ML20079H922
| ML20079H922 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1982 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-11111, NUDOCS 8212170200 | |
| Download: ML20079H922 (112) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:. _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ? " ' EP"- Telephone (412) 4564000 Nuclear Division P.O. Box 4 Shippingport, PA 150711)004 December 10, 1982
- Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Washington, DC 20555
Reference:
Beaver Valley Power Station Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 Supplemental Information to Fire Protection - Appendix R Review Report Centlemen: This letter is provided to summarize the November 30, 1982 meeting between the NRC staff reviewers and Duquesne Light Company personnel and to document the understandings mutually agreed upon by both parties with regard to Appendix R - Fire Protection Rule. During the November 30, 1982 meeting held at the Beaver Valley Site, Duquesne Light Company (DLC) provided the NRC staf f reviewers with preliminary r(sponses to questions received from the NRC via telecon on November 18, 1982. The finalized responses to the questions are provided as an attachment to this letter. Duquesne Light Company provided a detailed description and overview of the proposed safe shutdown methodology at the meeting and discussed the various flowpaths of the systems and equipment which would be required to accomplish safe shutdown under 10CFR50 Appendix R Consideration. In summary: Charging System (CVCS) to provide:
- seal injection to the Reactor Coolant Pumps
- Boron Injection Tank (BIT) boration
- makeup and boration to the RCS from the RWST Reactor Plant River Water System (RPRWS) to provide cooling for:
- Charging pump seal / lube oil coolers
- Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Coolers / f
- Containment Air Recirc Coolers q[){[h h Auxiliary Feedwater System (A FW) to naintain:
.)
- Stean generator level / heat sink I hgMl
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PDR ADOCK 05000334 F PDR
Beaver Valley Powar Station, Unit No.1
# Dockst No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
- r Supplemental Infotbation to Fire Protection
! Appendix R Review Report Page 2 h j Natural Circulation of the RCS with associated instrumentation. Pressurizer and Reactor Head Vent System for cooling, letdown and depressurization purposes. } Onsite (Diesel Generator) Power and associated electrical j equipment. Operations flow diagrams were reviewed and discussed in detail. The i diagrams were graphically color-coded to show the flowpaths that would be utilized in the alternative shutdown procedure and are listed below: RM-124A - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Feedwater System RM-155A - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Reactor Coolant System - SH1 RM-155B - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Recctor Coolant System - SH2 RM-129B - Operating Manual Flow Diagram - Air Conditioning Chilled Water Piping. RM-159A - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Chemical and Volume Control System-SH1 RM-127B - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Intake Structure (River Water System) RM-157D - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Component Cooling Water - SH4 RM-127A - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - River Water System RM-120A - Valve Oper. No. Diag. - Main Steam The majority of the ciectrical questions were discussed separately during the first part of the meeting. The major topics discussed for the elec-trical section were: Pressurizer heaters Availability and location of power sources Limit or inhibit func tions De-energizing power to the limit or inhibit functions. Cu rrent t rans forme rs
'-- Open secondaries causing breaker trip and damage Control cable loss Manual operation of equipment Universal power supplies Operation and availability Diesel Generator Proposed modifications (Section 6.10 of Appendix R Report)
The question on current transformers, was clarified by the NRC staf f reviewers and the response was re-evaluated and summarized on Page 17.1 of the question / response attachments.
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=
\ > j Braver Valley Powar Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 - Supplemental Inforhation to Fire Protection . Appendix R Review Ekport Page 3 The niternative shutdown method was previously docketed in our October 28, 1982 submittal letter and attachment titled " Appendix R - Alternate Shutdown Procedures". Upon considerable discussion, the determination was made that the design capability to achieve cold shutdown conditions using the water solid steam generator heat removal method could be accomplished in approximately 127 hourc following plant shutdown and that the availability of a water supply for the auxiliary feedwater system would be sufficient over this time period. The initial conditions for entry into the procedure, for fires in critical areas, were described to demonstrate that a significant portion of the alternate shutdown alignment could be done from the control room within a ten minute time frame by three (3) operating personnel. Key motor operated valve flow paths would be hardened by de-energizing those valves in the required condition to assare long term flow path availability. The cooldown calculations and assumptions are documented in the response to question nudber 4 (page . 4.1). Based. on discussion of the instrumentation being provided as the licensee proposed Backup Indication Panel (BIP), Duquesne Light Company agreed to provide local steam pressure indication near the Power Operated Relief Valves and Residual Heat Release Valve area which would be the location where the operator would be manually controlling steam pressure. The areas of contention which were identified at the meeting are summarized below:
- 1) Source range monitoring indication external to the control room.
- 2) Use of thermocouples vs. hot leg temperature indication at the Backup Indication Panel (BIP).
- 3) Use of steam generator pressure indication vs. cold leg temperature indication.
Per telecon on December 6, 1982 a mutual agreement was reached to provide source range monitoring indication external to the control room. Duquesne Light Company will provide a source range instrument drawer at the Backup Indication Panel (BIP) to be installed in the East Cable Vault (CV-2), with the ability to hook up to the pre-amplifier output within one (1) hour af ter the time at which source range indication would be available af ter a reactor trip. j
l 1: , Prayer Valley Powar Station,- Unit No.1 Dockat No. 50-334,.Licehse No. DPR-66
- Supplemental Infofmation to Fire Protection Appendix R Review Report Page 4 Contentions #2 and #3 above were resolved per telecon on December 9,1982.
Duquesne Light Company agreed to provide hot leg and cold leg RCS tem-perature indication at the BIP in the cable vault area as shown below: CONTAINMENT (RC-1) CV-2 CV-1 East Cable Vault West Cable Vault Loop A - T Loop A - T h Loop B - T g Loop B - T h Loop C - T h L P C-T C The above scheme will provide indication for both T and T instrument channela. '1his arrangement representshour finai position on these instruments with respect to Appendix R, 10 CFR 50 and Reg. Guide 1.97, Rev. 2. Altho g we maintain, based on our review of natural circulation test data , that the incore thermocouples are adequate for hot leg tem-perature indication during single phase flow conditions and steam pressure can be interpreted as n cold leg temperature, we have proposed an alternate arrangement to satisfy the NRC Staf f in this . regard. It is our understanding that the final resolutions would be identified in the evaluation report by the NRC. Please contact my staf f if additional information or clarification is necessary.
Reference:
i 1 (1) North Anna Natural Circulation Test Report July 2-2, 1980 - Results of the Semiscale MOD-ZA Natural Circulation Experiments NUREG 1CR-2335, LOFT Natural Circulation Test Report (ECG LOFT-5664) I
- Beaver Valley Powar Station, Unit No.1
- Docket No. 50-334,. License No. DPR-66 ,
I Supplemental Information to Fire Protection Appendix R Review Report Page 5 Very truly ,
- Cg
. J. Carey Vice President, Nuclear enclosures cc: Mr. W. M. Troskowski, Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Beaver Valley Power Station Shippingport, PA 15077 1
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission c/o Document Management Branch Washington, DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement Attn: R. C. Haynes, Regional Director Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Licensing Attn: D. G. Eisenhut, Director Washington, DC 20555 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: S. J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission Washington, DC 20555
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7 ' L Question . It appears from a review of the subnittals received to date 1. that Appendix R, Section III.L does apply. Why does the October 28, 1982 letter state it does not apply? Res po nse As documented in the October 28, 1962 letter, the final rule, as applicable to our facility which was licensed to operate prior to January 1,1979, requires us to comply with III.G. , III.J. , and III.O. , only. The NRC memorandum from Mattson to Vollmer, which clarifies NRC position on the applicability of III.L., was given to us October 14, 1982 which was well after the required submittal deadline date of June 20, 1982 for our Appendix R review report. For the determination of how many hours it would take to achieve cold shutdown, refer to the response to question #4 of how licensee will achieve the requirement. In summary, the calculations show that using a flow rate of 500 gpm auxiliary feedwater flow cold shutdown (200*F) would be achieved in approximately 127 hours. The method for achieving safe shutdown conditions are discussed in responses to questions 3, 5, and 11. l.1
i k . Question
- 2. What areas does the licensee plan to provide alternate shutdown around?
- 13. Will alternative shutdown be provided for each area discussed in Chapter 6?
Response
Per Appendix R definition of alternative shutdown capability, it is that which is "provided by rerouting, relocating, or modificating of existing systems: dedicated shutdown capability is provided by installing new structures or systems for the function of post-fire shutdown." In Summary: Appendix R Section Alternative S.D. Capability 6.9 CO St rage /PG Pump Room: 2 Relocating MOV-RW-113D from this area to DG-2 area 6.10 Normal Swgr. (NS-1), Cable Spreading Room (CS-1), Inst. Rack Room (CR-4), Relay Room (CR-3), Control Room Air Cond. Room (CR-2): modifications of the #2 DG control circuit and wiring. 6.12 Motor Control Centers (480V) E-MCC's Modify circuits (provide current limiting devices for the control transformers) . Appendix R Section Dedicated S.D. Capability 6.2 Auxiliary FW System: Install new Aux FW pump 6.11 B.I.P. Install new instrument panel in ~ CV-2, East Cable Vault (purple). (See attached info. on BIP) . NOTE: Additional modifications committed to in Section 6 are considered fire protection / prevention " fixes" and are not identified as either alternate or dedicated. They are: 2.1
- - - . . -_.~.n--.
i
~
j . Section 6.8 Cable Tunnel (CV-3)*: Install Halon System Section 6.4 Charging Pump Cubicles (PA-1g, if, lh) Install fire dampers between cubicles in the ductwork and seal B cubicle opening Sections 6.5 Portable ventilation capability for areas: 6.6 PA-1g, lh, if f 6.7 ES-1 & 2 CR-2
- In addition to mod. , exemption (section 11.5) requested for CV-3.
o
.' 7 "DRAFI" BACKUP INDICATING PANEL The Backup Indicating Panel and associated transfer switches and power supplies shall be capable of the following:
I. Transfer of the following instruments to the BIP for indication:
- 1. PT-RC-403 RCS Loop 1 B Hot Leg WR Pressure
- 2. LT-P4-475 1A SG Narrow Range Level
- 3. LT-FW-485 1B SG Narrow Range-Level
- 4. LT-FW-495 1C SG Narrow Range Level
- 5. LT-RC-460 PZR Level
- 7. TRB-RC-410 1A RCS Cold Leg Temp.
- 8. TRB-RC-420 1B RCS Cold Leg Temp.
- 9. TRB-RC-430 1C RCS Cold Leg Temp.
- 10. TC-28 Incore Thermocouple
- 11. TC-29 Incore Thermocouple
- 12. TC-31 Incore Thermocouple
- 13. TC-38 Incore Thermocouple
- 14. TC-40 Incore Thermocouple
- 15. TC-43 Incore Thermocouple
- 16. TC-45 Incore Thermocouple
- 17. TC-46 Incore Thermocouple
[I. Transfer Control and Provide d.c. Power to Operate the Following Valves:
- 1. TV-CC110E2 (SOV-CC110E2
- 2. TV-CC110E3 (SOV-CC110E3
- 3. TV-CC110B (SOV-CC1108)
- 4. TV-CC110D (SOV-CC1100)
- 5. TV-CC110F1 (SOV-CC110F1)
- 6. SOV-RC1038
- 7. SOV-RC1028
- 8. SOV-RC105 ,
NOTE: A d.c._ breaker panel shall also be provided with 3 or 4 breakers to aid in repair procedures. XII, 120 Vac shall be provided to the BIP to operate the instrument power supplies and the d.c. power source for the solenoid valves. ATTACHMENT 1 l j
f. Question
- 3. Appendix R, Section III.L.5 requires the capability to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours. How does the licensee plan to meet this requirement?
- 5. How does using the steam generators as a solid system, an untried and risky operation, justify not have au RHR cap-ability? What method will be utilized for decay heat removal if this method is not approved?
Response
Duquesne Light resorted to this water solid heat exchanger operation option because of several potential safety concerns that would be associ-ated with placing the RHR System in service from any area outside the control room. It is our position that a full complement of CVCS, RHR, RW and RCS instrumentation, annunciators and coatrols for diagnostics is necessary to place the RHR System in service, therefore, this operation can only be done safely from the control room without increasing the " risk of a release to the public or damaging shutdown equipment and com-pounding the potential consequences of fire related failures. The safety concerns associated with placing the RHR System in service from outside the control room, include, but are not limited to the following:
-flashing the RHR System due to either of the RHR inlet motor-oper-ated valves failing " closed" due to railures of pressure transmitters
[PT-RC-402] or (PR-RC-403] with the valve energized for nyerpressure protection.
-releases (extended relief valve operation) to the public due to mal-functions in pressure, level or temperature control loops or instru-ments in the letdown flow path, failures of component cooling water to any of the CVCS components and boron recovery systems.
-damage to the charging pump (due to failures above) through reliance on the VCT and letdown flow path as a source of suction to the charging pumps.
-loss of letdown flow due to fire induced control and protection system failures such as letdown isolation, SIS, VCT level changeover, high temperature divert, SIS automatic changeover, makeup system malfunction, VCT pressure control with subsequent damage to the operating charging pump.
By referring to the possible use of the water to water heat exchanger heat removat method, we neither condoned or committed the tae of this method. It was only addressed as a potential means which could be employed to attempt to meet the 72 hour criteria. A transcript of the minutes from the December 17, 1981 NUFPG/NRC hketing, Issue 5, stated, "there is no requirement that a plant be in cold shutdown within 72 hours af ter a fire rather only the capability to achieve that condition must be demonstrated." This method was referenced as part of this " capability" but our hand cal-culation have since shown that it would take approximately 127 hours to
--- mn . . - .
O Response (continued) achieve that cold shutdown condition without challenging the operating auxiliary feedpump unnecessarily at high flow rates. The identical NUFPG/ NRC meeting minutes, Issue 5, stated that the " Staff's major consideration with the 72 hour value was the demonstration of the adequacy and availability of a water supply on site." This being the case, an exemption was requested on the 72 hour requirement because we have a safety related makeup source of water to supply the auxiliary feed pumps indefinitely. It is our position that the RHR System would not be placed into operation unless the control room could be occupied with the necessary controls and indications available to execute the operation. Therefore, if the water to water heat exchanger ' method is not acceptable, the only remaining method would be pulling a vacuu= on the main steam lines and steam generators when steam bleed op-erations became ineffective for heat removal (i.e. Tave stabilized with maximum steam relief valves opened at low steam pressure). This method would require installation of a vacuum line between the steam lines and Vacuum Priming System and temporary 4160 volt /480 volt pownr to non IE equipment from the diesel generators. Certain fires could disable both mechanical vacuum pumps, therefore reliance could not always be placed on this method but it does diversify the means available. If this method of attaining cold shutdown was not available for oper-ation and the water to water heat exchanger method is not acceptable, the plant would remain at the Tave of approximately 257'F on steam bleed / feed until the necessary repairs could be made on the CVCS/RHR/CCR Systems and placed into service from the control room. See attached "cooldown temperature vs. time af ter trip" curve and response to question #4 for determination of the curve. 9 O
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Question t 4. How long will it take the plant to reach cold shutdown after a fire?
