
The nonnuclear safety portion of the CCR is automatically isolated by loss of of fsite power.
The analysis demonstrates that the cables and components for the 1
CCR could be impacted by a loss of the BE-1F fire area.
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j COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM F17HCTIONAL vtJt:CTION: Decay Heat Removal, Secondary DIVERSITY: Three Component Cooling Side Hater Pumps, Redundant Core-trol Points KEY SYSTEM COMPONENTS:
CC-P-1A Mov-CC-112A2 CC-P-18 Mov-CC-112D2 CC-P-IC HOV-CC-112A3 MOV-CC-11283 Failure Manual Automatic I
Critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recommended p
g Fire Area Degree Available Available Separation Position CR-4 Remote Yes Yes N.A.F.
Control aveilable from Control /2 main control room CS-1 Primary Yes Yes N.A.F.
Control available from I
control /2 auxiliary shutdown panels open valves manu-ally CV-2 Resnote Yes No N.A.F.
Control available from Control /2 auxiliary shutdown panel I
open valves manually PA-1F Cossponent No,
No (20' Installation of an auto-Loss /1 matic detection f. sup-pression system ta)TES :
e
- The redundant and diverse methods and autosnatic and manual alternatives for a safe shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in ttm listed fire area. See tive t ext.
t N.A.P. = Not a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of ik existing separation.
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DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM The Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System consists of two independent r -
subsystems.
Each subsystem consists of a main fuel oil storage
^
- tank, two parallel fuel oil transfer pumps and a fuel oil day tank, with a 2 1/2 hr supply of fuel oil.
The fire hazards analysis demonstrates that a
fire in CS-1 or CV-3 could jeopardize remote control of the fuel oil transfer
- pumps, however, each pump is equipped with local control which ensures system availability in the event of a fire.
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s DIESLL GENERATOR FUEL OIL SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL 71JNCTION: Fuel Oil for the DIVERSITY: Main Fuel Oil Storage Emergency Diesel Tank Standby Fuel Oil Generatora Day Tank Ret!undant luel Oil Transfer Pusps with local Control f or each Day Tank KEY SYSTF.M COMH)MENTSS EE-P-1A EE-P-1B EE-P-1C EE-P-1D s*
Failure Manual Automatic critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives kecommended Fire Areas Degree
_Available Available Separation Alternatives
)
CS-1 Primary Yes No N.A.F.
local Operation Control /2 i
CV-3 Primary Yes No N.A.F.
local Operation Control /2 NOTES:
i a The redundant. and diverse methods and automatic and sanual altervatives for a safe shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area. See the text.
N.A.F.
A L a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the exis-
=
ting separation.
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IE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
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This analysis demonstrates that the complete loss of fire areas CR-1, CR-3, CR-4, CS-1, CV-2, CV-3 or ES-2 could prevent the IE
-m electrical distribution system from automatically perf orming its safe shutdown function.
When faults in the DC control cables are the potential cause of failure, manual operator action can be use to turn off control power to the breaker (which clears the f ault) and then manually close the break @r thus restoring the safe shutdown function of the breaker.
Faults in the power cable to the 4 kV and 480 busses cannot be cleared as quickly.
Clearing of these faults would require rerouting of the cables.
case is the DC control power to both busses lost due to a In no fire in one fire area.
All 4 kV breakers required for safe shutdown can be operated locally and all breakers controlling safe shutdown pumps can be operated from the auxiliary shutdown panel as well as the control room.
Complete loss of CR-1 could cause loss of control cabling to both redundant 4 kV busses.
Power cables are still available and can be energized by manual operation at the switchgear or operation of the auxiliary shutdown panel.
Complete loss of CR-3 could cause loss of power and control cables to orange 4 kV Bus 1AE and loss of control to purple 4 kV Bus 1DF.
Fire detection and manual suppression is provided.
Complete loss of CR-4 could cause loss of power to both redundant 4 kV busses as well as associated control cables.
Power cables for both redundant busses are run in conduit.
The space occupied between redundant power cables is limited to conduit.
Fire detection is presently installed and manual suppression is provided.
i Complete loss of CS-1 could cause loss of control power to both l
redundant busses as well as power and control to MCC-E3, E4, E5 l
and E6.
Combustible material is limited to fire retardant cable.
Automatic fire detection and suppression is installed.
Since the power cables to the a kV busses are not routed through CS-1 then manual operation of D/G supply breakers can be accomplished.
I A
complete loss of CV-2 could cause a loss of power to redundant MCC-E3 and E4.
Eoth cables are in separate conduits and the space between the cables consist exclusively of conduits.
Other combustibles is limited to fire retardant cables.
Fire detection and suppression is presently installed.
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A complete loss of CV-3 could cause a loss of power and control to both redundant 4 kV busses.
Combustibles in this area are fire retardant cables only.
Fire detection and suppression is proposed for this area.
A complete loss of ES-2 could cause a loss of power and control to the purple 4 kV bus and loss of the sequences for the redundant orange 4 kV bus.
Manual sequencing of the orange bus can be accomplished from the auxiliary shutdown panel or locally.
Combustibles in this area ES-2 is limited to fire retardant cables.
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IE E11CTHICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL ftNCTION: Provides power to safe DIVERSITY: Separate sources, hattery shutdown comp >nents
. backed vitsi hoses EEY SYSTEN COMIONENTSs 480 V Substation its 125 V DC SW bRD M2 1 Vital Bus No. 1 MCC-El-NCCE5 HCC-L9 480 V Substation IP 125 V pc SN BRD No. 2 Vital Bus No. 2 NCC-E2-hCCEh MCC-E10 DG 1 125 V DC SN BkD Ik). 3 Vital Dus No. 3 HCC-E3-MLTE1 DG 2 125 V DC SN BPD No. 4 Vital Dus No. 4 HCC-1.4-HCCEb 4 KV Sus IAE 4 KV Bus 1DF Failure Manual Automatic 1
Critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recomunended f
b e Areas twaree Available Available Separation Position CR-1 Res>.t e No No (20' Existing detection &
Control /2 suppression adequate i
CR-3 Power &
No No (20' Existing detection &'
Control suppression ade<3uate loss /3 i
CH-4 Ibwer &
No No (20' Existing detection &
Control suppression adequate Ioss/3 CS-1 Power &
No Fo (20' Add fire detection i
Control and suppression Ioss/3 CV-2 Power &
Yes No N.A.F.
Existing detection and Control suppression adequate loss /3 CV-3 Power &
No No (20' Add fire detection Control and suppression loss /3 ES-2 Control Yes No (20' Hanually se.juence Loss /2 1oads pq1;S:
'The redundant and diverse methods and automatic and manual alternatives f or a saf e ghtudown nay be jeopardized due to a flae in the 11aited fire area. See the text.
N.A.F. = Not a tactor. The results of the analysis are inderea. dent of the exist-inq separation.
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HEATING VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONI14G SYSTEMS The Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Systems are r'
auxiliary support systems.
The loss of one of these systems does not directly jeopardize the safe shutdown capability of the station.
The analysis evaluated the vunerability of the control room HVAC system, the diesel generator ventilation system and the emergency switchgear ventilation system to a fire.
The results of that analysis are presented in the following tables.
A fire in fire area CR-2 could render the control room HVAC equipment inopei'able because the ecuipment is subject to a common failure.
- However, failure of the system does not result in a reduction in the integrity of the station's safety systems.
As defined in operating license technical specifications, control room habitability is demonstrated by verifying that the control
(
room air temperature is less than 113*F.
If, as a result of a fire and coincident loss of offsite
- power, the control room temperature could not be maintained below the existing limit, the plant would be shut down.
The analysis also demonstrates that a
fire in any other fire area would have a less severe impact on the control room HVAC.
Components of the Diesel Generator Supply and Exhaust Air System and the Emergency Switchgear and Battery Room Ventilation subsystems are not subject to a common failure.
The control cables for the subsystems are subject to a
common failure as indicated in the su:cmary tables.
However, these failures would not result in a reduction in the integrity of the stations safety systems.
The safe shutdown function of the intake structure ventilation system is to provide area cooling to each intake structure which contains a river water pump.
One fan is provided for each intake structure VS-F-57A in IS-1, VS-F-57B in IS-2 and VS-F-57C in IS-3 power to IS-1 and IS-2 is redundant to each other.
The power source to the fan in IS-3 and WS-F-57C can be powered from either the motor control center in IS-1 or the motor control centers in IS-3.
Independence between these redundant power sources is achieved through use of a transfer switch, which allows only one power source at a time, and can be connected to fan VS-F-57C.
In any event, the alternate intake structure is available.
Complete loss of any one fire area will not result in loss of area cooling to all three intake structure fire areas and functional diversity is provided by the alternate intake structure.
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DIESEL GENERATOR SUPPLY AND EXitAUST Alk EYSTFM 111HCTIONAL HJHCT ON: Auxiliary Support Sys-DIV!2SITY:
Separate Supply and tem, Diesel Generator F.xhaust Fans Room Ventilation ELT SYSTut cu4mHFNTS:
VS-F-22A VS-D-2A VS-D-22-1A VS-F-22B VS-D-2B VS-D-22-1B VS-D-2C VS-D-2D Failure Manual Automatic critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recommended i
Fire Area Degree
.Available
.Available Separation Position d'
Ch-4 Remote Yes Yes N.A.F.
Primary control sain-Contol/2 tained CS-1 Primary Yes Yes N.A.F.
Aux. shutdown panel control /2 CV-3 control Yes No N.A.F.
Manually open system Power /3 dampers tu rITS:
sThe redundant and diverse methods and automatic and manual alternatives for a saf e shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area. See the text.
fl.A.F. = Not. a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the existing separation.
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D1ERGENCY EWITCHGEAR AND BAYTEhY ROOM VENTILATION Ft#4CTIONAL ft:MCTION: Auxiliary Support Sys-DIVERSITY:
kedu Want supply and tem, Switchgear Rous exhaust fans Ventilation EEY SYSTEM COMPONENTS:
VS-F-16A VS-F-55b VS-D-55A VS-F-16B VS-D-16A VS-D-55h VS-F-55A VS-D-16h Failure flanual Automatic Critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recosaiended tire Areat Degree Available_
Availalile Separation Ibsition CS-3 Prisary Yes No H.A.F.
Manually open system control /2 dampers NOTES:
- The redundant and diverse methods and automatic and manual alternatives'for a safe shutdown may be jeopardized due to a tire in the listed fire area. See the text N.A.F. = Not a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the existing separation W
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HEATIIC, VENTILATING, AND AIR Cut 4DITIONING SYSTEM FilNCTIONAL FUt4CTION: Auxiliary Support Sys-DIVtRSITY:
Individual Room Isola-tem, Control koose and tion, Alternate Control Process Instrument Roomi Vent 11ation Flow Room Ventilation Path EEY SYSTEM ('IMPONENTS: VS-F40A VS-D-40-1A VS-F408 VS-D-40-1B VS-AC-1A VS-D-40-1C i
VS-AC-1B VS-D-40-1D I
t' allure Manual Automatic p
Critica1 H =h*/
Alternatives Alternativ.s Recommermied Fire Ared D* t r ee Available Available ieparation Position l
CR-2 Component No No
< 20e Adequate fire detec-Ix>ss/1 tion / suppression existing CH-4 Remote Yes Yes N.A.F.
Primary control maih-Control /2 tained p
CS-1 Primary Yes No N.A.F.
Add fire detec-Control /2 tion / suppression
/
PA-Ill I4ennot e Yes Yes N.A.F.
Remote control snain-Control /2 tained la)TESs y
51he redund. ant and diverse methods a nd automatic and saanual alternatives for a scle shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed area. See text.
5 N.A.F. = Not a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the existing seg u rat ion.
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RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS The RHR safe shutdown function is to remove both decay heat and sensible heat in order to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
gs Flow from one of two pumps is required and a flow path to one of two heat exchangers is required.
The active devices used to accomplish the safety function are:
the RHR pumps, both the suction valves from the reactor coolant system, and the return valves to the reactor coolant system.
Since the reactor coolant system can be brought to and maintained in an equilibrium
- state, i.e.,
hot shutdown, loss of this system as a result of fire can be tolerated untiL, repairs and/or manual operator actions are taken prior to the continuation of the cooldown process.
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RtSIDUA1. IllAT RtJ10 VAL SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL filNCTION : Remove decay heat. from DIVI:kSITY: Maintain lot shutdown hot to cold shutdown until pilR is functional FI;Y SYS1EM COMIONENTS:
Ril-P-1 A FCV-Ril-605 Ril-P-1B NOV-R11-700 MOV-Rit-701 MOV-Rti-720A HOV-Ril-720B HOV-Ril-783 railure Manual Aut ocrati c Critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recommwended Fire Areas Degree Available Availa ble Se@ ration
.Iwaition G -4 Remote Yes Yes N.A.F.
Manual control from Control /2 switchgear room CS-1 Primary Yes Yes N.A.F.
Use auxiliary shut-Control /2 down panel RC-1 Comgonent Fo No (20' Add detection & sup-Imss/1 pression system inTES:
sThe redundant and diverse methods and automatic and manual alternatives for a saf e shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the list.ed fire area.
See the text.
N.A.F. = Not a factor. %e results of the analysis are independent. of the exist-ing separation.
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RIVER WATER SYSTEM The safe shutdown function of the river water system is to provide cooling water to the diesel generator
- coolers, the charging pump
- coolers, the component cooling water system (for cold shutdown) and the control room HVAC system.
The active components used for this are the river water pumps, the auxiliary river water pumps and discharge valve, and the diesel generator cooler and component cooling water inlet valves.
The cooling functions can be accomplished with one of three river water pumps or one of two auxiliary river water pumps and a flow path to the heat exchangers**(one of two pu=p discharge valves, and one of four diesel generator cooler inlets).
The fire hazards analysis demonstrates that the most severe consequences of the fire could be a loss of one of two system
? control stations.
The analysis indicates that' loss of both of the control stations is not possible.
