ML19031B343

Energy Northwest Distribution - Volume 13 - Emergency Preparedness Procedures

ML19031B343
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	01/16/2019
From:	Energy Northwest
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML19031B343 (4)

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I DISTRIBUTION - VOLUME 13 - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURES Page 3 of 3 Distribution Date:

01/16/19 LAB Filed By:

Procedure Number Revision Procedure Number Revision Procedure Number Revision 13.1.1 049/001 TO: ENERGY NORTHWEST EXTERNAL CONTROLLED COPY PROCEDURE HOLDERS The following documents have been revised and are to be inserted into your controlled copy manual and the superseded revisions removed and destroyed. No receipt acknowledgement is required for the listed document(s).

Should you have questions on this distribution please contact Kim Saenz, Records and Information Supervisor at (509)377-2492 or KDSaenz@energy-northwest.com.

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION Copy#

Location 26 Region IV - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission All 28 Region IV - US Nuclear: ReQulatorv Commission All 52 State of Washington, Military Department All 55 Federal EmerQencv ManaQement AQencv (FEMA)

All 57 Benton County - Department of EmerQency Manaaement All 75 Department of Health Radiation Protection All

----87

-ommment-control-Oes}c - NRc-----

---

-A11-----,;;;

142 Hanford EOC/SMT All 164 Oregon State Department of Energy All 223 Franklin County EmerQency Management All 224 Washington State Department of Health - Office of Radiation Protection All

& PPM 13.1.1 is printed in color, single sided, on 11" x 17" paper, folded, 3-hold punched, stapled on top and distributed by Document Control.

% Contact Security-Steve English @ x 8317 or Kammi Hickman @ x 5157 for pick up and signature NOTE: Distribution of the PPM 13.1.1 wall flow charts is controlled by PPM 13.1.1A and distribution is performed by EP.

Procedures Updated 11/14/18 I

M Sy.stem 1

Loss of Emergenq AC Power 2

l oss of Vital DC Power 3

Loss of Control Room Indications 4

RCS Activity GENERAL EMERGENCY I SITE AREA EMERGEN~Y I ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT P.olonged loss of i!! offsile and i!!I onS11e AC powe, IO em,:,gency Los, ol II otfS11e and II onsne AC powe, IO eme~ney buses fol' 15 mloo'8S OI' lof9f MG1.1 j 1 I 2 I l j

loss of i!lJ. offsite ANO fill onsite AC power capability to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 ANO EITHER.

Restoration of emergency bus SM-7 or SM-8 in LT 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is nQt likely (Note 1)

OR RPV level !all!lQ! be restored and maintained GT-186 in.

loss of a!! ~

rgerocy AC and vital DC powttr sources tor 15 miroutesOf longer MS1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I Loss of.ru!. offsile and fill onsite AC power capability lo emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

MG1.2 ! 1 ! 2 ! 3 !

l oss of fill offsile AND fill onsile AC power capability lo emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

ANO Indicated vollage is l T 108 VDC on.b2.lb. 125 VDC buses OP-$1-1 and OP-S 1-2 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

I loss of ill Yitai DC po,ve, for IS minutes Of longer MS2.1

[

1 I 2 j 3 I Indicated vollage is LT 108 VDC on both 125 voe buses DP-Sl-1 and DP-S l -2 for GE 15 min. (Nole 1)

Table 5 Plant Structures Containing Safe Shutdown Systems or Components Vital l)Ortlons of the Rad Waste/Control Building:

467' elevation v1lal island 487' eleval,oo cable spreading room Main Control Room and vertical cable chase 525' elevation HVAC area Reactor Building Vila! portions of the Turbine Building DEH press1Je lwilches Loss ol illl but o"e AC power source to emerg-ocy b~s b 1Smnitesorlongef MA1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 j

AC power capability, Table 2, to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 reduced lo a single power source for GE 15 min (Note 1)

ANO

~

addiUonal single power source failure will result in a loss of fill AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS UNPl"""'ED k>ss o1 Con!rol Room 1ndicalloos tor 15 mtOOtPI or longer with l!I &lgnlfic&nt transient n progress MA3.1 I 1 j 2 I 3 j

An UNPLANNED event results in the Inability lo monilor one or more Table 10 parameters from within the Control Room for GE 15 min (Nole 1)