Response
See attached EM J70,882 for the cooldown calculations and deter-mination of the time required to achieve cold shutdown. (See attached). 4.1
l ( -
SUBJECT:
EM-70882, Cooldown Calculation to estimate the time involved in cooling down the BVPS-1 Plant to 200 F, using the steam generators and one auxiliary feedwater pump. TABLE OF CONTENTS a SUBJECT TITLE PAGES PURPOSE 1 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 2-3 METHODOLOGY 4-12 PARAMETRIC VALUES USED 13-18 REFERENCES 19-22
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._. __.- _1 . . , 7
Purpose:
The purpose of this c=Im'1ation is to roughly estimate the time involved in cooling down the BVPS-1 Plant to 200*F using the steam generators, atmospheric dmp valves, and one auxiliary feedwater pmp. The starting point for the calmslation is the primary side and steam generators at h w ature = 350'F @ t=8 hrs after reactor trip. Gerarally @ T=350*F, the residual Heat Remotsl System would be used to bring the plant to 200*F. In this case, it has been assuned that the auxiliary feehater systen must fulfill dis function. The primary side is assumed to be on Natttral Circulation. The mode of cooldown will be to very slowly cooldown at the rate of 1.5'F/ hour to sinulate a slow tham =1 cooldown transient. This part of the cooldown will have the steaming out rate = auxiliary feedwater inlet rate which enables a m oldown at constant steam generator mass. This is contin = 1 until the steam valves are wide open. Then a step change to 350 GPM of atwiliary feed-water is initiated to the stean generators, enabling the cooldown to continue with a variable increasing steam generator mass. This is continued until the system *amnavature is at 200'F or the steam generators are water solid. In the latter case, if the systan is not at 200*F, a step change to 500 GPM of atwiliary feedwater is initiated and a time is calculated to reach 200'F. This last process would be a cooldown with v stant steam generator mass, but the exhaust stream is saturated or slightly subcooled liquid, instead of steaming out by saturated steam. 4 L _ ._ ________-___ _ _- ____- . . -
~
2 Results and Conclusions Frtan the p2Vposed modes of operation: - at t = 70 hours after trip, Systan Ternperature = 257'F. at t = 73 hours after trip, Systan T-rature = 218'F, and the steam generators are roughly water solid. at t = 127 hours 'after trip, Systan Teroperature = 200*F. The conclusion is that a 350 GM notar driven ptanp will not cool the plant to 200*F in less than 72 hours, but may in 127 hours. O N 9 L_____________
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4 MgrnnmmGY The problen of cooldown will be treated frun a First Iaa of themodyranic approach, wnere the systan will be the steam generator and its fluid and metal content. The generalized energy balance provides the following: (Pate of Energy In) - (Rate of Energy Out) = (Rate of Energy Amm11ated) This is the Energy Balance on the Steam Generator. Rate 4f Energy In = 1) Rate of Decay Heat fran the reactor (since the reactor is tripped)
+2) Rate of stored sensible heat of the Metal (prirrary)
+3) Rate of stored sensible heat of the primary fluid
+4) Rate of Auxiliary Feedwater energy being supplied to the steam generator.:.
At this point, it is assuned that potential energy, Kinetic Energy, and work terms are either negligible or zero fran the energy "In", "Out" and ammilated tems. This is done to greatly simplify the calculation and is generally done in cooldawn calculations. Fran the nunbered terns in the " Rate of Energy In" equation, they are as follows: I
- 1) = Qd (t) -- Decay heat rate fran the reactor, whli is a function of
_- _. time after trip; BTU /ER -
- 2) = (M Cp dr' gPrimary netal M = Mass of the Primary Metal, LBM Cp = Specific Heat of the Primary Metal, BTU /LB *F dr - Rate of temperature change of the Primary metal, *F/HR. If the E primary netal is being cooled down then dr is (-).
at By definition, dr = T (t ) - T (t ) 2 l E t2 -% < Nhere 2t - is time at a time y g. For cool &wn T(t ) 4 T (t y) and thus dr/dt is negative. 2 3
5
- 3) = (bCp dr) primary fluid E
M-Mass of fluid in the Primary, LBM Cp-Specific Heat of fluid mass in the Primary, BTU /LBM 'F dr/dt+1erature change of the Primary Fluid, 'F/HR If the fluid heats up dr/dt=+ If the fluid cools down dr/dt= -
- 4) = $NW x HAEW hAEW = Mass flow rate of Auxiliary Feedwater being delivered, LEM/HR HAEW = Enthalpy of the Auxiliary Feedwater being delivered, BTU / IBM Rate of Energy Out = b Steam x H Steam out out k Steam Out = Rate of Steam leaving the steam generator, LBM HR H Steam Out- Steam Enthalpy ccmirg out of the Steam Generator It is assuned that the Enthalpy it of the Steam Generator is the saturated steam enthalpy at a given pressure or Hg (BIU/LBM); at a later time in
' the cooldown H outlet beccmes H SAT Liquid (BIU/LB) .
The mass flowrate of steam being renoved fran the steam generator will depend upon how much the downstream dtznp valves will pemit to dung
' to atmosphere. It will be assuned for this m1mlation that the steam dung valves will have controinhility d-@ the transient. (These are valves nunbered PO-MS-101A,101B,101C, on Flow Diagram, " Main Steam No. ,8700-RM-14A" (Stone & Webster drawing),
(As explained later in this calm 1ation, additional release of steam gerbrator fluid will be amliahed through release in the 2" Main Steam Trip Valve Bypass Lines. These valves are bymsM around TVMS101A,
- 101B,101C in the Main Steam Lines) .
4' L ,,
l . 6
'Ihe Mass Flow Rate of saturated steam leaving the steam generator can be expressed as:
[4 Steam = 2.lCy X d (d P) (Pinlet + Poutlet) Where & P = Pinlet - Poutlet to the valve Cy - Valve flow coefficient M Steam - Flowrate cf saturated steam through the valve in IBMIR. This formula applies for saturated flew of steam through control valves. It can be obtaim3 frun " Perry's Ch=4m1_ Engiwr4ng Handbook" (4th Edition) and "Ma m ilan Handbook for Control Valve Sizing". (3rd Edition,1971) For purposes of this mimlation, it will be assuned that the pressure drop fran the steam generator outlet to the steam dung valve inlet will be negligible and the valve will essentially "see" Saturated Stean Pressure at its inlet. Therefore, if Saturated Steam Pressure is at the inlet to the Valve (call this PSAT) and atnospheric Pressure is Tt the discharge, then Pinlet = PSAT ' Poutlet = 14.7 PSIA Further, for the relationship between PSAT and TSAT fran the ASME Steam Tables, the following table and formula can be constructed: TSAT (F*) PSAT (PSIA) 353 145 347.3 130 341.3 120 334.8 110 327.8 100 320.3 90 312 80 302.9 70 292.7 60 281 50 267.3 40 250.3 30 228.0 20 212.0 14.7 193.2 10 If this data is plotted on IOG-IOG Paper in the fonn of PSAT vs TSAT, the following functional relationship can be constructed: P = BT 4* 41 -10 where B = 8.092 X 10 4 or PSAT = (8.092 X 10-10 ) TSAT *41 PSAT - PSIA TSAT 'F
( .
+
7 Substituting this relationship into the steam fl w rate equation gives the following: M Steam = 2.1 Cy d (Pinlet - Poutlet) (Pinlet + Poutlet)
# 2
= 2.1 C y I (Pinlet - Poutlet )
Pinlet = 8.092 X 10 -10 TSAT 4*41 Poutlet = 14.7 psia
-10
'M Steam = 2.lCy s (8.092 X 10 TSAT )2 - (14.7) 2 8
= 30.87 C y d(3.03X10-21) T .82_1 s .
Therefore, M Steam = M Steam (Cy , T) Fran the " Specification for Main Steam Aba.miteric Dutp Valves" for BVPS-1, the manufacturer, Copes vulcan, states that the valve will pass 418,074 LBM/HR @ Pinlet = 1025 psig + 14.7 = 1039.7 psia Poutlet = 14.7 psia Plugging these nutters into the above equation and solving for C y give: Cy = 192. This would be the equivalent yd for the valve full open. The manufacturer states a full open C y = 216. However, a C y = 192 will be used for conservatively underestimating the steam f1w release. Rate of Energy A'm_= lated = d (U) dt U = Internal energy of the fluid and metal inside the steam generators. Since it is assuned that potential Energy and Kinetic Energy effects are, negligible then U = H. dH = du dH = Cpdr dU = Cpdr, en a per LB Basis dU = m Cpdr on an absolute BTU Basta, Rate of energy accunulated = d (M Cp T) Secondary Ht Usually Cp - Specific heat of fluid and metal is constant. 7 d (M Cp T) = C d (MT) Ht Et T - Bulk Fluid and metal secondary tsuperature, *F. M - Bulk mass of metal and fluid, LBM. The "MC" of the metal will be "lutped" into the fluid and thus the analysis will be treated as such.
. . , - g 8 .
Rewriting the acctmulation tenn produces the following: C h (MP) = CTh + CM h dm ' if the stean generator nu.ss changes with time then, p = Min - Mo Min = Auxiliary feedwater flowrate caning in LBM/HR Mo = Steaming rate caning out. dm lf the stean generator mass does not change with time, then g = 0. If the stean generator tauperature does not change with time then, drg = 0. If the stean generator mass does change with time then the mass at any time t after the 8 hr. period W a be definition: t Mgg{t) - MSG (t=8) = ( ct!SG(t) dt I l dt t=8 Initial stean generator mass @ time t = 8 hrs. If the mass in the stean generator b-a constant, then dmSG = 0. dt and MSG (t) = bG The overall Energy Balance provides tha following:
- dr dm
- 1) QD - (M C) primary dr - (C secondary) (M g + T g ) se.%
E
= (M Stean) (H out) - (b) (3AEW) ^
- 2) M Stean = (30.87) X (192) X k(3.03X 10 -21 ) ,p 8.82_[
$1APW = Whatever value is chosen such tl at the auxilimy feedwater systen will deliver to.
- 3) (dMsg(t)) dt + M3g (tg)
MSG (t) = dt
./
. o
~ e e
- 4) dm seccndary = MAEW -- MSteam out E .
Fran the above equations, the following variables are functions of time: O (t) -- Decay heat D T(t) - Fluid, nutal temperatures of primary Ts(t) - Fluid, metal tauperatures of secondary Mgg(t) - Mass of fluid in the sew < ~ . _
- ~ --- .. . . . . _ .,
9 TSAT(t) - Steam generator outlet tep, *F bIDI - Rate of change of mass in the secondary changes with time, *F/Hr dt As can be seen the problem may get very difficult for cal <'ilation since there are so many variables, to contend with. But scrne sir 14fying assunptions can be made to obtain an estimate for this problem. Step 1) It will be assuned that controlahility can be attained via the steam dunp valves during the cool 6own promss; thus it's Cv will change to regulate the steam flow = feed flow. Step 2) Fran Step 1, this means that [Eteam = $9GW and b = 0. dt Step 3) It will also be assuned that &/dt = oonstant, thus them will need not be a time function for tsperature. For this cal <laticm, a dT/dt = -1.5*F_ was investigated. Hr
. Step 4) It is assuned that the primary metal and fluid r==pcxd at the same rate as the secondary fluid and metal or (M) prim. metal = (M) prim. fluid =
E E (&) secondary metal = (&) seccridary fluid = &/dt
~E at -
Note: It must be w4 red that Die primary side is on natural circulation and this calc is an attenpt to estimate heat transfer under this mcde of operation. To atts pt to model the natural circulation is difficult, for one, due to the lack of the natural circulation data, ami the empiracism for natural circulation is of the form: Nu = A (Gr) (Pr) . where A, B, C are constants Nu = Nusselt nunber, which mntains the natural circulation heat transfer coefficient
= hD E'
~
Gr = Grashof nunber
= D [gB A T 2
u Pr = Prandl nunber = Cou . X l
. ,- s
. . .... .~ ..
10 All tha terms in the various numbers are properties of the fluid and wall temperatures. Thus for purposes of this analysis the approach to use this correlation is disregarded. For the cooldown, the process described in Steps 1 through 4 will work as long as MSteam = AAFW. But a point will be reached in the transient where the ASteam will start to become less than AAFW, because the pressure drop across the valve becomes limiting. At this point the auxiliary feedwater flow will be ramped to 350 gpm (Instantaneously) and a fill of the steam generators will begin. At this point in tin.e, the energy balance must be looked at and rewritten again
- 1) QD~( )p -C s [M +T SG ]
=M H - MAFW HAFW 3 s
- 2) dM 3g =M-M s dt 8
- 3) M = 17,781 s x[ (3.03 x 10-21) T .82 -1 (0 this point the valve is wide open
- 4) Msg (t) = M3g (to) + (dMSG) dt dt The calculation process becomes somewhat complicated at this point, but the following algorithm will be used to compute the cooldown.
Step 1 ~ 0 time =t g where this is the time in which the steam flow becomes less than auxiliary feed flow 0 time t, assume TSAT O time to, TSAT is knowit,therefore,dt& TSAT (t) - TSAT (t0) t-t 0 Since TSAT (t) < TSAT o(t ) for cooldown, then h is (-). assumed. Thishwillbereferredtoas(h) Step 2 s
- Take TSAT 0 time t in Step 1 and calculate M 3 from equation (3).
Step 3 dMsg Go to equation (2) and calculate L
11 Step 4 Go to equation (1) and plug in all the valves and solve for h. Step 5 Comparehinstep4tohinStep1. If the values are the same, then proceed with the cooldown with a new time t and a new values of (dT/dt) assumed. If not, then go back to Step 1 and assume a new TSAT 9 Time t and calcula'te a new (dT/dt) assumed, until the two dT/dt's are the same in Step 5 and proceed onward onto a new time, t. It should be noted that in Step 4 all the values for e.quation (1) will be known and thus the process can take place. Later in this calculation, it will be shown what values will be used in equation (1) for QD (t) C s, (MC) p. Hs = HSAT = HSAT (TSAT (t)) (vapor) (vapor) Thus Step 1 thru 5 will continue until the steam generators become full of saturated liquid. This value will be detennined later in the calculation. When the steam generators become full of saturated liquid, the energy balance must be rewritten at this time due to the fact that the steam generator mass no longer changes. Therefore: - (Egn 6) Q D (t full) = (MC), h - (Mc)s h
= M, Hg- MAFW HAFW t full -- time when the steam generators are full. At this time, it was decided to blow the remaining liquid thru the 2" bypass line around the main stream trip valves in the main steam line. The reason for this is that the steam dump valves were only designed to pass saturated steam and thus it is not desired to pass saturated liquid through these valves.
The actual hydraulics from the steam generator outlet to the 2" bypass drain was not modeled in this analysis because it is felt that the auxiliary feedwater system can provide sufficient head to overcome steam generator internals and blowdown thru the proposed path. Saturated liquid enthalpy is assumed to be blown down because of the fact that the auxiliary feedwater system have to provide enough head to overcome the SG internal resistance and thus the exit fluid may be slightly subcooled or at saturation liquid temperature. From equation (6) the cooldown would proceed to 200*F. The variables would be: hD " D (t) (MC)p = Constant (MC) sec = Constant i1 = MAFW = Constant 0
- - 1 .
