ML19031B343

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Energy Northwest Distribution - Volume 13 - Emergency Preparedness Procedures
ML19031B343
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Issue date: 01/16/2019
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML19031B343 (4)


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DISTRIBUTION - VOLUME 13 - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURES Page 3 of 3 Distribution Date: 01/16/19 LAB Filed By:

Procedure Number Revision Procedure Number Revision Procedure Number Revision 13.1.1 049/001 TO: ENERGY NORTHWEST EXTERNAL CONTROLLED COPY PROCEDURE HOLDERS The following documents have been revised and are to be inserted into your controlled copy manual and the superseded revisions removed and destroyed. No receipt acknowledgement is required for the listed document(s).

Should you have questions on this distribution please contact Kim Saenz, Records and Information Supervisor at (509)377-2492 or KDSaenz@energy-northwest.com.

I EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION I Copy# Location Procedures 26 Region IV - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission All 28 Region IV - US Nuclear: ReQulatorv Commission All 52 State of Washington, Military Department All 55 Federal EmerQencv ManaQement AQencv (FEMA) All 57 Benton County - Department of EmerQency Manaaement All 75 Department of Health Radiation Protection All

----87 -ommment-control-Oes}c - NRc----- ----- ----------------- -A11-----,;;;

142 Hanford EOC/SMT All 164 Oregon State Department of Energy All 223 Franklin County EmerQency Management All 224 Washington State Department of Health - Office of Radiation Protection All

& PPM 13.1.1 is printed in color, single sided, on 11" x 17" paper, folded, 3-hold punched, stapled on top and distributed by Document Control.

% Contact Security- Steve English @ x 8317 or Kammi Hickman @ x 5157 for pick up and signature NOTE: Distribution of the PPM 13.1.1 wall flow charts is controlled by PPM 13.1.1A and distribution is performed by EP. Updated 11/14/18

MG1 .1 GENERAL EMERGENCY P.olonged loss of i!! offsile and i!!I onS11e AC powe, IO em,:,gency j 1 I 2 I l j loss of i!lJ. offsite AN O fill onsite AC power capability to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 I

MS1 .1 SITE AREA EMERGEN~Y Los, ol II otfS11e and II onsne AC powe, IO eme~ney buses fol' 15 mloo'8S OI' lof9f I 1 I 2 I 3 I Loss of .ru!. offsile and fill onsite AC power capability lo emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

I MA1 .1 Loss ol b 1Smnitesorlongef I 1 I 2 ALERT illl but o" e AC power source to emerg-ocy b~s I 3 j AC power capability, Table 2, to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 reduced lo a single power source for GE 15 min MU1 .1 UNUSUAL EVENT loss cl ill off,te AC power capability lo &mef9"'0CY buses fol' 15nw'lll~S0flonge1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I Loss of i!!!. offsite AC power capability, Table 2, to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min . (Note 1)

ANO EITH ER. (Note 1) 1 Res toration o f emergency bus SM-7 or SM-8 in LT 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is nQt likely (Note 1)

OR ANO

~ addiUonal single power source failure will resul t in a loss of fill AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS Table 2 AC Powe r Sources Loss of Offslte Em e rgenq RPV level !all!lQ! be restored and maintained Startup Transformer TR-S AC Power GT-186 in.

loss of a!! ~ rgerocy AC and vital DC powttr sources tor 15 - Backup Transformer TR-8 MG1 .2 miroutesOf longer

! 1  ! 2  ! 3  !

- Backfeed 500 KV power lhrough Main Transfonners (if already aligned in modes 4, 5, def only )

l oss o f fill offsile AN D fill onsile AC power capability lo Onslte emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

DG1 ANO DG2 Indicated vollage is l T 108 VDC on .b2.lb. 125 VDC buses loss of ill Yitai DC po,ve, for IS minutes Of longer 2 OP-$ 1-1 and OP-S 1-2 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

MS2.1 [ 1 I 2 j 3 I Main Generalor via TR-N I IN2 l oss of Indicated vollage is LT 108 VDC on both 125 voe buses Vital DC DP-Sl-1 and DP-S l -2 for GE 15 min . (Nole 1)

Power UNPl"""'ED k>ss o1 Con!rol Room 1ndicalloos tor 15 mtOOtPI or UNPlANNED loss o1Control Room indltatJOns lo, 15 minutes Of longer with l!I &lgnlfic&nt transient n progress iongo, MA 3.1 I 1 j 2 I 3 j MU3.1 j 1 I 2 I 3 (