ANO anx Table 11 trans1en1 event in progress Table 10 Safety System Parameters Reacior power RPVlevel RPV pressure Primary containment pressure Wetwel level WetweN temperature Table 11 Transient Events Reactor scram Runback GT 25% thermal reactor

powe, l

loss cl ill off,te AC power capability lo &mef9"'0CY buses fol' 15nw'lll~S0flonge1 MU1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I Loss of i!!!. offsite AC power capability, Table 2, to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

Table 2 AC Power Sources Offslte Startup Transformer TR-S Backup Transformer TR-8 Backfeed 500 KV power lhrough Main Transfonners (if already aligned in modes 4, 5, def only)

Onslte DG1 DG2 Main Generalor via TR-N IIN2 UNPlANNED loss o1 Control Room indltatJOns lo, 15 minutes Of

iongo, MU3.1 j 1 I 2 I 3

(

An UNPLANNED event results in lhe inability to monitor one or more Table 10 parameters from wilhin the Control Room for GE 15 min (Nole 1)

Reactor coolant actlvny greater th3o Techllltal Speclftca!IOO llllowable limits MU4.1 I 1 I 2

)

3 I SJAE CONDSR OUTLET RAD HI-HI alarm (P602)

MU4.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 Coolant activity GT O 2 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131 RCS lealcage for 15 minutes or long,>r MUS.1

]

1 I 2 I 3 I Malfunct.

5 RPS switches on lurbine lhrotde valves Mam steam 111e radiatlOtl monitors Eleclrical k>ad re;ection GT 25% ruu electrical load (1) RCS unidenlified or pressure boundary leakage GE 10gpmforGE 15min RCS l eakage 6

RPS Failure Turbine Bukhng Vftnlllalion radialton monitors Main steam hne ptp1ng up lo MS*V-146 and the first stop valves Standby S8MC8 Water Pump Houses Diesel Generator Bu1ld1ng ln.tiillty to shut down the reactor cooslng a cha*~ to RPV wate, lf?vet or RCS hea1 removal MS6.1 I 1 I 2 j

An automatic OR manual scram fails lo shut down the reactor AND

~ actions to shut down the reactor are !lQ! successrul as indicaled by reactor power GT 5%

---

~----'-*

ANO EITHER:

RPV level s.ililll2l be restored and maintained above - 186 In or 0Ilil2l be determined Table 4 Communication Methods System Onsite ORO NRC OR WW temperature and RPV pressure~ be maintained bek>w the HCTL 1----+---<1 Plant Public Address (PA) System 7

Loss of Comm.

8 Hazardous Event Affecting Safety Systems F

Fission Product Plant Telephone System

?tanl Radio System Operations and Security Channels Offsile calling capability from the Control Room via direct telephone Long d1s1ance calling capability on the commercial phone system FG1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 l oss of filri lwo barriers AND X

X X

X X

X X

I Table 8 Hazardous Events Seismic event Internal or external FLOODING event High winds Tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Volcanic ash fallout Other events wil h similar hazard characteristics as delermlned by the Shift Manager FS1.1 ! 1 ! 2 ! 3 Loss or potential loss of.ii.rel two barriers {Table F-1)

ECCS injection Thermal power osciHations GT 10%

Automallc or manual SCl'&m !ails to shutdown the reactor, and subsequent mainunl ac11ons t3ken at the rea<:IOf control con,oles are Q!21 succ.ess1ul in shutting down the reacklr MA6.1

[

1 I 2 j

Ail automatic OR manual scram fails lo shut down the reactor AND Manual scram actions taken at the reactor conlrol console

{mode switch in shutdown, manual push bullons or ARI) are QQ! successrul in shulling down the reactor as indicated by reactor power GT 5% (Nole 8)

Himudous event Affecting a SAFETY SYSTEM needPd lo, the current Qpeu11mg mode MA8.1 I 1

)

2 I 3 j

The occurrence of iD.Y. Table 8 hazardous evenl ANO Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode AND EITHER Event damage has caused 1ndicalt0ns al degraded performance lo a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for lhe current operating mode OR Event damage has resulled in VISIBLE DAMAGE lo a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed ror the current operaling mode (Notes 9, 10)

FA1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 Any: k:>ss or am polenlial k:>ss of EITHER Fuel Clad or RCS barrier (Table F-1)

OR (2) RCS idenlmed leakage GT 25 gpm for GE 15 min OR (3) l eakage from the RCS lo a location outside containment GT25gpmforGE 15min.

