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f February 27, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Docket No. 50 317 Document Control Desk License No. DPR 53 p
Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Sirs:
The attached LER 89-26, Revision 0, is.being sent to you as required under 10 CFR 50.73 guidelines.
Should you have_any questions regarding this report, we would be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours,
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W R.k.Denton Manager 1
DWM/1r cc: William T. Russell Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control Messrs:
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Aesn AC, su~, u. sex Ma., s. aan.mw., e.n.,. u r. r.-n.. n. s,.w u s, On November 22, 1989, samples of fuel were taken from both Fuel 011 Storage Tanks (FOSTs) in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.b.
The samples were taken from the top third, middle third, lower third and bottom of each tank. The samples were analyzed and on November 28, 1989 it was determined that the particulate levels in the samples taken from the lower third of both tanks exceeded allowable limits. After careful consideration of the fuel filter design, the alarm setpoint, the operating history of the filter, and the other controls, we determined this item not to be reportable.
Both tanks were emptied, cleaned and filled with clean fuel oil.
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Fuel sampling of the FOSTs will include taking an extra sample from the bottom of the tanks in addition to the three presently taken.
All sample analysis results, including trends, will be provided to the system engineer.
A review will be conducted to determine the optimal amount and frequency of biocide addition to prevent biological growth in the tanks.
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DISCUSSION On November 22, 1989, while Unit I was in Mode 5 and Unit 2 was defueled, i
samples of fuel were taken from both Fuel Oil Storage Tanks (FOSTs) (EIIS DC TK) in accordance with Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.b.
The samples were taken from the top third, middle ' third, lower third and bottom of each tank.
The samples were analyzed and on November 28, 1989 it was determined that the particulate levels in the samples taken from the lower third of both tanks i
exceeded allowable limits. Table 1 of ASTM Standard ANSI / ASTM D974 81 lists the maximum water and sediment for No. 2 D Crade Diesel Fuel Oil as 0.05 percent by volume. The nonconforming sample from FOST Number 11 contained 3.0 percent particulates and the nonconforming sample from FOST Number 21 contained 2.8 percent particulates. No water was found in the samples.
The control room was notified at 1:30 p.m.
on November 28, 1989.
The Shift Supervisor immt diately commenced actions to verify containment integrity in accordance with Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.8.2.2.
He ensured that the action requirements of LCOs 3.1.2.3 and 3.8.1.2, which require suspension of core alterations, were met.
Upon notification of the condition, the Shift Supervisor initiated a reportability review in accordance with Calvert Cliffs Instruction C01 118.
At 9:00 a.m.
on November 29,1989 he determined that this condition required a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> telephone report in accordance with Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) paragraph 50.72 (b)(2)(iii).
It was determined on December 6, 1989 that this condition was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.73.
After further review, we have determined that a voluntary report is appropriate.
A laboratory analysis of the particulates in the FOSTs determined them to be normal bottom sediment.
The analysis concluded that the sediment consisted of dissolved metal material from normal degradation of the tank lining, dead biological matter from the annual use of a blocide and normal fuel by products from the effects of temperature changes on the fuel.
The amount, type and location of the sediment indicates that it built up gradually over a long period of time.
Fuel in the FOSTs is recirculated monthly.
The fuel in the tank had been recirculated and new fuel had been added to the tank within two days prior to its being sampled.
This caused the bottom sediment, which had not previously been detected at the level at which the samples were taken, to rise above the level of the outlet line (EIIS DC-0UT) from the tank.
The sediment settled back below the outlet within 3 days.
During this time, any fuel transferred from either of the FOSTs would have had a high sediment level.
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rnn w==.e m e = = 1, : _ me n,muw nn Monthly recirculation of the FOSTs has been performed since September 9, 1985.
Since that time, there have been approximately three days per month when contaminated fuel could have been passed to the day tanks (EIIS DC TK).
High particulate levels were not found in the day tanks when they were cleaned and examined in early December, 1989.
Fuel is added to the tanks intermittently.
This also disturbs bottom sediment.