3 An UNPLANNED event results in the Inability lo monilor one or more Table 10 parameters from wi thin the Control Room An UNPLANNED event results in lhe inability to monitor one o r more Table 10 parameters from wilhin the Control L oss of for GE 15 min (Nole 1) Room for GE 15 min (No le 1)

Control A NO Room Indications anx Table 11 trans1en1 event in progress T able 10 Safety System Paramete r s Reactor coolant actlvny greater th3o Techllltal Speclftca!IOO

  • Reacior power I T able 5 Plan t Structures Contain ing Safe Shutdown Systems or Components RPVlevel RPV pressure MU4.1 llllowable limits I 1 I 2 ) 3 I
  • Primary containment pressure SJAE CONDSR OUTLET RAD H I-HI alarm (P602) 4 Vital l)Ortlons of the Rad Waste/Control Building:

467' elevation v1lal island

  • Wetwel level WetweN temperature RCS Activity 487' eleval,oo cable spreading room Main Control Room and ver tical cable chase MU4.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 T able 11 Transient Even t s l Coolant activity GT O 2 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-13 1 525' elevation HVAC area Reactor Building Vila! portions of the Turbine Building Reactor scram M DEH press1Je lwilches RPS switches on lurbine lhrotde valves Runback G T 25% thermal reactor powe, RCS lealcage for 15 minutes or long,>r Sy.stem Mam steam 111e radiatlOtl monitors
  • Eleclrical k>ad re;ection GT 25% ruu MU S.1 ] 1 I 2 I 3 I Malfunct. electrical load (1) RCS unidenlified o r pressure boundary leakage 5 Turbine Bukhng Vftnlllalion ra dialton monitors Main steam hne ptp1ng up lo MS*V-146 and the first stop valves ECCS injection Thermal power osciHations GT 10%

GE 10gpmforGE 15min OR RCS l eakage Standby S8MC8 Water Pump Houses (2) RCS idenlmed leakage GT 25 gpm for GE 15 min Diesel Generator Bu1ld1ng OR (3) l eakage from the RCS lo a location outside containment GT25gpmforGE 15min.

ln.tiillty to shut down the reactor cooslng a cha*~ to RPV Automallc or manual SCl'&m !ails to shutdown the reactor , and Automatlc or manual scram 1ails kl shuttlown lhe reactor wate, lf?vet or RCS hea1 removal subsequent mainunl ac11ons t3ken at the rea<:IOf control con,oles are Q!21 succ.ess1ul in shutting down the reacklr MS6 .1 I 1 I 2 j MA6.1 [ 1 I 2 j MU 6.1 I 1 I 2 An automatic OR manual scram fails lo shut down the Ail automatic OR manual scram fails lo shut down the An automatic OR manual scram did QQJ shul down lhe reactor reactor reactor 6 ~

AND actions to shu t down the reactor are !lQ! successrul as AN D Manual scram actions taken a t the reactor conl rol console AND A subsequent automatic scram O R manual scram aclion RPS indicaled by reacto r power GT 5%

{mode switch in shutdown, manual pu sh bullons or AR I) are taken at lhe reactor con trol console (mode switch in Failure

- - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - --'-* ANO EITH ER : QQ! successrul in shulling down the reac tor as indicated by shutdown , manual push bullons or ARI) is successful In R PV level s.ililll2l be restored and maintained reactor power GT 5% (No le 8) shutting down the reactor as indicated by rea ctor power LE Table 4 Communication Methods above - 186 In or 0Ilil2l be determined 5% (APRM downscale) (Nole B)

OR Sys tem On site ORO NRC WW temperature and RPV pressure~ be maintained bek>w the HCTL 1 - - - - + ---<1 Plant Public Address (PA) System Plant Telephone System X X MU 7 .1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 7 ?tanl Radio System Operations and Security Channels X ( 1) Loss of ~ Table 4 onsite communication methods OR Los s o f Comm.

(2) loss o f all Table 4 ORO communication methods Offsile calling capability from the X X Control Room via direct telephone OR (3) Loss of an Table 4 NRG communication methods Long d1s1ance calling capability on X X the commercial phone system Himudous event Affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needPd lo, the current Qpeu11mg mode MA8.1 I 1 ) 2 I 3 j The occurrence of iD.Y. Table 8 hazardous even l I T able 8 Hazardous Events AN O Event damage has caused indications of degraded 8

  • Seismic event Internal or external FLOODING event performance on one train o f a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AN D EITHER Hazard o us Eve nt High winds Event damage has caused 1ndicalt0ns al degraded Affec ting Tornado strike performance lo a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM Safety
  • FIRE needed for lhe current operating mode Systems OR EXPLOSION Event damage has resulled in VISIBLE DAMAGE lo a
  • Volcanic ash fallout second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM need ed ror the Other events wil h similar hazard current operaling mode charac teristics as delermlned by the Shift (No tes 9, 10)

