ML20006F204

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LER 90-002-00:on 900114,120-volt Ac Inverter for Vital Bus 3 Experienced Blown Dc Input Fuse When Inverter Bypassed & Aligned to 480-volt Ac Emergency Power.Caused by Mgt Action. Administrative Guidance issued.W/900220 Ltr
ML20006F204
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 02/20/1990
From: Noonan T
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-002, LER-90-2, ND3MNO:2028, NUDOCS 9002270257
Download: ML20006F204 (5)
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lelephone (412) 393-6000 . 1 w ;~ Shippingport. PA 15077 0004 February 20, 1990 - ND3MNO:2028 w. Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 0 Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66 LER 90-002-00

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

                        -Document-1 Control Desk Washington, DC- 20555 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Appendix A Beavor Valley Technical . Specifications, the following Lice,nsee Event Report is submitted: LER-90-002-00; 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.1.A, " Plant Shutdown Due to Misinterpretation of Vital Bus operability Requirements". Very truly yours, T. P. Noonan General. Manager,- Nuclear Operations Eci' Attachment 5 2 m

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                 ~ND3MNOt2028                             .

Page.two . i cc: Mr. William T. Russell Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region 1 475 Allendale Road LKing of Prussia, PA 19406 C. A. Roteck, Ohio Edison i Mr. Peter Tam,.BVPS Licensing Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 J. Beall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, BVPS Senior Resident Inspector Dave Amerine Centerior Energy 6200 Oak Tree Blvd. Independence, Ohio 44101 INPO Records' Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle-75 Parkway 

                      . Atlanta,-GA           30339 G. E. Muckle, Factory Mutual Engineering, Pittsburgh Mr.-J. N. Steinmetz, Operating Plant Projects Manager Mid Atlantic Area Westinghouse Electric Corporation                     '

Energy Systems Service Division Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The Exchange Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032 Mr. Richard Janati Department of Environmental Resources P. O. Box 2063 16th Floor, Fulton Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Director, Safety Evaluation & Control Virginia Electric & Power Co. P.O. Box 26666 One James' River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261 l l l

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vE$ ist v.s to,n,^ rte EMECTED SV0ActSSIOn, DATEI No l l l Assi R ACT <-, , , uo <.o . . .,,,.. + r % , m. N, . ,,,..,,,,,,, ,,,,.o n ei On 1/14/90 at 0325. hours, the 120VAC Inverter for Vital Bus No. 3 experienced a blown DC input fuse. The Inverter was bypassed and aligned to the 480VAC Emergency Power to supply the 120VAC No.3 Vital Bus. On 1/19/90, NRC inquired as to the applicability of Technical Specification-(TS) 3.8.2.1, with respect to the No. 3 Inverter. The station has historically interpreted that Vital Bus Operability did not require the inverter to be operable to meet the existing wording of the  ; technical specification. NRC acceptance of revised TS 3.8.2.1 5 (Rev. 5), required the inverters to be operable. After discussions with NRC, station management committed to a revised interpretation of Vital Bus Operability with respect to TS 3.'8.2.1. A voluntary manual shutdown was commenced at 1622 hours on'1/19/90. .The station reached Hot Shutdown at 1808 hours on 1/19/90. At 2015 hours, the No. 3 Inverter was returned to service. At 2115 hours, the No. 3 Inverter was declared operable. The cause for this event was management action in response to NRC discussion as to the intent of the revised TS 3.8.2.1. Administrative guidance has been issued clarifying the intent of 'fS 3.8.2.1. There were no safety implications as a result of this event. The No. 3 Vital Bus remained energized throughout the entire time period the Inverter was out of service. N a,c, ... m

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  • DOCKl1 NUMBER (2) LER NVMSIR 468 PAOE (Il Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit I sta m ma. um e r vw. .aw wrc rom, muv <m DESCRIPTION On 1/14/90 at 0325 hours, with the Unit in Power Operation (Operating Mode 1) at 100 percent reactor power, the 120VAC Inverter for Vital Bus No. 3 experienced a blown DC input fuse.

i This necessitated bypassing the Inverter and realigning the 480VAC Emergency Power as the supply for the 120VAC No.3 Vital Bus. The station remained in this configuration until 1/19/90. On 1/19/90, the-NRC inquired as to the applicability of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.2.1, with respect to the No. 3 

                 . Inverter.       The station has historically interpreted that vital Bus. Operability did not require the inverter to be in service to meet the technical specifications. NRC acceptance of revised TS 3.8.2.1                                                                               After discussio(Rev. ns with5),    required NRC, stationthemanagement inverters to be operable.

committed to a revised interpretation of Vital Bus Operability with respect to TS 3.8.2.1. A review of TS 3.8.2.1 Action Statements prompted a voluntary manual shutdown at 1622 hours on 1/19/90. The station reached Hot Shutdown (Operating Mode 3) at 1808 hours on 1/19/90. At 2015 hours on 1/19/90, the No. 3 Inverter was returned to service. At 2115 hours on 1/19/90, the No. 3 Inverter was declared operable. CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause for this event was management action in response to NRC discussions as to the intent of TS 3.8.2.1 relative to the operability of the 120VAC Vital Busses. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The'following corrective actions have been taken as a result of this event:

1. The No. 3 Inverter was returned to service and declared operable on 1/19/90 at 2115 hours.
2. Administrative guidelines have been issued to all Operations personnel at both Units, specifying the actions to be taken in the event that an inverter is out of service or not capable of operation. This action is consistent with TS 3.8.2.1 until such time that a TS change is incorporated.

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3. ' Technical Specification Amendment Requests have been submitted, for both Units. The request will. change TS 3.8.2.1 to reflect Standardized Technical Specifications Revision 5, clarifying the 120VAC Vital Busses operability requirements. (Technical' l Specification Change Requests: 1A-179 and 2A-39).

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                , SAFETY IMPLICATIONS There were no safety implications as a result of this event..

The No. 3 120VAC Vital Bus romained energized through the redundant power supply throughout the time period the No.3 120VAC Vital Bus Inverter was unavailable. The 120VAC alternate supply is Class 3E, seismic, operating with Emergency Diesel' Generator backup to the -480VAC normal supply. Operation with an Inverter unavailable or not supplying the-120VAC Vital Bus is 

                -discussed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)

Section 8.5.4 "120VAC Vital Bus System" and was also acknowledged in the Safety Evaluation Report for Beaver Valley

1. Beaver Valley 1 was noted as one of several plants that have no limitations in'their technical specifications applicable to bypass operation on the vital bus in NRC Generic Issue 48 documentation.

REPORTABILITY This written report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.a.2.1.A, as an event which resulto in-the completion of a plant shutdown. 

                 ' PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES This is the first occurrence of this type involving the-120VAC Vital-Bus System. There have been previous reported events involving a loss of inverters which resulted in actuations of the~ Reactor Protection System (RPS) or the Engineered Safety Features (ESP) Systems.

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