ML20059M761
| ML20059M761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/1990 |
| From: | Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9010050240 | |
| Download: ML20059M761 (132) | |
Text
p.
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOG A. TENNESSEE 374ot SN 157B Lookout Place 00T 011990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Centlement In the Matter of
)
Docket No. 50-260 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - INTERRELATED SAFETY SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES This letter provides TVA's response to NRC's June 6. 1990 request for BFN to fill in a Staff provided blank dependency matrix. NRC requested this inforination in order to better understand the dependencies among loads supplied by the emergency diesel generators and batteries which are required to be operable to support unit 2 restart. The subject of unit sharing and interactions was reviewed at the time of the original licensing of BFN and is discussed in Appendix F of the BFN Final Safety Analysis Report.
TVA is providing two BFN dependency matrices as Enclosure 1.
Ti >
Support-to-Frontline Matrix lists the frontline systems across the horizontal axis and the support systems along the vertical axis. This matrix shows the dependencies for the analyzed systems. The Support-to-Support Matrix shows the cependencies for the support systems. Supporting information and notes are provided as Enclosure 2.
Through the review of the design documentation required to develop these matrices, TVA has not identified any instances of cross-train dependencies that would compromise the safety-related systems analyzed.
These matrices are intended to provide a mechanism for better understanding the dependencies among loads supplied by the emergency diesel generators and the emergency batteries for systems at BFN unit 2 while units 1 and 3 are in a shutdown condition. The scope of the equipment contained in the matrices reflects the list of systems provided by NRC in their blank dependency matrix with changes as discussed with NRC in the TVA/NRC working meeting of July 16, 1990. The matrices show the dependencies for the listed systems in the level
-of detail consistent with NRC's blank dependency matrix and that provided in the Browns Ferry Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). These matrices reflect the various modes of system operation identified in the PRA.
As such, the matrices.do not analyze equipment related to external events or equipment required for longer term operations since these aspects are not currently modeled in the BFN PRA.
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901003o2jo j001 gDR ADOCK 05000260
$6/
PDC An Equal Opportunity Employer
/
f 3
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 00T 011990 1
There are no commitments contained in this letter.
In consideration of the scope of technical information provided by this letter. TVA proposes to meet with NRC in the next few weeks to discuss this material.
If you have any questions, please contact Patrick P. Carier, Manager of Site Licensing, at l
(205) 729-3570.
t Very truly yours, TEhWESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY i
l" E. G. Wallace, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosures I
cc: See page 3 i
f 4
I k
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission cc (Enclosures):
Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate II-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabann 35609-2000 6
Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Region II 101 Marietta Street NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 i
l l
i ENCLOSURE 2 BPN PRA - SUPPORT TO SUPPORT DEPENDENCY MATRIX NOTES 1
500KV SWITCIIYARD The 500kV switchyard is fed from West Point, Davidson, Cordova, Madison 1, 2 and Trinity 1, 2 substations.
2 161KV SWITCl! YARD The two 161kV switchyard lines are fed from the Ather.s and Trinity substations.
3-UNIT TRANSPORMERS Unit transformers TUSSIB and TUSSIA are fed from Bay 21 of the 500kV Switchyard via Main Transformer 1.
Unit transformer TUSS 2A and TUSS 2B are fed from Bay 24 of the 500kV switchyard via Main Transformer 2.
Unit transformer TUSS 3B is fed from Bay 26 of the 500kV switchyard via Main Transformer 3.
4 COMMON STATION SERVICC TRANSPORMERS The Common Station Service Transformers (TCSSA and TCSSB) are fed via the Athens and Trinity 161kV lines respectively.
5 START BUSES Start Bus 1A is normally powered by Common Station Service Transformer TCSSA and automatically transfers to TCSSB upon loss of power from TCSSA.
Start Bus 1B is normally powered by Common Station Service Transformer TCSSB but automatically transfers to TCSSA upon loss of power from TCSSB.
Control Power for both Start Buses is from Batt Bd 1 (normal via TB DIST BD 1) or Batt Bd 2 (alternate via TB DIST BD 2).
The transfer is manual.
l 6
SITUTDOWH BUSES L
Shutdown Bus 1 is normally aligned to 4kV Unit Board 1A (breaker 1612 on 4kV SD BD A).
It can be alternately fed from 4kV Unit Bd 2B (breaker 1622 on 4kV SD BD D), or from the Cooling Tower Transformers via 4kV Bus Tie Bd (breaker 1642).
The switch from breaker 1612 to breaker 1622 is automatic.
Switching to breaker 1642 is a local, manual operation.
l.
Shutdown Bus 2 is normally connected to AkV Unit Bd 2A (breaker 1722 AkV i
SD BD C).
It can alternately be fed from the 4kV Unit Bd 1B (breaker L
1712 4kV SD BD B), or from the Cooling Tower Transformers via the 4kV Bus L
Tie Bd (breaker 1742). The switch from breaker 1722 to breaker 1712 is automatic.
Switching to breaker 1742 is a manual operation.
~ :
i s
7 4KV UNIT BOARDS The AkV Unit Boards are normally fed from the associated Unit Station Service Transformers. The alternate feed is from the Start Buses and is an automatic transfer on loss of voltage.
r Control Power is from the 250V de Turbine Building Distribution Boards (TB DB) 3. 2 and 3.
Control Power transfer is manual.
+
The following table lists normal and alternate feeders and normal and i
alternate control power sources. The number for the breaker between the feed and the unit board is shown in parenthesis, t
LNIT NORMAL ALTERNATE CONTROL POWER (250V DC)
EQARD FEED TEED liaRMAL ALTERNATE _
1A TUSSIB Start Bus 1A Batt BD 1 Batt BD 2 (1112)
(1424) via TB DB 1 via TB DB 2 i
1B TUSSIB Start Bus 1B Batt BD 1 Batt BD 2 (1114)
(1524) via TB DB 1 via TB DB 2 1C TUSSIA Start Bus 1B Batt BD 1 Batt BD 2 (1116)
(1532) via TB DB 1 via TB DB 2 2A TUSS 2B Start Bus 1A Batt BD 2 Batt BD 3 (1212)
(1428) via TB D'1 2 via TB DB 3 2B TUSS 2B Start Bus 1B Batt B0 2 Batt BD 3 (1214)
~!a TB DB 3 2C TUSS 2A Start Bus IA Batt BD 2 Batt BD 3 (1216)
(1426) via TB DB 2 via TB DB 1 3A TUSS 3B Start Bus 1A Batt BD 3 Batt BD 1 (1312)
(1432) via TB DB 3 via TB DB 1 3B TUSS 3B Start Bus 1B Batt BD 3 Batt BD 1-(1314)
(1528) via TB DB 3 via TB DB 1 e
,.m-
8' 4KV COMMON BOARDS The AkV Common Boards are normally fed from the AkV Unit Station l
Transformers and the AkV Start Buses. Control Power is from the 250V Battery Boards. The feeders are transferred automatically, control power switching is manual. Main and Control Power feeds are tabulated below.
The number for the breaker between the feed and the 4kV Common Board is shown in parenthesis.
COMMON BOARD MAIN FEED CONTROL POWER NORMAL ALER!iAH hl'8&L ALTERNATE 4kV Com Bd A TUSSIA Start Bus 1A Batt Bd 1 Batt Bd 2 (1118)
(1422) via TB DB 1 via TB DB 2 AkV Com Bd B TUSS 2A Start Bus 1B Batt Bd 2 Batt Bd 1 (1218)
(1522) via TB DB 2 via TB DB 1 9
4KV SHUTDOWN BOARDS There are four possible power feeds to each 4kV Shutdown Boards (SD SB).
Under normal conditions each board is connected to one of the offsite sources and will transfer automatically to its alternate offsite source on loss of voltage. During emergency shutdown conditions (LOP /LOCA),
each board can be fed from its own dedicated Diesel RI can be supplemented from the corresponding Unit 3 DG by paralleling from the SD BDS or from the Main Control Room. There are two sources of control power, a ' normal' and ' alternate' supply. 250V DC divisional contrel power transfer is a manual operation. Main feeders and control power feeders are tabulated below. The number for the breaker between the board being fed and the source is shown in parenthesis.
(See Table 1 on the next page).
n r-m----7 TABLE 1-f 4KV SHUTDOWN BOARDS MNER At!D CONTROL SollRCES c
DIESEL G",NERAT0k CONTROL POWER BOARD NORftAL ALTERNATE NOIJiaL ALTERNATE NORMAL ALTERNATE 4KV SIRfTDOWN uTFSITE FEEDER 4kV SD BD A SD Bus 1 SD Eus 2-DG A 4kV SD BD 3EA SB-A (II)
BB 2 BKR (1614)
BER (1716)
BER (1818)
BKR (1824) 4kV SD BD B SD Bus 1 SD Bus 2 DG B 4kV SD BD 3EB SB-B (2.I)
BB 2
~
BKR (1616)
BKR (1714)
BKR (1822)
BKR (1828) 4kV SD BD C SD Bus 2 SD Bus 1 DG C 4LV SD BD 32C SB-C (III)
BB 1 BKR (1718)
BER (1624)
BKR (1812)
BKR (1814)
' DG D 4kV SD BD 3ED SB-D (2II)
EB 3 BKR (171 )
BKR (1618)
BKR (1816)
BKR (1826)
OkV SD BD 3EA 4kV Unit Bd 3A 4kV Ens Tie DG 3A 4kV SD BD A BB 1 (3I)
BB 2 BKR (1334)
BER.(1726)
BKR (1838)
BKR (1844) 4kV SD BD 3EB 4kV Unit BD 3A 4kV Bus Tie DG 3B 4kV SD BD E SB-3EB (3I) BB 3 BKR (1336)
BKR (1728)
BKR (1842)
BKR (1848)
OkV SD BD 3EC 4kV Unit BD 38 4kV Bus Tie DG 3C 4kV SD BD C BB 3 (3II)
BB 1 BKR (1338)
BKR (1626)
BKR (1832)
BKR (1834) 4kV SD BD 3ED 4kV Unit BD 3B 4kV Bus Tie DG 3D 4kV SD BD D BB 2 (3II)
BB 3 BKR (1342)
BKR (1628)
BKR (1836)
BKR (1846)
-~
7, _
10 4KV BUS TIE BD The AkV Bus Tie Bd can manually tie Unit I and 2 shutdown buses together via breakers 1642 or 1742. These breakers are normally controlled by 250V DC Batt Bd 1 and alternate control is from Batt Bd 2.
11 DIESEh GENERATORS Diesel Generators (DGs) A/B/C/D/3A/3B/3C/3D provide emergency power to 4kV shutdown boards A/B/C/D/3EA/3EB/3EC/3ED, respectively. Each DG has its own dedicated 125V de control power system.
Each DG cooling water system has a heat exchanger cooled by the EECW system.
Each DG has its own Puel Oil Supply System consisting of a day tank, 7-day storage tank, associa?.ed pumps, valves, and piping.
Each DG contains two independent air starting systems, either of which is capable of. starting the engine. Each air starting system consists of five air receivers and an air conipressor powered from either an ac or de motor.
Diesel Generators' exhaust fans are powered from the 480V diesel auxiliary BDs.
12 480V SHUTDOWN BOARDS Each 480V Shutdown Board has a normal and alternate power source, and a normal / alternate
)ntrol power source. Transfer switching is via manual operation (Pac Since the switching is manual, the alternate power sources are p
/vn on the dependency matrix.)
)
The power ann
< trol feeders for each board are tabulated below:
~
480V SHUTDOWN BOARD MAIN FEEDER CONTROL POWER NORMAL ALTERNATE NORMAL ALTERNATE 480V SD BD 1A 4kV SD BD A 4kV SD BD B SB-A (II)
BB 2 480V SD BD 1B 4kV SD BD C 4kV SD BD B SB-C (III)
BB 3 480V SD BD 2A AkV SD BD B 4kV SD BD C SB-B (21)
BB 1 480V SD BD 2B AkV SD BD D 4kV SD BD C SB-D (2II)
BB 3 480V SD BD 3A AkV SD BD 3EA 4kV SD BD 3EB BB 1 (31)
BB 2 480V SD BD 3B 4kV SD BD 3EC AkV SD BD 3EB EB 3 (3II)
BB 1 13 480V STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGTS) BD There is only one power feed to the 480V Standby Gas Treatment System 3
Board. This feed is from compartment 7 of the AkV SD BD 3ED.
Control power for each load is via control power transformers located within each compartment.
l I'
I t
14 480V DIESEL AUXILIARY BOARDS l
Each Diesel Auxiliary Board has a normal and an alternate power feed.
Transfer from the normal to alternate source is manual on undervoltage.
, Control Power is from control power transformers within each compartment. These boards and their normal / alternate sources are i
tabu'u.ced below.
j DIESEL AUX 1LIARY BOARD NORMAL ALTERNATE 480V Dal Aux Bd A AkV SD BD A AkV SD BD B r
480V Dal Aux Bd B 4k SD BD D AkV SD BD B 480V Dal Aux Bd 3EA 480V SD BD 3A 480V SD BD 3B l
480V Dal Aux Bd 3EB 480V SD BD 3B 480V SD BD 3A 15 480V RMOV BOARDS Each Board has a normal and an. emergency power feed. The transfer is automatic on undervoltage for RMOV BTs 1E, 2D and 2E and manual for the rest. Control Power transformers located in the individual compartments supply control power for the various loads. The boards and their feeds are tabulated below:
RMOV BOARD NORMAL EMERGENCY 480V RMOV BD 1A 480V SD BD 1A 480V SD BD 1B 480V RMOV BD 1B 480V SD BD 1B 480V SD BD 1A 480V RMOV BD 1E 480V SD BD 1B 480V SD BD 1A 480V RMOV BD 2A 480V SD BD 2A 480V SD BD 2B l
480V RMOV BD 2B 480V SD BD 2B 480V SD BD 2A L
480V RMOV BD 2C 480V SD BD 2B 480V SD BD 2A 480V RMOV BD 2D 480V SD BD 2A 480V SD BD 2B 480V RMOV BD 2E 480V SD BD 2B 480V SD BD 2A 16 480V COMMON BD 1, BUS A AND B The 480V Common Board I has two Buses, A and B.
Electrically they are separate buses, with separate power feeds. They can however, be linked I
via a bus tie breaker on the board. Tying the buses together is automatic upon loss of voltage from either source. When power returns to the failed source the buses are automatically disconnected. Both Buses share a common source of 250V de control power (Turbine Building Dist. BD 1 and 2, both normal and alternate) which is manually transferable, i
MAIN PEED CONTROL POWER HQEli&L ALTERNATE 480V Com BD 1 Bus A 4kV Com Bd A TB DB 1 (BB1) TB DB 2 (BB2) 480V Com BD 1 Bus B 4kV Com Bd B TB DB 1 (BB1) TB DB 2 (BB2)
17 480V UNIT BOARDS 2A, 2B f
Normal Power for the 480V Unit Boards is from associated 4kV Unit Boards.
Alternate power, Via automatic transfer is from the Common Emergency l
transformers which is fed from the 4kV Common Boards. Normal and alternate Control Power sources are available. The transfer is manual. A tabulation f'
is given below:
MAIN FEED CONTROL POWER AL.ERNATE NORMAL ALTERNATE NORMAL T
480V Unit Bd 2A AkV Unit Bd 2A AkV Com Bd B TB DB 2 (BB2) TB DB 3 (BB3) 480V Unit Bd 2B 4kV Unit Bd 2B 4kV Com Bd A TB DB 2 (BB2) TB DB 3 (B83) 18 250V DC RMOV BOARDS l
Each 250V DI: RMOV Board has a normal and an emergency power feed. The i
power feed transfer is manual. Control power for each load comes from fuses within each compartment. The power feeds are tabulated below BOARD EDEAL ALTERNATE 250V RMOV BD 1A BB 1 BB 2 250V RMOV BD 2A BB 2 BB 3 250V RMOV BD 2B BB 3 BB 1 250V RMOV BD 2C BB 1 BB 2 l
=
8 e
19 250V DC DIVISIONAL CONTROL POWER FOR 4KV SHUTDOWN BOARDS
.There are two classifications of Control Power for each unit. These are Division I and Division II.
Each division is battery fed. The battery is supplied from a dedicated charger fed by 480V Class 1E power. The alternate. sources are similar. The transfer is manual. A tabulation of tha boards'and their power sources is shown below 480V AC POWER BOARD DIVISIQH BAIIIRI CHARGER TO THE CHARCdB 4kV SD BD A (Norr) 11 SB-A SB-A 480V RMOV BD 1A (Alt) 11 250V Batt #2
- 1, 2B 480V SD BD 1A, 2B (Alt) 31 250V Batt #2
- 2A, 2B 480V SD BD 2A,2B AkV SD BD 3EB (Norm) 31 SB-3EB SB-3EB 480V Diesel Aux Bd 3EA (Alt) 31 250V Batt #3
- 3, 2B 480V SD BD 3A, 2B (Alt) 3II 250V Batt #1
- 2A, 2B 480V SD BD 2A, 2B (Alt) 3II 250V Batt #3
- 3, 2B 480V SD BD 3A,.2B NOTE:
Charger 2B is a spare charger with single battery capacity and may be used for Batt #1, 2, 3, or 4.
r r
A 30 250V DC DIVISIONAL CONTROL POWER POR 480V SD BDS Control Power to the 480V SD BDs originates from the batteries which are supplied from chargers fed from 480V AC power.
Each shutdown Board has a normal and an alternate source that is manually transferable.
See tabulation below.
250V 480V AC POWER ggAgp Mym03 BAIIERY_1 CHARGER (
TO THE CHARGER
'480V SD BD 1A (Norm) 11 SB-A SB-A 480V RMOV BD 1A (Alt) 11
III SB-C SB-C 480V RMOV BD 1B (Alt)
III
- 1 1,
2B 480V SD BD 1A, 2B (Alt) 3I
- 3 3, 2B 480V SD BD 3A, 2B (Alt) 311
- 1 1, 2B 480V SD BD 1A, 2B NOTE: Charger 2B is a spare charger with single battery capacity and may be used for Batt #1, 2, 3, or 4 21 250V DC BATTERY BOARDS Each Battery Board has a dedicated battery and (normal) charger connected to its main bus. Each charger in turn is fed from a 480V Shutdown Board.
Charger 2B acts as an alternate source for all battery boards. The transfer is manual.
BATTERY BE GE RGER BATTERY 480V AC POWER TO THE CHARGER 1
(Norm) 1 1
480V SD BD 1A (Alt) 2B 1
480V SD BD 2B 2
(Norm) 2A 2
429V SD BD 2A (Alt) 2B 2
480V SD BD 2B 3
(Norm) 3 3
480V SD BD 3A (Alt)
P.B 3
480V SD BD 2B 4
(Norm) 4 4
480V SD BD 3B (Alt) 2B 4
480V SD BD 2B
f 22 l
125V DC DIESEL CENERATOR CONTROLS Diesel Control Power is supplied from a dedicated and associated 125V DC l
control power system for each Diesel Generator. Each system consists of j
two chargers which are powered from separate 480V AC sources. Switching i
flom one charger to the other is a manual operation performed at the 125V DC Dist Panel. A tabulation of each battery / charger /480V AC source is shown below.
(Switching is manual, however, normal and alternate sources
}
are shown on the Support to' Support Matrix for clarity.)
l 125V DC
[
DIESEL DIST BD BATTERY CHAREEE 4soV AC DG A A
A A NOR 480V DSL AUX BD a B ALT 480V DSL AUX BD B DG B B
B A NOR 480V DSL AUX BD A i
B ALT 480V DSL AUX BD B DG C C
C 4 ALT 480V DSL AUX BD A B NOR 480V DSL AUX BD B l
DG D D
D a ALT 480V DSL AUX BD A l
B NOR 480V DSL AUX BD B i
I DG 3A 3A 3A
.4NOR 480V DSL AUX BD 3EA b ALT 480V DSL AUX BD 3EB l
r DG 3B 3B 3B A NOR 480V DSL AUX BD 3EA B ALT 480V DSL AUX BD 3EB DC 3C 3C 3C A ALT 480V DSL AUX BD 3EA B NOR 480V DSL AUX BD 3EB DG 3D 3D 3D A ALT 480V DSL AUX BD 3EA B NOR 480V DSL AUX BD 3EB 23 120V AC'RPS-POWEh SYSTEM Each 120V AC RP3 Bus (2A, 2B) has its own normal feed and a shared alternate feed.
Transfer from normal to alternate is a manual operation by control switches un Battery Board 2 panel 9.
(Note:
Contactors in panel 9 are wired to prevent the single alternate feed from being connected to both buses at the same time.)
l L
The normal and alternate sources are tabulated below with the 480V source L
shown-in parenthesis.
ALTERNATE l
RPS Bus 2A RPS MG Set 2A Transformer TUP 2
?
(480V RMOV 2A)
(480V RMOV 2B)
RPS Bus 2B RPS MG Set 2B Transformer TUP 2 (480V RMOV 2B)
(480V RMOV 2B) l v
34 120V 1&C POWER There are two liC buses per unit, bus
'A' and
'B'.
Each bus is located in its own separate cabinet on Circuit Breaker Board 9-9.
Each Bus has a normal feed from its associated 480V Shutdown Boards. An automatic transfer to a 480V SD BD of another unit provides an alternate power feed.
I&C BUS NORMAL ALTERNATE IB 480V SD BD lb 480V SD BD 3B 2A 480V SD BD 2A 480V SD BD 3A 2B 480V SD BD 2B 480V SD BD 1B 25 120V PREFERRED POWER Unit 1--The Unit 1 Preferred Power Bus is fed from 480V Shutdown Board 1A via a Motor Generator (MG) set and Battery Board 1.
There is an automatic transfer to the Unit 2 Motor Generator set (fed by 480V SD BD 2A) and Battery Board 2.
Unit 2--The Unit 2 Preferred Power Bus is fed from 480V Shutdown Board 2A via a Motor generator set and Battery Board 2.
There is an automatic transfer (on Unit Panel 9-9 CAB 6) to the Unit 3 Motor Generator set (fed by 480V SD BD 3A) and Battery Board 3.
' Plant--Plant Preferred 120/240V AC is distributed from panel 13 located on Battery Board 2.
This panel is supplied normally from Lighting Board 2?. and alternately from Lighting Board 3B.
Transfer is automatic on under voltage. Power to the lighting boards originatec from 4ky Commen Boards A and B.
Under emergency conditions (i.e., undervoltage on the normal or alternate supplies) the panel is automatically switched to a dedicated motor t*nerator set. The motor is DC only and is powered from either Battery coard 4 (normal) or Battery Board 3 (alternate). This transfer is a manual operation via circuit breakers on the MG Set itself.
26 120V FEEDWATER INVERTER The Unit 2 Feedwater inverter is fed via breaker 710 on Battery Board 2.
There is no alternate source of power.
27 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER See table for System 67 (Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System) 28 FUEL OIL Each Diesel Generator has two 120 VAC Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps. These pumps transfer fuel oil from the respective 7-Day Tank to the Diesel's Day tank. Power for both pumps is supplied directly from the diesel output bus via 2400-240/120V transformers located in the DG Electrical Control Cabinets.
Each Diesel Engine has a 125 VDC driven priming fuel pump which is supplied from the respective diesel generators' control power system.
i 29 DIESEL CENERATOR STARTING AIR Motive power to the DGs starting Air Compressors A and B for DG, A, B, C, D is provided by 480V Diesel Aux Boards A and B.
1 I
Motive power to the DG starting Air Compressors A and B for DG 3EA, 3EB, 3EC, 3ED is provided by 480V Diesel Aux Boards 3EA and 3EB.
]
30 DIESEL GENERATOR EXHAUST FANS 1
Motive power to the DGs exhaust fans is provided from 480V Diesel Aux Bds as tabulated below. Control power is derived off individual control transformers.
(
M EXHAUST FAN 480V AttX BD i
A A
A B
B t
B A
A B
B C
A B
B A
M EXHAUST PAN 480V AUX BD D
A B
B A
3A A
3EA B
3EB 3B A
3EA B
3EB 3C A
3EB B
3EA 3D A
3EB B
3EA 31 COMMON ACTUATION SENSORS See table for System 98 (Common Actuation Sensors).
-32 PLANT CONTROL AIR S'r$fG See table for System 32 (Plant Control Air System).
33 CONDENSATE SYSTEM See table for System 2 (Condensate System).
1 i
34L RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM i
See table for System 24 (Raw Cooling Water System).
35 REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM.
See table for System 70 (Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System).
36 DRYWELL CONTROL AIR SYSTEM See table for System 32 (Drywell Control Air System).
37 SUPPRESSION POOL See table for System 64A (Suppression Pool).
4 3'
CONDENSER CIRCULATING SYSTEM See table for System 27 (Condenser Circulating System).
39 RAW SERVICE WATER See table for System 27 (Condenser Circulating Syctem).
I
TABLE-1A SAFETY RELIEF VALVE / ALTTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION _ (SRV/ADC) DEPENDENCIESI SUPPORT SYSTgg DEPENDENCY HQIES 350 VDC RMOV BD 2A PSV-1-4 2
PSV-1-22 2
PSV-1-30 2
PSV-1-41 2
350 VDC RMOV BD 2B PSV-1-18 2
PSV-1-19 2
(PSV-1-22)*
2 PSV-1-31 2;
PSV-1-42 2
PSV-l-179 2
250 VDC RMOV BD 2C PSV-1-5 2
PSV-1-23 2
(PSV-1-30)*
2 PSV-1-34 2
PSV-1-180 2
DRYWELL CONTROL AIR ALL 3
$UPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY HQIES 250 VDC RMOV BD 2A (DIV II)
PSV-1-5 4
250 VbC RMOV BD 2B (DIV I)
PSV-1-19 4
ADS AUTO OPEN INI'2IAT10N CIRCUIT PSV-1-22 4
PSV-1-30 4
PSV-1-31 4
PSV-1-34 4
BATTERY BD 1 PSV-1-5*
2 PSV-1-30*
2 PSV-1-34*
2
- ALTERNATE SUPPLY 1
TABLE 1A NQTEE
-H 11 The SRV/ ADS; function of the Main Steam System is to protect the reactor p"
i vessel from over pressuritation, to mar.ually control reactor pressure from-the Main Control Room, and to useLthe six SRV's A.aignated ADS valves to automatically depressurize the reactor vessel during certain-accident sequences.
Each SRV is-exposed to reactor pressure and provides reactor vessel overpressurization protection. The SRV will open due to-pressure acting' through a picton against. spring pressure thus preventing the reactor pressure from increasing above the vessel design limit. This function is not; dependent on any support system.
Operators are able to open any.SRV from the Main Control Room,'or backup Control room. The SRV will open when the operator turns A control switch,'
which energizes a solenoid valve (PSV - shown in Table 1A). The open solenoid valve dit'.-tr Drywell Control Air to a piston which in turn
-allows the reactor r N sure to open the-SRV.
JThe six SRV's, designated ADS, differ from the other.seven SRV's by their automatic opening feature. This automatic opening function of ADS is Provided to depressurize the reactor when the high pressure makeup cannot maintain vessel water level during accident conditions. Once depressurized, the low pressure safety system can supply water to'the vessel. The PSV automatically. directs Drywell Control' Air or accumulator fair (note 3) to open the valve. This function is modeled in this study.
In certain accident sequences the SRVs can be used to manually
'depressurite the reactor vessel.. This condition could occur during certain accident sequences in which the high pressure makeup systems have failed and the-vessel is to be depressurized so that the low pressure makeup systems can restore level per Emergency Operating Instruction E01-1 (unit 2).
The SRV's dependencies are modeled as a part of this study (see
-Emergency Reactor Depressurization).
2: 'PSV-1-22 and-PSV-1-30 are normally fed from 250 V RMOV'BD 2A.
If power is lost to 250 V RMOV BD12A, PSV-1-22 will auto-transfer to 250 V RMOV BD 2B, and'PSV-1-30 will auto-transfer to 2SO V RMOV BD 20.
If power is lost to 250 V RMOV Bp 2C the ADS valves PSV-1-5, PSV-1-34, and PSV-1-30, will auto-transfer to-Battery Board 1.
SRV's are listed below:
ARE Non-ADS PCV-1 PCV-1-4 SCV-1-19 PCV-1-18 PCV-1-22 PCV-1-23 PCV-1-30 PCV-1-41 PCV-1-31 PCV-1-42 PCV-1 PCV-1-179 PCV-1-180
.1
f F
1 TABLE'1A'(Continued) j 3
All SRV's arefnormally supplied from the Drywell Control Air System.
