ML24192A138
| ML24192A138 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia |
| Issue date: | 06/27/2024 |
| From: | Energy Northwest |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML24192A138 (1) | |
Text
I DISTRIBUTION - VOLUME 13 - EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROCEDURES Page 3 of 3 Distribution Date:
06/27/24 Filed By: _______________ Prepared by:
Procedure Number Revision Procedure Number Revision Procedure Number Revision 13.1.1 050 I
TO: ENERGY NORTHWEST EXTERNAL CONTROLLED COPY PROCEDURE HOLDERS The following documents have been revised and are to be inserted into your controlled copy manual and the superseded revisions removed and destroyed. No receipt acknowledgement is required for the listed document(s).
Should you have questions on this distribution please contact Alan Page, Records, and Information at (509)377-8595 or atpage@energy-northwest.com.
I EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION Coov#
Location 26 ReQion IV - US Nuclear Regulatory Commission All 52 State of Washington, Military Department All 55 Federal Emergency Management Aoencv (FEMA)
All II 57 Benton County - Department of Emergency Management All
~ -
87 Document Control Desk NRC All f "
142 Hanford EOC/SMT All 164 Oregon State Department of Enerov All 223 Franklin County Emergency Management All 224 WashinQton State Department of Health - Office of Radiation Protection All
& PPM 13.1.1 and is printed in color, single sided, on 11 " x 17" paper, folded, 3-hole punched, stapled on top and distributed by Document Control. All ERO Positional-Specific Binder procedures are stapled.
% Contact Security - All Security Procedures go to the sec for signature NOTE: Distribution of the PPM 13.1.1 wall flow charts are controlled by PPM 13.1.1 A and distribution is performed by EP.
Procedures
/)i45
///lrK Updated 01/18/2024 I
GENERAL EMERGENCY I SITE AREA EMERr CY I ALERT I
UNUSUAL EVENT Prok,t,ged 1o.. of d otfaile W'id II onske AC powf/1' to emergency LOH of d otr.ite I nd Iii ontite AC poWl!t lo emergency blAM LoH ol II b ul one AC poWl!I' 1ource to emergency bUSff Lon of d otfl.lte AC po-i::ap bitity to emergency b-lo, 15miM11101longer for 15mlnute.orlonger fo115minu1111or longer MG1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
MS1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
MA1.1 I 1 i 2 I 3 I I
I i
MU1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
Loss of fill offsite AND fill onsite AC power capability to Loss of fill offsite and fill onsite AC power capability to AC power capability, Table 2, to emergency buses SM-7 Loss of fill offsite AC power capability, Table 2, to emergency emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1) and SM-8 reduced to a single power source for GE 15 min.
buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. {Nole 1)
AND EITHER:
(Note 1) 1 Restoration of emergency bus SM-7 or SM-8 AND in LT 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> isnfil likely (Note 1) t£r:J._ additional single power source failure 'Nill resuh in a LOH of OR loss of ill AC power to SAFETY SYSTEMS Emetgenc)
RPV level cannot be restored and maintained Table 2 AC Power Sources AC Power GT -166in-LOH of !I emergency AC and vil*I DC power SOtJftH fo1 Offslte 15mlnule1orlonger Startup TransfOfmer TR-S MG1.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 i I
I i
Backup Transformer TR-B Loss of.ill offsite AND ~ onsite AC power capability lo Backfeed 500 KV power through emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)
Main Transformers (if already I -
AND aligned in modes 4, 5, def only) 2 Indicated vottage is LT 108 voe on b21b. 125 voe buses loH of l!I vital DC powe1 for 15 mil'IUl:es Of loll{ler Onslte DP-S1-1 and DP-51-2 tor GE 15 min. (Note 1)
DG1 MS2.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