It is probable that in this case, the combination of recirculating the tanks and adding fuel disturbed the bottom particulates more than usual.
One reason this condition was not detected earlier is that, prior to July, 1989, FOST fuel oil samples were taken from the tank drain line (EIIS DC DRN).
The prucedure governing these actions did not require a sufficient amount of oil to l
be drawn off to provide a sample of oil in the tank rather than oil in the drain line.
Suspended solids in the tank which did not enter the drain line would not be detected.
The sampling procedure was revised in July, 1989 to require I
samples to be taken from within the tank itself.
The sample tested in August, l
1989 was within ASTM limits.
A sample taken on November 28, 1989, after the l
particulates had settled back to the bottom of the tank was also within ASTM limits.
j CAUSE OF CONDITION The particulates in the tanks were normal bottom sediment which had built up l
over time.
They had not been discovered previously due to inadequate sampling technique.
l ANALYSIS 1
The POSTS supply fuel to all three Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) (EIIS EK DG).
The suction pipe, located approximately nine inches above the bottom of the POST, leads through a redundant header to one of the three motor driven fuel transfer pumps (EIIS DC P), each of which is associated with an EDG fuel oil day tank.
Each day tank holds enough fuel (485 gallons) to operate its associated EDG for 154 minutes at 3000 kilowatts.
Fuel demand at this load is 3.15 gallons per minute.
From the day tank, fuel oil runs through a 5 micron duel strainer basket filter (EIIS DC FLT) on its way to the EDG.
The basket assembly is of the duplex type which permits flow through one filter at a time.
In the event ora filter becomes fouled, the operation may be switched to the other filter without interrupting EDG operation.
Had dirty fuel passed via the day tank to any EDG, the filter would have removed all of the sediment.
It is possible for particulates to build up on the filter to the point that they restrict fuel flow.
The fuel line is instrumented (EIIS DC PA) to provide g*ow ms
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,,w.,nn indication of low fuel oil pressure in the event that a fouled filter is cutting off the flow of fuel to the EDG.
This signal feeds into the remote EDG combined trouble alarm provided in the control room.
The local fuel flow alarm, based on the pressure change across the filter, is set at 10 psi. This value is half the manufacture's recommended setpoint of 20 psi.
Should the EDG combined trouble alarm sound, an operator would be dispatched to the EDG room, where the low fuel pressure alarm would be sounding, indicating a dirty filter.
The operator would switch flow to the other filter basket and initiate actions to have the dirty filter replaced.
There may be a chance that the filter could back up quickly enough to prevent an operator from switching flow to the other filter basket before flow is cut off to the
- EDG, However, without sufficient data on how fast the filter would have clogged, it is not possible to determine whether or not an operator would have arrived in time to change the filter before fuel flow was constricted to the point that the EDG tripped.
Excessive particulates were not found in the day tanks and hence, did not reach the filters.
A review of the operating history of a recently replaced falter found that impurities had built up gradually over time and that there had been no sudden increase in the amount of sediment collecting on the filter.
After careful consideration of the filter assembly design, the low alarm setpoint, the operating history of the filter, and the other controls described above, we determined this item not to be reportable.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Both tanks were emptied, cleaned and filled with cican fuel oil.
Future sampling of the POSTS will include taking an extra sample from the bottom of the tanks in addit'on to the three presently taken.
The bottom sample will serve as a trend indicator.
All sample analysis results, including trends, will be provided to the-system engineer.
Biocide is presently added to the FOSTs annually to prevent growth of biological matter.