Automatlc or manual scram 1ails kl shuttlown lhe reactor MU6.1 I 1 I 2 An automatic OR manual scram did QQJ shul down lhe reactor AND A subsequent automatic scram OR manual scram aclion taken at lhe reactor control console (mode switch in shutdown, manual push bullons or ARI) is successful In shutting down the reactor as indicated by reactor power LE 5% (APRM downscale) (Nole B)

MU7.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I

( 1) Loss of ~ Table 4 onsite communication methods OR (2) loss of all Table 4 ORO communication methods OR (3) Loss of an Table 4 NRG communication methods Barrier Degradation Loss or potenlial loss of lhe lhird barrier (Ta~e F-1)

II Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix A

RPV Water Level B

RCS l eak Rate C

PC Conditions D

PC Rad f RCS Activity E

PC Integrity or Bypass F

Emergency Director Judgment FC - Fuel Clad Barrier Loss SAG entry required Containment Radiation Monitor CMS-R1S-27E or CMS-R1S-27F reading GT 3.600 R/hr OR Primary coolant activity GT 300 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent 1-1 31 MY condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates loss of the ruet clad barrier Potential Loss RPV level 00021 be restored and maintained GT - 16 1 in.

or ~

be determined.

An:t condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director that indicates polenlial toss of the Fuel Clad barrier Modes: ~1~11 ~ _2~11 3

Power Operations Startup Hol Shutdown RCS - Reactor Coolant Syste,m Barrier PC - Containment Barrier Loss RPV level cannot be restored and maintained GT -161 in.

or lli!lQ! be determined.

UNISOLABLE break in IDr£ of the fotlowing*

• Main~eamUne

• RCIC Sleam line

• RWCU

• Feedwater OR Emergency RPV Depressurization is required PC pressure GT 1.68 psig due to RC S leakage Containment Radiation Monilor CMS-R1S-27E or CMS-RtS-27F reading GT 70 R/hr AfiY condition in lhe opinion of the Emergency Director lhal indicates loss of the RCS barrier Potential Loss UNISOLABLE pnmary system leakage that results in exceeding EITHER:

RB area te,r;peralure alarTTl level {PPM 5.3.1 Table 23)

OR RB area rad1atioo alarm level (PPM 5 3 1 Table 24)

Am condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director lhal indicates polenllal loss of the RCS barrier Loss UNISOLABLE primary system leakage lhat resulls In exceeding EITHER RB area ma11imum safe operaliog temperature (PPM 5 3.1 Table 23)

OR RB area maximum safe operating radiation (PPM 5 3 1 Table 24)

UNPLANNED rapid drop in PC pressure following PC pressure rise OR PC pressure response oQ1 consistent wilh LOCA conditions UNtSOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after PC isolation signal OR Intentional PC venting per EOPs ADY condition in l he opinion of the Emergency Direclor lhal indicates loss of the Containment barrier Potential Loss SAG entry required PC pressure GT 45 psig OR Explosive mixture exists inside PC (H2 GE 6% and 0 2 GE 5%)

OR WW temperature and RPV pressure

~

be maintained bek)w the HCTL Containment Radiation "'1onitor CMS-R1S-27E or CMS-RIS-27F reading GT 14,000 R/hr

~

condition in the opinion of the Emergency Director lhal lndlcales potential loss of the Conlainment barrier ENERGY NORTHWEST 13.1.1 Rev. 49 MR 1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY 1/16/2019 HOT CONDITIONS (RCS GT 200°F)

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGE I-.... f ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT l~ ol RPVln-.enk,ry ~ngfuel dad in1t>g1tywif'I fflll~ ch.*nqed C

Cold SOI Refuel System Maffuncl.

1 RPV Level 2

Loss of Emergenc AC Power 3

RCS Temp.

4 Loss of Vital DC

Powe, 5

Loss of Comm.

