ML19256A851
| ML19256A851 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1979 |
| From: | Dunn C DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-11111, TAC-6405, NUDOCS 7901160234 | |
| Download: ML19256A851 (55) | |
Text
-
Duquesne Upt
..,m.,,.
435 Sixth Avenue Q"f,urgh, Pennsylvania January ll, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Ur.ited States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
A. Schwencer, Chief Branch No. 1 Division of Operating Reactors Washington, D. C.
20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334' Response to December 1, 1978 letter on Fire Protection Gentlemen:
Enclosed are four signed originals of our response to your December 1, 1978 letter on the Fire Protection Program at Beaver Valley Power St.ation, Unit No. 1.
Your letter requested our schedule for the implementation of administrative controls and the installation of equipment at Beaver Valley required to address forty staff positions. We are providing our best estimate of schedule dates to implement these positions or alternatives which we have determined will provide an equal degree of protection.
The scheduled dates provided in this response are very rough estimates.
The completion of activities that require detailed engineering, NRC approval, procurement of material and a refueling outage of the station to install cannot be accurately predicted at this time.
It is our intent to complete all possible activities during the second refueling outage which is anticipated to occur early in 1981. Any modifi-cation requiring a lengthy station outage that is not completed during that refueling will be completed during the third refueli~ng outage which is presently anticipated to be performed during the calendar year of 1982.
Very truly yours,
[
C. N. Dunn Vice President, Operations Attachment CC: Messrs.: Ralph Paolino, NRC, Region I Robert Dodds, NRC, Region,V Ingemar Asp, Gage, Babcock & Assoc., Inc.
7 90116 0 2M
(CORPORATE SEAL)
Attest:
,,i;, *L.;a x-i Joan S. Senchyshyn' Asst. Secretary COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
) SS:
COUN'AI OF ALLEGIENY
)
On this
/.2 7h day of s /4N'/4 4 Y' 1979, before me, E~'es A# / 8 k'w Aegy JS a Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared C. N. Dunn, who being duly sworn, deposed, and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
M< < VM
< Am d/
ED%'ARD P. KWAVEY, ll, ThSry Putte F,ttsburgh, Adegteny County, PA 14 Ccmmt:,sian Eines febra2ry 20,1982
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY Docket 50-334 ATTACHMENT I a
RESPONdE TO NRC ENCLOSURES I & II Including IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE
SUMMARY
January 11, 1979
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULES POSITION SCHEDULE PF-1, Fire Brigade Training In Effect PF-2, Instrument Air Supply June 30, 1980 PF-3, Hose Stations (& Cable Pene-Implementation depends on tration Areas) shutdown schedule.
To be installed during a refuel-ing outage scheduled in late 1981 or 1982.
PF-4, Containment Fire See PF-3 above PF-5, Exterior Hose Houses December 31, 1979 PF-6, Hydrant and Post Indicator October 31, 1980 Valve Guard Posts PF-7, Fire System Valve Supervision June 30, 1979 PF-8, Exterior Fire Hydrant In-June 30, 1979 spection PF-9, Welding, Cutting, Grinding July 31, 1979 and Open Flame Work Procedure PF-10, Maintenance of Fire Equipment June 30, 1979 Inventories PF-ll, Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir October, 1980 PF-12, Diesel Generator Rooms June 30, 1980 PF-12.6, Diesel Generator Drain System December 31, 1979 PF-12.7, Diesel Oil Line Break De-July 31, 1980 tection PF-13, Fire Retardant Wood December 31, 1979 PF-14, Control of Flammable Liquids June 30, 1980
- Auxiliary Building, Elev.
768'7"
' POSITION SCHEDULE PF-15, Cable Fire Stops -
December 31, 1979 Auxiliary Building PF-16, Fire Rated Barrier Penetra-December 31, 1979 tions PF-17, Safe Shutdown - Auxiliary None Required Building PF-18, Auxiliary Building - Waste October _'1, 1980 Storage PF-19, Control of Unnecessary June 30, 1979 Combustibles PF-20, Trash Containers June 30, 1979 PF-21, Charging Pump Cubicles December 31, 1979 PF-22, Interior Fire Hoses See PF-3 above PF-23, Cable Vaults Not Required PF-24, Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps October 31, 1980 PF-25, Auxiliary Building - Stair-Complete well, Elev. 722' PF-26, Gas Cylinder Storage January 31, 1979 PF-27, Floot Panel Lifter - Process June 30, 1979 Control Room PF-28, Fire Wall Penetrations December 31, 1979 PF-29, Cable Spreading Room October 31, 1980 PF-30, Cable Spreading Room Cell-Complete ing Penetrations PF-31, Control Room - Fire Detection June 30, 1979 inaVertical Panels PF-32, Separation of Kitchen Area December 31, 1979 in Control Room
. POSITION SCHEDULE PF-33, Control Room - Portable March 31, 1979 Extinguishers PF-34, control Room Analysis See PF-29 PF-35, Booster Hose See PF-14 PF-36, Hydrogen Lines June 30, 1980 PF-37, Battery Room Ventilation December 31, 1979 PF-38, Fire Brigade Equipment December 31, 1979 PF-39, Smoke Ejectors December 31, 1979 PF-40, Fire Hose Testing June 30, 1979 NOTE:
Detailed engineering, NCR review, procurement schedule is in the process of being developed.
PF-1 FIRE BRIGADE TRAINING Staff Position:
1.
Regular, planned meetings held every three months which repeat the classroom instruction program over a two-year period.
2.
Practice sessions at regular intervals, but not to exceed one (1) year for each brigade member.
3.
Drills performed at regular intervals, but not to exceed three (3) months for each brigade.
At least one (1) drill per year to be performed on a "back shift" for each fire brigade.
A suf-ficient number of these drills, not less than one (1) for each fire brigade per year, to be unannounced to determine the fire readiness of the plant fire brigade leader, fire protection systems, and equipment.
Response
1.
The overall program was developed with due con-sideration to the availability of fire fighting assistance from local paid and volunteer fire companies.
Considering the proximity end ex-pertise of the local fire companies and the response action plan which indicates a response time of ten (10) minutes or less, we feel any fire training beyond that which is required to provide assistance and first aid in the event of a major fire would be excessive.
The initial response company and the backup com-pany are trained on our fire system and radiolo-gical practices.
Our training stresses First Aid Fire Fighting Procedures, includes items as fire science, power plant fire fighting, nuclear power plant fire fighting, and is broken into sixteen (16) segments, is enhanced by conducting a practical session as part of the classroom instruction, and repeated every two (2) years.
PF-1 FIRE DRIGADE TRAINING (continued) 2.
Since smoke clouds result from field practice session training, field exercises are scheduled yearly during the summer months when a variance can be obtained from the County Smoke ordinance.
Due to the nature of our Emergency Squad, shift rotation and station activities, it is nearly impossible to schedule all members so that they do not exceed one year.
Since the large majority do receive annual field exercises, our overall program, based on a two-year cycle, is most ef-fective in assuring a well-trained Emergency Squad onsite at all times.
3.
The drills are held to enhance the Emergency Squad response to exigent situations.
These drills may include the use of fire protection and/or first aid equipment.
Each Squad member will participate in at least four (4) drills per year.
Due to the nature of our Emergency Squad and shift rotation, a brigade as a unit of specifi-cally identified members to function as a fire squad is not possible.
Each of the four (4) shift supervisors do hold drills for the Emer-gency Squad members on shift at the time of the drill.
Emergency Squad drills are normally held on back shifts, are unannounced and do include a critique as well as assesement of Squad effec-tiveness.
The Station Fire Brigade Training Program has been in effect for the last two (2) years and has proven most effective in assuring a well-trained Emergency Squad.
4.
It is not possible to provide form =1 training to all Fire Brigade members on a quarterly basis due to shift rotation, vacations, illnesses and personnel turnover.
A commitment to ensure that all fire brigade personnel will participate in a retraining program Ehat will duplicate the original training program over a two-year period is acceptable.
PF-2 INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN Staff Position:
An emergency air supply system should be provided to operate those valves necessary for safe shut-down.
Re spon se :
The air supply lines to these valves will be pro-vided with connections to permit the use of bottled nitrogen or carbon dioxide which are readily avail-able as an emergency power operator source.
BVPS-1 PF-3 Reactor Containment - Hose Stations Staff Concern:
Hose coverage should be capable of reaching all areas in the containment vessel, including unprotected safety-related cables at the cable penetration area.
Staff Position:
A standpipe system should be provided with a sufficient number of hose stations in order that all areas of the containment can be reached by a maximum of 100 ft of 1 1/2 in hose at each hose station. An automatically actuated water suppression system should be provided to protect the safety-related cables at the cable penetration area.
Response
The requirenents for hose stations for the containment were supplied under Table E.3-2 of the responses dated November 1978.
A remotely' operated, manually activated open head water spray deluge system will be provided for each redundant cable pene-tration area in lieu of an automatically actuated system to reduce the possibility of inadvertent operation. These areas are separated by a 12 in thich reinforced concrete wall GP3 hr.) as described on page 94 of the Fire Protection Progran Review.
The system will employ two detection loops. The indication in the control room from any detector in one loop would alarm for immediate investigation.
If an alarm were received from both loops, the operator would manually deluge the area. Two kinds of detectors will be used - thermal of the rate compensated type
-and smoke of the photoelectric type.
BVPS-1 PF h Containment Fire - Safe Shutdown staff Concern:
A fire in the containment vesse'1"vould destroy or damage redundant divisions of cables required for safe shutdown before it is detected and manually suppressed.