A review will be conducted to determine the optimal amount and frequency of biocide addition to prevent biological growth in the tanks.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
There have been no similar events at Calvert Cliffs which have been described in LERs in which fuel oil quality has threatened operability of the EDGs.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000317/LER-1989-001-01, :on 890208,coordinator Discovered That Since 880825 Three Startups Occurred W/O Operability of Manual Trip Channels Due to Missing Page from Procedure STP-0-6-1. Caused by Lack of Administrative Steps |
- on 890208,coordinator Discovered That Since 880825 Three Startups Occurred W/O Operability of Manual Trip Channels Due to Missing Page from Procedure STP-0-6-1. Caused by Lack of Administrative Steps
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000318/LER-1989-002-01, :on 890228,determined That Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Instructional Memo to Be Issued & Program to Be Initiated |
- on 890228,determined That Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Instructional Memo to Be Issued & Program to Be Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000318/LER-1989-002, :on 890228,discovered That Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable & Action Statement Requirements Not Satisfied.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls. Penetration Returned to Operable Status |
- on 890228,discovered That Fire Barrier Penetration Inoperable & Action Statement Requirements Not Satisfied.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls. Penetration Returned to Operable Status
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-002, :on 890214,Tech Spec Violations Discovered Due to Entry Into Mode 4 W/O Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation Valves & Air Supply Solenoid Valves in Denenergized State |
- on 890214,Tech Spec Violations Discovered Due to Entry Into Mode 4 W/O Containment Purge Exhaust Isolation Valves & Air Supply Solenoid Valves in Denenergized State
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000318/LER-1989-003, :on 890307,plant Shutdown Due to Air Leak on Feedwater Regulating Valve (Frv).Caused by Failure to Identify Need to Perform Adequate Preventive Maint on Positioner.Frv Controller Placed in Manual |
- on 890307,plant Shutdown Due to Air Leak on Feedwater Regulating Valve (Frv).Caused by Failure to Identify Need to Perform Adequate Preventive Maint on Positioner.Frv Controller Placed in Manual
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-003, :on 890319,operators Caused Inadvertent Actuation of ESF by Not Following Procedure step-by-step When Reinstating Block signal.INPO-assisted Formal Human Performance Evaluation Performed |
- on 890319,operators Caused Inadvertent Actuation of ESF by Not Following Procedure step-by-step When Reinstating Block signal.INPO-assisted Formal Human Performance Evaluation Performed
| | | 05000318/LER-1989-004-01, :on 890301,auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry Fire Occurred in Control Room.Caused by Incorrect Overspeed Trip Mechanism Adjustment on Actuator.Procedure Will Be Developed for Aligning Actuator |
- on 890301,auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Circuitry Fire Occurred in Control Room.Caused by Incorrect Overspeed Trip Mechanism Adjustment on Actuator.Procedure Will Be Developed for Aligning Actuator
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-004, :on 890320,while in Mode 5 at 130 Degrees F & 240 Psia Reactor Coolant Temp & Pressure,Operators Caused Inadvertent Partial Actuation of Esf.Event Reviewed W/Each Operations Crew |
- on 890320,while in Mode 5 at 130 Degrees F & 240 Psia Reactor Coolant Temp & Pressure,Operators Caused Inadvertent Partial Actuation of Esf.Event Reviewed W/Each Operations Crew
| | | 05000318/LER-1989-005-01, :on 890323,discovered That Snubber Functional Test Procedure to Satisfy Tech Specs 4.7.8.1.c & D Not Adequate.Caused by Lack of Adequate Control for Procedures. Rev Proposed to Facility Instruction CCI-104 |
- on 890323,discovered That Snubber Functional Test Procedure to Satisfy Tech Specs 4.7.8.1.c & D Not Adequate.Caused by Lack of Adequate Control for Procedures. Rev Proposed to Facility Instruction CCI-104
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-005, :on 890314,instrument Air Boundary Check Valve Determined by Test to Allow Excessive Back Leakage.Caused by Matl Wear Causing Poor Seating Surface.Check Valve Isolated & New Flow Path Was Initiated |