12 H = HSAT 0 (Tsat) = constant Liq. HAFW = H (1200 psia, 80*F) = constant Therefore the only unknown in equation (6) is time, t and it can be solved for in the following. d0 (t) - [(MC)p + (MC)s] x h = M H -MdFWHAFW o o or dD(*)M- [(MC)p + (MC)s] dT = ($g H g $AFWHAFW)dt Now integrating the previous equation gives: t0 200*F T =200 F F t(0200*F) Qo(t)dt - [(MC)p + (MC)s]dT = { (MgHg- MAFW HAFW)dt j full & T=T (t full) )t=tfull (This may be approximated conservatively linearly from the data. Solve for t0200 F. It will be a quadratic equation which means that two solutions are apparent. Reject the non-sense solution (t 200 F 4 t full) and thus an approximate answer can be arrived at.
/ =
13 ( PARAMETRIC VALUES USED From Table 4.1-1 of the BVPS - updated FSAR, primary system total reactor coolant system volume = 9716 FT3 3 ambient temp (assume 60*F) Cp primary fluid 02250* PSIA, 557*F
= 1 BTU
.795 WF ASME Steam Tables Fourth Edition Therefore (MC) primary fluid : 9716 FT3 x 62.4 1 h3 x .795 LB F BTU
=762,616 BTU /*F Since information on the (MC) primary metal is not readily available and that allow 10% more for (MC) primary = (1.10) (762616)
=838,877 BTU / F Steam Generators' From Table 4.1-5 of the BVPS-updated FSAR 3
(3350 FT3 + 2518 FT ) (17 3 - B *F) 19 FT ) Cp@ SAT Liquid 1100 psia 0 1100 psia Sat. Liquid total (MC) secondary = 387,815 BTU /*F For 3 steam generators = 1.164 x 10 6BTU /*F If 80 F auxiliary feedwater is used, then HAFW = H(1200 psia, 80*F) = 51.3 3 x .016 x QAFW(h)=MAFW(h)x60 in FT
~
N @lasspsia
./ fFW 80*F or QAFW (gal / min) = .002 MAFW (LBM/HR)
B 01100 psia,HSteam .HSAT Vapor = 1189 , Assume this to be relatively constant. (It varies very little). _______._______m_ _ . _ _ . . _ _ __ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
14 Decay Heat Values (Attached Rev. 1) . t (Hr. after reactor Trip) QD( 100 mwt) x 10-6OD(BTU /HR) 8 3.06 83 x 10 6 12 2.73 74.1 x 10 6 16 2.52 68.4 x 106 24 2.32 62.9 x 10 0 48 1.82 47.7 x 10 6 72 1.41 38.8 x 10 6 6
% 1.24 33.64 x 10 120 1.11 30.12 x 10 6 etc.
OD (BTUHr - 100 MWT x 10+6) x (qsla) MWT) X (1.02) =h D (BW/HR) Assume Rx trips 0 102% Power Plugging these valves in gives the following: Q Decay - (1.164 x 106+838,877)*h=(MSteamrequired)*(1189-51.3) M Steam available = 17,781 [ (3.03 x 10-21) T8.82 _y M Steam required = required steam flow to remove decay heat and cooldown. It is equal to AAFW p M Steam available--The maximum steam available for cooling down if the steam dump valves were wide open; this will vary over the transient. As long as this value is greater than M Steam required, then the cooldown transient proceeds. If this value is less, then the energy balance equation must be rewritten to account for a decreasing M Steam out and an increasing steam
,. generator mass.
Simplifying: MSteam = -1761 h + .00879 QD (t) Let dT/dt = constant = -1.5*F/Hr Ot=8 hrs, T(8)= 350 F Ot=12 hrs, T(12) = (-1.5) (4) + 350 = 344*F 6 MSteam Req. = .00879 (74.1x10 ) + -1761 (-1.5)
= 67,775 LBM JAuxFWFlow/Hr Rate = 135 gpm)
M Steam available = 149,224 LB/Hr
s - . . 15 kSteamavailable > $ Steam Required 0 t = 16 hrs T(16)'= (-1 5) (4) + 344 = 338*F
$Steamreq(16)=.000879(68.4x10)+(-1761) 6
(-1.5)
=62,7G6 LBM/HR
$Steamavail(16)=137,918LBM/Hr Proceed t= 24 Hrs, T (24) = (-1.5) (8) + 338 = 326*F 6
k Steam Reg (24) = .000879 (62.9 x 10 ) + (-1761) (-1.5)
= 57,931 LBM/HR kSteamavailable(24)= 17781 x (3.03 x 10-21) (326) 8.82,1
=117,227 LBM/Hr PROCEED t=48 hours T (48) = (-1.5) (24) + 326 =_290 F 0
$SteamReq.(48)=.000879(46.7x10)
+(-1761)(-1.5)=43,691h Steam Avail. (48)= 17781 * [(3.03x10-21) (290) 8.82-1
= 68500 LBM/Hr PROCEED t = 60 hrs,T(60) = (-1.5) (12) + 290 = 272*F Steam Req. (60) = .00879 (42.5 x 106 ) + 1761 (1.5)
= 37,622 LBM/Hr hSteamavail(60)=17,781 (3.03 x 10-21) (272)8.82-1
=50,299 LB/Hr THEREFORE, PROCEED.
t=65 hrs. T (65) = (-1.5) (5) + 272 = 264.5 ST Req. (65)= .00879 (40.7x106 ) L _ I
', 16 M Steam Available (65) = 17781 (3.03 x 10 -21) (264.5) 8.82
-1
= 43,680 LB/Hr Proceed t=70 hrs. t(70) = (-1.5) (5) + 264.5 = 257 F 6
bSteamReq.(70)=.000879(39x10)
+ (-1761) (-1.5)
= 36933 LB/Hr M Steam available (70) = 17781 ,f (3.03 x 10-21) (257)8.82 V -1 s
=37544 LB/Hr Therefore @ t=70 hr, T= 257*F and the steam Dump Valves will not release any more than what the pressure drop provides. At this time a step change of up to 350 gpm will take place from the auxiliary feedwater system. This means that the steam generator mass will change-dM3g (t) . .
= MAFW - M Steam dt 8
dM3g , = 175,444 - 17781 (3.03 x 10 -21) T .82 _3 dt 0 t= 70 hrs therefore, (1) d D - (838 877h + TdMsg ] 3 - (.75 )[M SG dt
=(17781) .03 x 10-21)T 8.82 -1 X(1189)
-9 x 10 6
~-
(2)dM SG 8 dt
= 175444 - 17781 x d (3.03 x 10 -21(T .82 _1) -
(3)M SG (t) = M 3g (t=70 Hrs) + dM3g (t) dt dt t=70 From Ref. 2 92,315 LBM x 3 = 276,945 total LBM Initially Fon. rHE Y Steam generator : __ __ _________J
17 There exists 3-non-linear equations. Procedure (Re-stated here again):
- 1. Pick, time, t.
- 2. get QD (t)
- 3. Assume T, get dM3g/dt from eqn. (2). .
- 4. Calculate dT/dt for Step 1.
- 5. Calculate MSG (t) from eqn (3).
- 6. Solve equation (1) for dT/dt. If not an equality, go back to step (3) and do it again. If an equality exists, proceed back to step (1) and pick a new time, t.
Note: to roughly estimate when the steam generates are full , from reference 2 (attached) the free steam volume appears to be about 1266 Ft 3 3 1740 Ft
~
~
- ~ ~ ~~
3'006 Ft y using an average saturated liquid density of .0171 Ft 3 x 3006 Ft 3 suggests LM that 175,789 LBM/ Steam generator is needed, or the~ steam generators are full at about 175,789 x 3 + ' 276,945
= 804,312 LB Using this procedure produces the following results:
0 t =71 hr T=239.5*F 0 t =72 hr T=226.5*F 0 t =73 hr T=218.5*F
,. At ta 73 hr the steam generators are about full, then initiate a step change to 500 gpm of auxiliary feedwater and evaluate time t by the following:
et . T=200 F QD (t) dt t=73 hrs T=218.5*F [(MC) primary + (MC) secondary]dT y
= kFW(H 0- HAFW)dt t=73 hrs
18 BW (MC) primary = 838,877 (MC) secondary = 746130 x 1.1 BTU /*F
. .75 MAFW = 500 gpm = 250,000 LBM/Hr H0 = 185.2 BW/LBM HAFW " '
- 6 hD (t) = -192337't + 52.1 x 10 BTU /Hr Substituting these values into the overall energy equation produces:
t = 127 hours 0 T = 200*F, A j . w..- _ .. _..
?
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pg 7e s hr 3.26 2.95 33.74 36.71 6. sin Tj 9 hr 39.58 7.2 =in 2.37 7.4 en M, ;C ar 2.s1 c. 37 7 9 213 p u hr 2.73 45.11 a.c sin N ;2 hr 2.67 c.77 3.3 sin Sg .3 hr 2.61 5C.37 Ys ;_ hr 52.92 9.3 mis 2.56 9.7 sin dQ 15 hr 2.52 55.41
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20 1 Integrated Decay Heat Prodnation Instantaneous Joody Heat Since R==ater Sa a or Shu+Aa w Time .fter squivalent Reestor Reactor Scram Rats, Btu /Hr/100 h(93M) Stu/100 )halth) 4) N11 Poue Gement4aa R=-atar Power (x 10 er %+Anm R==atae Powe (x 10 158.5 27.8 min 3 days 1.41 33 4 min 1.24 190.3 4 days 218.4 38.4 min 5 days 1.11 42.8 min 1.02 243.7 6 days 267.6 47.0 min 7 days 0.% 50.9 min 0.90 289.7 8 days 310.9 54.6 min 9 days 0.86 $8.1 min 0.82 331.0 10 days 350.1 1.c2 hr 11 days 0.78 1.08 hr 0.75 368.7 12 days 386.3 1.13 hr
,13 dmys 0.73 1.18 hr 0.71 /.03.4 14 days - 420.2 1.23 hr 15 days 0.68 1.83 hr 0.47 623.6 -
i :nonth 9Cr7.5 2.66 hr 2 months 0.33 3.28 hr 0.26 1,120. 3 months , 1,290. 3.78 hr 4 months 0.21 4.19 hr 0.18 1,431. ' 5 sonths 1,559, 4.57 hr 6 months 0.16 6.16 hr 0.10 2,104. 1 year rh
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Qutation 5 WHY NOT USE RHR?
- 1. It wculd also require CCR, and Letdown System.
- 2. Additional exemptions would be required to comply with Appendix R 10 CFR 50 (RHR, CCR, Letdown, Cable Tray Mezzanine, Process Rack Area).
- 3. Spare Motors required for RER and CCR PUMPS.
- 4. Extensive additional instrumentation for CVCS, CCR and RHR would be required at S/D panel for diagnostics.
- 5. Control system interaction and failures prohibit use (RHR, CVCS, CCR) from outside the control room.
- 6. Require annunciators to alert operator of loss of cooling functions to preclude damage to equipment and releases to public.
- 7. Extends fire hazard analyses and systems review beyond that which has been performed to date (due to item 5).
- 8. Existing configuration and modifications made to RRR, CCR, CVCS to comply with Appendix A - BTP 9.5-1 were accepted and completed satisfactorily until analyses required under Appendix R (hot shorts, etc) forbade their use.
- 9. Require extensive controls to be backfit to maintain CCR pressure, temperature control, flow control, RER HTX BYPASS /0UTLET flow control, for cooldown rate control.
- 10. Potential for steam void on RER during cut in due to hot spots in the hot legs and the S/G if RCP's were not in service during cooldown (IEC 81-10) (IEC 80-15) .
- 11. Extensive capital investment and radiation exposure for backfits.
- 12. Extends additional monitoring requirements and operator actions during a high stress period.
- 13. Level of protection to the public health and safety would not be sig-nificantly increased by backfitting for strict compliance with Appendix R on the CVCS letdown, RHR and CCR Systems.
WHY USE RHR, CCR AND LETDOWN?
- 1. To meet 72 hour requirement for cold shutdown.
- 2. Cool neutron shield tank for Source Range Detectors.
- 3. Cool containment penetrations on main steam header.
5.1
Question 5 (continued) (Also, see response to Question 3) Conclusion
-Cooldown on the RRR System should only be performed form the control room with a full complement of instrumentation and controls to perform all integrated activities in a safe and controlled fashion.
-Preferred mode of operation at low temperatures is steaming generators to the point where an equilibrium temperature is attained (steaming capacity = core decay heat value) until such time that off-site power is restored and control room access permitted.
-There is no safety concern associated with maintaining Tave at Hot Shutdown conditions or attaining cold shutdown witnin 72 hours. Efforts directed towards achieving it within 72 hours from areas outside the control room would be potential challenges to the operator.
A s 5.2 i
s e Question,
- 6. Is heat tracing required to allow the licensee to borate as time passes?
Respo nse Three different concentrations of boric acid are available for boration at Beaver Valley. They are 11.5 - 13% in the BIT portion of the Safety Injection System, 4 - 4.4% in the normal Boric Acid Transfer System and the 2000 ppm boron in the Refueling Water Storagu Tank. The Boron Injection Tank contents would be injected into the coolant system from the control room, or manually through local operation of valves [MOV-SI-867A or B and C or D] shown on figure OM 11-1 af ter isolation of the recirculation flow path. This action would be completed prior to the time at which this concentration solidifies (approximately 145'F technical specification limit) and flow path capability is assured on a short term basis since the system normally operates at approximately 200*F. The Boric Acid Transfer System is not necessary for hot or cold shutdown since the BIT (Boron Injection Tank) and RWST provide the short and long term boration flow paths availability under the Appendix "R" analysis. The EWST (Refueling Water Storage Tank) is insulated as are all outside pump suction flow paths. Since the 8" RWST flow path to the charging pumps will be in constant use during the shutdown If,r seal injection to the reactor coolant pumps and makeup), this wi.2 protect the line from freezing and boron precipitation. In the same manner, the flow path between the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank is assured through flow and recirculation. 6.1
f Question
- 7. What equipment that requires component cooling water for shutdown will be provided with alternate cooling? What alternate cooling will be used? What alternate equipment will replace which shutdown equipment that loses cooling?
Response
Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water System supplies water to:
- 1. Gas Waste Compressors and Cooling Coils (2)
- 2. BRS Degasifiers and Aux. Equipment (2)
- 3. BRS Evaporators and Aux. Equipment (2)
- 4. Fuel Fool Cooling Heat Exchangers (2)
- 5. LW&BRS Evaporators and Aux. Equipment (3)
- 6. Non Regen HTX (1) ***
- 7. Seal Water HTX (1) ***
- 8. Shield Tank Cooling (1) *
- 9. Sample System Coolers (10)
- 10. Blowdown System (Steam Generator) (1)
- 11. CRDli Shroud Cooling (6)
- 12. Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger (1)
- 13. RWST Cooling Units (2)
- 14. RCP Cooling (3)
- 15. RHR System (2) ***
- 16. Penetration Cooling coils (32) **
- Source Range Detectors Cooling (exemption request)
** Main Steam Penetrations (FSAR Q9.34-2)
*** Required to meet 72 hour criteria item 16 will be supplied with cooling water by the fire pump as per our commitment in the FSAR (see attached).