Staff Position:
An evaluation should be provided to demonstrate that a fire in any location in the containment vessel vould not destroy or damage redundant divisions of cable required for safe shutdown before it is detected and manually suppressed. If effective manual suppression capability cannot be demonstrated for the existing cable tray system, the following fire protection measures should be considered to assure manual suppression capability:
1.
Fire retardant coatings or covering on the cables.
2.
Rerouting one division of the required cables to obtain greater separation between redundant divisions.
3.
The use of solid barriers (e.g., Marinite board) between redundant division cables.
k.
In addition to any of the above items, fire detection should be provided in the vicinity of the cables.
Response
Systems used for safe shutdown which are jeopardized by a fire inside the containment are the RHR system and the instrumenta-tion used for safe shutdown. The only area where a fire could destroy redundant channel of safe shutdown instrumentation is the cable penetration area (see PF-3) inside containment. The RHR syster could be jeopardized by a fire in the (RHR) pump area. The response to Question A.2-1 recommends installation of fire detection and automatic suppression in the RER pump area.
PF-5 EXTERIOR HOSE HOUSES Staff Position:
Equipment should be added to the equipment already contained in the exterior hose houses, as necessary, so that equipment in each hose house includes the following items:
Two (2) hose gaskets for each hose size used.
One (1) 2-1/2 " x l-1/2 " x l-1/2 " gated valve.
One (1) forcible entry tool.
All hose houses and hose cart houses and equipment stored therein should be kept reasonably free of dirt and sand.
Inoperative door latches on hose houses should be repaired.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by December 31, 1979.
The extended time period is mainly due to the procurement of the 2-1/2" x 1-1/2 " x l-1/2" gated valves which are not stock items.
PF-6 HYDRANT AND POST INDICATOR VALVE GUARD POSTS S taff Position:
Barrier posts should be provided at the hydrants, post indicator valve and hose house locations.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the above position by October 31, 1980.
A survey of all hydrants, post indicator valves and hose houses will be performed and guard posts installed in areas where they are subject to vehicular traffic damage.
PF-7 FIRE SYSTEM VALVE SUPERVISION Staff Position:
Valves in the fire water suppression system should be either electrically supervised or provided with tamper-proof seals and administrative 1y controlled.
These provisions are not required for control valves at the standpipe hose stations.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by June 30, 1979.
PF-8 EXTERIOR FIRE HYDRANT INSPECTION Staff Position:
A semi-annual inspection (Fall and Spring) should be conducted of exterior hydrants to ensure the barrel is dry and that the threads are properly lubricated.
Perform an annual operational hydrostatic test of hydrants to verify barrel integrity following the winter freeze season.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by June 30, 1979.
PF-9 WELDING, CUTTING, GRINDING AND OPEN FLAME WORK PROCEDURES Staff Position:
Provide administrative controls to protect safety related equipment from fire damage or loss from work involving ignition sources such as welding, cutting, grinding, or open flame work.
The pro-gram should include the following provisions:
1.
All cutting, welding, grinding, or open flame work should be a:2thorized by the responsible foreman or supervisor through a work permit.
2.
Before issuing the permit, the responsible foreman or supervisor should, as a general rule, physically survey the area where the work is to be performed and establish that the following precautions have been taken:
a.
All moveable combustible material below, or within, a 35-foot radius of the cutting, welding, grinding, or open flame work has been removed (see NFPA-51B).
b.
All immovable combustion material below, or within, a 35-foot radius has been thoroughly protected and that fire extin-guishers or other fire-fighting equipment is provided at the work site (see NFPA-51B).
c.
A fire watch, trained and equipped to pre-vent and combat fires, is present throughout any operation in which there is a potential for fire that might damage safety related equipment.
The fire watch should remain on the work site while work is performed and re-main in the area following completion of the work to check for smoldering fires.
d.
All equipment issued is in a safe, working condition.
3.
The signature concurrence of a member of the Plant's management, or quality control inspector
PF-9 WELDING, CUTTING, GRINDriG AND OPEN FLAME WORK PROCEDURES (continue d) certified to make this concurrence, should be ob-tained whenever the responsible supervisor or fore-man determines that a fire watch.is not required.
Response
Administrative procedures and controls are being developed to provide protection in safety related areas of the plant from fire damage whenever work activities involve potential ignition sources.
An authorization system will be implemented and uti-lized by July 31, 1979, which will meet the intent of NFPA-51B for surveying the area prior to authori-zation of the work activities, establishing fire watches when necessary, issuing proper equipment and certifying that work in safety related areas will not result in fire damage.
PF-10 MAINTENANCE OF FIRE EQUIPMENT INVENTORIES Staff Position:
Tamper indicating seals should be installed on all fire equipment storage enclosures.
Broken seals should require that an inventory be taken and the immediate replacement of any missing equipment.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by June 30, 1979.
PF-ll TURBINE LUBE OIL RESERVOIR Staff Position:
Verify that the curbed area beneath the turbine lube oil reservoir is adequate in height to con-tain ene're volume of tank plus a margin for fire suppression water, assuming no credit for drains.
Response
As part of the EPA Oil Spill Prevention Upgrade Program, the curbed area will be increased in height sufficiently to contain the entire volume of the tank plus a margin for fire suppression water (no credit for drains was assumed).
DLC agrees to implement the upgrading of the curbed area below the Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir no later than October, 1980.
PF-12 DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS Staff Position:
1.
Curbing The curbing proposed by DLC should be of suf-ficient height to prevent an oil spill in one room from entering the adjacent room via the doorway communicating through the common wall.
2.
Additional Three (3) Hour Door An additional three (3) hour rated fire door and frame with self-closing hardware should be provided at the doorway between the two rooms.
3.
Manual Actuation Stations The manual actuation pull station for the CO2 extinguishing system should be relocated out-side the room it is designed to protect.
4.
Fire Rating of Penetration Verify that the cable, conduit and pipe pene-tration through the wall separating the two rooms have a minimum three (3) hour fire rating.
5.
Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps Provide a method of disabling the diesel transfer pump external to emergency diesel generator room.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by June 30, 1980.
PF-12 DIESEL GENERATC3 ROOMS - FIRE PROTECTION Staff Position:
12.6 Drain System DLC should verify that the fuel cannot communicate between the diesel generator rooms via the drain system.
Response
As part of the EPA Oil Spill Prevention Upgrade program, the drains in the diesel generator buildings will be plugged.
BVPS-1 PF-12 Diesel Generator Rooms - Fire Protection Staff Concern:
Fire could spread via the draln system. Further, a break in the.
diesel oil supply system could go undetected for a substantial period of time.
Staff Position:
12.7 Diesel Oil Line Break Detection Provide detection to indicate and alarm in the control room should a break occur in the diesel oil supply system.
Response
A level detecting device vill be installed in a sump close to the day tank to detect an oil accumulation due to a leak. High sump level vill be annunciated in the control room.
PF-13 FIRE RETARDANT WOOD Staff Fosition:
All untreated lumber and wood items in safety re-lated areas should be removed.
All lumber / wood required to be used in such areas should be treated, fire-retardant lumber and should be limited to temporary use, to be removed when no longer needed.
Large wooden timbers may be coated with a U.L.
listed fire retardant compound having a flame spread rating of 25 or less.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by December 31, 1979.
PF-14 CONTROL OF FLAMMABLE LIQUIDS - AUXILIARY BUILDING ELEVATION 768 ' 6" Staff Position:
A designated area, which is curbed and provided with automatic suppression system, should be es-tablished for the storage of combustible materials.
Response
Fire cabinets are being provided for storage of flammable liquids in the Auxiliary Building.
Un-necessary combustibles (normally, oil removed from the reactor coolant pumps) will be removed from the Auxiliary Building and stored in a radiation control area outside prior to processing for ship-ment and disposal.
Methods are presently being investigated for the disposal of contaminated oil to eliminate storage at the station.
PF-15 CABLE FIRE STOPS - AUXILIARY BUILDING Staff Position:
Fire stops should be provided in all vertical cable runs between floors.
Response
All fire barrier penetrations in safety related areas are being properly sealed and all flammable materials (plastic foam) removed as per the Staff Position.
Completion of all required areas will be finalized no later than December 31, 1979.
As of December 15, 1978, 236 seals have already been sealed and the following areas have been completed:
- Control Room (including benchboard and ver-tical board)
- Computer Room
- Relay Room
- Sequence of Events Power Supply Area
- Process Control and Instrument Room, and Emergency Shutdown Panel Area
- Rod Drive M-G Set Room
- AE and DF Emergency Switchgear Room
- Normal Switchgear Room
- Battery Rooms 1, 2, 3 and 4
- Control Room Ventilation and A/C Room
- Cable Spreading Mettanine Room
PF-16 FIRE RATED BARRIER PENETRATIONS Staff Position:
All flammable materials (plastic foam) should be removed from all fire rated barrier penetrations.
Response
All fire barrier penetrations in safety related areas are being properly sealed and all flammable materials (plastic foam) removed as per the Staff Position.
Completion of all required areas will be finalized no later than December 31, 1979.
As of December 15, 1978, 236 seals have already been sealed and the following areas have been completed:
- Control Room (including benchboard and vertical board)
- Computer Room
- Relay Room
- Sequence of Events Power Supply Area
- Process Control and Instrument Room, and Emergency Shutdown Panel Area
- Rod Drive M-G Set Room
- AE and DF Emergency Switchgear Room
- Normal Switchgear Room
- Battery Rooms 1, 2,
3 and 4
- Control Room Ventilation and A/C Room
- Cable Spreading Mettanine Room See Response to PF-15.
PF-17 Safe Shutdovn - Auxiliary Building Staff Concern:
Fire in any location in the Auxiliary Building could destroy redundant division cables required for safe shutdown before it is detected and manually suppressed.