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RIVER WATER SYSTFM HJNCTIONAL SUNCTION: Auxiliary heat DIVERSITY: Alternate intake disapation structure - 2 pumps main intake structure multiple control stations - 3 pumps KEY SYSTEM COMPONENTS:
WR-P-1A WR-P-9A MOV-kW-102A1 MOV-kW-102C2 WR-P-1B
.WR-P-9B MOV-RW-102B2 POV-RW-102C1 WR-P-1C MOV-kW-1027.2 MOV-RW-102D 1 MOV-hW-116 A HOV-RW-11316 MOV-RW-113A MOV-RW-116 tl MOV-kW-113C MOV-kW-113p d'
Fa11erre Manual Automatic critical Mode /
Alternatives Alternatives Recommended Fire Area Degreen Available Available Separat. ion Alternative CR-4 Remote Yes Yes N.A.F.
Primary Control Avail-Control /2 able (3-1 Primary Yes Yes N.A.F.
Use Aux. shutdown panel Control /2 i
p!yyt:
l s ne redurulant asui diverse methods and automatic and manual alternatives for a safe shutdown may be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area.
See the t ext.
N.A.F. = Not a factor. The results of the analysis are independent of the exis-ting separation.
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SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION
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The SJtfe Shutdown Instrumentation monitors reactor coolant pressure, pressurizes level and steam generator pressure and steam generator level so that hot shutdown can be maintained and cooldown to the RER mode can be achieved.
There are three monitors for each function, each powered by a redundant vital bus.
Minimum instrumentation for safe shutdown consists of one of three of each type of monitor.
The analysis (Iemonstrates that the steam generator pressure monitors and the pressurizer level and pressure monitors could be lost as a
result of a
fire in fire area RC-1.
The steam generator pressure monitors are not needed for the hot shutdown mode.
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SAFE SHUTDOWN INSTEUMEr.7AT10N FUNCTIONAL DUNCTION: Provide necessary infor-DIVERSITY; mation for safe shutdown EEY SYSTIJi COMIONENTS:
LT-fW-474 LT-EE-494 PT-nS-484 LT-RC-459 LT-PW-475 LT-IN-495 IT-MS-485 LT-RC-460 LT-kW-476 LT-)W-496 PT-MS-486 LT-RC-461 LT-FM-484 PT-MS-474 FT-MS-494 IT-HC-455 LT-tH-485 PT-MS-475 PT-MS-495 IT-RC-456 LT-fW-486 PT-MS-476 PT-MS-496 l'T-RC-4 57 Failure M.stual Autosnat ic g.
Critical Pode/
Altersatives Alternatives Reconoended Th e Area s Degree Ava il a.bl e
_Available separation
. Position CH-4 Loss of No No
( 20' Existing detection and Com.genent/1 suppression adequate IT-1 tessa of Yes No N.A.F.
Use reactor coolant Component /1 loop instrumentation RC-l Insa of No No
< 208 Use reactor coolant Congenent/1 Icop instrumentation CH-1 Isass of Yes No N.A.F.
Use reactor coolant Instrument loop instrumentation Cable /2 CS-1 Inas of Yes No N.A.F.
Use reactor coolant Instrument loop instrumentation Cable /2 EgTffin a The redisulant and diverse snetteds and automatic and ranual alternatives for a saf e shutdown tay be jeopardized due to a fire in the listed fire area. See the text.
N.A. F = Not. a factor. The results of the analyses are independent of the existing sepaaation.
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APPENDIX A, SPECIAL MODELING TECHNIQUES The analysis assumes that if a cable is associated with a safe shutdown component and passes through or is located in a
given i
fire area the component is declared failed.
There are certain systems or components for which this model is too conservative.
One such case exists for a component which can be operated from either electrical bus.
The high head sarety injections pump SI-P-1C, the component cooling water pump CC-P-1C, and the river water pump RW-P-1C are all examples of this type.
BotE electrical sources or the pump motor and power cables must be failed before the function is lost.
This analysis initially assumes that cable failures are correlated to component failure by a logical OR function.
In order to implement a logical AND function, the swing bus component is assigned a
fiticious designation.
When the pump is fed from the bus 1AE, the letter A follows the designation for the pump.
When it is operated from the redundant bus 1DF the pump receives the letter B.
Examples are CC-P-3CA and CC-P-3CB.
Both of these circuits P-3CA and P-3CB must be declared fail for the actual pump P-3C to be declared failed.
A similar case exists for the 120 v a-c vital bus.
This bus can be fed through an invertor from the d-c bus or from the 480 volt MCC through a
step-down transformer or through an additional battery charger / inverter.
All of these buses must fail for the vital bus to fail.
Vital buses 3, 31, and 32 must fail for vital bus 3 to be declared failed.
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BVPS 1 QUESTION A.2-2 Fire Induced Spurious Equipment Operation
~
Identify any equipment required for safe shutdown (see item 2 above) that is subject to spurious operation as a
result of
.a fire.
Particular attention is directed to valves and valve position indicators.
Discuss the effects on safe shutdown of such spurious operation.
RESPONSE
The answer to this question is dependent on the analysis of the problem defined in item 2 (i.e.,
valves and position operator wiring within the influence of a single postulated fire).
The only river water valves which influence safe shutdown are MOV-RW103A, RW103B, RW103C, and RW103D.
Spurious opening of one of these valves will divert river water from the safe shutdown heat loads.
'Ihis situation can be readily detected and corrected.
Flow Indicator FI-RW103 and the position indicating lights are located in the control room.
Flow to the Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger can be terminated by closing MOV-103 or by closing at least one valve (inlet or outlet) in the heat exchanger line.
Spurious operation (closure) of MOV-RH700 or MOV-RH701 will cause loss of RHR.
Position indicating lights are located in the control room for all of the above valves.
In all cases, the valve may be manually repositioned by disengaging the motor drive and operating the hand wheel.
Spurious operation of valves in other systems was implicitly included in the fire hazards analysis since each valve that was essential to a safe shutdown function and the related cables which could cause operation were included in the area-by-area study. As explained in the system-by-system analysis, where it was found that such cables to redundant functional components could be affected by a single fire, appropriate consideration was given to automatic and manual alternatives for valve operation, and to alternate methods of performing safe shutdown functions.
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BVPS 1 QUESTION A.2-3 Instrument and Station Air System e
Describe the function of the instrument and station air system in achieving and maintaining both hot shutdown and cold shutdown conditions.
Identify any fire areas which contain components or piping of the air system and air operated valves whose position must change for shutdown.
Verify that the loss of the air system will not prevent shutdown operations.
RESPONSE
The atmospheric dump valves located in PT-1 (valve house) are modulated by the station air system during hot shutdowp.
In the event of instrument air and/or instrument air failure, valves fail in the position required for hot shutdown.
Although the atmospheric dump valves fall
- closed, they can be operated manually.
The same function is provided by the self-actuated steam generator relief valves.
Air-operated valves in the makeup path of the CVCS fail to the open position.
Air-operated valves in the letdown path fail to the closed position.
However, these valves can be operated manually.
They are located in the valve penetration area in PT-1 or in PA-1. Since cold shutdown valve operations are not immediately needed, a temporary or permanent loss of air supply will not prevent shutdown operations.
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BVPS 1 I
QUESTION A.2 4 Safe Shutdown Systems - Valves j
Provide a list of remotely-operated valves, with their fail positions, in safe a.
shutdown systems identified in item 2 above.
b.
Describe the provision and accessibility to manually operate these valves, if necessary,-during the shutdown operations following fires which prevent remote operation of the valves.
RESPONSE
./*'.
A list of valves is provided in the fire hazards analysis. All moto-operated valves fail "as is", and are equipped with hand operators for manual operation. Air-operated valves fail either open or closed, and can be manually operated.- As stated in the response to Question A.2-3, all air-operated valves fail open in the CVCS makeup paths, and fail closed in the CVCS letdown paths. These letdown valves can be manually operated. Air-operated valves used for containment isolation fail closed on loss of.
air. Each valve has position indicators at its control stations. Accessibility of components has been discussed in the Fire Protection Review.
In addition the capability of automatic and manual operation has been discussed in a system-by-system basis in the 1
fire hazards analysis.
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BVPS 9 r ~
nt?ESTION A. 4-1 Failure Analysis The BVPS renponse addresses only examples given in staff position A.4 and does not provide an analysis of the depth and scope recuested by the position.
Provide a failure analysis which verifies that a single failure does not impair the prinary and backup fire suppression capabilities.
The analysis should include consideration of failures in the suppression system, the
' ire detection system, or the power sources for such systems.
"ESPONSE_
Attached Table A.4-1 identifies the probable failures in the fire suppression and detection systems.
The prinary or secondary fire suppression system is operable with a
single failure.
The sprinkler, deluge, and CO 2 systems are backed up by the hand hose stations that are supplied by motor-and diesel-driven water pumps.
The fire detection systen is supplied by two independent power supplies.
The failure of the line voltage regulator feeding the fire detection panels will hamper their ability to deternine the exact location of the fire.
However, their alarm
" unction is supplied by both nornal and emergency lighting
- panels, and a
general fire alarm will sound throughout the station.
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BVPS 1 TABLE A.4-1 FIRE DETECTION AND SUPPRESSION FAILURE ANALYSIS Compensating Component Failure Effect on System Features FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM Fire detection None More than one device detector is located in each safety-related fire area F
" Loss of normal ac None Auto transfer power switch to emer-gency power Loss of voltage Loss of alarm in the regulator control room SPRINKLERS-DELUGE Fusible link Water sprayed onto Alarm sounded (wet pipe system) equipment via water flow alarm check valve solenoid valve Failure to auto-Valve position, matica11y supply indication manual water override, hand hose S alarm in control room 125 V dc Failure of deluge Trouble alarm valve to open annunciator in control room, manual override, and hand hose CO, SYSTEM l
Master solenoid Failure to auto-Manual override, valve matically supply and hand hose l
CO, Area solenoid Failure to auto-Manual override, valve matically supply and hand hose cog 1 of 2 t
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BUPS 1 TABLE A.4-1 (Cont)
Compensating Component Failure Effect on System Features FP-C-2 Failure to maintain Alarm high or Refrigeration system pressure with-low pressure compressor in limits PUMPING EQUIPMENT FP-P-1 Loss of one pump System operable Motor driven by diesel engine-fire pump driven fire pump FP-P-2 Loss of one pump System operable Engine-driven by electric fire pump motor-driven fire pump FP-P-3 Loss of system pres-Pressure decreases Pressure maintenance sure causing fire until fire pump pump pumps to start and starts to restore restore pressure pressure FP-C-1 Loss of system pres-Pressure decreases Air compressor sure causing fire until fire pump pumps to start and starts toerestore restore pressure pressure PS-FP-101A Motor-driven pump Engine-driven Autostart pres-will not start auto-pump automatical-sure switch matically ly starts, may be manually started from the control room PS-FP-101B Engine-driven pump Motor-driven Autostart pres-will not start auto-pump automati-sure switch matically cally starts Normal ac or dc Loss of one pump Diesel pump power (motor-driven) available 2 of 2
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BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION A.5-1 Effects of Extinguishing Agents Provide the results of an analysis which shows that rupture or inadvertent operation of a fire fighting system will not subsequently cause damage or failure of safety-related equip-ment required for safe shutdown.
RESIONSE The information requested has been provided in the Fire Protection Program Review, page I., Position A.5.
l QA.5-1-1
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION A.5-2 g
Safety-related Systems Interlocked with Fire Fichting Systems Identify any safety-related systens or their auxiliaries which are interlocked to and could be disabled by operation of a fire fighting system.
FESPONSE There are no electrical interlocks that could defeat a safety function as a result of a fire.
Certain danpers close upon 002 actuation in order to extinguish a fire. The activation of CO2 suppression systems in either of the diesel generator rooms or water deluge systems in the charcoal filter banks will cause the loss of service of that particular conponent. However, there is no effect on plant safety due to availability of redundant equipment.
l l
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k QA.5-2-1 ss
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION A.5-3 7'
Fire Sueeression Systems Provide an analysis which shows that the fire suppression system meets the guidelines contained in AICSB Branch Technical Position 3-1.
RESPONSE
Tne information requested has been provided in the Fire Protection Program Review, page 4, Position A.5.
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QA.5-3-1 i
4 3
BVPS Unit 1
,3 OUESTION B.3-1 Fire Brigade Ecuipment Describe the equipment provided for the fire brigade. Describe means that will be used to either override door locking mechanisms or breach a barrier to provide fire brigade access and personnel egress in the event of a locking mechanism failure. Describe the training and tools provided for this purpose.
RESPONSE
The equipment provided the fire brigade consists of the following:
Strategically located portable fire extinguishers throughout the plant Fire hose and cart house hose stations Portable lighting equipment Forcible entry tools (axes and pry bars)
First aid equipment Spare auto sprinkler heads Personnel protective eauipment (hard hats, rubber boots, fire suits and gloves)
Respiratory protection equipment Transportation facilities onsite In the event of a locking mechanism failure, manual key overrides are installed on the doors. The keys are stored on a key ring in the control room, easily accessibl-to the fire brigade, and are taken along on each emergency by the Emergency Squad.
t 4
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l QB.3-1-1 i
C BVPS Unit 1 OUESTION B.3-2 Shared Emereenev Equipment List the emergency equipment that is shared or proposed to be used by both the fire brigade and the security team.
?
F FISPONSE Presently, no emergency ecuipment is shared, or proposed to be shared, by the fire brigade and the security team.
OB.3-2-1
/ ~'N BVPS Unit 1 OUESTION B.4-1 Supplemental Fire Department Describe the procedures cnd recuired authorizatica for entry, command and supervision of offsite fire department.
RESPONSE
In the event that offsite fire fighting assistance is necessary, procedures are outlined in the Station's Operating Manual. The procedures are described below:
a.
The Emergency Squad shall execute fire fighting procedures as directed by the Squad Chief until such time as the fire is extinguished or outside assistance is obtained.
b.
Upon notification of a call for outside fire assistance, the main gate is notified by a Shift Supervisor that a fire truck (s) is coming onsite and is authorized for entry.-
The guard is informed of the location of the fire in order to control access (providing TLD badges), and to escort the truck to the scene of the fire.
c.
