ML20024F744

LER 90-021-00:on 901113,ESF Actuation & Feedwater Isolation Occurred During MSIV Stroke Testing.Caused by Operator Error.Feedwater Isolation Signal Reset & Isolation Valves reopened.W/901214 Ltr

ML20024F744
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	12/14/1990
From:	Noonan T DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-021, LER-90-21, ND3MNO:3076, NUDOCS 9012170158
Download: ML20024F744 (6)

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..A d M 3,. w ,,<ci4 m mo +333 Noveiii Cnur V O Ev>n a s,m,,,an...i r a ison.m December 14, 1990 ND3MNO:3076 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 LER 90-021-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 90-021-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.iv, "ESF Actuation -

Feedwater Isolation During Main Steam Isolation Valve Stroke Testing".

Very truly yours, gf. 02%eask.:

As.

O T. P. Noonan General Manager Nuclear Operations JGT/sl Attachment 9012170159 901214 DR ADOCK0500,g2 g

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Dacomb2r 14, 1990 l

, ND3MNot3076 Pr,ge two cc Mr. T. T. Martin, Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 i 475 Allendale Road l King of Prussia, PA 19406

c. A. Rotock, Ohio Edison 76 S. Main Street Akron, OH 44308 Mr. A. DeAgazio, BVPS Licensing Project Manager l United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 J. Beall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, BVPS Senior Resident Inspector Larry Beck Cleveland Electric 6200 Oak Tree Blvd.

Independence, Ohio 44101 INPO Records Center '

Suite 1500 1100 circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339 G. E. Muckle, Factory Mutual Engineering 680 Anderson Drive #BLD10 Pittsburgh, PA 15220-2773 Mr. J. N. Steinmetz, Operating Plant Projects Manager Mid Atlantic Area Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Service Division Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Mr. Richard Janati Department of. Environmental Resources i -P. O. Box 2063 16th Floor, Fulton Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 l Director, Safety Evaluation & Control L Virginia Electric & Power Co.

P.O. Box 26666 One James River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261-

Dscambar 14, 1990 14D3MNO: 3076 Page three l

W. 11articy Management Analysis Company ,

112671 liigh Bluff Drive I San Diego, CA 92130-2025 J. M. Riddle NUS Operating Service Corporation Park West II Cliff Mine Road Pittsburgh, PA 15275 l

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1. ACELif V 9e AMI 06 ' DOC & ti NUW98 R til I AUt L3' Beavor Valley Power Station Unit 2 o is i o lo ; o j 4l 1; 2 i jorl 0l 3 flik J let ESF Actuation - Foodwater isolation During Main Steam ist.lation Valve Stroke Testing IVINT DAf t 'll Lt M IvuM$t h (Si plPORT Datt it OTHth f ACILitillINv0LVED 49t MONTH DAV YEAA vtAR ,,b 7/M",' VON 1w DAY Yl AT f *C Lit e hawlt 90C E E 1 NUVDt R S:

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4 8,'D Pm A SB XXXX N l X I X(X l 1 1 i l I 1 i l i I I I I I I I I I I ! I I I I SUPPLIMINT AL AtPORT t kPlCit0 nel MON 1H DAv viam Svev S$ ION D ,ts m ,. ane, usrectro svowss,oN ea rta y No l l l cost a AC; m-, ,, ,m .. i . . . .,n. v ,aw .y. . w...,me ,-.., n ei On 11/13/90 at 0001 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, with the Unit in Hot Shutdown (Operating Mode 4) a plant heatup to less than 3SOF was in progress. Operatkons personnel were preparing to perform partial stroking of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) as a

-prerequisite to entry to Hot Standby (Operating Mode 3). The initial conditions for the surveillance testing required the MSIVs to be fully open. The '! A" MSIV, 2 MSS *AOV101A, was to be stroked first, however the valve was shut. As the operator opened the valve, to a depressurized steam header, the increased steam flow required to pressurize the steam header resulted in a

" swell" of the steam generator level in the "A" steam generator. The level increased from 34% to greater than 75%

causing a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWI), at 0442 hours0.00512 days <br />0.123 hours <br />7.308201e-4 weeks <br />1.68181e-4 months <br />. .The FWI signal caused the closure of feedwater containment isolation valves. The cause for this event was due to operator error.

