ML19325C328

LER 89-016-00:on 890908,determined That as-found Condition of Resistance Temp Detectors Did Not Match Tested Configuration.Cause Not Stated.Subj Detectors Will Be Sealed,Per Environ Qualification requirements.W/891010 Ltr

ML19325C328
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	10/10/1989
From:	Furio P, Russell L BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-89-016, LER-89-16, NUDOCS 8910160071
Download: ML19325C328 (4)

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GAS AND

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N CHARLES CENTER

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• BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203-1475-CALVERT CLIFF 8 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DEPARTMENT 1 ; CALVEQt CUFFS NUCLEAA POWER PLAWT - ,

. LUSD4 MARVAND 30657 :

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October.10,-1989 x,

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[U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission DocketNo.50-317L

-Document Control Desk License No. DPR 53- '

Washington, D. C..20555- .

Dear Sirs:

The_ attached LER 89 016 is being sent_to you as required under 10 CFR 50.73'

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t Should you have any questions:regarding this report, we would be pleased to ,

discuss them with you.

Very truly yours, 4 1 4 i s.

. L. B. Ru ell- . .

Maneger alvert Cliffs Nticlear._ Power Plant Department ,;

-PSF:sb cc: William T. Russell Director. Office of Management Information  ;

and Program Control ,

-Messrs: 'G. C. Creel C. H. Cruse H

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8910160071 891010 PDR ADOCK0500g7 ,

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E LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LEW 'ma's er3=

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NVMeER Q4 PAGE (L Calvert Cliffs, Unit 1 015 l 0 l 0 l 0 l3 l 117 1loFl013 TITLE 441 RTDs Not-Environmentally Qualified Due to Unsealed Housitg EVENT DaTE f6) LER NUMMER tel REPORT DATE (7) OTHER F ACILITIES INvDLVED (St MONTH DAY Y E A's 43AR N$n ['f,"$ MONT H DAY YEAR 'aciLITv hawts DOCKE1 NUMBEnts:

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LICENSEE CUNTACT FOR TMis LER (12)

NiME TELEPHONE NUMBER ARE A CODE P. S. Furio, Licensinn Engineer 31011 216 101-14 131714 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOA E ACH COMPONENT F A' LURE DESCRit!O IN THtt ?tPORT (131 R ORT AC- REPORTa E <

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT M(yNC. o hpR CAU5F SYSTEM COMPONEN' " ANN'gg y g pq l i 1 ! I I l l I 1 1 I I I I I ! I l' I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENT AL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 MONTH DAY YEAR SUOMISSION

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] v Es n, ,... ,.,=. raserr0 svewssiOu oA rei ] NO 111 310 8 19 AAiT R A CT <w,,, e m ,,.c., . . . ,.--v ,,, e ,,,,,, -, r-... *, a n ei On September 8, 1989, while Unit 1 was in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was defueled, it was determined that the as-found condition of the resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) did not match the tested configuration. This condition invalidates the environmental qualification of the RTDs. The RTDs provide input to the

. post accident monitoring instrumentation and are governed by Tech Spec 3.3.3.6.

Because the condition existed during MODE 1 operation, the assumed inability of these instruments to function under post-accident conditions constitutes a violation of our Technical Specifications.

A supplemental LER will be submitted to discuss the root cause of the event and any additional corrective actions.

' Prior to restarting either unit, the RTDs will be sealed in accordance with environmental qualification requirements.

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1 U.S. NUCLEO 7.8!ULATDRY COMMtMION y LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT C3NTINUATION uraono ous No. mo-om o! (XPlHES. Br31/N h FACILITT NAhlt q11, "DOCOLki NUMDEM Up LER NUMBER (6) PA06 (31 NsIn eN 0l3 r C21 vert Cliffs,. Unit 1 0 l5 l0 l0 l0 l 3l1l7 81 9 -

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, tur amm. e m-w. w ees w we win asam on DISCUSSION On September 8, 1989, while Unit 1 was in cold shutdown and Unit 2 was defueled..it was determined that the as found condition of the resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) (EIIS IP TW) did not match the tested configuration. This condition invalidates the environmental qualification of the RTDs. .The RTDs provide input to

.the post accident monitoring instrumentation and are governed by Tech Spec 3.3.3.6. >

Because- the ' condition existed during MODE 1 operation, the assumed inability of

-these instruments to function under post-accident conditions constitutes a violation

'of our Technical Specifications.

During this Unit 2 refueling outage, the RTDs were removed fr.im the primary coolant system (EIIS AB) for routine-maintenance. Technical traintag was provided to the maintenance personnel to familiarize them with the envir.inmental qualification requirements of the RTDs. Personnel attending the tiaining noted several discrepancies between the guidance offered in- the training and the condition of the RTDs as found in the field. Engineering personnel were notified and walked down the  ;

. installed RTDs on Unit 1 during the next Unit 1 shutdown (approximately three weeks '

later), The walkdown disclosed the fact that the RTDs were not installed as tested.

The nipple-to base interface in the upper housing was not sealed as the l

environmental qualification tests required. Moisture intrusion could have occurred as.a result of a the. post-accident environment, and the RTD internals-could have

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been affected. ' Design Engineering personnel evaluated the unsealed interface to determine if this condition could be considered environmentally qualified. Their evaluation concluded that~the RTDs were not qualified using the installed

configuration'and, therefore, they were not qualified for post accident operation.

l'l- A supplemental LER will be submitted to discuss the root cause of the event and any additional corrective actions.

I- ANALYSTS The RTDs are installed in the hot and cold legs of the primary coolant system. They provide input into the reactor protection system as well as providing temperature

. indication during normal operation. After an accident, the RTDs provide input to the Subcooled Margin Monitor, which constitutes one of our Inadequate Core Cooling i Instrumentation (ICCI) subsystems. The environmental qualification conditions apply l only to the post-accident environment, therefore, only the post-accident function of l the RTDs was affected by the unsatisfactory seal. l l

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U $. NUCLEAR RESULATO2Y COMMIS$loN LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APeRovio oMe wo sino-om

1. , , EXP6RER- 8131/88 FACILITY OsAMk til DOCKET NUMSth (2) LER NUMBER 163 PAGE (3).

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Calvert Cliffs. Unit 1 0 l5 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 311 l 7 8l9 -

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010 Ol3 0F 0 l3 TEXT (r aos spece a mounov, ese ederene/ NRC Fam JIMA's)(th Our ICCI. consists of three subsystems; the Subcooled Margin Monitor (SMM), the Core Exit Thermocouples (CEls), and the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS).

The SMM.would have been rendered inoperable by the loss of the RTDs. The ICCI is

' designed to remain functional with only one subsystem unavailable. Although our CETs and RVIJiS are installed and functional, they have not been declared OPERABLE and are not yet included in our Technical Specifications, llowever, the systems are functional and meet the surveillance requirements that would be imposed by our proposed Technical Specifications.~ In a post-accident condition, we would rely on these subsystems to provide information about core conditions. Alternative methods for determining if adequate core cooling exists include comparing safety injection flow with system pressure (for large break LOCA) and determining steam generator heat removal (for small break LOCA). Because alternatives to the RTDs exist, there is minimal safety significance associated with the loss of the RTDs.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Prior to restarting either unit, the RTDs will be sealed in accordance with environmental qualification requirements.

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