ML20028A092

LER 82-119/03L-0:on 821010,while in Mode 2,OB Vaporizer Concentrate Train Could Not Maintain Required 0.125-inch Water Positive Pressure Relative to Adjacent Areas.Caused by Loose Louver Blade Blocking Ductwork.Blade Repaired

ML20028A092
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	11/08/1982
From:	Wittenburg K COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20028A089	List: ML20028A088 ML20028A092
References
LER-82-119-03L, LER-82-119-3L, NUDOCS 8211160400
Download: ML20028A092 (2)

Text

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT DONTAOL BLOCK: l 1

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DATE 8 M 61 DOCKET NwMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES h l

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,;3j l Te...nical Specification 3.7.2 requires the control room emergency filtration system [

3 ;,i l train to be operable. On October 10, 1982 while in mode 2 the "0B" VC train could l 0 ;3; ;

not maintain the required .125 inches' of water positive pressure relative to the [

O is j l adjacent areas. Later that day the Reactor Mode Switch was moved to the run position.;

3 57; l The health and safety of plant personnel was maintained at all times since the [

,,,j ; redundant "A" VC train was available to maintain the required positive pressure. [

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,.,l Tne inlet ductwork was blocked by a losse louver blade and several manual damoers [

were not in thei r original posi tion. The loose louver blade was repaired and the l g9 nanual danpers were restored'to their original position. All shift engineers have l l

been inforred not to change modes under this Technical Specification. l 60 s*0AE4 OTME A OTATUS is O R ==vERY OESCRIPTION ST A

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't. LER NUMBER: 82-Il9/03L-0

11. LASALLE COUNTY STATION: Unit i 111. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-373 IV. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Technical Specification 3.7 2. requires that the control room emergency filtration system train shall be operable in a'l operational conditions.

On October 10,1982 at 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br /> during Startup mode, the "0B" VC train could not maintain .125 inches of water positive pressure relative to the adjacent areas as required by Technical Specification 4.7.2.d.3 Technical Specification 3 0.4. states that entry into an operational con-

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dition shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the Action requirements. At 1845 hours0.0214 days <br />0.513 hours <br />0.00305 weeks <br />7.020225e-4 months <br /> on October 10, 1982 the Reactor Mode Switch was moved to the run position.

V. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The health and safety of plant personnel was maintained at all times since the redundant "A" VC train was available to maintain the required posi tive pressure and no hazardous releases occurred.

VI. CAUSE:

The Mechanical Maintenance group found that one of the lower blades had come loose and was blocking the inlet ductwork. The operating department found that several of the manual dampers were not in their original posi-tions.

With regard to the changing of modes, the~ shif t engineer failed to recognize that the technical 'secifications precluded changing modes under the action item concerning the control room ventilation.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Vil.

Tne "A" Train aas used to maintain the .125 inch positive pressure in the Control Room. To regaia the required positive pressure from the "B" control room ventilation systen, the operating department repositioned several dampers to their original positions. In addition the broken louver was repaired.

Each shif t engineer was inforned by an operating engineer as to the over-sight involving changing the mode switch.

Prepared by: Ke rmi t C. Wittenburg