The Station Emergency Sauad is primarily responsible for fire fighting and the Emergency Squad Chief shall direct and coordinate all fire fighting activities of the Squad and any outside assistance groups.
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QB.4-1-1 i
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION B.5-1
(
Fire Brirade Orranizational Chart Provide an organizational chart of the fire brigade.of each shift which shows the brigade size, compositinn and chain of cot: mand and which designates the normal duty position of the brigade leader; i.e., operator, electrician, maintenance man, etc.
RESPONSE
The following is extracted fro =~ Chapter 56 Section /.,
Procedure I and lists the Emergency Squad Organization (Fire Brigade Organizational Chart).
Emercenev Souad Orcanization The function of the Emergency Squad is to execute the necessary action during an emergency. Members of the squad are assigned as follows:
1.
Squad Ohief - Shift Supervisor or,in his absence, the Station Operating Foreman.
Coordinate the execution of emergency procedures for a.
personnel injury and fire and ensure that the squad has the proper equipment.
b.
Safeguard the squad and all station personnel.
Augment the squad with any available personnel if the c.
fire or first aid needs are such that the basic squad cannot adequately control the incident.
2.
Squad Captain - Plant Operator.
Direct the operation of the squad.
a.
b.
Clear all energized equipment which may endanger safe execution of the plan.
Assure availability of necessary emergency _ equipment.
c.
3.
Additional Squad Members, a minimm of three of the following:
Nuclear Operator, Start-up Operator, Shift Chemist, Radiation Control Technician.
Carry out the orders of the squad captain in extinguish-ing the fire or caring for the injured.
1 V
QB.5-1-1
BUPS Unit 1 QUESTION B.5-2 Fire Brigade Physical Examination Confirm that all fs.re members are provided with a periodic physical examination to screen out personnel with heart or respiratory disorders, or provide justification for any cxceptions.
RESPONSE
Periodic physical examinations and reviews are conducted by the DLC Medical Department which meets Regulatory Guide 8.15.
QB.5-2-1 v
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3VPS Unit 1 QUESTION B.5-3
,~
Fire Protection Orranization Identify the contractor or onsite management position responsible for implementing the personnel indoctrination program diserssed in subsection 1.0d(5) of Attachment No. 1 to Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.
P2SPONSE The onsite management position responsible for implementing the personnel indoctrination program is the Station Superintendent, via the approved and presently implemented Station Indoctrination Training Program.
/
(j Q,B.5-3-1
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTIOi B.5-4 f
Control of Ignition Sources Confirm your commitment that your procedure for the control of ignition sources complies with Section 2.0 of Attack >ent No. 4 to Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.
RESPONSE
Station approved procedures are established to cover the requirements for control of welding, cutting, grinding, and open flame work. The program does not utilize a specific permit for the work.
l 1
QB.5-4-1
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BVPS Unit 1 C
OUESTION B.5-5 Fire Fighting Procedures Confirm your comitment that your fire fighting procedures comply with subsections Id and lg of Attachment No. 5 to Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance.
RESPONSE
y An in-depth analysis and review is presently being conducted and procedures are being developed to establish strategies for specific 1
safety related, potentially hazarNs areas.
Present fire fighting Facedures are in compliance with section lg of Attachment No. 5 on coordination of fire fighting activities with offsite fire departments in the event they are needed.
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i QB.5-5-1 1
4
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BVPS Unit 1 d@uesiionC-1:
Quality Assurance (C) h 1.
Confirm that the QA program is under the manage control
(~
of the QA organization.
2.
Confirm your commitment that the stations QA program under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix will be implemented to comply with the requirements of Appendix A to BIP 9.5-1 or Regulatory Guide 1.120.
Response C-1:
The Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 Fire Protection Quality Assurance Program is presently under development.
This program will incorporate requirements 1.0 to 10.0 in Attachment.No. 6 of your February 3, 1978 letter which provided the guidelines for Nudlear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities. Administrative Controls,and Quality Assurance.
/*
This program will be managed by the Station Senior Engineer responsible for Fire Protection, Emergency Preparedness Planning, and Industrial Safety.
When necessary, he will be assisted by the Power Stations Department Safety Engineer who is an active member of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers.
Question C.10-1: Confirm that an in-house audit plan will be implemented which does not rely in total ou inspections and audits by insurance underwriters.
Response C.10-1: An in-house audit plan presently exists that does not rely in total on inspections and audits by insurance underwriters.
The annual audit of the Fire Protection Program required by BVPS Unit 1 - Technical Specification 6.5.2.8.1 will be performed under the sponsorship of the Off-Site Review Committee utilizing DLC personnel or qualified consultants.
In addition, the DLC - QA Department will perfor= an annual audit of the Fire Protection Program.
t QC-1-1 & 10-1-1 w
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION D.1-1 Fire Barrier Identify the fire barriers, enclosing separate fire areas, that do not have a minimum fire rating of three hours. For those barriers, describe the fire rating of the associated doors, ventilation dampers and seals for cable, pipe and ventilation duct penetrations.
RESPONSE
Three-hour-rated fire barriers are provided between fire areas as described in the Fire Protection Program Review, pages 23-24, except as noted in Section F of the report and as summarized below:
Fire Fire Barrier Rating Control room doors to computer room
<3 hr Cable spreading room floor slab
>l 1/2 hr Cable spreading room door to SE stairwell 1 1/2 hr Computer room 8 in concrete block wall
<3 hr Normal switchgear area doors (to be replaced)
<3 hr Radwaste building ventilation duct penetrations 1 1/2 hr Radwaste building interior doors to stair towers 1 1/2 br (one perimeter door to be replaced)
Charging pump cubicle exhaust damper (to be replaced) 1 1/2 hr Except where the above barrier components are to be replaced, the barriers are considered adequate as they are more than that required by the fire loading analysis. Also see Question D.1-4.
QD.1-1-1 t
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QUESTION D 1-2
~s Steel Structures Describe the type of fire protection, if any, applied to steel structures.
Evaluate the possibility of fire damage to protect-ed and unprotected steel structures and the effect of such dam-age on the safe plant shutdown capability.
RESPONSE
In general, structural steel is not fireproofed (protected) unless it is part of a fire barrier or part of a designated fire area.
This is described in detail in report BVPS-1, Fire Protection Program Review APCSB9.5-1 Appendix A, which contains detailed fire hazard analysis and a description of barriers surrounding the fire areas (Ref. Dl.d, page 18).
The ceilings of areas ES-1, ES-2, MG-1, CR-2, CR-3, and CR-4 do have exposed structural steel supporting the floor of the cable mezzanine.
This has not been committed to be fireproofed (prot-ected) because of the results of the fire hazards analysis identified above.
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BVPS Unit, 1 QUESTION D.1-3 i
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Drains s
1.
Provide the results of an analysis which shows that drains have sufficient capacity, and/or equipment pedestals have sufficient height to prevent standing water from sprinklers and fire hoses from damaging safety-related equipment or supporting systems necessary for safe shutdown of the plant.
As an alternate, show that the standing water does not damage 4
such equipment.
2.
Identify the areas containing safe shutdown equipment that l
are not provided with floor drains. Describe the drainage path for those areas without drains.
i 3.
Identify the areas containing combustible liquids that are not provided with floor drains.
Describe the drainage path and provisions for containing or diverting the combustible liquid'in those areas without drains. In those areas with drains, state the capacity and location of the drain reser-voirs and describe the provisions to prevent the spread of i
flammable liquid fires via the drain system to areas which may jeopardize safety-related equipment.
RESPONSE
The information requested has been provided in the Fire Protection Program Review, pages 21-23, Position D.1.
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QD.1-3-1
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BVPS 1 QUESTION D.1-4 Pipe and Ventilation Duct Penetrations e'
Provide the results of an analysis which shows that the fire barrier penetration seals for pipe penetrations and ventilation ducts are adequate to prevent the spread of smoke and fire through the barrier considering the combustible loading and pos-sible air pressure differential.
RESPONSE
The adequacy of fire barriers and pipe and ventilation duct penetrations has been previously evaluated.
See the Fire Protection Program Review, pages 23 through 25, Position D.1.
Attached is a
copy of fire test reports on testing done by the Portland Cement Association, as well as NELPIA's letter of generic approval for use of cellular concrete in penetration seals as performed at Beaver Valley-1.
In
- addition, a
copy of BVTM-160, Leak Testing of Typical Penetration Flood Seals, is attached.
See also the previous response to Questions PF-3 and D.3-2.
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QD.1-4-1 v
Kucz.acA.n Ewxmor PacernTv 1Neun.A.Ncac AssemTrow u
as,wooetens street Hartford Conn. 00102 r.s accomma W
j January 16, 1974~
8
,3-Mr. W. A. Lotz, P. E.
Dahron Corporation Room #107 - 1300 Wirt Road Houston, Texas 77055
Dear Mr. Lots:
CABLE PENETRATIONS - FIRE STOPS Foamed-in place cellular concrete (portland cement and aggregates) for fire stops for cableJans and conduit _ for pass-through fire walls and floors haa NEPIA's generic approval. Specific drawings and speci-fications should be submitted for review.
A copy of-this letter should accompany any submittal to our Field Offices.
Sincerely, k
MA J.
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Septe:ber 8, 1976
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Stone L Webster Engine,ering Corporation Summer Street Boston, tbssachusetts Attention: Mr. Peter Talbot s.,.
t P.eference: Penetration Seals at Beaver Valley l
Dear Mr. Talbot:
I Enclosed please find copics of fire test reports published by the Portland Cement Association on our high and low density cellular cencrete.
If we can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Very truly yours,
)Ghrs.w.[.?h*Y
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u, Timothy H. Poplawski
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FIRE TESTS OF 3x3-FT. SPECIMENS i
MADE WITH STANDARD HIGH-DENSITY
~> CELLULAR CONCRETE-PHASE I 1.
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BY:
Melvin S. Abrams 3
?'DATE:
January 1976
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A Research Report for
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- Darbron Corporation Box 32 Orchard Park, New York 14127 e
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Submitted by
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PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY LABORATORIES Old Orchard Road Skokie, Illinois 60076 4
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l FIRE TESTS OF 3x3-FT. SPECIMENS MADE WITI! STANDARD IIIGil-DENSIff j
g CELLULAR CONCRETE-PilASE I i
4 by I r l
Melvin S. Abrams i
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S Y N O'P'S I S s
...I Fire tests'were conducted on 3x -ft. specimens
' 3, 5, and 7-in. thick to determine heat transmission
' -/
characteristics of standard high-density cellular concrete.
,,,,, After force-drying in a kiln heated to betwcon 170 and 180 F, 8
specimens were tested in a, horizontal position with the central
.J sl,.~1.'33x33-in. of the bottom surface exposed to fire.
No load was
. ' applied.
Temperatures within the concrete and of the unexposed surface (side away from the fire) were monitored..The fire r-
' endurance periods in all tests were determined by an average J
J'
- temperature rise of 250'F on the unexposed surface.
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Fire endurance periods, corrected for moisture were:
4
' i f,...1 hr. 48 min for 3-in.; 4 hr. 41 min for 5-in., and 7 hr. 42 n.. ' 9 min.- for 7-in. thick slabs.
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DESCRIPTICN OF SPECIMEN
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Tests were conducted on 3
,.5
, and 7-in. thick
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...,'l3x3 ft. slab specimens.
These were fabricated at the sponsor's i'acility in Rainier, O'regon, on September 24, 1975.
Mr.
6, Charles Schm.idt of the Portland Cement Association was present and assisted in the fabrication of the specimens.
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,.y Wood forms, butt-welded chromel-alumel thermocouples, s
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and humidity wells were provided by the Pcftland Cement Associ-s Forms were assembled at the job site.
The butt-welded
- - ation.
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- Manager, Fire Research Section, Engineering Development i
Department, Portland Cement Association, Skokie, Illinois t
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l tharmoccuples for measuring temperatures.at various elevations in the concretc were positioned in the fon.ts as described t
i in PCA R.esearch Bulletin 223 (1)
- Thermocouple locations t
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in each specimen are given in Table 1.
A Monfore-type i
humidity well(2) was located in,,each slab so that the' I
. moisture condition of the con'drete could be determined at mid-depth.
w Information on broportions of the concrete mix was furnished by the sponsor.
These data are given in Table 2.
All components of the conc;ete were supplied on site by the
.. sponsor.
During casting of the specimens, 6-in. diameter by 12-in high cylinders were made for strength determinations.
Three cylinders each were made for Specimens 1 and 2.
Two cylinders were made for Specimen 4.
Forms were stripped from the specimens after one
' day..~The concrete was moist-cured under damp burlap for 7
' days.
Slab specimens and cylinders-were then protected with
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.. foamed plastic material and carefully crated for shipment.
On October 4, 1975, they were shipped to the Portland Cement Association.
One cylinder each from Specimens 1 and 2 was
' supplied by the sponsor to Pittsburgh Testing Lcboratory in Portland Oregon.
These were used for an 8-day moisteured com-
'pressive strength determination.
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,y METHOD OF TEST Specimens and cylinders were received at the PCA
. Fire Research Laboratory on October 16, 1975.
After uncrating
- Superscript numbers in parentheses designate references en Page 7
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'one cylinder for cach specimen was placed in a 100". rcla-tive humidity fog room to moist cure for 28 days.
After this time, compressive strength was determined.
The three slab s ecimenc, along with companion cylinders woro placed in a heated drying kiln maintained at 170 to 180'F and 0 to 25% relative humidity.
These specimens were dried until the rela'tive humidity at mid-depth of the concrete reached 75%
or less..
c y
When a specimen reached the proper moisture con-dition, it was removed from the kiln and cooled.
Prior to test, the thickness of cach specimen was determined using the equipment shown in Fig. 1.
The method is described in Ref. 3.
The specimen was then placed in a rigid restraining frame as shown in Fig. 2, grouted securely, and placed on the furnace in a horizontal position as shown in Fig. 3.
l Specimens were tested without applied load.