If-
'Dryvell Contrcl Air is lost, the ADS. dedicated valves are equipped with individual air.tecumulators. Each accumulator is sized to provide for five cycles of its relief valve. Each ADS valve, in addition to an independent accumulator (note 3), is equipped with an automatic opening feature.which will'depressurize the reactor-vessel during certain postulated design basis accidents.
To auto-depressurize, the following conditions must be met:
'1.
Low reactor level and; 2.
High drywell pressure, and;
- 3. - Confirmatory low reactor level and; 4.
Any RHR pump or 2 CS pumps running (CS pump A.,, and C or D)-
and; 5.
ADS timer timed out.
i, or t.,
l.
1.
Low reactor level and; l
2.
ADS High Drywell Bypass timer timed out, and; 3.
Confirmatory low reactor level and; 4.-- Any RHR pump or 2 CS pumps running (CS pump A or B, and C or D) and; L
5.
ADS timer timed out.
l l
1.
l--
l-1' i=
l-l L
L l
1
.. 1 1
is TABLE:2
. q M
ICONDENSATE STORAGE TANK (CST) NO. 3 (UNIT 2) HEADER DEPENDENCIES 1 1
-I l
g;p
[ SUPPORT' SYSTEM-
' HQN-TRAINED DEPENDENCY -
NOTE h
'480 VAC WATER &
2-FCV-2-162, STORAGE-J
=0IL STORAGE BOARD TANK 3. EMERGENCY 2
i DISCHARCE VALVE
~4 l
. ?
TABLE 2 NOTES
'l l
1 - ' :The Condensate Storage Tank (CST) No. 3 (unit 2) header.is the' preferred.
(initial) source 5$ esctlon water for multiple systems..A standpipe in-y b
the storage tank dratt ytter above 11 feet in the tank for makeup to the lc condenser. VatWe bel 6k the standpipe is reserved for the High Pressure Coolant Injectiler 6yrtem (HPCIS), the Peactor: Core Isolation Cooling System fRCIC8), and the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDHS). The porticu of the. unit 2 CST header. common to these high pressure vessel 1
-makeup systems is modeled as a support system.
)
1' l'
2-This board provides motive and control power to the motor-Operated valve listed. This normally open valve must remain open to allow flow from the unit 2 CST. The dependency of the Unit 2 CST header on this board is-not I
1 accounted for on the support-support dependency matrix because the few io components supplied by the board-are fail-safe (i.e., they do not require the board to performLtheir modeled function)..
e l t l
1
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I
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m:0 I
16 9
. - l 1, R!L I
i 1
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[,
S i
i V n-,
a I
f I
r i
t iis y..,
W
?!!O:
j
~~
- TABLE 3 REACTOR FEEDWATER SYSTEM (RFWS) DEPENDENCIES I
REACTOR VESSEL OVERFILL PROTECTION
' SUPPORT TRAIN A TRAIN B
' TRAIN C:
'NON-TRAINED' SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCIES.
NOTES 250 VDC RWS TURBINE -
RNS TURBINE
.RWS TURBINE-1,2,4 TRIP SOLENOID TRIP SOLENOID BATT BD 2 TRIP. SOLENOID.
.XSV-3-151(SV12) XSV-3-176(SV12)-
XSV-3-125(SV12)
120 VAC-RV HIGH LEVEL UNIT PREF LEVEL 8 TRIP RELAY A (6A-K2A) 3 RV HIGH LEVEL 120 VAC LEVEL 8 I&C BUS 2A TRIP RELAY B (6A-K2B)
RV HIGH LEVEL 3
120 VAC LEVEL 8 FEEDWATER INVERTER TRIP RELAY C (6A-K2C)-
a w
r
,b -
l
- 22.
i
TABLE 3 NOTES
(
The purpose of the:modeled function of the Reactor'Feedwater System is to l~
~
I
' provide for reactor vessel overfill protection. If the water level in the
(
reactor increases beyond'the Reactor Water High Level trip point, water
-could be entrained'in the steam and swept past the moisture f
separator / steam dryer. The presence of water in the steam lines could I
cause damage to pipes or turbine blades. When the RPW turbine trip solenoids energize, the feedvater turbine stop valves close.
Reactor overfill pistection is the only feedwater functivt modeled.
2 The purpose of the Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine (RPWPT), trip solenoid is to stop the reactor feedwater pumps to prevent over filling the reactor
.When reactor high water level is reached.
3 Any combination of two out of three relays will cause the reactor feedwater pumps to trip.
4 Following a reactor scram, one feedvater pump is operated in idle by manually turning the Motor Speed Changer (MSC) of one RPWPT back so that the turbine is idling at its minimum flow rate.
i
TABLE 23 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SERVICE WATER (RHRSW) SYSTEM DEPENDENCIESl TRAIN A
-TRAIN B
'NON TRAINED SUPPORT SYSTEMS DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCIES NOTES 4 KV SD BD A RHRSW PUMP A2 2
'RHRSW PUMP B2' 2
' 4 KV SD BD.B RHRSW PUMP C2 2
'RHRSW PUMP D2 2
RHRSW PUMP Al 2
4 KV SD BD 3EC' RHRSW PUMP B1 2
.2 2
4 KV SD BD~3ED RHRSW PUMP D1 2
250 VDC CONTROL POWER II RHRSW PUMP Al&A2 2-CONTROL 250 VDC CONTROL POWER 2I RHRSW PUMP C1&C2 2
CONTROL 250 VDC CONTROL POWER III RHRSW PUMP B2 2
CONTROL
-250 VDC CONTROL POWER 2II RHRSW PUMP D2 2..
CONTROL-250 VDC CONTROL POWER 3II RHRSW PUMP Bl&D1 2
CONTROL 48'O VAC RMOV BD 2A 2-FCV-23-34 &
3 2-FCV-23-40 480 VAC RMOV BD 2B 2-FCV-23-46 &
3 2-FCV-23-52
'480 VAC RMOV BD l'B l-FCV-23-46 &
4
~
1-FCV-23-52~
NPK1 - 1723L
~
TABLE 23 NOTES l - 'The RHRSW' system supplies cooling water to the RHR heat exchangers during accident. situations for heat removal. The RHRf.W is also used during non-accident conditions'such as the fuel pool cooling mode of RHR.(not
-part of this model).
=The RHRSW pumps serving the RHRSW system are manually started by the reactor. operator. There are four RHR heat exchangers with one heat-cxchanger from ecch unit on each header.
There are two RHRSW pumps on each header with one pump-normally assigned to each header (A2, B2, C2, D2), and one on alternate assignment (A1, B1, LCl,tD1).
r One RHR heat exchanger header can adequately deliver the flow supplied by
[
both RHRSW pumps to any two of the three RHRSW heat exchangers on the
~ header.
Two RHR heat 4 exchangers can adequately handle the cooling requirements of' one unit in any abnormal or post-accident situation.
The RHRSW pumps and heat exchanger flow valves are manually controlled to regulate the amount of cooling required during accident scenarios.
2 RNRSW motor starting circuit breakers fall as-is on loss of control power.
3, The motive power for the valves is from the RMOV BD indicated.
'4 RHR heat exchanger throttling valves 1-FCV-23-46, 52 are modeled in this dependency matrix to serve as backup to the unit 2 RHR heat exchangers.
These valves must also be manually opened from the control room by the operator.
I i
NPK1 - 1723L l
i:.
A
,Jii
4 TABLE 24 1
RAW COOLING WATER SYSTEM 1RCWS) DEPENDENCIES l-)UPPORTSYSTEM DEff2pf&gy NOTES 4'KV UNITTBD 1A:
RCW PUMP 1A-2-
250,VDC TURB BLDG RCW PUMP 1A 2
BD 1 (FROM BATTERY, BD 1)-
4 KV UNIT BD 2A RCW PUMP 2A 2
250 VDC TURB' BLDG.
RCW PUMP 2A 2
hDl2 (FROM BATTERY BD'2)'
-4 KV UNIT BD 1B RCW PUMP 1B 2
~350 VDC TURB~ BLDG
.RCW PUMP 1B 2
lBD 1 (FROM BATTERY BD: 1)-
-4 KV UNIT,BD 2B-RCW PUMP 2B 2:
,250 VDC TU"B-BLDG RCW PUMP 2B 2
- BD 2 (FROM BATTERY-
- BD 2) 4 KV UNIT BD 1C RCW PUMP 1C 2
'250 VDC TURB BLDG- -RCW PUMP 1C 2
- BD l'(FROM BATTERY-BD 1)
'AlKV UNIT BD 2C RCW PUMP 20 2
250 VDC-TURB BLDG RCW PUMP 20-2 BD 2-(FROM BATTERY
LRCW PUMP 1D 2
250 VDC BUS RCW PUMP.lD' 2
10N'4160 V SD BD A
_(250'VDC DIV II)
CCW RCW PUMPS 1A, 3
2A,1B,2B,10, 2C &_1D i
IADLE 24 NOTES h
The purposeLof the-Raw Cooling l Water (RCW) System is to remove heat from turbine-associated equipment and auxiliaries located in and adjacent te the turbine. building, from Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW)'
heat exchangers, control air systems and from certain reactor associated equipment. After a design base accident,,the system is not required for a safe' shutdown, as its essential cooling functions are assumed by the Emergency Equipment' Cooling Water (EECW) S,vstem. Units 1 and 2 suction During the no mal operation of a unit, two to headers are interconnected.
c three pumps, depending upon the inlet water-temperature, are required to be in operation.
In order to operate Unit 2, any of the two to three pumps, stated in the dependency table, irrespective of the unit affiliation, will be put into operation. According to BEN engineering
. experience, Unit 1 RCW Pumps 1A, 1B, 1C or ID will provide adequate flow i
while taking suction from Unit 2 CCW intake culvert provided that manual cross-tie valve 1-24-504 or 2-24-515 remains open. Only clogging of the RCW suction strainers is considered as strainer failure for which the
(
electrical supports to the strainers play no role. The continued operation of the RCW system is modeled in the dependency matrix.
i 3
As stated in note 1 above,' the alignment of the seven pumps mentioned in.
~
the table depends upon the configuration mode. RCW Pumps 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B, 10, and 2C are povared from 4 KV Unit BD 1A, 2A, 18,.2B, 1C, and 2C respectively, with control and actuation power supplied by their.
7 respective 250 VDC Turbine Distribution Panels. Pump ID is powered from 4 KV SD BD A with controlcand actuation power supplied by 23C VDC DIV 11.
On loss of power to the Unit Board or SD Board, the respective pump would fail to run.
On a loss of DC Control power, the control and actuation power of the pump would be lost.
t 3
Suction headers for Units 1 & 2 of RCW pumps are interconnected.
RCW pumps' suction header contains river water supplied by the Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) System of
- Tit 1 or 2.
l
(-
=
L I
I c
- m--
.m.-
, i s
i u
m i - i TABLE'26:
HICH PRCSSURE FIRE PROTECTION (HPFil DEPENDENCIES 1
' TRAIN A-TRAIN B;
' TRAIN C.-
- SUPPORT' DEPENDENCY-
-DEPENDENCY' DEPENDENCY NON TRAINED 4
NOTES
- SYSTEM'
-PUMP A' PUMP B PUMP G.'
DEPENDENCIES. LDIESEL 2
250 VDC II CONTROL 2
, 250 VDC 2I CONTROL 2
CONTROL
- 250 VDC III 3
120 VAC PLANT START LOGIC POWER FOR ALL HPF PUMPS PREFERRED
.m
+
r E
n s
in ?
- i TABLE 26 NOTES 1 The HPF'syst'em provides a reliable source of'high prescura water.for fighting fires throughout the plant. _The source of water is strained raw t
water. There are three electric pumps and one diesel driven fire pump.
'The Raw Service Water System is used for, fighting:small fires and
{
maintaining a hydraulic head on the HPF pystem lines (not modeled in this study). Only remote, manuti start of the diesel HPF pump is modeled as an alternate emergency low pressure injection source. : The electric fire pumps receive motive and control power as shown on the r
-Table.
1 The primary fire pump controls arc located on unit 1, panel 9-20.
4 The diesci fire pump may be used in an emergency _to inject water into the
~
RHR system.
In order to do this, the reactor operator vill start the diesel from the pump house and manually connect fire hoses from the fire header, and run the hose to the RHR system to inject water.into the
- vessel. For manual starts the diesel fire pamp is self contained (i.e.,
it_is independent of other plant systems for starting and running during an accident, including the 120 VAC Plant Preferred power used in its auto start or operator Control' Room start circuit),'and is maintained with the minimum amount of fuel per plant operating instructions. The pump discharges to the Raw Service Water header and can be aligned to inject into the reactor vessel by manually connecting a fire hose, or other 1
s temporary conduit, from the fire header to discharge into the primary system. This means of. injection is not proceduralized.
(
i I
l e,-
-w
3 E.,
TABLE 27 I
f&HDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM (CCWS) DEPENDENCIES '
f SUPPORT SYSTEM.
DEPENDENCY HQlEE 4 KV UNIT BD'2A CCW PUMP 2A
- 21
- 250 VDC CONTROL BUS CCW PUMP 2A 2
-ON 4160 V UNIT BD 2A
' :(250,VDC BATT BD-2)
-4 LT UNIT BD 2B.
CCW PUMP 2B 2
i 250.VDC CONTROL BUS CCW PUMP 2B 2.
1:
ON 4160 V UNIT BD 2B (250 VDC BATT BD 2) 4'KV UNIT BD-2C CCW PUMP 2C 2
-250 VDC CONTROL BUS CCW PUMP 2C 2
ON 4160.V. UNIT BD 20 If
-(250 VDC BATT BD 2)-
- 480 V WATER SUPPLY BD-2-FCV-27-13 -21,-29 3
1
' BUS 2 0480'V TURB MOV BD 20'-
2-FCV-27-31,-39,-47,-55,-63,-71 4
- 480 V TURB MOV BD 2B.
'2-FCV-27-38,-54,-70,-46,-62,-78 5
-LQ480 V WATER SUPPLY-BD TRAVELING SCREENS' 6.'
BUS 2-2AA,2AB,2BA,2BB,2CA,2CB MOTIVE" POWER
- 0120 VAC CONTROL BUS 2 TRAVELING SCREENS 6
ON 480'V WATER 2AA,2AB,2BA,2BB,2CA,2CB.
' SUPPLY BD' BUS:'2 CONTROL. POWER'-
- l
' RAW SERVICE-WATER
.CCW PUMP MOTOR COOLING
-7 RAW 5 SERVICE WATER CCW PUMP BEARINGS SHAFT 8
LUBRICATION / COOLING
- Denotes that-this-interface-is not required for the subject-function of the
'CCW (see corresponding note).
t
'{
e E
e t
16EE 27
- DOTES 1
The primary purpose-of the Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) system is to provide'a means of rejecting heat from the main condenser to the ambient surroundings.. It also provides a flow of water for auxiliary services
-and actsEto dilute low-level. radioactive liquid waste discharge.- The isystem operates in three different modest (1) open, (b) helper and (c) closed.'-Yearly operating experience of the CCW system shows that the plant operates mostly (60 to 70%) in the open mode of operation. The system - model assumes open mode of operation with the three CCW pumps of unit 2.
The CCW system is, therefore, assumed to be in open mode for this analysis and " helper" or " closed" modes, wherein cooling towers and j
vacuum loop are used,.will not be analyzed.
In the open mode of-operation, cooling water is drawn from the forebay by the CCW pumps and-
.is passed through the condenser tubes. After the cooling water is passed through the condenser, it is returned directly to the Wheeler Reservoir.
If the CCW return. vater temperature exceeds environmental specification
'(86*F), the operator must use either the helper mode or'the closed mode-
'of cooling. The unit 2 CCW pumps are modeled as norma 31y running.
Raw Service water (RSW) System provides cooling capability to the motor and lubricates the shaft bearing of the CCW pumps. The RSW is supplied water from the CCW inlet conduits.
RSW system is not required for safe L
-shutdown of the plant and is, therefore, not being included in the I
present model of BFN PRA' dependency matrix. The RSW pumps will not automatically start-upon a design basis accident or loss of power conditions.
I The CCW' system does not perform any safety related function.
It performs L
several protective safety functions, one of which is that the CCW intake channel shall provide cooling water to the RHRSW pumps to meet their i
suction requirements.
Note: The CCW System at Browns Ferry Nuclear' Plant site has nine pumps (three per unit). The normally closed crossties permit pump
. sharing between units during abnormal situations.
In such cases, one of the nine CCW pumps will be available to the condensers of L
all the three units given unit shutdown or' loss of offsite power.
L However, during the ' restart efforts of Unit 2, it is expected that one of the three CCW pumps of Unit 2 will be available to the -
Unit 2 condenser in case of shutdown or loss of offsite power conditions. Therefore, similar to the open mode assumption stated i-above, the system is being modeled for condenser circulating water flow from at least any one-of the CCW pumps of Unit 2 only.
2
.Under normal operating conditions of the plant, all three CCW pumps deliver water to the condenser. Pumps 2A, 2B, and 2C are powered from 4 KV-Unit Board 2A, 2B and 2C respectively with control and actuation
. power supplied by their respective 250 VDC Control' Bus. Given a loss of power to the board, the pump will fail to run. Given a loss of DC control power to the pump, its control and actuation power would be
-lost.- In case of complete failure of CCWS, the essential systems are provided with backup supply from the RHR service water pumps feeding through the Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system.
4 m
i TABLE 27 NOTES (CONTINUED) 3 -The 480.V Water Supply Board Bus 2'provides control, actuation, and
_ motive power to the CCW pump discharge motor operated butterfly. valves.-
The valves are'in the closed position when the pump starts and attain.
full'open position with a slight delay after the pump starts. On a loss of power to the board, the valves would fail in as-is position. The-dependency of this board is not being accounted for on the support-to-support matrix. The subject component being supplied power by this board is fail-safe (i.e., it does not require this board to perform its modeled function).-
- 4 Under normal operating conditions of the plant, the six main condenser
[
inlet butterfly valves are open. The 480 V Turbine MOV Board 2C provides I
motive.and control power to the main condenser inlet butterfly motor ll operated valves. On closure signal, limit switches deenergize the valve l
operator motor at closure.. On a loss of power to the board, the valves L
would= fail in the as-is position. The dependency of this board is not being accounted for on the support-to-support matrix..The subject components being supplied power by this board are fail-safe (i.e., they
-do not require this board to perform their modeled function).
5 Under normal operating conditions of the plant, all six main condenser outlet butterfly valves are open. The 480 V Turbine MOV board 2B provides motive and control power to the main condenser outlet butterfly 1
motor operated valves. On a loss of power to the board, the valves will fail in the as-is position. -The control switch is held in the closed position to effect full valve closure. The dependency of this board is not being accounted for on the support-to-support matrix. The subject l
components being supplied power by this board are fail-safe (i.e., they I
~
l~
do not require this board to perform their modeled function).
6 l_
The 480 V Water Supply Board Bus 2 provides motive power whereas the 120 l
VAC Control Bus 2 provides control and actuation power to the screens.
On high differential pressure across the screens, the screens will start automatically. On a loss of power to the 480 V Water Supply Board, the n
l.
screens are not-designed to run. The dependency of this board is not i
being accounted for on the support-to-support matrix. The subject components being supplied power by this board are fail-safe (i.e...they j
do not require the 480 V Water Supply Board to perform their modeled functions).
l.
7 Motors of the CCW pumps 2A, 2B and 2C are cooled by Raw Service Water (RSW). 'The inlet RSW pressure control valves 2-PCV-25-21A, -B and -C i
assigned to their respective CCW pump motors are set to open at a set pressure.- On a loss of RSW flow or a reduction in RSW pressure below the l
setpoint, the CCW pump motor cooling will be lost. Shaft bearings if CCW pumps 2A, 2B and 2C are lubricated by the water i
supplied from RSW.
On a loss of water supply from RSW, the shaft bearing i'
lubrication to the CCW pumps will be lost.
t
,-47
+' {. L' TABLE'32A' PLANT CONTROL' AIR SYSTEM (PCAS)-DEPENDENCIES 1
'l SUPPORTJ
- SYSTEM-DEPENDENCY NOTES'
-v 480 VAC.SD BD 1A PCAS COMPRESSOR A 2
COMMON COMPRESSOR SEQUENCER 5
STANDBY PCAS DRYER 5-UNIT 2 PCAS DRYER 6
0-FCV-32-90, 2-FCV-32-90 8-250 VDC BUS ON PCAS COMPRESSOR A 2
480 VAC SD BD 1A 0-FSV-24-21 7
'29 VDC DIV II) 480 VAC COMMON BD 1 BUS A PCAS COMPRESSOR B 3
' COMMON COMPRESSOR SEQUENCER S
STANDBY PCAS DRYER 5
UNIT 2 PCAS DRYER 6
0-FCV-32-90, 2-FCV-32-90 8
480 VAC COMMON BD 1 BUS B PCAS'COMPREASOR C-3
-250 VDC' TURBINE PCAS-COMPRESSOR B 3
BLDG BD 1 (FROM' PCAS COMPRESSOR C
-3 BATTERY BD 1) 0-FSV-24-22 & 0-FSV-24-23 7
l 480 VAC SD BD.2A' PCAS COMPRESSOR D 4
COMMON COMPRESSOR. SEQUENCER 5
t Standby PCAS: Dryer 5
Unit 2 PCAS Dryer 6
0-FCV-32-90, 2-FCV-32-90 8
'250 VDC BUS ON
'PCAS COMPRESSOR D 4
4 480sVAC SDLBD.2A 0-FSV-24-24 7
h, (250 VDC DIV 2I) 9 l
L 120 VAC I'& C BUS 2B 2-FSV-32-28A, 2-FCV-32-29A 9
'l 2-FSV-32-91A l
UNIT 2!120 VAC
.FSV-32-28B, 2-FSV-32-29B-
-9 PREFERRED 2-FSV-32-91B 1
l l:.
UNIT'l.120 VAC PREFERRED
'0-FCV-67-53 7
1 RAW'C'00 LING WATER
.PCAS COMPRESSOR A, B,.C.
D 7
W.h
-EECW PCAS. COMPRESSOR A, B, C, D.
7 f
.]
i b
f
--- - - - -- -.m
a TABLE 32A NOTES-1 JThe Plant Control Air System (PCAS) is defined for the BFN PRA as the 1
required components of the Control Air System to provide dry oil-free l
compressed-air to-the air ~ operated components used for the safe operation l
of' the plant excluding the. components. supplied by the Drywell Control Air System and the Service Air System. Some of the more important loads of PCAS include, for each unit, the Drywell Control Air System suction isolation valves (FCV-32-62, -63), the outboard main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)',-and the scram inlet and outlet valves.
The Control Air System consists of four compressors and three receivers shared among the units. Each unit has its own dedicated air dryer with a standby dryer available for any unit. The downstream air headers from-l the unit dryers can be interconnected between the units with manual
-i
- valves, but these cross connect valves are normally closed.-
- The Service Air. System and Containment Atmosphere Dilution System provide backup to the Control Air System. The service air valve FCV-33-1 is l
J designed to automatically open at header pressure less than 90 psig to allow the Service Air System to supplement the control air compressors.
The Containment Air Dilution System and the Plant Control Air System can supplement the unit Drywell Control Air System b;' manual connections to
!~
the drywell air header. The Service Air System and the Containment Air i
Dilution System are not modeled.- The alternate manual connection from i
the Plant Control Air System may be modeled as a recovery action if loss of drywell air is a significant-contributor to core damage.
'2
- Plant control air compressor A is powered from 480 VAC Shutdown BD 1A.
The control power for this board is the 250 VDC Bus on 480 VAC Shutdown BD 1A (250 VDC DIV lI). The compressor and aftercooler are-cooled by raw cooling water as described in note 7, and controlled by the sequencer in note 5.
3 Plant control air compressors B and C are powered from 480 VAC Common BD 1.
PCAS-compressor B is powered from Bus A and PCAS compressor C is powered from' Bus B.
The 250 VDC control power for both compressors is from Turbine-Building Distribution Board 1 which is supplied by Battery BD 1.
Both' compressors and aftercoolers.are cooled by raw cooling water as described ~in note 7, and controlled by the sequencer in note 5.
'4
' Plant control air compressor D is powered from 480 VAC Shutdown BD 2A.
The control power for this board is 250 VDC Bus on 480 VAC Shutdown BD 2A (250 VDC DIV 2I). The compressor and aftercooler are cooled by-rav l
cooling water sus described in note 7, and controlled by the sequencer in note 5.
5 The common control air compressors (A, B, C & D) sequencer and unit 1, unit 2,'and standby control air dryer are powered through a 480/120 V transformer from either'the 480 VAC Common BD 1 Bus A, 480 VAC Shutdown BD 1A, or 480 VAC Shutdown BD 2A.
The common compressor' sequencer has automatic swapover relays between these boards designed to maintain a power source.
5
IABLE 3RA' NOTES (CONTINUED)-
6.
The unit 2 control _ air dryer is. shown on 45E769-5 as being powered from the common compressor sequencer as described in note 5.
The unit 2 dryer
-is_ presently powered from the 240 VAC Lighting BD 20.
The power dependency for the unit 2 control air dryer will be restored to the common compressor sequencer.
- 7f
'The four' common plant control air compressors and aftercoolers are cooled by water from the raw cooling water system with EECW used as a backup to RCW through 0-FCV-67-53. The coolant flow to each compressor is controlled by an electric flow solenoid valve.which goes to its closed position on loss or removal of power. The power for these raw cooling water flow control valves comes from the associated compressor control
' circuitry as given in the table below. Each flow control valve has a manually operated bypass valve, if required.
PCAS Power Compressor FSV Supply A
0-PSV-24-21 250V DC DIV 11 on 480V SD BD 1A B
0-FSV-24-22 250V DC Control Bus on 480V Common BD 1 C
0-FSV-24-23 250V DC Control Bus on 480V Common BD 1 D'
'0-FSV-24-24 250V DC DIV 21 on 480V SD BD 2A The EECW backup valve, 0-FCV-67-53, opens on low RCW header pressure at the PCAS air complessors. The control power'for the pressure switches (PS-24-134A and PS-24-134B) and the solenoid valve 0-FSV-67-53 are powered from Unit 1 120 VAC Preferred power.
8 Control air dryer flow control valves, 2-FCV-32-90 and 0-FCV-32-90, are designed to isolate the unit control air dryer on high air flow or low airtpressure. The isolation control circuit is powered from the common compressor sequencer described in note 5.
-9
' Secondary containment isolation valves, 2-FCV-32-28, 2-FCV-32-29, and 2-FCV-32-91 are normally open, control air powered valves, which fail closed on loss of air or power. The air supply to each FCV is controlled by two series.FSVs. The train A solenoid valves, 2-FSV-32-28A, 2-FSV-32-29A, and 2-FSV-32-91A are powered from 120;VAC I & C Bus 2B. The train B solenoid valves, 2-FSV-32-28B, 2-FSV-32-29B, 2-FSV-32-91B are powered from Unit 2 120V AC preferred power.
1
~
TABLE 32B I C-
~ DET/MNTROL ATR SYSTEM (DCAS) DEPENDENCIES 1 p
EUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCI RQIEE
..')480 VAC RMOV!Bb'2A DRWELL AIR COMPRESSOR 2A 2
- DRWELL AIR DRYER 2A 2
kBO.VACRMOVBD2B DRWELL AIR COMPRESSOR-2B 3
DRWELL AIR DRYER 2B 3
320 VAC I.& C BUS 2A-2-FCV-32-62 4
-I'2'O VAC I-&'C BUS 2B 2-PCV-32-63 5
4 4
' PLANT' CONTROL AIR:
2-FCV-32-62, 2-TCV-32-63.
4,5 s
RBCCW DCAS COMPRESSORS 2A & 2B 2,3 h
--4
1ABLE 32B NOTES L1 The Drywell Control Air System-(DCAS) supplies compressed air to the loads in the drywell. Each unit has a Drywell Control Air System with
]
two compressors and two dryers. The principal loads of the DCAS are tha
. inboard main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) and main Lteam. relief valves (MSRVs).
3' The 'drywell control' air compressor 2A and drywell control air dryer 2A are powered from 480 VAC RMOV BD 2A.
The coolant to the drywell air compressors and aftercoolers is supplied by the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Syetem. The coolant flow control valve 2-FCV-32-64 is controlled by the air pressure generated by the drywell control air compressor.