Staff Position:
An evaluation should be performed for the Auxiliary Building to demonstrate that a fire in any location vould not destroy /da= age redundant division cable required for safe shutdown before it is detected and manually suppressed.
If effective manual suppression capability cannot be demonstrated for the existing cable tray system, the following protective measures should be considered to assure manual suppression capability.
1.
Fire retardant coatings or covering on cables.
2.
Rerouting one division of the required cables to obtain greater separation between redundant divisions.
3.
Use of solid barriers (e.g., marinite boards) between redundant divisions.
h.
In addition to any of the above items, fire / smoke detection should be provided in the vicinity of these cables.
Resoonse:
The Auxiliary Building has been analyzed on a floor-by-floor basis to determine the effects that a fire would have on safe shutdown capability. This analysis is covered in the response to question A.2-1 and demonstrates that a fire in any location would not destroy / damage redundant division cable required for safe shutdown.
PF-18 CONTAMINATED WASTE STORAGE - AUXILIARY BUILDING ELEVATION 735'6" Staff Position:
The contaminated waste storage area adjacent to the drumming station should be provided with an early warning detector and protected by an auto-matic water suppression system.
Response _:
The contaminated waste storage area will be ex-panded and relocated in a new building to be constructed in the near future.
PF-19 CONTROL OF UNNECESSARY COMBUSTIBLES Staff Position:
All waste, debris, scrap, rags, oil spills, or other unnecessary combustibles resulting from work activity in safety related areas should be removed following completion of the activity or at the end of the work shift (whichever is sooner).
Adminis-trative procedures should be established to control combustibles in safety related areas.
The unneces-sary combustibles in the following areas should be removed.
Auxiliary Building Cable Vaults Control Room Complex (includes area behind vertical control board)
Intake Structure Fuel Oil Tank in Yard (weeds)
Response
Maintenance activities that are ongoing twenty-four (24) hours a day will be kept clear of highly combustible material.
For noncontinuous activities, highly combustible materials will be cleaned up at the end of the shift or activity, whichever is sooner.
Low-hazard combustible materials will be removed at the end of the activity.
The unnecessary combustibles in safety related areas, notably the Auxiliary Building, Cable Valuts, Control Room and Intake Structure, will be cleaned up by April 15, 1979.
Administrative procedures and controls will be es-tablished and implemented no later than June 30, 1979.
PF-20 TRASH CONTAINERS Staff Position:
Trash containers in safety-related areas should be metal with swing tops.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by June 30, 1979.
PF-21 CHARGING PUMP CUBICLES Staff Position:
A smoke detector should be provided in each charging pump cubicle with alarm annunciation in the control room.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by December 31, 1979.
BVPS-1 PF-21 Charrine Puno Cubicles 21.2 Fire Spread Throuch Tunnel Staff Concern:
Fire could spread from one charging pump cubicle to the other charging pump cubicle via the connecting tunnel in the floor.
Staff Position:
Verify that a fire in one of the charging punp cubicles cannot spread to the adjacent cubicle through the connecting tunnel in the floor.
Response
The charging punp cubicles in the auxiliary building have been verified as being isolated from the piping tunnels.
Therefore, a fire in one charging punp cubicle cannot spread to an adjacent cubicle through the tunnel.
',VPS-1 PF-22 Interior Fire Hose Station Canability Staff Concern:
Sufficient hose stations, with' hoses not exceeding 100 feet in length, should be available to provide manual coverage for all safety-related areas.
(Note: Cable vaults appeared to be deficient in this area of concern.)
Staff Position:
Verify by a hose stretch test that all areas of the plant can be reached from existent hose stations with present hose lengths.
Add additional hose stations / lengths (total not to exceed 100 feet),
as required, if this cannot be satisfactorily accomplished.
Response
This response was supplied on Question E.3-2 dated November 1978.
Hose stations which will be added to assure complete coverage are listed in Table 2 3-2
PF-23 SAFETY RELATED CABLES PASSING THROUGH BOTH CABLE VAULTS Staff Position:
Identify and reroute redundant safe shutdown cables passing through one cable vault to the other cable vault or provide a water suppression system for both cable vaults.
NOTE:
Cable tray covers should be removed if water suppression system is used.
Response
Cable vault CV-2 has a small number of orange con-duits passing through the area.
Although failure of all safe shutdown cables in the purple train and failure of those orange safe shutdown cables result in a loss of redundancy for several systems, the ability to safely shut down following a fire in CV-2 is not lost.
Systems that are lost are the boron injection system (control cables for valves only), component cooling water system (control cables for pumps), chemical volume control system (control wiring for valves), and power and control cabling for MCC-E3 and E4 located in the Auxiliary Building.
Since the boron injection system and component cooling water system are not required for hot stand-by, there is ample time for manual operation or repairs prior to the cooldown to cold shut.down.
Failure of the control wiring to the suction valves in the chemical and volume control system between the charging pumps and the refueling water storage tank could possibly cause failure to automatically open.
These valves art not located in the fire area CV-2 and can thererore be manually operated.
Failure of MCC-E3 and E4 causes loss of control and power cabling to valves in the CVCS described above.
PF-23 SAFETY RELATED CABLES PASSING THROUGH BOTH CABLE VAULTS (continued)
The safe shutdown cables traversing through CV-2 from CV-1 are as follows:
Cables Components ISILNOK020--------------------MOV-SI-867B ICHVBOC001--------------------MOV-CH-ll5B ICHVCOC001 -------------------MOV-CH-ll5C ICCPAOC 3 0 5--------------------CC -P -1A IEHSAOC205--------------------MCC-1-E3 IEHSAOL205--------------------MCC-1-E3
BVPS-1 PF-214 Auxiliary Feedvater Pumps Staff Concern:
Oil spil b ge and fire from one auxiliary feedvater pump could involve the redundant feedvater pump (s) needed for safe shutdown.
Staff Position:
Provide suitable fire containment / curbing and automatic fire suppression to prevent an oil fire in one auxiliary feedvater pump from spreading to the redundant pump (s). Note: An early warning fire-smoke detector (s) should also be installed.)
Resnonse:
(See Answer to Question A.2-1 and Auxiliary Feedvater Analysis)
Fire containment by the installation of fire barriers between pumps is not possible. A curb to contain the spread of oil from each pump vill be installed. The vaste system vill be modified to limit the spread of oil via the vaste system using the existing drains.
A preaction sprinkler spray system over the entire feed pu=p area is proposed using clor,ed heads and a detector system to alarm and release water up to the' heads but discharge water only from those heads that are fused. An early varning smoke detection vill be provided.
PF-25 AUXILIARY BUILDING STAIRWELL - ELEVATION 722 '
Staf f Position :
Flammable materials should not be stored in stair-wells.
Flammable storage cabinet in stairwell should be removed.
Response
Flammable storage cabinets have been relocated outside of stairwell areas.
The Staff Position has been implemented.
PF-26 GAS CYLINDER STORAGE Staff Position:
Gas cylinders should be stored in racks in areas designated for that purpose.
Storage should be in the approved manner.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position and to be in full compliance no later than January 31, 1979.
PF-27 FLOOR PANEL LIFTER - PROCESS CONTROL ROOM Staff Position:
A dedicated floor panel lifter should be provided in the process control room contained in a wall-mounted break glass front box.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position no later than June 30, 1979.
PF-28 FIRE WALL PENETRATIONS Staff Position:
Penetrations above the fire door between the control rod M-G sets and the switchgear room should be compatible with fire wall rating.
Response
All fire barrier penetrations in safety related areas are being properly sealed and all flammable materials (plastic foam) removed as per the Staff Position.
Completion of all required areas will be finalized no later than December 31, 1979.
As of December 15, 1978, 236 seals have already been sealed and the following areas have been completed:
- Control Room (including benchboard and vertical board)
- Computer Room Relay Room
- Sequence of Svents Power Supply Area
- Process Control and Instrument Room, and Emergency Shutdown Panel Area
- Rod Drive M-G Set Room
- AE and DF Emergency Switchgear Room
- Normal Switchgear Room
- Battery Rooms 1, 2, 3 and 4
- Control Room Ventilation and A/C Room
- Cable Spreading Mettanine Room See response to PF-15.
=
BVPS-1 PF-29 Cable Spreadine Room Sprinkler System Staff Concern:
Because of cable tray congestion and probable dense smoke, manual suppression (fire hose) of a fire in the cable spreading room does not seem feasible as a backup system should the CO2 system fail.
Staff Position:
The cable spreading room should be provided with a manually acti-vated water suppression system.
(Note: In order to make the system effective, the covers on top of the cable tray should be removed or relocated to permit exposure of cables to watei spray.)
Resoonse:
The following cables in the safe shutdown systems vill be rerouted.
PNL-SHUTDN-A 1CCPAOC304 1NEA00303 1RHSADC303 1 CCPC0C30l+
1NEAOC606 1 SWSAOC302 1CHSAOC302 1 WEAOC611 1SWSC0C302 1CHSC0C302 1WEBOC011 1CHSNOC605 1 NEFOC011 PNL-SHUTDN-B 1CCPBPC304 1 NEAPC011 1RHSBPC303 1CCPCPC30!&
1 WEBPC303 1SWSBPC302 1CCPCPC306 1 WEBPC606 1SWSCPC302 1CHSBPC302 1 WEBPC611 1 SWSCPC305 1CHSCPC302 1 WEBPC613 1 CHSCPC30l+
1 WECPC011 1 WEEPC011 This change vill ensure that the station can be shutdown'if a fire results in the total loss of the cable spreading _ room.