Test
- -procedures are described in Ref. 1.
Temperatures within the concrete were measured at the location shown in Fig. 4, and automatically recorded during the tests.
Unexposed surface temperatures were measured using procedures described in I4)
ASTM E119 Measurements were~obtained at the four points shown in Fig. 4.
At the time of test, the compressive strength of the kiln-dried companion cylinder was determined.
Furnace temperatures, as measure,d by two thermocouples U
l'ocated in the furnace 12-in. below the test slab, were moni-tored throughout the tests.
The maximum variations for the m
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threa tests frcm the Standard ASTM E119
~
time-temperature i
- curve are shown in Fig. 5 3-l.
I ANALYSIS OF RESULTS f
I-
. A summary of test data is given in Table 3.
Fire endurance periods were based on a 250'F rise l.
i r
of _the average temperature of the unexposed surface.
Re-
.'.I~'
sults were adjusted to include the effects of elevated tem-s g
'perature forced drying on the moisture condition of the con-l
,. crete.
The corrections were made in accordance with the procedures described in ASTM Designation E119, Appendix A5-Method of Correcting Fire Endurance of Concrete Slabs Deter-mined by Unexposed Temperature Rise for Non-Standard Mo'isture Content (4)
The procedure describes a method for adjusting
[.
the fire endurance of concrete slabs obtained when the moisture condition within the slab at time of test is different than that, corresponding to a condition of 75% relative humidity at 73'F.
It also ta'kes into account drying conditions other I
than at temperatures of 70 to 80*F and 30 to 40% relative t
i i
humidity.
The procedure is, based on work described in several
- publica tions (1,5,6)
Adjusted fire endurances were:
1 hr. 48 min. for the 3-in. slab, 4 hr. 41 min. for the 5-in, slab, and 7.hr.
42 min. for the 7-in. slab.
Figures 6 and 7 show the average unexposed surface temperatures obtained during the tests.
The slab thickness-fire endurance relationship for e
1,
.the standard high-density cellular concreto tested is shown S
-4_
c-9.
3.,
M in Fig. 8.
Also shown is the relationship for a normal
' weight siliceous aggregate concrete with about the same density as the cellular concrete.
For the same slab thick-f ness, th,e fire endurance of the cellular concrete was con-siderably higher than that of..the siliceous aggregate con-(
i-
,cre.te.
The higher fire endurance of the cellular concrete t
l' j-is attributed to a high volume of cement paste, a high air 3.
yl content, and the small size, approximately 1/8 in., of the ilmenite aggregate.
9 4
Figure 9 shows the average temperature within the L
cellular concrete at various distances.from the heated.
14 t
surface.
Sirilar information is plotted for the normal i
l, -
' weight siliccous aggregate concrete.
With the exception w
of the temperatures at 1/4 in, and 1/2 in. from the heated t
b surface, the temperatures within the cellular concrete were lower than those of the normal weight siliceous aggregate
' concrete.
}
Some small flexure cracks were observed on the r
exposed and unexposed surfaces of the specimens during the 2
tests.
Shrinkage of the concrete during cooling caused more extensive cracking of Specimen 4.
The condition of the sur-i faces of Specimen 1 shortly after test and of Specimens 2 and 4 about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after test are shown in Figs. 10, 11 and 12. ~C' racks were darkened with a felt-tip pen for the photographs.
Furnace atmosphere, unexposed surface, and internal concrete temperatures are included. in an Appendix to this report.
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SUMMARY
Three fire tests of standard high-density cellular concrete were carried out.
These-tests worc conducted to f
determiYle the teat transmission characteristics of this type of concrete.
Considerably higher fire endurance periods
~
were obtained for the cellulap. concrete'than for similar nor mal weight siliceous aggregate concrete specimsns of about
..the same density.
Gdnerafly, lower temperatures were obtained s
within the cellular concrete than in the siliceous aggregate concrete.
Crack gatterns observed during the tests of the cellular concrete were similar to those of other concretes
' 0f the same unit weight.
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.I TABLE 3 - TEST DATA AND RESULTS
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Specimen Thickness, in.
2.97 5.16 7.16 Date of Test f 10/27/75 11/7/75 11/5/75 Relative Humidity at i
Test, Per. cent 40 31 70 s
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Uncorrected Fire Endurance, 3
Hr: Min 1:09 3:20 6:46 Corrected Fire Endurance, Hr: Min!
1:48 4:41 7:42 Duration of Test, Hr :!Lin.
4:03 4:03 6:51 Compressive Strength at Test, psi 4000 3640 4350 s
2 Based on rise of average unexposed surface temperature rise of 250'F l
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FIRE TEST OF A 3x3-FT. SPECI.* N I
MADE WITli STANDARD LOW-DENSITY D
f CELLULAR CONCRETE-PHASE IV T
By:
Melvin S. Abrams
~
Datei February 1976 A Research Report
~
for r
Darbron Corporation Dox 32 Orchard Park, New York 14127 t
l Submitted by
~
PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOCIATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CONSTRUCTION TECIINOLOGY LADORATORIES Old Orchard Road Skokie, Illinois 60076 O
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E FIPS TEST OF A 3x3-FT. SPECIMEN MADE WITH STAMDARD k
LOW-DENSITY CELLULAR CONCRETE-PHASE IV F
R1 by h/
Melvin S. Abrams *
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S Y N.0.P S I S
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be A fire test was conducted on a 3x3-ft. specimen
[
3-1/2-in. thick to determine the heat transmission character-g istics of standard icw-density cellular concrete.
After y'
conditioning in a room maintained at 70 to 80F, and 30 to 40%
relative humidity, the specimen was tested in a horizontal position with the central 33x33 in. of the bottom surface exposed to fire.
No load was applied.
Temperatures within
[
the concrete and of the. unexposed surface (sido away from y
the fire) were monitored.
The fire endurance period in the g
test was determined by an average temperaturc risc of 250F on the unexposed nurfacc.
4 The fire endurance period, corrected for moisture g
was 4 hr. 48 min. for the 3-1/2-in. thick specimen.
Eg DESCRIPTION OF SPECIMEN fi A test was conducted on a 3-1/2-in. thick 3x3-ft.
4 slab specimen fabricated at the sponsor's facility in Rainier, E
[
Oregon, on September 24, 1975.
Mr. Charles Schmidt, of the T
[
Portland Cement Association, was present and assisted in the 6
. fabrication of the specimen.
5 Wood forms, butt-weldc d chromel-alumel thermocouples,
d.
and humidity wells were provided by the Portland Cement Associa-tion.
The form was assembled at the job site.
The but't-welded j
thermoccuples for measuring. temperatures at various elevations Y:
g in the concrete were positioned in the forms as described in Y
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- Manager, Fire Research Section, Portland Cement Association, "Research and Development, Construction Technology Laboratories,
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Skokie, Ill.inois.
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at mid-depth of dic concreto specimen was loss than 80%.
i
~
When the specimen reached the proper moisture j
condition, it was removed from the drying room.
Prior to test,
'[
~
the thickness of the specimen was determined using the equipment shown in Fig. 1.
The method is described in Ref.
3.
The specimen was then placed in a igid restraining frame as shown in Fig. 2 and grouted securely.
Finally, t$e specimen was placed s
on the furnace in a horiz,ontal position as shown in Fig. 3.
The specimen was tested without applied load.
Test procedurcs arc described in Ref. 1.
Temperntures within the concrete were measured at the locations shown in Fig. 4 and Iautomatically recorded during the test.
Unexposed surface temperatures were measured using procedures described in ASTM
- Designation:
E119 ( 4)
Measurements were obtained at the four points shown in Fig. 4.
At the time of test, the compressive
. strength of the ccmpanion cylinder was det.2rmined.
~',~
Furnaje temperatures, as measured by two thermocouples
~
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located in the furnace 12 in. below the test slab, were monitored T.4.throughout th'e test.
The maximum variations for the test from the Standard ASTM Designation:
E119 ( 4} time-temperature curve are shown in Fig. 5.
j ANALYSIS OF RESULTS A summary of test data is given in Table 2.
The fire enduranec' period was based on a 250F rise i l'
.g.;
of the average temperature of the unexposed surface.
The fire
~
endurance was adjusted for the non-standard moisture content
~~
e 4
t b
p i
a-4-
I 2
a
9
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s TABLE 2 - TEST DATA AND RESULTS
?
Specimen 5 Specimen Thickness, in.
3.65
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Date of Test, mo/ day /yr 11/10/76 Relative Humidity at Test, Percent 77 Uncorrected Fire Endurance, Hr: Min 2 5:06
,e Corrected Fire Endurance, 1
Hr: Min 4:48 Duration of Test, Hr: Min 5:12 Compressive Strength at Test, psi 112'O 2Based on rise of average unexposed surface temperature of 250F g
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b 8 a..
4 a
g gg g'g,,..
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.ap
,g,,
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e
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of the specimen at time of test.
The correction was made in-1tr r
a accordance with the procedures described in ASTM Designation:
N
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E119, Appendix AS-Method of Correcting Fire Endurance of Concrete Slabs Determined by Unexposed Temperature Rise for h
- Non-Standard Moisture Content (i.}.
The procedure describes a I.
method for adjusting the fire e'ndurance' of concrete slabs ob-j g:
%i tained when the moisture condition within the slab at time of k,
~
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, test is different than that corresponding to a condition of 75%
4t 13 re'lative humidity at 7'3F.
The procedure is based on work
~
n
$k described in several publications (1,,6)
TA
~
The adjusted fire endurance period was 4 hr. 48 min.
at hh for the 3-1/2-in. thick slab.
Figure 6 shows the average un-
,g, hh
. exposed surface temperatures obtained during the test.
~.y
~
The fire endurance for the 50 pcf (40 pcf oven dried j{
standard low-density cellular concrete) is shown in Fig. 7.
r(( -
Also shown is the slab thickness-fire endurance relationship M
$?
obtained from tests conducted previous'ly by PCA.
The PCA test data is interpolated from results given in Fig. 3 of Ref. 3.
t As shown in Fig. 7, the fire endurance of the 3-1/2-in.
sk
( 4k (nominal) thick specimen falls right on the curve for a cellular l
concrete cf the same unit weight tested previously at the PCA Laboratories.
Therefore, it would be expected that the slab i.-
thickness-fire endurance relationship for the standard low-V
'j{$
7.
density cellular concrete would be the same as that shown in
\\
Fig.
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p v
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. l54
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m
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. -. ~ - -
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BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION D.1-5 C
Curbed Areas Provide the results of an analysis that shows that curbed areas surrounding combustible liquid tanks have sufficient cepacity to contain the full contents of the tanks plus the quantity of water required for extinguishment of a fire involving the combustible liquid.
RESPONSE
The information requested has been provided in the Fire Protection Program Review, pages 75 -76, Position F.9.
t r
QD.1-5-1
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTI0:1 D.2-1 6
Piping Containing Combustibles Identify all piping containing flammable gas or combustible liquid which is routed through areas containing safety-related equipment, safety-related cables or through wh.ch personnel must pass to reach safety-related equipment for local operation.
Provide an analysis to show that a fire involving the liquid or gas will not prevent safety shutdown or result in the loss of function of a safety-related systen.
RESP 02:SE The only piping containing flammable liquids within safety-related areas is in the vicinity of the diesel generator fuel oil day tanks and the fuel oil storage tank for the diesel-driven fire pump. See also the response to Positions F.9 and F.10 (Fire Protection Program Review, pages 75-76 and 110-113) and PF-2.
l l
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QD.2-1-1 C'
m
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION D.2-2 C
Diesel Fuel Transfer Shut-off Describe the means provided to automatically and/or manually stop the transfer of diesel oil from the bunker tanks to the diesel generator day tanks in the event of a fire in the area housing the day tank, or through which the fuel oil transfer piping is routed.
RESPONSE
Each transfer pump is stopped manually by means of local control switch at each pump.
QD.2-2-1
BVPS Unit, 1 QUESTION D.2-3 Combustible Fluid Rese "oirs and Storare Provide a listing of all fixed tanks and pumps which contain oil or other combustible fluid and indicate the location of the container and quantity of combustible fluid contained.
Describe the fire protection provisions associated with each such lor:stion.
RESPONSE
This information is provided in Table 1 of the Fire Protection Program Review (located after page 150).
I r
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m CD.2-3-1 b
t
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION D.3-1 b
Ir.terface between Safety and Non-Safetv Eouipment Certain cables electrically connected to equipment necessary for safe shutdown may be used for functions designated as non-safety-related and therefore classified as non-safety-related.
Examples of these might be remote indicating lights for valves, breakers etc. Describe whether such cables are kept with the safety division to which they were originally connected nnd if not, describe the effects on the safe shutdown equipment due to shorts to these cables as a result of fire.
RESPONSE
Annunciator cables are run with other non-safety cables, and they are isolated from the safety circuit. A short in the annunciator circuit does not have any effect on the operability of safety-related devices.
Remote indicating lights are treated as Class IE and are always kept within the electrical division.
Ammeters remote from safe shutdown switchgear are routed with non-safety cables. A short to this cable does not have an effect on the operability of the safety-related device.
l k
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QD.3-1-1 i
J
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION D.3-2 l'
Fire Stoes Provide a detailad description of fire breaks and fire stops.
Include sketches, identification of naterials of construction, and description of test results which demonstrate the effective-ness of fire stops used on electrical cubicles and vertical cable trays; and for intersection between horizontal and vertical cable runs. Provide the criteria that were used in the design of the fire breaks and fire stops.
RESPONSE
See page 2/. of the Fire Protection Progran Review for a descrip-tion-of existing lowMensity cellular concrete used in electrical cable penetration fire stops. New fire stops installed after nid-1978 utilize silicon foan following an MTI-approved ins +n11ation procedure.
/ '.
QD.3-2-1
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION D.3-3 Cable Insulation Materials Identify all types of cable used in all areas of the cable tray system. For each type of cable, identify the materials used for insulation and jacketing.
State the combustion and toxic characteristics of each type of material.
Identify whether flame tests were performed on sin 61e and jacketed assemblies.