3 The drywell control air compressor 2B and drywell air dryer 2B are powered.from 480 VAC RMOV BD 2B.
The coolant to the drywell control air compressors and aftercoolers is supplied by the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System. The coulant flow control valve 2-FCV-32-67 is
. controlled by the air pressure generated by the drywell control air compressor.
4 The Dryvell Control Air suction isolation valve 2-FCV-32-62 is a normally open, air powered valve which fails closed on loss of air pressure. The i
motive air source for this valve and 2-FCV-32-63 is the plant control air system. The closing of either of these valves isolates the Drywell Control Air system from its suction source, the drywell. This presents the situation where the Drywell Control Air System is dependent on the Plant Control Air System to function. This valve closes on a division I primary containment isolation signal. The control power for this valve is 120 VAC :I & C Bus 2A.
15-The Drywell Control Air suction isolation valve 2-FCV-32-63 is a normally open, air powered valve which fails closed on-loss of air pressure..The motive airisource.for this valve and 2-FCV-32-62 is the plant control air system. The closing of either of these valves isolates the Drywell
. Control Air system from its suction source, the drywell. This-presents the situation where the Drywell Control Air System is dependent on the
. Plant Control Air System to. function. This valve closes on a. division II 1
primary containment isolation signal. The control' power for this valve is-l
'120 VAC I & C-Bus 2B.
t 1
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. TAliLE 63.:
STANDBY-LTOUID CONTROL (3LC) DEPENDENCIES 1 SUPPORT' TRAIN A-
^ TRAIN B
.NON TRAINED' SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCIES.
59174
'-480 VAC SD BD 2A MOTIVE POWER 2
TO PUMP 2A 480 VAC SD BD'2B~
MOTIVE POWER 2
TO PUMP 2B-
- 250 VDC 2I-CONTROL POWER-2
. CONTROL' POWER TO PUMP 2A 250 VDC 2II CONTROL POWER 2
CONTROL POWER
.TO PUMP 28
-250 VDC'2I~
FIRING SICNAL TO
'2 CONTROL POWER "A" SQUIB VALVE FCV.63-8A 250 VDC 2II FIRING-SIGNAL TO 2
CONTROL POWER-
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~
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i i
TABLE 63 NOTES l-The SLC-system has no automatic-actions..Any initiation is manual, and governed by the plant procedures. The SLC functions as an alternate means of shutting down.the reactor during emergency conditions.
In addition to the SLC boron injection function, the SLC system can be used to inject high pressure demineralized water into the Reactor Vessel in accordance 1
with plant procedures (high pressure injection by SLC is not modeled in i
this study).: The SLC is not a backup to-the control rods.
Indication devices and annunciation devices are not modeled, as well as'other support systems for normal maintenance or operation, because they are not needed for-the SLC to complete its safety function.
The Reactor Water Cleanup-(RWCU) System isolation valve (2-FCV-69-2) closes when the SLC system initiates. This will prevent RWCU from removing the boron from the reactor vessel'once it is injected, which could allow criticality to-recur (modeled in PCIS).
It is assumed that the SLC is initially in standby, that is, verified operational, in accordance.with plant operating procedures.
!!VAC is not required due sto the relatively short mission time of this system (2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) and the location of the pumps in a room where the worst case accident temperature is ll1' degrees Fahrenheit.
2 The 250 VDC control-power for the 480 VAC SD BDs is the same 250 VDC used to. fire the squib valves, FCV 63-8A and FCV 63-8B.
l=
1 1
1 k
l i
TABLE 64A-
' SUPPRESSION P00L1 RQIE -
.i I
The suppression pool is a large volume of water (123,000 cubic feet-
. minimum) contained in a carbon steel suppression chamber (torus). This s
water serves to: prevent prir.ary containment overpressure following a loss ~
of coolant accident (LOCA) inside the drywell by quenching steam released through-the break._lThe pool _also serves as a.readily available-heat sink
. t for deposition of reactor decay heat for isolation ~ transients and of
~
latent and decay heat for LOCAs inside the drywell. In addition, the pool serves as a source of water for the emargency cooling systems: High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIS), Reactor Core Isolation _ Cooling-4 System (RCICS), Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Containment Cooling (CC) modes of the Residual Heat Removal System (RRRS), and the Core Spray System-(CSS). The pool is the primary source for' the RERS LPCI mode, the RHRS CC mode, and the CSS, an automatic secondary source for the HPCIS, and a manual secondary source for the RCICS. The pressure supp' cession, heat removal, and emergency cooling system water supply functions are safety-related functions of the suppression pool. The suppression pool is a passive component requiring no support.
't
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TABLE 64C~
J^
SECONDARY CONTAINMENT' ISOLATION SYSTEM (SCIS} DEPkNDENCIES1!
SUPPORT' TRAIN A
' TRAIN B SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY
.HOTES c120 V..RPS Bus 2A
' Unit 2 PCIS Relay 2-16A-K23 for L-Refueling Zone-DIV I Isolation.
for Unit 2 Reactor Zone DIV I.Isolatica c120 V RPS Bus 2B.
Unit-2-PCIS Relay.
-2 16A-K24.for Refueling Zone DIV II Isolation PCIS Relay 16A-K38 3
for Unit 2 Reactor Zone DIV II Isolation 8120 V I&C Bus lA Unit 1 SCIS 4
Refuelig Zone DIV I Relays:
R2A R3A LRA4 LRA5 1
- 120 V I&C Bus lA-Unit.1 SCIS 5
(Continued)-
Refuelig Zone DIV I-Solenoids:
FSV-64-6 FSV-64-10
)
8120 V I&C Bus IB Unit 1 SCIS-6.
l Refueling Zone DIV.II Relays:
1 R2B R3B-
- )
LRB4 LRB5 Unit 1 SCIS 7-1 Refueling Zone
~
.DIV II Solenoids -
FSV-64-5 l
FSV-64-9 I
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-....~..-
. ~..
. TABLE 64C (CONTINUEjll SUPPORT.
TRAIN A TRAIN B-SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES
- 120 V I&C Bus 2A Unit 2 SCIS Refueling Zone
- DIV I Relays:
R3A LRA4
'LRAS
- 120 V I&C Bus 2A Unit 2 SCIS 9
(CONTINUED)
Refueling Zone DIV I Solenoids:
FSV--64-6 FSV-64 Unit 2 SCIS 10 Reactor Zone DIV I Relays:
ElA LRAl LRA2 Unit 2 SCIS 11 Reactor Zone DIV I Solenoids:
FSV-64-14 FSV-64-42 0120 V I&C Bus 2B Unit 2 SCIS 12 Refueling Zone-DIV II Relays:
R3B LRB4" LRB5 0120 V I&C' Bus 2B
' Unit.2 SCIS 13 Refueling Zone DIV II Solenoids:
FSV-64-5 FSV-64-9 UNIT 2 SCIS 14 Reactor Zone DIV II Relays:.
ElB LRB1
. LRB2 Unit 2 SCIS
.15 Reactor Zone r-
~
DIV II Solencids: ~
FSV-64-13 FSV-64-43
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W. - s,E &,.,.
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~ -. -..., -.
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TABLE ~64C (CONTINUEDF SUPPORT-TRAIN A TRAIN B-SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES
'*120 V I&C Bus 3A Unit'3 SCIS-16 Refueling Zone DIV.I Relays:-
R3A^
LRA4 LRAS Unit 3 SCIS 17
' Refueling Zone DIV I Solenoids:
FSV-64-6 FSV-64-10
- 120 V I&C Bus 3B Unit 3 SC.
18 Refueling Zone DIV II Relays:
- R3B LRB4 LRB5 Unit.3 SCIS 19 Refueling Zone.
DIV II Solenoids:
FSV-64-5 FSV-64-9 0480 VAC RX Bldg Unit 1 20
. Vent BD 1A Refuelig Floor Exhaust Fans:
1A 1B C480 VAC RX Bldg Unit 2' 20
. Vent BD 2A Refueling Floor Exhaust Fans:
2A 2B Unit 2 _
20 Reactor Zone.
Exhaust Fans:
2A 2B' c480 VAC RX Bldg Unit.3 20 Vent BD 3A Refueling Floor Exhaust Fans:
3A 3B
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ITABLE 64C (CONTINUED).
SUPPORT TRAIN A-
- TRAIC B SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES Unit 1' 20-c480 VAC EX Bldg ~
Refueling Floor'-
Vent BD 1B Supply Fans:-
1A 1B 8480 VAC RX Bldg Unit'2.
20 Vent BD 2B
. Refueling Floor Supply Fans:
2A 2B
- Unit:2-.
20 Reactor Zone Supply Fans:
2A 2B.
c480 VAC RX Bldg Unit-3 20 Vent BD 38 Refueling Floor-Supply Fans:
3A 3B.
0120 V Common Control Bus Exhaust Fan Supply Fan-20 Associated With Each Control Power Control Power 480 V AC RX Bldg Vent BD
_
- Plant: Air Ventilation Path Ventilation Path 21 System DIV I (Inboard)
DIV II (Outboard)
Supply & Exhaust
- Supply & Exhaust Isolation Dampers Isolation Dampers i
o Denotes'that this interface is-not required for the subject function of the SCIS (see corresponding note).
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1 IIBLE'64C NOTES o
12
- The Secondary' Containment Isolation System (SCIS) serves'to automatically
- isolate the reactor building (Unit 2 reactor zone and Units 1-3 refueling zones) ventilation system upon receipt of certain signals indicating a need, or potential need,-for secondary containment 1 integrity.. Note that in general ~, an isolation signal in any' reactor zone (Unit 2 only for this
. effort) must cause-isolation of that reactor zone and the entire =
refueling floor (all three units). Jm isolation signal in any portion of-the refueling floor would isolate only the refueling zone.
= The Unit 2 reactor zone isolation signal is generated as a result of'any.
of the following conditions; (1) Reactor vessel low water level 3, (2) high drywell pressure, or (3) high radiation in the reactor zone ventilation system. The refueling zone isolation signal'will be generated from the Unit 2 reactor zone isolation signal or if high radiation in the refueling zone ventilation system is detected..It should be noted that for the events considered by the PRA analysis, the refueling floor radiation sensors are not required to operate, and thus the Unit 2 reactor zone isolation signal will be initiated for all cases considered (both Unit'2 reactor zone and entire refueling zone isolated).
=
The reactor building. ventilation air flow passes through the secondary containment boundary at the supply and exhaust plenums of the ventilation-system. Normal inlet flow is distributed on the refueling floor and t'
I throughout the reactor building. Secondary containment isolation is established by tripping the supply and exhaust ventilation fans, closing
- the-isolation dampers on the supply and exhaust lines, and by operation of other dampers to line up the exhaust to the Standby Gas Treatment l
System [(SBGTS) (these dampers are included-in the SBGTS boundary)].
L
.The reactor. zone and refueling zone ventilation supply static pressure limiters have been disabled, the associated dampers closed, and the ducts capped.- Therefore,.these paths are not considered in the BFN PRA as potential breach to secondary containment integrity, l
The equipment access lock exhaust fan and the stair hall supply fan
?
1 receives signals to stop spon receiving an isolation signal. =Their L
associated isolation dar its also receive isolation signals. However, these paths do not connect either the reactor zone or the refueling zone
~
directly with the environment. Therefore, they are not considered.as components necessary to assure the SCIS function.
[
LThe basis for the mechanical configuration of the SCIS is as depicted on the latest as-constructed flow diagrams.
l l
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<1 1
TABLE 64C NOTES'(CONTINUED)
. 2
.There are two' Unit 2 PCIS relays (16A-K23, -K24 considered to be within
~
the-SCIS system! boundary for PRA purposes) that provide SCIS signals for-1 isolation of ths' entire refueling zone upon' initiation of a Unit 2 reactor zone SCIS signal (see note 1.and 3).--There are also identical pairs ofLrelayaL(same identification numbers) associated with Units 1 and 3..
However, these four, relays will not be necessary for refueling zone-
' isolation since the Unit 1-and 3 reactor zones and the -refueling floor-radiation sensors are not within the scope of the PRA analysis (see note 1).
The.16A-K23= relay deenergizes to provide Division I^(inboard ~and common valves) refueling zone secondary containment isolation signals via dropout of corresponding contacts in the associated SCIS logic pcnels..
The 16A-K24 relay deenergizes to provide Division II (outboard valves).
refueling zone _ secondary containment isolation signals via dropc"t of
)
corresponding contacts in the associated SCIS logic panels.
Since these
-relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supplies are not required for the SCIS function.
' 3 There are two PCIS relays (16A-K37, -K38) that provide SCIS signals for isolation ~of the Unit 2 reactor zone.
In addition, these relays provide
-the signals necessary for isolation of the refueling zone.
Relay 16A-K37 deenergizes to provide Division I (inboard and; common valve;) Unit 2' reactor zone isolation signals via dropout of a corresponding contact in the associated SCIS logic panel, Relay 16A-K38 deenergizes to provide
-Division'II (outboard valves) Unit 2 reactor zone isolation signalsivia-dropout of corresponding contacts in the associated SCIS logic panels.
~
Since;these relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supplies are not-required for the SCIS function. These relays initiate refueling
.i zone isolation via~ dropout of the corresponding contact in the PCIS logic:
circuitry associated with PCIS relays 16A-K23,.-K24.
Deenergizing of Unit 2, Division'I' reactor zone relay 16A-K37'deenergizes Unit'2,-
i
' Division I. refueling zone relay 16A-K23. Deenergicing the Unit 2, Division II reactor zone relay 16A-K38 deenergizes.the Unit 2, Division II refueling zone relay 16A-K24. Since these relays deenergize to actuate,'the associated power supplies are not required for the SCIS' function.
L
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i 1
m.
TABLE 64C NOTES (CONTINUED) 4 There are four relaus (R2A, R3A, LRA4, and LRAS) located in tho Unit 1, Division I SCIS logne panel tbst deenergize to initiate the action required to provide accondary containment integrity of the Unit I refueling zone. Three relays with the identification numbers being the same as three of the four Unit I relays (R3A, LRA4, and LRAS) are also located in the SCIS logic panels associated with Division I refueling zone isolation of Units.2 and 3.
The Unit I specific relay R2A deenergizes upon dropout of a contact associated with the deenergizing of the Division I PCIS relay 16A-K23 (see note 2). Deenergizing this relay results in dropout of a corresponding cor. tact in the Unit 1, 2, and 3 Division I refueling zone logic panels that deenergizes each of the three R3A relays located in those panels. Deenergizing each R3A relay provides a seal-in for each refueling zone unit logic panel and deenergizes relays LKA4 and LRA5 associated with the logic panel of each refueling zone unit. Deenergizing these relays results in dropout of contacts that deenergize the solenoid valves (FSV-64-6, -10) associated with the inboard isolation dampers (resulting in their closure) in the respective refueling Tcne supply and exhaust ventilation paths.
Also, the supply and exhaust fans associated with these ventilation paths receive a Division I signal to trip upon deenergizing of these relays.
5 The Division I solenoid valves associated w' n the Unit 1 refueling zone supply and exhaust inboard isolation dampers (FSV-64-6, -10) are powered from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the SCIS function for these valven.
Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the ab.ociated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
6 There are four relays (R2B, R3B, LRB4, and LRBS) located in the Unit 1 Division 11 SCIS logic panel that deenergize to initiate the action required to provide secondary containment integrity of the Unit I refueling zone.
Three relays with the identification numbers being the same as three of the four Unit I relays (R3B, LRB4, and LRBS) are also located in the SCIS logic panels associated with Division II refueling zone isolatien of Unita 2 and 3.
The Unit 1 specific relay R2B e
deenergizes upon dropout of a contact associated with deenergizing the Division II PCIS relay 16A-K24 (see note 2).
Deenergizing this relay results in dropout of a corresponding contact in the Unit 1, 2, and 3 Division II refueling zone legic panels that deenergizes each of the three R3B relays located in those panels. Deeners.izing each R3B relay provides a seal-in for each refueling zone unit logic panel and deenergizes relays LRB4 and LRBS associated with the logic panel of each refueling zone unit. Deenergizing these relays results in dropout of contacts that deenergize the solenoid valves (FSV-64-5, -9) associated with the outboard isolation dampers (reculting in their closure) in the respective refueling zone supply and exhaust ventilation paths. Also, the supply and exhaust fans associated with these ventilation paths receive a Division II sianal to trip upon Jeenergizing these relays.
Since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supplies are not required for the SCIS function.
TABLE 64C NOTES (CONTINUED)
'7-The Division I solenoid valves associated with the Unit I refueling zone
. supply and exhaust outboard isolation dampers (PSV-64-5, -9) are powered from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the SCIS function for these valves (see note 6).
Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
8 The function of the Unit 2 SCIS refueling zone Division I relays are as discussed in note 4.
However, since these relays are located in a Unit 2 logic panel, they have a different power supply.
As stated in note 4, since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
9 The Division I solenoid valves associated with the Unit 2 refueling zone l
supply.and exhaust inboard isolation dampers (PSV-64-6, -10)-are powered from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the SCIS function for these valves (see note 8).
Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
10 There are three relsys (RIA, LRA1, and LRA2) located in the Unit 2, Division I SCIS logic panel that deenergize to initiate the action required to provide secondary containment integrity of the Unit 2 resctor l
zone.
Relay R1A deenergizes upon dropout of the contact associated with deenergizing the Division 1 PCIS relay 16A-K37 (see note 3).
Deenergizing of this relay provides a seal-in for this SCIS logic panel.
In addition, this action causes dropout of a corresponding contact in the Unit 2, SCIS Division I reactor zone logic panel that deenergizes relays LRA1 and LRA2.
Deenergizing these relays results in dropout of contacts that deenergize the solenoid valves (FSV-64-14, -42) associated with the inboard isolation dampers (resulting in their closure) in the respective Unit 2 reactor zone supply and exhaust ventilation paths. Also, the supply and exhaust fans associated with these ventilation paths receive a Division I signal to trip upon deenergizing of these relays.
Since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supplies are not. required for the SCIS function.
11 The Division I solenoid valves associated with the Unit 2 reactor zone supply and exhaust inboard isolation dampers (PSV-64
'4, -42) are powered from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the SCIS function for these valves (see note 10).
s I
Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
12 The function of the Unit 2 SCIS refueling zone Division II relays are as discussed in note 6.
However, since these relays are located in a Unit 2 logic panel, they have a different power supply.
1 As utated in note 6, since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function, t
1
2 BLE 64C NOTE 3 (CONTINUED) i 13 The Division II solenoid valven associated with the Unit 2 refueling zone supply and exhaust outboard isolation dampers (FSV-64-5, -9) are powered from t.he same pcwer supply associated with the relays that initiate the j
SCIS function for these valves (see note 12).
j Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function 1.
i
\\
14 There are three relays (R1B, LRB1, and LRB2) located in the Unit 2, j
Division II SCIS logic panel that deenergize to initiate the action required to provide secondary containment integrity of the Unit 2 reactor l
zone. Relay R1B deenergizes upon dropout of a contact associated with the i
deenergizing of the Division 11 pCIS relay 16A-K38 (see note 3).
Deenergizing this relay provides a seal-in for this SCIS logic panel.
In addition, this action caua m dropout of a corresponding contact in the Unit 2, SCIS Division 11 reactor zone logic panel that deenergizes relays LRB1 and LRB2. Deenergizing these relays results in dropout of contacts that deenerSize the solenoid valves (FSV-64-13, -43) associated with the outboard isolation dampers (resulting in their closure) in the respective Unit 2 reactor zone supply and exhaust ventilation paths. Also, the supply and exhaus; fans associated with these ventilation paths receive a Division 11 signal to trip upon deenergir,ing these relays.
Since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supplies are not required for the SCIS function.
15 The Division II solenoid valves associated with the Unit 2 reactor zone supply and exhaust outboard isolation dampers (FSV-64-13, -43) are powered from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the SCIS function for these valves (see note 14).
Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
If The function of the Unit 3 SCIS refueling zone Division I relays are as discussed in note 4.
However, since these relays are located in a Unit 3 i
logic panel, they have a different power supply.
As stated in note 4, since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the aesociated power I
supply is not required for the SCIS function.
17 The Division I solenoid valves associated with the Unit 3 refueling zone supply and exhaust inboard isolation dampers (FSV-64-6, -10) are powered l
from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the SCIS function for these valves (see note 16).
Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated j.
power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
l 38 The function of the Unit 3 SCIS refueling zone Division II relays are as i
discussed in note 6.
However, since these relays are located in a Unit 3 l
logic panel, they have a different power eupply.
As stated in note 6, since all subject relays deenergize to actuate, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
i 7
+
m
v 1
I' TABLE 64C NOTES (C01q1hTIM 19 The Division !! solenoid valves associated with the Unit 3 refueling zone supply c.nd exhaust outboard isolation dampers (FSV-64-5, -9) are powered
)
from the same power supply associated with the relays that initiate the
]
SCIS function for these valves (see note 18).
j Since the subject solenoids fail to the safe position, the associated power supply is not required for the SCIS function.
30 The Unit 1, 2, and 3 refueling zone supply and exhaust fans will be tripped by either a Division I or Division II trip signal from their respective unitized SCIS logic panels (see notes 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, and 18).
Deenergizing the appropriate 3C15 refueling zone actuation relays i
results in dropout of either or both of a series pair of contacts in the controls of each fan. This action deenergizes the associated trip coil of the subject ventilation fans.
j Each ventilation fan requires both control and motive power for operation which involves t.wo different power supplies. Motive power is supplied from a 480 V Reactor (RX) Building (Bldg) Vent Board (BD) as indicated in Table 640. Control power for each fan is supplied from a 120 VAC common control bus on each respective fans 480 V RX Bida Vent BD power supply.
The 480 V RX Blds Vent BD's and their corresponding control bus are identified as follows:
Fan Motive Power Fan Control power 480V RX Bldg Vent BD li 120V AC Common Control Bus IA 480V RX Bldg Vent BD IB 120V AC Common Control Bus IB 480V RX Blda Vent BD 2A 120V AC Common Control Bus IIA A80V RX B3dg' Vent BD 2B 120V AC Common Control Bus IIB 480V RX Bldg Vent BD 3A 120V AC Common Control Bus IIIA 480V RX Bldg Vent BD 3B 120V AC Common Control Bus IIIB Since the trip coil of the controls associated with each fan is
-f deenergized to trip, the control bus power supplies are not required for the SCIS function. Also, the motive power supplies are not required since the fans are tripped off for the SCIS function.
In addition, the dependencies of the ventilation fans on the subject power supplies is not accounted for on the support-to-support dependency matrix since the fans fail-safe (i.e., the fans do not require these boards to perform their 1
i I
l modeled function).
1 21 The Plant Air System (PAS) is required for opening the inboard and outboard isolation dampers (supply and exhaust) associated with (1) the refueling zone ventilation path of each reactor unit and (2) the Unit 2 reactor zone ventilation path.
Since all subject dampers fail to the required positions for the SCIS function on loss of air, PAS is not required.
TAhLE 64D PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATI0ft (PCTS) SYSTEM DEFENDENCIESI RWCU ISO TION / REACTIVITY CONTROL (SLC INITIATiJN)2 TRAIN A TRAIN B
$UPPORT SYST'dM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 0120 VAC RPS BUS 2A CONTROL LOGIC 3
RELAY 16A-K26 FOR ACTUATION OF INBOARD VALVE FCV-69-01 0120 VAC RPS BUS 2B CONTROL LOGIC 4
RELAY 16A-K27 FOR ACTUATION OF OUTBOARD VALVE FCV-69-02 i
250 VDC RMOV BD 2B FCV-69-02 5
(OUTBOARD)
MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER 480 VAC RMOV BD 2A FCV-69-01 6
(INBOARD)
MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER
. ~.
Tattle 64D (CONTINUZill MSIV CLOSURE FOR NON-PIPEBREAK TRANSIENTS 7 TRAIN A TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES cPX-99-A1,-A1A DIV IA RPS ATU 8,9,10 INSTR STRINGS CPX-99-A2,-A2A DIV IIA RPS ATU 8,9,10 INSTR STRINGS CPX-99-B1,-BlA DIV IB RPS ATU 8,11,12 INSTR STRINGS cPX-99-B2,-B2A DIV IIB RPS ATU 8,11,12 INSTR STRINGS 0120 VAC RPS BUS 2A PCIS TRIP 13 CHANNELS Al & A2 RELAYS ENERCIZING POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR INBOARD MSIV AC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-14C FSV-1-26C FSV-1-37C FSV-1-51C c120 VAC RPS BUS 28 PCIS TRIP 13 CHAMMFT.9 B1 & B2 RELAYS ENERCIZING POWER &
14
. RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR OUTBOARD MSIVs AC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-15C FSV-1-27C FSV-1-38C FSV-1-52C
- ~~ -
l TAhlE 64D (CONTINilED)
TRAI~! A TRAID B i
SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES
-c250 VDC RMOV BD 2A m eCIZING POWER &
14 RET.AY LOGIC POWER.
FOR OUTBOARD MSIV DC PILOT SOLEN 0 IDS:
1 FSV-1-15A FSV-1-27A I
FSV-1-38A I
FSV-1-52A l
0250 VDC RMOV BD 2B EMERCIZING POWER &
14 RRflY LOGIC POWER FOR INBOARD MSIVs i
DC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
.j FSV-1-14A FSV-1-26A FSV-1-37A FSV-1-51A CDRYWELL CONTROL AIR INBOARD MSIVs 15 CPLANT AIR SYSTEM OUTBOARD MSIVs 15 e
_ ___... _... _._ _... -. ~..
] Alit.E 61.D (CONTINt!ED)
ISOLATION OF A ffEth OPC16 cPX-99-A1,-A1A DIV IA RPS ATU 8 9 10 INSTR STRIES
-lY,18 CPX-99-A2,-A2A DIV IIA RPS ATU 8 9 10 INSTR STRIES li,18 CPX-99-B1,-BIA DIV IB RPS ATU 8 11 12 INSTR STRINGS 14,26 CPX-99-B2,-B2A DIV IIB RPS ATU 8 11 12 INSTR STRIES 14,20 PX-71-60-1,-1A DIV I ECCS ATU 21,22 INSTR STRINGS
.FOR HPCI & RCIC HICH FLOW SIMATA PX-71-60-2,-2A DIV II ECCS ATU 21,23 INSTR STRIES FOR HPCI & RCIC HIGH FLOW SIGNALS SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY NOTES RAW COOLIE WATER PCAS COMPRESSOR A, B, C, D 7
EECW PCAS COMPRESSOR A, B, C, D
.7
+
~
. TABLE 64D (CONTINtIE_D1 TRAI~! A TRAIN G SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 0120 VAC RPS BUS 2A RPS rusMurt.s 24 Al & A2 RX LEVEL 3 REIAYS (5A-K6A,-K6C)
PCIS TRIP 13 runansvit Al & A2 RELAYS CONTROL LOCIC 25 RELAY 16A-K26 FOR ACTUATION OF INBOARD VALVE FCV-69-01 ENERGIZING POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR IBBOARD MSIV AC PILOT SOLE 301DS:
FSV-1-14C FSV-1-26C FSV-1-37C FSV-1-51C cl20 VAC RPS BUS 2B RPS ruauwrt.R 24 B1 & B2 RX LEVEL 3 RELAYS (5A-K68,-K6D)
PCIS TRIP 13 FHaMNFT.M Al & A2 RELAYS EMERCIZING POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR OUTBOARD MSIVs AC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-15C FSV-1-27C FSV-1-38C FSV-1-52C CONYROL IACIC 25 RELAY 16A-K27 FOR ACTUATION OF OUTBOARD VALVES FCV-69-02,-12
(
TABLE 64D (CONTINUED)
TRAI."1 1 TRAIN B~
SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 250 VDC RMOV BD 2A ENERCIZING POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR OUTBOARD MSIV-DC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-15A FSV-1-27A FSV-1-38A FSV-1-52A RELAY LOCIC 26 ASSOCIATED WITH TRAIN 3 HPCI ISLN SIGNAL:
23A-K52 23A-K9 23A-K6 23A-K8 23A-K27 RELAY LOGIC 27 ASSOCIATED WITH TRAIN B RCIC ISLN SIGNAL:
2-71-K32 13A-K32 13A-K33 MOTIVE & CONTROL.