Loss of DG2 VltalDC Indicated vohage is LT 108 voe on~ 125 voe buses Main Generator via TR-N1/N2 Power DP-S1-1 and DP-S1-2 lor GE 15 min. (Nole 1)
UNPLANNED 1011 of Control Room lndic1tioo1 lor 15 minutes or UNPLANNED loHofControl Room lndie.tion, for 15mITTutesor longerwilhaalgnifleant!Tansientin progreH longer MAJ.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
MUJ.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
3 An UNPLANNED event results in the inability to monitor one An UNPLANNEq event results in the inability to monitor or more Table 10 parameters from within the Control Room one or more Tabfe 10 parameters from within the Control LoHof for GE 15 min. (Note 1)
Room for GE 15 min. (Note 1)
Control AND Room
/j[Jy_ Table 11 transient event in progress Indications Tati,e 10 Safety System Parameters Tati,e 5
. Reactor power Reaeto1 eoolent aetivffy greater than Technical Spec1t'lcatlon
- lowablemwls Plant Slnlctures Containing S f* Shutdown Sysl~s or RPVlevel Components RPV pressure MU4.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
4 Primary containment pressure SJAE CONDSR OUTLET RAD HI-HI alarm (P602)
Vital portions of the Rad Waste/Control Building:
Wetwell level 467' elevation vital island Wet.veil temperature RCS Activity 87 " elevation cable spreading room MU4.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I I
Main Control Room and vertical cable ch.se I
525' elevation HVAC area Tati,e 11 Transient Events Coolant activity GT 0.2 µCi/gm dose equivalent 1-131 Reactor Building Vital portions of the Turbine Building Reactor scram RCS leak1g1 for 15 minute* ot lonoer M
DEH pres&ure switches Runbaci< GT 25% thermal reader power MUS.1 I 1 I
- I 3 I I
I i
RPS witches on turbine lhrotde valves Electrical load rejection GT 25% full
{1) RCS unidentified or pressure boundary leakage System j
Malfunct.
Main steam line radiation monitors electrical load GE 10 gpm for GE 15 min.
5 Turbine Building ventilation radiation monitors ECCS injection OR Main steam line piping up to MS-V-1 46 and the first stop valves Thermal power oscillations GT 10%
(2) RCS identified leakage GT 25 gpm for GE 15 min.
RCS Standby Service Water Pump Houses OR lukage Diesel Generator Building (3) Leakage from the RCS to a location outside containment GT 25 gpm for GE 15 min.
(Note 1) lnabllitytoahutdOWl'lthereaetoreauslngaehal enge toRP'v' Automatic: or manual.uam fails lo I hut down the reaeior, and AUlomatle or manual scram falls lo.tiut down the rHdor water level or RCS heat removal sublequen1manuIl actionItaken11the reai;tori;ontrolwns!MtI areQ2lsuei;eu.flA lnshutting down lhereaetor MS6.1 I 1 I 2 I I
I I
i MA6.1 I 1 I 2 I I
I I
i MU6.1 I 1 I 2 I I
I I
i An automatic OR manual scram fails lo shut down the Ari automatic OR manual scram fails to shut dO'Nn the An automatic OR manual scram did !!.Q! shut dO'Ml the reactor reader reader 6
AND AND AND ei!! actions to shut down the reader are n.Ql successful as Manual scram actions taken at the reactor control console A subsequent automatic scram OR manual scram action RPS indicated by reactor power GT 5%
(mode switch in shutdown, manual push buttons or ARI) are taken at the reactor control console (mode switch in Failure ANO EITHER:
!!Q! successful in shutting down the reactor as Indicated by shutdown, manual push buttons or ARI) is successful in Tati,e, Communication Method*
RPV level 0Illlii!t be restored and maintained reactor power GT 5% (Nole 8) shutting dO'M'l the reactor as indicated by reactor power above -186 in. or 0Drull be determined LE 5% (APRM downscale) (Nole 8)
OR System Onslte ORO NRC W\\/V temperature and RPV pressure~ be maintained below lhe HCTL Plant Public Address (PA) System X
loll of d lll"l91te or offsile i;ommunieationI e.pabiltiel P1ant Telephone System X
X MU7.1 I
2 3
7 Plant Radio System Operations and X
(1) Loss or i!!J T ble 4 onslte communication methods Security Channels OR loss or (2) Loss of i.11 Table 4 ORO communication methods Comm.