Provide the acceptance criteria and results of the flame tests.
Identify the flame temperature used, the exposed area, and the heat rate. Provide a com-parison between these test procedures and the IEEE 383 flame test procedures.
BESPONSE y-The follesing itemized list represents all the types of cable used in the BVPS-1 cable tray system.
Cable Type Manufacturer Insulation Jacket 5,000 V Power Kerite Co.
HT Kerite NS Neoprene 600 V Power Okonit'e Co.
Thermoset Ethylene Thermoset Neoprene Propylene Rubber Compound 1,000 V Control Okonite Co.
Thermoset Ethylene Thermoset Neoprene Propylene Rubber Compound Instrument Continental F. R. Cross-Linked F.R. Chlorosulfonate Wile Polyethylene Polyethylene F.R. Cross-Linked Asbestos Braid Polyethylene Polyethylene Polyethylene Type I ASTM-D-1248 Type I AS M-D-1248 Thermocouple Boston Insul.
Thermoset Silicone Asbestos Braid Wire Rubber Glass Braid Sili-Asbestos Braid cone, Varnish Saturated High Tempere-Cerro Wire &
Methyl-Vinyl Sili-Asbestos Braid ture Cable cone Rubber Coaxial Rachem Extruded Alkane Extruded Cross-Linked I=ide Plus Cross-Polyolefin Linked Polyolefin With the exception of the 5,000 V Power Cable manufactured by the Kerite Co.,
test data have been obtained for all cable. -The cable has been flame tested for individual conductors per ASTM-D2633 or 1PCEA 5-19-81 as required. Vertical flame tests similar to 2.5.h.5 of IEEE-383 were performed on each cable type, with the results that all passed. Flame temperature, heat rates, and exposed areas are not required per IEEE-383 and, therefore, in the majority of cases not i
available. Test data are on file.
QD.3-3-1 N--l.
l l
(
Information on Kerite 5,000 V Fower Cable is attached.
Reports of Fire Tests Hos. 74 VG 23-P and 75 VG 32-P show that the single and three conductor 3EV H.T. Kerite insulated and HTNS jacketed single conductor and those triplexed with galvanized steel inter-lock armor are non-propagating as tested using the gas burner flame source as specified in IEEE 383-1974.
I
-~
V QD.3-3-2 l
o 49 Day Street Seymour. Ccnnecticut 06483 (203) 888-2591 041 the kerite company
/7 d w
i October 27, 1978 e
Stone & Webster Engineering Corporation P.O. Box 2325 Boston, Massachusetts 02107 i
Attention:
Mr. James Cumiskey Project Engineer Re: Duquesne Light Company i
Beaver Valley Generating Station Unit 1 P.O. No. VC227 of 11/1/71 Kerite No. B-59 Gentlemen:
Confirming our teletype of 10/25, we are enclosing Kerite Reports of Fire Tests Nos. 74 VG 25-P and 75 VG 32-P showing that the single and three conductor SKV H.T. Kerite insulated and HTNS jacketed single conductor and those triplexed with galvanized steel interlock armor are non-propagating as tested using the gas burner flame source as specified in IEEE 383-1974.
We certify that the cable constructions and materials used on these tests are identical to those supplied on the referenced order.
Should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to call.
Yours truly, THE KERITE COMPANY f
L(, t @','
A. Hubbard III t
Manager, Sales Engineering AH:sc Encs.
,a I
i b
a subsidiary of HARVEY HUBBELL INCORPORATED H
seLt.
wnys niva coumury
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REPORT ON FLAME TEST CONDUCTED ON POWER CABLES July 22,1974 i
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A.
OBJECTIVE The objective of this flame test is to demonstrate the ability of a multiconductor HTK insulated and HTNS jacketed cable with an outer galvanized steel interlocked armor not to propagate a fire under test
,t specifications in IEEE Std. 383-1974.
,i i:
B.
CABLE TESTED
- l
~i 3/c No.1/0 (str.) AWG, 5000 volt,125 mil HTK (N-98) insulation, 95 mil HTNS (HI-70) jacket; cabled with asbestos laterals and an overall galvanized steel interlocked armor.
4 C.
TEST FACILITY AND INSTRUMENTATION The test was conducted on July 22,1974, in the test facility at
.. 4 i
-The Kerite Company, Seymour,. Connecticut. An American Gas
'I Furnace Company 10" ribbon burner was used to provide the flame
(
source. A Lewis Engineering Pyrometer was used in conjunction i
with a calibrated thermocouple to monitor the flame temperature throughout the test. A laboratory timer was used in timing the test.
D.
TEST PROCEDURE The test was conducted generally in accordance with IEEE Std. 383-1974, Section,2.0, Paragraph 2.6. The flame source used was gas with a mixture of compressed air. The pressures used during the test are as follows.
The gas pressure was -4.6 cm of water as measured on the gas supply.of the Venturi mixer.
The air pressure was +4.4 cm of water as measured at the air inlet of the Venturi mixer.
Pressures were measured using water manometers under dynamic conditions.
l l
The flame temperature was adjusted to approximately 1500'F and a l
length of about 12".
The flame was placed in proper contact with the cable samples which had been installed in a 9" wide, 3" deep, and 8 ft.
long galvanized steel tray. The three cable samples were 8 ft. long, and installed in the tray with about one-half cable diameter between cables.
O, 74 VG 25-P n
1-
,----y--
g--
4 g
w
--3e m-
~
O The flame was left in contact with the cables for twenty minutes.
Appropriate test data was recorded.
E.
TEST DATA
- 1) Time for specimen to ignite.
?*
2)" Time specimen continued to burn upon removal of flame.
52 sec.
- 3) Maximum length of sample burned. Include char distance.
7 inches
- 4) Post test dissection.
Upon removal of armor interlock in area of hot test flame jacket on individual conductors was charred for a maximum of 7" and consumed for a maximum of 4".
I i
- Unable to determine at what time cable ignited because i
of armor interlock. However, five minutes into test I
flames were noted emitting from the laps in the armor.
Flame Flame Minutes Temperature *F Minutes Temperature 'F 0
.1680 11
~ 1720 1
1550 12 1740 2
'1580 13 1730 3.
1620 14 1750 4
1680 15 1820 5
1670 16 1770 6
1670 17 1750 7
1700-18 1850 8
1680 19 1700 9
1760 20 1770 10 1720 74 VG25-P
~
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, =...
F F.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This cable shows no evidence of propagating a fire. This type of cable, thus, qualifies as a fire resistant cable in the context of the test configuration.
G.
ATTESTATION The above test was personally witnessed by the undersigned and the data presented above is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.
f f
R. X}MqpYsy Tecnician RJM/pp Approved by
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R. B. Budrow Mgr., Cable Applications Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20 day of February,1975.
l Pl d T Nos nea -l.
Notary Public '/
My Commission Expires Mar. 31,1976 74 VG25-P
~-
en.--
rzin ;(cro rn courwnv Test Number 75 VG P
- Reference Number: IG-7/18/75
(
These 1 ressures were measured for both air and fuel at the inlet of the mixer.
The Ildme sour'cc was placed 3 inches away from the caliles and allowed to burn for 20 minutes. At the end of 20 minutes, the flame source was shut off and the. cable was allowed to burn until it self-extinguished or was totally consumed. All pertinent data was recorded. The temperatures indicated in the itext section.were m,casured by a thermocouple located 2-7/8" from the burner face. The test was performed three times for reproducibility, s
E.
TEST DATA' Test No.1 Test No. 2 Test No. 3
' ) Time for specimen to ignite.
35 sec.
36 sec.
38 sec.
1
- 2) Time specimen continued to burn after removal of flame O sec.
O sec.
O sec, source.
~
- 3) Maximum length of sa'mple burned.
34" 42" 46" 4)
Minutes Flame Impingement Temperature PF)
Start 1475 1500 1450 1
1500 1550 1525 2
1610 1575 1525 3
1625 1600 1575 4
1625 1575 1575 5
1630 1600 1575 G
1650 1650 1575 7
1625 1625 1575 nL 8 :...a 1G25 1675
,1575 9
1025 1G75 1550 10 1000 1G25 1550 e
f se-e
.rn,c. h?z:61*rc conszw"Y
-3,
'Tcst Number:
75 VG-32-P Reference Number: 1G-7/18/75 2G-7/28/75 3G-7/28/75 i
^
Minutes Flame Impingement Temperature (*F) 11 1650 1625 1540 12 1600 1625 1540 13 1500 1625 1525 14 1575 1600 1525 1625 1525 1575 15 16 1550 1675 1525 17 1575 1600 1525
- 18 1550 1625 1525 19 1550 1625 1500 20 1560 1600 1500 N. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This cable shows no evidence of propagating a fire. This type of cable thus, qualifies as a fire resistant cable in the context of the test
~
configuration.
G. ATTESTATION The above test was personally witnessed by the undersigned and the data presented above is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.
b, df+ % "
J.' Osborn y,
Technician l
Approved:
/b A'n.s,cenI Paul D. Basconi
~
~
Mechanical Engineer Subscribed and' sworn to, before me, this 28 day of July,1975.
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.4m,?.. /d'./. 8 PDB/JO/pp Notary Public p.,.r,,mmbe.n,,,
3%PS Unit 1 QUESTION D.4-1
.f Method of Heat and Smoke Venting In all the areas where manual fire fighting is proposed as either primary or backup means of suppression, describe the methods which would be used for heat and smoke removal using either fixed or portable air handling equipment. If the plant HVAC systems are proposed for such service, provide design data to show that these systems are rated for the conditions (temperature and capacity) required when used for this service.
RESPONSE
The fire areas in which manual fire suppression (extinguishers and/or hose) is proposed are identified on the summary sheets included with the fire hazards analysis. This tabulation also indicates which fire areas house safety-related equipment. The removal of heat and smoke from areas of the plant would be effected by utilizing installed ventilation or, if these installed systems are incapacitated, by alternate methods as described in the Fire Protection Program Review, pages 33-34 and 36, Position D.4.
QD.4-1-1
)
BVF3 Unit 1 QUESTION D.4-2
/
Prevention of Fire and Smoire Scread Describe the manner in which fire and smoke are prevented from spreading from area to area via the normal and emergency venti-lation systems in all parts of the plant areas. Describe the location, actuation method and fire rating of dampers used for fire and smoke control in both air supply and return air systems.
Describe the details of interlocks for ventilation system shut-down or mode change that can be utilized for fire and smoke control.
RESPONSE
The responses to Positions D.4.a (page 36) and D.3.1 (pages 33-
- 34) describe the prevention of fire and smoke spreading.
%s
\\~ I QD.4-2-1
BVPS 1 QUESTION D.4-3 j
Ventilation System Power and Control
(
/
Identify the areas where ventilation systems power supply or controls are located within the area they serve.
Provide the basis for leaving ventilation systems power and control cables within the area they serve.
R SPONSE l
The ventilation systems for the following safety-related areas have been investigated in detail, and it has been determined that the power supply or controls are located within the area they serve:
CR-2 Control Room HVAC Room CR -3 Communication and Relay Room x
"CR-4 Process Instrument DG-1 Diesel Generator Cubicle DG-2 Diesel Generator Cubicle IS-1,
-2,
-3 Intake Structure CR-2, CR-3, and CR-4 are served by the same ventilation system e7haust fans VS-F-40A or B.
Heat and smoke may be removed from these areas by using:
1.
The nomal ventilation equipment, if still cperational:
2.
The ve'ntilation exhaust in adjacent area NS-1 by opening doors under strict administrative control of fire
- brigade, and running FN-18.shich serves NS-1 under full exhaust with no recirculation.
(A temporary connection to the duct system is an alternate option) : or 3.
@ogtable fans with elephant-trunk vent hoses installed o
to goom NS-1 to the stairway at SC, through clean shop atmos 3.rbine room where the roof fans will exhaust to the l
'ere.
I DG-1 or DG-2 are s the normal ventilat rved by separate ventilation exhaust fans.
If e
ventilated b
i n system is not available, each room may be with the opposite
.able fan equipment set in the outside doorway or open to provide a ventilation air supply.
IS-1,
-2, and
-3 i
1 ventilation system i8 have individual inlet fans.
If the normal 4 navailable, each room may be vented by 2
,~
QD.4-3-1 l
l t
BVPS 1 portable fan equipment to the general area where the roof fans exhaust to the atmosphere.
'(
It was determined that the ventilation systems for the following safety-related areas have power supply and controls outside their respective fire area:
RC-1 Reactor Containment - Purge System CR-1 Control Room CS-1 Cable Tray Mezzanine See response to Position F.3.b (page 69 of Program Review)
ES-1, -2 Emergency Switchgear Room See response to Position D.3.i (page 33 and 34 Program Review)
Portable equipment will be used for CV-1 and -2 cable vaults and CV-3 cable tunnel on the basis outlined on page 34 of the Program Review.
All other safety-related areas will use:
1.
Normal ventilation equipment if available; 2.
Adjacent exhaust systems with or without portable equipment:
3.
Portable ventilation fans with or without elephant trunks; or 4.
Natural chimney effect where applicable.
'^',
QD.4-3-2
'% I
BVPS 1 QUESTION D.4-4 7
,Preventina Recirculation of Ventilation Air Describe the separation between the air intakes and exhausts for normal and emergency ventilation systems and th3 provisions which prevent smoke from being drawn back into the plant.
RESPONSE
As discussed in the original Fire Protection Program Review Response to Position D.A.e., the only safety-related areas whose functions would be affected by external smoke would be control room areas CR-1 thru CR-4 (personnel habitability) and diesel generator cubicles DG-1 f, DG--2 (equipment startup and run).
The locations of the air intakes and elkhausts for these areas are depicted in Figures 9.5-14 and 16, respectively.
~
Smoke detection and control within the control room areas are discussed in the Position F.2 Besponse.
In addition, the control room is provided with a
bottled air emergency pressurization system.
The remote location of the diesel generator cubicles (Figure 9.5-2) minimizes the possibility of smoke from other fire areas impacting diesel generator availability.