Manager I I I  !  !  ! I I I F FG1 .1 1 2 l oss of filri lwo barriers 3 FS 1.1 1 2 3 Loss or potential loss o f .ii.rel two barriers {Table F-1)

FA1 .1 1 2 3 Any: k:>ss or am polenlial k:>ss of EITHER Fuel Clad or RCS Fission Product AND barrier (Table F- 1)

Barrier Degradation Loss or potenlial loss of l he l hird barrier (Ta~e F- 1)

Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix FC - Fuel Clad Barrier RCS - Reactor Coolant Syste,m Barrier PC - Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss RPV level 00021 be res tored and RPV level canno t be res tored and A SAG entry requ ired maintained GT - 16 1 in . maintained GT -161 in . SAG entry required RPV Water Level or lli!lQ! be determined.

or ~ be determined.

UNISOLABLE break in IDr£ of the UN ISOLABLE pnmary system leakage UNISOLABLE primary system leakage fotlowing*

that results in exceeding EITHER : l hat resulls In exceeding EITHER

  • Main~eamUne
  • RCIC S leam line RB area te,r;peralure alarTTl level {PPM RB area ma11imum safe operaliog B
  • RWCU 5.3. 1 Table 23) tempera ture (PPM 5 3.1 Table 23)

RCS l eak Rate

  • Feedwater OR OR OR RB area rad1atioo alarm level (PPM RB area maximum safe operating Emergency RPV Depressurization is 5 3 1 Table 24) radia tion (PPM 5 3 1 Table 24) required PC pressure GT 45 psig OR UN PLANNED rapid drop in PC pressu re fo llowing PC pressure ri se Explosive mixture exists inside PC C PC pressu re GT 1. 68 psig due to RC S OR (H 2 GE 6% and 0 2 GE 5%)

PC Conditions leakage OR PC pressu re re sponse oQ1 consistent wilh LOCA condi tions WW tempera ture and RPV pressure

~ be maintained bek)w the HCTL II Containment Radiation Monitor CMS-R1S-27E or CMS-R1S-27F D reading GT 3.600 R/hr Containment Radiation Monilor Containment Radia tion "'1onitor CMS-R1S-27E or CMS-RtS-27F CMS-R1S-27E or CMS-RIS-27F PC Rad f OR reading GT 70 R/hr reading GT 14,000 R/hr RCS A c tivity Primary coolant activity GT 300 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent 1-1 3 1 U NtSOLABLE direct downstream E pathway to the environment exists after PC Integrity or PC isolation signal Bypass OR Intentional PC ven ting per EOPs F MY condition in the opinion of the An:t condition in the opinion o f the AfiY condi tion in lhe opinion of the Am condition in the opinion o f the ADY condition in l he opinion o f the ~ condition in the opinion of the Eme rg e ncy Emergency Director lhal lndlcales Emergency Director that indicates loss Emergency Director that indicates Emergency Director lhal ind icates loss Emergency Director lha l indicates Emergency Direclor l hal indicates loss Director o f the RCS barrier potential loss of the Conlainment of the rue t clad barrier polenlial toss o f the Fuel Clad barrier polenl lal loss of the RCS barrier o f the Containment barrier Judgme nt barrier 13.1 .1 Rev. 49 MR 1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY Modes: ~1~11~_2~11 Power Opera tions Startup 3

Hol Shutdown ENERGY NORTHWEST HOT CONDITIONS 1/16/2019 (RCS GT 200°F)

GENERAL EMERGENCY C G1 .1 AND l ~ ol RPVln-.enk,ry ~ngfuel dad in1t>g1tywif'I f f l l l ~ ch.*nqed I 4 RP V level LT-161 in. forGE30min. (N ol e 1)

I s I Any_ of the following indical ions of oontainment challenge SITE AREA EMERGE I-. ... f CS1 .1 Los., (If RPV lrl'Vf'flkwy :dfeclinQ core dera,- t,,,,at rt!f'l'IOY&I (1) CONTAINMENT CLOSURE ANO RPV level LT - 129 in .

I 4 I s I

!!21 esla~ished CA1.1 ALERT

- I 4 (1) Loss of RPV lnvenlOf)' as indica ted by RP V level LT-SO in OR I s CU1 .1 UNUSUAL EVENT I 4 I s

( 1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results Ill RPV level less than a required k>wer limit for GE 15 min (Note 1)

OR (2) RPV le v e l ~ be monitored f0< GE 15 min (Note 1) (2) RPV level ~ be monilored CONTAINMEN T CLOSURE 021 established (Note 6) OR ANO AND Explosive mix ture inside PC (2) CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established (H2 GE 6% and 02 GE 5%) UNPLANNED Increase in filri Table 1 sump or pool levels AND UNPLANN ED increase in ifill Table 1 sump or pool due to a loss of RPV Inventory UNPLANNED rise in PC pressure levels due to a loss of RPV inventory RPV level LT - 16 1 in.