6 HazardCXK Events AffecHng Safety Systems Modes:

CG1.1 I 4 I s I RPV level LT-161 in. forGE30min. (Nole 1)

AND Any_ of the following indicalions of oontainment challenge CONTAINMENT CLOSURE 021 established (Note 6)

Explosive mixture inside PC (H2 GE 6% and 02 GE 5%)

UNPLANNED rise in PC pressure RB area radlalion GT filri Maximum Safe Operating level (PPM 5 3.1 Table 24)

CG1.2

! 4 ! 5 !

RPV level ~

be monilored for GE 30 min. (Note 1)

AND Core unoovery is indicaled by it.DY of the following*

UNPLANNED welwell level rise GT 2 inches (PPM 5 2 I entry oondilion)

VALID Indication of RB room flooding as identified by high level alarms (PPM 5.3.1 Table 25)

Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage outside primary oontammenl of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery ANO

~

of the following 1odicalions of conta111ment challenge*

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE fl:2! established (Nole 6)

Explosive mixture inside PC (H2 GE 6% and 02 GE 5%)

UNPLANNED rise in PC pressure RB area radiation GT~ Maximum Safe Operating level (PPM 5.3.1 Table 24)

Table 4 Communication Methods System Onslle ORO NRC

~anl Public Address (PA) System X

Plant Telephone System X

Plant Radio System Operations and X

Securily Channels Offslle calling capability from lhe Conlrol Room via direcl telephone long d1slance caN1ng capability on 1

the commercial phone system Los., (If RPV lrl'Vf'flkwy :dfeclinQ core dera,- t,,,,at rt!f'l'IOY&I CS1.1 I 4 I s I (1) CONTAINMENT CLOSURE !!21 esla~ished ANO RPV level LT -129 in.

OR (2) CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established AND RPV level LT -161 in.

CS1.2 RPV level.mnn2t be monitored for GE 30 min (N~e 1 )

ANO Core unoovery is indicaled by~ of the following UNPLANNED wetweH level rise GT 2 inches (PPM 5 2 1 enlry condition)

I VALID indlcalioo of RB room nooding as idenlifted by htgh level alarms (PPM 5 3.1 Table 25)

Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage outside primary containmenl of sufficient magnilude lo indicate COf"e u ncovery Table 7 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds If an RCS heal removal syslem is in opera1ion within this time frame and RCS 1empera1ure is being reduced lhe EAl ls[lQlappllcable RCS Statu s Containment Heat-up Closure Status Duration lnlacl NIA 60 min

• established 20 min *

~mtact p

ll2l established Omin Tabte 8 Hazardous Events SetSmic event lnlernal or exlernal FLOODING event High winds Tornado slrike FIRE EXPLOSION Volcanic ash fallout Olher evenls with similar hazard characleristics as determined by lhe Shift Manager 4 __,I I 5 I! DEF Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled CA1.1 I 4 I s (1) Loss of RPV lnvenlOf)' as indicated by RPV level LT-SO in OR (2) RPV level~ be monitored f0< GE 15 min (Note 1)

ANO UNPLANNED increase in ifill Table 1 sump or pool levels due to a loss of RPV inventory CA2.1 I_ Table 1 Sumps/Pool

&ri valid HI-HI level alarm on R-1 through R-5 SUO'l)S EDR GE 25 GPM FORGE IOGPM Wetwel level rise Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage l ooo, ol i!I off~lltt arld i!! on<,ile AC po,'<E'f to emergeney bows ffK l5mlnut~orlonger -

j 4 j 5 j DEF j Loss of all offsite and al onsile AC power capabitily lo emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min (Nole I )

CAJ.1 I.. I s UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to GT 20o* F for GT Table 7 duration (Note 1)

OR UNPLANNED RPV pressure increase GT 10 pslg CA6.1 Hazordclu~ &VE'III aflecllnq a SAFETY SYSTEM nneoof)f)l"a~nq mode I 4 I s I The occurrence of am: Table 8 hazardous event ANO Evenl damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operal1ng mode ANO EITHER Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance lo a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for lhe current operating mode OR Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE lo a second lrain of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for lhe current operating mode (Notes 9, 10)

ENERGY NORTHWEST CU1.1 I 4 I s (1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results Ill RPV level less than a required k>wer limit for GE 15 min (Note 1)