Offsite caRing capability from the X
X Control Room via direct telephone OR (3) Loss of fill Table 4 NRC communication methods long distance calling capablllty on X
X the commercial phone system Hazudou1 even! alleetlng a SAFETY SYSTEM needed fOI' the current°"eratlr'igmode MA8.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
The occurrence of~ Table 8 hazardous event Tabfe 8 Hazardous Events AND 8
Event damage has caused indications or degraded
. Seismic event performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode Internal or external FLOODING event AND EITHER' Hazardous Event High winds Event damage has caused indications of degraded Affecting
. T omado strike performance to a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM Safety
. FIRE needed for the current operating mode Systems EXPLOSION OR
. Volcanic ash fallout Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the Other events with similar hazard current operating mode characteristics as determined by the Shift (Notes 9, 10)
Manager F
FG1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
FS1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I I
I i
FA1.1 I 1 I 2 i 3 I I
I i
I Loss of.iWY t'NO barriers Loss or potential loss of
.6!lk'. loss or ~
potential loss of Fission Product AND
~
two barriera (Table F-1)
EITHER Fuel Clad or RCS barrier (Table F-1)
Barrier Degradation Loss or potential loss of the third barrier (Table F-1 )
I Table F-1 Fission Product Barrier Threshold Matrix FC - Fuel Clad Barrier RCS - Reactor Coolant System Barrier PC - Containment Barrier Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss Loss Potential Loss A
RPV level 0llllQl be restored and RPV level~ be restored and SAG entry required maintained GT -161 In.
maintained GT -161 in.
SAG entry required RPV Water Level or cannot be determined.
or~ be determined.
UNISOLABLE break in 2!!..X of the UNISOLABLE primary system leakage UNISOLABLE primary system leaka~
following:
that resuhs in exceeding EITHER:
that results in exceeding EITHER:
- Main Steam Une RB area temperature alarm level RB area maximum safe operating
- RCIC Steam Line B
- RWCU (EDP Table 23) temperature (EDP Table 23)
RCS leak Rate
- Feedwater OR OR OR RB area radiation alarm level RB area maximum safe operating Emergency RPV Depressurization is (EDP Table 24) radiation (EDP Table 24) required PC pressure GT 45 psig I
UNPLANNED rapid drop in PC pressure OR following PC pressure rise Explosive mixture exists inside PC C
PC pressure GT 1.68 pslg due to RCS
"°""
PC Conditions leakage OR PC pressure response n21 consistent v.-ith LOCA conditions WiN temperature and RPV pressure cannot be maintained below !he HCTL Containment Radiation Monitor CMS-RIS-27E or CMS-R1S-27F Containment Radiation Monitor D
reading GT 3,600 Rfhr Containment Radiation Monitor PC Rad f CMS-RIS-27E or CMS-RIS-27F CMS-RIS-27E Of CMS-RIS-27F DR reading GT 70 R/hr reading GT 14,000 Rfhr RCS Activity Primary coolant activity GT 300 µCi/gm Dose Equivalent 1-131 E
UNISOLABLE direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after PC Integrity or PC isolation signal Bypass OR Intentional PC venting per EOPs F
~
condition in the opinion of the
!!:!f:J.. condition in the opinion of the 6!J:i. condition in the opinion of the 6!J:i. condition in the opinion of the
~
condition In the opinion of the
&J:i condition in the opinion of the Emergency Emergency Director that indicates loss Emergency Director that indicates Emergency Director that indicates loss Emergency Director that Indicates Emergency Director that indicates lou Emergency Director that indicates Director of the fuel clad barrier potential loss of the Fuel Clad barrier of the RCS barrier potential loss of the RCS barrier of the Containment barrier potential loss of the Containment Judgment barrier 13.1.1 Rev. 50 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY I
ENERGY 6/27/2024 Modes: I 1 I I 2 I I 3 HOT CONDITIONS NORTHWEST Power Operations Startup Hot Shutdown (RCS GT 200°F)
C Cold SDI Roluol System Matfunct.