This modification provides greater immunity to a fire and will be made in lieu of installing a second automatic fire suppression system in the cable spreading room.
BVPS-1 PF-30 Cable Spreading Room ceiling Penetrations Staff Concern:
The penetration fire barriers b'etween the cable spreading room and the control room benchboards have been breached. Further, the fire rating of the metal panels between the control room benchboards and the ceiling of the cable spreading room had not been established. Both these conditions could lea / to involving the control room in the event of a fire in t~e cable spreading room.
Staff Position:
Penetrations between the cable spreading room and the control room benchboards should be upgraded to a 3-hour fire rating.
The metal panels between the control room benchboards and the ceiling of the cable spreading room should be upgraded to provide a 3-hour rated fire barrier.
Response
Modifications as described in the response to PF-29, ensure that the loss of CS-1 and CR-1 would not prevent safe shutdown from the am 1.11ary shutdown panel located in fire area CR l+. Howeve upgrading to a 3-hour fire rating to reduce the potr 'lal consequences.of a fire in CS-1 was accomplished as vt Decembe.r 15, 1978.
PF-31 CONTROL ROOM - FIRE DETECTION IN VERTICAL PANELS Staff Position:
Early warning detectors should be provided in the walk through section of the vertical control board panels.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by December 31, 1979.
PF-32 SEPARATION OF KITCHEN AREA IN CONTROL ROOM Staff Position:
Prove a one (1) hour rated fire barrier between the kitchen area and the control room operating areas.
NOTE:
Barrier should be sufficient to enclose per-sonnel utilizing the kitchen area.
Auto-matic water suppression system could be utilized in lieu of the fire barrier, pro-vided safety-related equipment would not be affected by the water spray or accumulation of water on floor.
Response
Analysis of the effects of a control room fire on safe shutdown equipment is covered in the response to PF-34.
Although it has been demonstrated that the plant can be safely shut down, the addition of a one-hour fire barrier results in an additional increase in safety.
Therefore, the one-hour fire barrier will be installed.
PF-33 CONTROL ROOM - PORTABLE EXTINGUISHERS Staff Position:
Provide a dry chemical extinguisher on the wall adjacent to the cooking range and a 2-1/2 gallon pressurized water extinguisher at each entrance for the control room.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by March 31, 1979.
PF-34 CONTROL ROOM - SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS Staff Position:
Verify that an exposure fire in the control room benchboard will not affect controls for redundant safe shutdown equipment.
Provide adequate barriers where this is not the case.
Response
Modifications as described in PF-29 to the 1E Electrical distribution system and safe shutdown instrumentation (monitoring only) will be made to make the auxiliary shutdown panel circuits immune to any postulated failure due to a fire in CR-1.
All other systems required for safe shutdown are also controlled from the auxiliary shutdown panel located in CR-4 and, through the use of the trans-for switch, failures in the CR-1 are cleared.
This allows for a control capability which is in-dependent of CR-1.
BVPS-1 FF-35 Booster Hose Service for Water Sensitive Electrical Areas Staff Concern:
Controlled water spray is essential to limit water damage to safety-related equipnent and cables when small fires cannot be put out with portable extinguishers.
Staff Position:
One inch booster hose lines equipped with variable gallonage no::le and ball valve shutoff should be provided for coverage of the control room switchgear room, and the instrument relay rooms. Each station should be limited to hose length of 100 ft.
Response
Coverage for the control room switchgear room and instrument relay rooms vould be provided from new hose stations in stair-wells as outlined in Answer to Question E.3-2.
A standard 11/2 inch cotton rubber-lined hose vill be installed to provide higher pressure for better ato=iza-tion at the fog no::le. To control the amount of water, a 12 to 30 gpm variable gallonage and adjustable spray angle r.o::le with ball valve shutoff (Akron Brass Co. Turbojet Style 1710 or equivalent) and 1 1/2 by 1 in reducing adapter (Akron style 337) vill be provided for the control, switchgear and instru=ent relay rooms.
PF-36 HYDROGEN LINES Staff Position:
All hydrogen lines in safety-related areas should be identified by color coding or lettered markers affixed to the pipe.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position no later than June 30, 1980.
c....
~
BVPS-1 PF-37 Battery Room Ventilation Air Flow Monitor Staff Concern:
Failure of exhaust ventilatio'n'in battery room could lead to buildup of explosive hydrogen concentrations.
Staff Position:
A ventilation air flow monitor should be installed in the exhaust duct of each of the station battery rooms to alarm and annunciate in the control room upon loss of air flow.
Responses A flow switch will be installed in the ventilation ducts to determine lov flow. Lov flow vill be annunciated in the control roome
PF-38 FIRE BRIGADE EQUIPMENT STORAGE Staff Position:
Provide a suitable storage area (or areas) rea-sonably close to the control room for fire brigade equipment.
Fire brigade equipment should include:
1.
Set of fire fighting protective clothing con-sisting of turnout coats with removable liners, thigh length boots, gloves and fire fighter style helmets for each brigade member.
2.
Six (6) complete self-contained breathing units with two (2) cyoinders for each unit and with the spare cylinders for all other units.
3.
One (1) 2-1/2 " x l-1/2 " x l-1/2 " gated wye.
4.
One (1) 2-1/2 " gate valve.
5.
Two -(2) forcible entry tools (halligan type).
6.
Two (2) 2-1/2 " double female adapters.
7.
Two (2) each, 2-1/2 " and 1-1/2 ", universal hose spanners.
8.
Two (2) portable radios.
9.
Two (2) battery powered portable handlights (7-1/2 volts).
10.
Spare lengths of 2-1/2 " and 1-1/2 " hose,
11.
Spare gaskets for 2-1/2 " and 1-1/2 " hose couplings.
12.
Spare 2-1/2" and 1-1/2" fog nozzles.
Response
A suitable storage area for fire brigade equipment will be provided no later than December 31, 1979, which will include the following:
/
PF-38 FIRE BRIGADE EQUIPMENT STORAGE (continued) 1.
At least five (5). sets of fire fighting cloth-ing for each brigade member on shift.
The minimum required by BVPS Unit I - Technical Specifications - is five (5) Emergence Squad members per shift.
2.
At least five (5) complete, self-contained breathing units with a spare cylinder for each unit.
3.
Items 3, 4,
6, and 7 all pertain to 2-1/2" hose adapters and equipment, which are not necessary inside the fire brigade storage area.
All 2-1/2" hose fittings, adapters and hoses are stored in Hose Cart Houses (3) and Hose Reel Cabinets (9) in strategic locations around the perimeter of the plant.
4.
Two (2) forcible entry tools will be supplied.
5.
Spare lengths of 2-1/2 " and 1-1/2 " hoses and gaskets will be available at the storage area.
6.
Two (2) portable radios will be made availabe to the Emergency Squad, but will be stored in-side the control room for tighter controls and equipment operability (radio checks, charging unit, e tc. ).
7.
Two (2) battery powered portable lights will be made available to the Emergency Squad, but will be stored inside the control room for tighter control.
8.
Spare 1-1/2" fog nozzles will also be stored in the storage area.
In addition, the fire brigade members also have access to the following:
- Strategically located portable fire extinguishers throughout the plant
J PF-38 FIRE BRIGADE EQUIPMENT STORAGE (continued)
- Fire hose and cart house hose stations
- First aid equipment
- Spare auto sprinkler heads
- Personnel protective equipment (hard hats, rubber boots, fire suits and gloves)
Transportation facilities onsite In the event of a locking mechanism failure, manual key overrides are installed on the doors.
The keys are stored on a key ring in the control room, easily accessible to the fire brigade, and are taken along on each emergency by the Emergency Squad.
PF-39 SMOKE EJECTORS Staff Position:
Three (3) 5,000 CFM portable, explosion-proof, fire service smoke ejectors with suitable duct-ing should be provided.
Response
DLC agrees to implement the Staff Position by December 31, 1979.
PF-40 FIRE HOSE TESTING Staff Position:
All outside fire hoses should be tested annually and all inside hoses should be tested every three (3) years.
The test pressure should be 50 psi above working pressure.
During the periodic inspection of hose stations, any hoses found with water from valve seepage should be removed, drained, dried and reinstalled on the rack.
Fbsponse:
Hoses stored outside buildings are enclosed in cabinets and hose cart houses, specifically to prevent deterioration of equipment.
We, there-fore, will continue our present hydro schedule every three (3) years as per BVPS Unit I - Techni-cal Specifications.
During the periodic testing and inspection of the hose / rack stations, any hose found with water from valve seepage will be removed, drained, and reinstallsd on the rack.
All fire hoses at the station are Imed with rubber and not susceptible to deterioration.
DLC agrees to implement the above by June 30, 1979.
\\; g TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 2000 Decatur, Alabama 35602 JAN 10 ?.!E Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Management Information and Program Control Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is the December 1978 Monthly Operating Report for Browns Ferry Nuc1 car Plant Units 1, 2, and 3.
Very truly yours, TENNF SEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
// G. Dewcase Ltlant Superintendent Enclosure CC: Director, Region II Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement 230 Peachtree Street, NW Suite 818 Atlanta, GA 30303 (1 copy)
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 (10 copies)
Mr. J. A. Prestele, Acting Director Nuclear Engineering and Operations Dept.
Electric Power Research Institute P. O. Box 10412 Palo Alto, CA 94304 k%\\
\\
790116 oM7 An Equal Opportunity Employer
9 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUT110RITY DIVISION OF POWER PRODUCTION BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT n
f i
l a
MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT December 1, 1978 - December 31, 1978 DOCKET NUMBERS 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 LICENSE NUMBERS DPR-33, DPR-52, and DPR-68 Submitted by X M/8h
[lantSuperintendent 790116 day
e s
TABLE OF CONTENTS Operations Summary.