OR (2) RPV level ~

be monilored AND UNPLANNED Increase in filri Table 1 sump or pool levels due to a loss of RPV Inventory CU2.1 Table 2 AC Power Sources Offslte Startup Transformer TR-S Backup Transfoml8r TR-8 Bac:kfeed 500 KV power lhrot9l M<Wl Transformers ftf already aligned In modes 4, 5, def only)

Onslle DGl DG2 Main Generator via TR-N 1/N2 Lon of ii bul OM AC pc,,t,-9f SOU'{:8 k'I emerg....tc~ hustts for 15

!1W"IUIMOf'°"9fll' j 4 j5j DEF j AC power capability. Table 2. lo emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 reduced to a single power source fcx GE 15 min (Nole 1)

ANO

~

addilional single power source failure wfll result in a loss of fill AC power lo SAFETY SYSTEMS UNMANNED K-.crea-.e 111 RCS l"fl1J)t"fahxe CUl.1 I 4 I s UNPLANNED increase in RCS temperature to GT 20o*F CU3.2 l oss of fil! RCS temperature and RPV water level indication for GE 15 min (Nole 1)

L~-.cAvitatOC~ for15m111ulesOflorlll@f CU4.1 j 4 J 5 j Indicated vottage LT 108 VOCon~ 125 voe buses DP-S1-1 and DP-S 1-2 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)

Loss cA l!! 01v;ite or off<.1le cornnumcattons capahlhlli>s CUS.1 j 4 j 5 j DEF j l oss of fill Table 4 onsile communication methods OR Loss of all Table 4 ORO communication methods OR loss of fil! Table 4 NRC communicalion methods 13.1.1 Rav. 49 MR 1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY 1/16/2019 COLD CONDITIONS (RCS '.:'. 200°F)

R Abnormal Rad Levels I

Rad Effluent E

ISFSI H

Hazards 1

Rad Effluent 2

Irradiated Fuel Event 3

Area Radiation Levels 1

Confinement Boundary 1

Security 2

Seismic Event 3

Nalural or Tech.

Hazard 4

Fire 5

Hazardous Gases 6

Control Room Evacuation 7

Judgment GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY I ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT R~Me ol !JIIWOUI radloactMty,esut11og in ott,lte dose greater then 1,000 mrem TEDE Of 5,000 mrem lhyrold COE RG1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 j 5 I DEF I

( 1) Reading on i1!lY Table 3 effluent radialion monitor GT column "GENERAL* for GE 15 min.

OR (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicales doses GT 1.000 mrem TEDE or GT 5000 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)

RG1.2 ! 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Fiekt survey results indicate EITHER of the following al or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:

Closed window dose rates GT 1,000 mR/hr e)(pected to continue for GE 60 min Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid COE GT 5.000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.

(Notes 1, 2)

Spent fuel pool teY~ canno1 be reslofed to et least the top ol' the fve(racks lor60 minu!esor longer RG2.1 I 1 I 2

)

3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Spent fuel pool level cannot be restored lo at least 0.5 ft fOf GE 60 min (Note 1)

ReleaM of gMeous radioacbvlly resulting In off Site dos* greater lhan 100 nvttm TEDE or 500 mtem thyroid COE RS1.1 ! 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) Reading on am'. Table 3 effluent radiation mon1lor GT column *SAE" for GE 15 min.

OR (2) Dose assessment using actual meleorology indicates doses GT 100 mrem TEDE or GT 500 mrem thyroid COE al or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Notes 1, 2. 3, 4)

RS1.2 I 1

( 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Field survey results indicate EITHER of lhe following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:

• Closed window dose rales GT 100 mR/hr expected to continue for GE 60 min.

• Analyses d field survey samples indicale thyroid COE GT 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation (Noles 1, 2)

Spent t..rel pool level 111 the top of the fuel racks RS2.1 I 1

) 2 I 3 j 4 I 5 j DEF I Lowering of spenl fuel pool level to 0.5 ft Table 3 Effluent Monito r Clas.sfficatlon Thresholds Release Polnl Monitor General SAE Alert UE PRM-RE*11 305E-OJ..,cu<<

Ret"tetor Building Emaust PRM-RE-12 282E*l ~cc PRM*RE-13 0

7.50E+02 µCl/cc 7.50E*111Cl/cc

TurblneBulldlogExhaus!

