ML20005F890

LER 89-015-01:on 891213,operator Incorrectly Restored Solid State Protection Sys Generating Low Steamline Pressure Safety Injection Signal.Caused by Operator Error.Plant Restored to pre-safety Injection condition.W/900112 Ltr

ML20005F890
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/12/1990
From:	Noonan T DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-015-01, LER-89-15-1, ND3MNO:2011, NUDOCS 9001170357
Download: ML20005F890 (5)

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$hippingpon. FA 4077 0004 January 12, 1990 ND3MNOt2011 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 TIR 89-015-00 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlement In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER. 89-015-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.iv, " Inadvertent Safety Injection During Restoration of the Solid State Protection System".

Very truly yours,

&=J T. P. Noonan General Manager Nuclear Operations cj Attachment

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9001170357 900112 PDR I i ADOCK 05000334 S PDC ('

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'e Jdnuary 12, 1990 NQ3NNO:2011

[ .. Page two cc: Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator j: United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission L Region 1 475.Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

C. A. Roteck, Ohio Edison Mr. Peter Tam, BVPS Licensing Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 J. Beall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, BVPS Senior Resident Inspector Dave Amerine Centerior Energy 6200 Oak Tree Blvd.

Independence, Ohio 44101 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway '

Atlanta, GA 30339 G. E. Muckle, Factory Mutual Engineering, Pittsburgh Mr. J. N. Steinmetz, Operating Plant Projects Manager Mid Atlantic Area Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Service Division Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The Exchange Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032 Mr. Richard Janati Department of Environmental Resources P. O. Box 2063 16th Floor, Fulton Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Director, Safety Evaluation & Control Virginia Electric & Power Co.

P.O. Box 26666 One James River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261 1

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~) vts era m n.. turcreo svouiss oN oArar T] No l l l A st R Act <o-, M ,m M , . . .-., ., ,,, .y. <. .-,,,. oi si On 12/13/89, with the Unit in Cold Shutdown, Operations personnel were performing required tests to allow an escalation in plant modes. Operations personnel were preparing to perform surveillance test (OST) 1.36.4, " Diesel Generator No.2 Automatic Test". In accordance with this procedure, Train "A" of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) had been placed in the

" Test" position. Pretest valve alignments for OST 1.36.4 required the main feedwater regulating valves (MFRV) to be opened. Although not stated in OST 1.36.4, the reactor trip breakers (RTB) are requireci to be closed in order to open the MFRVs. Train "A" RTB could not be closed due to SSPS being in

" Test". It was decided to restore SSPS to allow RTB closure.

An operator was dispatched to restore Train "A" of SSPS. The operator incorrectly restored the SSPS generating a Low Steamline Pressure Safety Injection (SI) Signal. The cause for the event was operator error. The operator failed to utilize an SSPS restoration procedure to restoro the system. The SI was reset, and the plant was restored to the pre-SI condition.

There were no safety implications as a result of this event, The- No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator started as designed and the Train "A" Containment Isolation Valves closed. All other Train "A" equipment was not needed and had been defeated prior to the signal and did not operate.

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DESCRIPTION On 12/13/89 at 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br />, with the Unit in Cold Shutdown, Operations personnel were performing required surveillance tests to allow an escalation in plant modes in support of the plant startup. Operations personnel were preparing to perform operating surveillance test (OST) 1.36.4, " Diesel Generator No.

2 Automatic Test". In accordance with this procedure, Train "A" of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) had been placed in the " Test" position. Operators were verifying pretest valve alignments for OST 1.36.4. One of these alignments required the main feedwater regulating valves (MFRV) to be opened. Although '

not stated in OST 1.36.4, the reactor trip breakers (RTB) were required to be closed in order to open the MFRVs. This was due to a control interlock (Low T-average with the reactor trip breakers open) designed to prevent excessive cooldown following a reactor trip. The Train "A" RTB could not be closed due to the Train "A" SSPS being in " Test". After discussions among the operating shift personnel, it was decided to restore the Train "A" SSPS to " Operate" to allow RTB closure. An operator was ,

dispatched to restore Train "A" of the SSPS. The operator incorrectly restored the SSPS generating a Low Steamline Pressure Safety Injection (SI) Signal at 0615 hours0.00712 days <br />0.171 hours <br />0.00102 weeks <br />2.340075e-4 months <br />.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause for this event was an incorrect restoration of Train "A" of the Solid State Protection System by the operator. The operator failed to follow the procedure for restoration of the SSPS. Performance of the procedure would have resulted in the operator reinstating blocks on safety injection system actuation signals, prior to restoring Train "A" of the SSPS. Failure to reinstate the blocks resulted in generation of a Low Steamline Pressure Safety Injection Signal, since actual plant conditions during shutdown were such that the logic for signal generation was satisfied.

SAFETY INJECTIONS The following information is provided regarding the number of safety injections, to date:

Operational: 23 Pre-operational: 2 l

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- The following corrective actions have been implemented or are l planned as a result of this events

1. Operations personnel reset the safety injection signal and returned the plant to pre-safety injection conditions.

2. A Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES) investigation of this event is in progress. Additional corrective actions are expected to be generated as a +

result of this investigation.

3. The involved operator and supervisory personnel were counseled regarding the inappropriate actions taken during this evolution.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS There were no safety implications to the public as a result of this event. The No. 1 Emergency Diesel Generator started as designed upon receipt of the Safety Injection Signal. The Train "A" Containment Isolation Valves closed as designed. All other Train "A" equipment was not required and had been removed from service ' prior to the signal and did not operate. No injections occurred.

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