- on 890314,instrument Air Boundary Check Valve Determined by Test to Allow Excessive Back Leakage.Caused by Matl Wear Causing Poor Seating Surface.Check Valve Isolated & New Flow Path Was Initiated
| | | 05000318/LER-1989-006, :on 890417 & 19,discovered Tech Spec Requirement for Containment Closure During Core Alterations Not Satisfied.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Control. Corrective Actions Listed |
- on 890417 & 19,discovered Tech Spec Requirement for Containment Closure During Core Alterations Not Satisfied.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Control. Corrective Actions Listed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-006, :on 890508,containment Iodine Filters Outside Design Basis Due to Equipment Qualification.Recalculation of Total Integrated Radiation Dose to Cables for Filter Fans Demonstrated Cable Qualified |
- on 890508,containment Iodine Filters Outside Design Basis Due to Equipment Qualification.Recalculation of Total Integrated Radiation Dose to Cables for Filter Fans Demonstrated Cable Qualified
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-006-01, :on 890508,containment Iodine Filters Outside Design Basis Could Not Perform Design Function for Length of Time Assumed in FSAR Accident Analysis.Caused by Power Cable No Longer Qualified Beyond 96 H |
- on 890508,containment Iodine Filters Outside Design Basis Could Not Perform Design Function for Length of Time Assumed in FSAR Accident Analysis.Caused by Power Cable No Longer Qualified Beyond 96 H
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-007-01, :on 890317,identified Bent Vertical Support for Piping Restraint on Shutdown Cooling Portion of LPSI Suction Piping.Caused by Slamming Shut of LPSI Pump 12 Discharge Check Valve.Restraint Replaced |
- on 890317,identified Bent Vertical Support for Piping Restraint on Shutdown Cooling Portion of LPSI Suction Piping.Caused by Slamming Shut of LPSI Pump 12 Discharge Check Valve.Restraint Replaced
| | | 05000318/LER-1989-007, :on 890505,evidence of Reactor Coolant Leakage from Unknown Number of Pressurizer Vessel Heater Penetrations & One Pressurizer Vessel Pressure/Level Penetration Noted.Cause Unknown |
- on 890505,evidence of Reactor Coolant Leakage from Unknown Number of Pressurizer Vessel Heater Penetrations & One Pressurizer Vessel Pressure/Level Penetration Noted.Cause Unknown
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000318/LER-1989-008, :on 890327,surveillance Requirement to Perform Type B Local Leak Rate Test at Intervals No Greater than 24 Months Not Met.Caused by Maint Package Not Specifying That Test Had to Be Performed |
- on 890327,surveillance Requirement to Perform Type B Local Leak Rate Test at Intervals No Greater than 24 Months Not Met.Caused by Maint Package Not Specifying That Test Had to Be Performed
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-008-01, :on 890508,engineering Personnel Determined That Instrument Air Supply Tubing Could Not Be Determined to Conform W/Design Requirements for Seismic Support on Eight Valves.Caused by Poor Maint Practices |
- on 890508,engineering Personnel Determined That Instrument Air Supply Tubing Could Not Be Determined to Conform W/Design Requirements for Seismic Support on Eight Valves.Caused by Poor Maint Practices
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000317/LER-1989-009, :on 890515,preliminary Evaluation Concluded That Util May Not Have Adequate Assurance to Bring Down Unit to Cold Shutdown Condition,Per App R Requirements. Caused by Inadequate Procedure |
- on 890515,preliminary Evaluation Concluded That Util May Not Have Adequate Assurance to Bring Down Unit to Cold Shutdown Condition,Per App R Requirements. Caused by Inadequate Procedure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000318/LER-1989-009-01, :on 890522,fire Damper Found in Closed Position by Fire Protection Design Engineer.Caused by Failure of Damper Fusible Link.Link Replaced,Damper Opened & Damper Insp Procedure Improved & Clarified |
- on 890522,fire Damper Found in Closed Position by Fire Protection Design Engineer.Caused by Failure of Damper Fusible Link.Link Replaced,Damper Opened & Damper Insp Procedure Improved & Clarified
| | | 05000318/LER-1989-010-01, :on 890623,determined That Tech Spec Surveillance 4.7.12a Not Performed within Required Time Interval.Caused by Procedural Problem.Overdue Surveillance Performed.Surveillance Procedure Revised |