RB area radla lion GT filri Maximum Safe Operating level (PPM 5 3.1 Table 24)

CS1 .2 CG1 .2  ! 4  ! 5  ! RPV level .mnn2t be monitored for GE 30 min (N~e 1) 1 RPV level ~ be monilored for GE 30 min. (Note 1)

I_

ANO AND RPV Core unoovery is indica led by~ of the following Ta ble 1 Sumps /Pool Level Core unoovery is indica led by it.DY o f the following*

UNPLANNED wetweH level rise GT 2 inches UNPLANNED welwell level rise GT 2 inches (PPM 5 2 1 enl ry condi tion) &ri valid HI-HI level alarm on R-1 Table 2 AC Po wer Sources (PPM 5 2 I entry oondil ion) VALID indlcalioo o f RB room nooding as idenlifted by through R-5 SUO'l)S VALID Indication of RB room flooding as identified by htgh level alarms (PPM 5 3.1 Table 25) EDR GE 25 GPM Offslte high level alarms (PPM 5.3.1 Table 25) Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage outside Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage outside FORGE IOGPM Startup Transformer TR-S primary containmenl of sufficient magnilude lo indicate primary oontammenl of sufficient magnitude to indica te COf"e u ncovery Wetwel level rise Backup Transfoml8r TR-8 core uncovery Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS Bac:kfeed 500 KV power lhrot9l M<Wl ANO leakage Transformers ftf already aligned In

~ of the following 1odicalions of con ta111ment challenge* modes 4, 5, def only)

CONTAI NMENT CLOSURE fl:2! established (Nole 6)

Explosive mixture inside PC Onslle (H 2 GE 6% and 02 GE 5%) DGl UNPLANN ED rise in PC pressure DG2 RB area radiation GT~ Maximum Safe Opera ting Main Generator via TR-N 1/N2 level (PPM 5.3.1 Table 24) l ooo, ol i!I off~lltt arld i!! on<,ile AC po,'<E'f to emergeney bows Lon of ii bul OM AC pc,,t,-9f SOU'{:8 k'I emerg....tc~ hustts for 15 ffK l5mlnut~orlonger

- !1W"IUIMOf'°"9fll' j 4 j 5 j DEF j 2 CA2.1 j 4 j 5 j DEF j Loss of all offsite and al onsil e AC power capabitil y lo CU2.1 AC power capability. Table 2. lo emergency buses SM-7 Loss of emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min (Nole I ) and SM-8 reduced to a single power source fcx GE 15 min C Emergenc AC Power (Nole 1)

ANO Cold SOI ~ addilional single power source failure wfll result in a loss Refuel of fill AC power lo SAFETY SYSTEMS System Maffuncl. UNMANNED K-.crea-.e 111 RCS l"fl1J)t"fahxe Table 7 RCS Reheat Duration Thresho lds C AJ.1 I .. I s CUl .1 I 4 I s 3 If an RCS heal removal syslem is in opera1ion within this UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to GT 20o* F for GT Table 7 dura tion (Note 1)

UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to GT 20o*F RCS time frame and RCS 1empera1ure is being reduced lhe EAl Temp. ls[lQlappllcable OR UNPLANNED RPV pressure incre ase G T 10 pslg CU3 .2 Containment Heat-up RCS Statu s Closure Status Duration l oss of fil! RCS temperature and RPV water level indication for GE 15 min (Nole 1) lnlacl NIA 60 min

  • L~-.cAvitatOC~ for15m111ulesOflorlll@f 4 ~mtact established 20 min
  • CU4.1 j 4 J 5 j Loss of ll2l established Omin Indicated vottage LT 108 VOCon~ 125 voe buses Vital DC Powe, DP-S1-1 and DP-S 1-2 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

Loss cA l!! 01v;ite or off<.1le cornnumcattons capahlhlli>s 5

Loss of Comm.

