ML19332D232

LER 89-026-00:on 891020,automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Caused Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation. Caused by Inadequate Communications & Radiation Monitor Setpoint.Setpoint adjusted.W/891120 Ltr

ML19332D232
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	11/20/1989
From:	Noonan T DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-026, LER-89-26, ND3MNO:1990, NUDOCS 8911300189
Download: ML19332D232 (6)

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'Af Teicphonte (41h 3916i00 P O Dos 4 StuppinDoort PA 15077 6 November 20, 1989 ND3MNO 1990 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412, License No. NPF-73 LER 89-026-00 i

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

In accordance with Appendix A, Beaver Valley Technical Specifications, the following Licensee Event Report is submitted:

LER 89-026-00, 10 CFR 50.73.a.2.iv, " Inadvertent Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation - Engineered Safety Features Actuation".

Dwsa T. P. Noonan General Manager Nuclear Operations i

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6913300189 891120 PDR ADOCK 05000412 S PDC l

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, Nov mber 20, 1989 i ND3MNO:1990  !

Page two cc: Mr. William T. Russell  !'

Regional Administrator United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i Region 1 l 475 Allendale Road l King of Prussia, PA 19406 [

C. A. Roteck, Ohio Edison l Mr. Peter Tam, BVPS Licensing Project Manager United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, DC 20555 '

J.-Beall, Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  ;

BVPS Senior Resident Inspector .

Dave Amerine  !

Centerior Energy  !

6200 Oak Tree Blvd. 2 Independence, Ohio 44101 l t

INPO Records Center .

Suite 1500  !

1100 circle 75 Parkway ,

Atlanta, GA- 30339 '

G. E. Muckle, Factory Mutual Engineering, Pittsburgh  ;

Mr. J. N. Steinmetz, Operating Plant Projects Manager Mid Atlantic Area Westinghouse Electric Corporation Energy Systems Service Division Box 355 .

Pittsburgh, PA 15230 ,

American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The. Exchange Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032 Mr. Richard Janati Department of Environmental Resources  !

P. O. Box 2063 r 16th Floor, Fulton Building Harrisburg, PA 17120 Director, Safety Evaluation & Control i Virginia Electric & Power Co. .

P.O. Box 2G666 One James River Plaza Richmond, VA 23261 i

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T no l l l An i A AC T ,e ,, ,, , = ,. , . ,,,,.. .,, a, . .. . . ,,,..-,,,, nei on 10/20/89 at 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, with the Unit in Power Operation at 100% reactor power, Operations personnel were performing testing of the Solid State Protection System. A portion of this testing involves starting of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps. An automatic start of the AFW pumps causes a steam generator blowdown (SGBD) isolation. Prior to the automatic start signal, the radiation technician inputs an increased high radiation setpoint to the SGBD sample radiation monitor, 2SSR-RQ100, to prevent inadvertent SGBD isolations due to residual activity in the sample pathway. This channel is then continuously monitored. During this test, the radiation technician adjusted the setpoint on the wrong radiation monitor, 2SGC-RQ100. Following the start of the AFW pumps, the operators restored the SGBD system to normal arrangement in accordance with the surveillance procedure. This system manipulation swept residual activity into the SGBD sample monitor, 2SSR-RQ100, causing the SGBD isolation. The isolation is considered an Engineered Safety Features system actuation and reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. Tha SGBD system was restored to normal arrangement. An Engineering evaluation is in progress to raise the setpoint on 2SSR-RQ100, with defeating and monitoring as an interim measure.

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Op 0l2 0F 0l4 TpT & assee were m sogareW, use emponsiMtc ,erm JutLA D107) i DESCRIPTION On 10/20/89 at 1345 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00222 weeks <br />5.117725e-4 months <br />, with the Unit in Power Operation at 100% reactor power, Operations personnel were performing testing of the Solid State Protection System. A portion of this testing involves starting of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps. An automatic start of the AFW purns causes a steam generator blowdown (SGBD) isolation. Pric to the start of the AFW pumps and the SGBD isolation, the etpoint of the SGBD sample s radiation monitor, 2SSR-RQ100, is adjusted to allow SGBD system manipulations. The radiation technician inputs an increased  !

