ML19339A586
| ML19339A586 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1980 |
| From: | Dunn C DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-11111, NUDOCS 8011040375 | |
| Download: ML19339A586 (13) | |
Text
..
1 #A Y@
A l
M om 4ss-sooo 43S S.uth Avenue 7;"78"*
October 30, 1980 1
l Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief j
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 j
Division of Licensing J
Wr.shington, DC 20555 1
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 i
Docket No. 50-334 Fire Protection System Information i
i Gentlemen:
i i
In your letter of October 1, 1980, you requested that we provide the additional information required to complete your review of the Beaver l
Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 fire protection system modifications.
The attached enclosure and associated reference drawings describe the modifications as presently proposed. Additionally, we are addressing the necessity of providing alternate shutdown capability for those areas for which the modifications will not be completed by the November 1, 1980 date in the proposed Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
3.3-1 Reactor Containment Penetration Area: The modifications for this area were originally scheduled for completion during the 1981 (2nd) refueling outage, and will not be completed by November 1, 1980. The following interim fire protection measures will be in effect prior to station startup.
A temporary water suppression system has been provided in the i
containment.
This temporary system utilizes two 1-1/2 inch fire hoses.
One hose is connected to a 3/4 inch primary grade water drain line using an adapter to increase to a 1-1/2 inch fire hose.
This connection is at the 738 ft. elevation in containment, the same elevation as the cable penetration a ca.
The second hose is' connected to a 2-1/2 inch primary grade water line drain at approximately the 700 ft. elevation in containment.
A 2-1/2 inch hose runs from the drain connection to the 738 ft. elevation.
At this elevation the hose is reduced to 1-1/2 inches and run to the 765 ft.
elevation with sufficient hose to allow for fighting a fire from the other side of the penetration area.
Primary grade water can be supplied to this temporary system using the two 200 gpm primary water supply pumps. The 80130403%
f
4 Seaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 Fire Protection System Information Page 2 pumps have a design pressure of 135 PSIG and a design head of 310 ft.
A 4
test performed shows a discharge pressure of 125 PSIC at the 738 ft.
elevation against a closed nozzle.
The pumps take suction from the two 75,000 gal. capacity primary water supply tanks.
The control switches for the punps are located in the control room.
i Procedures have been developed to direct personnel to utilize the temporary system when fighting a fire at the cable penetration area in containment.
Additionally, the smoke detectors in the cable penetration area described in the enclosure have been installed.
The completion of the installation is awaiting delivery of a panel to allow annunciation in the control room.
The delivery of the panel is expected by November 1, 1980 with installation and testing expected to take an additional two weeks.
We believe that these meesurer, provide adequate interim capability to fight a fire in the cable penetration area inside containment. We further believe that the threat of a fire in this area is remote because the cables are constructed of fire resistant materials, the availabic I
oxygen is reduced due to subatmospheric operation of the containment and because this area is seldom occupied during plant operation, thus elimi-nating ignition sources which may result from daily work activities.
Further. we cannot identify any source of air flow which would cause "blowtorching" and which would tend to sustain or propogate a fire once ignited.
3.3-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System PT-1A:
3.3-3 Component Cooling Water Pumps PA-lF: The following is the pre sent status of the modifications for these areas described in the entlosure.
The water component cooling water suppression system has beca installed.
The auxiliary feedwater pump area water suppression system is expected to be installed by the first week in November.
The early warning smoke detectors have been installed and are currently undergoing testing.
The heat detectors are presently being installed. After completion of construction, the heat detector system will also require testing.
The remaining items to be shipped for this system are expected to be received at the site by November 1,1980 and installation and testing of these items will be pursued without unnecessary delay until this system is fully operational, as designed.
Until the heat detector system becomes-operational, the deluge system will have to be activated manually. The operator, upon receiving a fire alarm in the control room, will dis-patch personnel to manually activate the deluge valves.
The deluge valve for the auxiliary feed pump area is located at the 722 ft. elevation in the east safeguards area and the deluge valve for the component cooling water pumps is located at the 735 ft. elevation in the au.iliary building.
y Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 Fire Protection System Information Page 3 3.3-4 Residual Heat Removal Pump: The modification described in the enclosure will not be completed by November 1, 1980.
These modifications are presently scheduled to be installed during the 2nd refueling outage, the date originally specified in the SER. We believe that an alternate shutdown capability pre =cntly exists should there be a loss of RRR due to fire..The plant can be brought to a cold shutdown condition without use of the RHR System by using either or both of the following methods:
1.
by dumping stea= to the condensor while maintaining the condensor under vacuum.