- Table 4 Communication Methods System

~anl Public Address (PA) System Onslle X

ORO NRC CU S.1 l oss of OR Loss of j 4 fill Table 4 onsile communication methods all Table 4 ORO communica tion methods j 5 j DE F j OR Plant Telephone System X loss of fil! Table 4 NRC communicalion methods Plant Radio System Operations and X Hazordclu~ &VE'III aflecllnq a SAFETY SYSTEM nneoof)f)l"a~nq mode Securily Channels CA6.1 I 4 I s I Offslle calling capability from lhe p Tabte 8 Hazardous Events The occurrence of am: Table 8 hazardous event Conl rol Room via direcl telephone ANO 6 long d1slance caN1ng capability on the commercial phone system SetSmic event Evenl damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for HazardCXK lnlernal or exlernal FLOODING event the current operal1ng mode Events AffecHng 1 I High winds ANO EITHER Event damage has caused indications of degraded Safety Tornado slrike performance lo a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM Systems FIRE needed for lhe curren t operating mode EXPLOSION OR Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE lo a Volcanic ash fallout second lrain of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for lhe Olher evenls with similar hazard current operating mode characleristics as determined by l he Shift (No tes 9, 10)

Manager 13.1.1 Rav. 49 MR 1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY Modes: .___ 4 Cold Shutdown

__,I I 5 Refueling I! DEF Defueled ENERGY NORTHWEST COLD CONDITIONS 1/16/2019 (RCS '.:'. 200°F)

RG1 .1 GENERAL EMERGENCY R~Me ol !JIIWOUI radloactMty ,esut11og in ott,lte dose greater then I

1,000 1

mrem TEDE Of I 2 I 3 5,000 I

mrem 4

lhyrold COE j 5

( 1) Reading on i1!lY Table 3 effluent radial ion monitor GT column "GE NERAL* for GE 15 min.

I DEF I RS 1.1 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Rele aM of gMeous radioacbvlly resulting In off Site dos* greater lhan 100 nvttm TEDE or 500 mtem thyroid COE

! 1 I 2 I 3 (1) Reading on am'. Table 3 effluent radiation mon1lor GT column *SAE" for GE 15 min .

I 4 I 5 I DEF I I

RA1.1 j 1 j 2 ALERT Release of ~ecus Of Nquld radioactivity reMJhing In olfsite dose greatei- than 10 l'Ofem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid COE I 3 I 4 I (1) Reading oo am: Table 3 effluent radia tion monitor GT column *ALERr for GE 15 min 5 I DEF I RU1 .1 I UNUSUAL EVENT Release of gaseous ot liquid r~ecuvlly greeter tu1n 2 times the OOCM limits fot 60 minutes or longer 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5

( 1) Reading on i!!r£ Table 3 effl uent radiation monilOf GT column *uE* for GE 60 min I DEF I OR OR OR OR (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indical es (2) Dose assessmen t using actual meleorology (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indica tes (2) Saml)*t analyses for a gaseous or liquid release doses GT 1.000 mrem TEDE or GT 5000 mrem thyroid indicates doses GT 100 mrem TEDE o r GT 500 doses GT 10 mrem TEDE or G T 50 mrem thyroid COE indicates a concen tral ion or release rate > 2 )( ODCM COE a t or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY mrem thyroid COE a l o r beyond the SI TE al or beyond lhe SI TE BOUNDARY limits for GE 60 min.

(Notes 1, 2, 3, 4) BOUNDARY (Notes 1. 2. 3, 4) (No tes 1. 2, 3)

(Notes 1, 2. 3, 4)

I I I I DEF I 1 RG1 .2  ! 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I RS1 .2 I 1 ( 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I RA1 .2 j 1 ) 2 3 4 5 Analysis o f a liquid efftuent sample indicates a concenlralion Rad Fiekt survey results indicate EITHER o f the following a l or Field survey results indicate EITHER o f lhe foll owing a t or or release rale lhal would resul t in doses GT 10 mrem TEDE Efflue nt beyond the SI TE BOUNDARY: beyond the SITE BOUNDARY : or GT 50 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond l he SITE

  • Closed window dose rales GT 100 mR/hr expected BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Noles 1, 2)
  • Closed window dose ra tes GT 1,000 mR/hr e)(pected to con tinue for G E 60 min to continue for GE 60 min.
  • Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid
  • Analyses d field survey samples indicale thyroid RA1.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I COE GT 5.000 mrem for 60 min. o f inhalation. COE G T 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation Field survey resulls indica te EITHER of the following a l or (Notes 1, 2) (Noles 1, 2) beyond the SITE BOUND ARY :
  • Closed window dose ra tes G T 10 mR/hr e)(pecl ed lo conlinue for GE 60 min .
  • Analyses of field survey sampkls iod1ca le l hyroid C OE GT 50 mrem for 60 min d inhalalion R ( No les 1, 2)