The main steam header was not pressurized prior to opening of the MSIV as. required by procedure. The FWI sinnal was reset and the foodwater containment isolation valves were reopened at 0448 hours0.00519 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.407407e-4 weeks <br />1.70464e-4 months <br />. There were no safety implications as a result of this event. The feedwater containment isolation valves closed as designed upon receipt of the FWI signal. All other components actuated by the FWI si-gnal were not in service.

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Ojo 0j 2 or 0 l3 textm,,.= =.. . Mi ==c,,-,mm.nm DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 11/13/90 at 0001 hours, with the Unit in Hot Shutdown (Operating Mode 4), a plant heatup to less than 350F was in progress. The reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature was 305F and RCS pressure was 400 psig. The pressure in the steam generators was 40 psig. Operations personnel were preparing to perform partial stroking of the main steam isolation valves (MSIV), as a prercquisite to entry into Hot Standby (Operating Mode 3). The initial conditions for the surveillance testing required the MS1Vs to be fully open. The "A" MSIV, 2 MSS *AOV101A, was to be stroked first, however the valvo was shut. A normal operating procedure is available to guide the operator in the steps required to pressurize the steam header (opening the bypass valve around the MSIV to reduce the pressure differential and increano steam header pressure prior to opening the MSIV), however this procedure was not consulted. As the operator opened the MSIV, to a depressurized steam header, the increased steam flow required to pressurize the steam header resulted in a " swell" of the steam generator loval in the "A" steam generator. The level increased from 34% to greator than 75% causing a Feedwater Isolation Signal (FWI), at 0442 hours0.00512 days <br />0.123 hours <br />7.308201e-4 weeks <br />1.68181e-4 months <br />.

The FWI signal caused the closure of feedwater containment isolation valves. All other components actuated by the FWI isolation signal (main foodwater regulating valves, bypass feedwater regulating foodwater pump and main foodwater pumps) were valves,instartup not service and therefore did not actuate. The Muclear Regulatory Commission was notified of this Engineered Safety Features actuation at 0620 hours0.00718 days <br />0.172 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.3591e-4 months <br />.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause for t'his event was operator error. The operator, while attempting to establish the initial conditions for the test (MSIV fully open), failed to equalizo pressure across the valve prior to opening the MSIV using the normal operating procedure. This resu)+-d in increased steam flow which pres,surized the steam headu resulting in a " swell" of the steam generator level in the "A" steam generator. Specific procedural guidance, for pressurizing the steam header if the MSIVs were not open, was not in the surveillance test.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS l The following corrective actions have been or will be taken as a result of this event:

1. The FWI signal was reset and the feedwater containment isolation valves were reopened at 0448 hours0.00519 days <br />0.124 hours <br />7.407407e-4 weeks <br />1.70464e-4 months <br />.

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. M 0,!'%','i, M ANACIMt.Jt"",1'a*~^Me.il?' Mfd h? AND BUDGE f,n A HINGTON 2 0?di DC 70603 I

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2. The surveillance tests for partial stroking of the MSIVs will be revised to include guidance for opening the MSIVs to a depressurized steam header.

3. The involved operator was counseled rogarding the actions performed during this event.

4. This event will be covered at a future Retraining session with all Unit 1 and 2 Operations personnel emphasizing the requirements for use of procedures.

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5. An engineering evaluation has been performed to address the potential for piping damage subsequent to this event. No concerns were identified.

REPORTABILITY This event was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 0620 hours0.00718 days <br />0.172 hours <br />0.00103 weeks <br />2.3591e-4 months <br /> in accordance with 10CFR50.72.b.2.11. This written report- is being issued in accordance with 10CFR50.73.a.2.iv, an an event involving an Engineered Safety Features (ESP) system actuation.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES The following similar feedwater isolation events have been previously reported for Unit 2. A review of these events showed

-that none of these events were caused by a failure to use procedures. .

LER 88-011-00 " Automatic Feedwater Isolation" LER 89-015-00 "Foodwater Isolation During Testing Of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump" LER 89-020-00 HInadvertent Start Of Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps"

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