NOTE: CCR will not be utilized in the alternate shutdown method as discussed in question 1 of BNL Questions /Information Request - Electrical.
~~
e 7.1
1
', BVPS FSAR Amsndm nt 4 9/10/73 Question 9.34 C. The response to Question 9.11 as well as the response to Question 9.10 is inadequate. To enable us to complete our review, clearly and sequentially address the various parts of our original Question 9.11 as applied to attaining and maintaining a cold, safe shutdown. In addition, for all cases where the component cooling water to the containment penetration cooling coils is lost, discuss the consequences as functio,. of the time interval that cooling is unavailable during all modes of operation and postulated accidents.
Response
If either of the cooling water supply lines (241n.-cc-112-151, 241n-cc-113-151) should cease to supply component cooling water due to a large fault or leak, the conditions that could exist during the various operating modes are as follows:4 (1) If the plant was in normal operating mode, the cessation of flow would result in the reactor coolant pumps being deenergized manually and coasted to a stop with natural circulation taking over in the reactor coolant system. The containment air temperature would rise. The consequence of the rupture in this mode would be that the reactor would be brought to and maintained in the [T hot standby condition until the pipe fault was repaired. V No steps can be taken to mitigate the consequences of the pipe leakage or fault other than rectifying the condition. The plant may be maintained in the hot standby condition without the component cooling water system indefinitely. The main consequences of the fault are the loss of the reactor coolant pumps, containment cooling, re sidual heat removal pumps and residual heat removal capability to accomplish a cold shutdown. Charging pumps, emergency diesel generators and control room air conditioning are cooled by the river water system and are not affected. (2) If the plant was in its initial phase of cooldown, the cooldown would continue and pressure and temperature
~~ would be held at values greater than 350 F and 450 psig by use of the main feed system and the condenser. To lower these values and achieve cold shutdown would require the residual heat removal system to be functional. After the fault was repaired, cooldown would continue.
(3) If the plant was in its secondary phase of cooldown using the residual heat removal system, the reactor 3' coolant pressure and temperature would begin to increase Q9.34-1
. BVPS'FSAR Amendment 4 9/10/73 due to the loss of the residual heat removal system. At m this time, the RHR syetem would be secured and isolated. '
Reactor coolant conditions would be stabilized and maintained by transferring heat from the reactor coolant system to the steam and power conversion system. This is normally done during the primary phase of the cooldown. Reactor coolant conditions would be allowed - to rise above and be maintained slightly above 350 F and ( i- 450 psig until the damaged piping was repaired and cooldown could continue. (4) During any accident condition which initiates safety injection, the component cooling system is not in use and a hypothetical pipe fault would not impair the plant's cooldown capability since cooldown is accomplished by the safety injection and recirculating spray systems. For the containment penetration cooling coils, the temperature of the adjoining concrete cannot withstand an extended period (12 hr) at a temperature higher than 200 F. Hose connecticns will be provided from the fire protection system to provide an alternate source of cooling water to the coils. The 12 hr period available o is ample time to connect all hoses.
- )
v Q9.34-2
Question
- 8. Reactor coolant makeup ca.pability
Response
Source Capacity Refueling Water 439,000 Storage Tank a T 8.1
Question
- 9. Makeup available for steam generator feed
Response
Source Total Capacity (3) Assumed Main Inventory W-TK-26 600,000 gal 450,000 gal W-TK-11 200,000 177,000 gal (1) 1 W-TK-10 152,000 140,000 gal (2) 952,000 767,000 (1) Detected by logic (level) (2) Tech. Spec. minimum level (3) Does not assume hotwell inventory
)
4 9.1
Question
- 10. The October 28, 1982 letter, Appendix R, Page 3 Item 4, Last Item, floating a solid pressurizer on the letdown system is risky and has not been justified. What alternative method is available if this method is not approved?
Response
This statement on solid water operation specifically limited the range over which this mode of pressure control would be used to
" low pressure" condition ( 225 psig). This was intended to provide a means of removing the high head charging pump from service to avoid any hypothetical overpressure events and safety valve challenges.
This could be done by valving in a Low Head Safety Injection Pump to the Charging Pump suction flow path and aligning recirculation from the LHSI Pump to the RWST. The RCS could then be slowly filled and pressure maintained at (approx. 220 psig) the shutoff head of the LHSI Pumps. This would only_be done if the LHSI Pump was undamaged by the fire and was intended to prevent overpressure events, not initiate them. We do not intend to take the pressurizer solid as a means of pressure control for cooldown from outside the control room at higher pressures. A low pressure pressurizer vapor space would be maintained if other equipment was not available for this mode of operation. 10.1 , J
i N g% l 6.
\ u ,
s *. s Q . 7 ~ Question i l
- 11. The following PWR instrumentation is missing: ,
-i
- a. steam generator pressure
- b. source range monitoring (exemption requested) .,
I
- c. tank levels such as concensate storage tank, RWST, etc. 3
- d. diagnostic tools such s: k, N 1 4 s
- 1. auxiliary feed flows * \, i j
- \\ i , ., ,
- 2. RHR flow pressure temperature s a 3.
\N*' t g component cooling wathr,[flo@, pressurs, umperatu'e
,^
's . s
'} ( \ J 4.
service water flow, pressure or t.em. perature S s ( k
- 5. charging pump flow , ,
j( $ ' ( 7,; ' 5. ' l s g-3 J'? /i
;* s g q 3a Response ' '
( , s Steam Pressure - This indication will b'e protided l'ocrily) near thn l' location of the bleed valves where'the opeietor requites th A / i y interpretation of these instruments. This ons ste W in ourit . October 28, 1982 letter. i ' T A - y
.' i% ; .' .N ;
s t . An exemption request' h.ss oeen foNirded with ,9 Source Range Detectors - additional information. We have stated that iwith t!ie\asud$nde l' 2 ' that; all control rods have been inserted','1 Injection of. 4d ) Boron Injection Tank, dilution sources 'feMahds with the YGUT 4 providing makeup, that subcritical reactivity conditions are (- assured. Therefore, the absence of this instrument "would not I 3 endanger life or property of the common de h nae and security N '
- l and is not otherwise in the public interest "and,woola'not enhance #
fire protection safety" pursuant to 50.48; (c) (6) . We believe -
,'}, t s
that our existing configuration, (2 soured tange indicators in s I; , the control room and monitoring capabilicy frem 4 the existing shut- , down panel) although they are : tot protec'ted for ali, fire scenario.'4m does not justify backfitting another insi.)ument,1 cop to the Back'n't I \ Indication Panel. It must be unoerstood'that. the installation of'a ; source range detector or separation of c.able iit the inst.2nce would \A, ,\ ,< ,1 not in itself provide a reliabla souce range indication'. h '
~
A'dherence , to their requirement would necessitata numerous bodification's to j ss. comply with Appendix "R" on the Ccmponhnt rycoting' Watir: System soiely 9 for the cooling of the Neutron Shield'Tark wh'ere.tthis %tector is ( located. This would represent n significant n' umber of c6ntrols, #
/
indicators, cable rerouting ant systems haalysis for the compotient id cooling water system for the purpose fof 3eutronMh'ield Tank Cooling of the source range detectors. Beaver Villev' Unit 1, was ' licensed as a hot shutdown plant and does,not 4equfre Component Cooling q Water under accident conditions. Accepting de original licensing basis for the facility with regaM to the desidn of the Component s , s ~ l { , I 11.1 - l s
t Coolin; Water System, in consideration of tha items identified above, 1t is our position that our method of shutdown and cool-down preseries the integrity of our shutdown capability, thereby giving reasonable assurance of the preservation of the public health and safety and justifies this exemption. Tank Levelt! - The only two tank Ievel indications that must be used are the RWST (Refueling Watec Storage Tank) and PPDWST (Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank) . Both tanks contain sufficient inventory for the first 8 hours by Technical Specification requirecents. By this; time, sufficient personnel would be on site to check the tank's level indication locally or by interpretation of tank level through local pressere indication which would be indicative of the static water head in the tank.
+ Auxiliary Feed Flow - Pump suction flow can be checked locally or interpreted through stream generator level.
RRR, flow, pressure, temperature - We do not intend to place this system in service unless the control room and a full complement of instrumentation and controls were available for monitoring and use. Component Cooling Water flow, pressure, temperature - Th'is system
," , - is only required for RHR Cooling and penetration cooling coils. The RHR system is discussed above and alternate cooling (fire pump dis-charge) would be provided for the Main Steam Line penetration cooling coilo. An exemption was requested for the source range detector g
3 because of their location in the Neutron Shield Tank, which would
, require cooling and the cable routing of the source range detectors.
< Service water flow, pressure, temperature The Reactor Plant River Water System is needed immediately to provide cooling to the Charging Pumps, Diesel Generators and the
/
r River Water Pumps themselves. Adequate cooling is assured by posi-
,'tioning of in-line motor operated valves and subsequent de-energization of the valve for assuring long term flow capability. Local pressure and temperature indication is provided and could be checked periodically g3 , during the cooldown after additional personnel were onsite. River
\ water supplies are attached.
6 Charging pump flow
~,
)
, ?, Flow can be interpreted through pressurizer level and charging
+
, I pump discharge pressure and is not required. Charging flow will be
, c;s *
, regulated by an operator assigned for this purpose.
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11.2
- l.
- Quzstion #11 (Continued)
Attachment Reactor Plant River Water Syetem Supplies Water to:
- 1. CCR Heat Exchanger Cooling
- 2. Control Room Air Conditioning
- 3. Charging Pumps oil / seal cooling *
- 4. AW Pump Suction (Backup) **
- 5. Diesel Generator Heat Exchangers *
- 6. Backup Fus.1 Pool cooling / makeup **
- 7. Recire. Spray Heat Exchangers
- 8. Containment Air Recire. Cooling Backup **
- 9. Seal Water / Motor Cooling for RW Pumps *
- Required for hot shutdown immediately
** Required after hot shutdown 11.3 J
Question
- 12. What support equipment is needed to reach shutdown?
Response
Chapter 4 " Shutdown Capability Summary", was documented to explain the " minimum" safety-related shutdown systems required to be available for safe shutdown based on the procedure method identified in Chapter 7 and further clarified in our October 28, 1982 letter (attachments " App-endix R - Alternate Shutdown Procedures") . Chapter 5 " Electrical Analysis", was written to evaluate equipment and systems normally used to achieve safe shutdown via the computer analysis method. This list of equipment and associated cabling was used to generate a complete listing of cables used for performing these shutdown functions. Conservative equipment listing since it includes alternative and diverse methods to achieve safe shutdown af ter assuming a fire in any one area. Chapter 7 " Procedures" of our report, with consideration of the October 14, 1982 meeting with the NRC and the clarifications with respect to repairs required for cold shutdown, should now be considered procedures which may be required to achieve cold shutdown since they involve lif ting leads, jumpers, etc. The typical operating procedures - equipment, Section 7.2.8, were written to provide alternate methods of operating equipment to accomplish safe shutdown if deemed necessary by the operations pe rsonnel. The safest and most prudent method of plant operations will be determined by plant management depending on the emergency situation a t the time. Other than what has been identified in the above referenced sections of the report, the only additional support equipment which may be necessary is instrument air (i.e., bottled air and regulator ) to TV-CC-110 of Con-tainment Air Coolers if the Diesel Air Compressor is not operational.
~
l 12.1
Question
- 14. Ventilation Flow Rates.
Response
Control Room 15,200 CFM (Maintaining 75'F) Charging Pump Cubicles 3,000 CFM Emergency Switchge. - Backup Ventilation 8,200 CFM The proposed fans will deliver approximately 5,500 CFM per fan. When used together, they will provide sufficient ventilation flow rates for the areas of concern. 13.1
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .]
Question Page 3.3-5 of the submittal is missing. The page in our book is blank.
Response
Attached is page 3.3-5 of the June 30, 1982 submittal. 4 e 14.1 _ . . - __d
- f. Relays and . instrument racks for control of redundant safety related equipment are in separate
,] panels. In control panels, for control of safety
/
related redundant equipment such as the main control board, safety related trains are separated by either a full metal barrier between redundant safety related control groups or a partial metal barrier between redundant control devices. Where internal panel cable wiring between redundant devices are not separated by a minimum of 6 in, the redundant cables are installed in flexible conduit. Separation criteria are in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.6 and IEEE 308 dated 1971, entitled " Independence Between Redundant Standby Power Sources and Between Distribution Systems" and
Criteria for Class IE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Stations,"
respectively. 3.3.2.2 AC Emergency Power System The ac emergency power system includes power supplies, a distribution system, and load groups arranged to provide power to Class lE loads. The system has two 4,160-V, 3-phase, 60-Hz diesel-driven synchronous generators, as shown on Figure 3.3-1. The two generator sets are electrically and physically isolated 'from each other. Each emergency bus is continuously energized from the station service system or from an emergency diesel generator, as shown on Figure 3.3-1. The automatic transfer from service system to emergency diesel generators, when required, is accomplished by automatically opening the normal source air circuit breakers and closing the emergency diesel generator tir circuit breaker. The emergency buses and the supply for all essential components are normally connected to the station service system. Two circuit breakers in series are provided in these supply circuits from the normal buses to the emergency buses. The emergency diesel generators can be manually started on a signal from the main control room, or are automatically started on the receipt of a time delay undervoltage signal from the emergency bus source, on a safety injection signal, or on an
^
, opening of either series - connected normal supply circuit breakers. Loss of voltage on the normal bus opens both the series - connected normal supply circuit breakers and closes the emergency source breaker when the generator voltage is established.
Redundant breakers which ensure that the emergency bus is disconnected from the normal station service system have independent trip circuits supplied by independent 125-V de O 3.3-5 I
- _ - - - _ - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -a
', Qutstien There is no consistent, cohesive description of how licensee will achieve safe shutdown. Please provide. ,
i
Response
The October 28, 1982, letter identifies the major steps taken to achieve safe shutdown. During the November 30, 1982, meeting, the NRC reviewers will be given a marked up set of flow diagrams that show all flow paths utilized for the alternate shutdown method, identifies all fluid flow paths, instrumentation required and mechanical equipment utilized. The only changes necessary to the procedures portion of this letter are;
- 1. Item 5 stated "Tave below 240F," this value should be changed to 257'F based on hand calculations of this value.