1 RPV LoYol 2
Loal of Em* gonci AC Power 3
RCS Temp.
4 Lon ol Vltal DC *-*
5 Loos of COfflm.
6 Hazardous Events A-no Systems Modes:
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERC.
(1) CONTAINMENT CLOSURE n.Q1 established AND ANO
&Jy_ of the following indications of containment challenge:
RPV level LT -129 in.
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE !!Q! established (Note 6)
(2) CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established
- UNPLANNED rise in PC J)fessure AND
(EOP Table 24)
RPV level cannot be monitored for GE 30 min. (Note 1)
AND Core uncovery is indicated by filri of the follo\\Mng:
- UNPLANNED wetwell level rise GT 2 inches
- VALID indlcatioo of RB room fiooding as identified by high level alarms (EDP Table 25)
- Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage outside plimary containment of sufficient magnitude to Indicate core uncovery AND
&ill'. of the following indications of containment chaaenge:
- CONTAINMENT CLOSURE !lQ! established (Note 6)
, Explosive mixture inside PC (H2 GE 6% and 0 2 GE 5%)
- UNPLANNED rise in PC pressure
Table4 Communication Methods System Onslte ORO NRC Plant Public Address (PA} System X
Plant Telephone System Plant Radio System Operations and X
Security Channels Offsite calling capability from !he Control Room via direct telephone Long distance calling capability on the commercial phone system X
RPV level cannot be monitored for GE 30 min. (Note 1)
AND Core uncovery Is indicated by !!Ji'. of the follo'lling:
- UNPLANNED wet\\1/ell level rise GT 2 inches
- Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage outside primary containment of sufficient magnitude to indicate core uncovery Table 7 RCS Reheat Duration Threshokl1 If an RCS heat remonl 1yst1m is in ope,atlon 'Mlhin this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced !he EAL lsDmappiCilble RCS Status Containment Heat-up Closure Status Duration Intact NIA 60 min.
- establ!shed 20 min. *
~intact 021 established O min.
Table I Hazardous Events SelSmic event Internal or external FLOODING event High 'llinds Tornado strike FIRE EXPLOSION Volcanic ash fallout other events with similar hazard characteristics as determined by the Shift Manager
~I _4~11 5 11 DEF I Cold Shutdown Refueling Defueled Slgnillc:anl INa or RPV inv.rwory
( 1) Loss of RPV Inventory as indicated by RPV level LT -50 in.