2.
by letting down through the pressurizer PORV's and providing makeup with the safety injection pumps.
(This procedure will be formalized as part of the Westinghouse Ovners Group Procedures on Loss of Heat Sink.)
3.3-5 Cable Spreading Area CS-1, CV-1. CV-2:
The fire detection coverage for this area meets the requirement of NFPA 72E and satisfies the concerns expressed in the SER.
Additionally, the rerouting of the 30 cables outside the cable spreading area to the alternate shutdown panel has been completed.
Therefore, independent, redundant shutdown capabilir; exists.
3.3-6 Ccble Tunnel CV-3: The modifications described in the attached enclosure have been completed.
No additional shutdown capability is required.
For the modifications completed, we failed to submit the modifications for your review prior to their implementation.
Full design details related to items 3.3-1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 are provided as an enclosure to this submittal for your review.
Concurrence for these designs was received from American Nuclear Insurers prior to implementation.
ANI has determined that these modifications are in compliance with the applicable NFPS codes. We are confident that these designs are in accordance with the descriptions in the SER.
We also wish to inform you that construction of the new building for contaminated waste storage described in sections 3.12.4 and 5.11.6.as not been initiated.
The recent developments in the reduction of,fsite waste disposal have made it necessary to reanalyze the capability for onsite storage facilities.
We have made every effort to comply with all the requirements of the proposed Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 by November 1, 1980.
Due to the large amount of other engineering and modification activities which were per-formed during the eleven month outage of the facility, we were not abic to complete certain work within the containment building, specifically the installation of automatic fire suppression equipment over the residual heat removal pumps and the electrical penetration areas and the installa-tion of numerous manual hose stations inside the building. We have determined:
i t
i Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
^
Docket No. 50-334 i
Fire Protection System Information Page 4 L
a) for the case of the RHR pumps that alternate shutdown
- capabi11ty exists.
b) that provisio'ns for the use of manual extinguishing equipment j
at the cabic penetration area has been made and equipment to detect and annunciate a fire in this area is presently being stalled.
We have determined that sufficient redundant or alternate shutdown t
J capability exists to assure that the Beaver Valley Power Station can be j
safely shutdown should a fire occur. We also believe that adequate provisions now exist to extinguish any fire which might occur.
i Very truly yours,
,t k<;
C. N.
Dunn Vice President, Operations cc:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. D. A. Beckman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077 i
i e
i l
(CORPORATE SEAL)
Attest:
kh~
D""
Thomas Welfer,Lar.
Secretary COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
) SS:
COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY On this c 9 o 'A day of OC 2 N6'0 1980, before me, DONATD W. MAvvnw a Notary Public in and for said Commonwealth and County, personally appeared C. N. Dunn, who being, duly sworn, deposed, and said that (1) he is Vice President cf Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.
b ~whWW8l ann ~
DONALD W. SHANNON, NOTARY PUBLIC PITTSBURGH. ALLEGHENY COUNTY MY COMMISS!ON EXPIRES JUNE 7,1983 Member, Pennsy! vans Associaton of Notaries
}
ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORE\\ TION BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-334
Reference:
Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (May 3, 1979)
Section 3.3 - Fire Suppression 3.3-1 Reactor Containment Cable Penetration
. Area Modificatica Purpose The purpose of the modification is to provide adequate fire protection coverage for the East and West Reactor Containment Cable Penetration Areas. This is to include fire detection, signaling and water suppression systems.
System Description Each redundant reactor containment cable penetrations area will be provided with a remotely operated, manually activated, open-head water spray daluge system.
Each area will utilize two detection schemes:
thermal detectors of the rate compensation type and smoke detectors of the photoelectric and ionization types.
Each system consists of two early warning ionization smoke detectors, two early warning photoelectric smoke detectors and four water spray system thermal heat detectors. The layout of these detectors is in accordance with NFPA 72D, and follows guidelines in Appendix A of NFPA 72E as a minimum. Additional detectors, in excess of the minimums established by NFPA 72E, are added based upon a review of the area so protected.
Since actual or simulated fire conditions would not be feasible, approval of the system layout by the local authority having jurisdiction indicates the system meets the number and pattern requirements established by experience and engineering practice and NFPA Standards.
The fire protection alarm system is an NFPA 72D Class B system, except the early warning smoke detector systems, which are Clasa A within the area protected (this includes the detectors and the connections to the local supervisory panel; the connection of the local panel to the main tire protection panel in the control room is Class B circuitry).
The fire alarm circuits are Class I as defined in NFPA 70.
The power supplies for the main fire protection panel in the control room and for each fire suppression system originate from the station d-c distribution system. The d-c system load requirements are normally met by the output of the charger (rectifier) associated with each battery.