The existing area ionization detection system with control room and local alarm for these
- cubicles, as discussed in Position F.2 Response, provides remote indication of any smoke buildup in these areas from smoke venting of any other fire area.
This remote smoke identification capability provides control room input to decide if termination of smoke venting from other fire areas is warranted.
The individual fixed-flooding Co fire suppression system for each r
cubicle with automatic shutdown of the associated exhaust fan and closure of intake and exhaust
- damperc, as discussed in Position F.9
- Response, minimizes the smoke generation from any postulated diesel generator cubicle fire, and limits the amount of smoke that would be expelled to the atmosphere.
f.
QD.4-4-1 V
\\
BVPS Unit, 1 QUESTICN D.5-1
(
Senaration of Redundant Coccunication Systems j
Describe the proximity of the cables for redundant communica-tion systems to each other at the containment penetration.
Identify any parts of the plant to or from which communication by both systems might be lost to a single fire and discuss how the communication vill be maintained during the fire emergency.
RESPONSE
Containment Cables servicing the page-party, calibration jack, and PAI tele-phone systems are routed in separate conduit systems, both within the containment and throughout the plant. However, these systems are routed through a common penetration, No. 88. A fire in fire area PT-1 or RC-1 could cause a partial loss of.these systems in the containment.
The personnel hatch is serviced from the containment side for page-party, private-line phone, and calibration jack systems. A fire in PT-1 or RC-1 could cause a loss of these systems. In addition, a PAX telephone is serviced from the plant side of the hatch. A fire in area PA-1 could cause a partial loss of this phone service.
Loss of Alternate Communications between Areas in the Plant The PAI switchboard telephone system is located in the communications equipment room, fire area CR-3.
A fire in this area could cause partial or total loss of all PAI telephone service in the plant.
Main PAI telephone boxes are. located as follows:
Building Location Fire Area Control 735' control Rm CR-1 Service 713' Proc Instr Rod Rm (N. Wall)
CR-4 Service 735' Fire Passage (E. End)
SB-3 Turbine 6938 (S.E. Corner)
TB-1 Reactor 735' (Column 10)
RC-1 l
PA 722' (N.W. Corner)
PA-1 In addition to the above panels, telephone boxes are located in remote areas such as Intake Structure, Alternate Intake, Meteorological Shelter, Radio Building, Relay House.
A fire in the area of a telephone box may cause loss of PAI service within that area.
(?
v QD.5-1-1
The page-party system is routed throughout the plant. A fire in a particular area could cause total loss of the plant system if a short circuit results.
If the
/
cables fail open, then service would be segregated. Within a short period of time, the affected area could be severed and partial use of the page-party system restored.
A calibration jack system is routed throughout the plant.
It has a susceptibility to loss of service by fire similar to that of the page-party.
Portable VHF radios are also used and are not dependent on the hard-wired systems; they are part of the EPP.
'l l
,1 s
j v/
QD.5-1-2 l
BVPS Unit, 1 QUESTION D.5-2 Proximity of Recular and Emergency Lichting Wiring Provide the results of an evaluation of the potential for a fire in a safety-related area to cause damage to electrical wiring which would result in the loss of both regular and emergency lighting to areas providing access to the fire.
RESPONSE
The information requested has been provided in the Fire Protection Program Review, pages 43-44, Position D.5.
Suitable sealed-beam, battery-powered portable hand lights are available to the fire brigade as a part of the nor=al~ emergency equipment.
QD.5-2-1
BVPS Unit 1
(
_./
QUESTION E.1-1 Fire Detection System Design Provide data for the numbers and locations of fire detectors in each safety-related area and in other areas which could affect safety-related arene as a result of postulated fires.
RESPONSE
Refer to Table 1 of the Fire Protection ' Program Review, located after page 150. Fire detection equipment has been provided in the following areas:
Ionization Zone Description No. of Detectors ES-1 Emergency SWGR Room A 5
Battery Rm. 1 1
Battery Rm. 3 1
ES-2 Emergency SVGR Room B 5
Battery Rm. 2 1
Battery Rm. 4 1
MG-1 MG Pod Control Room 4
CR-4 Process Inst & Rod Position 12 CR-2 Air Cond. Equip. Rm.
2 Pump Rm.
2 CR-3 Communication Equip. Rm.
2 NS 480 & 4160 SVGR Rm.
13 CR-1 Control Room 7
Office 1
Computer Room 2
i DG-1 Diesel Generator Roem 3
DG-2 Diesel Generator Room 3
CS-1 Cable Tray Mezzanine 31 CV-1 West Cable Vault 3
West Cable Tunnel 2
CV-2 East Cable Vault 3
East Cable Tunnel 2
l IS-l*
Pump Cubicle (Heat Detectors) 2 IS-2*
Pump Cubicle (Heat Detectors) 2 IS-3*
Pump Cubicle (Heat Detectors) 2 IS-4*
Pump Cubicle (Heat Detectors) 2 1
1
- Proposed l
QE.1-1-1
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION E.3-1
(
Fire Suppression System Design Provide the design data for all automatic suppression systems (both existing and proposed) including such items as design densities, soak times, pouer supplies, and associated alarms.
Identify areas of non-compliance with appropriate hTPA Standards.
RESPONSE
Automatic Fire Suppression Systems as described in the
" Fire Hazards Analysis summary sheet" are:
Area Code Plant Identification g
Alarm Power CS-1 Cable Tray Mezzanine CO2 - Total C.R./ Local 125 V-DC (Proposed)
Flooding CR-4 Process Instrument Halon C.R./ Local 125 V-DC and Rod Pos. Room D.C. 1; 2 Diesel Generator CO2 - Total C.R./ Local 125 V-DC Cubicle Flooding MF-1; 2 Main Exhaust Filter Water Spray C.R./Iocal 125 V-DC Banks Deluge.
CV-1 West Cable Vault CO2 - Total C.R./ Local 125 V-DC Flooding CV-2 East Cable Vault CO2 - Total C.R./ Local 125 V-DC
. Flooding TR-1 to Main and Station Water Spray C.R./* Local 125 V-DC TR-5 Transformers Deluge TD-1 Turbine Building Wet Pipe C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Generator Area Sprinkler TB-2 Turbine Oil Reservoir Water Spray C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Deluge TB-3 Hydrogen Seal Oil Water Spray C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Unit Deluge TO-1 Turbine Oil Wet Pipe C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Storage Room Sprinkler QE.3-1-1 d
Area Code Plant Identification Type Alarm Power
[
AB-1 Auxiliary Boiler Rm Wet Pipe C.R /* Local 125 V-DC k./
Sprinkler TC-1 Turbine Generator CO2 C.R./ Local 125 V-DC RS-1 Records Storage Rm Wet Pipe C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Sprinkler WH-1, 2 Warehouse Wet Pipe C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Sprinkler CE-1 Controlled Environ-Halon C.R./ Local 125 V-DC ment Storage Rm Total Flood SB-1 PCA Shop Wet Pipe C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Sprinkler CL-1 Chemical Lab Wet Pipe C.R./
- Local 125 V-DC Sprinkler SH-1 Clean Shop Wet Pipe C.R./* Local 125 V-DC Sprinkler
- = Local Alarm Exists at Sprinkler Header.
The design of the total flooding carbon dioxide fire protection systons conforms to the standards for carbon dioxide systems, 1&PA No. 12 - 1972. The design density for each CO2 Protected area is 52 percent. Two shot capability is provided.
The design of the sprinkler and water spray fire protection systems conforms to the standards for sprinkler system, IEPA No. 13 - 1972, and the standards for water supply systems, !TPA No. 15 - 1969, and the requirements of the Nuclear Energy Properties Insurance Association (NEPIA).
For the turbine floor, the sprinkler coverage (design densities) is at a rate of not less than 0.30 gpa per sq ft with all sprinklers within any 3,000 sq ft area operating, and not less than 0.2 gpm per sq f t with all sprinklers within any 10,000 sq t
ft area operating. Ordinary hazard areas have a design density of not less than 0.25 gpm.
F= Ntion of the available fire protection documents did not reveal any noncompliance with the above NFPA standards.
b QE.3-1-2
BVPS 1 QUESTION E.3-2 Requirements for Manual Hose Stations Demonstrate that all points of safety-related areas and areas with major fire hazard can be reached with the hose line stored at the manual hose stations.
Provide an analysis to support the position that hose stations need not be located in such safeguards areas as the pipe tunnel and cable vaults, diesel generator cubicles, and containment.
RESPONSE
The coverage provided by manual hgse stations was reviewed.
Enclosed Table E.3 lists additions. and revisions to the existing manual hose system which would provide coverage with a maximum 100-foot hose line, conservatively assuming a
30-foot reach for the hose stream.
In the analysis, obstructions of structures and equipment were considered.
I i
i I
f-~(_j QE.3-2-1
BVPS 1 TABLE E.3-2 MANUAL HOSE STATION FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW BY FIRE AREA PC-1 El 767e-10" Add 100* hose rack at columns 4, 8,
11, S 14.
El 730'-10" Add 100* hose rack at columns 4 & 15:
One inside doorway to room located inside crane wall between columns 1S 3.
One outside crane wall near doorway by column 8.
El 718'-6" Add 100' hose rack at columns 4, 8, & 14.
El 692'-11" Add 100' hose rack at colunns 4, 8, S 14.
Total of 100' hose racks = 14.
CR-2 Add 75' hose rack in stairs by G-11.
CS-1 Add 50' hose rack by stairs at G-11.
Add 50' hose rack by stairs at D-5 (also for NS-1).
Add 50' hose rack by columns 7 S 9.
DG-1 Add 75' hose rach by door.
DG-2 Add 758 hose rack by door.
,s, 1 of 4 m-
DV?S 1 TABLE E.3-2 (Cont) f l
IS-1 to 4 v
Existing hose rack is adequate.
PT-1 Add 50 ' hose rack in following locations:
At door to PT-1 by personnel hatch El 7678-10*.
At door in vent room beside main steam area El 7518-0".
In stairwell by columns 10 1/4 El 7568-0a.
Just inside door to main steam area El 7568-0".
Add 75' hose rack in following locations:
Just inside door from west cable vault with auxiliary feed pump.
Just inside door, west of centerline of RC El 7478-0".
(These with hose racks to be added to CV 1 S 2 take care of all equipment requiring hose protection in PT-1.
If all PT-1 needs protection, add (3) 50' hose racks to El 7 22 8-6").
FB-1 Existing hose rack is adequate.
PA-1, 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 1f, 1c, 1h, 11, 1i, 1k, 11, 1m, 1n, lo, 1p, la, 1r El 7228-6" To keep hose rack at G7/8 - 11 1/2 from being cut off by fire and to effectively fight fire in 1c, increase hose L-13 from 50' to 75'.
El 735'-6" Add 50' hose rack in room located in southwest corner of auxiliary building.
Put in northeast corner of room.
I Increase hose L-13 from 50' to 758 This is to keep hose rack at G7/8 - 11 1/2 from being cut off.
/ ~'s
(.j 2 of 4 l
BVPS 1 TABLE E.3-2 (Cont) r)
To be on safe side for areas 1g & 1h, increase length of hose at G7/8 - 8 7/8 from 50' to 75'.
Add 100' hose rack by coolant recovery tank BR-TK-4A.
El 752'-6a Change 50' hose rack at G7/8 - 8 7/8 to 758 to adequately protect 1k and keep hose rack at L-9 3/8 from being cut off by fire.
Change 50 ' hose rack a't L-9 3/8 to 758 to adequately protect PA-li.
Change 50' hose rack at G1/8-11 1/8 to 75' for PA-le.
El 7688-7" Hose rack at 11 1/2-G1/8; if VS-F-4A and or 4B catch fire, hose rack will be inaccessible.
Move out to G7/8-10 7/8 or G7/8-11 1/2.
CV-1 & 2 Add 50' hose rack in stairwell El 7358-6* between east and west cable vault.
This also gives access to PT-1.
Totals 100' hose rack to be added = 15 75' hose rack to be added =
5 50' hose rack to be added = 10 (+3 if needed, see note in PT-1).
50 ' hose rack to be increased to 75 ' = 6 Hose rack to be relocated = 1 Reference Drawings Fire Area Reference Drawing RC-1 11700-RM-1 Series CR-2 11700-RB-17 3 of 4
BVPS 1 TABLE E.3-2 (Cont)
,n.
11700-RE-27C u.s CS-1 11700-RE-34AC DG-1 11700-RB-27A DG-2 11700-RB-27A IS-1 to 4 11700-RB-26B PT-1 11700-RM-1 Series FB-1 11700-RB-23 PA-1 & la to 1r 11700-RM-2 Series 11700-RB-6 Series 11700-RC-24 Series CV-1 & 2 11700-RM-1B
/
4 Of 4
BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION F.1-1
~'
/
Fire Hazard at the Containment Cable Penetration Identify the consequences on safe shutdown of a fire at the cable penetration area on either side of containment.
RESPONSE
A fire in a cable penetration area on either side of contain-ment will not affect cables in a redundant safety system required for safe shutdcan due to physical separation and concrete fire barriers.
~~.
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QF.1-1-1
BVPS Ur.it 1 QUESTION F.4-1
[
Fire Hpards Associated with the Plant Computer
'w)
Provide the results of an analysis which demonstrates that a fire within the computer area vill neither expose any safety-related equipment nor affect the safe plant shutdown.
Verify that the barrier around the area is compatible with the combustible loading in the area.
RESPONSE
The computer room is not safety.-related and is provided with an 8-inch concrete block vall fire barrieg' r this area is separating this roca from the control room.
The fire loading fo 8,995 Btu /sq ft. (See Table 1 of the Fire Protection Program Review, located after page 150.) The existing vall is more than adequate, considering the fire loading.
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QF./.-1-1
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BVPS Unit 1 QUESTION F.6-1 f
Remote Shutdovn Panels
~~.
Identify the location of all remote shutdown panels and provide the results of analysis to demonstrate that no fire which could impair the control from the control room could also prevent the control from these areas. Specifically, justify why an automatic fire detection systen is nLt needed in the intake structures areas (IS 1, 2 & 3) where remote safety related panels are located.