high radiation setpoint to the SGBD sample radiation monitor and continuously monitors the channel, 2SSR-RQ100, to prevent -

inadvertent SGBD isolations due to residual activity in the sample pathway. During the performance of this test, the radiation technician adjusted the setpoint on an incorrect radiation monitor, 2SGC-RQ100. Following the start of the AFW pumps, the operators restored the SGBD system to normal arrangement in accordance with the surveillance procedure. The restoration of the SGBD system resulted in residual activity, ,

from a previous steam generator tube leak (

Reference:

LER 89-021-00), being swept into the SGBD sample radiation monitor, '

2SSR-RQ100. The SGBD sample radiation monitor momentarily .

alarmed high and caused the closure of the SGBD isolation valves, 2BDG-AOV100A-1, 100B-1 and 100C-1, which also serve as contaimnent isolation valves. This closure is considered an Engineered Safety Features (ESP) actuation.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause of the event was due to a combination of: inadequate communications between Operations and Radiation Control personnel, the residual activity deposited within the steam ,

generator blowdown system from a previous steam generator tube leak and the radiation monitor setpoint for 2SSR-RQ100. The

• nomenclature used to designate the two radiation monitors (2SSR-RQ100 and 2SGC-RQ100) also contributed to this event. The radiation monitor equipment designation was inadequately communicated to the Radiation Control technician performing the setpoint change. This resulted in the Radiation Control technician changing the setpoint on the wrong monitor. The residual activity deposited within the steam generator blowdown and blowdown sample system, from a previous steam generator tube leak, results in a relatively low level activity spike which is swept into the radiation monitor during steam generator blowdown system or steam generator blowdown sample system pertubations.

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Bzver Valley Power Station. Unit 2 o l6 l0 j o l0 l4 l1l 2 Ol2l 6 0l0 01 3 0F 0l4 819 isx, ren., ume e me. .oor w oc ,s.nuw nn The design basis of the current high alarm setpoint on the SGBD sample radiation monitor allows for the detection of primary-to-secondary leakage while limiting the secondary liquid concentration to less than 1.0E-5 microcuries per cubic centimeter, minimizing the buildup of steam generator blowdown demineralizer activity.

Due to the deposition of low level activity in the sample system from a previous steam generator tube leak (reference LER 89-021-00), manipulations of the SGBD system result in sufficient activity being swept into the radiation monitor, causing a high alarm and SGBD system isolation. The steam generator blowdown restoration procedure was also deficient in coordinating the inter-group communications between Operations and Radiation Control personne) involved with this evolution.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The following corrective actions have been or will be taken as a result of this event:

Short-term actions

1. The correct radiation monitor setpont was adjusted to allow SGBD system restoration.

2. Procedure changes have been incorporated to improve the inter-group communications during steam generator blowdown system manipulations. Additional independent verifications of the radiation monitor setpoint change will be incorporated into the steam generator blowdown system procedures.

Lona-term actions

1. An Engineering Memorandum has been issued requesting an Engineering evaluation of the design basis for the high  ;

alarm setpoint for 2SSR-RQ100, with the intent of raising the setpoint to a level allowing for the quick detection of a primary-to secondary tube leak, while eliminating unnecessary system isolations. New setpoints have been identified and are currently under evaluation for issuance.

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SAFETY IMPLICATIONS There were no saf6ty implications to the public as a result of this event because tr.e radiation monitor actuated as designed to  :

isolate the blowdown system in the event of any steam generator ,

tube leakage. The low level activity was only a momentary ,

excursion due to the residual activity in the piping. The monitor's alarm setpoint is less than 10% of the allowed. limits for normal Power Operation (

Reference:

Beaver Valley Unit 2 UFSAR Table 15-0.8). This is an administrative limit chosen to control the contamination to the uncontrolled secondary plant systems in the event of a steam generator tube leak.

r REPORTABILITY This event was reported as an Engineered Safety Features (ESP)  !

System Actuation, in accordance with 10CFR50.72.b.2.ii, at 1520 '

hours on 10/21/89. This written report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.a.2.1v.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES There has been one previous reported event (

Reference:

LER 89-024-00), involving an Engineered Safety Features (ESP)

Actuation during steam generator blowdown system manipulations.

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