be monitored for GE 15 min. {Note 1)
AND UNPLANNED increase in.l!lY. Table 1 sump or pool levels due to a loss of RPV inventory Table 1 Sumps/Pool t!J1_ valid Hi-Hi level alarm on R-1 throul71 R-5 sumps EOR GE 25GPM FOR GE 10GPM Wet\\1/ell level rise I
Observation of UNISOLABLE RCS leakage Losa of ii oltsile,nd ii onalle AC power to emergency buses fc,r 15minutnor longer Loss of fill offsite and ill onsite AC power capability to emergency buses SM-7 and SM-8 for GE 15 min. (Note 1) l Inability 10 malncaln plant in cold shutdCIWn UNPLANNED increase In RCS temperature to GT 20o*F for GT Table 7 duration (Note 1)
OR UNPLANNED RPV pressure increase GT 10 psig Hazardous event anec;tjng a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the anent operabng mode CA6, 1 lc.-__....)c.-__.l_~I--"-* _._I....e.5 _,_I _ _,I The occurrence of w Table 8 hazardous event AND Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance on one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed fOI' the current operating mode ANO EITHER*
Event damage has caused indications of degraded performance to a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for the current operating mode OR Event damage has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to a second train of a SAFETY SYSTEM needed for !he current operating mode (Notes 9, 10)
ENERGY NORTHWEST UntJlannad '"9 of RPV lrwentory CU1.1 rl -,,- ~,-~,-.~ r,-5~rl -,I
{1) UNPLANNED loss of reactor coolant results in RPV level less than a required lower limit for GE 15 min. (Note 1)
{2) RPV level ~
be monitored AND UNPLANNED increase in ruiY Table 1 sump or pool levels due to a loss of RPV inventory Table 2 AC Power Sources Offslte Startup Transformer TR..S Backup Transformer TR-8 Backfeed 500 KV power throui;, Main Tr,rsformers (if already aligned in modes 4, 5, def only)
Onslte DG1 0(32 u.Jn Generator via TR-N1fN2 Lou of II bl.tone AC porr,,<er sowce 10 emergency buses fot 15 mtnlfnor lqer CU2.1
[I ::J1c::J1:::::::1:I* ::::1 :s~:::::1
- oe;]F
(Note 1)
AND
&Jy additional single power source failure IMN result in a loss of ill AC po'Ner tOi SAFETY SYSTEMS UNPLANNED lnc:rease In RCS t-,nper1ture UNPLANNED Increase in RCS temperature to GT 2oo*F cuJ.2 LI _...,lc.-__.l_~l--"-*-'-1 ~s'-,_l _...,1 Loss of fill RCS temperature and RPV water level indication lor GE 15 min. (Note 1)
CU4.1
[
(
j j -4 j 5 j j
Indicated voltage Lr 108 voe on~ 125 voe buses DP-81-1 and DP-61-2 for GE 15 min. (Note 1)
Loss of d ~* or offue oommunlcatlona capablllies CUS.1
[
I I
j 4' j 5 j DEF I Loss of e!1 Table l onsite communication methods OR Loss or ill Table 4' ORO communication methods DR Loss of fill Table 4' NRG communication methods Ii 13.1.1 Rev. 50 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY 6/2712024 COLD CONDITIONS (RCS :S 200°F)
R Abnofm Rad Levels I
Rad Effluent E
ISFSI H
Hazards 1
Rad Effluent 2
Irradiated Fuel Event 3
A,ea Radiation Levels 1
Conflnemenl Bound*ry 1
Security 2
S~smlc Event 3
Natural or Tech.
Hazard 4
Fire 5
Hazardou&
Gases 6
Control Room Evacuation 7
Judgment Modes:
GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGL. _..;y I ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT RelHH of g*N-radloeciivlty rnul:ing in off&ile doN gr.lier lt.n 1,000 mrem TEOE or 5.000mrem lhyroid COE RG1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5
[ DEF j
( 1) Reading on fil1i'. Table 3 effluent radiation monitor GT column "GENERAL" for GE 15 min.
OR (2) Dose assessmenl using adual meteorology indicates doses GT 1,000 mrem TEDE or GT 5000 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RG1.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 5 I DEF I Field survey resuhs indicate EITHER of the following at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.
Closed window dose rates GT 1,000 mR/hr expected to continue for GE 60 min.
Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid COE GT 5,000 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
Sp.nt fuel poo1 i.ve1 cannot be rn!Ofed ro M 6enl !he lop of !he II.let racks 101 50 mirues or longer RG2.1 ! 1 I 2 I 3 I
ReleHe of gNeou. radloadivlly '"'-'ting in offwte dne gfHler lhan 100 mrem TEOE OI' 500 nwem thyroid COE RS1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 j S f DEF I (1) Reading on ~Table 3 effluent radiation monitor GT column "SAE" for GE 15 min.