28 POWER FOR OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE FCV-73-03 250 VDC RMOV BD 2B MOTIVE & CONTROL 14 POWER FOR OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE FCV-69-02 ENERCIZING POWER &
5 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR INBOARG MSIV DC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-14A FSV-1-26A FSV-1-37A FSV-1-51A i
we'
TAfsLE 64D (CONTINtIED) l
\\
TRAIS A TRAID B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 250 VDC RMOV BD 2B
. RELAY LOGIC MOTIVE & CONTROL 26,29 (CONTINUED)
ASSOCIATED WITH POWER FOR TRAIN A HPCI OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE ISLN SIGNAL:
FCV-71-03 23A-K53 23A-K36 23A-K34 23A-K35 23A-K37
. RELAY LOGIC 27 ASSOCIATED WITH TRAIN A RCIC ISLN SIGNAL:
2-71-K12 13A-K12 13A-K15 13A-K16 480 VAC RMOV BD 2A MOTIVE & CONTROL 6,30 POWER FOR INBOARD ISLN VALVES:
FCV-69-01 FCV-73-02 480 VAC RMOV BD 28 MOTIVE & CONTROL MOTIVE & CONTROL 31,32 POWER FOR POWER FOR INBOARD ISLN VALVE OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE FCV-71-02 FCV-69-12 CDRYWELL CONTROL AIR INBOARD MSIVs 15 CE. ANT AIR SYSTEM OUTBOARD MSIVs 15 e
TAfsLE 64D (CONTINUED)
CONTAY! STENT OF RADIOACTIVITY 33 TRAIN A' TRAIN B SUPP0ltr SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES C0K-99-A1,-AIA DIV IA'RPS ATU 8,10,18 INSTR STRINGS cPX-99-A2,-A2A DIV IIA RPS ATU 8,10,18 INSTR STRINGS cPX-99-B1,-BlA DIV IB RPS ATU 8,12,20 INSTR STRINGS cPX-99-B2,-B2A DIV IIB RPS ATU 8,12,20 INSTR STRINGS c-"
avauw_-=
.. w s
iv'.
-.4
~..
. ~...
.. ~.....
. -. _. ~...... ~. -
~
TAliLE 640 (CONTINUED)
TRAIN A TRAID B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES cl20 VAC R1S BUS 2A RPS ruauurts 24 Al & A2 RK L3 RELAYS (5A-K6A,-K6C).
PCIS TRIP 13 CHANNELS Al & A2 RELAYS CROUP 2 ISLN VALVE 34 RELAY 16A-K17 CROUP 6 ISLN VALVE 35 RELAYS:
16A-K37 16A-K66A 16A-K66B 0120 VAC RPS BUS 2A ENERGIZING POWER &
14 (CONTINUED)
RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR INBOARD MSIV t
AC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-14C FSV-1-26C FSV-1-37C FSV-1-51C ENERCI7.ING & CONTROL 36 poler FOR INBOARD ISLN VALVE SCLENOIDS:
FSV-64-18 FSV-64-29 FSV-64-32 k$V-77-2A FSV-77-15A 0120 VAC RPS BUS 2B RPS CHANNELS 24 B1 & B2 RX L3 RELAYS (5A-K6B,-K6D) s
...-- - -. - -,...-.=---.... ----.-.
~
TABLE 64D (CONTINUED)
TRAIT 7 A TRAIC B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 0120 VAC RPS BUS 28 PCIS TRIP 13 (CONTINUED)
CHANNELS B1 & B2 REIAYS ENERGIZING POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR OUTBOARD MSIV AC PILOT SOLENOIDS:
FSV-1-15C FSV-1-27C FSV-1-38C FSV-1-52C CROUP.2 ISLN VALVE 34 RELAY 16A-K18 CROUP 6 ISLN VALVE 35 RELAYS:
16A-K38 16A-K65A 16A-K65B c120 VAC RPS BUS 2B ENERCIZING & CONTROL 36 (CONTINUED)
POWER FOR OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE SOLEN 0 IDS:
FSV-64-17 FSV-64-30 FSV-64-33 FSV-76-24 FSV-77-2B FSV-77-15B i
b.m._:_. _.m_
m.._=_
. -~
TABLE 64D (CONTINUED)
TRAIG A TRAIS S SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 120 VAC I&C BUS 2A ENERGIZING & CONTROL
'37 POWER FOR INBOARD ISLN VALVE SOLEN 0 IDS:
FSV-64-20 FSV-64-21 250 VDC RMOV BD 2A ENERCIZING POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR OUTBOARD MSIV -
DC PILOT SOLE 100 IDS:
FSV-1-15A FSV-1-27A FSV-1-38A FSV-1-52A 250 VDC RMOV BD 2A MOTIVE & CONTROL MOTIVE & CONTROL 38,39 (CONTIEUED)
POWER FOR POWER FOR INBOARD ISLN VALVE OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE FCV-73-35 FCV-73-40 CONTROL LOGIC RELAYS 40 23A-K21 FOR CLO5-K22 URE OF FCV-73-35,-36,-40 1
m
.-. m m
m
.~
TABLE 640 (CONTIN 1 FED)
-TRAIU A
--TRAI3 B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPEND"JCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 250 VDC RMOV BD 2B MOTIVE & CONTROL 38 POWER FOR OUTBOARD ISLN VALVE FCV-73-36 ENERCIZINC POWER &
14 RELAY LOGIC POWER FOR INBOARD MSIV DC PILOT SOLEN 0 IDS:
FSV-1-14A FSV-1-26A FSV-1-37A-FSV-1-51A cDRYWELL CONTROL AIR INBOARD MSIVs 15 PLANT AIR SYSTEM INBOARD ISOLATION
-OUT30ARL ISOLATION 15,37,41 l
VALVES VALVES o Denotes that this interface.is not required for the subject function of the FCIS (see corresponding note).
IABLE 64D NOTES
}
1 Four functions of the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) are addressed in the dependency matrix.
These functions areg (1) Reactor Water Cleanup (WWCU) system isolation during SLC initiation (Group 3 isolation valves), (2) Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) clcsure for r
non-pipebreak events (Group 1 isolation valves), (3) isolation of a High Energy 1.ine Break (HELB) Outside Primary Containment [0PC (Group 1, 3, 4, and 5 isolation valves)), and (4) containment of radioactivity (Group 1, 2, 3, 6, and 9 isolation valves). See notes 2, 7, 16 and 33 for a 7
description of these PCIS functions. The PRA system boundary for the PCIS includes the input signal instrumentation strings, trip logic channels, PCIS isolation valve group logic, and the associated primary containment isolation valves and valve controls necessary to assure automatic isolation of those systems non-essential to providing safe shutdown of the reactor. One exception to this is that certain essential systems will also be automatically isolated by the PCIS if a break occurs in the primary containment piping penetrations associated with those systems.
I Note that a PCIS' isolation valve'is designated as inboard if it is the innermost valve (closest to reactor vessel) of an isolation valve pair associated with a single flowpath. An isolation valve is designated as an outboard isolation valve if it is the outermost valve of an isolation valve pair associated with a single flowpath.
The dependencies identified for each of the four PCIS functions differ due to the varying scope of PCIS equipment required. The scope of equipment varies due to the required input signals and isolation valves necessary to mitigate the initiating event category considered by each l
PCIS function.-
The following list identifies the BFN systems containing Probabilistic
-Risk Assessment (PRA) PCIS boundary isolation valves.
i System Main Steam System (01)
Primary Containment System (64) t Reactor Water Cleanup System (69)
(
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (71) i High Pressure Coolant Injection System (73) l Core Spray System (75)
Containment Inerting System (76)
Radwaste System (77)
The' criteria for determining which isolation valves are to be included within the PCIS system boundary (for PRA modeling) are those valves in lines which have a diameter of three inches or greater.
l O
w
~
1 TABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED) 3 The RWCU Isolation / Reactivity Control function of the PCIS is required to isolate the RWCU from the Reactor Recirculation System following initiation of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System. The function of
(
the SLC.is to inject the Recirculation System with a neutron absorber j
solution (boron) in sufficient quantity to shutdown the reactor.
Isolation of the RWCU will prevent dilution of the highly concentrated boron solution.
The PCIS equipment required to provide isolation of the RWCU from the f
reactor is the group 3 isolation valves (RWCU primary containment isolation valves), including the necessary relay logic and valve j
controls. No initiating signals are required to actuate this isolation function since it occurs simultaneously with manual SLC initiation (SLC i
injection and RWCU isolation are both initiated by manipulation of the same handswitch).
3 120 VAC Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus A provides the power necessary to energize PCIS relay, 16A-K26. Upon activation of the Standby Liquid Control System via handswitch HS-63-6A relay 16A-K26 is deenergized via drop out of the corresponding contact in the PCIS logic. This action results in closure of a contact in the valve
[
controls that energizes a closing coil to initiate RWCU valve FCV-69-01 closure. Note that since the isolation signal is transmitted from the PCIS relay logic to the valve controls via a deenergizing relay, RPS Bus A is not required for this isolation signal, t
4 120 VAC RPS Bus B provides the power necessary to energize PCIS relay 16A-K27. Upon activation of the Standby Liquid Control System via handswitch HS-63-6A, relay 16A-K27 is deenergized via drop out of the corresponding contact in the PCIS logic. This action results in closure of a contact in the valve controls that energizes a closing. coil to initiate RWCU valve FCV-69-02 closure. Note that since the isolation signal is transmitted from the PCIS relay logic to-the valve controls via a deenergizing relay, RPS Bus B is not required for this isolation signal.
5 This power supply is required for closure of FCV-69-02 since this valve is motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
6 Thir power supply is required for closure of FCV-69-01 since this valve l
1s motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
7 7
There are two transients that result in required MSIV closure for reactor water inventory preservation. These events are loss of feedwater and pressure regulator failed open.
The'PCIS input signals required for MSIV closure following these transients are reactor water Level 1 following loss of feedwater and reactor water Level 1 or low reactor pressure following the pressure regulator failed open.
D
l I
TABLE 64D HQTES (CONTINUED) 8 There are two PCIS trip channels for each train of the PCIS trip logic circuitry associated with isolation of valve groups 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8 (isolation of valve groups 4, 5, and 7 are controlled within the HPCI 3
and RCIC systems). They are channels Al & A2 for train A and channels B1 & B2 for train B.
There is a completely redundant and separate set
}
i of input signal instrument strings [RPS Analog Trip Units (ATU)] that are dedicated to each of the four PCIS trip channels. The four sets of RPS ATU instrument strings are separated into subdivisions and are j
denoted as Division (DIV) IA (input to PCIS trip channel A1), DIV IIA (input to PCIS trip channel A2), DIV IB (input to PCIS trip channel B1),
and DIV IIB (input to PCIS trip channel B2).
For the High Energy Line Break (HELB) OPC isolation function, each RPS ATU instrument string subdivision provides signals upon detection of either high steamline flow, low reactor Level 1, low reactor Level 3, or low steamline pressure. Each RPS ATU instrument string within each subdivision
[
consists basically of a series arrangement of a transmitter, an indicating switch (ATU), and an actuating relay. Each subdivision of i
the RPS ATU instrument strings consist of four high steamline flow strings, one low reactor Level 1 string, one low reactor Level 3 string, and one low steamline pressure string. The RPS ATU instrument strings o
are designed such that the actuating relays of the associated instrument v
string deenergize when the trip setpoint of the process condition being monitored is detected. The deenergized actuation relay results in drop out of a contact in the associated PCIS trip channel..One exception to 1
i this.is that the deenergized low reactor Leve) 3 instrument string i
actuation relays result in dropout of corresponding contacts in the RPS trip channels (see note 24). These signa 2s are transmitted to the RPS trip channels since they are also used in the reactor scram function.
Dropout of the associated RPS trip channel contacts results in I
deenergizing of the corresponding RPS trip channel relays. Deenergizing these relays transmits signals to the corresponding PCIS trip channels and to the RPS scram logic. The signal is transmitted to the PCIS trip channels by drop out of the associated contacts just as the other signals are transmitted directly from the RPS ATU instrument strings.
The power supplies for the DIV IA and IIA RPS ATU instrument strings are fed directly from 120 VAC RPS BUS 2A.
The power supplies for the DIV IB and IIB RPS ATU instrument strings are fed directly from 120 VAC RPS BUS 2B.
Note that although these instrument strings receive power directly from the PX power supplies only the associated RPS Buses are reflected on the support-to-support dependency matrix. Since the RPS ATU instrument string actuating relays deenergize to actuate, availability l
L of the associated power supplies of each instrument string subdivision is not required to provide input signals to the PCIS trip channels.
i L
i
i i
i TABLE 64D EQIES (CONTINUED) l 9
The DIV IA & DIV IIA RPS ATU low steamline pressure instrument strings i
(one in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation:
{
DIV IA
.PT-1-72, PIS-1-72, and actuation relay 63-1-72.
DIV IIA PT-1-82, PIS-1-82, and actuation relay 63-1-82.
Upon detection of low steamline pressure conditions, each instrument f
string results in drop out of a contact within its associated PCIS trip l
channel. This action deenergizes the associated low steamline pressure i
PCIS trip channel relay (16A-K4A (channel A1), 16A-K4C (channel A2)).
10' The DIV.IA & DIV IIA RPS ATU low reactor Level 1 instrument strings (one
[
in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation l
DIV IA' f
f LT-3-56A, LIS-3-56A, and actuation relay 71-3-56A.
I DIV IIA LT-3-560, LIS-3-560, and actuation relay 71-3-56C.
e Upon detection of low reactor level 1 conditions, each instrument string results in drop out of a contact within its associated PCIS trip channel. This action deenergizes the associated low reactor level 1 i
PCIS trip channel relay [16A-K1A (channel A1),-16A-K1C (channel A2)).
l f
11 The DIV.IB & DIV IIB RPS ATU low steamline pressure instrument strings (one in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation:
DIV IB PT-1-76, PIS-1-76, and actuation relay 63-1-76.
DIV_ IIB PT-1-86, PIS-1-86, and actuation relay 63-1-86.
1' h
W D
=v e
+
~
~
TABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED)
Upon detection of low steamline pressure conditions, each instrument string results in drop out of a contact within its associated PCIS trip channel. This action results in deenergitation of the associated low j
steamline pressure PCIS trip channel relay (16A-K4B (channel B1),
l*
16A-K4D (channel B2)).
13 The DIV IB & DIV IIB RPS ATU low reactor Level 1 instrument strings (one in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation:
DIV IB LT-3-56B, LIS-3-56B, and actuation relay 71-3-56B.
DIV IIB t
i LT-3-56D, LIS-3-56D, and actuation relay 71-3-56D.
Upon detection of low reactor level I conditions, each intstrument string results in drop out of a contact within its associated PCIS trip t
channel. This action deenergizes the associated low reactor level 1 PCIS trip channel relay [16A-K1B (channel B1), 16A-K1D (channel B2)).
l 13 The trip channel relay logic associated with PCIS isolation valve groups 1, 2, 3, and 6 are referred to as PCIS trip channels Al & A2 for Train A and trip channels B1 & B2 for Train B.
The PCIS trip channel relays associated with these input signals and valve groups are 16A-K1A, -K1C (channel Al & A2 reactor Level 1, respectively), 16A-K1B, -K1D (channel
.B1 & B2 reactor Level 1, respectively), 16A-K2A, -K2C (channel Al & A2 high main steamline space temperature, respectively),16A-K2B, -K2D l
l (channel B1 & B2 high main steamline space temperature, respectively),
16A-K3A, -K3C (channel Al & A2 high main steamline flow, respectively),
16A-K3B, -K3D (channel B1 & B2 high main steamline flow, respectively),
16A-K4A, -K4C (channel Al & A2 low reactor pressure,-respectively),
16A-K4B, -K4D (channel B1 & B2 low reactor pressure, respectively),
16A-K6A, -K6C (channel Al & A2 reactor Level 3, respectively), 16A-K6B,
-K6D (channel B1 & B2 reactor Level 3, respectively), 16A-K7A, -K7C (channel Al & A2 group 1 isolation signal, respectively), and 16A-K7B,
-K7D (channel B1 & B2 group 1 isolation signal, respectively).
These I
relays are deenergized to actuate, and thus do not require power to
+
l transmit signals to valve groups 1 & 3 relay logic.
l l
l i
IABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUE 10 l
14 The MSIVs are designed such that one of two solenoid pilot valves (one AC powered'& one DC powered) must be energized to allow air supply to j
the MSIV pistons to maintain the valves open. When both solenoids are deenergized, the air supply to the valves is redirected such that,'in
]
combination with a compressed spring, the valves are closed.
Since i
these valves are normally open during power operation, the pilot j
solenoids are normally energized and deenergire to initiate MSIV closure. The pilot solenoids are signaled to deenergize upon drop out of either of two series contacts upon initiation of a Group 1 isolation signal (see note 21). Dropout of either of these contacts deenergizes the corresponding MSIV isolation relay. These relays are 16A-K51 (inboard MSI VDC solenoids), 16A-K14 (inboard MSI VAC solenoids),
16A-K52 (outboard MSI VDC solenoids), and 16A-K16 (outboard MSI VAC solenoids). The MSIV relay logic is arranged such that the DC powered
]
I solenoids associated with the inboard MSIVs receive signals from the group 1 PCIS trip channels B1 & B2 (PCIS relays 16A-K7B, ~K7D j
see note 13) while the AC powered solenoids receive signals from the 1
group 1 PCIS trip channels Al & A2 (PCIS relays 16A-K7A, -K7C see/ note /13).
For the outboard MSIVs, the DC powered solenoids receive signals from the group 1 PCIS trip channels Al & A2 (PCIS relays 16A-K7A, -K7C/see note 13) while the AC powered solenoids receive J
signals from the group 1 PCIS trip channels B1 & B2 (PCIS relays 16A-K7B, -K7D/see note 13). The PCIS Trip channel signal combination required for MSIV closure will be a signal from either "A" channel (channel Al or A2) and a signal from either "B" channel (channel B1 or B2).
l The power supply required to energize the AC & DC pilot solenoids is identical to that required to energize the MSIV isolation relays. Since both the pilot solenoids and the MSIV isolation relays must deenergize to initiata MSIV closure, these power supplies are not required for the PCIS isolation function.
L 15 The MSIVs are fasir,ned to close by either force from a compressed spring or air pressure on the upper side of the valve piston. The valves are designed to fail closed on loss of power or unavailability of the Drywell Control Air for the inboard MSIVs (FCV-1-14, 37, -53) and the Plant Air System (PAS) for the outboard MSIVs (FCV-1-12, 38,
~52).
Closure on unavailability of the Drywell Control Air or the PAS is assured by an accumulator / check valve arrangement associated with each MSIV such that sufficient air is stored for one valve cycle to close.
For PRA modeling purposes, these accumulators and check valves are considered to be a portion of each respective MSIV.
Thus the MSIV dependencies on the two air supply systems are not required since the l
accumulator / check valve arrangements associated with each MSIV assure L
valve closure.
l
TABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED)
I i
16 Isolation of a High' Energy Line Break (HELB) Outside Primary Containment f
(OPC) is necessary to preserve reactor water inventory, and thus prevent escalation of the initiating event scenario to that which may involve core damage.
f The HELB's OPC that are considered, including the corresponding PCIS input signals and valve groups associated with each are identified as follows:
l f
PCIS PIPE BREAK PCIS INPUT SIGNALS VALVE CROUP l
Main Steamline Break OPC High Main Steamline Flow 1
r (Differential Pressure) t High Main Steamline Space Temperature e
Reactor Water Level 1
}
HPCI Steamline Break OPC High HPCI Steamline Flow 4
(Differential Pressure)
High HPCI Steamline Space Temperature RCIC Steam 11ne Break OPC High RCIC Steamline Flow 5
(Differential Pressure)
^
RWCU Line Break OPC Recctor Water Level 3 3
17 The DIV IA & DIV IIA RPS ATU high steam flow instrument strings (four in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation.
l DIV IA String #1: PDT-1-13A, PDIS-1-13A, and actuation relay 63-1-13A.
String #2: PDT-1-25A, PDIS-1-25A, and actuation relay 63-1-25A.
String #3: PDT-1-36A, PDIS-1-36A, and actuation relay 63-1-36A.
String #4: PDT-1-50A, PDIS-1-50A, and actuation relay 63-1-50A.
DIV IIA String #1: PDT-1-130, PDIS-1-13C, and actuation relay 63-1-130.
String #2: PDT-1-25C, PDIS-1-25C, and actuation relay 63-1-250.
String #3: PDT-1-36C, PDIS-1-360, and actuation relay 63-1-360.-
String #4 PDT-1-500, PDIS-1-500, and actuation relay 63-1-500.
{
)
-e e
n
.h 4 j
TABLE 64D NOTES _(CONTINUED)
I Upon detection of high steam flow conditions, each of these instrument strings result in drop out of one of four contacts arranged in series l
within its associated PCIS trip channel.. This action results in j
deenergization of the associated high steamline flow PCIS trip channel
)
relay [16A-K3A (channel A1), 16A-K3C (channel A2)]. Thus, detection of l
high steam flow conditions by only one of these instrument strings will result in actuation of the corresponding PCIS trip channel.
18 The DIV IA & DIV IIA RPS ATU low reactor level 3 instrument strings (one in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation:
DIV IA 4
LT-3-203A, LIS-3-203A, and actuation relay 71-3-203A1.
DIV IIA LT-3-203C, LIS-3-203C, and actuation relay 71-3-203C1.
Upon detection of low reactor Level 3 conditions, each instrument string results in drop out of a contact within its associated RPS trip channel. This action deenergizes the associated low reactor Level 3 RPS l
trip channel relay (5A-K6A (channel A1), SA-K6C (channel A2)).
19 The DIV IB & DIV IIB RPS ATU high' steam flow instrument strings (four in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation.
DIV IB String #1: PDT-1-13B, PDIS-1-13B, and actuation relay 63-1-13B.
String #2: PDT-1-25B, PDIS-1-258, and actuation relay 63-1-25B.
String #3 'PDT-1-36B, PDIS-1-36B, and actuation relay 63-1-36B.
I String #4: PDT-1-50B, PDIS-1-50B, and actuation relay 63-1-50B.
-DIV IIB String #1: PDT-1-13D, PDIS-1-13D, and actuation relay 63-1-13D.
String #2: PDT-1-25D, PDIS-1-25D, and actuation relay 63-1-25D.
String #3: PDT-1-36D, PDIS-1-36D, and actuation relay 63-1-36D.
String #4: PDT-1-50D, PDIS-1-50D, and actuation relay 63-1-50D.
Upon detection of high steam flow conditions, each of these instrument strings result in drop out of one of four contacts arranged in series i
l within its associated PCIS trip channel. This action deenergizes the associated high steamline flow PCIS trip channel relay (16A-K3B (channel B1), 16A-K3D (channel B2)]. Thus, detection of high steam flow conditiona by only one of these instrument strings will result in j
actuation of the corresponding PCIS trip channel.
l-i ri rw m
.a a
_a,_
m a
b a
a+--
TABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED) 80 The DIV IB & DIV IIB RPS ATU low reactor Level 3 instrument strings (one in each RPS ATU subdivision) consist of the following instrumentation:
DIV IE LT-3-203B, LIS-3-203B, and actuation relay 71-3-203Bl.
DIV IIB LT-3-203D, LIS-3-203D, and actuation relay 71-3-203D1.
Upon detection of low reactor Level 3 conditions, each instrument string results in drop out of a contact within its associated RPS trip channel. This action results in deenergitation of the associated low reactor Level 3 RPS trip channel relay [5A-K6B (channel B1), SA-K6D l
(channel B2)].
j al There are two trains of PCIS trip logic (Train A & B) associated with both HPCI and RCIC steam supply line isolation (isolation of valve l
groups 4 & 5, respectively). For the HELB OPC isolation function, high
)
HPCI steamline flow and high HPCI steamline space temperature are j
required as inputs to each train of the HPCI PCIS trip logic. Only high RCIC steamline flow is required as input to each train of the RCIC PCIS l
trip Icgic for this function.
The high steamline flow signal is j
provided by Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) analog trip unit (ATU)
]
instrument strings. There are two separate and redundant divisions of
)
ECCS ATU instrument strings which are denoted as DIV 1 and DIV II.
There is one high steamline flow instrument string for each of these systems in each ECCS ATU division with the two DIV I strings providing input' to Train A of the HPCI and RCIC PCIS trip logic and the DIV II strings providing input to Train B.
Each ECCS ATU, instrument string within each division consists basically of a series arrangement of a transmitter, an indicating switch (ATU), and an actuating relay.
The ECCS ATU instrument strings are designed such that the actuating relay i
of the associated instrument string energizes when the trip setpoint of the process condition being monitored is detected. The energized actuation relay results in closure of a contact in the associatea train of HPCI and RCIC PCIS trip logic.
The power supplies for the Division I and II ECCS ATU instrument strings are_PX-71-60-1, -1A and PX-71-60-2, ~2A, respectively. These power supplies receive their power through an associated inverter from 250 V RMOV BD 2B and 250 V RMOV BD 2A, respectively. Note that although the CAS instrument strings receive power directly from the PX power supplies, the associated 250 V RMOV BDs are reflected or. the support-to-support dependency matrix as being the dependency for this instrumentation.
Since the actuating relay energizes to actuate, the associated power supplies of each ECCS ATU instrument string division are required to provide input signals to the associated train of the HPCI and RCIC PCIS trip logic. However, the dependency is conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since loss of one division pcNer supply will fail the PCIS function only if the other division power supply
! ailed.
IABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED) 22 The DIV I ECCS ATU RCIC and HPCI high steamline flow instrument strings (one per system) consist of the following instrumentation 1
RClG-PDT-71-1A,'PDIS-71-1A, and actuation relay 63-71-1A.
HEGI PDT-73-1A, PDIS-73-1A, and actuation relay 63-73-1A.
Upon detection of high steamline flow conditions, each instrument string results in closure of a contact within its associated train of PCIS trip logic. This action results in excitation of the associated high steamline flow Train A PCIS trip logic relay [2-71-K12 (RCIC), 23A-K53 (HPCI)).
23 The DIV II ECCS ATU RCIC and HPCI high steamline flow instrument strings (one per system) consist of the following instrumentatir,st RG.If PDT-71-1B, PDIS-71-1B, and actuation relay 63-71-1B.
KEEL PDT-73-1B, PDIS-73-1B, and actuation relay 63-73-1B.
l Upon detection of high steamline flow conditions, each instrument string results in closure of a contact within its associated train of PCIS trip logic. This action results in excitation of the associated high steamline flow Train A PCIS trip logic relay [2-71-K32 (RCIC), 23A-K52 (HPCI)).
I 24 A reactor water Level 3 signal is transmitted from the RPS ATU instrument strings to the RPS trip channels (see note 8).
RPS relays i
SA-K6A, -K6C (Train A) and SA-K6B, ~K6D (Train B) deenergize upon dropout of.the contacts associa.ted with the signal received from the RPS ATU instrument strings. These deenergized relays result in dropout of associated contacts in the PCIS trip channels. Thus, the reactor water Level'3 signal is transmitted from the RPS trip channels to the PCIS trip channels. The power supply associated with the RPS relays is not l
required for the PCIS isolation function.
I i
a i
v TABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUER).
I 25; The RWCU isolation valves are signaled to close upon deenergitation of
)
the corresponding PCIS RWCU isolation valve relay. These relays are 16A-K26-for inboard RWCU valve FCV-69-01 and relay 16A-K27 for outboard i
RWCU valves FCV-69-02, -12.
120 VAC RPS Bus A provides the power necessary to energize PCIS relay 16A-K26 while 120 VAC RPS Bus B provides the power to energize relay 16A-K27. Following a HELB OPC, receipt of a reactor water Level 3 signal from either PCIS trip channel Al or A2 and from either PCIS trip channel B1 or B2 will result in deenergization of the corresponding RWCU isolation valve relay due to orop out of the associated contacts in the RWCU isolation valve relay logic. Deenergizing the inboard or outboard RWCU isolation valve relays will result in closure of a contact in the associated valve controle i
that energizes a closing coil to initiate valve closure. Note that since the isolation signal is transmitted from the PCIS RWCU isolation valve relay logic to the valve controls via a deenergizing relay, RPS Bus A and Bus B are not required for this isolation signal.
I i
26 As specified by note 16, input signals necessary for isolation of HPCI
)
for a break in the HPCI steam supply line are high HPCI steamline flow 1
and high steamline space temperature. Each train of the HPCI PCIS trip j
logic (Train A & B) contains two relays associated with the high HPCI steamline flow signal. The two Train A high steamline flow relays are 23A-K53 and 23A-K36 vnile the two relays associated with Train B are 23A-K52 and 23A-K9.