RESPONSE
7-The shutdown panel (SDP) contains all of the necessary con-trols for achieving hot shutdown and is located in Fire Area CR-4 which is located in the service building at elevation 713 ft-6 in.
This fire area is separated from the control room by two fire walls. Should the control room become inaccessible due to fire, the reactor can be maintained at hot shutdown from the shutdown panel. Faults which occur in the control' room side of the control circuit may be isolated by use of the transfer switch which is locaced on the shutdown panel (SDP).
An automatic fire detection system will be installed in the intake structures IS-1, 2 and 3.
i n
QF.6-1-1 t
BVPS Uni?,1 QUESTION F.14-1
~s' Radiological Con couences of a Fire Evaluate the radiological consequences of a fire in radvaste areas and areas containing contaminated materials such as filter cartridge, spent resin, etc.
_ RESPONSE Fires in the primary auxiliary building are discussed on pages 35-37 and 120-122 of the Fire Protection Program Review.
fQ QF.14-1-1
BVPS Unit,1 PF-1
("
Fira Brigade Training (B-5)*
Fire Brigade training should include the following:
1.
Regular planned meetings held every three months which repeat the classroom instruction program over a two year period.
2.
Practice sessions at regular intervals but not to exceed one year for each brigade member.
3.
Drills performed at regular intervals but not to exceed three monthe for each brigade. At least one drill per year to be performed on a "back shift" for each fire brigade. A sufficient number of these drills, not less than one for each fire brigade per year, to be unannounced to determine the fire readiness of the plant. fire brigade leader, fire protection systems, and equipment.
RESPONSE
1.
A schedule has been in:plemented to review the classroom instructional program over a 2-year period.
2.
Practice sessions are held approximately each year for each brigade member and, thus far, has been successful, with no inability on the part of the brigade member to perform his duties.
3.
Drills will be held approximately once per quarter which includes personnel injury, fire drills, etc, for each fire brigade. At least one drill is conducted on a back shift,and there vill also be an unannounced drill.
t d
QPF-1-1 l
(
BVPS Uni?,1 PF-2
../
Control of Combustibles (B-5)
All vaste, debris, scrap, rags, oil spills, or other combustibles resulting from the work activity should be removed in the area following completion of the activity, or at the end of each work shift (whichever is sooner).
RESPONSE
Maintenance activities that are ongoing 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day will be kept reasonably clear of highly combustible material.
For noncontinuous activities, highly combustible materials will be cleaned up at the end of the shift or activity, whichever is sooner.
Low-hazard combustible materials, such as scaffolding timbers, will be removed at the end of the activity.
6 l
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QPF-2-1 l
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BVP3 Unit I r
PF-3 Electrical Cable Penetration Qualification (D-3)
The cable penetration fire barriers should be tested to demon-strate a three-hour rating, as is required for fire barriers.
The test should be performed or witnessed by a representative of a qualified independent testing laboratory, and should include the following:
(1)
The tes.s should be performed in accordance with ASTM E-119 and the followin" conditions.
(2) The cables used in the t<~. should include the cable insulation naterials used in the facility.
(3) The test sample should be representative of the worst case configuration of cable loading, cable tray arrangement, anchoring and penetration fire barrier size and design. The test sanple should also be representative of the cable sizes in the facility.
Testing of the penetration fire barrier in the floor configuration will qualify the fire stop for use in the wall configuration also.
(4) Cables penetrating the fire barrier should extend at least three feet on the unexposed side and at least one foot on the exposed side.
(5) The fire barrier should be tested in both directions unless the fire barrier is symmetrical.
(6) The fire barrier should be tested with a pressure differential across it that is equivalent to the maximum pressure differential a fire barrier in the plant is expected to experience.
(7) The temperature levels of the cable insulation, cable conductor, cable tray, conduit, and fire stop material should be recorded for the unexposed side of the fire barrier.
(8) Acceptance Criteria - The test is successful if:
(a) The cable penetration fire barrier has withstood the fire endurance test without passage of flane or ignition of cables on the unexposed side for a period of three hours, and
, ~.
(,_.
QPF-3-1 1
(b)
The tenperature levels recorded for the unerposed
/
side are analy:ed and demonstrate that the maxinum tenperature is sufficiently below the cable insula-
~,
tion ignition temperature, and (c)
The fire barrier rennins intact and does not allow projection of water beyond the unexposed surface during the hose stream test.
If previous test can be shown to meet the above position, the licensee should provide the results of the tests to show that the above position Js met.
ItESPONSE Refer to response 11.3-2.
Also, see attachnents Chemtrol Corp. Evaluation report dated flarch 22, 1978, and Chentrol tfaterial and Installation Qualification sheets.
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QPF-3-2 l
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(7 u Houston, Texas 77050 LtTTER OF. TRANSMITTAL Cab!e: CHEMTROL
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. Quality Assurance Departmerit Tra'nsnittal Umber; _100-26
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Beaver Valley Muclear Power Sta August 18, 1978 T0:
RE; Certificate of Compliance for Duquesne Light Co.
Silicone Dispensing Machine P. 0.. Box 4 Shippinoport, PA 15077
- CT106-215 E h Mr. J. V. Vassello tSE,NdESENDIMGYOU (X) ATTACHED
( ) U!! DER SEPARATE COVER
( ) DRAlllilGS
( ) COPY OF LETTER
( ) SPECIFICATIONS
( ) QUALITY tSSURANCE liANUAL
()
GUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES
( ) OUALITY ASSUPR'CE MANUAL REVISION
( ). QUALITY C0iiTROL PROCEDURE.-
REVISION Certificate of Compliance for Silicone Dispensing Machine #CT106-215 _
(X))
DESCRIPTION t0 PIES DATE SERIAL f!O, 1
7/3/78 CT106-215 Certificate of Compliance
~
THESE ARE TRAMSMITTED
~
( ).FOR APPROYAL (X ) AS REQUESTED
( ) FOR REVIEW Af!D COMMENT (X)) FOR YOUR SE
( ) RETURNED FOR CORRECTIONS
( ) FOR DID DUE I
(' ) _
. REMRKS:
SIGHE N J i/ 8 M$ e 7 d COPY T0:
Please return copy of this transmittal to Chemtrpi Corporation, acknowledging -
receipt of the above listed document,(s).
TRANSMITTAL:
..( ) COMPLETE
( ) NOT.. COMPLETE - ( ) DISCREPANGIES HOTED BELO!L
(
Titie Date Ret'd by cT/or.-Ir,(4/7a)
Cl~)eliltr Ol l_)O P J O P d til L.J L 1
, Arca Code 713/447 0010 a k
'530 I!rnlis Ih!! Fa'l. Suitem 105/112 TWX: Dio CD10223 Hou:lon. Tr:xa:; 770C0 Cabic: CliEldTRO:.
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' CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIAllCE RE.:
CHEMTROL CORPORATION Silicone Foam D,1SPENSING UNIT No..c2-20s-21s DATE OF SERVICE July 3,1978 WE HEREBY CERTIFY TilAT THIS EQUIIViENT, SERIAL NO.
cT-ios-21s,
COMPLIES IIITH OUR STANDARD MANUFACTURING REQUIREMENT PUBLISHED LITERATURE. -
CHEMTROL CORPORATION
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CHARLES Spa r/
QUALITY AssonAwCM14 NAGER
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D-77 i
.o MATERIAL TEMPERATURE ll1DICATOR CALIBRATI0li CERTIFICATE e.
- UrnT110, C m s-21s TYPE CT-18 Silicone Foam Dispensing DATE July 3,1978 The Material Temperature Indicators as used on Chemtrol Silicone Foam Dispensing Units is an adjustable pyrometer device.
This is a thermocouple mensuring device and is calibrated upon installation. ' When accurate thermocouple measurements are required, it is common prattice.to reference both legs to copper lead wire at the ice point so that copper leads may be connected to the emf readout instrument.
This procedure avoids the generation of thermal emfs at'the terminals of the readout instrument.
Changes in reference junction temperature influence the output. signal and practical instruments must be provided with a means to cancel this potential source of error.
This can be accomplished by placi'ng the reference junction in an ice water bath at a constant 0 C.
(32 F.').
In lieu 0
of an ice water bath, alternate methods as listed may.be used:
~~
Alternato 2:
Electrical Dridge Method l
Aleornate 2:
Thermoelectric Refrigeration Method Alternate 3:
Heated Oven References This instrument has bee'n calibrated by one or.more of these methods
.and is certified to be accurate 2% (at 7.70F. ambient temperature).
\\
Tested by:
Bruce Roberson/ Lee Moritz Date:
July,3, Jp78,
,y Approved by:
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CT/QC-18 August, 1977 r
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Arca C^do 713/447.G11L4 105/112
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_3 Cab!c: CHEMTROI.
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I Equipment Manufacture Quality Assurance Checklist CT-18 Silicone Foam Dispensing CT105-215 Type:
Unit flo:
Chemtrol Manufacturer:
Date of-Inspection:
July 1, 1978
/
ns et Rod Warfield
[8///,/'
Certif,ied for Conformance by:
'./A Date:
Q'uality Assttfa'negt
/
/
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Dispensed Material Check July' 3,1978 Performed By:
L. Charles Spriggs Date:
18.0-lb/ft Cell Structure:
Pass @
Reject C 3
Density:
Bruce Roberson 68 72 Verified By:
_!iat'l.
T a, lur.b.
Lot tio.
EV107157 Snap Time:
1 min.15 seconds General Comments
~
' ' *:t CT/QC - 16.01
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8/77 Rev. 2/78
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Quality Assurance Checklist
~
Instrumenta tion r
Certification Dsseription_
Manufacturer Number Pass / Hold / Reject _
Remarks Li$e-aessure-2" 0-200 lbs.
Wika 1562-33 Pump Pressure-2" Wik'a 1562-34 0-200 lbs.
{]
'A' Ma t'l Pressure 0-2000 lbs.
Wika 1562-35
'B' Mat'l Pressore Wika 1562-36 0-2000 lbs.
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Stroke Counter llecon Corporation g))
Reset Stroke Counter Hecon Corporation Accumulative
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X Temperature Indicators
~
Deb iption
, Manufacturer Pass / Hold / Reject Remarks Mat'l Temp.
Mastercraft Pyrometer 7 -
Ambient Temp.
Mastercra'ft Pyrometer X
3 Position Switch O
Pump Description
--~~~ '
-- Manufacturer Pass /Iloid/ Reject Remarks
~
Pump No.'
208-341-Series No.
106-Serial #A223 Gr'aco Air Motor No. 207-457 Series No.
- H7P Graco Mounting Tanco
-]
x
~ "
. interior lloses
& Fittings Nylaflow Recirculation Values Graco X
l Prusure Re'gulator Asco (0-125 PSI)
X l
Low ' ' cl Warning Ranco X
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Intb./
r Filter Master Pneumatic FD100-3 Ai b
CT/0C - 16.05 i
Rev./772/73.
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.',.s cs$ pint'io'n_
lianufacturer Pass /liold/ Reject _
Remarks Chemtrol liring Ilarness
- ircuit.Brecher N4F - Potter Brumfield C]
Doulr "ful.1 )
X
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. cad (U)
W. W. Grainger Chemtrol
)igtail Tank Heat,
lesoription 14anufacturer; Pass /lloid/ Reject _
Remarks
~
Thermon Heating Element.
Thermostat Control Ranco AMF Pottr r Brumfield Control Suitclies Indicator Lights. Dialco y
Hose Heat Description Manufacturer Pass / Hold / Reject' Remarks OO Heating Element Chromolox x
(
]
Thermostat Control Brisl: eat X
Control Sui,tches AMF Potter Brumfield ED D Indicator Lights AMF Potter Brumfield
~
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Cabinet Manufacturer _
Pass / Hold / Reject Remarks Description
]
Cabinet Tanco 4" O
~
W. W. Grainger
- X Casters Casket Style Stanley
{
]
Handles 2" 0 Hoisting Rings Bayou City & Bolt X
]
steel
]
17 gal. stainless Tanco
- X Material Tanks Good '
{' ]
Tanco Appearance Paint Tanco Good CT/QC - 16.03
~
Rev./772/78 8
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Manufacturer Pass /lloid/Re,icet Remarks
' Description.
Matr~'ai Lines Nylaflow g
g 1/2' 00' r
i Air (M.e.-
] ]
Binks 5/1G" 00 X
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Insulation-100' Armorflex Connections &
Fittings Kinetics
-] ]
- Hose Covering *,,
Comp 6tition Marine y
Dispsnsing Uhips Kinetics X
1
. Dispensing Gun _
..q.._._.
Manufacturer _
Pass /llold/ Reject. Remarks Description
/.
Dispensing Gun Serial Number f417491 _..
X
~~
~
l Connections &
Fittings Binks & Shop X
Ter ~ rature
- Pocket Thermometer. assigned to QC Insp.
Indicator X
Optiohal Cooling Manufacturer
- Pass / Hold / Reject Remarks Description-Cooling Unit
] ], ]
~
/
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/
Cooling Pump
.....y/p...). j...y/)......
// ///
].] ]
l Hoses & Fittings
. Water Reservoir
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Mounting
'I
~
Circuit Breaker
] ]
m Indicater Lights J
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yw CT/QC - 16.04
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330 North Seit East, $uite 103 TWX: 910 8816223 Houston, Texas 77060
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1 Cable: CHEMTROL March 22,1978 g.
i Beaver Valley Power Station
'l Duquesne Light Company
~
P. O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 ATTH: Mr. J. V. Vasselo
Dear Mr. Vasselo:
RE:
Evaluation Report - Daily Record Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Duquesne Light Company Chemtrel Job No. 8010 Duquesne P. O. iC005851 dated 2/16/78 Attached is a copy of the Ivaluation Report of your Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1.
This report includes a copy of the Daily Record for myself and our Mr. R. Warfield as well as the Evaluation Findings.
If you have any questions regarding this evaluation, please coniact me at your convenience.
Per ou'r discussion on March 17, 1978, I am also enclosing the latest printing of
~
our Design FC-225 Guide Specifications and the latest revision of our Quality Assurance (For Information Only) for your reference.