- on 890623,determined That Tech Spec Surveillance 4.7.12a Not Performed within Required Time Interval.Caused by Procedural Problem.Overdue Surveillance Performed.Surveillance Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-010, :on 890614,determined That High Energy Break Temp Profile Not Correct for 5 Ft East Piping Penetration Room.Cause Not Stated.Equipment Qualification Design Manual Updated to Reflect Correct Temp Profile |
- on 890614,determined That High Energy Break Temp Profile Not Correct for 5 Ft East Piping Penetration Room.Cause Not Stated.Equipment Qualification Design Manual Updated to Reflect Correct Temp Profile
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-011, :on 890630,missing Fire Damper Discovered in Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Sys.Caused by Error in Facilities Change Request That Installed Fire Dampers.Action Statement Entered & 1 H Rept Made |
- on 890630,missing Fire Damper Discovered in Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Sys.Caused by Error in Facilities Change Request That Installed Fire Dampers.Action Statement Entered & 1 H Rept Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000318/LER-1989-011-01, :on 890710,discovered Condition Which Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of Safety Function of Structures or Sys Needed to Mitigate Consequences of Accident.Caused by Nut Failure Due to Inadequate Matl Properties |
- on 890710,discovered Condition Which Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of Safety Function of Structures or Sys Needed to Mitigate Consequences of Accident.Caused by Nut Failure Due to Inadequate Matl Properties
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000318/LER-1989-012-01, :on 891227,core Alterations Performed W/Only One of Two Containment Vent Valves Closed.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Procedures Revised to Include Valve & Surveillance Test Program Instruction Revised |
- on 891227,core Alterations Performed W/Only One of Two Containment Vent Valves Closed.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Procedures Revised to Include Valve & Surveillance Test Program Instruction Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-012, :on 890720,technician Discovered Solenoid Disconnected from Associated Halon Cylinder.Cause Unknown. Halon Sys Declared Inoperable & Hourly Fire Watch Established.Solenoid Reconnected & Verified |
- on 890720,technician Discovered Solenoid Disconnected from Associated Halon Cylinder.Cause Unknown. Halon Sys Declared Inoperable & Hourly Fire Watch Established.Solenoid Reconnected & Verified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-013, :on 890731,missing Steps in Surveillance Test Procedure Discovered Resulting in Failure to Comply W/Tech Spec Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error.Review of Test Procedures Performed to Satisfy Requirements |
- on 890731,missing Steps in Surveillance Test Procedure Discovered Resulting in Failure to Comply W/Tech Spec Surveillance.Caused by Personnel Error.Review of Test Procedures Performed to Satisfy Requirements
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-014, :on 890723,determined That Saltwater Header 12 Incapable of Withstanding Seismic Event Intact & Could Result in Failure of Svc Water Hx.Caused by Inadequate Welding of Spool Pieces.Spool Pieces Repaired |
- on 890723,determined That Saltwater Header 12 Incapable of Withstanding Seismic Event Intact & Could Result in Failure of Svc Water Hx.Caused by Inadequate Welding of Spool Pieces.Spool Pieces Repaired
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-015, :on 890822,determined That Calculations Used to Determine That Dousing Sys for Containment Iodine Filters Not Required to Be Environmentally,In Error.Justification for Continued Operation Will Be Established |
- on 890822,determined That Calculations Used to Determine That Dousing Sys for Containment Iodine Filters Not Required to Be Environmentally,In Error.Justification for Continued Operation Will Be Established
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-016, :on 890908,determined That Resistance Temp Detectors Installed in Hot & Cold Legs of RCS Not Properly Sealed to Prevent Moisture Intrusion.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Design Manual Revised |
- on 890908,determined That Resistance Temp Detectors Installed in Hot & Cold Legs of RCS Not Properly Sealed to Prevent Moisture Intrusion.Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Design Manual Revised