- 2. Item 4 stated "cooldown and depressurization would begin following...
verification of RCS boron concentration." We have determined through several reactivity balance calculations that the boron concentration does not have to be verified prior to cooldown if the BIT (Boron Injection Tank) has been injected, all rods are inserted and the RWST is the source of makeup. We will verify the boron concentration at 350*F during the 20 hour thermal soak which was identified in Item 5 of our October 28, 1982 letter. This is only being done to compress the time frame for the overall cooldown sequence such that the boron analysis will not interrupt the inititial cooldown and depressurization. It is impossible to have one " consistent and cohesive" procedure that provides cookbook instructions based on a fire in any one of 32 fire areas assuming loss of all functions in that area. For this reason, the necessery steps taken will be given on a worst case basis and express several options or alternative methods to achieve each major step. These major steps are outlined in our October 28, 1982 letter and include many of those options and alternative methods. The final draft of the procedure cannot be finalized until the Backup Indicating Panel is available and functional since it is an integral part of the procedure. A flow chart is attached which identifies the parameters maintained, instrumentation utilized and equipment for the shutdown cooldown evolution for general information. You may contact K. D. Grada (Telephone (412) 643-5500) directly for any questions on the shutdown methods. e 4N 15.1
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i Ouestion The following questions are necessary:
- a. Will pressurizer heaters be used for pressure control in hot shutdown? If not, how will pressure be controlled?
- b. Are there any limit or inhibit functions, or any other automatic logic whose damage by fire could prevent or impair safe shutdown.
If so, what does licensee propose to do? Response G
- a. One bank of heaters are required for pressurizer control. Bank "B" was rerouted in the ductline as part of Appendix A Fire Protection Review, BTP 9.5-1, and is powered from 480 Volt Emergency Bus 1Pl.
- b. Yes. The solid state protection logics. Both trains of the 120 volt AC solid state protection system output breakers will be defeated prior to evacuation of the control room, if deemed necessary. These breakers are located in the control room.
To prevent automatic functions of the 4160 Volt equipment, the DC control power will be turned of f. Also see modification 6.10 of the June 30, 1982 submittal and response to question on page 37.1. c 16.1
. Ounstion Page 3.3-6, 6th paragraph, last sentence: Page 5.2-2, 5.2.2, 3rd paragraph. Ilow will licensee avoid having current transformers with open secondaries cause spurious breaker trip, thereby probably ,
damaging the breakers?
Response
Open-circuit operation of current transformers is not a recommended procedure because the high voltages generated are a serious hazard to personnel, and may damage the CT insulation. Two features of open-circuit operation are worth commentary:
- 1. Open-circuit operation will have no affect upon the primary circuit.
High voltages are indeed induced in the secondary winding, but because no current is flowing, the winding and voltage is non-existant with respect to the primary circuit. The primary circuit " sees" only a core surrounding the primary conductor. Core losses will be higher than normal due to saturation effects, and it may be perceptably warm, but heating will not be a problem. Note also that induced voltages may be 2 or 3 KV which are far below the dielectric strength of the primary insulation. Thus, they cannot strike the primary I circuit to induce a primary failure. Menufacturers (such as G. E., Westinghouse, and Gould) have been contacted and concur in the above. 6% EP6 GL CONTROL Room r----, I
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- 2. In a typical circuit, three phase-overcurrent protective relays are used. Only two are absolutely necessary, because any phase to phase fault will actuate one or both of the relays, thus, the third relay provides redundancy. Similarly, if one relay circuit is open-circuited, system protection is not impaired, and no common mede failure is possible. If dielectric failure occurs in the open-circuited trans-formers, operation is similar to a short-circuited transformer. Once again, system protection is not impaired, and no common made failure is possible.
17.1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - . - - . - - _ . - _ - - _ - - - - - --_------------J
l Question 3.4-19 Are there more than one main fuel oil tank? How many? How are day tr.nks and engines supplied? Can a single fire knock out fuel source for both diesels?
Response
There are two fuel oil tanks. The answer to the question can be t found in our previously submitted APCSB 9.5-1 Appendix A document (pages 110 & 111) and the F. P. SER, Amendment #18 to our Tech. Specs. See attached pages from both references for the D. G. area. (See attached info rmation) . 9 18.1
l - . _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ .. . . . . . . . _ . . . .
- ~ - - - -
. 5.10 Diesel Generator Roo=s 5.10.1 Safety-Related Eouipcent Each of the two redundant diesel generator rooms contains a diesel engine driven air cocpressor, local control panels, cabling, and fuel day tank. At least one division of this equipment is necessary for safe shutdown upon loss of offsite power.
5.10.2 Combustible Materials Combustibles in the diesel generator room area include diesel engine lubricating oil, diesel fuel in fuel lines, day tanks, and electrical cable insulation. 5.10.3 Consequences if No Fire suporession An unmitigated fire in one of the evo diesel generator rooms could result in the loss of function of one unit with possible da= age to the redundant diesel generator located in the adjacent fire area, by means of fuel passing under the coc=unicating door or by breaching the fire door. 5.10.4 Fire Protection Systems Early warning fire detection is provided by ioni=ation type smoke detectors arrranged to alarm in the control room. A total flooding CO extinguishing system automatically actuatedbythermaldetec!orsisprovidedinthediesel generator rooms. The CO system has reserve capacity for 2 a second manually actuated discharge. Back up fire suppression capability consists of portable CO and dry 2 chemical extinguishers located in each room. additional manual firefighting capability is provided by yard hydrants. The two diesel g'enerator rooms are enclosed by 3-hour fire raced reinforced concrete walls and ceilings. The doorway between the two rooms is provided with a 3 hour
,. rated fire door.
e M
-_ i - - - - _ - - - _ - - _ _ _ - _ . _ :_ --_- l- : 'LT_ ---
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l . Adequacy of Fire Protection 5.10.5 The existing ionization fire detection system, portable extinguishers and back up firefighting capability from the yard hydrant is considered acceptable. The fixed CO fire extinguishing system is adequate as 2 the primary automatic suppression system. The location of the manual pull stations inside the protected rooms is r not acceptable. The intensity of a potential diesel fuel fire in one of the rooms could make it impossible to enter and reach the pull box. Provisions are not adequate to insure a fire in one diesel generator room does not affect the redundant diesel generator room via oil seepage under the doorway. The manual control for stopping the diesel fuel transfer ' pump is located within'the diesel generator rooms and could be inaccessible during a fire. A leak in the diesel fuel supply system could go undetected for a considerable period of time and accumulate on the floor. If significant quantities of fuel entered the floor drains; the possiblity exists that fuel could communicate via the drainage system to the adjacent diesel generator room. The fire door between the two redundant diesel generator rooms may not be capable of withstanding a potential high intensity diesel fuel fire. 5.10.6 Modifications In order to mitigate the possib! ities of a fire affecting both redundant diesel generator soms, the licensee will make the following modification. .
- 1. Curbing of sufficient height to prevent on oil leak in one rocu from entering the adjacent room will be provided at the doorway between the rooms.
- 2. An additional three (3) hour fire rated door and frame with self-closing hardware will be provided at the doorway between rooms. (also discussed under 4.9.1)
- 3. The manual actuation pull box for the CO2 extinguishing sysc. ems will be relocated outside the room it is designed to protect. (also discussed under 4.3.2)
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- 4. A control for shutting off the diesel fuel transfer
- . pump outside of the diesel generator rooms will be provided. .
- 5. Floor drains in the diesel generator rooms will be plugged.
- 6. A fail safe level detecting device will be installed in a sump close to the day tank to detect an oil accumulation due to a leak. High sump level will be annuciated in the control room.
- 7. Fire barrier wall penetration between Diesel Generator ro, oms will be evaluated and up-graded to a 3 hr barrier.
We find that, upon implementation of the above described modifications, the Diesel Generator Room's fire protection satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.2 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
.2
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F. P. Pp %L EVPS Unit 1 110 IEC Docket No. 50-334 g ( Diesel Generator Cubicles (DG-1 and 2) These cubicles are depicted on Figure No. 9.5--16. The diesel , generator bn41 ding perimeter walls and roof are constructed of 2 ft thick rainforced concrete and designed as a :nissileproof structure. The i.nterface wall between the cunicles is constructed of 12 in. reinforced concrete and provided with a 3 hr fire rated door. Any penetrations of exterior and int e h walls have been sealed ..
.with cellular concrete. There are no ventil ation penetrations between cubicles. The only openings in the cubicles that are not fire rated are the exterior doors, intake and evhaust ventilation dampers, and the muffler exhaust openings. As can be seen from '
Figure No. 9.5-16, these openings provide no pose hility of , allowing a fire in one diesel generator cubicle propagating into the other cubicle. No fire hazards exist in the area of the exterior non fire rated doors. The inlet dampers are located in a missile protected vestibule and are separated from the adjacent cubicle by a 2 ft thick reinforced concrete wall. The , evhaust damper openings on .the roof are also located in missileproof cubicles and separated by a 1 ft
- hick rainforced concrete wall. The mnffler exhaust cpanings on the roof are also enclosed in missileproof structures and have 25 ft harirontal separation. -
4 A-C emergency power is supplied to all safety related equipment by 100 percent redundant diesel generators. The diesel generators, including respective associated starting eqnirm_ent - and other anvi1 ud.es, are physically and electrically isolated fran each other. The safety related equipment located in these cubicles is listed in Table No. 2. A list of ccmbustible materials and fire loadings for the diesel generator cubicles is presented in Table No. 1.
'Ibe primary fire suppression system for each cubicle is an individual, autc=xatic or manual, double shot, total flooding CO2 system. Backup suppression capab41ity consists of portable CO2
- and d y chemical ehgni whers located in each area (see Figure No. 9.5-2) . Addit innal water coverage could be achieved by utilization of yard fire hydrants (see Figure No . 9 . 5-2) .
Detection for the cubicles consists of area ionization coverage with control rocm and local alarm as described in Appendir A, Seceinn F.2 response. Additional detection with control room alarm is provided by the electric rate-cc=pannated heat-actuated devices associated with au+ - +ie actuatica of the CO2 system. Additional control rocm alar indications associated with the CO2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . A
BVPS Unit 1 111 NRC Docket No. 50-334 ' suppression system are identical to those described in
, Appendix A, Section F.3 system for CS-1. 'Ihe avi e g alurms enable the control room to be aware of the status and availability of the CO2 system at all t-i mas . These features provide the required protection for inadvertent operation or
. rupture of the CO2 system. The CD2 piping within the cubicles has also been seismically analyzed and supported.
. The CO2 system design was to attain a 52 percent concentration.
This type of suppression systeg would result in minimum damage to the diesel generators. . f The ' floor drain systems' for the diesel generator cubicles are
) routed directly outdoors to.the underground storm sewer system.
A consnitment has been made to raise the elevation of the floor drains in these cubicles as part of the station oil spill control and
}' countermeasure plan required by the EPA. This was necessary to prevent. the pos' s ihi1ity of oil discharge to the Ohio River in the event of a single fuel oil day tank rupture. The improbable ) loss of the total oil inventory of a diesel generator ' crankcase and associated fuel oil day tanks would result in approximately a 2 in. floor buildup,. assuming no -drainage. 'Ib preclude any i possibility of oil spread to the adjacent cubicle via the consuon interface door, a 6 in. high concrete barrier (ramp) at the door is proposed'. -
i 5 As determined by the fire hazards analysis, a design basis fire for either cubicle would be con 4nined wiihin the individual
, cubicle by the existing construction and proposed modification.
1
! As a result of the complete redundancy and electrical isolation, a loss of one diesel generator would 'not affect the nhili ty to achieve safe shutidown.
[ The existing CO2 and backup fire suppression, coupled with the existing detection systems, wo'uld provide the capability for early extingnithmant of any fire within the cubicle. Except for a fire that might develop from the highly unlixely event of rupture of the fuel oil day tanks, minimal damage to the diesel
.- generator would be experienced.
6 4 8
. l
7 .. . _ . _ . . . _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ ._ _ _ _ .. . DESCRIPTION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR ~. FUEL OIL TRANSFER OPERATION Ref er to Ingic Diagrams LSK-22-6J and K which illustrate De operation of diesel generator No. 1 fuel oil i transfer pumos ZZ-P-1A and 13 and which are typical for diesel generator No. 2 fuel oil transfer pu=ps EE-P-1C and 1D. a_ . Transfer pump EE-P-1A will be started manually, grovided all of the following conditions are met: O r 1 Selector switch for EE-P-1A in " MANUAL"
- 2. No motor electrical protection trip l l
- b. Transfer pump EE-P-1B will be started manually, provided all of the followinc conditions are met:
l 2 selector switch for EE-P-13 in "MANUAra l
- 2. No motor electrical protection trip
- c. Transfer pump EE-P-1A will be started automati-l gally, provided all of the following conditions are i met:
1 Selector switch for EE-P-1A in " AUTO"
- 2. No motor electrical protection trip l 2 Transfer pump EE-P-1B not running l
3 Day tank level low
- 5. Any of the following:
l a. Transfer pump EE-P-1B ran last l
.b_ . Transfer pump EZ-P-1B motor electrical grotection trip present E. Transfer pump EE-P-1B selector switch M "OFF"
- d. . Transfer pump EE-P-1B' will be started automati-sally, provided all of the following conditions are met:
1 Selector switch for EE-P-15 in " AUTO"
- 2. No motor electrical protection trip
- 3. Transfer pump EE-P-1 A not running 1 Day tank level low
. _ . . . . ._j
- 5. Any of the following:
- a. Transfer pump EE-P-1A ran last
_b . Transfer oumn EE-P-1A- - motor electric,al p_rotection trip present
- c. Transfer pump EE-P-1A selector switch in "OFF"
- e. Transf er pump EE-P-1A will be stopped, provided any of the following conditions are met:
1 Selector switch for EE-P-1A in "OFF"
- 2. Motor electrical protection trip
- 3. Selector switch for EE-P-1A in "AL"IO" _and day tank level high
- f. Transfer pump EE-P-13 will be stopped, provided any of the following conditions are met: q 1, . Selector switch for EE-P-13 in "OFF" 2 Motor electrical protection trip
- 3. Selector switch for EE-P-13 in " AUTO" and day tank level high t
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Question Page 4.1-3: Assumption No. 3: Appendix R requires that cold shutdown be achieved within 72 hours, and that n_o repairs are allowed during hot shutdown. How will licensee achieve these re-quirements?