Relays 23A-K52 -K53 are time delay relays that eneigize upon closure of a contact associated with each.upon receipt of f
a high HPCI steamline flow signal from the ECCS ATU instrument strings j
(see notes 21, 22, and 23). This action results in contact closure that energizes a second relay associated with each trained high HPCI l
steamline flow signal (23A-K36 and 23A-K9). This action results in one additienal contact closure in the associated train of the HPCI steamline isolation relay logic that energizes the associated HPCI steamline isolation relay (23A-K37 for Train A and 23A-K27 for Train B).
-Each Train of the HPCI PCIS trip logic contains eight contacts
.1 associated with the high HPCI steamline space temperature signal. These i
contacts will close upon detection of high steamline space temperature by its associated temperature switch. Each train of the HPCI PCIS trip logic also contains two relays (23A-K34, -K35 for Train A and 23A-K6,
-K8 for Train B) associated with the high steamline space temperature signal. Four of the eight contacto associated with the high steamline spece temperature signals are arranged in parallel to result in energization of one of the two high steamline space temperature relays associated with each trip logic train upon closure of any one of these four contacts.
Each train of the PCIS HPCI isolation relay logic contains four contacts that are associated with the four high HPCI t
steamline space temperature relays (two from each train of the HPCI trip logic). These contacts are arranged one out of two twice, fith closure of a contact associated with each train of the HPCI trip logic required to energize the associated HPCI steamline isolation relay (23A-K37 for L
Train A and 23A-K27 for Train B).
TABLE 64D_ NOTES (CONTINUED)
Energizing relay 23A-K37 or 23A-K27 results in corresponding contact closure within the. valve controls of each HPCI steamline isolation valve (FCV-73-02
-03).
This action results in energizing the closing coil associated with each isolation valve which results in valve closure.
Note that since relays associated with the HPCI steamline isolation l
function require to be energized, the associated power supplies are i
required. However, this dependency is conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since loss of one train of power will fail the PCIS function only if the other train has failed (i.e., syst a can actuate on one division of logic).
I 27 As specified by note 16, #he input signal necessary for isolation of RCIC for a break in the RCIC steam supply line is high RCIC steamline flow. Each train of the RCIC pCIS trip logic (Train A & B) contains two relays associated with the high RCIC steamline flow signal. The two Train A high steamline flow relays are 2-71-K12 and 13A-K12 while the l
two relays associated with Train B are 2-71-K32 and 13A-K32. Relays 2-71-K12, -K32 are time delay relays that energize upon closure of a contact associated with each upon receipt of a high RCIC steamline flow signal from the ICCS ATU instrument strings (see notes 21, 22, and 23).
I This action results in contact closure that energizes a second relay associated with each trained high RCIC steamline flow signal (13A-K12 and 13A-K32). This action results in one additional contact closure in i
l the associated train of the RCIC steamline isolation relay logic that energizes the associated RCIC steamline isolation relays (13A-K15, -K16 for Train A and 13A-K33 for Train B).
{
Energizing relays 13A-K15, -K16 (Train A) or 13A-K33 (Train B) results in corresponding contact closure within the valve controls of each RCIC
?
I steamline isolation valve (FCV-71-02, -03).
Note that relay 13A-K15 has a corresponding contact in the controls of FCV-71-02 while relay 13A-K16 has a corresponding contact in the controls of FCV-71-03.
Relay 13A-K33 has a corresponding contact in the controls of both of these valves.
This contact closure results in energizing of the closing coil associated with each isolation valve which results in valve closure.
Note that since relays associated with the RCIC steamline isolation l
function require energizing for signal transmission, the associated power supplies are required. However, this dependency is conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since loss of one train of power will fail i
l the PCIS function only if the other train has failed (i.e., system can actuate on one diviolon of logic).
28 This power supply is required for closure of FCV-73-03 since this valve is motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
29 This power supply is required for closure of FCV-71-03 since this valve is motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
30 This power supply is required for closure of FCV-73-02 since this valve is motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
f b
TABLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED) 31 This power supply is required for closure of PCV-71-02 since this valve is motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
32 This power supply is required for closure of FCV-69-12 since this valve is motor operated, normally open, and fails as-is.
33 The cor cainment of radioactivity function of the PCIS prevents the relear s of radioactive material to the environment by isolation of major linee that penetrate the drywell and communicate either with the reactor vessel or the drywell air space.
In addition, lines that penetrate the Torus and communicate with the Torus air space are subject to this function of the PCIS. This function of the PCIS is necessary following those events that may result in core damage. Reactor Level 1 & 3 are the PCIS input signals considered for actuation of this PCIS function.
34 The PCIS trip channels transmit the reactor Level 3 signal to the Group 2 valve relay logic associated with the Drywell Drain Isolation Valves FCV-77-2A, -15A (inboaru) and FCV-77-2B, -15B (outboard). There is a separate array of relay logic associated with the inboard and outboard Group 2 isolation valves. All four PCIS trip channels provide the reactor Level 3 signal to both the inboard and outboard relay logic associated with these Group 2 valves. The logic is arranged such that deenergizing any one of the four reactor Level 3 relays in the PCIS trip channels will result in dropout of the corresponding contact in both the inboard and ot board group 2 relay logic. Dropout of any one of these contacts will deenergize the corresponding relays (16A-K17 for the inboard valve logic and 16A-Kl8 for the outboard).
Deenergizing these relays will result in dropout of a contact in the controls associated with the subject valves (see note 36).
Note that since the subject relays deenergize.o actuate, their corresponding power supplieu are not requi'ed in performing the the PCIS function.
35 The PCIS trip channels transmit the reactor Level 3 signal to the Group 6 valve relay logic associated with Reactor Building Ventilation isolation valvec [FCV-64-18, ~29, -32 (inboard) and FCV-64-17, -30, -33 (outboard)] & [ Containment Inerting System isolation valve FCV-76-24 (outboard)). There is a separate array of relay logic associated with the inboard and outboard group 6 isolation valves. All four PCIS trip channels provide the reactor Level 3 signal to both the inboard and outboard relay logic associated with these Group 6 valves. The logic is arranged such that deenergization of any one of the four reactor Level 3 relays in the PCIS trip channels will result in dropout of the corresponding contact in the both the inboard and outboard Group 6 relay logic.
Dropout of any one of these contacts will result in deenergization of the corresponding relays (16A-K66A for inboard valves FCV-64-29, -32, 16A-K66B for inboard valve FCV-64-18, 16A-K65A for outboard valves FCV-64-17, -30, -33, and 16A-65B outboard valve PCV-76-24).
Deenergizing of these relays will result in dropout of a contact in the controls associated with the subject valves (see note 36).
Note that since the subject relays deenergize to actuate, their correspanding nover supplies are not required in performing the the PCIS function.
%p 4 g s j
- , 3 N
H BLE 64D NOTES (CONTINUED) i:
i 361 The controls associated with the Group 2 & 6 intoard isolation valves
' required to close for'the radioactive containment function of the PCIS.
l receive their isolation signals via the corresponding deenergized relays-in the Group 2 & 6' relay logic (see notes 34 and 35).
Deenergizing 4
these relays result in dropout of the associated contact in the valve =
9
+
f controls.. Dropout of this contact within the associated valve controls _
E deenergizes an additional relay.
These valve control relays are necessary to provide signals to the solenoids of valves that enable D
closure by handswitch manipulation, etc. The following is a listing of each Group 2 & 6 valve and its associated valve control-relay:
L INBOARD J
Isolation Valve Control Relav Valve Groun FCV-64-18' 86-64-18 6-F3V-64-29 86-64-29 6
FCV-64-32 86-64-32 6
i" L
FCV-77-2A 86-77-2A 2
FCV-77-15A 86-77-15A 2
l' OUTBOARD holation Valve.
Control Relav Valve Groun FCV-64-17 86-64-17 6
H FCV-64-30
'86-64-30 6
-TCV-64-33 86-64-33
'6 FCV-76-24 86-76-24 6
FCV-77-2B 86-77-2B 2
FCV-77-15B 86-77-15B 2
.Deenergizing a control relay associated with any one of these valves Jresults in; dropout of a contact that doenergizes the solenoid of the associatedsvalve. This action results in closure of the group 2 or
. group'6 isolation valve.
/
Note that since the subject relays deenergize to actuate, theiri g
y
' corresponding-power supplies are not required in performing the PCIS 0
. function.0 M
$37 The; PCIS function of the' inboard isolation valves (FCV-64-20,:-21) in the Torus to Reactor Building vacuum breaker lines-(prevent escape-of l
fradioactivity'from the' Torus to the environment) is secondary to the 1
vacuum reliefLfunction of these lines. 'Therefore, these isolation
, valves are failed safe open..Thus, power and. air is required to-maintain the valves closed for the PCIS function (i.e., the solenoids 1
FSV-4-20, -21 must remain energized to maintain air to the pistons of theJrespective FCV's). ' Note that these isolation valves are normally
' closed and receive no PCIS signals to close.
bh il.
75.
3 _
1 r
TABLE 64D~ NOTES (CONTINUED')
g
]
38 The HPCI,testiline isolation valves (FCV-73-35, -36). are required to I
Mg h
' perform the PCIS isolation function when the HPCI suction is switched.
from the CST to-the Torus. This will provide containment of b
' radioactivity from the Torus to the environment. Although these valves receive'a signal.to close upon hutomatic HPCI initiation,'it is assumed that they may be reopened (prior to. suction switchover to Torus) for s
a d
at ru ae n sola i e (F 73 U.8)-have fully opened (see note 40). Thus, the associated power supply
- is' required for closure of these valves (when open)'since this valve is i
?
. motor operated.and fails as-is.
E
- 39~
.Tlie HPCI: CST suction line isolation valve (FCV-7?-40) is normally open 4
.and automatically closes upon a signal indicating that:the Torus suction
. isolation valves (FCV-73-17, -18) have fully opened (see note 10). This function is to prevent possible radioactivity release from the Torus to the environment. The associated power supply is required-for closure of-
-this valve since it fails as-is.
40i 2
Relays 23A-K21, -K22 are ' mergized upon full' openinf,'of the HPCI Torus suction isolation valves'(FCV-73-17, -18).
These relays are energized l-upon contact closure when the position switches associated with these
'i valves are tripped to indicate the fully opened position. These relays transmit'an' isolation signal to FCV-73-35, ~36 -40 via contact closure I
associated with the controls of these valves. There is a contact R
associated with each of these two relays within the controls of'all y'
three.of these valves, arranged in parallel (i.e.,, associated valve closes if either of two contacts close). Since these relays energize to actuate, their associated power supplies are required.
Al' The inboard Reactor Building to Torus vacuum breaker isolation valves FCV-64-20-21 require air to remain closed (normal' position) since they
(
are failed open on-loss of pcwer or air.
All remaining isolation valves fail closed on loss of air and thus, do not require this dependency for the PCIS: Function.
1 L
The-remaining isolation-valves (other than the MSIVs and FCV-64, '20, L
--21) required for the containment of radioactivity function of PCIS are
?
i identified as follows:
Inboard Isin Valves Outboard Isin Valves FCV-64-18 FCV-64-17 Y'
FCV-64-19 FCV-64-32 FCV-64-29 FCV-64-33 FCV-64-30 FCV-75-5B FCV-75-57 FCV-76-24 FCV-77-2A FCV-77-2B
~FCV-77-15A FCV-77-15B i
. ~
. ~. _- -
. _. ~
. ~..
IABLE 6'5' STANDBY CAS TREATMENT SYSTEM (SBGTS) DEPEfDENCIES1' TRAIN A-TRAIN B TRAIN C SUPPORT SYSTEM-DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES
'480 VAC DIESEL AUX BD A FAN A 6
9 HUM CONTROL HTR A 6
0-FCO-65-17.
0-FCO-65-16 4
0-FCO-65-3 4
0-FCO-65-26 0-FCO-65-52'
. I',8 480.VAC DIESEL AUX BD B
' FAN B 6
HUM CONTROL HTR B 9
0-FCO-65-4 1,8 0-FCO-65-39 6-0-FCO-65-38 4:
0-FCO-65-25 4
.480 VAC SBCT BD FAN C 7
HUM CONTROL HTR C:
-9 0-FCO-65 7 0-FCO-65-51 5
120 VAC 2-FCO-64-41 2
I&C BUS 2A 120 VAC 2-FCO-64-40 2
I&C BUS 2B 120 VAC-1-FCO-64-45 3
I&C BUS 1A 120 VAC 1-FCO-64-44 3
I&C BUS 1B
)
PLANT. CONTROL AIR-2-FCO-64-41 2
2-FCO-64-40 2
l-FCO-64-45 3
i
~
1-FCO-64-44 3
~
~
m_:
' -k I
'l
- ~
~ S
- j'r'
' 5-5
~
~
7E.
' ' ~ '
- 3 Y ? ~
. :.kQ y
- ::. 3..,
lS:-
,a a
~ ~:t "2 :::
-p;_
i
:{ :
a,
4 L
TABLE 65 NOTES l
?
1l The Standby CasiTreatment System-(SBGTS) maintains a negative pressure in the Reactor Building under isolation conditions to prevent ground-level:
release of airborne activity.
It also treats the effluent from the containment buildings before discharging it through the plant stack, in J
order to minimize release of radioactive material from the containment to, 1
'the environs.. System operation 10 initiated on a primary containment isolation signal. This signal is modeled as part of the Primary 1
Containment Isolation System (PCIS). The SBGTS model includes the two common refueling zone exhaust. trains of Units 1 and 2, the two reactor r
zone exhaust trains of Units 1 and 2, end three.SBGTS' fan / filter trains.
Purge Air Valves 0-FSV-65-2,-24 and -66 as well as train B cross-tie damper 0-FCO-65-22 are not being modeled.
The decay heat removal mode of the system is manually initiated in case i
the component of a train is overheated.
In that case, the train is.
rendered inoperable and its respective residual heat removal damper 0-FCO-65-4 for train A, 0-FCO-65-26 for train B or 0-TCO-65-52 for t
- train C is opened. An open decay heat removal damper of a particular train would' render that train inoperable for secondary containment purposes.
2 The Unit 2 reactor zone exhaust to SBGT crosstie dampers 2-FCO-64-40 and-
-41 are normally closed and open on system startup. The'120 VAC I&C L
-Buses supply power to dedicated' solenoid valves 2-FSV-64-40 and -41 deenergize to open their associated dampers by bleeding air off of the damper operators.
3 The refueling. zone exhaust to SBGTS crosstie dampers 0-FCO-64-44 and -45 i
are normally closed and open on receipt of an automatic signal from Unit
'2 PCIS. relay 16A-K23 Panel 9-42-2.
These dampers will open only if fan A i'
-is running.' Control power for 0-FSV-64-45 and -44 is supplied from 120 c
sVAC I&C Busea A &'B respectively.
4 Train A filter train' inlet damper 0-FCO-65-3 and outlet damper j
0-FCO-65216 are. initially in a; closed and open position respectively.
When train A fan starts, inlet damper. 0-FCO-65-3 opens automatically.
Both the; dampers are powered-from 480 VAC Diesel Auxiliary Board A.
n
- Damper 0-PCO-65-3 will fail closed whereas damper 0-FCO-65-16 shall fail to the open position. The functional characteristics of train B filter train inlet and outlet dampers 0-FCO-65-25 and -38 are the same as train A except that these dampers are powered from 480 VAC Diesel Auxiliary Board B.
5 Train C filter train inlet damper 0-FCO-65-51 is normally closed and
~
. opens when fan C starts. The damper is powered from 480 VAC SBGT Board.
,0r. loss of power the damper will fail closed.
1 6..
SBGTS ; fan A is nonna11y 'not running' and its fan suction damper 0-FCO-65-17 is normally open. The fan starts automatically when PCIS relay 16A-K23 ic~deenergized. On a loss of power to 480 VAC Diesel Auxiliary' Board A,'the fan will fail to run and the damper will fail in open' position. The functional characteristic of SBGTS fan B and damper
.0-FCO-65-39 is1 the same as for SBGTS fan A described above.
4
+
a
t
-TABLE 65 NOTES ~(C0!!TINUED) t 7-
.SBGTS-fan C'is normally not running andLfan discharge damper 0-FCO-65-67
- is normally open. The-fan starts automatically when auxiliary relay MCX is energized'from refueling zone inboard isolation relay-RI or'from.
refueling zone outboard isolation relay R0.
The fan discharge damper FCO-65-67 will remain open when fan'C starts operating. On a loss of power'to 480 VAC SBGT BD,.the fan will fail to run and the' fan discharge damper shall fall in the open position.
- 8:
tecay heat dampers 0-FCO-65-26,.-4 and -52 are normally closed when the-system is not operating. These dampers are closed when the system x
operates. The source of the power for actuation-and control is as shown for each damper.under their respective train columns in the dependency
. table. On a loss of power the decay heat dampers will fail in closed position.
o 9
The relative humidity control heaters for trains A, B and C are'in a deenergized position when'the system is not operating. The heaters start automatically when flow from the train fan to the common SBGTS' exhaust header is detected by their respective flow switch auxiliary relays. The o
power source for each heater is shown in the dependency table.. The flow switch auxiliary relays are powered from the same board as their l
respective fans and heaters. -On loss of power the heaters would fail to l"
operate.
l l'
't
?
1
'l
-l a -
. - - - ~ -.
w.
-. - ~ - -.
TABLE'67 EMERGENCY EOUIPMENT COOLING WATER (EECW) SYSTEM DEPENDENCIESI NORTH HEADER SOUTH HEADER!
' SUPPORT SYSTEM.'
DEPENDENCIES.
~ DEPENDENCIES NOTES-4 KV SD BD 3EA EECW PUMP.A3 2
"4 KV SD BD C, EECW PUMP B3 2.
'4 KV SD BD 3EB-EECW PUMP C3 2
.4 KV SD-BD D
~ EECW PUMP D3
- 2 4 KV SD BD A EECW PUMP Al 2
. 2-4 KV SD BD B
- EECW PUMP C1 2-4 KV SD BD 3ED EECW PUMP D1 2.
-250 VDC CONTROL POWER II EECW PUMP Al 2-
LOGIC & CONTROL 250 VDC CONTROL POWER 2I EECW PUMP C1-2
LOGIC & CONTROL
- 250 VDC CONTROL POWER 3I EECW PUMP A3 & C3 2
LOGIC & CONTROL 250 VDC CONTROL POWER III EECW PUMP B3 2
LOGIC & CONTROL 250 VDC CONTROL POWER 2II EECW PUMP D3-2' (4 KV SD BD D)
LOGIC & CONTROL 250"VDC CONTROL POWER 3II EECW PUMP'B1 & D1-2
LOGIC &. CONTROL ~
CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL C0f990N TO ALL PUMPS 3
-LEVEL l --DIV IB & IA CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL C0ffl0N TO ALL~ PUMPS-4 PRESSURE - DIV-IA CAS HIGH DRYWELL
- C0f990N TO ALL PUMPS-4
-PRESSURE - DIV IA w
a
+
4a 1M
.a
- L..~~
'7
~
~
~
~
eD; I
TABLE 67 NOTES ~
1-ReactorL Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pumps A3,. B3, C3,. and D3 (pumps Al, B1',,C1, and D1 alsot.8f valved in) serve the;EECW system and are referred to as EECW pumps. The EECW system supplies. cooling water to
~
safety =related systems including the Core Spray (CS) system,,the Residual-i Heat. Removal,(RHR) system,.the diesel generator engines, the shutdown
~!
board room emergency cooling, and serves as a backup to the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system heat exchangers.
The RHRSW System is divided into two headers, north and south. The EECW north header is designated as Division I, and the south header as Division II.
Two EECW pumps and one EECW header are aosquate to supply cooling' water to remove heat from the reactor during an accident, in accordance with the Browns Ferry Tech Spec 3.5.C.
The north and south sectionalizing valves (FCV-67-13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25, 26) are not modeled because-these valves are normally open, fall as-is valves, and multiple failures must. occur to lose cooling to the various components.
RHRSW pumps A1, B1, Cl, and D1 can back up the EECW pumps.
Pumps Al and B1 may be valved into the EECW headers manually, and pumps C1 M.d D1 may be valved in electrically.by handswitch. Pumps A3, B3,C3, and D3 (A1,:
B1, C1, and D1 will auto start if valved in) will auto start when one of
'the following conditions are mets A.
Common accident signal.
(Hi'drywell pressure, and low reactor pressure, or low reactor water level.)
B '.
Low Raw Cooling Water (RCW) header pressure as sense?. at the control-
)'
air compressors.
l C.
Low RCW header pressure as sensed at the RBCCW heat exchanger.
1 l
D.
Pumps B3 and.D3 (and Al and Cl, if valved in) will auto start when:
1.
Any Unit 1 or 2 core spray pumps start, or, j
2.
Any Unit 1 or 2 diesel generator. starts.
l E.
PumpsA3and-C3(andB1andDl,[if.valvedin)willautostartwhen:
i.
J 1.
Any Unit 3 core spray pump starts, or, p
'1-Any Unit 3 diesel generator starts.
1g Upon receiving an auto start signal, there is a 28 second time delay'if normal voltage is available, or-a.14 second time delay if the shutdown d
boards are'being fed from'the diesels.
i 2.
The EECW-pumps receive power from their assigned 4 KV Shutdown Board
.(motive) and 250 VDC Control Bus as shown in Tab'.e 67.
3
-Low reactor water level from Common Accident Sensor (CAS) Division IA
. LS-3-58A), and IB (LS-3-58B) automatically start the EECW pumps (CAS
(
E signals-are not modeled in this study),
f l
4 Low reactor pressure from CAS Division IA (PIS-3-74A) along with high drywell pressure from.CAS Division IA (PIS-64-58B) or Division IB (PIS-64-58D) will automatically ~ start the EECW pumps (CAS signals are not modeled in this study).
.. -.-~;.
. ~ g..- -.
TABLE.68A ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP CIRCUIT (ARPTCY SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES 1 TRAIN A'
. TRAIN'B-SUPPOR" SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES
'480 VAC RMOV PD'IB ARPT SYSTEM 2A BREAYER 2'
.1442 (PUMP 2A) AND 1542-
-(PUMP 2B)
ARPT CHANNEL 2A. TRIP' 3
RELAYS 2-RLY-68-118A3A-i
~
(PUMP 2A).AND=-ll8A3B (PUMP 28)-
- 480 VAC RMOV BD 2B' ARPT SYSTEM 2B BREAKER 2
1452 (PUMP 2A) AND 1552 (PUMP 28)
ARPT CHANNEL 2B TRIP
'3
' RELAYS 2-RLY-68-ll8B3A PUMP 2A AND -118B3B
. PUMP 2B POWER SUPPLIES ARPT LOCIC CHANNEL 2A (ECCS 4
'2-PX-71-60-1 AND.-1A' DIV I) ACTUATION RELAY 2-RLY-3-58C5 1
,h..
n..
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2:
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.2?" V N{ >~~ ; j_ l.*
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TABLE 68A ~(CONTIN 1IE!O SUPPORT TRAIN'A.
TRAIN B -
SYSTEM-
- DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY.
NOTES POWER SUPPLIES-
' ARPT REACTOR LOW LEVEL 2-
.: 5
.. 2-PX-71-60-1 and -1A LOGIC CHalGEEL 2A (ECCS (CONTINUED)
DIV I):. ANALOG TRIP UNIT' (ATU) 2-LS-3-58Al RELAY-3-58A3 ATU 2-ES-3-58B1, AND RELAY,71-3-58B3 "ARPT REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE-5
- LOGIC CHANNEL 2A (ECCS DIV I): PRESSURE TRANSMITTER i
- PT-3-204A ATU 2-PIS-3-204A, relay 63-3-504A ATU 2-PIS-3-2048,2-PT-3-204B, i
AND RELAY l
63-3-2048' l
1 POWFR SUPPLIES
.ARPT LOGIC CHANNEL'2B 4
2-PX-71-60-2 AND -2A (ECCS DIV II) ACTUATION RELAY 2-RLY-3-58C4 ARPT REACTOR LOW LEVEL 2 5
LOGIC CHANNEL 2B (ECCS
'DIV. II): ATU 2-LS-3-58C1, RELAY 71-3-38-C3, RELAY ATU 2-LS-3-58Dl, AND 71-3-58D3 4,
S
~
~
p.
T-
/
SUPPORT ~
TRAIU A-TRAIN B:
FOTES SYSTEM DEPENDENCY
' DEPENDENCY-
' POWER SUPPLIES ARPT REACTOR HIGH PRESSURE' 5 PX-71-60-2 AND -2A:
LOGIC CHANNEL 2A (ECCS
-(CONTINUED):
DIV II):
2-PT-3-204C,
-ATU 2-PIS-3-204C, RELAY 63-3-204C, 2-PT-3-204D, ATU 2-PIS-3-204D AND RELAY 63-3-264D CAS REACTOR LOW' ARPT REACTOR LOW LEVEL 2 6
. LEVEL 2 DIV. I(A)'
LOGIC CHANNEL 2A (ECCS DIV I): ATU 2-LS-3-58Al-AND RELAY 71-3-58A3 CAS REACTOR LOW'.
ARPT REACTOR LOW LEVEL 2-6 LEVEL 2 DIV I(B)
LOGIC CHANNEL 2A (ECCS-DIV I): ATU 2-LS-3-58B1 AND RELAY 71-3-58B3 CAS REACTOR LOW ARPT REACTOR LOW LEVEL'2 6
LEVEL 2 DIV II(A)
' LOGIC CHANNEL 2B-(ECCS z
DIV II): ATU 2-LS-3-58Cl-AND RELAY 71-3-58C3--
ARPT REACTOR LOW LEVEL 2 6
LEVEL 2 DIV.II(B)
LOGIC CHANNEL 2B (ECCS AND red):Y 71-3--58D3 DIV II ATU 2-LS-3-58Dl.
q
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L TABLE 68A NOTES h
1" The Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip Circuit (ARPTC) reduces reactor power and allows sufficient time for the operator' l
to initiate long. term shutdown measures in the event the RPS fails to -
' N
-f operate as designed.:.The ARPTC operates by tripping off both recirculation pumps thus' increasing the void fraction-in the core
_ volume. : This increase in the void fraction results. in a reduction of j
reactor power due to the negative moderator void coefficient of reactivity.
2~
.These boards provide normal AC power to the trip coil 52-2TC on each breaker via battery chargers. On loss of this normal supply, 250 VDC power is automatically provided from a battery (SB-C for 480 V RMOV BD 1B e
and SB-D.for 480 V RMOV BD 2B). _In addition, a manual backup supply from 480-V RMOV~BD 1A and 2A and their associated chargers and batteries is
-t available. Only the normal 480 VAC supplies are credited in this j
analysis. The trip coils must be energized to open their respective j
breakers and trip the pumps.
- 31 These boards provide normal AC power to the trip relays listed via battery chargers. On loss of this normal supply, 250 VDC power is automatically provided from a battery (SB-C for 480 V RMOV BD 1B and SB-D for 480 V RMOV board 2B).
In addition, a manual backup supply from 480V
- RNOV BD 1A and 2A and their associated chargers and batteries is.
available...Only the normal 480 VAC supplies are credited in this 1.
l analysis. The normally deenergized trip relays must be energized to trip 1the pumps.
4i
.These power supplies are powered from 250 VDC RMOV BDs 2A and 2B,(via l inverters) and supply power to the actuation relays listed.-.Each relay is, actuated by two simultaneous Reactor Low Level 2 signals or two H
simultaneous High Reactor Pressure signals. The normally deenergized relays must be energized to actuate the ARPT circuitry._ Both power
?
supplies serving an ARPT channel must fail to render that channel inoperable and are therefore shown as redundant on.the support-frontline
. dependency matrix. The power supplies are accounted for on the
- support-support matrix on-the 250 VDC RMOV su level.
5.
,These power. supplies are powered ~from 250 VDC RMOV BD'2A-and 2B-(via ninverters) and supply power to the ARPT logic which is divided?into-A & B channels, either of which can initiate a trip of both recirculation
. pumps.z Each channel is actuated by two simultaneous Reactor Low Level 2 signals or two-simultaneous Reactor High Pressure signals. This; logic must be energized to actuate the ARPT circuitry.- Both power supplies 7
serving an ARPT channel must fail to render that channel, inoperable and
~
are therefore shown as redundant on the support-frontline dependency
' matrix..The power supplies are accounted for on the support-support o '
matrix on the 250_VDC RMOV BD level.