TEA-RIS-13 8JSE-02 ~Cilcc 835E-OJ 11Cilcc 835E-04 µCllcc 4 22E-05 11Cllcc

~ RadwasteBuildlng ExhauSI WEA*RIS-14 345E-01 µCl/cc 345E-02 ~Cl/cc 3 45E-03µCilcc 398E-()I. 11CUcc Radwaste Effluent FOR-RIS-608 2XHI-Hlalarm

~ TSWEffluenl TSW-RIS-5 300E-05v(:llcc 3" 5eMce Water Process A SW-RI~

1 OOE*02q,s Service Water Process B SW-Rls-605 1 OOE*02 q,s Table 9 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Release of ~ecus Of Nquld radioactivity reMJhing In olfsite dose greatei-than 10 l'Ofem TEDE or 50 mrem thyroid COE RA1.1 j 1 j 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) Reading oo am: Table 3 effluent radiation monitor GT column *ALERr for GE 15 min OR (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indica tes doses GT 10 mrem TEDE or GT 50 mrem thyroid COE al or beyond lhe SITE BOUNDARY (Notes 1. 2. 3, 4)

RA1.2 j 1

) 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Analysis of a liquid efftuent sample indicates a concenlralion or release rale lhal would result in doses GT 10 mrem TEDE or GT 50 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond lhe SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of exposure (Noles 1, 2)

RA1.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Field survey resulls indicate EITHER of the following al or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:

Closed window dose rates GT 10 mR/hr e)(pecled lo conlinue for GE 60 min.

Analyses of field survey sampkls iod1cale lhyroid COE GT 50 mrem for 60 min d inhalalion (Noles 1, 2) 5,gnlficam low~ of water level above, or damage to, lrredilllll!dfuet RA2.1 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 r s I DEF 1 Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATH WAY RA2.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4

[

5 I DEF )

Damage lo irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity ANO High alann on m or lhe following radialion monilOrs ARM--RIS-1 Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-2 Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM--RIS-34 Reactor Building Elevation 606 REA-RtS-609A-D R)( Bldg Vent RA2.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Lowering ol spent fuel pool level to 10 fl RadiallOn levels lhst IMPEDE access IO equipment necnsa,y lor normal pbnt operations. oocklo.om °' sh.J~

RA3.1 I 1

( 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) Dose rates GT 15 mR/hr in Control Room (ARM-RIS-19) or CAS (by survey)

OR (2) An UNPLANNED event results in radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access lo.anx Table 9 rooms or areas (Nole 5)

Release of gaseous ot liquid r~ecuvlly greeter tu1n 2 times the OOCM limits fot 60 minutes or longer RU1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I

( 1) Reading on i!!r£ Table 3 effluent radiation monilOf GT column *uE* for GE 60 min OR (2) Saml)*t analyses for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentralion or release rate > 2 )( ODCM limits for GE 60 min.

(Notes 1. 2, 3)

U11>1aMed loss of water level above luadated fuel Ru2.1 1 1 1 2 1 3 r 4 1 s I DEF 1 UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by EITHER of the following:

SFP level LE 22 3 ft SFP low level alarm ANO UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levets as 1odicaled by IDri of the folk)y,11ng radiation monilors ARM-RIS-1 ReaclOr Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-2 Reaclor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-34 Reactor Building Elevation 606 J

Oamape O

• io.ded caak CONFtlEMENT BOUNOARY Room/Area Modes Applicability L-----------t~R;::w:::,::.;:-,-;R;::adw:=.,:::,.::c::on::::*::o::,R;:oom

=-(:R::;H:;-R:;:llu::::>h::,:::o:RW:;::ta::::nk::,)t"---:----* f--1-----------------..) EU1.1 I StorageOperatlons Damage lo a k>aded canister (MPC) CONFINEMENT RW 467 Vital Island (RHR-V-9 disconnecl)

BOUNDARY as Indicated by measured dose rates on a RB 422' B RHR Pump Rm (local pump temperatures) loaded overpack GT EITHER:

RB 454 ' B RHR Pump Rm (operate RHR-V-85B)

Norw 20 mrem/hr (gamma+ neutron) on lhe lop of lhe overpack HOSTILE ACTION within the P~OTECTED AREA H0ST1l.E ACTION wi1tlin the OWt,JER CONT~OlLEO AREA or eilbome allt"tek thrut wiltwl 39 nw,utes HS1.1 I 1