Abnormal Spent fuel pool teY~ canno1 be reslofed to et least the top ol' the Spent t..rel pool level 111 the top of the fuel racks 5,gnlficam low~ of water level above, or damage to, U11>1aMed loss of water level above luadated fuel Rad fve(racks lor60 minu!esor longer lrredilllll!dfuet Levels I RG2. 1 I 1 I 2 ) 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I RS2.1 I 1 ) 2 I 3 j 4 I 5 j DEF I RA2.1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 r s I DEF 1 Ru2.1 1 1 1 2 1 3 r 4 1 s I DEF 1 Rad Spent fue l pool level cannot be res tored lo a t least 0.5 ft Lowering o f spenl fu el pool level to 0.5 ft Uncovery o f irradiated fue l in the REFU ELING PATH WAY UNPLANNED wa ter level drop in the REFU ELING PATHWAY Effluent fOf GE 60 min (Note 1) as indicated by EITHER of the following:

RA2.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 [ 5 I DEF )

  • SFP level LE 22 3 ft 2 Damage lo irradia ted fuel resulting in a release o f
  • SFP low level alarm Irradiated Fuel Event Release Polnl -

Table 3 Monitor PRM-RE* 11

- General -

Effluent Monito r Clas.sfficatlon Thresholds SAE A lert UE -

305E-OJ..,cu<<

radioactivity ANO High alann on m or lhe following radialion monilOrs

  • ARM--RIS-1 Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area ANO UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levets as 1odicaled by IDri of the folk)y,11ng radiation monilors
  • ARM-RIS-1 ReaclOr Building Fuel Pool Area 0

Ret"tetor Building Emaust PRM-RE-12 PRM*RE- 13 7.50E+02 µCl/cc 7.50E*111Cl/cc 282E*l ~cc

  • ARM-RIS-2 Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area
  • ARM--RIS-34 Reactor Building Eleva tion 606
  • REA-Rt S-609A-D R)( Bldg Ven t ARM-RIS-2 Reaclor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-34 Reactor Building Eleva tion 606
TurblneBulldlogExhaus! TEA-RIS-13 8JSE-02 ~Cilcc 835E-OJ 11Cilcc 835E-04 µCllcc 4 22E-05 11Cllcc RA2.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I

~ RadwasteBuildlng WEA*RIS-14 345E-0 1 µCl/cc 345E-02 ~Cl/cc 3 45E-03µCilcc 398E-()I. 11CUcc Lowering ol spent fuel pool level to 10 fl ExhauSI Radwaste Effluent FOR-RIS-608 2XHI-Hlalarm RadiallOn levels lhst IMPEDE access IO equipment necnsa,y lor normal pbnt operations. oocklo.om °' sh.J~

~ TSWEffluenl TSW-RIS-5 300E-05v(:llcc 3 3" 5eMce Water Process A SW-RI~ 1OOE*02q,s RA3.1 I 1 ( 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Area (1) Dose ra tes GT 15 m R/hr in Control Room Service Water Process B SW-Rls-605 1 OOE* 02 q,s Radiation (ARM-RIS- 19) or CAS (by survey)

Level s OR (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radia tion levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access lo .anx Table 9 Tab le 9 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas rooms or areas ( No le 5)

Oamape O

  • io.ded caak CONFtlEMENT BOUNOARY L - - - - - - - - ---t~R;::w:::,::.;:-,-;R;::adw:=.,:::,.::c::on Room/Area
  • o:::

,R;:o=-(

om :R::;H:;-R:;:llu::::>h: :,:::

o:RW :;::ta::::

nk::

Modes Applicability

,)t " - - - : - - - -* f- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . ) J EU1 .1 I StorageOperatlons Damage lo a k>aded canis ter (MPC) CONFINEMENT E 1 RW 467 Vital Island (RHR-V-9 disconnecl)

RB 422' B RHR Pump Rm (local pump temperatures)

BOUNDARY as Indicated by measured dose rates on a loaded overpack GT EITHE R:

Confinement ISFSI Boundary RB 454 ' B RHR Pump Rm (operate RHR-V-85B) Norw 20 mrem/hr (gamma+ neutron) on lhe lop of l he overpack

  • 100 mremlhr(gamma + neutron) on the side of lhe overpack, e)(duding inlet and outlel duds HOSTILE AC TION within the P~OTECTED AREA H0ST1l.E ACTION wi1tlin the OWt,J ER CONT~OlLEO AREA or Contrmed SECURITY CQNOITION or threat eilbome allt"tek thrut wiltwl 39 nw,utes HS1.1 I 1 ) 2 I 3 I -4 I 5 I DEF I HA1.1 I 1 ) 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I HU1 .1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred w1l hin ( 1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred ( 1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does !1Ql 1nvolve a the PROTECTED AREA as reporled by the Secunty wi thin the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported HOSTI LE ACTION as reported by the Securily 1 Sergeant or Securil y l ieutenant by the Security Sergeant o r Security lieutenant OR Sergeanl or Security l ieutenant OR Secu rity (2) A validaled notifi calion from NRC o f an aircraft a ttack (2) No tifica tion o f a credib'e security lhreat d1recled al lhe threat wi thin 30 min . of the si le site OR (3) A validated nol ificalion from the NRC providing informal ion of an aircraft threat Seismic event T QBE levels 2 I