- 6 Low Reactor Water Level 2 Common Actuation Sensor (CAS)' level-transmitters 2-LT-3-58A, ~58B, -58C, and -58D provide reactor low level signals to the ARPT logic channels listed via ATUs 2-LIS-3-58A, -58B,
~580, and -58D, respectively.
i p 11.
i
....~
.... ~. =..._. -
7,
[ TABLE 6SH
- RECIRCULATION DISCHARGE VALVE CLO3UR'E (RDVC) SYSTEM DEPENDENCIES 1~
TRAIN A.
-TRAIN B-
.- SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPE1' Sql DEPENDENCY NOTES 480 V RMOV BD 2D-
-FCV-68-79 2'
MOTIVE & CONTROL
- .. POWER
~
'480'V RMOV'BD 2E FCV-68-03 2
i MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER CAS DIV I-DIV I RDVC
' RX PRESSURE.
RX PRESSURE 3
= INPUT SIGNALS INSTRUMENT STRINGS CAS DIV II-DIV II RDVC 3
RX PRESSURE RX PRESSURE INPUT SIGNALS INSTRUMENT STRINGS PX-71-60-1,-1A DIV I RDVC-4 RX PRESSURE INSTRUMENT STRINGS
' PX-71-60-2,-2A DIV-II RDVC 4
RX PRESSURE INSTRUMENT STRINGS
- 250 V RMOV BD 2A' RDVC TRAIN 3.'
5 LOGIC CIRCUITRY 350 V RMOV BD 2B RDVC TRAIN A' 5
LOGIC CIRCUITRY i
D
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1 IABLE 68B NOTRE 0?
15 The Recirculation' Discharge Valve Closure (RDVC) System:is a-system designation (for PRA modeling purposes) for the function' of the Reactor Recirculation System (system 68) where the recirculation pump discharge valves (FCV-68-3,-79) are automaticallyLclosed upon receiptsof a LPCI initiation signal and coincident reactor pressure permissive signal (230-1 psig). This function provides' the proper flovpath of cooling water to the reactor core through the recirculation pump discharge legs and into
. the. jet pumps, which provides effective core' cooling.
'An additional function of system 68 is the'ATWS Recirculation System Pump
[
' Trip Circuit (ARPTC).
Both the RDVC and ARPTC functions of system 68 are modeled as separate systems. For purposes of-the dependency matrix effort, the ARPTC function will be referred to as ' system 68A while the
. RDVC System is referred to as system 688.
t 2
The1480 V RMOV BD's 2D & 2E are the sources for the motive and control
'E
- power associated-with FCV-68-79 (Train B) and FCV-68-03 (Train A),
respectively. These valves are the recirculation pump discharge valves that are required to automatically close during LPCI initiation.
3 Reactor pressure signals-are provided to the RDVC reactor presso;e instrument strings (see note 4) by the Division I & II Common Actuation o- ""
Sensors (CAS) System reactor pressure instrument strings (see note 1 of s
Table 98 for a description of.the the CAS System). There are two reactor-pressure instrument strings associated with each division of CAS. Those portions of the CAS reactor pressure instrument strings providing situals
~ !
to the~RDVC consist of a pressure transmitter and. pressure indicating switch'[ Master Analog Trip Unit (ATU)]. arranged in' series. The Division I CAS instruments are PT-3-74A& PIS-3-74A and PT-68-95 & PIS-68-95.
The Division II instruments are PT-3-74B & PIS-3-74B and PT-68-96 &
PIS-68-96. The pressure indicating switch associated with each CAS it reactor pressure instrument string provides a signal to the-Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal Systems.
In addition, they provide a pressure signal to the RDVC reactor pressure instrument strings.
Note that each CAS instrument string dependency.has been designated as
. conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since both strings associated
- with a single CAS. division must be failed for loss of a. single-instrument:
string of the other CAS division to fail the.RDVC function.
i l-
TABLE 68B NOTES (CONTINUED)
~
b4I
_The-Division I & II RDVC: reactor pressure instrument strings are those
. portions of_the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) ATU instrument strings (see Reference 2-45E670-series) that are only specific to
-providing a 230 psig reactor pressure permissive _ signal to the RDVC System-logic circuitry (see note 5).
There are two RDVC reactor' pressure
- instrument strings associated with each division of the ECCS ATU's.
Each Qc
_RDVC; instrument. string consists of a pressure switch (slave ATU to the 4
y master ATU of the associated CAS reactor pressure instrument string - see note 3):and actuation relay arranged in series. The Division I RDVC
.[
reactor pressure instruments are slave ATU PS-3-74A & actuation relay l
0:
63-3-74A2 and slave ATU PS-68-95 & actuation relay 63-68-952.
The
" Division II instruments are slave ATU PS-3-74B & actuation relay 68-3-74B2 and. slave ATU PS-68-96 & actuation relay 63-68-962.
Each RDVC reactor pressure instrument string provides its signal to each division
-(or train)'of RDVC logic circuitry by contact closure in the associated j'
logic panels resulting from excitation of the associated RDVC reactor pressure instrument string actuation relays.
j L e a
The subject power supplies for the RDVC reactor pressure instrument
-)
L 1
L strings are the same as the power supplies for the CAS instrument strings-since-the instruments associated with both instrument strings are
-f considered to be subsets of the ECCS ATU instrument strings. These power supplies are fed from 250 VDC RMOV BD 2B (Division I' power supplies y'
PX-71-60-1,-1A) and 250 VDC RMOV BD 2A (Division II power supplies 3
j, PX-71-60-2,-2A) through an associated DIV I and DIV II ECCS ATU inverter,-
respectively. Power is required by the RDVC reactor pressure instrument U
strings in performing'the.RDVC function since the associated actuation relays energize.to actuate. However, this dependency is conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since loss of one division power supply will y
fail the RDVC function only if the other division power supply has ll failed.
i 5
- There is logic circuitry located in the RHR logic' panels-9-32 & 9-33 that LF is solely dedicated to the actuation of RDVC. This circuitry consists of
(
B the receptor' contacts and relays (10A-K90A, -91A in panel 9-32 and
?!I r
10A-K90B, -K91B'in panel'9-33) for the-230 psig reactor pressure peemissive signal from the RDVC reactor pressure instrument strings (see
' notes 3.and 4) and.the associated relay logic array for processing this cignal and-the LPCI initiation signal. Upon receipt of the appropriate
. combination of these signals, a RDVC actuation signal is transmitted to
~
the control' circuitry associated with the system recirculation. pump i
discharge valves (FCV-68-3,-79) for automatic closure. Since the logic
- (
circuitry in the RHR logic pancis that provides the RDVC' actuation signal is specific only to the RDVC. function, the associated logic circuitry
- components are considered to be within the RDVC System boundary. The power supply for these. logic components are the same as for the RHR logic panels..This power supply is required by the RDVC logic circuitry in I
performing-the RDVC function _since all associated relays are energized to i
_ actuate. However, this dependency is conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since=1oss of one. train of power will fail the RDVC function only if the other train has failed (i.e., the system can actuate on one division of logic).
i i
i
I i*
,-,L 1h
. TABLE 70~
j
.T,.
REACTOR BUILDING CLOSED C00LINC WATER (RBCCW)' SYSTEM DEPENDENCIE11 i>
w.
- ]i I
+
I J
g fjj
'AUPPORT SYSTEM' DEPENDENCY NOTES a
~
.2 480 V SD BD 2A RBCCW PUMP 2A t-
<>2 i250 VDC CONTROL
.RBCCW PUMP 2A
- l.h '
BUS ON 480 V iSD BD 2A' N
- (250 VDC DIV 21)
I e,
480LV=SD BD 2B RBCCW PUMP 2B 2
gk >
is 350 VDC CONTROL RBCCW PUMP-2B 2
' BUS'ON 480 V.
p-SD BD 2B
-i (250 VDC DIV 211)
-v
'480 V-SD BD 1B.
j' 250 VDC CONTROL'
'RBCCW PUMP 10 2
~
BUS ON 480 V t
- SD BD IB (250 VDC DIV III) 4 480=V.RMOV BD 2B 2-FCV-70-48 3
RCW RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGERS-4 EECW.
RBCCW HEAT EXCHANGERS 4
, 120 V PFD'AC U1 1-FCV-67-50, 4 i
120 V PFD AC U2 2-FCV-67-50, -51 4'
480 V'RMOV BD 2C 1-FCV-70-67 5
-480 V RMOV BD 2C-1-FCV-70-68 5
2 m
k@
l(
TABLE 70 NOTES T
- , 1 For' system description, see Brown Ferry TSAR section 10.6.4.
This is a.
safety related' system containing. essential and non-essential sections asi
' stated in the'FSAR. The boundary conditioned for RBCCW model assume;that
- unit" 2 is operating.in mode 1 at 100% power, whereas units 1 and 3 are in cold shutdown condition..
- 1
. Pumps 2A and 2B are normally in operation whereas 10 is-inLa standby position. Pump 2A is powered'from 480 V SD BD 2A with control and.
actuation. power supplied by 250 VDC 2I. Pumps 2B and 1C are powered from 480 V SD BD 2B and IB with' control and actuation power supply by 250 VDC 21I and 250 VDC III'respectively.
On a loss of power to the 480 V SD BDs, the pumps would fail to run.
On a loss of DC control power, the control and actuation power to the pumps would be lost.
4 3
During the normal plant operation, 2-TCV-70-48 valve is in an open position. The valve is controlled, actuated and powered from 480 V RMOV.
BD 28.
On loss of normal AC= power, this valve closes automatically shutting off the cooling water to the nonessential equipment and redirecting the entire supply to go to the essential equipment.
4 RBCCW heat: exchangers are co: led by Raw Cooling Water (RCW) during normal operation.. Spare heat exchanger IC can also be utilized for service of.
Unit 2 RB CCW system loads by opening manual valves 0-70-623 and' 0-70-633.- On a loss of RCW, the RBCCW heat exchangers 2A and 2B are cooled by Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) system by automatic opening o f 2-FCV-67-50 and -51.
Similarly if spare heat exchanger 1C happened to be in service when RCW is lost, the EECW will. cool heat exchanger 10 by automatic opening of 1-FCV-67-50, snd -51, 5
FCV-70-67 and FCV-70-68'must be aligned to have the. spare RBCCW pump (10)-
l available.
l~
0544k.
i 1-I-
1
h E
s
- TABLE 71
['
. REACTOR COPL ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCICS) DEPENDENCIES 1 3
+
.w "b3]EPORT SYSTEM NON-TRAINED DEPENDENCY.
NOTES 480 VAC RMOV BD 2BL STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-71-2 2-t.
L350 VDC RMOV BD 2C CST SUCTION HEADER VALVE 2-PCV-71-19
'3' n
3 PUMP ASSEMBLi 4:
- [
l GLAND SEAL VACUUM PUMP
-5 l
CLAND SElu VACUUM TANK CONDENSATE PUMP S
j t
STEAM ' UPPLY VALVE 2-FCV-71-8 6
a PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE 2-FCV-71-37 7
l INJECTION VALVE 2-FCV-71-39 8
I
TEST LINE VALVE 2-FCV-71-38 9
.o SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION VALVE 10 h,
2-FCV-71 j L
SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION VALVE 10 2-FCV-71-18 Il i
3 l.,
[250 VOC RMOV-BD 2A' REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 11 l
L ACTUATION RELAYS 10A-K79B AND 10A-K80B 1 v.s 350 VDC-RMOV BD 2B PUMP ASSEMBLY 12 4
- \\
l STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-71 13 9
lh t
TEST LINE VALVE 2-FCV-73-36 9
-r
.MINIFLOW' BYPASS'LINE VALVE 2-FCV-71-34' 14
-i '-
f-REACTOR' VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 11 t
4 1
4 ACTUATION RELAYS 10A-K79A-AND 10A-K80A t
.. p 1
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i TABLE-71 (CONTINUED):
1 i
f SUPPORT SYSTEM' NON-TRAINED DEPENDENCYi NOTES
- i 250 VDC RMOV BD 2B GLAND SEAL VACUUM TANK CONDENSATE PUMP
' 15
- I 4
(CONTINUED).
ACTUATION RELAY 13A-K22 H
.1
- REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 COMMON 16.
j ACTUATION RELAY 13A-K2-i a
- REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 COMMON 17 7 -
ACTUATION RELAY 13A-K3
.J REACTOR VESSEL HIGH WATER LEVEL'8 18 TURBINE TRIP RELAY 13A-K5 120 VAC UNIT 2 PREFERRED l RCICS TURDINE FLOW CONTROL.
19 f
POWER
'CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL-RCICS ACTUATION
.20 WATER LEVEL 2-DIV I(A)
CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL RCICS ACTUATION 20
' VATER LEVEL 2 DIV I(B)
CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL RCICS~ ACTUATION 20 VATER LEVEL 12.DIV II(A)'
CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL RCICS ACTUATION 20 WATER LEVEL 2 DIV II(B) l POWER SUPPLIES RCICS-HIGH REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL 8 DIV. I 21' 8-PX-71-60-1,-1A LOGIC STRINGS: LEVEL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-208A', ANALOG TRIP. UNIT (ATU)
.2-LIS-3-208A, RELAY 71-3-208A, 2-LT-3-20BC, ATU 2-LIS-3-208C, RELAY 71-3-208C '
l CST NO. 3'(UNIT'2)
RCICS PUMP-22 flEADER.
SUPPRESSION POOL RCICS PUMP
' 23l i
v
+
-l IABLE'71 NOTES
)
1" The-Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCICS) provides a source of..
i
.high-pressure makeup water to.the reactor vessel after transients which result in a loss of reactor.feedwater or after loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) that do not result in rapid vessel depressurization. Automatic-
-cyclical operation of the-RCICS between initiation on Low Reactor Water Level 2 and closure of.the RCICS turbine steam supply valve on High.
Reactor Level 8 for those initiating events where.the.RCICS injection'
. rate exceeds-the inventory loss rate are included.. Manual actions to throttle the RCICs flow to prevent the Level 8 turbine trip are not i
explicitly modeled in the system Level analysis.
The adequacy of the Condensate Stora63 Tank (CST) as a source of RCICS-injection to the vessel ir dependent on the initiating event and operator actions taken. This analysis assumes that the CST inventory is not
's adequate for all initiating events. Therefore, manual switchover to suppression pool suction is included in this study.
The Reactor Building Ventilation System provides forced ventilation to-the RCICS pump' room. This ventilation source is isolated on low reactor water level 3 or high drywell pressure. However, forced ventilation of-the RCICS is not considered as necessary in the analysis because the pump room opens directly to a stairvell leading to the upper floors-of the Reactor Building. No credit is taken for the manual alignment of the auxiliary steam supply line as a backup steam source to the RCICS turbine..
2' This. board provides motive and control power to RCICS steam line inboard
- isolation valve 2-FCV-71-2.
This motor-operated valve is normally open and.must. remain open to. supply motive steam to drive the RCICS pump turbine.
'3 This' board provides motive and control power for the motor-operated valve listed. The valve is normally open and must remain open for RCICS suction from CST No. 3 and is modeled as closing on switchover to suppression pool suction. -The valve-fails as-is of loss of'its power supply.
A This board provides motive and control power to the turbine! trip and-throttle (T&T) valve 2-FCV-71-9 and turbine lube oil cooling water valve FCV-71-25.
The normally open' motor-operated T & T valve must-remain open to' provide motive steam to drive the.RCICS turbine. The normally-
' closed' motor-operated oil cooling water valve must open to provide-cooling: vater toithe lube oil cooler.
'5 This b'oard'provides motive and control power to the gland seal vacuum >
pump and the. gland seal vacuum tank condensate pump. This power is i
required to initiate-operation of these pumps from their normal standby
-condition.
6 This' board provides motive and control power to-the steam supply. valve listed.This normally closed motor-operated valve cycles open on Reactor Low Level 2 and closed on Reactor High Level 8 if-the RCICS flow rate exceeds the vessel loss rate and the operator does not throttle the flow.
i IABLE 71 NOTES (CONTINUED) 7-lTh'is board provides motive and control. power to the pump' discharge-valve
' listed.. This motor-operated. valve is normally open-and must remain open to provide RCICS makeup flow-to the vessel and falls as-is on loss of its
. power supply.
i 84
- This board provides motive and control power to the injection valve-
' listed.- This motor-operated-valve is normally closed and must oper. to provide RCICS makeup flow to the vessel. The valve fails as-is on loss of.its power supply.
9' These boards provide motive and control power to the test line valves listed. These motor-operated valves are normally closed and are modeled as required to remain closed to prevent excessive RCICS makeup flow
-diversion. The valves fail as-is on loss of their power supply.
102 This board provides motive and control power to the suppression pool suction valves listed. These motor-operated valves are normally closed and must be manually opened to provide suppression pool suction to the RCICS pump.
11 These boards support the normally deenergized relays listed. These
. relays are energized on Low Reactor Vessel Water Level 2 to initiate RCICS operation. Relay 10A-K79A or 10A-K79B And relay 10A-KBOA or 110A-K80B ("one-out-of-two-taken-twice") must be actuated to initiate RCICS operation.
12L This board-provides power to turbine speed controller (EGR hydraulic
.i actuator) 2-SC-71-10 and the'EGM control box.
13' This board provides motive and control power to RCICS steam line outboard isolation valve 2-FCV-71-3. 'This motor-operated valve is normally open and must remain open to supply motive steam to drive the RCICS pump turbine.
14 ThiaLb'oard provides motive and control power to the miniflow bypass line
' valve listed. This motor-operated valve is normally closed and opens on RCICS startup. This valve is modeled as required to reclose on high pump discharge flow following RCICS pump start.
~
15' iThis board supports the normally deenergized relay listed. This relay is energized on~ gland seal vacuum tank high' level to start the gland cent vacuum tank condensate pump.
16 This board-supports the normally deenergized relay listed. This relay is energized on Low Reactor Vessel Water Level 2 to open steam supply valve 2-FCV-71-8 and injection valve 2-FCV-71-39, 17 This board supports the normally deenergized relay. listed. This relay is
. energized on-Lov. Reactor: Vessel Water Level 2 to start the gland seal vacuum pump.
.18. lThis board supports the norma 11y deenergized relay listed. This relay is energized on liigh Reactor Vessel Water Level 8 to close RCICS turbine steam supply valve 2-FCV-71-8.
TABLE 71 NOTES'(CONTINUED) 139-. This bus supplies power to RCIC turbine flow controller 2-FIC-71-36A and square root converter 2-FM-71-36.. On loss of this power supply to the flow control circuitry, the governor control' circuit will process the power loss as a 1112 milliamp. input and turbine speed will-decrease to a minimum failing the RCICS. The power ic'ss would affect the flow-y' controller in manual or automatic mode of operation.
i20= Low reactor vessel water level 2 common actuation sensors (CAS) divisions I(A) (2-LIS-3-58A), I(B) (2-LIS-3-58B), II(A) (2-LIS-3-580), and II(B)
(2-LIS-3-58D) automatically start the RCICS (i.e., open steam supply valve 2-FCV-71-8, start the RCIC gland seal vacuum, etc.) when the vessel-water. level falls below 470" above vessel zero. At least one division I logic string and one division II logic string must be actuated to initiate ^a RCICS start ("one-out-of-two-taken-twice").
-21 These power' supplies are powered from 250 VDC RMOV Board'2B-(via.sn inverter) and supply power to the ECCS DIV I logic strings listed. This logic provides the signal to close RCICS turbine steam supply valve.
2-FCV-71-0 on High Reactor Vessel Water Level 8 via relay 13A-K5.- Both strings must.be actuated to close the steam supply valve. The logic strings are failed on loss of their power supply. Both power supplies A: -
serving the logic strings must fail to render the-strings inoperable and are shown as redundant on the support-frontline dependency matrix. The power supplies are accounted for on the support-support matrix on the 250 VDC RMOV Board level.
22: JThe RCICS pump is normally aligned to take suction from Condensate Storage Tank (CST) No. 3 (Unit 2).
It is assumed for this analysis that the 375,000 gallon CST supply is not sufficient for all of the RCICS initiating events analyzed (see note 1).
L 33 The suppression pool serves as the secondary source of RCIC suction and as the condensing medium for the RCICS turbine exhaust. l$1nce.it is assumed that the CST supply is not sufficient for all the RCICS
. initiating events analyzed (see note 1), manual alignment of the RCICS 39-e pump:to take suction from the suppression pool is included.
T it 4
t 1) if f s
[
t e
s 9
j a
TABLE 73.
j HICil PRESSURE COOLANT' INJECTION SYSTEM =(IIPCISY DEPENDENCIES 1 I
~
SUPPORT SISTEM NON-TRAINED DEPENDENCY NOTES 250-VDC RMOV BD 2A CST SUCTION HEADER VALVE 2-FCV-73-40' 2
SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION HEADER VALVE 3
2-FCV-73-26 SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION HEADER VALVE 3
2-FCV-73-27 TURBINE-DRIVEN PUMP ASSEMBLY 4
GLAND SEAL CONDENSER EXHAUSTER 5
- GLAND SEAL CONDENSER-CONDENSATE PUMP 5
STEAM ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-73-3 6
STEAM SUPPLY VALVE 2-FCV-73-16 7
PUMP DISCHARGE VALVE 2-FCV-73-34 8
- {
-INJECTION VALVE 2-FCV-73-44 9
TEST LINE VALVE 2-FCV-73-35 10 AUXILIARY OIL PUMP ACTUATION RELAY 11
. 23A-K24X AUXILIARY OIL PUMP AND GLAND SEAL 12 CONDENSER'EXHAUSTER ACTUATION RELAY
. 23A-K24 HPCIS INITIATION SEAL-IN RELAY;23A-K23 13
~ REACTOR' VESSEL WATER LEVEL 2 COMMON 14 ACTUATION RELAY 23A-K1'
]
REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL 2 COMMON
-15 ACTUATION RELAY'23A-K2 HICII DRYWELL PRESSURE COMMON ACTUATION 16 RELAY 23A-K3 i
4
&f
TABLE =73 (CONTINUED)
+
-i
- $UPPORT SYSTEM.
NON-TRAINED' DEPENDENCY!
NOTES i
250 VDC RMOV BD 2AL
.IIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE COMMON ACTUATION 17
/;
- (CONTINUED) iRELAY-23A-K4 e
~ REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 18 I
ff ACTUATION RELAYS 23A-K5 AND 23A-K7 fl GLAND SEAL CONDENSER CONDENSATE PUMP
-19 ACTUATION RELAYS 23A-K19 AND 23A-K45 SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION VALVE 20 ACTUATION RELAY 23A-K25 f
SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION VALVE 21 ACTUATION RELAYS 23A-K51 AND 23A-K15.
CST SUCTION HEADER VALVE 2-FCV-73-40 22 ACTUATION RELAYS 23A-K21 AND 23A-K22
+
REACTOR VESSEL HIGH WATER LEVEL 8 TURBINE 23 TRIP' RELAYS 23A-K42 AND 23A-K14 e
L 2501 DC RMOV BD 2B TEST LINE VALVE 2-FCV-73-36 10 a
REACTOR. VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL 2 18 ACTUATION RELAYS 23A-K40 AND 23A-K41
]
~480V AC RMOV BD 2A STEAM IS01ATION VALVE 2-FCV-73-2 24
HPCIS ACTUATION 25 LEVEL 2 DIV I(A)
L,
.CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL HPCIS ACTUATION 25 LEVEL 2 nIV I(B) i CAS LOW REACTOR VESSEL HPCIS~ ACTUATION-25 1
'LLEVEL.2-DIV II(A) y qga CAS' LOW: REACTOR. VESSEL llPCIS ACTUATION 25 LEVEL 2-DIV II(B) 1
- CAS IIIGli DRYWELL IIPCIS' ACTUATION 26
-PRESSURE DIV'I(A) i b
m?
s' g-iI)$
[i
- ' 3 ?
{
h:
TABLE 73 (CONTINUED)-
i i_
4 -- % -
8 p
' SUPPORT SYSTEM NON-TRAINED DEPENDENCY-NOTES b
lCAS.HIGH DRYWELL HPCIS ACTUATION 26 t
< PRESSURE DIV I(B) j CAS.HIGH DRYWELL.
HPCIS ACTUATION 26.
U JPRESSURE DIVlII(A).
l a
4
- CAS'HIGH DRYWELL HPCIS ACTUATION 26 1
~. PRESSURE DIV II(B) i
[-
POWER-SUPPLIES HPCIS HIGH REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL 8 27 2-PX-71-60-2,'-2A DIV II' LOGIC STRINGS l'
-CST-NO..3-(UNIT 2)
HPCIS PUMP
-28 HEADER =
SUPPRESSION POOL HPCIS FUMP 29
?
I 4
1 1
a; i
- t-7 i
i
ID LE 73 NOTES-
)
11l IThe High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCIS) provides a source of high pressure makeup water to-the reactor vessel after transients which i
result in a loss of reactor feedwater or after loss of coolant accidents j
(LOCAs).that do not. result in rapid vessel depressurization.. Automatic cyclical operation of the HPCIS between initiation on Low Reactor Water Level 2 and closure of the turbine stop valve on High Reactor Water Level 8 for.those initiating events where the HPCIS. injection rate exceeds the j
inventory loss rate is included. Manual actions to throttle-the HPCIS-flow to prevent the Level 8 turbine trip-are not explicitly modeled in the system' analysis.
The adequacy of the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) as a source for HPCIS injection to the vessel is dependent on the initiating event and operator actions taken. -This analysis assumes'that the CST inventory is not l
adequate for all initiating events. Therefore, automatic switchover to
. suppression pool suction on low CST header-pressure is included in this 3
study. The* is also a HPCIS suction switchover to the suppression pool on high po. level which is included in this analysis.
Operation cf minimum - flow bypass line valve 2-FCV-73-30 is not included in this analysis. This valve is required to open only if the vessel injection path is blocked in which case the HPCIS is considered failed due to'the. injection line blockage. Therefore, failure of 2-FCV-73-30 to open is assumed to have a negligible impact on HPCIS vessel injection availability.
It is 'further assumed that failure of the minimum flow bypass line valve to close will.not divert-enough vessel injection flow
.to cause HPCIS failure due to the presence of a 1.25 inch flow reducing orifice in the' bypass line.
Steamline drain valves 2-FCV-73-6A and -6B are not included in this analysis.
It is assumed that failure of these valves to close on HPCIS l
.startup does not fail the system because. steam diversion through the l
one-inch steam drain line is insignificant in comparisen to the steam i
flow through the 10-inch turbine steam line.
The Reactor Building-Ventilation System provides forced ventilation to the HPCIS pump room.' This ventilation source is isolated on Low Reactor l
Water Level 3 or High-Drywell, Pressure. However, forced. ventilation of
~*
the HPCIS'is not considered as necessary in this analysis because the
[
pump room communicates directly with an open stairvell leading to the l-upper floors of the, Reactor Building.
The main steam system is not-listed as.a support for the HPCIS turbine because it is a frontline system. No credit is taken for the manual alignment-of the auxiliary steam supply line from the auxiliary boiler system as a backup steam source to the HPCIS turbine, 2
This board provides motive and control power for the motor-operated valve l
listed. The valvo'is normally open and must remain open for HPCIS "iction.from CST No. 3.
The valve is modeled as closing on switchover to enression pool suction.
j;
, board provides motive and control power for the motor-opeL 1
ives listed. These valves are normally closed and must open itchover to suppression pool suction.
I
- - ~
j IABLE
.3 NOTES (CONTINUIR1 i
4-
'3 This board provides motive and control power to the turbine auxiliary
- oll= pump and power to the turbine controls:(e.g., flow controller 2-FIC-73-33)_via power supply 2-PX-73-33.
The HPCIS turbine-driven pump assembly consists of the main pump, booster pump, turbine, turbine stop valve, turbine governor valve, turbine controls, turbine auxiliary oil pump, turbine. lube oil cooling, and turbine rgture discs.
- 5-
_This board provides motive and control power to the gland seal condenser exhauster and the gland seal condenser condensate pump. The gland seal condenser is not required for the vessel injection mode of HPCIS.
6 This board provides motive and control power to HPCIS steam line outboard isolation valve 2-FCV-73-3.
This motor-operated valve is normally open
.r and_must remain open to. supply motive steam to drive the HPCIS pump j
turbine.
7 iThis board provides motive and control power to the steam supply valve listed. This motor-operated valve is normally closed and must open to provide motive steam to drive the HPCIS pump turbine.