1 2
Operational Data.
3 Maintenance Refueling Information 3
Significant Operational Events 5
Average Daily Unit Power Level.
12 Operating Data Reports.
15 Unit Shutdowns and Power Reductions.
18 r
Plant Maintenance Summary.
21 Unit 1 Refueling Outage Summary.
30
t Operations Summary The following summary describes the significant operational activities during the reporting period. In support of this summary, a chronological log of significant events is included in this report and begins on page 5.
There were 10 Reportable Occurrences reported to the NRC during the month of December.
Unit I Significant operational events for Unit 1 are tabulated by date and time beginning on page 5.
The unit was shutdown for scheduled refueling the entire month.
A summary of maintenance work is shown on pages 21 through 31.
Unit 2 Significant operational events for Unit 2 are tabulated by date and time beginning on page 5.
The unit did not scram during the month.
A summary of maintenance work is shown on pages 21 through 29.
Unit 3 Significant operational eventt for Unit 3 are tabulated by date and time beginning on page 9.
The unit did not scram during the month.
A summary of maintenance work is shown on pages 21 through 29.
2 Operations Summary (continued)
Fatigue Usage Evaluation The cumulative usage factors for the reactor vessel are as follows:
Loca ti_o_n Usage Factor Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 Shell at Water Line 0.00377 0.00259 0.00237 Feedwater nozzle 0.17304 0.11409 0.09383 Closurc studs 0.16449 0.09806 0.07206 Note: This accumulated monthly information will satisfy technical specification section 6.6.A.17.b(3) reporting requirements, r
Common Systems Approximately 8.llE+5 gallons of waste liquid were discharged containing approximately 8.6E-1 curies of activity.
Cooling towers 4 and 5 were operational this month for two lift pump operations. Tower 6 was operational for one lift pump operation. Modifications by the tower vendor were continued on Tower 3 and Tower 2 and began on Tower 1.
None of the towers had significant operational problems.
Operational Data The average daily unit power 1cvel for units 1, 2 and 3 is shown on pages 12 through 14.
The operating data reports for all three units are shown on pages 15 through 17.
Unit shutdowns and power reductions for all three units are shown on pages 18 through 20.
3 Operations Summary (continued)
Maintenance Major electrical, mechanical, and instrument maintenance activities during the month are described on pages 21 through 29. Refueling outage n
activities for Unit 1 are summarized on pages 30 and 31.
t i
Refueling Information i
Unit 1 Unit 1 began its second refueling on November 26, 1978, with a restart dete of January 16, 1979. Resumption of operation on that date will require a change in technical specifications pertaining to the core thermal limits. Licensing information in support of these changes was submitted in August 1978. This refueling will load additional 8 X 8R (retrofit) fuel assemblics into the core, replacing presently loaded 7X7 fuel and will involve installing a new recirculation pump trip (RPT) system.
There are 764 fuel assemblies in the core. The spent fuel storage pool presently contains 322 spent 7X7 fuel assemblics and two 8 X 8R fuel assemblics. The present storage capacity of the spent fuel pool is 1080 assemblics.
Present planning is to increase that capacity to 3471 assemblies.
With present capacity, the present refueling is the last refueling that could be discharged to the spent fuel storage pool without exceeding that capacity and maintaining full core discharge capability in the pool.
Unit 2 Unit 2 is scheduled for its second refueling beginning on April 22, 1979, with a restart date of July 1, 1979.
Resumption of operation on that date will require a change in technical specifications pertaining to the core thermal limits.
Present scheduling is to submit licensing information in
4 Operations Summary (continued)
Unit 2 (continued)
~
support of these changes before the refueling. This refueling will involve replacing some more 7 X 7 fuel assemblies with 8 X 8R (retrofit) assemblics.
There are 764 fuel assemblies in the core. At the end of the month
/
there were 132 discharged cycle 1 7X7 fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool. There are presently 36 new 8 X 8 fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool which were not loaded into the core during this cycle. The-present storage capacity of the spent fuel pool is 1080 assemblies.
Present planning is to increase that capacity to 3471 assemblies. With present capacity, the 1979 refueling would be the last refueling that could be discharged to the spent fuel pool without exceeding that capacity and maintaining full core discharge capability in the pool.
Unit 3 Unit 3 is scheduled for its next refuel outage beginning on August 30, 1979. This refueling will involve loading additional 8 X 8R (retrofit) assemblies into the core.
Resumption of operation following refueling will require changes in technical specifications pertaining to the core thermal limits. Licensing information in suppcrt of chese changes will be submitted before the refueling.
There are 764 fuel assemblies presentl; in the core. There are 208 fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool. The present licensed storage capacity of the spent fuel pool is 1132 assemblies.
5 Significant Operational Events Unit 1 Date Time Event 12/1 0000 Reactor shutdown for reload 2, cycle 3 refueling outage 12/3 1015 Commenced shuffling and sipping fuel
/
End of Month j
Unit 2 12/1 0000 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/2 0112 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 85% for turbine C.V.
tests and SI's 0231 Turbine C.V. tests and SI's completed, commenced power ascension 0700 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/3 0745 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 72% for removal of "C" reactor feed pump from service for maintenance (flange leaks) 1230 Repairs to "C" reactor feed pump completed and pump placed in service 1240 Commenced power ascension from 72% thermal power 2300 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/4 1212 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 72% for removal of "A"
reactor feed pump from service due to high vibration 12/5 1400 Repairs to "A" reactor feed pump completed and pump placed in service 1530 Commenced power ascension from 72% thermal power 2000 Commenced PCIOMR from 90% thermal power 12/6 0400 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 0850 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 72% for removal of "A"
reactor feed pump from service due to high vibrations 1016 Repairs to "A" reactor feed punp completed and pump placed in service O
6 Significant Operational Events Unit 2 Date Time Event 12/6 1040 Comnenecd power ascension from 72% thermal power 1200 Commenced PCIOMR from 95% thermal pcuer I
2300 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/7 1404 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 72% for removal of "A" reactor feed pump from service due to high vibration 1730 Repairs to "A" reactor feed pump completed and pump placed in service 1745 Commenced power ascension from 72% thermal power 2100 Commenced PCIOMR fron 95%' thermal power 12/8 0700 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 2300 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 56% for maintenance to "C" reactor feed pump leaks and turbine C.V. tests and SI's 12/9 0106 Reduced thermal power from 56% to 40% for control rod sequence exchange from "A" to "B" 0300 Control rod sequence exchange from "A" to "B" completed, commenced power ascension 0600 Commenced PCIOMR from 60% thermal power 2300 Reactor thermal power at 73%, holding for "A" reactor feed pump vibration problems 12/11 1250 "A" reactor feed pump maintenance conpleted, commenced power ascension 1500 Commenced PCIOMR from 80% thermal power 12/12 2105 Reactor thernal power at 98% steady state 12/15 2125 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 85% for turbine C.V.
tests and SI's 2225 Turbine C.V. tests and SI's completed, commenced power ascension 12/16 0700 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state
7 Significant Operational Events Unit 2 Date Time Evaat 12/19 2225 Commenced thermal power reduction to 60% for,"A" recirculation pump MG set brush replacement and "B"
reactor feed pump vibration checks f
2355 "A" recirculatica pv p MG set brush replacement completed and pump pitced in service and "B" recirculation pump MG set removed from service for brush replacement.
"B" reactor feed pump vibration checks completed 12/20 0250 "B" recirculation pump MG set brush replacement completed, commenced power ascension from 60% thermal power 0600 Commenced PCIOMR from 90% thermal power 1000 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/23 2225 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 70% for turbine CV tests and SI's 12/24 0150
~ Turbine C.V. tests and SI's completed, commenced power ascension 0700 Commenced PCIOMR from 75% thermal power 12/25 1430 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/27 1310 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 95% due to a valve le~ ka in "F" condensate demineralizer vessel 1357 Valve leak in "F" condensate demineralizer vessel fixed, commenced power ascennion 2300 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/29 0230 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 85% for removal of "G" condensate demineralizer from service 'for back washing and precoating G& 'l "G" condensate demineralizer placed in service, commenced power ascension 0700 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state 12/30 0020 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 85% for turbine C.V.
tests and SI's 0238 Turbine C.U. tests and SI's completed. commenced power ascension
=.