The battery " floats" on the output of the charger.
In the event the charger is incapacitated, the battery supplies power to the d-c distri-bution system to supply the necessary d-c loads.
The charger is fed from a safety-related 480 V a-c motor control center which receives power from the off-site station power system, or when
this la not available, from the diesel generator associated with that bus.
The fire detector system (alarm and annunciation only) receives power from station 120 V a-c power supplies. These a-c power supplies are very reliabic and are derived from the normal (on-site) station service power distribution system or, in the event this source of power is not available, from the reserve (of f-site) station power system.
These power systems are designed such that a loss of a-c power in the normal system auto-matically initiates a transfer to the reserve station service power distribution system. This assures continued availability of power for the fire detection systems.
The actuation of any one smoke or heat detector in either cable pene-trctions area provides a FIRE alarm for that area on the fire protection control panel in the control room.
The control room operator must manually open the containment isolation valve (CIA not present), master deluge. valve and applicable area deluge valve. Waterflow and master deluge valve supervision is provided with a circuit trouble alarm in the control rcom. Water spray through all heads is immediate for the area activated through normally open head nozzles.
The water spray deluge system receives its water supply up to the master deluge valve from the station fire main supply. The containment penetra-tion and inside containment spray system arrangement remains a dry pipe system until activated. Each area is provided with a fifteen 14NA nozzle arrangement for complete area ecverage approved by the local authority having jurisdiction.
The system is seismic, QA Category III.
Justification The reactor containment cable penetrations area detection, j
signaling and water spray systems meet the requirements of NFPA-13, 70, 4
I 72D and 72E (location, spacing, sensitivity).
The implementation of the above described modification satisfies the objective identified in l
Section 2.2 of the referenced report.
t i
Design documents in support of the modificatien are shown on the List of References.
1 i
4 t
I m
.,m, zm-m -
3.3-2 Auxiliary Feedwater System Modification PURPOSE - The purpose of the modification is to provide adequate fire protection coverage for the Auxiliary Feedwater System Area. This is to include a fire detection, signaling and water suppression system.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION - The Auxiliary Feedwater Pamp area will be provided with an aut. matic preaction sprinkler spray system using closed heads and j
a smoke and N at detector system installed in the same area as the sprinklers; actuatton of any fire detector as from a fire, opens a deluge valve which petmits fire main water to flow into the sprinkler piping system and to be discharged from any sprinklers which may be open.
3 The detection system consists of 7 early warning ionization smoke detectors and 7 preaction system thermal heat detectors. The layout of r
j these detectors is in accordance with NFPA 13, based upon a reniew of the area so protected and approved by the local authority having jurisdiction
]i for the number and pattern requirements established. The fire protection alarm system and power supply requirements are as described in Section 3.3-1.
1
}
The actuation of any one smoke detector provides a FIRE alarm'on the j
fire protection control panel in the control room.
The actuation of any one heat detector automatically opens the master deluge valve.
i Waterflow, detector and master deluge valve supervision is provided with a circuit trouble alarm in the control room. Water spray is provided through only those heads which are fused. The area is provided with 12
~l EA-1:l/4 in and 6 EA-1:3/8 in nozzles rated at 250 F for complete area coverage. The system is seismic, QA Category III.
JUSTIFICATION - The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump area detection, signaling and preaction sprinkler system meets the requirements of NFPA-13, 70, 72D and 72E (location, spacing, sensitivity). The implementation of the above-described modification satisfies the objective identified in Section 2.2 of the referenced report.
Design documents ta support of this modification are shown on the List of References.
= - -
~
3.3-3 Component Cooling Water Pumps Area Modificatiou PURPOSE - The purpose of the modification is to provide adequate fire protection coverage for the Component Cooling Water Pumps area.
This is to include a fire detection, signaling and water suppression system.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION - The Component Cooling Water Pumps area will be provided with an automatic preaction sprinkler spray system using closed heads and a smoke and heat detector system installed in the same area as i
the sprinklers; actuation of any fire detector as from a fire, opens a deluge valve which permits fire main water to flow into the sprinkler piping system and to be dis. charged from any sprinklers which may be open.
The detection system consists of six early warning ionization smoke detectors and six preaction system thermal beat detectors. The layout of l
these detectors is in accordance with NFPA 13 and 72E, based upon a review of the area so protected and approved by the local authority having jurisdiction for the number and pattern requirements established.
The fire protection alarm system and power supply requirements are as described in Section 3.3-1.