) 2 I 3 I -4 I 5 I DEF I HA1.1 I 1

) 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred w1lhin the PROTECTED AREA as reporled by the Secunty Sergeant or Securily l ieutenant (1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Sergeant or Security lieutenant Notes 1

The Emergency Director should declare !he event promptly upon delennining that time limit has been exceeded. or wHI likely be exceeded 2 If an ongoing release IS detected and lhe release slart time is unknown, assume that lhe release duration has e)(ceeded lhe specified time limit 3

If the effluent flow past an effluent monilor is known to have stopped. Indicating that the release path is isolated.

the effluent monilor reading is no longer VALID for classificalion purposes 4 The pre-calculated effluent monilor values presented in EAls RA1. 1, RS 1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the resulls from a dose assessment using acluat meteorok)gy are available 5 If the equipment in the listed room or area was already inoperable or oul-of-se<vice before the event occurred.

then no emergency dassification is warranted 6

If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior lo e)(ceeding the JO-minute lime limit declaration of a General Emergency is not required 7 This EAL does not apply lo rouline 1raff1C lmpedimenls such as fog, snow. ice, or vehide breakdowns or accidents 8 A manua saam action is any operalor action, or set of actions, which causes the control rods IO be rapidly inserted into l he core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implemenlalion of boron injection strategies 9

If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before lhe hazardous event occurred, then emergency classification is nol warranled 10 If the hazardous event only resul ted in VISIBLE DAMAGE. wilh no indications of degraded perfom,ance lo at least one train ol a SAFETY SYSTEM. lhen lhis emergency classificalion is not warranted OR (2) A validaled notificalion from NRC of an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the sile

'se~A61IMAB1 f;-po;;;iiaito'; -

I I upgrade to an Alert based on degraded safety system performance or damage I

'se~A6IIMA8.1 f;-po;;;iiai",; -

I I

upgrade lo an Alert based on degraded safety syslem performance or damage I Table 5 Pl11nl Structures Containing Safe Shutdown Systems or Components Vital portions of the R&d Waste/Control Building:

467' elevatlOr"I vital island 487' elevation cable spreadiog room Main Control Room and V8ftical cable chase 525' elevation HVAC area ReaclOf Butlchng Vital port,ons of lhe TurbiM Building OEH pressure switches RPS swttdies on tlrlline thronle valves Mam steam *ne radiabon momlofs Turbine Bu~ding venhlal1on radial1on monitors Main steam line piping up 10 MS-V-146 and the rlrsl stop valves Standby Service Water Pump Houses Diesel Generator Building l°se~A6IIMA81 f;-po;;:;iia1b -

I I

upgrade to an Alert based on degraded safety system performance or damage I Table 9 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room/Area Modes Appllcablllly RW 467' Radwasle Control Room (RHR Hush to RW tanks)

RW 467' Vital Island (RHR-V-9 discomecl)

RB 422. B RHR Pump Rm (local pump temJ)flralures)

RB 454' B RHR Pump Rm (operate RHR-V-858)

Other conditions existing w)llch in the Judgment of the Emerf}l!:n<:Y Oirecto, wariant ~aratkm of General Emergency HG7.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 j 4 I 5 I DEF I Olher conditions e)(iSI which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate lhal events are in progress or have occurred which involve aclual or IMMINENT substantial core degradalion or melling wilh potential for loss of containment lnlegrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of lhe facility.

Releases can be reasonably e)(pected to e)(ceed EPA Protective Action Guideline e)(posure levels offsite for more than the immediate sile erea l~lilty to i;OOtrol a key sale!}' tund>on from outlkle the Contr61 R-HS6.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 j 5 j

An evenl has resulted in plant control being transferred from the Control Room to lhe Remote Shutdown Panel or Alternate Remole Shutdown Panel AND Control of !!rt of the following key safety functions is ~

reestablished w1th1n 15 min (Nole 1 ):

Reactivity (Modes 1 aod 2 only)

RPV water level RCS heat removal Other condi!lons eils\\lng which ir;, the iuc!9ment ol the Emergency Oireclbr wan ant declafalion of Site Area Emergency HS7.1 I 1 I 2 j J I 4

( 5

( DEF I Other conditions e)(lst which. in the judgmenl of lhe Emergency Oireclor, indicate that events are In progress or have occurred which involve adual or likely major failures d ptant functions needed for proteclion of l he public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious ads. (1) loward site personnel Of equipment that roukt lead to lhe likely failure of Of. (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of lhe public.