8 Significant Operational Events Unit 2 Date Time Event
^
12/30 0300 Commenced PCIOMR from 95% thermal power I
0700 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state i
e 1525 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 85% for removal of "C" reactor feed pump from service due to high vibration 1848 "C" recctor feed pump placed in service, commenced power ascension from 85% thermal power 12/31 1922 Reactor thermal power at 98%, steady state for the remainder of the month 7
9 Significant Operational Events Unit 3 Date Time Event l
12/1 0000 Reactor critical with startup! in progress 0230 Rolled T/G j
0306 Synchronized generator, commenced power ascension (Sequence "B")
12/3 0255 Commenced PCIOMR from 60% thernal power 12/5 0138 "A" reactor feed pump trip (cause unknown) reducing thermal power from 90% to 70%
0150 "A" reactor feed pump trip reset and pump placed in service, commenced power ascension 0225 Commenced PCIOMR from 87% thermal power 0700 Reactor thermal power at 92%, holding due to core flow limits 1700 Reduced thermal power from 92% to 72% for renoval of "C"
reactor feed pump from service for maintenance (pump discharge flange leakage) 12/6 1200 Maintenance completed on "C" reactor feed pump and pump placed in service 1830 Reduced thermal power from 72% to 65% for FW testing (RTI-23A) 12/7 0158 RTI-23A completed, commenced power ascension 0330 Commenced PCIOMR from 85% thermal power 1500 Reactor thermal power at 92%, steady state, core flow limited 1826 Commenced reducing thermal power from 92% to 35% for recirculation pumps flow tests (RTI-32A) 12/8 0518 Recirculation pumps flow tests conpleted, commenced power ascension for recirculation pumps trip tests (RTI-27) 0525 Reactor thermal power at 70%, holding for RTI-27 i
~ ~ - -.. _. -.. -. -
- - - - - ~.. - - -
erma
==t
.. ~
e 10 Sinnificant Operational Events Unit 3 Date Time Event 12/8 0550 RTI-27 discontinued due to system load demand, commenced power ascension p
p
//
0830 Reduced thermal power from 85% to 70% for resuming RTI-27 0925 Both recirculation pumps tripped, thermal power to 35%
0936 Both recirculation pumps in service, commenced power ascension 1210 Reactor thermal power at 40% holdsng for control rod sequence exchange from "B" to "A" 1428 Control rod sequence exchange from "B" to "A" completed, commenced power ascension in control rod sequence "A" 12/9 0020 Reduced thermal power from 78% to 70% for turbine C.V.
tests and SI's 0357 Turbine C.V. tests and SI's completed, commenced power ascension 1505 Commenced PCIOMR from 80% thermal power 12/11 1500 Reactor thermal power at 97%, steady state 12/12 0025 Reduced thermal power from 97% to 90% for removal of "B" string high pressure heaters from service for maintenance (leakage) 0300 Commenced PCIOMR from 90% thermal power 2300 Reactor thermal power at 95%, core flow limited 12/15 2330 Reduced thermal power from 95% to 60% for "B" recirculation pump MG set brush replacenent 12/16 0225 "B" recirculation pump MC set brush replacenent completed, commenced power ascension 0700 Connenced PCIOMR from 75% thermal power 12/17 2000 Reactor thermal power at 99Z, steady state 12/22 2115 Reduced thermal power from 09% to 00% for turbine C.V.
tests and SI's
11 Significant Operational Events Unit 3 Date Time Event 12/23 0230 Turbine C.V. tests and SI's completed, commen'ced PCIOMR from 90% thermal power I
0930 Reactor thermal power at 98%,isteady state 12/24 1425 Reduced thermal power from 98% to 80% for removal of "B" reactor feed pump from service due to high vibrations 12/26 1500 Reactor thernal power at 80%, holding for "B" reactor feed pump maintenance 12/27 0405 "B" reactor feed pump maintenance completed and placed in service 0430 Commenced power ascensionefrom 80% thermal power 0820 Reduced thermal power from 93% to 80% for renoval of "B" reactor feed pump from service due to high vibrations.
Reactor thermal power held at 80% the remainder of the month e
~
~
12 AVERACE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL 50-259 DOCKET NO.
Browns Ferry I D'IT
.DATE 01-05-79 COMPLETED BY-Don Creqn TELEPilONE 205/729-6846 l
December, 1978 s
MONTil DAY AVER AGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVER AGE DAILY POWER LEVEL
_ MWe-Net)
(
(MWe-Net)
-4 l
-6 17 2
-5 18
-4
-2
.3
-4 19 7
-5 20
-2 4
-2 5
21
-2 6
-4 22
-3
.7
-3 23
-3 8
24
-3
-4 25
-2 9
-3
-4 26 10
-4
-3 11 27 1
-4 23
-2
~4
-2 13 29
-4
-3 14 30
-4
-2 15 31
-4 16 INSTRUCTIONS.
Oli this format hst the average daily unit power leselin MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Comput_e to the nearest whole rnegawatt.
(9/77 )
e 13 AVERAGE DAILY t! NIT POWER LEVEL DOCKET NO.
50-260 UNIT Browns Ferry II DATE 01-05-79 COMPLETED BY Don Green TELEPIIONE_
'05/729-6846
~
December 1978 MONTil j
DAY AVER AGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
(MWe Net) 1 262 17 1011 3
469 1067 jg 3
711
~ =%
19 1073
.4 891 20 1073 908 5
21 1070 6
790 1079 22 827 7
23 1049 8
647 24 971 777
~
838 9
25 10 921 26 837
- g 1040 857 27 12 991 2S R10 13 1032 29 R36 g4 1010 858 30 15 1020 821 3,
16 770
~
. INSTRUCT 10SS On this format !ist the ave ~ race daily umt power leselin MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.
W/77)
~
~~ +:- n.. +y
,. m...~..,, 3 ry. _m.v
. ~
~~-
v.
..w..
14 AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL DOCKET NO.
50-206 UNIT Browns Ferry III
~
01-05-79
.DATE Don Green COMPLETED BY
~
TELEPIIONE 205/729-6846 i
1 MONTil DAY AVER AGE DAILY POWER LEVEL DAY AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
,( MWe-Net )
1056 17 1081 I
2 107A Ig 1070
~
.3 988 19 1056 4
930 20 977 870 5
21 1072 1031 22 1085 6
.7 999 23 1033 832 8
1065 24 1032 9
708 25
~
810 10 26 1072 822 11 27 1077 976 12 28 1071 13 1084 29 1065 1063 14 30 1088 1068 15 31 1006 1066 16
.s INSTRUCTIONS.
We-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to On this format, hat the average daily unit power lesel in 3:
the nearest whole megawatt.
(9/77 )
e
15 OPERATING DAT_A REPORT
~
DOCKET NO.
50-259 DATE 01-05-79 COMPLETED BY Don Green
~
TELEP110NE ons/7?o-6846 OPERATING STATUS N tes I. Unit Name:
Browns Ferry I December 1978
- 2. Reporting Period:
- 3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 3293 1152
- 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe):
1065
- 5. Design Electrical Rating (Net'MWe):
- 6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe):
1098 4 1065
- 7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe):
- 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report.Give Reasons:
-s
- 9. Power Level To which Restricted,if Any (Net MWe):
N/A
- 10. Reasons For Restrictions. If Any-This Month Yr.-to-Date Cumulative
- 11. Ilours in Re' porting Period 744 8760 38'.738 0
7251.71~
20,231.59
- 12. Number Of flours Reactor Was Critical -
0 352.33 4,399.13
- 13. Reactor Resene Shutdown flours 0
7045.21 19,691.34
- 14. Ilours Generator On Line U
0 0
- 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown flours
-~
0 18.399.443 50.779.672
- 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWil) 0 5.999.980 16.818.000
- 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWil) 5,817,873 16,306,220 0
- 18. Net Electrical Energy Generated 8MWil)
- 19. Unit Senice Factor n
80.4 50.8
~
- 20. Unit Availability Factor 0
80.4
- 50.8 0
62.4 39.5
- 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net) 0 62.4 39.5
- 22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net) 0 6.0 40.2
- 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate
- 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type. Date.and Duration of Each):
~
January 19 /8
- 25. If Shur Down At End Of Report Period. Estimated Date of Startup:-
m
- 26. Units in Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):
Forecast Achiesed m
~
INITI\\L CRl r!CA LITY INITIAL ELECTRICITY COM\\lERCIAL OPER ATION (0/77)
~
16 OPERATING DATA REPORT
~
DOCKET NO.
50-260 DATE 01-05-70 COSIPLETED BY mn croon TELEPiiONE 9n5 /790-6846 a
OPERATING STATUS
~'
N tes
- 1. Unit Name:
Brotms Ferry II
- 2. Reporting Period: Nco-kar 1079
- 3. Licensed Thermal Power (51Wt): 3293 1152
- 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross 51We):
1065
- 5. Design Electrical Rating (Net SIWE):
~
1008.4
- 6. Staximum Dependable Capacity (Gross SIWE):
1065
- 7. Slaximum Dependable Capacity (Net SIWE):
- 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Gi Keasons:
~
- 9. Power Level To Which Restricted.lf Any(Net 31We):
N/A
- 10. Reasons For Restrictions. If Any:
This alonth Yr..to.Dat e Cumulative i
744 8,760 3 T.640
- 11. Ilours in Reporting Period 744 6,150.06 16.718.29
- 12. Number Of Ilours Reactor Was Critical 0
276.94 11,476.71
- 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown llours 744 6.034.50 16,067.86
- 14. Ilours Generator On.Line 0
0 0
- 15. Unit Reserve Shutdown flours
- 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated ($1Wil) 2.272.498 17.278.651 43.451.788
- 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (.\\lWil) 768,240
_ 57,716,838 14.313.788 749,325 5,547,360 13,890,164
- 18. Net Electrical Energy Generated ($1Wil) 100 68.4 47.8
- 19. Unit Service Factor 100 68.9 47.8
- 20. Unit Availability Factor 94.6 59.5 1R_R
- 21. Unit Capacity Fact.r (Using SIDC Net) 94.6 59.5 18.8
- 22. Unit Capacity Factcr (Using DER Net) 0 4.4 45.8
- 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate
- 24. ' Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Stonths (Type. Date.and Duration of Each):
Refuel outane April. 1979
~
- 25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period. Estimated Date of Startup:
- 26. Units in Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):
Forecast
' Achiesed INITIA L CRITICA LITY INITIAL ELECTRICITY CON 1\\lERCI A L OPER A l'lON (9/77)
~
17 OPERATING DATA REPORT s
DOCKET NO.