The actuation of any one smoke detector provides a FIRE alarm on the fire protection control panel in the' control room. ~The actuation of any one heat detector automatically opens the master deluge valve.
Waterflow, detector and master deluge valve supervision is provided with a circuit trouble alarm in the control room. Water spray is provided through only those heads which are fused.
The area is provided with 18 EA-1:1/4 in nozzles rated at 250 F for complete area coverage.
The system is seismic, QA Category III.
JUSTIFICATION - The Component Cooling Pumps area detection, signaling and preaction sprinkler system meets the requirements of NFPA-13, 70, 72D and 72E (location, spacing, sensitivity).
The implementation of the above-described modification satisfies the objective identified in Section 2.2 of the referenced report.
Design documents in support of this modification are shown on the List of*
References.
1
3.3-4 Residual Heat Removal Pump Area Modification Purpose The purpose of this modification is to provide adequate fire protection coverage for the Residual Heat Removal Pumps anl Heat Exchangers Area. This is to includa fire detection, signaling and water suppression systems.
System Description The remotely operated, canually activitated, open-head water spray deluge system for this area is identical to the basic design for fire detection, signaling and water suppression system described for the reactor containment cable penetrations area in Section 3.3-1.
Specific differences are herein described.
The detection system consists of four early warning ionization smoke detectors, four early warning photoelectric smoke detectors and eight water spray system thermal heat detectors.
The detector layout, alarm systems, power suppliers, and system actuation criteria are as cescribed in section 3.3-1.
The actuation of any one smoke or heat detector in the RHR Pump / Heat Exchanger area provides a FIRE alarm for that area on the fire protection control panel in the control room. The control room operator n.ust nanually open the containment isolation valve (CIA not present), and cc. ster deluge valve. Waterflow and master deluge valve supervision is provided with a circuit trouble alarm in the control room. Water spray through all heads is immediate for the entire area through normally open head nozzles.
The water spray deluge system receives its water supply up to the water deluge valve from the station fire main supply. The containment penetra-tion and inside containment spray system arrangement re=ains a dry pipe system until activated.
The area is provided with a sixteen EA-1:l/4 in nozzle /six EA-1:3/8 in nozzle arrangement for complete area coverage approved by the local authority having jurisdiction. This exceeds the minimu=s established by NFPA 72E, based upon a review of the area so protected.
This system is seismic, QA Category III.
Justification The Residual, Heat Removal Pump and Heat Exchanger area detection, signaling and water spray system meets the requirements of NFPA-13,70, 72D and 72E (location, spacing, sensitivity). The implementa-tion of the above described modification satisfies the objective identified in Section 2.2 of the referenced report.
Design documents in support of this modification are shown on the List of References.
3.3-5 Cable Spreading Area CS-1, CV-1, CV-2 PURPOSE - The purpose of this question was to verify fire detection coverage conforms to NFPA-72 recommendations.
i SYSTEM DESCRIPTION - The plant is provided with a fire detection and alarm system consisting of manual pull stations snroughout the plant and fire detectors located in various safety-related and high hazard areas.
Ionization type detectors are utilized in most of the detection 4
systems with heat type detectors used to actuate fixed CO2 and water deluge systems. Detector spacing in the plant was found to be generally more conservative than the spacing guidance outlined in NFPA 72E and should result in reasonable detector response times.
Fire detectors are located in the following safety-related areas:
Fire.
Ionization Zone Plant Identification No. of Detectors l
E S-1 Emergency SWGR Room A 5
Battery Room 1 1
i Battery Boom 3 1
E SW2 Emergency SWGR Room B 5
Battery Room 2 1
Battery Room 4 1
MG-1 MG Rod Control Room 4
CR-4 Process Inst. & Rod Position 12 CR-2 Air Cond. Equip. Room 2
./
Pump Room 2
CR-3 Communication Equip. Room 2
N S-1 480 & 4160 SWGR Room 13 CR-1 Control Room 7
Office 1
Computer Room 2
CG-1 Diesel Gen,erator Room 3
DG-2 Diesel Generator Room 3
CSW1 Cable Tray Mezzanine 31 CV-1 West Cable Vault 3
West Cable Tunnel 2
CV-2 East Cable Vault 3
East Cable Tunnel 2
The detector and pull station circuits are connected to a central processor unit in the control room. An alarm or trouble signal will immediately sound an audible signal and will display the location, status and type of alarm. Actuation of a detector or pull station will also sound all the station fire alarm horns. The installed system is in conformance with NFPA 72D and all circuits are supervised to indicate loss of power, undervoltage, short circuits, open circuits or ground faults.