Response
See responses provide for questions No. 3, 4, 5, and 11. l 0 l. l l l
'19.1
Ouestion Page 4.1-3: Assumption No. 5: Explain how this statement can be justified. m
Response
Motor operated valves are an example which illustrate this assumption. 8 A loss of control or power cables not common to the equipments location does not imply complete loss of the equipment. Manual operation of the valve can be performed. D 20.1
l Question Page 4.5-1: Define, for and loads on UPS-1 explain through operation of, and show feeds (sources) UPS-4. else. They are not called out anywhere _ Response ( The UPS which they st / -tem cables are included under the vital bus system to y power (IE. PNL-VB-1,2,3,4) . For list of loads see a t tached . 21.I ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . - _ _J
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3.7.P.S. - 0.M. 1.33.5 TA3LZ 3S-3 VITAL 3CS LCAD LIST 12CV AC 7:!.C 3CS 2! 01s::ibu:i== ?anel Sk: No. Acts , Load { 2-1 15 ?:o:ec:1on - Nucl. Inst. Sys. Rack II { t ' - 2-2 15 Non-?:o:. - Nucl. Ins:. Sys. Rack II l l 2-3 15 ,
?:ocess ? o:. Racks 10, 11, 12, 13 2-4 15 ! Sec. ?:ocess ?:o:. Rack 3 2-5 15 l Sec. ?:ocess Rack G 2-6 15 l Sec. ? ocess Rack li 2-7 15 ?:ocess Control Racks 5, 8, 9,19 l 2-8 i 15 Ver:. Board Con::cl -
I 2-9 15 3enchboard Control g2-10 15 Loop Stop Valves Relay Rack 3 I 2-11 15 Inpu: Solid S:a:e ? ot. Sys. Train A, Channel !! 2-12 15 Input Solid S: ate Pro . Sys. Train 3, Channel II , 2- 13 25 PNL-AC-INST 2 2-14 15 Benchboard Sta:us Lights 2-15 15 RK-INCOR-INS-1 and APDMS - e 2-16 25 Rad. Mon. Sys. Panels 2, 4, 6) 7 . 2-17 15 Vib. Men. 3, 6 2-18 15 Bat. Skr. Ind. L:s. 2-19 15 Load 7:equency Con:. L and N 2-20 15 Ioad Freq. Con:rol I 2-21 l
*r 70 Wre atea oca V T Scidic.*J '
2-22 Sen. line Break ? ::. Channel !! ? 1. ?: c. Rack "O -
- 2-23 ;
15 4160V Bus 13 Underf ree. Relav PrA-RE(.-->l :
) 2-24 t 15 3at. No. 2 125V DC Isola:1on' Transduce:
Oscillograph Vital Bus 2 Volts : 2-25 2 2-26 l 15 3at. No. 5 125V DC Isolation Transduce ! 2-27 70 ?NL-AC-BUS 1F i 2-28 15 Aux. Safeguards ':ab. 3 e 2-29 40 Syste L.ESEL L:AO S E 4 0 8VCE R-2-30 40 Aux. Relav Rack 3
- t PAGE 2 0F 4 PAGES 2SSUI 2 l
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3-1 15 ?:::e :i:n - *ucl. Inst. Sys. Pack !!! I ::en-? :: . - ::ccl. Inst. Sys. Rack !!! 3-2 15 f 3-3 l 15 Process ? ct. Rack 14 15. 16. 17. 13 3-a I 15 Sec. ? ccess Pro:. Rack C l, 3-5 I 15 f Sec. ?:: cess Rack J - 3-6 15 ' Sec. ?:ccess Rack ? 3-7 15 ? ocess Cen::al Racks 20. 23 3-8 15 P';I.-AC-I::S 3 3-9 15 *ler:. Board Control 3-10 15 3enchboard Con::el 3-11 15 Input Solid State Prot. Sys. Train A. Channel !!! 3-12 15 Input Solid State P ct.,Sys.. Train 3. Channel I!! Vib . Mer. 2. 5 Ylf-VSIOlA 1 VS f004 g 3-133-14 15 15 3 Poin: Osc111cgraph 3-15 25 Spare 3-16 25 St.n. Line Break Prot. Channel III Pri. ?:ocess Rack 35 3-17 15 Whittaker T/C Ref. Junction Box 1 3-18 15 . Acoustic valve Moni:or Syste= L::put Transfer Sw. 3-19 15 Vib. Men. Aux. Relays V3'E'IO 4 7 0 3-20 15 Spare vs yi j 3-21 15 Vib . Men . 4, 7 /IS?/ d Mgtfid2C 3-2 15 j 16 Pein: Oscillograph , 3-23 l 15 - ' 150V Sus 1C Underfree. Relav . 3-24 j 15 I Spare
' i 3-25 i 2 ,
Oscillegraph Vical Eus III Vol:s 3-26 15 ?ilo: *;1:e . Monitor Relays (CET-RY-1] l , 3-27 15 Chic:ine De:ecter C*-A-VS-1013 3-28 15 I 3at. ::c. 3125V DC Isola:ien ::ansduce: 3-29 40 Spare i 3-30 40 Spare 4 PACE 3 07 4 PAGES ISSUE 2
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? :cass Cen:::1 Racks 21, 22, 27, 28, 29 4-11 Vert. Board Control s
' 4-12 4-13 15 13 4 aoe ~fppes217" *T(MS PLdM M4MA S:=, Gen. Au:o Level Cent:cl ? 1. Precess Rack , ,
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h 15 4-14 15 Inpu Solid Sta:e ?:::. Sys., Irain A, Channel D
- 1) Solid State P c . Sys. Safeguards Test Cab. Train 3
- 2) Input Solid Sta:a ? o . Sys.
Train 3 Channel IV
- 3) Outpue Solid Sca:e ?re:. Sys.
4-15
' Train 3 15 4-16 cen:rol Board De=ul:1plexer 15 S::. Line 3:eak ?;ot. Channel !? ? 1. .
' 17
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! 15 4-15 t 15 'Ini:::ker T/C Re5. .iunc:ien Sex 2 t .
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- 4.: i Spare 4-24 15 Spare 4-25 2 4-26 15 Oscillograph Vital Sus W Vol:s 4-27 ?ile: *. Tire Relavs -
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4-23 15 4-29 3at. No.
- 1257 DC Isola:1cn Transduce !
40 Spare 4-30 . 40 ! Soare i PACI 4 0F 4 ? AGES .S
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i. AC DISTRI3UTION PANELC ' PNL-AC- 3US-1Z Location: Rel.17 Room West Wall I - k) ' l' i i 1 Power Supplied Prom: NCC1-EII.IVia VITAL BUS ).,, - i t i s 3kr No. Amos Mg, , ,, .t. 1Z-1 70 Seq of Events Escorder ' 1Z-2 15 Communicacions 3cx 50 1Z-3 15 Tamp Lighting 11-4 15
's Communicacious Box 45 !,
1Z-5 15 Et Trace Master .b:n.s / 1Z-6 15 12-7 120 V AC Source to Auttio Tona PNL C3A 15 Spare ' 1Z-8 15 Handie-Talkie Radio & 960MEZ Consolecca in NSS Offica
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\ J AC DISTRI3UIION PANELS
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PNL-AC-BUS 17
' Location: Ralay Room, West Wall
, Power Supplied From: MCC1-E 14 (via 7I"4 BUS II) 3kr No. Asse s Load 17-1 70 Annunciator 17-2 15 17-3 c-mications 3cx 50 15 Telematering and Frequency Indicator 17-4 15 Communications Box 50 17-5 15 Et Traca Master Ann.
17-6 15 Automatic Synchronizar (TRS' HTS-MA] 17-7 13 Viscorders 17-8 15- Spare 1 I f 4 I g . t t. <. i .
Cuestion Pages 4.5-1, -2: Provide data on functions of each load on each bus, substation and MCC of this tabulatina.
Response
(See attached) 4 9 e 22.1 J
1 MAJCR CCMPONE.NTS Motor Control Center fMCC1-E11 (Located in Screenwell, Elev. 708') - (Fed from t.60V Substation 1-8, Bus IN) Cubicle i A. Incoming Line
- 3. Intk. Struct. Cubicle Supply Fan (VS-F-57A]
C. Aircraft warning lights (CT-AWL-1] D. R.P. River Wtr. PP. Dischg. Valve [MOV-RW-102A1] E. Intk. Struct. Cubicle Supply Fan (VS-F-57C] G. R.P. River Wtr. PP Dischg. Valve (MOV-RW-102A2] H. R.P. River Wtr. PP Dischg. Valve (MOV-RW-100C2] J. Spara U. Fire Pump Room Unit Heater (HS-EUH-7) V. AC Distr. TRF (TRF-PWR-E5] (PN-AC-ES) Y. Unit Heater (HS-ECH-11] Z. Unit Heater (HS-EUH-32] e e e e
MAJOR CCMPONEWS (continued) Motor Control Center fMCCI-E21 (Located in Screenwell, Elev. 708') - (Fed frca 480V Substatica 1-9, Bus IP) Cubicle A. Incoming Line
- 3. Intk. Struct. Cubicle Supply Fan C.
D. AC Distr. Transformer (PNL-AC-E6)(VS-F-37B] [72F-PWR-E6] R.P. River Vtr. PP Dischg. Valve [MOV-RV-10231] E. Intk. Struct. Cubicle Supply Fan (VS-F-37C] G. R.P. River Ver. PP Dischg. Valve [MOV-RV-10232]
- 3. R.P. River Ver. PP Dischg. Valve [MOV-RV-102C1]
J. Spare
- U. Unit Heater (HS EUH-10]
V. Spare X. Spare Y. Unit Hester [HS-EUH-11A] Z. Unic Heater (HS-EUH-15] eg e e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . o__________J
l
."JLJOR COMPONENTS (continued)
Motor Control Center fMCC1-E31 (Located in Aux. 31dg. Westwall, Elev. 135'6") - (Fed from 440V Substation 1-8, Bus IN) A. Incoming Line B. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch, Isol. Valve (MOV-RW-103A] C. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol. Valve (MOV-RW-103C] D. RW to R.P. Comp. Cool. Wtr. Ht. Exch. Valve (MOV-RW-114A] E. Emergency Light Transformer (LTG-TRF-E3] F. Baron Inj. Recire. Pump (SI-P-3A] H. la Charg. PP Min. Flow Line Isol Valve (MOV-CH-275A] J. RWST Disch. Valve (MCV-CH-1153] K. VCT Disch. Valve (MOV-CH-115C] P. 13 Charg. PP Min. Flow Line Isol Valve (MOV-CH-2753] Q. 1C Charg. PP Min. Ficw Line Isol Valve (MOV-CH-275C] R. Chg. PP Pit Sump Pump (DA-P-12A]
- 5. Chg. PP Pit Sump Pump (DA-P-12C]
V. Leak Coll. Bypass Exhaust (VS-D-4-1A] V. Charg. PP Cubic Nor. Exhaust (VS-D-4-3Al . AB. Spare AC. RW to R.P. Comp. Cool. Wtr. Ht. Exch. Valve [MOV-RW-114B] AD. RW To CMNT Air Recire. Coils (MOV-RW-116] , AE. No. 1A RCP Seal Wtr. Valve (MOV-CH-308A] AF. No. 13 RCP Seal Wer. Valve (MOV-CH-30SB] AG. TRF-SW-01 AH. No. 1C RCP Seal Wer. Valve [MOV-CH-308C] AJ. Cont. Room Emerg. Supply Fan (VS-F-41A] . AK. Rad. Mon. Pump (RM-P-GW108] AL. ) Rad. Mon. Pump [RM-P-VS101] AM. Boron Inj. Tk. Heater (SI-EH-1A]
MAJCR COMPCNENTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCCl-E41 (I.ocated in Aux. Bldg. Westwall. Elev. 735'6") - (Fed from 430V Substation 1-9, Bus IP) Cubicle % A. Incoming Line B. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol. Valve [MOV-RW-103B] C. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol.. Valve (MOV-RW-103D] D. R.P. Comp. Cool Ver. Heat Exch. Inlet Valve [MOV-RW-1063} G. J. 3W To Cant. Air Recire. Cool Coils (MOV-RW-117] RWST Disch. Valve (MOV-CH-115D] K. VCT Disch Valvs (MOV-CH-115E] N. Baron Inj. Rec:.re. Pump (SI-P-3B] P. R.P. Comp. Cool Wtr. Hear Exch. Inlet Valve (MOV-RW-106A] # Q. Charg. PP Disch. Ndr. Valve (MOV-CH-3731 R. Charg. PP Pit Sump PP (DA-P '.23] S. Charg. PP Suct. Ndr. (MOV-CH-350] T. Charg. PP Pit Sump Pump [DA-P-12C] V. I,aak Coll. Bypass Exhaust (VS-D-4-1B] W. Charg. PP Cub. Nor. Exhaust (VS-D-4-3B] ' AB. Spare AC. Emerg. Switchgear Exh. Tan (VS-F-16Bl AD. Control Rm. Emerg. Sup. Fan (VS-F-41B] O e 9
MAJCR CCMPONENTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCCl-EST (Located in West Cable Vault) - (Fed from 480V Substation 1-8, Bus IN) Cubicle A. Incoming Line B. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol: Valve (MOV-RW-104A] C. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol. Valve (MOV-RW-104C] D. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol. Valve (MOV-RW-105A] E. Boron Inj. Surge Tk. Heater (SI-EH-3] G. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol. Valve (MOV-RW-105C] H. Quench PP Disch. Hdr. Valve [MOV-QS-101A] J. QS Flow Cutback Valve [MOV-QS-103A] K. Quench PP Suction Valve [MOV-QS-100A] N. Chemical Injection Pump Discharge Valve [MOV-QS-104A] P. Res. Ht. Res. Supply Isol. Valve (MOV-RH-700] Q. Res. Ht. Res. Return Line Valve [MOV-RH-720A] R. Low Hd. Inj. PP Suction Valve (MOV-SI-860A] U. Mi Hd. Inj. PP Disch. Valve [MOV-SI-863A] V. Low Ed. SI PP Hdr. Isol Valve (MOV-SI-864A] W. Baron Inj. Tk. Inlet Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-867A] X. Boron Inj. Tk. Inlet Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-867C] AA. Lew Ed. SI PP Inj. Line Valve [MOV-SI-890A] AB. Cold Leg Inj. Header Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-836] AC. Outside RS PP Suction Valve [MOV-RS-155A] AD. Outside RS PP Disch Valve (MOV-RS-156A] AG. 1C Aux. Feedwater Throttle Valve (MOV-FW-151B] AH. 13 Aux. Feedwater Throttle Valve (MOV-FW-151D] AJ. IA Aux. Feedwater Throttle Valve (MOV-FW-151F] AK. LA Fd. Wer. Isolation Valves (MOV-FW-156A] AL. Boric Acid Tank Heater (HS-EUH-57] aM. Boric Acid Tk. Heater (HS-EUH-58] AN. 13 Fd. Wtr. Isolation Valves (MOV-FW-156B] AP. 1C Fd. Wtr. Isolation Valves [MOV-FW-156C] AQ. Cont. Atmos. Purge Blower Inlet (MOV-KY-101A] AR. Hot Leg Inj. Edr. Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-869A] AS. Boric Acid Tk. Heater (HS-EUH-69] AT. Hydrogen Recombiner (HY-RT-1A) (MOV-HY-102A] AU. Hydrogen MA4.yrar (MOV-HY-103A] AY. 1A S.G.F.P. Disch. Valve [MOV-FW-150A] AZ. 13 S.G.F.P. Disch. Valve [MOV-FW-150B] e e _a
1 I' MAJOR CCMPONENTS (continued) I Motor Control Center IMCCl E31 (Located in West Cable Vault) - (Fed from 480V Substation 1-6, 3us IN) (continued) Cubicle BA. Charging PP Disch. Edr. Valve (MOV-CH-378] 3B. Charg. Edr. Isol. Valve (MOV-CH-259] 3C. 11 Accum. Outlet Isol. Valve (MOV-SI-865A] 3D. Low Ed. Inj. PP Suction Valve (MOV-SI-862A] BE. Par. Rel. Valve Isolation [MOV-RC-535] 3F. 3G. Low Nd. SI PP 1 Min. Flow Isol. Valve (MOV-SI-885A] 3J. Low Hd. SI PP Min. Flow Hdr. Isol Valve (MOV-SI-685C] BK. Residual Mt. Removal Ht. Exch. Valve (MOV-CC-112-A2] BL. Residual Ht. Removal Ht. Exch. Valve (MOV-CC-112-A3] BM, Saf. Grd. VV Pit Isol (VS-D-4-11A] Contant. .Acmos. Purge Blower (HY-P-1] BN. H2 Recombiner (HY-RT-1A] BP. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-CH-01] BQ. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-BR-01] BR. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-3R-02] BS. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-QS-01] 3T. Chemical Injection Pump (QS-P-4A] BU. Chemical Injection Pump (QS-P-4C] CX. Incoming Line 4 _______ _____________ _ ___ __________________--_____---------------------~
MAJOR COMPCNESTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCC1-E61 (Located in East Cable Vault) - (Fed from 4a0V Substation 1-9, Bus 1P)- c Cubicle A. Incoming Line B. .tecire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol Valve (MOV-RV-1043] C. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol Valve [MOV-RW-104D] D. Recire. Spray Ht. Exch. Isol Valve (MOV-RV-1053] E. Rad. Mon. Pump (RM-P-VS-107] T. Boron Inj. Tank Heater (SI-EH-1B] G. Recire. Spray Nx RV Outlet Isolation [MOV-RW-105D] H. J. Low Hd. SI PP Min. Flow Isol. Valve (MOV-SI-885D] Quench PP Dischg. Valve (MOV-QS-101B] K. Quench PP Suct. Valve (MOV-QS-100B] N. Chemical Injection Pump Discharge Valve (MOV-QS-104B] P. RHR Supply Isol. Valve (MOV-RH-701] Q. RHR Return Line Valve [MOV-RH-720B] R. Low Nd. Inj. PP Suct. (MOV-RH-860B] U. Hi Hd . Inj . PP Sw.t . Valve (McV-SI-863B] V. W. Low Md. SI PP Hdr. Isol. Valve (MOV-SI-864B: Baron Inj. Tk. Inlet Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-8673] X. Boron Inj. Tk. Outlet Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-867D] AA. Low Ed. SI PP Inj. Line Valve (MOV-SI-890C] AB. Low Ed. SI PP Inj. Line Valve [MOV-SI-890B] AC. AD. Outside RS PP Suct. Valve (MOV-RS-155B] Outside RS PP Dischg. Valve (MOV-RS-156B] ) AG. AH. 1C Aux. Feedwater Throttle Valve [MOV-FV-151A] AJ. IB Aux. Feedwater Throttle Valve [MOV-TV-151C] AK. 1A Aux. Feedwate: Throttle Valve [MOV-FV-151E] AL. QS Flow Cutback Valve (MOV-QS-103B] Boric Acid Tk [HS-EUH-59] AM. Boric Acid Tank (HS-EUH-60] AN. AP. Low Ed SI PP Inlet itW5T[MOV-SI-862B] Boric Acid Tank (HS-EUH-68] AR. Safeguards VV Pit Isolatica Valve (VS-D-4-11B] AU. Low HD SI PP2 Min. Flow Isol. (MOV-SI-885B] AVA. Chemical Injection Pump (QS-P-4B] AVB. Chemical Injection Pump (QS-P-4D] AW. RCP Seal Leakoff Isol. Valve (MOV-CH-381] AX. Reg. Heat Exch. Ch. Ln. Dischg. Valve (MOV-CH-310] AY. AZ. Accum. No. 3 Outlet Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-865C] Accum. No. 2 Outlet Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-865B] _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ .- J
l l l l l MAJOR COMPONENTS (centinued) Motor Control (Fed from 480VCenter Substation IMCCl-E61 (Located 1-9, Sus IP) in East Cable' Vault) - (continued) Cubicle 3A.
