ML19309F389

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LER 80-023/01T-0:on 800411,during Operational Mode 5,w/ Steam Generators Drained & RCS Level mid-span in Loops, Complete Loss of RHR Flow Occurred While Plant Operators Were Increasing RHR Heat Exchanger Flow
ML19309F389
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 04/23/1980
From: Werling J
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19309F387 List:
References
LER-80-023-01T, LER-80-23-1T, NUDOCS 8004290393
Download: ML19309F389 (2)


Text

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10121lAt 0020 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> when the plant was in operational Mode 5 with the steam generators Icvel mid-span in the loops. RCS l g [dra'.ned and Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

(TTTl I text:perature was 101F and the "B" Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) pump was in l

l l o i s ; l scevice. A complete loss of RHR flow occurred while plant operators were in the ITTTI I process of increasing RHR heat exchancer flow by clos ine down or. the heat exchancer l 1017 ] l hypass valve. At 0020 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, when becinning this evolution,_. pump flow dropped to l 1oIaIlzero as the cump air bound. At this time, the "B" RHR pumo (continaed on attached) SoI SUSCOC'E 5 E CE Co E SUSC E COP.'PCN E N T CODE

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CAUSE DESCRIPrlCN AND CCRRECTivE ACTICMS h l i t o l lThe apparent cause of the incident was that the pump was air bound. This incident not l g lwas not attributed to lack of venting becr use the flow was being diverted, but

,,,,,jincreased. A procedure has been implemen ;ed for a total loss of RHR flow and a l the present time and will be put into operation l g l continuous vent hose is installed at l

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r Attachment To LER 80-23/01T Beaver Valley Power Station Duquesne Light Company Docket No. 50-334 Event Description And Probable Consequences (continued) was shutdown and the "A" RHR Pump was started. (RH-P-1A) showed no flow also so it too was shutdown. Both pumps were then vented plus the RCS loops levels were increased. At 0108 hours0.00125 days <br />0.03 hours <br />1.785714e-4 weeks <br />4.1094e-5 months <br />, the "B" was started satisfactorily and normal conditions were reached at 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br />. There were no implications to the health and safety of the public due to this loss of RHR flow because the prompt action csken to restore flow plus the RCS temperature never increased more than 7F during the incident.

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