'8 This board provides motive and control power to the pump discharge valve listed..This motor-operated valve is normally open and must remain open to provide HPCIS makeup flow to the vessel.
l 9L This board provides motive and control power to the injection valve listed..,This motor-operated valve is r.ormally closed and must open to-i provide HPCIS makeup flow to the vessel.
10 These boards provide motive and control power to the test line valves
-listed. These motor-operated valves are normally closed and modeled as required to remain closed to prevent excessive HPCIS makeup flow
~ diversion.
Il This normally deenergized relay is energized to automatically start the
.p $
HPCIS auxiliary oil pump on a HPCIS startup on Low Reactor Vessel Water
]
Level 2 or High Drywell Pressure.
?
12~
This normally deenergized relay is energized to automatically start the auxiliary oil pump (by energizing relay 23-K24X) and the gland seal condenser exhauster on a HPCIS stattup on Low Reactor Vessel Water Level.
p, 2 or High Drywell Pressure. The gland seal is not required for the vessel injection mode of HPCIS.
5
\\%
13:
This normally deenergized relay is energized to seal in the HPCIS initiation signal (i.e., maintain relay 23A-K24 energized) thereby y
Lmaintaining-the auxiliary oil pump and gland seal condenser exhauster running even if the initiation signal drops out.
The gland seal is not 1
@Jr required for the vessel injection mode of HPCIS.
Jom y
'14 This normally deenergized relay is energized on Low Reactor Vessel Water 4
Level 2 to open steam supply valve 2-FCV-73-16 and injection valve f-2-FCV-73-44.
i t
i.4
>W,
i TABLE 73 NOTES (CONTINUED)
'15-This normally deenergized relay is energized on Low Reactor Vessel Uater Level'2.to pilot actuate the auxiliary oil pump (via relay 23A-K24X) and the gland seal coadenser exhauster (via relay 23A-K24). This: Telay also clears the High Reactor Water Level 8 seal-in (if present). The gland seal is-not required for the vessel injection mode of HPCIS.
16' This norma,1y deenergized relay is energized on High Drywell Pressure to' open steam supply valve 2-FCV-73-16 and injection valve 2-FCV-73-44.
17-This normal 2y deenergized relay is energized on'lligh Drywell Pressure to
-f pilot' actuate the auxiliary oil pump (via relay 23A-K24X) and the gland seal condenser exhauster (via relay 23A-K24).
The gland seal =is not required for the vessel injection mode of HPCIS.
18:.These normally deenergized relays are energized on Low Reactor Vessel 7
Water Level 2 to initiate HPCIS operation. Relay 23A-K5 or 23A-P,40 and relay-23A-K7 or 23A-K41 ("one-out-of-two-taken-twice")' must be actuated to initiate HPCIS operation.
19 These normally deenergized relays are energized on gland seal condenser hotwell high level to start the gland seal condenser condensate pump.
The gland seal is not required for the vessel-injection mode of HPCIL.
20:
This normally deenergized. relay is energized'on condensate header low level to' initiate HPCIS suction from the suppression pool by opening L
suppression pool suction valves 2-FCV-73-26 and -27.-
1-L 131 Normally deenergized relay 23A-K51 is energized on a Suppression Pool.
.High. Level' signal via level switch 2-LS-73-57A or 2-LS-73-57B.
Relay 23A-K51 then energizes normally deenergized relay 23A-K15 which opens suppression pool suction valves 2-FCV-73-26 and -27.
.22
- Each of these normally deenergized relays is energized via limit switch I
l when their associated suppression pool suction valve (2-FCV-73-26 and
~-27)fis fully open to close condensate header suction valve 2-FCV-73-40 on HPCIS swapover to suppression pool suction.
-23 Normally deenergized relay 23A-K42 is' energized upon receipt of a High R
Reactor Water Level 8 signal from relays 71-3-208B and 71-3-208D.
Relay 23A-K42 then energizes normally deenergized relay 23A-K14 which trips the
-turbine'by, closing stop valve 2-FCV-73-18.
24.
This board provides motive and control power to HPCIS steam line inboard isolation valve.2-FCV-73-2./This motor-operated valve is normally open Land must remain open to supply motive. steam to drive the HPCIS pump turbine.
-25 Low Reactor Vessel Water Level 2 Common Actuation Sensors (CAS) divisions
-I(A),(2-LIS-3-58A), I(B) (2-LIS-3-58B), II(A) (2-LIS-3-58C), and II(B)
(2-LIS-3-58D) automatically start the HPCIS (i.e., start the auxiliary oil pump, open steam supply valve 2-PCV-73-16, etc.) when the vessel-water level falls below 470 inches above vessel zero. At least one Division I logic string and one Division II logic string must be actuated
-to initiate a llPCIS start ("one-out-of-two-taken-twice").
L;.
~
IAER JJ1 NOTES (CQNTINUELQ.
1 --
26 High Drywell Pressure CAS divisions I(A)(2-PIS-64-58B), 1(B)
(2-PIS-64-58D), 11(A)-(2-PIS-64-58A), and 11(B) (2-PIS-64-58C) automatically start the HPCIS on High Drywell Pressure. At least one
. Division I logic string And and one Division II logic string must be
' actuated to initiate a HPCIS start ("one-out-of-so-taken-twice").
- 27 These power supplies are powered from 250 VDC RMOV TD 2A (via an inverter)
~
and supply power to the two ECCS DIV 11 logic channels (analog trip units 2-LIS-3-20$B and -2080) providing the signal to close the HPCIS turbine stop valve on High Reactor Vessel Water Level 8.
Both strings must he actuated to close the stop valve. The logic strings are failed on loss of their power supply. Both power supplies servirig the logic strings must fal1 to render the strings inoperable and are shown as redundant on the j
support-frontline dependency matrix. The power supplies are accounted for 7
on the support-support matrix on ths 250 VDC RMOV Board level.
e 7
28 The HPCIS pump is normally aligned to take auction from condensate storage tank (CST) no. 3 (unit 2).
It is assumed that the 375,000 gallon CST 1
supply is not sufficient for all of the HPCIS initiating events analyzed (see note 1). The manual crosaties to the other units' CSTs are not modeled.
t
=
29 The suppression pool serves as the secondary source o.f IIPCIS suction and I
as the condensing medium for the HPCIS turbine exhaust. Since it is assumed that the CST supply in not sufficient for all of the HPCIS initiating events analyzed (see nott 1), automatic realigtunent of the
!!PCIS pump to t'4.ke suction from the suppreasion pool is included.
Switchover to suppression pool suction on high suppression pool level is also included.
1 3
s
.TAELE 7/-
I RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM DEPENDEroCIES
~
LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (LPCI) MOP.p TRAIN B TRAIN A DEPENDENCY NOTES IIIPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY 3
4 KV SD BD A MOTIVE & CONTROL (250 VDC BUS II)
POWER TO PU!MP 2A 3
MOTIVE & CONTROL (250 VDC BUS 21)
POWER TO PUMP 2C MOTIVE & CONTROL 3
4 KV SD BD C POWER TO PUMP 2B (250 VDC BUS III)
MOTIVE & CONTROL 3
4 KV SD BD D POWER TO PUMP 2D (250 VDC BUS 2II) 4,5 480 V RMOV BD 2A PUMP CLE 2A & 2C FAN
- F W-74-Ol
- FCV-74-12 FCV-74-52 PtMP CLR 2B & 2D FAN 4,5 480 V RMOV BD 2B
- FCV-74-24 87CV-74-35 FCV-74-66 5
480 V RMOV BD 2D FCV-74-07 FCV-74-53 FCV-74-30 5
480 V RMOV BD 2E FCV-74-67 RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-33 6
250 V RMOV BD 2A 6
250 V RMOV BD 2B RER LOGIC PANEL 9-32 FSV-2 6138 21,25,26 120 V I&C BUS 2A FT-74-50 FSV-24-135 FT-74-64 21 120 V I&C BUS 2B
~
- DENOTES THAT THIS ' INTERFACE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE' SUBJECT RHR Pv'NCTION (SEE CORRESPONDING NOTE);
O e
e.,
a.
I lI I
IIup a
TA BL L 7 1 LC0!UJfqtEnl TRAIN A TRAIN B
$UPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 7
CAS DIV I RX LOW RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-32 LEVEL 1 INPUT SIGNALS RER LOGIC PANEL 9-33 7
CAS DIV II RX LOW LEVEL 1 INPUT SIGNALS 8
CAS DIV I RX LOW RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-32 PRESSURE INPUT SIGNALS RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-33 8
CAS D1V II RX LOW PRESSURE INPUT SIGNALS 9
CAS DIV I DRYWELL RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-32 HICH PRESSURE INr1T SIGNALS RER LOGIC PANEL 9-33 9
CAS DIV II DRYWELL HICH PRESSURE INPUT SIGNALS EECW RHR PUMP SEAL HI RHR PUMP SEAL HX 10
' NORTH & SOUTH HEADERS RHR PUMP CLRS RER PUMP CLES RCW EECW BACKUP EECW BACEUP 25 SUPPRESSION POOL PROVIDES WATER SUPPLY PROVIDES WATER SUPPLY 11 POR RER TRAIN A FOR RHR TRAIN B OPLANT AIR SYSTEM FCV-24 -135 FCV-24-138 26 AIR SUPPLY AIR SUPPLY r
"'#r'
l6 III' IAELE 74 (CONTI NUEIO CONTAINMENT C00LIN9 MODg12 TRAIN A TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 3
4 KV SD BD A MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER TO (250 VDC BUS II)
PUMP 2A 3
4 KV SD BD B MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER TO (250 VDC BUS 2I)
PUMP 2C MOTIVE & CONTROL 3
4 KV SD BD C POWER TO PUMP 28 (250 VDC BUS III)
MOTIVE & CONTROL
.3 4 KV SD BD D POWER TO PUMP 2D j
(250 VDC BUS 2II) 3,4,13 480 V RMOV BD 2A PUMP CLR 2A & 2C u N
- FCV-14-01
- FCV-74-12 FCV-74-52 FCV-74-57 FCV-74-58 FCV-74-60 FCV-74-61
- FCV-74-104 PUMP CLE 2B & 2D FAN 3,4,13
' 480 V RMOV BD 28
- FCV-74-24
- FCV-74-35 FCV-74-66 FCV-74-71 FCV-74-72 FCV-74-74 l
FCV-74-75
- FCV-74-106 13 480 V RMOV BD 2D FCV-74-07 FCV-74-53 FCV-74-59 FCV-74-30 13 480 V RMOV BD 2E FCV-74-67 FCV-74-73 RHR LOCIC PANEL 9-33 6-250 V RMOV BD 2A 6
C
. 250 V RMOV BD 2B RHR LOCIC PANEL 9-32 120 V I&C BUS 2A FT-74-50 FSV-24-138 21,25,26 FSV-24-135 FT-74-64 21 120.V I&C P'/S 2B
- DENGTES.THAT"THIS INTERFACE IS NOT _ REQUIRED F0E THE SUBJECT RHR IUNCTION (SEE CORRZSPONDIN
~
-m m:
-IAllLE 74 (CONTIT'IED)
TRAIN A-
. TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY
-DEPENDENCY.
NOTES PX-71-60-1, -1A DIV I HICH DRYWELL PRESSURE 24 PERMISSIVE INSTR STRINGS PX-71-60-2, -2A DIV II HICH DRYWELL 24 PRESSURE PERMISSIVE INSTR STRINGS EECW RHR PtNtP SEAL HK RHR PtNtP SEAL HX 10 NORTH & SOUTH HEADERS RHR PtNtP CLE RHR PUMP CLR RCW EECW BACKUP EECW BACKUP 25 SITiTRESSION POOL PROVIDES WATER SUPPLY PROVIDES WATER SUPPLY 11 FOR RER TRAIN A FOR RRR TRAIN B CPLANT AIR SYSTEM FCV-24-135 FCV-24-138 26
-AIR SUPPLY AIR SUPPLY T
=
i-
-~
m m
... -. -.. -... ~
. ~. -.
TABLE 74 (CONTI FRIED)
S1fUTDOVN COOLING MODE 14 TRAIN A TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY HQIES o KV SD BD A MOTIVE & CONTROL 3
(250 VDC BUS 11)
POWER TO PUMP 2A 4 KV SD BD B MOTIVE & CONTROL 3
(250 VDC BUS 2I)
POWER TO PUMP 2C 4 KV SD BD C MOTIVE & CONTROL-3 (250 VDC BUS III)
POWER TO PtMP 2B I
'4 KV'SD BD D MOTIVE & CONTROL 3
(250 VDC BUS 211)
PCWER TO PUMP 2D 480 V RMOV BD 2A PtMP CLE 2A & 2C FAN 3,4,15,17
.FCV-74-Ol i
FCV-74-02
-FCV-74-12 FCV-74-13 FCV-74-48 FCV-74-52 FCV-74-57 FCV-74-58 FCV-74-60 FCV-74-61
- FCV-74-104 480 V RMOV BD 2B PUMP CLR 2B & 2D FAN 3,4,15 FCV-74-24 FCV-74-25 FCV-74-35 FCV-74-36 FCV-74-66 FCV-74-71 FCV-74-72 FCV-74-74 FCV-74-75
- FCV-74-106
~
4sl V RMOV BD 2D FCV-74-07 15
~
FCV-74-53 FCV-74-59 480 V RMOV BD 2E FCV-74-30 15 FCV-74-67 FCV-74-73 250 V RMOV BD 2A FCV-74-47 RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-33 6,16,17 250 V RMOV BD 2B RHR LOGIC PANEL 9-32 6
o DENOTES 1 EAT THIS INTERFACE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE SUBJECT RHR RINCTION (SEE CORRESPONDING NOTE).
1-----
m TAhLE 74 (CONTI fdtIED)
TRAIN A'
-TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 120 V I&C BUS 2A' FT-74-50 FSV-24-138 21,26 FSV-24-135 FT-74 21 120 V I&C BUS 23 EECW RHR PUMP SEAL HK RHR PUMP SEAL HX 10 NORTH & SOUTH HEADERS RHR PUMP CLES RHR PUMP CLES RCW
.EECW BACKUP EECW BACKUP 25 OPLANT AIR SYSTEM FCV-24-135 FCV-24-138 26
- AIR SUPPLY AIR SUPPLY
.IABLE-74 (CONTINUED) 18 UNIT 1 TO UNIT 2 EiR CROSSTIE MODE TRAIN B TRAIN A DEPENDENCY NOTES SUPPORT SYSTEM DEFENDENCY MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER TO 3
4 KV SD BD C PUMP 1B (250 VDC BUS III)
MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER TO 3
4 KV SD BD D PUMP ID (250 VDC BUS 2II)
PUMP CLR IB & ID FANS 3,4,19 480 V RMOV BD IB 2-FCV-74-96 2-FCV-74-100 1-FCV-74-24 1-FCV-74-35 1-FCV-74-98 1-FCV-74-101
- 1-FCV-74-106 480 V RMOV BD 28 2-FCV-74-97 1-FCV-74-99 19 l-FCV-74-30 19 480 V RMOV BD lE UNIT 1 RHR LOGIC PANEL 20 250 V RMOV BD 1A 9-33 l-FT-74-64 22,26 120 V I&C BUS IB 1-FSV-24-138 UNIT 1 RHR PUMP B & D 23 EECW SEAL EX & PUMP CLR
-NORTH AND SOUTH HEADERS EECW BACKUP 25 RCW FCV-24-138 8 PLANT AIR SYSTEM AIR SUPPLY DENOTES THAT THIS INTERFACE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE SUBJECT RHR WNCTION (SEE CORRESPONDING N o
W
1 TJs 9 74 NOTT4 1
The design basis for the Rewadual Heat Removal (RHR) System includes
)
four modes of operation:
- 1) Low Preseure Coolant Injection (LPCI), 2) i Containment' Spray Cooling (CSC), 3) Suppression Pool Cooling, snd 4) l Shutdown Cooling. The general configuration of the RHR System is based J
on the latest as constructed flow diagrams.
3 The system dependencies for the LPCI mode of RHR cperatie.: vere derived l
by determining the system interfaces involved with the equipment along i
the LPCI flowpath. These interfaces were determined to be RHR dependencies (required interfaces) for the LPCI mode if the associated component is required to change state from its standby readiness position (state) to the state required to perform the LPCI function.
3 Motive power to the RHR pumps is indicated in Table 74.
Normal control power for each pump is provided by a 250 V control bus on each respective 4 KV SD BD.
The control power will be required for all modes of RHR operation. All modes of RHR operation require manual start i
except for LPCI. Manual start of the RHR pumps will require that the drain pump isolation valves (1-FCV-74-106 for RHR loop II, Unit 1, 2-FCV-74-104 for RHR loop I, Unit 2 and 2-FCV-74-106 for RHR loop II, Unit 2) be in their normally closed positions.
4 Cooling requirements for each RHR pump involves pump space cooling and puup seal cooling (see note 10). Train A Pump Space Coolers A and C are dedicated to RHR Pumps A'and C, respectively, while Train B Pump Space Coolers B and D are dedicated to RHR Pumps B and D, respectively. Each pump space cooler consists of a fan / cooling coil combination requiring electrical and cooling water support (see note 10).
The BPN Environmental Qualification (EQ) program has concluded that operation of the RHR pump coolers are not required during the short term (less than 10 minutes) of an accident sequence. BFN design basis assumes automatic LPCI operation during this timeframe with any other mode of RHR being manually initiated in the long term (10 minutes < t <
24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for the PRA mission). Thus, until calculations are identified or performed to show that this cooling is unnecessary to support the RHR pumps for the long term PRA mission timeframe, operation of the coolers are assumed required for long term LPCI operation, and during the Containment Cooling, Shutdown Cooling, and Unit 1 and Un't 2 Crosstie Modes of RHR operation.
l 5
The valves listed are those that are electrically powered, within or adjacent to the LPCI flowpath, and must attain or maintain a particular state to assure availability of the LPCI function.
Of the valves listed as loaded on 480 V RMOV BD's 2A, 2B, 2D, and 2E, valves FCV-74-07, -30,
-52, -53, -66, and -67 will be required to change state (see note 2).
The-LPCI injection valves.(FCV-74-53, -67) must open, the Mini-flow bypass valves (FCV-74-07, -30) must be operational, and the LPCI injection throttling valves (FCV-74-52, -66) must be functional.
Therefore, these valves will require their respective power supplies for the LPCI function of RHR.
6 Power supply for RHR logic panels 9-32 and 9-33.
IABLE 74 NOTES (CONTINUED)
I
- 7 Reactor (RX) L1 signals generated by Common Actuation Sensors (CAS) are utilized, in combination with other logic inputs (see notes 8 and 9), by the RHR Train A and B logic automatic system startup. The CAS components that generate the Train A RX L1 signal are CAS Analog Trip Unit ( ATUs) LIS-3-$8A, -58B, slave ATUs LS 58A, -58B and Core Spray System (CSS) relays 14A-K7A, ~K8A.
The Train B RX L1 signal is generated by CAS ATUs LIS-3-58C, -58D, slave ATUs LS-3-58C, ~58D and CSS relays 14A-K7B, -K8B.
CSS Relays 1AA-K7A, -K8A and 14A-K7B, -K8B are considered to be within the CAS boundary since they transmit RX L1 signals to both the CSS and RHR logic panels.
Each CAS instrument string dependency has been designated as conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since both strings associated with a single CAS division must be failed for loss of a single instrument string of the other CAS division to fail the LPCI function of RHR.
8 Reactor low pressure signals generated by CAS are provided to RHR Train A and B lo81c panels 9-32 and 9-33, in combination with other logic inputs (see notes 7 and 9), to generate the accident signal for automatic system startup. The CAS components that generate the Train A low pressure signal are CAS ATUs PIS-3-74A and PIS-68-95.
The Train B low pressure signal is generated by CAS ATUs PIS-3-74B and PIS-68-96.
Note that CSS Train A relays 14A-K40A, -K41A, -K42A, -K43A and CSS Train B relays 14A-K40B, -K41B, -K42B, -K43B relay the RX L1 signals from CAS ATUs to the RHR logic panels.
Since these CSS relays are RHR Systet specific, they will be included in the RHR system boundary. The power supply for these CSS relays are included in the RHR system boundary.
The power supply for these CSS relays are identical to the power supplies for the RHR logic panels (see note 4) since the CSS and RHR logic panels 9-32 and 9-33 are powered from the same sources.
Each CAS instrument string dependency has been designated as conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since both strings associated with a single CAS division must be failed for loss of a single instrument string of the other CAS division to fail the LPCI function of RHR.
9 High drywell pressure signals generated by CAS are provided to RHR train A and B logic panelo, in combination with other logic inputs (see notes 7 and 8), to generate the accident signal for automatic system startup.
The CAS components that generate the Train A high drywell pressure signal are CAS ATUs PIS-64-58B, ~58D.
The Train B high drywell pressure signal is generated by CAS ATUs PIS-64-58A, -580.
The Train A and Train
-B signals are received via RHR relays 10A-KSA, -K6A and 10-A-K5B, -K6B, respectively.
Each CAS instrument string dependency has been designated as conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since both strings associated with a single CAS division must be failed for loss of a single instrument string of
+he other CAS division to fail the LPCI function of RHR.
t
I TABLE 74 NQIES (CONIIEVED1 10 Cooling water for RHR pump room coolers 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D and the RHR pump seal HX 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D is provided by both the north and south l
headers of the FECW, Loss of a RHR pump space cooler or a seal HX is l
assumed to fall the associated RHR pump. The EECW north and south header dependencies have been denoted as conditional on the dependency mat.rix since either header will provide the cooling function for the RHR.
I 11 Loss of water supply from the suppression pool will fail the four i
process functions of the RHR due to loss of the pumps.
12-The Containment Cooling mode of the RHR System includes both Drywell and Torus Sprays and Suppression Pool Cooling. The system dependencies for
[
the Containment Cooling mode were derived by determining the system interfaces involved with the equipment along the RHR flowpath required for this function. Those interfaces were determined to be RHR dependencies (required interfaces) for Containment Cooling if the associated component is required to change state from the LPCI mode.
In addition, it wrs assumed that the core cooling function normally maintained by the CSS and the RHR System has been completely shutdown in the meantime (i.e., RHR pumps are off). Thus, the control power for the pumps will be required for Containment Cooling since they must be restarted.
i A 2/3 core height permissive signal is required to open the appropriate valves for performing all three functions of Containment Cooling.
r However, this signal is not considered to be an RHR dependency since a manual override switch exists. A high pressure permissive signal is required to open the valves associated with the torus and drywell spray functions. No manual override exists for this signal and failure to receive this signal would prevent the ability to perform both spray functions when required.
See note 24 for additional information concerning the dependencies for the high drywell permissive signal associated with torus and drywell sprays.
i-
$3 The valves listed are those that are electrically powered, within or l
adjacent to the Containment Cooling flovpath, and must attain or maintain a particular state to assure availability of the Containment Cooling function. The only valves that will not be required to change state for indicated alignments are the suppression pool pump suction isolation valves FCV-74-01, -12, -24, -35.
These valves will not l
require utilization of their associated power supplies and have been
?
denoted (by asterisk) as not requiring power for the Containment Cooling function.
l 14 The Shutdown Cooling (SDC) mode of RHR being considered in the PRA analysis does not involve the cooldown process during a normal plant shutdown. The system dependencies for SDC were derived by determining the system interfaces involved with the equipment along the RHR flowpath required for this function. These interfaces were determined to be RHR dependencies-(required interfaces) for the SDC mode if the associated
(
l component is required to change from the Containment Cooling mode (requires _the maximum number of changes in equipment states).
1 IAhtE 74 NOTES (CONTINUED) 15 The valves listed are those that are electrically powered, within or adjacent to the SDC flovpath, and must attain or maintain a particular state to assure availability of the SDC function. All the valves listed as loaded on 480 V RMOV BD's 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, ano 2E will require their respective power supplies. The Mini-flow bypass valves must close when required to prevent blowdovn of the reactor to the torus during the SDC mode of RHR operation. 480 VAC RMOV BD 2A has been marked as required for both loops of RHR (on the dependency matrix) since its failure will prevent opening FCV-74-48, and thus, disable both loops of shutdown cooling.
16
. Motive and control power for FCV-74-47. This power will b. required for the SDC mode of RHR since this valve will be required to open from the SPC mode.
250 VDC RMOV ua 2A has been marked as required for both loops cf RHR (on the dependency matrix) since its failure will prevent opening FCV-74-47, and thus, disable both loops of shutdown cooling.
17
. Two pressure switches within the RHR System model (PS-68-93, -94) provide low pressure permissives (75 psig) to the RHR SDC isolation ralves (FCV-74-47, -48) and to the outboard LPCI isolation. valves (FCV-74-53, -67) and allow valve opening for the shutdown cooling function. However, these pressure switches are mechanical in nature, and thus do not require power for operation.
18 The Unit 1 to Unit 2 RHR Crosatie mode involves interconnecting the pump suction and heat exchanger discharge lines of one loop in the Unit 1 RHR System (pumps B and D) to the pump suction and heat exchanger discharge lines of one loop in the Unit 2 RHR System (Pumps A and C).
This mode allows use of Unit 1 RHR Pumps B and D and associated heat exchangers to provide the LpCI, Containment Cooling, or Shutdown Cooling modes of Unit 2 RHR operation. Two normally closed isolation valves are provided in the' heat exchanger discharge Cross-connection and four normally closed isolation valves are provided in each suction Cross-connection (one at each pump suction).
19 The valves listed include the heat exchanger discharge and RHR pump suction Cross-connection isolation valves (see note 18) that must be opened to align Unit 1 RHR pumpa B and D for the Cross-connection mode of RHR.. Additionally, the Unit 1 RHR pumps B and D suppression pool suction isolation valves (1-FCV-74-24, -35) must be closed. Mini-flow
. bypass isolation valve 1-PCV-74-30 must also function during Unit 1 RHR pump B and D operation. The Mini-flow bypass isolation valve control relay (10A-K108B) located on Unit 1 RHR logic panel 9-33 is powered from the 120 V Control Bus associated with 480 V RMOV BD 1E.
20-Power supply for Unit 1 RHR logic panel 9-33 (required for trip of RHR pumps).
21
.The RHR pump Mini-flow valves (FCV-70-07, -30) are normally opened and signaled to close when sufficient flow is established. Flow transmitter 17-74-50 provides this signal for RNR loop 1 (pumps A and C) and transmitter FT-74-64 for RHR loop 2 (pumps B and D).
IABLE 74 NOTES (CONTINUED) j i
32:
RHR pump Mini-flow valve 1-PCV-74-30 is required to function to support i
operation of Unit 1, ic 9 2 RHR pumps B and D in the Unit 1 to Unit 2 i
Crosstie mode.
Flow transmitter 1-FT-74-64 provides the signal for j
automatic operation of the valve.
j l
23 Cooling water for Unit 1 RHR pump space coolers 1B and ID and the Unit 1 RHR pump seal HX 1B and ID is provided by both the north and south headers of the EECW. The EECW north and south header dependencies have been denoted as conditional on the support-frontline dependency matrix j
l since either header will provide the cooling function for the RHR system.
i i
24 The DIV I and DIV II high drywell pressure permissive instrument strings provide signals to RHR logic panels 9-32 and 9-33 for indication of the I
appropriate conditions necessary for drywell and torus sprays. These instrument strings originate from the Emergency Otre Cooling Syhtem (ECCS) ATUs. Each string (two per division) consists of a pressure I
transmitter, an ATU;(pressure indicating switch), and an actuation j
relay. When drywell pressure increases above the setpoint, the actuation relay is energized resulting in closure of the associated 1
i contacts in either RHR logic panels 9-32 or 9-33.
Since the actuation relays energize to actuate, the power supplies associated with these instrument strings are required for the torus and drywell spray
)
functions. However, this dependency is conditional (i.e., a partial l
dependency since lose of one division power supply will fail the I
containment spray function only if the other division power supply has 1
failed.
The subject tower supplies are fed from 250V DC RMOV BD 2B (DIV I Power Supplies PX-74 u0-1, -1A) and 250V DC RMOV BD 2A (DIV II power Supplies PX-71-60-02, -.1A) through an associated DIV I and DIV II ECCS ATU inverter, respectively.
25 RCW provides a backup to EECW by supplying cooling water to the RHR pump seal KX and the RHR pump coolers via the EECW piping arrangement (see note 10). This backup cooling supply is provided to the associated RHR equipment upon loss of EECW header pressure allowing the RCW pump head to open the appropriate check valve. There is a RCW supply header associated with each of the two RHR equipment trains.