- 33. Aux. W Turb. Sta Isolation Valve [MOV-MS-105]
3C. Rec. Spr. Heat Exch. Supl. Hdr. Valve (MOV-RW-104] 3D. Pzr. Rif. VV Isol. Valve [MOV-RC-536] - 3J. Par. Rif. VV Isol. Valve [MOV-RC-537] Hot Leg Inj. Header Isol. Valve [MOV-SI-8693] 3K. Residual Et. 3L. Residual Ht. Removal Heat Exch. Valve (MOV-CC-11232] BM. Removal Heat Exch. Valve (MOV-CC-ll233] Mn. Sem. ~V Bypass Valve [MOV-MS-101A] 3N. Mn. Sem. TV Bypass Valve (MOV-MS-1013] BP. Mn. Stm. TV Bypass Valve [MOV-MS-101C] 3Q. Safety Inj. Accum. Test. Line Isol. Valve (MOV-SI-842] 3R. H2 Recombiner (MOV-HY-1013] 3S. BT. H2 Recombiner - HY-RT-13 (MOV-HY-1023] H2 Analyzer HA-HY-1003 (MOV-HY-1033] 3U. H2 Recembiner (HY-RT-13] 3V. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-CH-03 } 3W. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-3R-03] 3X. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-BR-04] BY. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-QS-02] BZ. (TRF-SW-02] s. m
MAJCR COMPCNENTS (continued) Motor Con:rol Center IMCCl-E71 (Located in Diesel Generator No. 1 Suilding) - (Fed from 480V Substatica 1-8, Sus IN) , l { Cubicle A. Incoming Line B. Fuel Pool Cire. Pump (FC-P-1A] C. Spare E. No. 1 Diesel Gen. Bldg. Exh. Fan (VS-F-22Al - H. Diesel Heat Exch. Edr. Valve [MOV-RW-113Al J. Diesel Heat Exch. Hdr. Valve (MOV-RW-113B] K. LO Cire. Pumps (EE-P-3A]IImmer. Her. [EE-1H-1A] N. No.1 Start Air Compressor (EE-C-1A] P. No. 2 Start Air Compressor (EE-C-2Al Q. No. 1 F.O. Trans. Pump [EE-P-1A] R. No. 2 F.O. Trans. Pump (EE-P-1B] S. Spare T. Unit Heater (HS-EUH-73] Y. Aux RW PP Disch. (MOV-RW-116A] l 0 l I 1 1 O
MAJOR COMPONENTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCCl-ES1 (Located in Diesel Generator No. 2 Building) - (Fed from /+80V Substation 1-9, 3us IP) Cubicle A. Incoming Line B. Fuel Pool Cire. Pump.(FC-P-13] C. Spare E. No. 2 Diesel Gen. 31dg. Exh. Tan (VS-F-223] H. J. Diesel Heat Exch. Hdr. Valve (MOV-RW-113C] K. Diesel Heat Exch. Edr. Valve (MOV-RV-113D] LO Cire. Pump (EE-P-23] & Immersion Heater (EE-1H-1B] N. No. 1 Start Air Compressor (EE-C-13] P. No. 2 Start Air Compressor (EE-C-23] Q. No. 1 F.O. Trans. Pump (EE-P-1C] R. No. 2 F.O. Trans. Pump (EE-P-1D] S. Unit Heater (MS-EUH-39] T. Unit Hester (HS-EUH-7/*] Y. CO2 Stor. Unit (FP-C-2] Z. Aux Raw Wer PP Disch. (MOV-RW-116B] AA. Spara AB. Unic Heater (HS-EUH-68] ( 9 J
MAJOR COMPCNESTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCCl-E91 (Located in Emergency Switcagear Roca) - (Fed from 480V Substation 1-8, Eus IN) Cubicle A. Incoming Line C. E. Cont. Rs. Area Return Air Fan (VS-F-40A] AEWS Intake Fan (VS-F-69A] H. Cont. Rm. A.C. Cond. Wt. Cir. Pump (VS-P-3A] J. Turbine Turning Gear Motor (LO-M-5] K. Turbine Gen. 3 earing Lube Oil Pump (LO-M-7] L. 3rg. Oil Lift Pump (LO-M-8] P. Emerg. Swgr. Area Supply Fan (VS-F-55A] Q. Emer. Lighting Transformer (LTG-TRF-E2] S. T. AC Distr. Transformer (TRF-PWR-E1] (PNL-AC-El) U. AC Distr. Transformer (TRF-PWR-E3] (PNL-AC-E3) V. Control Rm. Outdoor Air Intake (VS-D-40-1A] W. Control Spare Rs. Exhaust Air (VS-D-40-1C] X. [TRF-PWR-22] (CPU) Z. Computer Inverter . AA. 48V 3att. Charger [3ATT-CHG-48A] AB. AC. Sta. Batt. No. 1 (3AT-CHG-1] AD. Sca. Batt. No. 3 (BAT-CHG-3] AE. Vital Spare Bus I and III Inverters [INV-VIT3CS I], (INV-VIT3US III] AF. Emergency Switchgear Exhaust Fan [VS-T-16A] s l
MAJOR CCMPONESTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCC1-E101 (Locatad in Emergency Switchgear Room) - (Fed from 480V Substation 1-9, Sus IP) Cubicle A. Incoming Line C. Cont. Rs. Area Retur , Air Fan (VS-F-403] D. Cont. Rs. Emerg. Air rk. Ccmpressor (VS-C-2] E. ARWS Intake Fan (VS-P-69B] F. G. AC Distr. Transformer (TRF-PWR-E4] (PNL-AC-E4) H. AC Distr. Transformer (TRF-PWR-E ] (PNL-AC-E2) Cont. Rm. A.C. Cond. Ver. Circ. Pump [VS-P-3B] J. K. Control Rm. Outdoor Air Intake (VS-D-40-13] N. Control Rm. Exhaust Air (VS-D-40-1D] H.P. Seal Oil BU Pump (LO-P-10] P. Spare R. Batt. Chgi. [3AT-CHG-05] S. 48V Batt. Charger [3AT-CHG-48B] T. Sta. Batt. No. 2 (2AT-CHG-2] U. V. Sta. Batt. No. 4 [3AT-CHG-4] W. Vital Spare Bus II and IV Inverters (INV-VIT3US-II], (INV-VIT3US IV] X. Emerg. Swgr. Area Supply Fan (VS-F-53B] e l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ O
MAJCR CCMPONENTS (continued) Motor Control Center IMCCl-Elli (Located in 'a'ast Cable Vault) - (Fed from 440V Substation 1-8, Bus 1.N1) Cubicle A. Incoming Line B. Boric Acid Trans. Pump (CH-P-2A] C. Boric Acid Tk. Heatar (CH-EH-1A] D. Boric Acid Tk. Heater (CH-EH-1C] G. Safegd. Area Sump Pump (DA-P-1A] H. Cont. Instr. Air Compressor (IA-C-1A] J. Emer. Lighting Transformer (LTG-TRF-E4] ' K. Spare L. Cont. Isol. Purge Exh. [VS-D-5-3A] N. Cont. Isol. Purge Supply (VS-D-5-5A] P. Spare S. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-SI-01] T. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-SI-02] U. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-SI-03] V. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-3R-05] l l g I __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _E ._ ^
MAJOR CCM.PONENTS (continued) Motor Centrol Center fMCCI-E121 (Located in East Cable Vault) - (Fed from t.80V Substation 1-9, Bus IP1) Cubfele A. Incoming Line
- 3. Boron Acid Trans. Pump [CH-P-23]
C. D. Bort- Acid Tank Heater (CH-EH-13] G. Boric acid Tank Heater (CH-EH-1D] Safegd. Sump Pump [DA-P-131 H. Cont. Instr. Air Ccmpressor [IA-C-13] J. K. Emers. Spara Lighting Transformer (LTG-TRF-E1] L. N. Cont. Isol. Purge Exhaust (VS-D-5-3B] Cont; P. Spare Iscl. Purge Supply [VS-D-5-53] Q. S. Ec2 erg. Lighting Transformer [LTG-TRF-E3] ' T. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-SI-OS] U. Heat Tracing Transfor:ner [TRF-SI-06] V. Heat Tracing Transformer (TRF-SI-07] Heat Tracing Transformer [TRF-BR-06]
l [.AJOR COMPONE.m (continued) Motor Control Center (MCC1-E131 (Located in MCC Room above Cable Vault) - (Fed from 480V Substation 1-8, 3'2s IN) Cubiele j 1A. Incoming Line
- 13. Spare.
IC. Spare 1D. Vital Bus I & III Voltage Regulator 1013 2A. Spara
- 23. Rad. Mon. Trans. TRF-WR-29 2C. Rad. Mon. Trans. TRF-PWR-29 e
i g
*- e ~
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.JLJOR COMPONEr5 (continued)
Motor Control Cente IMC01-Elt.) (I.ccated in East Cable Vault) - God from I.80V Substation 1-9, Bus IP) Cable la. Incoming Line
- 13. Spare 1C. Spare 1D. Vital Bus II & IV Voltage Regulator IP15
- 21. Spare
=
l E
Question Page 5.1-1, 5.1-1: Are "The equipment required for shutdown the same as those listed on Page 4.1-1, or are thers other components / systems as well?
Response
Chapter 4 " Shutdown Capability Summary" was documented to explain the " minimum" safety-related shutdown systems required to' be available for safe shutdown based on the procedure method identified in Chapter 7 and further clarified in our October 28,.1982 letter,(attachment "Appen-dix R - Alternate Shutdown Procedures"). Chapter 5 " Electrical Analysis", was written to evaluate equipment and systems normally used to achieve safe shutdown via the computer analysis method. This list of equipment and associated cabling was used to generate a complete listing of cables used for performing these shutdown functions. This list would be the more conservative equipment listing since it includes alternative and diverse methods to achieve safe shutdown after assuming a fire in any one area. The " Electrical Analysis" of Chapter 5 was performed prior to the procedure method in Chapter 7, therefore, the analysis was utilized to determine available equipment. n 23.1
Quu tion Tables 5.1-1, -2: Provide descriptions of each system code.
Response
SYSTEM CODE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION l BYS BATTERY 125V STATION CCP PRIMARY COMPONENT COOLING (REACTOR BLDG. CLOSED , LOOP COOLING) l CHB CHARGING AND VOLUME CONTROL - BORIC ACID CHC CHARGING AND VOLUME CONTROL - BORIC ACID CHS CHARGING AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM CHV CHARGING AND VOLUME CONTROL - VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM EGF GENERATOR, STANDBY SYSTEM EGT GENERATOR, STANDBY TEMPERATURE EHS MOTOR CONTROL CENTER STANDBY SYSTEM ENS SWGR, STANDBY, 4.60V - SYSTEM WE FEEDWATER EMERGENCY FEEDWATER WS FEEDWATER SYSTEM HVD HEATING, VENTILATING, AIR COND. - DIESEL HVR HEATING, VENTILATING, AIR COND. REACTOR BLDG. AND PURGE HVS HEATING, VENTILATING, AIR CONU. SYCDI ISM ISOLATION MAIN STEAM MSS MAIN STEAM SYSTEM RCP REACTOR COOLANT (PRI LOOP) - PRESSURIZER C RCR REACTOR COOLANT (PRI LOOP) - PRESSURE RELIEF QUENCH SPRAY p RCS REACTOR COOLANT (PRI LOOP) - SYSTEM i RHS RESIDUAL HFAT REMOVAL SYSTD1 SWE SERVICE WATER EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SIL SAFETY INJECTION LOW PRESSURE SWS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM VBS VITAL BUS SYSTDi (INCOMING SUPPLY FROM INVERTER) 24.1
Question Page 5.1-4, 5.1.3, 4th paragraph: Clarify and explain meaning and significance of this material. I f Response Paragraph 4 was included in the submittal for NRC information. It identifies the various reports which were available from the original data to use in the analysis. Each variation provided information which was utilized to develop the circuit analysis sheets. Report #1 includes all information provided in other reports. Report #3 and 4 enabled us to key in on certain parameters to assist the engineer in his analysis, s 25.1
Question
- 3. Page 5.2.1, 5.2; Page 6.2-1, 6.2; Page 6.11-1, 6-11; Page 7-1, 7.1; Letter 1, 3rd paragraph; Letter 2, Procedure Item 3: All these items addressed " alternative" or " dedicated" safe shutdown. How can licen-see justify that II.L does not apply?