50-296 DATE 01-05-79 COSIPLETED BY Don Green TELEPliONE on5/79o-6846 OPER ATING STATUS
+
Notes -
- 1. Unit Name:
Browns Ferry III 4
December 1978
. 2. Reporting Period:
3293
- 3. Licensed Thermal Power (5fWt):
1152
- 4. Nameplate Rating (Gross 51We):
1065
- 5. Design Electrical Rating (Nef 31We):
- 6. Staximum Dependable Capacity (Gross 51We): 1no9 A 1065
- 7. Staximum Dependable Capacity (Net 51We):
- 8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report. Give Reasons:
- 9. Power Level To Which Restricted. If Any (Net 51We):
N/A
- 10. Reasons For Restrictions. If Any:
This 5fonth Yr.-to-Dat e Cumulative
~
744 8,760 16,104 I1. Ilours in Reporting Period
- 12. Number Of flours Reactor Was Critical 6,395.53-13,091.20 744 0
517.00 1105.41
- 13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown flours
- 14. Ilours Generator On-Line 740.90
_. 6.230.67 12.729.98 0
0 0
- 15. Unit Resene Shutdown llours
- 16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (5tWil) 2.013,518 17,509,688 36,151,382
- 17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (51WII) 672.650 5,733,630 11.767. son
- 18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (51WH) 656.104 5,554,282 3 3, f,n q _3 g g
~
- 19. Unit Service Factor 90.6 71.1 79.0
- 20. Unit Availability Factor 99.6 71.1
- 79.0 82.8 59.5 66.5
- 21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using 51DC Net) 82.8 59,5 66.5
- 22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)
.4
-9.0 9.5
- 23. Unit Forced Outage Rate
- 24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 631onths (Type. Date,and Duration of Each):
- 25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period. Estimated Date of Startup:-
- 26. Units in Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):
Forecast Achiesed INITIAL CRITICALITY INITI A L ELECTRICITY CO.\\1%!ERCIA L OPER ATION (9/77)
t e
i DOCKET NO.
50 '54
' UNIT SilUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS Browns Ferry I UNIT NAME DATE 01-05-70 I
COMPLETED BY Oon Green REPORT MONTil _ n=c,-t Cr TELEPIIONE
'905/7'0-69/26 l
".(.
I E
E i
.! ?
}
$.Y K Licensee 5-t, gg,8 Cause & Corrective 9
Action to No.
Da'e g
5g jss Event g,7 H
j jg Report #
mu 8O Prevent Recurrence 6
55 78 11 26 5
744 C
2 Refueling r
4 1
P s
O
.i 4
-t--
s a
/
I g
i i
2 3
4 F: Forced Reason:
Method:
Exhibit G - litstructions S: Scheduled A-Equipment Failure (Explain) 1 Manual
, for Prepar.uion of Data B-Maintenance of Test 2 Manual Scram.
, Entq Sheets im 1.icensec C. Refueling 3-Autom.itic Scram.
Event Repori (1.E R) Fde (NURI.G-D. Regulatory Re,striction 4-Other ( Explain) 0161)
E-Operator Training & License Examination F Administrative t
5 Exhibit I Same Source G Operational Error (Explain)
(9/77) il Other (Explain).
e 9
+
50-260 DOCKET NO.
UNIT SilUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS 4
UNIT NAME, Browns Ferry II I) ATE 01-05-79 i
e Do, cron, COMPLETED HY REPORT MONTil December TELEPIIONE
'05/7'n-6P!d._
\\
~
E
.! ?
3
$YE Licensee Eg gn Cause & Corrective o
No.
Date
~g s
j~s Event g7 93 Action to
<. i =g Report e mV EV Prevent Recurrence j
~j H
o d
e 68 78 12 03 F
'A Derated when "C" Rx feed pump flange leaked 69 78 l'2 04 F
A Derated when "A" Rx feed pump had high vibration 1
70 78 12 06 F
A Derated when "A" Rx feed pump had high G
l vibration 71 78 12 07 F
A Derated when "A" Rx feed pump had high vibration Derated when "C" Rx feed pump flange 72 78 12 09 F
A leaked 73 78 12 19 F
B Derated to replace brushes in botis recirc pump M.G. sets g
74 7R 17 91 S
B Derated for turhine cbntrol valve test and SI's i
2 3
4 S: Scheduled A Equipment Failure (Explain')
1 -Manual.
Exhibit G. Instructions F: Forced Reason:
Method:
for Prepara. tion of Data i
il-Maintenance or Test 2-Manual Scram.
Entn Sheets for 1.icensee C. Refueling 3 Automatic Scram.
Even'i Report (t.ER) Fil2 (NURI G-D-Regulatory Restriction 4 Other (Explain) 0161)
E-Operator Training & License Examination F-Administrative 5
G. Operational Error (Explain)
Exhibit I - Same Source (9/77)
II-Other ( Explain)
1
)
'50-296 DOCKET NO.
' UNIT SilUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS UNIT N AM E Brownq Ferry III DATE 01-05-74 i
COMPLETED BY ynnn crna, REPORT MONTil December TELEPil0NE 9 M /7')o A9AA
\\
s I
e.g
?
E
.5?
3
.5E Licensee E-(
Cause & Corrective No.
Date 3g s
j s E, Event g'g e-8 Action to c
j=
3 gjj c:
Report a mU EV Present Recurrence H
e t
i o
67 78 12 01 F
3.10 A
2 LPRM connections were improperly installed 68 78 12 05 F
A Derated when "A" Rx feed pump tripped 69 78 12 05 F
A Derated when "C" Rx. feed' pump tripped 70
,78 12 07 F
B Derated to perform recire pump flow test y
71 78 12 08 F
.B Derated to perform recirc pump trip o
test 72 78 12 15 F
B Derated to replace brushes in recire pump MG set 8
J
/
l g
I 2
3 4
F: Forced Reason:
Method:
Exhibit G - Idstructions S: Scheduled A-Equipment Failure (Explain) 1-Manual
, for Pieraiation of Data B-Maintenance of Test 2-Manual Scram.
. Entry Sheets for 1.ieensee C-Refueling 3 Automatic Scram.
Esent Report (LER) File (NUREG-D-Regulatory Re,striction
-4 Other (Explain) 0161)
E-Operator Training & License Examination F-Administ rative t
5 Exlubit I - Same Source G-Operational Error (Explain)
~
(9/77)
Il Other ( Explain) -
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PIANT UNIT 1
( SSC EQUIPMENT MECHANICAL MAIN 1E!aNCE
SUMMARY
For the Month of December 1978 ji EFFECT ON SAFE ACTION TAKEN DATE SYSTEM COMPONENT NATURE OF OPERATION OF CAUSE OF RESULTS OF TO PRECLUDE MAINTENANCE THE RFACTOR MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION RECURRENCE 12/1 RHR FCV 74-68 Packing leak hone Unknown None Repacked valve with graphoil
' 12/12 CRD CRD Module Leaking star None Operation None Replaced packing seat 10-23 valve and body o-ring 12/13 Ventilation lA Refuel zone Expansion join None Operation None Replaced joint and exhaust fan worn out lubricated dampers 12/13 CRD CRD module Valve leaking None Operation None Replaced stem packing 06-27, valve 229 1
4 12/29 CRD HCV's85-229 Packing leak None Operation None Repack cartridge valve
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BROWNS FERRY UUCLEAR PIANT UNIT 2
MECHANICAL MAINTENANCE SUFBIARY CSSC EQUIPMENT f.
For the Month of December 19 78 jj lf EFFECT ON SAFE ACTION TAKEN l
DATE SYSTEM COMPONENT NATURE OF OPERATION OF CAUSE OF RESULTS OF TO PRECLUDE l
MAINTENANCE THE REACTOR MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION RECURRENCE Outboard 12/11 HPCI Booster pump Bearing oil None Unknown None Added oil to bearin reservoir reservoir need oil 12/13 RCIC Turbine Turb. inboard None Low oil level None Added oil bearing oil reservoir low f.
on oil 12/11 RCIC Turbine Inboard turb.
None Oil Low None Added oil bearing needs
}
b oil h
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4 be p
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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PIANT UNIT 1
MECIIANICAL MAINTElaNCE SU 24ARY CSSC EQUIP >ENT For the Month of Decer.ber 19 78 EFFECT ON SAFE ACTION TAKEN DATE SYSTD1 COMPONENT NATURE OF OPERATION OF CAUSE OF RESULTS OF TO PRECLUDE MAINTENANCE THE REACTOR MALFUNCTION MALFUNCTION RECURRENCE 12/6 CRD Exhaust filter Filter "B" None Filter was None Replaced dirty need cleaning dirty filter with new one.
filter is isolated, vent 3d, and drained 12/16 SLC 3A pump relief Valve operatin ;
None Valve lifting None Re-run S.I. work valve at 1150 psi at 1150 psi o.k.
T.S. 4.4.A-2 N
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BR0h'NS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
CSSC EQUIPMENT ELECTRICAL FfAINTENANCE SUMfARY
/ For the Month of December 1S8 p,,.I of 2 Effect on Safe Action Taken Date System Component Nature of Operation of Cause of Results of To Preclude Maintenance The Reactor Malfunction Malfunction Recurrence 12/1 All with CR 120A relay Change all CR None Contact arm re-Possible fire hazard Change out all CR120A contact arm 120A relay con ~
tainers not of contact arm retainers not made of Veloz valoz relays retiner tact arm re-per EMI 53. TR 99508, tainers per 99503, 99507, 99520, EMI 53 99509, 99567, 99512, 99518, 99524, 99516, 99513, 99517, 99511, 99515, 99514,.99528, 99505, 99527, 99506, 99525, 99501, 99523, 99502, 99519, 99504, 99526, and 99522 12/1 Diesel D/G 1 C & D STOL1 relay on None STOLI relay on Did not meet criterio Changed both relay.
Generator C and annun.