In addition to p
the check valve actuation, a normally closed, fail-open air operated flow control valve is located in each header (see note 26). These valves receive a signal to open upon actuation of the associated RHR pump cooler fans (see note 4).
26 The RCW header flow control valves (1-FCV-24-138 and 2-FCV-24-135, -138) t are normally closed and open upon dropout of a contact that signals actuation of an associated RHR pump cooler fan. Dropout of this conta ct deenergizes the solenoid valve associated with each flow control valve.
These solenoid. valves (1-PSV-24-138 and 2-FSV-24-135, -138) control plant Air System supply for operation of each respective FCV.
Deenergizing the solenoid valves removes the 2.r supply to the associated FCV and opens the valve. Since these valves open on the loss of power or air supply their associated power and air supplies are not required for any of the RHR modes of operation.
J
TABLE'75-1 CORE SPRAY SYSTEM (CSS) DEPENDENCIES l
TRAIN A TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES 2
4 KV SD BD A MOTIVE & CONTROL f
(250 VDC BUS II)
POWER TO PUMP 2A 2
4 KV SD BD B MOTIVE & CONTROL (250 VDC BUS 21)
POWER TO PUMP 2C MOTIVE & CONTROL 2
POWER TO PUMP 2B (250 VDC BUS III)
MOTIVE & CONTROL 2
4 KV SD BD D POWER TO PUMP 2D (250 VDC BUS 2II) 3,4 480 V RMOV BD 2A MOTIVE & CONTROL POWER FOR:
PUMP COOLER 2A FAN
- FCV-75-02 FCV-75-09
- FCV-75-11
- FCV-75-22
- FCV-75-23 FCV-75-25'
.=. -
~.. -.... -....
IgBLE 75_ff,0!Kl.Jf4LEJ.}l TRAIN A TRAIN ~B
- SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY
-DEPENDENCY NOTES 480 V LMOV BD 2B MOTIVE & CONTROL 3,4.
POWER FOR:
PtMP COOLER 2B FAN
- FCV-75-30 FCV-75-37
- FCV-75-39
- FCV-75-50
- FCV-75-51 FCV-75-53 250 VDC RMOV BD 2A CSS DIV II LOGIC PANEL 5
9-33 RELAYS 250 VDC RMOV BD 2B CSS DIV I LOGIC PANEL 5
9-32 RELAYS CAS DIV I RX LOW CSS DIV I LOGIC 6,9 LEVEL 1 INPUT SIGNALS P m L 9-32 CAS DIV II RX LOW CSS DIV II LOGIC 6,9 LEVEL 1 INPUT SIGNALS PANEL 9-33
,.w-,
TABLE 75 (CONTINUED)
TRAIN A TRAIN B SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY NOTES CAS DIV I RX LOW' CSS DIV I LOGIC PANEL 7.9 PRESSURE INPUT SIGNALS 9-32 CAS DIV II RX LOW CSS DIV II LOGIC PANEL 7,9 PRESSURE INPUT SICMAf.M 9-33 CAS DIV I HICH DRYWELL CSS DIV I LOGIC PANEL 8,9 PRESSURE INPUT SICMAYM 9-32 CAS DIV II HICH DRYWELL CSS DIV II LOGIC PANEL 8,9 PRESSURE INPUT SIGNALS 9-33 SUPPRESSION POOL PROVIDES WATER PROVIDES WATER 10 SUPPLY FOR CSS SUPPLY F0E CSS TRAIN A TRAIN B EECW PROVIDES COOLING PROVIDES COOLING 11 NORTH & SOUTH WATER FOR WATER FOR READERS CSS PUMP ROOM COOLER 2A CSS PUMP ROOM COOLER 2B cDEN0TES THAT THIS INTERFACE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE SUBJECT HINCTION OF THE CSS (SEE CORRESPONDING NOTE).
1 i
TABLE 75 NOTER J
l The basis for the mechanical configuration of the Core Spray System (CSS) is as depicted by the latest as-constructed flow diagram.
3 Motive power to the CSS pumps is distributed as indicated above. Normal control power for each pump 9 provided by a 250 VDC control bus on each
)
3 Cooling requirements for each CSS pump involves a pump space cooler located in each of the two CSS pump rooms. Pump Cooler 2A is dedicated to CSS Pumps 2A & 2C while Pump Cooler 2B is dedicated to CSS Pumps 2B &
2D.
Each pump cooler consists of a fan / cooling coil combination requiring electrical and cooling water support (see note 11).
i 4
Of the valves listed as being loaded from 480 V RMOV BD's 2A & 2B, only TCV-75-09,-25 (Train A) and FCV-75-37,-53 (Train B) require utilization of these boards (only valves that change state) for CSS injection to the reactor. Note that for-this PRA effort, the standby readiness state of
)
.the CSS is assumed at event initiation (as reflected by the associated 01 startup checklist).
l 5
Power supply for CSS logic panel relays. This power is required for the CSS function since associated relays are energized to actuate.
6 Reactor (RX) Level 1 signals generated by the Common Actuation Sensors i
l' (CAS-see note 1 of Table 98) are utilized, in combination with other i
logic inputs (see notes 7 & 8), by the CSS Division I & II (Train A & B, l
respectively) logic panels tc generate the accident signal which initializes automatic system startup. The CAS components that generate t
the Train A RX L1 signal are CAS Analog Trip Units (ATU's)
LIS-3-58A,-58B, slave ATU'S LS-3-58A,-58B and CSS relays 14A-K7A,-K8A.
l The Train B RX L1 signal is generated by CAS ATU's LIS-3-580,-58D, slave ATU's LS-3-580,-58D and CSS relays 14A-K7B,-K8B.
& 14A-K7B,-K8B are considered to be within the CAS boundary since they transmit RX L1 signals to both the CSS and RHR logic panels.
(
7 Reactor low pressure signals generated by CAS are provided to CSS l
Division I & II (Train A & B, respectively) logic panelt, in combination with other logic inputs (see notes 6 & 8), to generate the accident signal for automatic system startup. The CAS components that generate j
the Train A low pressure signal are CAS ATU's PIS-3-74A & PIS-68-95. The
'T ain B low pressure signal is generated by CAS ATU's PIS-3-74B &
v P/S-68-96.
l.
8 High drywell pressure signals generated by CAS are provided to CSS Division I & II (Train A & B, respectively) logic panels, in combination i
with other logic inputs (see notes 6 & 7), to generate the accident signal for automatic system st u tup. The CAS components that generate the Train A high drywell pressure signal are CAS ATU's PIS-64-58B,-58D l
and CSS relays 14A-K5A -K6A..The Train B high drywell pressure signal is
~
geherated by CAS ATU's PIS-64-58A,-58C and CSS relays 14A-K5B,-K6B.
CSS Relays 14A-K5A,-K6A & 14A-K5B,-K6B are considered to be within the CAS boundary since they transmit high drywell pressure signals to both CSS and HPCI logic panels.
. m
l L
[.
TABLE 75 NOTES CONTINUED j
9 The dependency' matrix has been marked to indicate that all four CSS pumps l
and both CSS trained headers are dependent on both divisions of the high drywell pressure and low reactor level 1 CAS signals since the signals l
from each division are arranged in one-out-of-two-twice logic in each CSS logic panel. However, each instrument string dependency has been i
designated as conditional (i.e., a partial dependency) since each instrument string associated with a single CAS division must be failed i
for loss of a single instrument string cf the other CAS division to fail r
the CSS; function.
The CAS low reactor pressure instrument strings have been marked to indicate that the Division I CSS pumps and header are dependent on the Division I instrument strings while the Division II CSS pumps and header are dependent on the Division II instrument strings. All four CSS pumps and both CSS headers are not dependent on both divisions of the low reactor pressure instrument strings since these signals are not arranged i
in one-out-of-two-twice logic within each CSS logic panel. However, the i
Iow reactor pressure signals associated with each CSS pump and header I
division have been designated as conditional since the signals associated with the corresponding CSS logic panel are arranged such that either of two low reactor pressure signals will actuate the associated division of the CSS (i.e., both signals must be failed for the associated CSS division to fail).
20 Although loss of torus water supply will fail the reactor spray function.
of the CSS, the dependency matrix is marked to indicate that all four CSS l
pumps would be failed.
l 11 Cooling water for CSS pump coolers 2A & 2B is provided by both the north and south headers of the EECW. As stated in note 3 above, loss of a pump cooler is assumed to fail the associated CSS pumps, i
I i
l l
t l
l t
TABLE 85
' CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM (CRDHS) DEPENDENCIES _1 SUPPORT TRAIN 41 TRAIN B NON TRAINED SYSTEM DEPENDIEC_I DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCIES lt0TES 4 KV AC UNIT BD 2C FEED PUMP 2A 2
250 VDC CONT BUS ON 4 KV FEED PUMP 2A 3
UNIT BD 2C (250 VDC BATT BD 1) 4 KV AC SHUTDOWN BD A FEED PUMP 1B 4
250 VDC NORMAL CONTROL FEED PUMP 1B 5
BUS ON 4 KV SHUTDOWN BD A (250 VDC DIV II) 480 VAC RMOV BD 2C 2-FCV-85-8 6
FEED PUMP 1B DISCNARGE VALVE TO UNIT 2 2-FCV-85-65, 7
CRD PUMP 2A ISOLATION VALVE 2-FCV-85-50 8
CRD RETURN,
LINE ISOLATION VALVE 2-PCV-85-23 9
CRD DRIVE W1TER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE 2-PCV-85-27 9
CRD DRIVE WITER PRESSURE C0KIROL VALVE 480 VAC RMOV BD 1C 1-FCV-85-56 10 UNIT 1 CRD,
PUMP SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE y
.r-,a u
, m w.s w-g-
g m,
gs-..,,
s,,
we
.s e-v-4+
,+,wc
,w
,e,,., - w w eer
-e s
ne
,w-
.-m,-.
en 7_ABLE 85 (CONTINUED)
-SUPPORT TRAIN A' TRAIN B NON TRAINED SYSTEM DEPENDENCY pgy.ausNCY DEFENDENCIES NOTES 1-FCV-85-8, 11 480 VAC RMOV BD IC PUMP IB (CONTINUED)
CROSSTIE ISOLATION VALVE TO UNIT 1 12 I-PCV-2-170,.
480 VAC WATER & OIL CST NO. 1 STORAGE BD-DISCHARGE ISOLATION.
VALVE 2-FCV-85-lla, 13 120V 2C U rr 2 PREFERRED CRDHS FI/M Pt7 DER CONTROL VALYE 2-FCV-85-11B, 13.
CRDHS FLOW CONTROL vU,VE 2-FCV-85-llA, 14 PLANT CONTROL AIR CRDRS FLOW CONIROL VALVE l
2-FCV-85-IIB, 14 l
GRDRS FLOW CONTROL VALVE 15 RCW FEED PUMP 2A 15 FEED PUMP 1B 16 UNIT 2 CST HEADER FEED PUMP 2A
TABLE B5 NOIES 1
1 The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDHS) serves as an alternate (non-ECCS) source of high pressure makeup water to the reactor vessel.
Two modes of CRDHS operation are considered a) " enhanced mode" as a sole source of early high pressure injection requiring continued operation of pump 2A and manual start of pump 1B with both pumps operating for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and b) pump 2A continued operation for 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> assuming that some other injection system (e.g., HpCIS) has been operating successfully for approximately six hours.
The only injection path considered in this analysis is the CRDHS return line to feedwater line B (reference BTN Unit 2 operating instructions Appendix 14).
It is recognized that the charging water header is available for vessel injection through the scram inlet valves following a reactor scram that is not reset.and following a loss of control air event.
It is also known that CRDHS flow control valve 2-TCV-85-11A would have to be locally opened utilizing a handwheel to allow flow through the CRDHS return line following a loss of control -ir event. No credit is taken for bypassing 2-TCV-85-11A, 2-PCV-85-23, and 2-PCV-85-27 using the pump test bypass line (via 2-85-551).
]
Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) no. 3 header normally provides suction flow to CRDHS feed pump 2A and can be aligned to CRDHS pump 1B for Unit 2 operation. Because this header also provides suction flow to the HPCIS and RCICS pumps, it is treated as a support system with regard to the Unit 2 CRDHS. Unit 1 CST no. I header (Unit 1) normally serves CRDHS pump 1B in support of Unit 2 event mitigation and is therefore considered to be within the CRDHS boundary for this analysis. There is a manual crosatie (via 2-85-539) between the Unit I and Unit 2 CST headers.
The CRDHS is currently modeled as not requiring HVAC support to perform i
its high pressure vessel makeup function.
Only the normally supplied CRDHS supports are included in this analysis.
No credit is taken for backup supports.
2 This board provides motive power to normally running feed pump 2A Loss l
of this power supply will fail the pump.
1 This bus supplies control power to normally running feed pump 2A. Loss of this power will not cause this pump.to cease operating but would prevent the pump from starting if it were on standby.
4 This board provides the motive power to standby feed pump 1B which must be manually started for the " enhanced mode" of CRDHS high pressure makeup to reactor vessel. Loss of this power supply will prevent the pump from starting.
5 This bus supplies control power to standby feed pump 1B which must be manually started for the " enhanced mode" of CRDHS high pressure makeup to the reactor vessel. Loss of this power supply will prevent the pump from starting but will not fail the pump after it is started.
m
+
IABLE 85 NOTES (@l(IJE! Eld I'
This board provides motive and control power to the normally closed motor-operated valve listed. This valve must be opened to allow feed i
pump 1B flow to the vessel return line in the " enhanced mode" of CRDitS high pressure makeup.
7' This board provides motive and control power to the normally open i
motor-operated valve listed. This valv6 must remain open to allow suction flow to feed pump 2A.
This valve fails as-is on loss of its Power supply.
)
8 This board provides motive and control power to the normally closed motor-operated valve listed. This valve must be opened to allow flow j
through the vessel return line.
j 9
This board provides motive and control power to the normally open
)
motor-operated valves listed. These valves must remain open to allow j
flow through the vessel return line. These valves fail as-is on loss of j
their power supply.
)
i 10 This board provides motive and control power to the normally open motor-operated valve listed. This valve must remain open to allow suction flow to feed pump 1B.
This valve fails as-is on loss of its l
power supply. The board is not accounted for on the support-support i
dependency matrix because the components supplied by the board are fail safe (i.e., they do not require the board to perform their modeled i
function).
]
11 This board provides motive and control power to the normally closed motor-operated valve listed.
It is currently assumed that transfer of this valve to the open position would result in sufficient diversion of flow to the Un'., 1 CRDl!S supply header to fail the Unit 2 CRDHS high pressure makeup function. This valve fails as-is (closed) on loss of its power supply. Therefore, the power supply is not required for successful CRDHS operation in the high pressure makeup mode and does not appear on the support-support dependency matrix.
j 12
= This board provides motive and control power to the normally open motor-operated valve listed. This valve must remain open to allow CST no. 1 (Unit 1) suction flow to feed pump 18.
This valve fails as-is on loss of its power arpply.
13 This is the normal supply to the flow control circuit controlling the position of the CRDilS flow control valves listed. One valve (normally 2-FCV-85-11A) must be fully opened to allow maximum flow through the vessel return line. The valves fail closed on 1%s of their power supply.
14 plant control air provides motive and control air to the valves listed.
One valve (normally 2-PCV-85-11A) must be fully opened to allow maximum flow through the vessel return line. The valves fail closed on loss of their air supply.
~15 The Raw Cooling Water System (RCWS) supplies cooling water to the CRDilS feed pump water oil coolers and thrust bearings.
i TABLE B5 NOTES (CONTINUED).
)
e 16 CST no.'3 (Unit 2) header normally supplies suction flow to CRDHS feed pump 24 and can be aligned to CRD:!S Pump 1B for Unit 2 operation.
Because this header also supplies suction flow to the Unit 2 HPCIS and RCICS pumps, it is considered to be a support system for this analysis.
CST no. 1 header (Unit 1) normally serves only CRDHS pump 1B in support of Unit 2 event mitigation and is therefore consid-aed to be within the CRDHS boundary for this analysis (see note 1).
T,
<q k
TABLE 98 i
1
[
C0te40N ACTUATION _ SENSORS (CAS) SYSTEM DEFENDENCIEll i
t i
SUPPORT TRAIN A TRAIN B SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY RQIE1 PX-71-60-1,-1A DIV I CAS ATU 2
(250 V RMOV BD 2B)
INSTRUMENT STRINGS (EXCLUDING CSS RELAYS)
PX-71-60-2,-2A DIV II CAO ATU 2
(250 V RMOV BD 2A)
INSTRUMENT STRINGS (EXCLUDING l
CSS RELAYS) 1.
l 350 V RMOV BD 2A CAS DIV I 3
(CSS) RELAYS L
IAA-K5A,-K6A L
AND l
14A-K7A,-K8A 7
(PANEL 9-32) 250 V RMOV BD 2B CAS DIV II 3
(CSS) RELAYS t
14A-K5B,-K6B AND-14A-K7B,-K8B (PANEL 9-33) 1 t;
?
l 1
i,c f
I w
r e
TABLE 98 NOTES 1
l'
.The Cosunon Actuation Sensors (CAS) System consists of those Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) analog trip unit (ATU) instrumLnt strings that provide an actuation signal to the control Ingic associated with more than one system. This system designation is necessary in the Probability
{
Risk Assessment (PRA) process for modeling simplifications where these signals are required for the automatic actuation of selected systems.
The system boundary of the CAS System is specified to include all.
components within the subject instrument strings that are associated with providing a signal to more than one system. Normally a CAS instrument string will consist of a process transmitter, an ATU (indicating switch),
possibly a slave ATU (switch), and an actuation relay. However, there are cases where relays in the Core Spray System (CSS) are considered to be the last component in the CAS instrument string boundary. These cases l
include the Division I & II CAS instrument strings that provide RX L1 and i
high drywell pressure signals to the train A & B CSS logic panels. The I
I CAS actuation relays associated with these instrument strings transmit their respective signals via contact closure in the CSS logic panels, closure of these contacts result in CSS relay actuation resulting in additional contact closure in the CSS logic panels and in the RHR and HPCI logic panels..The CSS relays that are associated with these CAS instrument strings are 14A-K5A,-K6A (Train A high drywell pressure),
14A-K5B,-K6B (Train B high drywell pressure), 14A-K7A,-K8A (Train A RX L1), and 14A-K7B,-K8B (Train B RX L1).
For those cases where an ECCS ATU instrument string provides a signal to only one systen, the entire instrument string is considered to be components of the system actuated (not CAS System components).
2 The power supplies for the Division I & II CAS ATU instrument strings (excluding CSS relays - see note 1) are FX-71-60-1,-1A and FX-71-60-2,
-2A,:respectively. These power supplies receive their power through an associated inverter from 250 V RMOV BD 2B and 250 V RMOV BD 2A, respectively. Note that although the CAS instrument strings receive
. power directly from the PX power supplies, the associated 250 V RMOV BDs arst reflected on the support-to-support' dependency matrix as being the dependency for this instrumentation. The CSS' relays thait are included in the CAS instrument string boundaries are excluded as receiving power from these power supplies since they receive power from the same source as the CSS logic panels (see note 3).
3 There are four relays in each division of CSS logic (panel 9-32 (Division l
I/ Train A) and panel 9-33 (Division II/ Train B)] that are connidered to.
l be within the CAS instrument string boundaries (see note 1). Thus, these relays receive their power from the power supplies for the CSS logic panels.
l l
l
,,,,,,,l
..i..i.-..~.
TAtiLE 99 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)/ CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM (CRD NON-TRAINED SUPPORT YEAIN A TRAIN B DEPENDENCY NOTES SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY 2
120 VAC SCRAM PILOT VALVES RPS BUS 2A 2-PSV-85-39A (1-125) 3 RPS CHANNEL Al SCRAM PILOT VALVE ACTUATIorJ RELAYS 5A-K14A AND 5A-K14E 3
RPS CHAanrPT. A2 SCRAM PIIM VALVE ACTUATION RELAYS 5A-14C AND 5A-K14G 3
HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RPS CHAinsrf. Al ARPM NO.1 (CH. A), RELAY 5A-K12A, APRM No. 3A (CH. E),
RELAY 5A-K12E 3
HICH NEUTRON FLUX RPS CHANNEL A2 APRM NO. 2 APRM _u), RELAY 5A-K12C, (CH. Cm. 38 (CH. E),
RELAY 5A-K12G 3
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION RPS CHANNEL Al RELAYS 5A-K3A AND SA-K3E 3
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION RPS CHAMMEL A2 RELAYS 5A-K3C AND 5A-K3G 3
TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE RPS CHANKEL Al
. RELAYS SA-K10A AND 5A-K10E 3
TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE RPS PHAMNEL 12 RELAYS 5A-K10C AND 5A-K10G 3
HICH DRYWELL PRESSURE RPS CHANNEL Al RFAAY 5A-K4A
. TABLE 99 CONTIN 1 FED NON-TRAINED SUPPORT TRAIN A
' TRAIN B DEPENDENCY NOTES SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY 3
120 VAC HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE RPS BUS 2A RPS enaMMRY. 12 RELAY (CONTINUED) 5A-K4C 3
REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL RPS CHAMMRf. 11 RELAY 5A-K6A 3
REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL RPS CHANNEL A2 RELAY 5A-K6C 3
CRD SCRAM DISCHARGE AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW RPS CHANNEL Al-RELAY 63X-85-35Al 3
CRD SCRAM DISCHARGE AIR HEADdR PRESSURE LOW RPS CHANNEL A2 RELAY 63X-85-35A2 2
SCRAM PILOT VALVES 120 VAC 2-FSV-85-398 (1-185)
RPS BUS 28 3
RPS 2ANNEL B1 SCRAM PILOT VALVE ACTUATION RELAYS 5A-K14B AND 5A-K14F 3
RPS CHANNEL B2 SCRAM PILOT VALVE ACTUATION RELAYS 5A-14D AND 5A-14H 3
HICH NEUTRON FLUX RPS CWaMNFT. B1 APRM NO. 6 (CH. F) RELAY 5A-K12F, APRM NO,. 4A (CH. B),
RELAY 5A-K128 3
HIGH NEUTRON FLUX RPS CHAMMFT. 82 APRM NO. 5 (CH. D), RELAY 5A-K12D, APRM NO. 43 (CH. B),
RELAY 5A-K12H ap.
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TAM.E 99 CONTIMJZD NON-TRAINED SUPPORT TRAIN A TRAIN B DEPENDENCY NOTES SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY 3
MAIN STEAM ISOLATION 120 VAC
' RFS CHAMERT. B1 RELAYS RPS BUS 2B 5A-K3B AND SA-K3F (CCNIINUED) 3 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION RPS CHANNEL B2 2ELAYS 5A-K3D AND 5A-K3H 3
TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE RPS CHAMMEL B1 RELAYS SA-K105 AND SA-K10F 3
TURBINE STOP VALVE CLOSURE RPS CHANNEL B2 RELAYS SA-K10D AND 5A-K10H 3
HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE RPS CHANNEL B1 RELAY 5A-K4B 3
HICH DRYWELL PRESSURE RPS CHANNEL B2 RELAY 5A-K4D 3
REACTUR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL RPS f*H AMMET. B1 RELAY 5A-K65 3
REACTOR VESSEL LOW WLTER LEVEL RPS CHANNEL B2 RELAY 5A-K6D 3
CRD SCRAM DISCHARGE AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW RPS CHAMMRT. El RELAY 63X-85-35B1 3
CRD SCRAM DISCHARGE AIR HEADER PRESSURE LOW RPS CHANNEL B2 RELAY 63X-85-35B2 M
m.
_fAh!E 90 C0t:TINUED.
T NON-TRAINED'
'3UPPORT TRAIN'A
TRAIN B DEPENDENCY NOTES SYSTEM '
DEPENDENCY DEPENDENCY 4-HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE POWER SUPPLIES 2-PX-99-A1,--A1A-RPS CHANNEL Al PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-64-56A, ANAY.nG TRIP UNIT ATU) 2-PIS-64-56A, RET. Y 63-64-56A 4
REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL RPS CHANNEL Al LEVEL TRANSMITTFR 2-LT-3-203A, ATU 2-LIS-3-203A, RELAY 71-3-203Al 4
' POWER SUPPLIES' HIGH DRYWELI PRESSURE ~
2-PX-99-A2, -A2A RPS CHAElG, 4 PRESSURE TRANSMITTif, 2-PT-64-56C, ATU 2-PIS-61-56C, RELAY 63-64-56C.
4 REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATER LEVEL RPS CHANNEL A2 LEVEL-TRANSMI*TER 2-LT-3-203C, A?.' e-LIS-3-203C, EET.AY 71-3-203Cl POWER SUPPLIES HIGH DRYWP.LL PRESSURE 2-PI-99-B1, -BIA RFS CHANNEL B1 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-64-568,
. ATU 2-PIS-64-56B, err.AT 63-6*-56B-5 REACTOR VESSEL LOW WATEi!
LEVEL RPS ('HAIHiEL B1 LE/2[.
TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-203B.
AIU 2-LIS-3-203B, RELAY 71-3-203B1 5
POWER SUPPLIES HIGH DRYWEI.L PRESSURE 2-PX-99-B2, -B2A RPS CHANNEL B2 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER 2-PT-64-56D, ATU 2-PIS-64-56D,.EELAY 63-64-56D 5
tREACTOR VESSEL LOW TcTER LEVEL RPS CHANNEL BJ: 41EL TRANSMITTER 2-LT-3-20',D,
- ATU 2-LIS-3-2U3D,.. PET.AY
~-
71-3-203Dl-
~
SCRAM INLET' VALVES' 6
' PLANI CONTROL
' 2-FGV-85-39A (1-185)
A I R -.-
' SCRAM OUTLET VALVES.
6
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~
'2-FCV-85-39B'(1-185) iw p-o A;
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9 g.
C-
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' TABLE 99 ligIfd L1 Tlie' Reactor Protection System (RPS) assures reactivity control by ihitiating a rapid' automatic insertion of the control rods-(scram) upon-i~ detection of various plant parameters (high reactor neutron flux, low
< rcactor. vater level, etc.).
There are four automatic (2A1, 2A2, 2B1, and l
- i 12B2):and two manual (A3 and B3) RPS channels. Only the automatic channels Jare modeled in this analysis.
]
The Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (CRDHS) pt vides the motive force v:for the rapid insertion of the control rods in response to the reactor scram signal from the RPS. Only operation of the CRD accumulators is
_modeled.in this analysis. No credit is taken for the alternate drive water path directly from the reactor vessel. Also, only the scram inlet n
pair) controlling their air supply are currently modeled. No credit is taken for the backup scram valves or the recently installed Alternate Rod
~ $
^
Injection (ARI) valves.
'2 During normal operation, 120 VAC kPS Bus 2A maintains scram pilot solenoid'
-valves 2-FSV-85-39A.(1-185)* in the energized state and 120 VAC RPS Bus 2B t
energizes scram pilot solenoid valves 2-FSV-85-39B (1-185)*.
Both "A" and "B" scram pilot solenoid valves are deenergized to vent air off of their associated scram inlet and outlet valve pair thereby allowing insertion of 7
a control rod.
'r E31 _One "A" channel and one "B" channel ("one-out-of-two-taken-twice") must be actuated to initiate a reactor scram. This logic is normally energized and is deenergized for actuation.
4 These power supplies are powered. from 120 VAC RPS Bus 2A and supply power r
to the RPS division IA and IIA logic listed. This normally energized
' logic-is deenergized to initiate a-reactor scram. Therefore, these power supplies are not required for-control rod injection and are noted as uuch on the support-frontline dependency matrix. The power supplien'are accounted for on the support-support matrix on the 120 VAC RPS Bus level.
7
'n
- 5 These power supplies are powered from 120 VAC RPS Bus 2B and supply power to the-RPS division IB and IIB logie listed. This normally energized
. logic is deenergized to' initiate-a reactor scram. Therefore, these power
-supplies are not required for control rod injection and are noted as such
.i on.the support-frontline. dependency matrix. The power supplies are accounted for on the support-support matrix on the 120 VAC RPS Bus level.
6 Scram inlet valves 2-FCV-85-39A (1-185)* and scram outlet valves 2-PCV-85-39B (1-185)* are maintained in'the closed position by plant control air during normal operation. Air is vented off both the scram 1
' inlet valve and the scram outlet valve to inject the ossociated control jf,
. rod.
.;r
~*There are 185 control rod drive units each having a scram inlet and Q[j,
outlet valve pair and an associated serem pilot solenoid valve pair.
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