Response
The final rule, with respect to our facility which was licensed to operate prior to January 1,1979, requires us to comply with III.G, III.J and III.0, ong. We have reviewed the internal NRC memorandum from Mattson to Vollmer dated July 2,1982, and understand why the provisions of III.2 are being interpreted upon us by the reviewers in which " alternative or dedicated shutdown capability" is applicable. However, if III.L is to be included in the regulatory process, it should have been clearly identified in the law, not by a memorandum internal to NRC and given to us October 14, 1982 af ter the deadline for our Appendix R submittal had elapsed. See response to question #1. l l l s 26.1
O Question
- 4. Page 5.2-2, 5th paragraph: Can action be taken in time to avoid a LOCA? How much time can the valves be open? ;
i l
Response
As delineated in Chapter 8, the pressurizer PORV's will be isolated by closure of their respective MOV blocking valve immediately upon indi-cation of a fire in the areas containing their respective cables. l l l 27.1
Question
- 5. Page 5.2-1: Clarify and explain the meaning and signficance of this drawing.
Response
This figure shows the basis with which we determine those cables to be included in the analysis. This basis was determined by complying with the guidelines established in the 81-12 clarification letter and original licensing commitments. In summary, coil to contact and contact to contact separation is acceptable and serves to provide isolation of IE and non-IE circuits. When non-IE circuits come in contact with IE accross isolation devices, they were considered potentially associated. When these non-IE circuit left their point of potential association and came in contact with other non-IE cables they were not considered in the analysis. 28.1
Question
- 6. Page 5.2-3, 5.2.4, 3rd paragraph, last sentence: The section callout is an obvious error. What should it be?
Response
Typographical error. Should be Section 5.3. 29.1
. Qu 2 tion
- 7. Page 5.3-1, -2, 5.3, 3rd paragraph: Clarify meaning of this pa ragraph. What are Fire Reports 3 and 4, and why does the fact of a cable failure identification in the former eliminate it from the latter?
The following questions apply to the Circuit Analysis Sheets for the various Fire Areas:
- a. Regarding EE-EG-1 (V-REG) and EE-EG-2 (V-REG), some sheets state they are redundant for each other, and some state there is not redundancy as follows:
Redundancy Stated Non Stated CR-2 CV-3 CR-3 Explain the discrepancy. How can one substitute for the other? Will one regulator serve both generators?
- b. Similar discrepancies on whether or not redundancy exists show for:
H0V-RW113A through D EE-EG-1 (TR-PP) & EE-EG-2 (TR-PP) _, PZR-HTR-A through E Various MCC's Etc. ;
- c. Does (TR-PP) mean transfer pump?
- d. Explain the following discrepancy: Table 5.1-1 shows MCC-1-E2,
-E6, -E10, and -E12 as emergency MCC-s necessary-for safe shut-down. They are also listed in some Circuit Analysis Sheets as redundant equipment. In fire area CS-1 however, Note 2 states they are only included for breaker coordination. How can these mutually exclusive facts all be true?
- e. For Diesel Room DG-1 and DG-2, the two generator fields are listed as mutually redundant. How is this possible?
- f. For areas MG-1, ES-1 and ES-2, the generator grounding switches are shown as nutually redundant. How is this possible?
f Response This paragraph was intended to provide a brief description of the method used to develop the circuit analysis sheets. Report #3 was used to define the power cables / equipment only that were lost in a fire area. The list of equipment is shown under type
" power" for each fire area in the circuit analysis sheet.
Report #4 provides the total number of cables for a piece of equip-ment in each fire area. We compared report #4 to #3 and made a list of
" control and instrument" cables lost on the analysis sheets. Our reports are not used to eliminate cables only to provide lists for comparison.
30.1
The circuit analysis sheets identifies the equipment lost in a fire area under the heading " equipment lost" if redundant equipment can be used in place of the lost equipment and perform the same function but not be affected by the fire it is identified under the heading " redundant function equipment" if redundant equipment is not available it is noted as "N/A, 7a. There are (2) two emergency diesel generators EE-EG-1 & 2. Each has its own voltage regulator. In CR-2 and CR-3 only the cables for the voltage regulatory for EE-EG-2 are lost. The cables for EE-EG-1 voltage regulator are available, therefore EE-EG-1 is considered the available diesel and other cabling to EE-EG-1 was investigated. 7b. Same as (7a) items listed in column heading " redundant function ! equipment" identifies redundant equipment available to perform l similar functions. 7c. Yes (TR-PP) means tranfer pump 7d. Fire area CS-1 (cable spreading area) is unique in that no electrical equipment controlled from the MCC's exists in this area only cables of MCC equipment. In the analysis of power cables for CS-1, we identify MCC-1-E2 & E8 as alternates for MCC-1-El & E7. The power cables to MCC-1-E2 & 8 were installed in ductline in this area as a result of our Appendix A analysis so that we could maintain operation of motor operated valves required for use inside containment. The other MCC's noted were included to show all power cables lost. Equipment required on these MCC's can be operated manually if lost. Note 2 was added to show that the feeder breaker is coordinated with the other 480V bus breakers. l 7e. (see above) 7f. (see above)
~
e 30.2
. ,n Question l 5
- 8. Page 6.9-1, 6.9, Fig. 6.9-1: Text refers to bothi heat exchangers EE-E-1A and -1B (for the diesela) as the two unf ts ' fed by valves MOV-RWil3A through D. This is consistent with other data. Figure, however, shows feed only to -1B. Explain discrepancy.
,, \
Response N
,-- , a By protecting the MOV-RW-ll3D valve of the B Train (by relocating - '
this valve to another fire area separate from CO-2, P.G. Pump Room where the A, B & C valves are located), we are assuring redundant separa-tion of cooling water to the Diesel Generators. Valves MOV-RW113A & C feed heat exchanger EE-E-1A and valves MOV-RWil3B & D feed heat exchanger EE-E-1B. Since the proposed modifica- ' 't tion is applicable to the -1B heat exchanger, the -1A heat exchanger was omitted. > t s
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- 9. Page 6.10-1, -2, Figs. 6.10-1 through 3, Attachment 1:
This modification requires more explanation and clarification to wit: relays on one generator? s
- a. What is achieved by adding the interposing?
t
- b. Where are these relays located physically?
- c. Which generator will be so modified?
/ , \
, , d. How is the separately protected 125 VDC supply provided?
\ !!
- e. Show how all requisite function are retained. Provide schematics which can be clearly read and understood (not true of Attachment 1, RE21BZ-2).
f.- Where will operator controls be located?
. g. What fire areas will contain the modified, new cables?
- h. How will operator (s) determine that main control's are
, burned out, and alternates are to be used?
4\
- Response
\ Item 9 - Yes, all modifications are planned for D/G-2
- a. A seperate circuit connected to one D/G starting circuit s
along with interposing relays are used to isolate the cables that run outside the diesel generator room from the starting circuit.
- b. In D/G room number 2.
- c. EE-EG-2 (generator 2) d.. "Seperately protected 125VDC power supply" means that an in-4 dependent 125VDC circuit protected by it's own protective device will be used for the interposing relay circuit.
. . Relay output contacts shown on SH.1, 2 & 3 of Fig. 6.10-1 will (U '
replace the functions identified in attachment RE-21BZ R1 i thru R16. The functions shown on RE-21BZ field flash, stop
~
, PB, etc. will be replaced by interposing relays. (Note:
p , the remote start functions are only used during testing.) Automatically initiated should a problem occur with the inter-
$ ; posing relay circuit.
o j f. All manual controls identified in Fig. 6.10-1 with the exception
' of exercise selector switch are located in the control room.
The exercise selector switch is part of the engine control panel in the D/G room. As stated above, these functions are used during testing. 1 32.1
,y i o
8 Existing cables will be intercepted as they enter the D/G room and will be run to a new panel containing the relays. New cables will only be run in the D/G room.
- h. An annunciator drop will be provided.
A detailed discussion took place at the meeting concerning the proposed modification to the diesel generator control and starting circuits. Some of the items discussed were:
- 1. All diesel circuits as they now exist are fed from a single DC supply from the station battery with distribution from independant ciruit breakers located in the control panel in the diesel generator room. Several functions for starting and controls are directly connected to the diesel starting circuits such that a loss of any of these as they run throughout the plant could prevent the diesel f rom s tarting. The proposed change will provide separately protected D.C. from the main diesel supply to interposing relay circuits. These circuits will be used for all cabling external to the diesel generator room.
l Non-Emergency Controls (Fig. 6.10-1)
- 2. Cabling to the control room is for functions used during normal plant operation (exercise starting for example) and the loss of this cabling as modified in (1) above will not effect safety operation.
Emergency Controls (Fig. 6.10-2)
- 3. Any loss of external cabling incurred due to a fire would result in the automatic start of the diesel.
e i 32.2
4 Question
- 10. Page 9.2. -3, Response to 8.C: Since operators must go out of the control room to other locations, both operator inter-face and system logic change for the modifications of 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11. Explain why the final statement is in conflict with this.
Response
This statement was intended to convey the fact that the design of the modification does not degrade the licensed safety analysis or design. Any logic changes and cable rerouting associated with these modifications will not change the operators' interactions with the system. The BIP will require a change of operating station but the parameters available will be those with which the operator is familiar with from control room operation. 33.1 _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ___.__________.__________________.__________________________________J
O Question
- 11. Page 9-5, Response to 8.b: This statement conflicts with the follow-ing:
- a. Page 4.1-2, Assumption No. 3
- b. Page 6.11-1, 3rd paragraph (Letter 1 negates this).
Explain the discrepancy and provide data showing whether or not any repairs are needed for cold shutdown (repairs are not allowed for hot shutdown). If repairs are needed, are materio!= kept onsite? What materials are needed?
Response
Response to 8.1 states "no repair procedures are required", which was our position at the time of initial submittal of our report since the procedures in Chapter 7 were considered" equipment operating procedures". As a result of our October 14, 1982 meeting with NRC and our follow-up letter (October 28, 1982), the procedures listed in Chapter 7 of our report are now " repair procedures" for achieving cold shutdown. Upon review of the procedures and what material would be required, the follow-ing equipment list was developed: screwdriver (s) electrical tape electrical jumper (s) adjustable wrench (es) pneumatic (air hose) jumper (s) portable N bo t tles 2 All are stcck items which are readily available onsite. 34.1
O O Question
- 12. Page 9-6. Response to 1.A through 1.E: Provide schematics of at least a representative sample of all circuits modified for alternative shutdown.
Response
An example of a typical circuit was reviewed at the Novmeber 30, 1982 meeting. The only modification of circuit is the Diesel Generator Control described is section 6.10 of the June 30, 1982 submittal. og e 35.1 i
f. Question
- 13. Section 11.0: Exactly what exemption requests are being made?
Respo nse
- 1. Control Room CR-1 (Section 11.1)
Exemption for auto suppression and separation [IIIG.2.b] Note: Justifications provided for all exemptions in Section 11 of the report.
- 2. Reactor Containment RC-1 (Sec.11.2)
October 22, 1982 letter provided additional clarifications for this area. [IIIG.2.d] Exemption for separations for this area:
- 1) Pressurizer heater cables directly at the Pressurizer and within the Pressurizer cubicle itself.
- 2) Pressurizer head vent solenoid valves and associated cabling at the Pressurizer (see attached dwgs.)
- 3) Rx. head vent solenoid valves and associated cabling.
- 3. Blender Room (PA-lG) PAB 722 level -
Exemption for auto suppressior detection, and separation for MOV-CH-115 B&D, and MOV-SI-867 A or B. See 11.3.2 & 3 for justi-fication.
- 4. Pipe Tunnel (PT-1) Elev. 722 level Exemption for auto suppression, detection and separation for the cooling water supply valves for Containment Air Recire. Coolers (TV-CC-110 E2, F2, and F1) [IIIG.2.b (or C)]
MOV-CH-289, MOV-SI-867C or D (see pages 11.4-3 and 4 for justification)
- 5. Cable Tunnel CV-3 See Section 6.8 (Modification to install Halon System; area already has detection)
Exemption for separation and/or 1 hr. fire barrier betwen redundant cablir.g of equipment. See pages 11.5-3 and 4 for justification [IIIG.2.b or c]
~
- 6. PAB Elev. 722 PA-lG October 22, 1982 letter provides additional clarification for this area (also common area for Blender Room item #3 of this response)
Exemption requested for auto suppression and detection for the changing pump power leads in this area (adequate separ-ation documented in October 22 letter) [III.G.2.b or c]. l 36.1
4 Exemption requested for auto suppression, detection and separation for the river water cooling valves MOV-RW-106A & B, MOV-RW-ll4A & B, and MOV-RW-ll6 & 117, which supply backup cooling capability to the containment air recirculation coils. See page 11.6-4 for justification III.G.2.b or c. See pages 11.6-3 & 4 for justification of exemptions for this area. 36.2
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' Question Letter 2, Procedure, Page 4, next-to-last paragraph: It is not necessary that any cables be severed. Explain why that statement was made.
Letter 2, Procedure, Page 5: Same comment and request as 25 above. In addition, there is no necessity that only leg be physically grounded, only that the DC circuits share a common (electrical). This is likely in view of the submittal statement that all cables in a common tray or conduit will be of the potential (Submittal, Pages 5-1-3, -4, 5.1.2.7.2. Item 2, Explain and clarify.
Response
This statement was intended to give the basis for the improbability of 480 volt equipment (valves) changing position due to fire induced failures of the 3 phase power cables. It is not physically probable in the case of 3 phase 480V cable to superimpose on energized 3 phase c cable onto another 3 phase cable and cause operation. The paragraph was inserted, as stated, to define wny " prompt positioning and de-energization of 3 phase motor operated valves was not considered necessary on a priority basis for maintaining hot shut-down conditions. The " severed" term in both cases was only included to address cable failures that might occur within a cable tray. With regard to the DC failures, the " ground" in question in the coumon elec-trical, we stated that these types of failures are more probable than the 480 volt failures. It is for this reason that the DC control power will be turned off of all running 4160 volt equipment once it has been placed on the emergency diesel generator on a priority basis. These statements were made only to support the order (priority) in which the actions for removal of control power from valves and pumps would be removed. l 37.1
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