"C" D/G ann.
of SI 4.9.A.1.d Met all criteria of' relay on D fai ed relay bad on "D" SI 4.9.A.l.d.
Checked D/G ok.
TR 87915 to operate properly per SI 4.9 A.l.d J
12/1 RHR HCV 74-44 Open limit None Limit switch was Incorrect annunicatot Changed.out limit switch still bad switch.
Checked ok TR 107190 made up with I
valve closed i
12/2' Control Air FCV 32-62 Limit switch None Limit switch arm Incorrect ann.
Straightened limit l
on FCV 32-62 bent and out of switch arm adjusted i limit switch.
Checked will not pick adjustment ok.
TR 109622 i
up 12/2 RCIC Steam lire Bad level None Bad level switch Improper Ann.
Replaced level switch' Ran EMI 56.
Checked condensate switch ok.
TR 106412 level switch t
I
BROUNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
CSSC EQUIPMENT ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE SUID!ARY
/ For the Month of December 19 78 Page 2 of 2 Effect on Safe Action Taken Date System Component Nature of Operation of Cause of 3esults of To Preclude Maintenance The Reactor Malfunction Malfunction Recurrence 12/4 250V DC No.1 battery Not operating None Bad control Not operating correct Replaced transformer charger for correctly transformer ly Checked ok.
TR 115522 No, 1 battery board i
l 12/6 4-kV SD.
Breaker 1624 Breaker will None Jack nut and Breaker would not Repair jack nut i
Board not rack in screw bad dam-rack in and screw. Checked aged threads ok.
TR 115621 1
12/6 250V DC Battery charg-Charger will None Blown fuse Battery charger not Replaced blown fuse' er No. 1 not hold vol-operational with new one, Checked ok.
tage and trip-TR 116609 ped nor K.C.
supply bkr.
12/20 RHR HCV 74-55 Red light is None Limit switch Red light on with Freed limit switch on with valve stuck valve closed and lubricated.
Checked ok.
TR 11625 closed l
E 12/24 Diesel Power failure Power failure None Coil burned out Power failure alarm Replaced coil and Generator alara for alarm will not on D/G control would not-clear cleared alarm.
D/G A close panel TR 34115
./
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) )
i
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8
BROWS FERRV NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 9
CSSC EQUTMtENT ELECTRICAL MAINTEENCE SUmfARY For the Month of Decerher 1978
~
Action Taken Effect on Sate Date System Component Nature of Operation of Cause of Results of To Preclude Maintenance The Reactor Malfunction Malfunction Recurrence 12/6 Air. Cond.
Battery room Bearing noisy None Bad motor bear-Bearings noisy Replaced motor bear-supply fan 2B ings ings (2) Checked ok TR 116567 12/7 HPCI FCV 73-26 No indicating None Wire burned from No indicating lights Pulled new wire.
lights in con-JB 2217 to FCV Replaced flex conduit trol : room 73-26 Performed EMI 18.
Checled ok.
TR 11654ti 1
12/9 250V DC 250V batt. bd. Bd. No. 2 has None Limit switches Bd. No. had 230V Replaced limit switcht No. 2 230V pos.
on FSV 3-92 were pos. ground Checked ok.
ground grounded due to TR 114765 water and corro-sion 12/11 RHR Service Limit switch No red indicat None Limit switch out No red indicating Adjusted limit switch on HCV 23-43 ing light in of adjustment light in control roon Checked ok.
l TR 116531 control room 12/14 250V Rx.
2A-K61A relay Relay bad None Coil open Relay inperable Replaced coil.
Checked ok.
12/30 HPCI HPCI trip HPCI failed to None Bad solenoid coilHPCI would not trip Replaced solenoid, solenoid trip during resistor, and by trip solenoid resistor, and diode.
performance of diode Ran SI 4.5.E.1.B i
Meet all criteria.
i e
s e
BR0h'NS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3
CSSC EQUIPMENT ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE SUIDIARY e
i For the Month of December 19 78
,Page 1 of 2 Effect on Sate Action Taken Date System Component Nature of Operation of Cause of Results of To Preclude Maintenance The Reactor Malfunction Malfunction Recurrence 12/1 HPCI Gland seal Runs for about None Al lead contact Motor thermals out rightened clip to Ex,hauster 2 min. and then clip on breaker breaker finger ex-thermals out was loose anuster running cor-rectly. TR 116306 12/1 Neutron D - SRM "D" SRM has 1None Coil bad in relay "D" SRM will not movt Replaced coil in relay 7CK7K.
Checked ok Monitoring both in-out 7CK7K TR 116398 lights and will not move 12/1 Air Cond.
Emergency Chiller has None Break in suction Chiller was leaking Replaced sight glass chiller for 3t leak line and sight Repaired leak.
and 3B Rx. M01 glass Checked ok.
TR 110028 boards 12/1 Diesel Gen.
Press. switch Diaphragm blown None AP2 - Press switc1 Press sw' itch inoper-Replaced press switch AP2 D/G 3D out on AP2
') a d able.
Alarm in Alarm cleared.
rR 110084 12/1 RHR FCV 74-1 Valve vill not None iotor bad Valve cannot be Replaced motor.
Ran operate by moto motor operated -
EMI 18., Checked ok l
TR 114330 12/5 Fire Smoked Detec-Detector alarmeil None lad detector False alarm Change model FT-200 l
to model 1212 detector l Protection tor 39-19A for no reason Ran SI 4.1.1.C.16.5 l
i TR 115870 i
e 12/1 Core Spray Seal in con-Seal in contact None llose contacts Valve would stop Repaired and adjusted l tact would not pick Tot sealing in travelling when hand contact. Checked ok'."
4eal in contact switch was released TR 110098 up 3ent i
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 3 ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE
SUMMARY
CSSC EQUIPMENT For the Month of December 19 78 Page ? sf 2 Action Taken Effect on Sate Nature of Operation of Cause of Results of To Preclude Date System Component Maintenance The Reactor Malfunction Malfunction Recurrence 12/7 HPCI HCV 73-23 Limit switch out None Limit switch Limit switch would Repositioned and tight-liinit switch actuator loose not give full open ened actuator limit of place position switch checked ok.
FR 116407 12/1 CRD HS 85-48 Control switch None Hand switch broke HS 85-48 not operat-Replaced stop plate on stop is broke ing HS 85-48.
Check ok.
FR 114353 a
h I
i i
i 1
i l
.T,'
I
o BROUNS FERRY NUCLEAk PLANI UNIIS 1,2 & 3 INSTRU1ENT MAINTENANCE SlDDIARY For the Month of Decerher 19 78 CSSC Equioment Effect on Safe Action Taken Date System Component Nature of Operation of Cause of Results of To Preclude Maintenance The Reactor Malfunction Malfunction Recurrence UNIT 1 12/8 RPIS Probe 58-35 Replace None Bad reed switch No "00" indication None
}
RPIS Probe 26-03 Replace None Bad reed switch No fuel in indicatior None t
12/13 Main steam TI-1-40D Replace None Switch broken Caused half isolatiooNone during outage 12/14 Rad Monit RI-90-8A Maintenance None Transistor faultyAlarm would not test Mone 12/30 SLC LI-63-1B Calibration None Zero shift Did not agree within 1% of stick measure-ment None t
b1T2 12/15 Feedwater PI-3-79 Calibration None Transmitter zero Indicated high re-e' shift actot pressure None 12/19 CRD PDS-85-63, 64 Replace None Cages damaged Indicate DP when none existed _ _
None UNIT 3 12/4 SLC Feed-LT-3-53 Calibrate None Zero shift on Indicated 4" low None transmitter water 12/5 Primary LI-64-54, A, B Calibrate lone Slight zero shiftTwo indicators did i
None Containment not agree s
O e
30 OUTAGE SECTIOI MONTHLY REPORT December 1978
~
c During the entire month of December, Unit 1 was down for a refueling I
outage.
The refueling sequence progressed from reactor vessel disassembly through fuel shuffling and sipping.
In addition to normal refueling activities, major maintenance items accomplished during this time included changeout of eight CRD's and nine LPRM's; leak rate testing and repair of all contain-ment isolation valves including the eight MSIV's; changeout and testing of 11 MSRV's; replacement of the two MSSV's with two new MSRV's and the routing of tailpipes for these valves; leak checking and probolog of feedwater heaters and condenser waterboxes, CRD HCU maintenance; inspection and repair of "C" LP turbine which included discovery by non-destructive examination of 273 cracked pins on generator side and 195 on the turbine side requiring the spindle to be pulled; furmaniting of RWCU regenative heat exchanger; motor testing was conpleted with drywell blower lAl requiring replacement; approxi-
' mately 80% of the electrical board maintenance was completed during this month.
Several unforeseen probler's occurred which have placed the outage behind the original outage schedule. One of these was the decision to sip all 8 X 8 fuel bundles instead of just the 440 (7 X 7) reload bundles originally planned.
Another problem occurred when several items were dropped into the vessel during jet pump plug installation. This necessitated a prolonged time for search and retrieval, and one item, a tube of versilube lubricant, has not been found.
.t",
31 OUTAGE SECTION MONTHLY REPORT (Con't) s December 1978 Recirculation valve maintenance included disassembly of valves 68-3
~
and 68-33 which required the jet pumps to be plugged and the loop drained, f
i After disassembly, it was found that both valves had broken stems and these I
were replaced. All recirculation loop isolation valves had their bonnets seal welded.
Major modifications worked this mcath were the recirculation pump trip modification, HPCI modifications, security modifications, generator field ground modification, addition of two new MSRV's and routing of tailpipes, second level undervoltage protection, generator monitor modification, and RHR vent piping modification.
e