'se~A61IMAB1 f ; -po;;;iiaito'; -

upgrade to an Alert based on degraded I HU 2. 1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF )

Seis m ic Event safety system performance or damage I Seismic event GT Operating Basis Earthquake (QBE) as

'- - - - - - - - indica ted by H1 3 P851 S 1 5- 1 (OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED) activated Notes Haz11fUOUsevent 1 The Emergency Director should declare !he event HU3 .1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I DEF I promptly upon delennining that time limit has been ( 1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA exceeded. or wHI l ikely be exceeded OR 2 If an ongoing release IS detected and lhe release slart (2) Volcanic ash fanout requiring ptanl shuldown time is unknown, assume that lhe release duration has e)(ceeded lhe specified time limit HU3 .2 I 1 I 2 l 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I 3 If the effluent fl ow past an efflu ent monil or is known to I

3 have stopped. Indicating that the release path is isolated.

the efflu ent monilor reading is no longer VALID for

'se~A6IIMA8.1 f;-po;;;iiai",; -

Iupgrade lo an Alert based on degraded safety syslem performance or damage I Internal room or area FLOO D ING of a magnitude sufficient lo require manual or aulomalic electrical Isolation of a SAFETY Nalural or classificalion purposes SYSTEM component needed for lhe current operating mode Tech . 4 The pre-calculated effluent monilor values presented in Hazard EAls RA1 . 1, RS 1. 1 and RG1 . 1 should be used for HU 3.3 I 1 I 2 j 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I emergency classification assessments until the resulls (1) Movement o f personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is from a dose assessment using acluat meteorok)gy are IMPEDED due to an o ffsite event involving hazardous available materials (e.g, an o(fsite chemical spill, 6 18-11 event or 5 If the equipment in the listed room or area was already toxic gas release) inoperable or oul-of-se<vice before the event occurred. OR then no emergency dassification is warranted (2) A hazardous event that results in on-site condil ions 6 If CONTAINMENT CLOSU RE is re-established prior lo sufficient to prohibit the planl staff from accessing the site e)(ceeding the JO-minute lime limit declaration o f a via personal vehides (No te 7)

General Emergency is not required 7 This EAL does not apply lo rouline 1raff1C lmpedimenls such as fog, snow. ice, or vehide breakdowns or Table 5 accidents Pl11nl Struc tures Contain ing Safe Shutdown Sys tems or 8 A manua saam ac tion is any opera lor action, or set o f Components HU 4.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 j DEF I A FIRE is Jl2I e)(fingurshed within 15 min of i£ri of lhe actions, which causes the control rods IO be rapidly Vital portions of the R&d Waste/Control Building: foHow ing FIRE detection indicalions (Nole 1) inserted into l he core, and does not include manually

  • Report from the field (i.e , visual observalion) driving in control rods or implemen la l ion of boron injection 467' elevatlOr"I vital island
  • Receipt of multiple (more lhan 1) fire alarms or strategie s 487' elevation cable spreadiog room indical ions H 9 If the affec ted SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before l he hazardous event Main Control Room and V8ftical cable chase 525' elevation HVAC area
  • Field veri fical ion of a single fire alarm ANO Hazards occurred, then emergency classi fica tion is no l warranled The FIRE is localed within .fil!Y Table 5 area 10 If the hazardous event only resul ted in VISIBLE ReaclOf Butlchng DAMAGE. wilh no indications of degraded perfom,ance Vital port,ons of lhe TurbiM Building HU-4.2 1 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 DEFI I 4 lo at least one train ol a SAFETY SYSTEM . lhen lhis emergency classificalion is not warranted OEH pressure switches RPS swttdies on tlrlline thro nle valves Receipt o( a single fire alarm (i e
  • Q2 other indications of a FIRE)

Fire ANO Mam steam *ne radiabon momlofs The fire alann is indicating a FIRE within i!ri Table 5 area Turbine Bu~ding venhlal1on radial1on monitors ANO T he e)(istence of a FIRE is not veri fied wilhin 30 min. of alarm Main steam line piping up 10 MS-V- 146 and the rlrsl stop valves recelpl (Nole 1) -

