ML20005F192

LER 89-025-00:on 891208,Tech Spec Action Statement Entered When Ventilation Ducts Penetrating Fire Barrier Could Not Be Accessed to Determine If Fire Dampers Installed.On 891211, Fire Watch Missed.Caused by Personnel error.W/900110 Ltr

ML20005F192
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	01/10/1990
From:	Osborne J, Russell L BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-025, LER-89-25, NUDOCS 9001160035
Download: ML20005F192 (5)

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GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER e P.O. BOX 1475 e BALTIMORE MARYLAND 21203 1475-

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' CALVERT CLIFFB NUClut POWER PLANT DLPARTRIENT l CALVE'J CUFFS NUCLEAR PO%fR PLANT

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. January 10, 1990' i l

. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50-317 Document Control Desk License No. DPR 53 Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Si rs:

(

Thefattached LER 89-25, Revision 0, is being sent to you as required under 10- l CFRJ50.73 guidelines.

Should you have any questi6ns regarding this report, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very.truly yours,

- L.sB. Russell Manager-Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Department JMO:sw.

cc: William T. Russell Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control Messrs: G.-C. Creel C. H. Cruse R. E. Denton J. R. Lemons 9001160035 900110 PDR ADOCK 0500031'7 g PDC p i

NR,C ewa see- u.s. NUCLEMEiuLATORY COMMWSION t APPROVED oms N3. 31to-41M LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) '"Na' $ * *"

f ACILITY NAME til DOCKET NUMBER ut FAGE G Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 015 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 3 l 1 l7 1 lOFl ol4 Technical Specification Violation -

Missed Fire htch Tour than to Ibrsomel Ermr

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBE R ARE A CODE John M. Osborne, Licensirg Ergineer 3;O;1 2;6;O; i 4; 3 8i g4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR E ACH COMPONENT F AILURE DESCRitED IN TH18 REPORT (13)

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} NO nI6 O I1 9 In AssTRACT tL~r se ruo noues. a. somunewy roomn sonpro wuo tvorarem neon t1st On December 8, 1989, the Action Statement for Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.12 was entered as a precautionary measure. It had been determined that ventilation ducts penetrating a TS fire barrier could not be accessed to determine if

(. fire dampers were installed. For one barrier, there is smoke detection on both sides i

of the barrier, but automatic sprinklers only on one side. Therefore, an hourly fire watch tour was initiated, j On December 11, 1989, the hourly fire watch tour was missed at midnight. The hourly l tour at 2300 on December 10, 1989 and the hourly tour at 0100 on December 11, 1989

, were performed. Unit 1 was in cold shutdown (MODE 5) during the incident.

L l The cause of the event has been determined to be cognitive personnel error. Lack of management oversight contributed to the event.

A contract fire brigade member was assigned to perform this tour at midnight. The tour was not performed. There was no program in place to insure that this assignment was carried out. To prevent future events of this type, a single contract fire brigade member is assigned, as their l primary responsibility, to perform all hourly fire watch tours on his shift. A supplemental LER will be submitted to address additional corrective actions that are under review.

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N a C Form 366 GSD

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0l0 0l2 OF 0l4 itxtrn  % ., M,mcr m m I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT l.

As part of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear- Power Plant's ongoing review of fire dampers (see LERs 50 318/89-10 and 50-317/89-11), all fire dampers or locations where fire dampers should be installed are being reviewed. It was discovered on December 8, 1989, that the supply and exhaust ducts for the battery rooms did not have inspection potts where these ducts pass through the Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room (CSR) into the Unit 1 1B Cable Chase (CC1B) and from CC1B into Unit 1 Cable Chase 1A (CClA). - As a precautionary measure the Action Statement j for Technical Specification 3.7.12, Penetration Fire Barriers was entered. This  !

occurred December 8, 1989 while the Unit was in cold shutdown (MODE 5) . The l reactor coolant system temperature was 115 F and pressure was atmospheric.

l l In accordance with Action Statement 3.7.12.a, the operability of the automatic I sprinkler in room CC1B and CC1A was verified and therefore, no fire watch was necessary. There is no automatic. sprinkler in - the CSR but there is smoke detection. As a result, en hourly fire watch tour was initiated. The fire I watch tour was performed by a member of the Safety and Fire Protection Unit ,

contract fire brigade. A roster of hourly tour assignments was_ posted for each l shift, with a different person assigned each tour. l I

L At 0025, December 11, 1989, the Shift Supervisor contacted the.on shift Fire and l Safety Technician (FAST) to inquire about the midnight fire watch tour. At L 0200, the FAST had completed verification that the midnight tour had been missed. I l l l

1

.. 1 II. CAUSE OF EVENT l The root cause of this event was a cognitive personnel error in missing an j assigned duty. A contributing cause was a lack of management oversight to make  ;

certain the duty was performed. The practice of assigning a different person to

-perform the fire watch patrol each hour had been used in the past without l l similar incident. The contract of this fire brigade member has expired and was I l

not renewed. No unusual characteristics of the work location contributed to the event.

The Action Statement of the Technical Specifications was entered as a precautionary measure. The battery room supply and exhaust ducts are routed  ;

from the battery rooms through the Cable Spreading Rooms and Cable Chases 1A and l 1B. Where the ducts penetrate the barrier between the Unit 1 CSR and CC1B and between CC1B and CClA, there are no access hatches to use to determine if fire dampers are present. Other barrier penetrations of these ducts such as, into the battery room and between the Unit 2 and Unit 1 CSRs, do have fire dampers.

I When the access hatches are cut and a determination as to the presence of fire dampers is made, a reportability evaluation on this issue will be made. There is currently a Field Engineering Change Request and a Maintenance Order has been initiated to fabricate the access hatches, i

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II I '. ANALYSIS OF EVENT  !

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The event is considered reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B),

"any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." The l conditions of Action Statement 3.7.12.a were not met.

i

. Although the _ Action Statement as defined by the Technical Specifications was violated, no adverse safety consequences resulted from. the event. Both of the ,

Cable Chases have automatic sprinklers and smoke detection. These systems will prevent a fire from reaching the point where the fire barrier would be threatened. There is a total flooding flalon 1301 system actuated by smoke detectors in the CSR. . The ability of the llalon system; to maintain concentration in terms of the duct work and dampers is not affected. The battery room ventilation system has no openings into the CSR. The 11alon system was tested in the existing configuration. The llalon system and smoke detectors are designed to prevent a firo from threatening the barriers. There is no direct path for heat and smoke to travel between these areas unless the duct r work were to;actually fail.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The immediate corrective action was to resume the fire watch the next hour.

To prevent similar events in the future the following corrective ac. ions have been taken:

- A single - fire brigade . member is assigned by the FAST to perform the fire watch tour for the entire shift. This is that person's primary responsibility during the shift. This will be proceduralized.

- The Safety and Fire Protection Unit personnel were made aware of the importance of performing the fire watch tour by required reading of the corrective actions that will be proceduralized.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATIOJ There have been no previous similar events involving missed fire watch tours as i

described in Section II,above.

A supplemental LER will be submitted to address additional corrective actions that are under review.

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i 1 IDENTIFICATION OF COMPONENTS REFERRED TO IN THIS 1.ER I

IEEE 803 IEEE 805 i

-Component EIIS Funct. System ID

. . 1 Fire Damper DMP VF l Automatic Sprinkler SRNK KP  !

Smoke Detector DET IC l Halon System KQ Battery Room Ventilation System DUCT VF I

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NRC FORM 366A *U.S. Cro 1989 526-584 00070

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