Please feel free to contact me if you have any further questions.
Sincerely.
CHEMTROL CORPORATION L. Charles Spriggs Quality Assurance Manage" LCS/me Attachments cc: Mr. A.,J. Moritz Mr. J. Young Mr. H. Russell Mr. R. Sanchez Mr. F. Farese
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ar;1ugarrr.u-,cu m 1
330 North Belt East, Suite 103 TWX: 910 8816222 Houston, Texas 77060 Cab!:.7: CHEMTROL 2
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BEAVERVdLLEY-UNIT 1 1
R DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY a
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EVALUATION REPORT l=
n 1.1 CHEMTROL CORPORATION MARCH 22, 1978 L-.I L. CHARLES SPRIGGS ASSISTED BY R00 WARF U
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RE. PORT ON FLAME TEST CONDUCTED ON POWER CABLES' July 28,1975 Test Number:
75 VG 32-P Reference Number: 1G-7/18/75 2G-7/28/75
(
3G-7/28/75
./
A. OBJECTIVE The objective of this flame test is to demonstrate that an HTK insulated, liTNS jacketed, non-shielded power cable will not propagate a fire.
' B. CABLE TESTED 1/c, #6 AWG (7) str., 5 KV,125 mils HTK (N-98) insulation,
' E0 mils HTNS (HI-70) jacket.
C. TEST FACILITY The tests were conducted July 17 and 28,1975 at The Kerite' Company Fire Test Facility. An American Gas-Furnace Company 10 inch wide ribbon burner was used to provide the flame source'. A direct readout
, Omega pyrometer was used in conjunction with a thermocouple to monitor flame temperature throughout the test. A laboratory timer was used to measure the duration of the test. The test specimen was installed in a 12' inch wide, 3 inch deep,11 foot high ladder type tray.
_D.
TEST PROCEDURE (IEEE 383-1974)
I A single layer of seven 8 ft, lengths of test cable were mounted in the center G inches of.the tray, allowing a space of 1/2 cable diameter between cable.c.
The flame source was adjusted so that the temperature was approximately 1500*F and approximately 15 inches in length. Under dynamic conditions the following annometer readings were recorded for both air and fuel in centimeters of water.
Air Fuel Test No. 'I 4.4 2.5
~
Test No. 2 4.4 2.4 Test No. 3 4.4 2.5 j
q 1
G
'1
..Y TO:
Harry Russell
(
A
~./
FROM:
L. Charles Spriggs DATE: March 20,1978
~,
RE: Evaluation Recort - Daily Record Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Station - Unit I Duquesne Light Company Shippingport, PA 15077 Chemtrol Proposal 177-150 Chemtrol Job No. 8010 Duquesne P. O. #C005851 dated February 16, 1978
.1 Verbal request from Mr. J. V. Vasselo, Training Supervisor at the above mentioned plant to proceed with evaluation per Item 3.0, Section 1 of our Comercial Proposal and Item 1.1 of the correspondence from Mr. Ralph J.
Block, Chemtrol Contract Administrator.
Listed below is a report of the daily activities performed to accomplish this evaluation:
.-*I 1.0 Monday, March 13, 1978 L
L. Charles Spriggs and R. Warfield departed Houston, Texas at 3:35 p.m. on American Airlines #146 with arrival in l,
Pittsburgh at 6:58 p.m.
2.0 Tuesday, March 14, 1978 77 Arrived Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit 1 at' 8:30 a.m.
y to meet with Mr. Jim Vasselo.
Were introduced to Mr. Vince Lack of Duquesne Light Company who was assigned as our co-ordinating engineer for the evaluation.
We were given Health Physicist Training and issued photo identification badges enabling us access to the plant without unnecessary delays.
The badges are in effect until April 30, 1978.
Have been informed training will begin on May 8,1978, therefore necessitating new badges prior to i
l ::
training.
Began the area, by area evaluation of fire-protected and air protected areas.
The results of this evaluation is attached.
D
.b 3.0 Wednesday, March 15, 1978 Continued the area by area evaluation.
I I
4.0 Thursday, March 16, 1978 Continued the area by area evaluation.
l 5.0 Friday, March 17, 1978
, -O Finalize the evaluation and discussed per'tinent details of the evaluation and training with Mr. Vassello.
Departed Pittsburg 1
on United No. 599 for Atlanta at 2:15 p.m. with final destination in Houston at 7:50 p.m.
a e
L'
- _ _ _ _ ~.
l
..g-6.0 Sumary Four calendar days, March 14,15,16 and 17 were utilized for
.%'(
this evaluation, therefore billing should consist of eight (8) r man days.
p
'J L. Charles SpriggsV Quality Assurance Manager LCS/me i
.i 1,
h l..
,.a P
L.
7 1J n
U
- J n
O
(,
t, TO:
Harry Russell
. i,..
FROM:
L. Charles Spriggs DATE: March 21, 1978
(-
Beaver Valley Duquesne Evaluation-Findings G
RE:
We were furnished a list of penetration discrepancies by Duquesne Light Company to check and confirm for sealing requirements.
Instructions were alsc ?iven authorizing us to evaluate and determine any other penetrations need' ag repair or sealing and any fire walls or areas requiring air seals.
The following is an area by area comparison of the penetration discrepancies determined by Duquesne Light Company and the discrepancies found by our Chemtrol evaluation:
Duouesne Chemtrol
}
Control Room (includino comouter room) 30 51 1.0 Refee to Pe.:atration Sealing Schedule 7-attached and Duquesne Light Company j
Drawing B700RE37BC for locations of these penetrations.
2.0 Battery Room (Elevation 713'6")
4 4
l Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule and Chemtrol Sketch BV-07.
3.0 Relay Room (Elevation 713'6")
11 12 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule n(
and Chemtrol Sketch BV-04.
4.0 Reactor Trip Breakers & MG Set Room (Elev. 713'6")
1 11
~~
Refer to, Penetration Sealing Schedule and Chemtrol Sketch BV-06.
U 5.0 4 KV Emerg. Bus IDF Room (Elevation 71?' 5")
8 11
~
- 1 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule i_i and Chemtrol Sketches BV-05 & BV-06.
6.0 Emerg. Shut Down Panel Room (Elev. 713'6")
1 3
i, Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule i:
and Chemtrol Sketch BV-01.
]
.7. 0 Secuence of Events Recorder Ro6m (Elev. 713'6")
9 10 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule and Chemtrol Sketches BV-02 & BV-03.
n C
8.0 Cable' Tray Mezzanine (Elevation 725'6")
2 6
l Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule and Chemtrol Sketch BV-14
(
l 9.0 West Cable Vault (Elevation 735'6")
0 23 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule 1
j and Chemtrol Sketch BV-0B.
(..
~
- _. ~.. _ _ _..
I Ducuesne Chemtrol
(^
10.0 East Cable Vault (Elevation 735'6"_)
0 49 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule I
and Chemtrol Sketch BV-09.
11.0 Quench Soray Pumo Room (Elevation 735'6")
0 12 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule
~'
and Chemtrol Sketch BV-10.
This one section requires the use of the majority of silicone foam required due to the large openings requiring sealing.
~
12.0 Ventilation Room Adjacent to the Ouench Spray Pump Room 0
5 Refer ~ to Penetration Sealing Schedule and Chemtrol Sketch BV-11.
13.0 Diesel Generating Room (Elevation 735'6")
0 9
Refer to Penetration. Sealing Schedule
~-
and Chemtrol Sketch BV-12.
~
14.0 River Water pumo House 0
1 Refer to Penetration Sealing Schedule and Chemtrol Sketch BV-13.
I The above area by area penetration evaluation was a total of 67 penetrations requiring sealing from Duquesne and Chemtrol's list of 207.
Due to the nature
~
,t of the majority of these seals being repair penetrations, it.is impossible to state that this is all of the penetrations that will need action.
I would suggest that after training is accomplished, that Duquesne Light Company personnel proceed to these specific areas and other areas in the plant to seal all penetrations not previously sealed with cellular concrete.
This evaluation represents a fairly accurate sumary of the penetrations requiring imediate sealing.
in A copy of the purchase order requisition from Mr. Jim Vasse11o to Mr. J. A. Werlin was given to me on the final day of the evaluation based upon quantities detennine
~
by this evaluation. A recap of these quantities as referred on the Purchase Order Requisition are as follows:
Repairs Training Total l
l CT-18 1800 lbs.
900 lbs.
2700 lbs.
CT-23F 50 lbg.
25 lbg.
75 lbs.
_a CT-23FB 60 ft' 150 ft' 210.ft2
,?
CT-23B 2 rolls 2 rcils 4 rolls
.i CT-4C caulking 1 carton 0 carton 1 carton Installation & tool kit 0 5
5-
~'
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~
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area an@ copVes oV We FeneYr5BF@cD$eeVViiB9T8EOHG GBBV@MW;J V E9,%miv'R4 tembw to every penetration requiring sealing.
.-g.*.
If you have questions regarding this evaluation sumary, do not hesitate to contact me.
'(
l L. Charles Spriggs y Quality Assurance Manage LCS/me Enclosure e
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Refer to Chemtrol Penetration Sealing Schedule Page 8 of r
REVISIONS CHEMTROL CORPORATION NO DATE BY Houston, Texas c
1 Beaver Valley - Unit I
..3 Penetration Sealing Evaluation 2
MATERIAL.
oRAwN av LCS SCA1.E flTS j,i 3
1 cmeD o^TE 3/16/78 oRAWING NO.
4 Sketch - BV-02 TRACED APP-D
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Sealing Schedule Page8of 1
.l 8
REVISIONS CHEMTROL CORPORATION NO DATE BY Houston, Texas 1
Beaver Valley - Unit I Penetration Sealing Evaluation 2
DRAWN SY SCAL.E MATERIAI.
3 1.CS NTS
_J cxx o 4
o4TE3/16/78
, DRAWING NO.
b Sketch - BV-03
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i; Sealing Schedule Page 9 of 1
ij REVISIONS CHEMTROL CORPORATION NO DATE BY Houston, Texas 7
1 Beaver Valley - Unit I Penetration Sealing Evaluation MATERIAL.
oaAwN av LCS scA u NTS p
3 CHA o DATE ORAWING NO.
4 3/16/.,G i
TR4cEo Arro Sketch - BV-Oa V
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Sealing Schedule Page // of l L, REVISIONS CHEMTROL CORPORATION l
NO DATE BY Houston, Texas l
3 I
1 Beaver Va.11ey - Unit I
'C Penetration Sealing Evaluation 2
ORAWN SY SCA LE MAT ERIAL l
3 LCS NTS I
cxx D DATE 3/16/78 DRAWING NO.
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- CT-18 7"
49 BV-08 Celling West Cable ~ a WCV 735 54 1 Vault 2" Cond. 18" Cab 1'e' Fire CT-18 7" 22 BV-08 Celling West Cable WCV 735 54 2 Vault 2" Cond. 18" Cabl's Fire CT-18 7" 22 87-08 Celling . West Cable Vault West. d WCV 735 55 1 Wall 5" Cond. 18" Cable F,tre CT-18 7 138 BV-08 h West Cable 55 2 Vault West 5" Cond. 18" Cab 1'e Fire CT-18 7"
- 138, BV-0.8 WCV 735 Wall e
i West Cable Vault West l WCV 735 55 3 Wall 5" 18" Cable Fire CT-18 7" 138 DV-Da i
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BVPS Unit 1 .h p7-4 Fire Detector in Control Room Cabinets and Consoles (F-2) Each of safety-related cabinets and consoles in the control room should be provided with a fire detector. RESNNSE The area is continuously manned and, therefore, it does not require fire detectors. QPF-/.-l k.,
^ BVPS Unit 1 PF-5 Batterv Room Ventilation Air Flow Monitor (F-7) A ventilation air flow monitor should be installed in each of the station battery rooms to alarm and annunciate, in the control room, the loss of ventilation air flow.
RESPONSE
A position indication switch will be installed on each damper which would, when failed, cause loss of ventilation air to any one battery ror.m. These switches will alarm and annunciate in the control room when any one ventilation path is lost. These fans have alamed control room indicators for fan trip as well as indicating lights for fan running condition (see page 73 of the Fire Protection Program Review, Position F.7). e l l l y. e,. QPF-5-1 L 1
tL N IN PCA Research Bulletin 223 II'
- Thermocouple locations were li!y 1/4, 1/2, 1, 2-and 3-in. from the heated surface.
A 2.,. 7. Monfore-type humidity well II was located in the slab so that RE Gw the moisture 'c' ondition of the concrete could be determined at Eif 4 mid-dep th. sa h-Information on prope tions of the concrete mix was .b e2 furnished by the sponsor. These data are given in Table 1. All components of the\\ concrete were supplied on site by the f 3 sponsor. During casting of the specimen, three 6-in. diameter .( ? by 12-in. high cylinders were made for strength determinations. .. sc y i;l,. . [Q Forms were stripped from the specimen af ter one day. T.T
- g.
,The concrete was moist-cured under damp burlap for 7 days. t-The slab specimen and cylinders were then protected with foamed i .&i
- {[
plas tic material and carefully crated for shipment. _On October ..y .}} ..' 4, 1975, they were shipped to the Portland Cement Association. ,g. In this case, a 6x12-in. cylinder was not supplied by the .f sponsor to Pittsburgh Testing Laboratory in Portland, Oregon, ,.3,, !,[.{( i 'y$. for an 8-day moist-cured compressive strength determination.
- .gs-METHOD OF TEST
.-Ah, 'eh The slab specimen and cylinders were received at the cemik PCA Fire Research Laboratory on October 16, 1975. After.unerating, + -{$ the slab specimen along with the companion cylinders were placed / in a room maintained at 70 to 80F and 30 to 40% relative humidity a O for drying. After 28 days of drying, compressive strength was determlined from tests of 2 of the cylinders. The slab spqcimen i .and the remaining cylinder were dried until the relative humidity ' ; Wi 2J '.,'j'g,.1
- Superscript numbers in parenthcscs designate references on ww...
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