OR (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses GT 100 mrem TEDE or GT 500 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RS1.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 5 I DEF I Fiekl survey resuhs Indicate EITHER of the follOINing at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
- Closed window dose rates GT 100 mR/hr e)(pected lo continue for GE 60 min.
- Analyses of fiekl survey samples indicate thyroid COE GT 500 mrem for 60 min. of inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
Spenl ~I poal levsl 81 rha lop ol lhe fuel rack, RS2.1 j 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I lowering of spent fuel pool level lo 0.5 ft Tab6e 3 Effluent Monitor Classification Thresholds Release Point Reactor Building Exheur.l Monitor PRM-RE*11 PRM*RE*12 PRM*RE*1J General SAE Alert LIE J.OSUIJIIC!fec 2.82E*1 l,ICl/cc i 1--T,- rt>-I,-, -.,-,. -,, -,,-,-,,-"'-, +------+-----!-------+----!----~
7.50E+02 µCl/cc 7.50E+1 µCl/cc TEA*RIS*13 8.35E-02 µCllcc 8.JSE-OJµCllcc 8.35E-04µCilcc 4.22E-05iJCilcc Cl RedwHte Building
'\\
Eirhau.t
\\I\\IEA*RIS*14 J.45E-01 µCl/cc 3.45E-02µCl/cc 3.45E-03 µCi/cc 3.98E-04 1,10/cc RedwHleEffluent FDR-RIS-606 2XHI-Hl alerm
! TSWEMluerit TSW-RIS-5 3.00E-05 µCl,'cc J
Seivk:11Wa1erProcneA Sw.RIS-604 1.00E+Ol cps Seivk:e Water ProceH B SW-RIS-605 1.00E*02cps RelHn ol gHeous or lquid rw.di!MctMry rHUlting In oW.1141 dote gre.ter than 10 mrem TEDE or SO rnram thyroid COE RA1.1 I 1 I 2
[
3 I 4 I 5 I DEF )
(1) Reading on i.QY. Table 3 effluent radiation monitor GT column "ALERT lor GE 15 min.
OR (2) Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses GT 10 mrem TEDE or GT 50 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (Notes 1, 2, 3, 4)
RA1.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Analysis of a liquid effluent sample indicates a concentration or release rate that would result in doses GT 10 mrem TEOE or GT 50 mrem thyroid COE at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY for 60 min. of e)(posUre (Notes 1, 2)
RA1.3 I 1 I 2 j 3 I 4 j 5 I DEF I Field survey resuhs Indicate EITHER of the foMowing at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY:
Closed window dose rates GT 10 mR/hr expected to continue for GE 60 min.
Analyses of field survey samples indicate thyroid COE GT 50 mrem for 60 min. of Inhalation.
(Notes 1, 2)
Signit\\elnl lowering ol water level above, or damage to, lmidlatedl'uel RA2.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Uncovery of irradiated fuel in the REFUELING PATHWAY RA2.2 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Damage to Irradiated fuel resulting in a release of radioactivity ANO High alarm on iQY of the following radiation monitors*
ARM-RIS-1 Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-2 Reactor Building Fuel Pooi Area ARM-RIS-34 Reactor Building Elevation 606 REA-RIS-609A-D R)( Bldg Vent RA2.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF j Lowering of spent fuel pool level to 10 ft
[.,.
Radiation level, lhet IMPEDE
- cc;:MS lo equipment netnsa-y tor normal punt operetione, cooldown or el-MdOWl'I RAJ.1 ! 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) Dose rates GT 15 mRhir in Control Room (ARM-RIS-19) or CAS (by survey)
OR RelH.. of PMOUI or liqukt radio*cOvtty gr**rer lh*n 2 timH the 00CM.,....s for 60 minutes or longer RU1.1 ! 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) Reading on filll Table 3 effluent radiation monitor GT column "UE" for GE 60 min.