Any releases are not e)(pected to result in e)(posure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline e)(posure levels beyond lhe SITE BOUNDARY.

G11se,oos releMe; IMPEDING access to equlpmen! necessary br flotmlll pl9fl\\ opeiatlons, CQOldown or shutdoWn HAS.1 I 1 I 2

(

3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Release of a IO)(lc. corrosive, asphyxianl or flammable gas inlo w Table 9 rooms or areas ANO Entry into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Nole 5)

C-Onlfol Room evacuation resulting WI transfer of p,1an1 control to alternate IQCatiQn, HA6.1 I 1

) 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I An event has resulted in plant conlrol being transferred from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel or Altemale Remote Shutdown Panel Other conditions existing whk:t) In the ju<lgmel)t ol the Emergency OkeclOr wanant declaration of an Alert HA7.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Other conditions e)(isl which. in lhe judgment ol lhe Emergency Director, indicate lhal events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk lo site personnel or damage lo site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are e)(pected to be limited lo small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline e)(posure levels 100 mremlhr(gamma + neutron) on the side of lhe overpack, e)(duding inlet and outlel duds Contrmed SECURITY CQNOITION or threat HU1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I

( 1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does !1Ql 1nvolve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Securily Sergeanl or Security l ieutenant OR (2) Notification of a credib'e security lhreat d1recled al lhe site OR (3) A validated nolificalion from the NRC providing informalion of an aircraft threat Seismic event T QBE levels HU2. 1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF )

Seismic event GT Operating Basis Earthquake (QBE) as indicated by H1 3 P851 S1 5-1 (OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDED) activated Haz11fUOUsevent HU3.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I DEF I

( 1) A tornado strike within the PROTECTED AREA OR (2) Volcanic ash fanout requiring ptanl shuldown HU3.2 I 1 I 2 l 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Internal room or area FLOODING of a magnitude sufficient lo require manual or aulomalic electrical Isolation of a SAFETY SYSTEM component needed for lhe current operating mode HU3.3 I 1 I 2 j 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) Movement of personnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an offsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g, an o(fsite chemical spill, 6 18-11 event or toxic gas release)

OR (2) A hazardous event that results in on-site condilions sufficient to prohibit the planl staff from accessing the site via personal vehides (Note 7)

HU4.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 j DEF I A FIRE is Jl2I e)(fingurshed within 15 min of i£ri of lhe foHowing FIRE detection indicalions (Nole 1)

• Report from the field (i.e, visual observalion)

• Receipt of multiple (more lhan 1) fire alarms or indicalions

• Field verificalion of a single fire alarm ANO The FIRE is localed within.fil!Y Table 5 area HU-4.2 1 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Receipt o( a single fire alarm (i e

• Q2 other indications of a FIRE)

ANO The fire alann is indicating a FIRE within i!ri Table 5 area ANO The e)(istence of a FIRE is not verified wilhin 30 min. of alarm recelpl (Nole 1)

HU4.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF j

( 1) A FIRE within lhe tSFSI or plant PROTECTED AREADQl e)(tinguished within 60 min of the initial report, alarm or indicalion (Note 1)

OR (2) A FIRE within the ISFSI or plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offs1le fire response agency to e)(tinguish Other cooditlons e~fsting Mwch In the jtldgmentof !he Emergency 0 1,-llClkll wMaot declarfltlon ol a UE HU7.1 j 1 I 2 I J I 4 I 5 I DEF)

Other conditions e)(ist which. in lhe judgmenl of lhe Emergency Direclor, indicale Iha! evenls are In progress or have occurred which indicate a polential degradation of the level of safely of the plant or Indicate a security threat to facility proleclion has been initialed. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsile response or monitoring are e)(pecled unless further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occurs Modes:.____1 ___.I.__

I _2 ___.I '--

1 _3 ___.I.__

I _4 ___.II'--_5 ___.I I DEF I ENERGY NORTHWEST 13.1.1 Rev. 49 MR 1 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY 1116/2019 Power Operalions Startup Hol Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled ALL CONDITIONS