4 i
Actuation of Zixed CO2 and water extinguishing systems are arranged to i
alarm and annunciate at the fire alarm panel in the control room.
. _ = -. -
e.
3.3-6 Cable Tunnel CV-3 Area Modification PURPOSE - The purpose of the modification is to provide adequate fire l
protection coverage for the Cable Tunnel CV-3 area. This is to include i
fire detection, a rapid access hatchway and portable CO extinguisher.
2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION - The Cable Tunnel CV-3 is provided with six early warning ionization smoke detectors with annunciation on the fire protection control panel in the control room.
The fire protection alarm system, power supplies and actuation criteria are as desc"ik'.d in Section 3.3-1.
The layout of these detectors is in acco
.nce with 1
NFPA 72D, and follows guidelines in Appendix A of NFPA 72E as a minimum.
j Additional detectors, in excess of the minimums established by NFPA 72E,are added based upon a review of the area so protected.
l Since actual or simulated fire conditions would not be feasible, approval of the system layout by the local authority ha" ig jurisdiction indicates the system meets the number and pattern requirements established by experience and engineering practice and NFPA standards.
A rapid access P,ilco type "J" aluminum hatch is provided at the northwest j
end of the cable tunnel.
Portable CO, fire extinguishers are located near the access hatch. On alarm in the control room, the fire brigade is dispatched to access CV-3 with CO extinguishers and combat the 2
prospective Class C fire. The size and location of the CO, fire extinguishers is in accordance with NFPA-10 for Class C fires.
JUSTIFICrtION - The Cable Tunnel CV-3 area detection and signaling meet the requirements of NFPA-10, 70, 72D and 72E. The implementation of the i
above-described modification satisfies the objective identified in j
Section 2.2 of the referenced report.
}
Design documents in support of this modification are shown on the List of f
References.
i f
i
~
i 1
2-12690.85-3
'l
. = _.
2 Rsfereness For Stetions I
3.3-1. 3.3-2, 3.3-3. 3.3-4. 3.3-6 i
Applicable Drawing Title Section j
11700-RB-2L,M,N,P-0A-1 Fire Protection Arrangement All 1
11700-RB-16B,C-0A-1 Flow Diagram Fire Protection All
[
t 11700-RB-116C-0A-1 Operating Manual Flow Diagram All 3
Fire Protection 11700-RB-36A,5,C,D-0A-2 Fire Protection Reactor Containment 3.3-1 3.3-4 12690.B5-SK-F-30-2 Smoke Detectors Cable Penetration /
3.3-1 Safeguard Area 3.3-2 i
f 11700-LSK-20-1A,B.C,D,E, Logic Diagram Water Fire 3.3-1 F,G-4A-1 Protection System Sprinklers 3.3-2 4
3.3-3 3.3-4 11700-RB-10A-8A-1 Floor & Equipment Drains SH.1 3.3-2 Turbine Area el. 693' - 6" j
11700-RB-10C-0A-1 Floor & Equipment Drains SH.3 3.3-2 Pipe Tunnel & Turbine Area 11700-RB-12B-6B-1 Fire Protection & Plumbing SH.2 3.3-2 Turbine Area 3.3-3 ll700-RB-12D-0A-2 Fire Protection & Plumbing SH.4 3.3-2 Turbine Area ll700-RB-30E,F-0A-2 Fire Protection SH.5,6 3.3-2 Cable Vault / Safeguards Area 3.3-3 11700-LSK-20-5A-3A-1 Lrgic Diagram Fire ?rotection System 3.3-2 3.3-3 3.3-6 11700-RB-6C-6A-4 Fire Protection Plumbing SH.3 3.3-3 Floor & Roof Drains Aux. Bldg.
11700-RB-6L-0A-1 Fire Protection Plumbing 3.3-3 Floor & Roof Drains Aux. Bldg.
12690.85-SK-F-32-2 Smoke Detectors Aux. Bidg.
3.3-3 CCP & CHP Areas 12690.85-SK-F-31-2 Smoke Detectors Containment 3.3-4 i
RHR Pump Areas 12690.85-SK-F-28-2 Smoke Detectors Cable 3.3-6 4
Tunnel - Control Room
j DOCU
~
fMMB P A G.
m I
l-
]
AkO.nncvc -
M 3d NO. OF PAGES REASON-O PAGE ILLEGIBLE:
O HARD COPY FILED AT:
/
_1 D BETTER COh' REQUESTED ON -
l D PAGE TOO LARGE TO FILM.
O HARD CW FILED ATdOD CF OTHER O FILMED ON APERTURE CARD N l#T8
$6//09'o37C 0 M.
l
.-