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-017, :on 890907,determined That Discrepancy in Acceptance Criteria of Surveillance Test Procedure M-452-0 Resulted in Failure to Fully Comply W/Requirements of Tech Spec 3.9.12.Main Cause Undetermined |
- on 890907,determined That Discrepancy in Acceptance Criteria of Surveillance Test Procedure M-452-0 Resulted in Failure to Fully Comply W/Requirements of Tech Spec 3.9.12.Main Cause Undetermined
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-018, :on 891106,discovered That Many Air Operated Control Valves & piston-operated Dampers Which Utilize safety-related Air Accumulators Would Not Have Performed as Expected After Loss of Air |
- on 891106,discovered That Many Air Operated Control Valves & piston-operated Dampers Which Utilize safety-related Air Accumulators Would Not Have Performed as Expected After Loss of Air
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000317/LER-1989-019, :on 891128,discovered That HPSI Discharge Header Isolation Valves Not Locked Shut When RCS in Water Solid Condition,Resulting in Operation Outside Design Basis. Procedure Revised to Require Valves Closed |
- on 891128,discovered That HPSI Discharge Header Isolation Valves Not Locked Shut When RCS in Water Solid Condition,Resulting in Operation Outside Design Basis. Procedure Revised to Require Valves Closed
| | | 05000317/LER-1989-020, :on 891113,determined That Some Solenoid Valves & Valve Power Supplies for Saltwater Sys May Not Be Able to Perform Design Function After Design Basis Seismic Event. Cause Undetermined.Power Supplies Upgraded |
- on 891113,determined That Some Solenoid Valves & Valve Power Supplies for Saltwater Sys May Not Be Able to Perform Design Function After Design Basis Seismic Event. Cause Undetermined.Power Supplies Upgraded
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000318/LER-1989-022, :on 891227,core Alterations Performed W/Only One of Two Containment Vent Valves Closed,Violating Tech Specs.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Surveillance Test Procedure Revised to Include Deleted Valves |
- on 891227,core Alterations Performed W/Only One of Two Containment Vent Valves Closed,Violating Tech Specs.Caused by Procedural Deficiency.Surveillance Test Procedure Revised to Include Deleted Valves
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-023-02, Revises Initial Assumption Identified in LER 89-023-02 Re Postulated Rupture in nonsafety-related Svc Water Sys Which Could Cause Failure of Both safety-related Subsystems.Turbine Bldg Piping Will Now Withstand SSE | Revises Initial Assumption Identified in LER 89-023-02 Re Postulated Rupture in nonsafety-related Svc Water Sys Which Could Cause Failure of Both safety-related Subsystems.Turbine Bldg Piping Will Now Withstand SSE | | | 05000317/LER-1989-023, :on 891220,design Deficiency Noted Which Could Result in Unavailability of Both safety-related Svc Water Subsystems.Caused by Design Deficiency.Leak Rate Monitoring Increased |
- on 891220,design Deficiency Noted Which Could Result in Unavailability of Both safety-related Svc Water Subsystems.Caused by Design Deficiency.Leak Rate Monitoring Increased
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000317/LER-1989-024, :on 891218,determined That Wires Which Connect Actuation Device Logic Relay Contacts to Remainder of Circuit Not Tested During Channel Calibr Test.Caused by Inadequate Test.Test Program Upgrade Underway |
- on 891218,determined That Wires Which Connect Actuation Device Logic Relay Contacts to Remainder of Circuit Not Tested During Channel Calibr Test.Caused by Inadequate Test.Test Program Upgrade Underway
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-025, :on 891211,Tech Spec Violation - Missed Fire Watch Tour Occurred Due to Personnel Error |
- on 891211,Tech Spec Violation - Missed Fire Watch Tour Occurred Due to Personnel Error
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000317/LER-1989-026, :on 891128,determined That Particulate Levels in Samples Taken from Lower Third of Tanks Exceeded Allowable Limits.Caused by Inadequate Sampling Technique. Tanks Cleaned & Filled W/Clean Fuel |
- on 891128,determined That Particulate Levels in Samples Taken from Lower Third of Tanks Exceeded Allowable Limits.Caused by Inadequate Sampling Technique. Tanks Cleaned & Filled W/Clean Fuel
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