Standby Service Water Pump Houses Diesel Generator Building HU4.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF j

( 1) A FIRE within lhe tSFSI or plant PROTECTED AREADQl e)(tinguished within 60 min of the initial report, alarm or I indicalion (Note 1) l°se~A6IIMA81 f ; -po;;:;iia1b -

Iu pgrade to an Alert based on degraded OR safet y system performance or damage I (2) A FIRE within the ISFSI or plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offs1le fire response Table 9 Saf e Operation & Shutdown Rooms /Areas '-------- agency to e)(tinguish Room/Area Modes Appllcablllly G11se,oos releMe; IMPEDING access to equlpmen! necessary br flotmlll pl9fl\ opeiatlons, CQOldown or shutdoWn RW 467' Radwasle Control Room (RHR Hush to RW tanks) 5 RW 467' Vital Island (RHR-V-9 discomecl)

RB 422. B RHR Pump Rm (local pump temJ)flralures)

HAS.1 I 1 I 2 ( 3 I 4 I 5 Release of a IO)(lc. corrosive, asphyxianl or fla mmable gas I DEF I Hazardous Gases RB 454 ' B RHR Pump Rm (operate RHR-V-858) inlo w Table 9 rooms or areas ANO Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Nole 5) l ~lilty to i;OOtrol a key sale!}' tund>on from outlkle the Contr61 C-Onlfol Room evacuation resulting WI transfer of p,1an1 control to R- alternate IQCatiQn, HS6.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 j 5 j HA6. 1 I 1 ) 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I An evenl has resulted in plant con trol being transferred from An event has resulted in plant conlrol being transferred 6 the Control Room to lhe Remote Shutdown Panel or Al ternate Remole Shutdown Panel from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel or Altemale Remote Shutdown Panel Control AND Room Control of !!rt of the following key safety fu nctions is ~

Evacuation reestablished w1th1n 15 min (Nole 1):

  • Reactivity (Modes 1 aod 2 only)
  • RPV water level
  • RCS heat removal Other conditions existing w)llch in the Judgment of the Emerf}l!:n<:Y Other condi!lons eils\lng which ir;, the iuc!9ment ol the Emergency Other conditions existing whk:t) In the ju<lgmel)t ol the Other cooditlons e~fsting Mwch In the jtldgmentof !he Oirecto, wariant ~aratkm of General Emergency Oireclbr wan ant declafalion of Site Area Emergency Emergency OkeclOr wanant declaration of an Alert Emergency 0 1,-llClkll wMaot declarfltlon ol a UE HG7 .1 I 1 I 2 I 3 j 4 I 5 I DEF I HS7 .1 I 1 I 2 j J I 4 ( 5 ( DEF I HA7 .1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I HU7.1 j 1 I 2 I J I 4 I 5 I DEF)

Olher conditions e)(iSI which, in the judgment of the Other conditions e)(lst which. in the judgmenl of l he Other conditions e)(isl which. in lhe judgment ol l he Other condi tions e)(ist which. in l he judgmenl of lhe Emergency Director, indicate lhal events are in progress or Emergency Oireclor, indicate that events are In progress or Emergency Director, indicate lhal events are in progress or Emergency Direclor, indicale Iha! evenls are In progress or have occurred which involve aclual or IMMINENT have occurred which involve adual or likely major failures d have occurred which involve an actual or potential have occurred which indicate a polential degradation o f the 7 substantial core degradalion or melling wilh potential for loss of containment lnlegrity or HOSTILE AC TION that ptant functions needed for proteclion of l he public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or substantial degradation o f the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk level of safely of the plant or Indicate a security threa t to fa cility proleclion has been initialed. No releases of Judgment results in an actual loss of physical con trol of lhe facility. malicious ads. (1) loward site personnel Of equipment that lo site personnel or damage lo site equipment because of radioactive material requiring o ffsi le response or monitoring Relea ses can be reasonably e)(pected to e)(ceed EPA roukt lead to lhe likely failure of Of. (2) that prevent effective HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are e)(pected to be limited are e)(pecled unless further degradation of SAFETY Protective Action Guideline e)(posure levels offsite for more access to equipment needed for the protection of l he public. lo small fra ctions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline SYSTEMS occurs than the immediate sile erea Any releases are not e)(pected to result in e)(posure levels e)(posure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action G uideline e)(posure levels beyond lhe SITE BOUNDARY.

13.1.1 Rev . 49 MR 1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY Modes: .____ ENERGY 1116/2019 1 ___.I I.___2 ___.I 1 '--_3___.I I.___4 ___.I I'--_5 ___.I I DEF I NORTHWEST Power Operalions Startup Hol Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled ALL CONDITIONS