OR (2) Sample analyses for a gaseous or liquid release indicates a concentration or release rate > 2 )( ODCM
~mits for GE 6Q min.
(Notes 1, 2, 3)
RU2.1 j 1 I 2 I 3 I 4
) 5 I DEF I UNPLANNED water level drop in the REFUELING PATHWAY as indicated by EITHER of the following:
SFP level LE 22.3 ft e SFP low level alarm ANO UNPLANNED rise in area radiation levels as indicated by fil!Y of the following radiation monitors ARM-RIS-1 Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-~ Reactor Building Fuel Pool Area ARM-RIS-3,4 Reactor Building Elevation 606 I
T abte 9 Sale Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room/Area (2) An UNPLANNED event results In radiation levels that prohibit or IMPEDE access to ifil'. Table 9 rooms or areas (Note 5) j Damage to I k>llded CHk CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY Modes Applicability L---------~ :::R::;W
- ,::6::7-:R::-,...,
- -::-,::.. :::c::~:::*::,;-;,R::,-::=::l;;:R;;HR;::-ffu:::oh:::to::;:RW-:;::~-;,,:::,J:r- -:----*..,_-l-________________.)
EU1.1 ~I ___
st_occ,ag c,c*c..c.
Ope
= **cclicc.on.c*'----'
Damage to a loaded canister (MPC) CONFINEMENT RW 467 Vital Island (RHR*V-9 disconnect)
BOUNDARY as indicated by measured dose rates on a RB 422' B RHR Pump Rm (local pump temperatures) loaded overpack GT EITHER:
RB 454' B RHR Pump Rm (operate RHR-V--65B)
None 20 mrem/h (gamma + neutron) on the top of the overpack Notes 1 The Emergency Director should declare the event promptly upon determining that time limit has been exceeded. or will likely be exceeded 2 If an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown, assume that the release duration has exceeded the specified time Nmit 3 If the effluent now past an effluent monitor is known to have stopped. indicating that the release path ts isolated, the effluent monitor reading is no longer VALID for classification purposes 4 The pre-calculated effluent monitor values presented in EAls RA1.1, RS1.1 and RG1.1 should be used for emergency classification assessments until the results from a dose assessment using actual meteorology are available 5 lf the equipment in the listed room or area was already Inoperable or out-of-service before the event occurred, then no emergency classification is warranted 6 If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the JO.minute time limit, declaration of a General Emergency Is not required 7 This EAL does not apply to routine traffic impediments such as fog, snow, Ice, or vehicle breakdowns or accidents HOSTILE ACTION v.ithln the PROTECTED AREA HS1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 j 5 I DEF I A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Security Sergeant or Security Lieutenant HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or 1irbOl'nelllKklhr111twilhiri30minutee HA1.1 I 1
) 2 I 3
) 4 I 5 I DEF I
( 1) A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the Olf.lNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by the Security Sergeant or Security Lieutenant OR (2) A validated notification from NRC or an aircraft attack threat within 30 min. of the site
'se~A6~MA8.1 f~
o~iai,;; -
j I upgrade to an Alert based on degraded safety system performance or damage j L_ _
Table 5 8 A manual scram action is any operator action, or set ol actions, which causes the control rods to be rapidly Inserted into the core, and does not include manually driving in control rods or implementation of boron injection strategies Plant Structure1 Containing Safe Shutdown Systems or Components Vital portions of the Rid Wste !Con trol Building:
46T elevationvit*l island 487 elevation cable spreading room 9
If the affected SAFETY SYSTEM train was already inoperable or out of service before the hazardous event occurred, !hen emergency classification is not warran1ed 10 If the hazardous event only resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE, with no indications of degraded performance to at least one train of a SAFETY SYSTEM, then this emergency classification Is not warranted Main Control Room and verticet cable chase 525' elevation HVAC area Reector Building Vital portion& ol lhe TUrbiFlll Building OEH pres.sure s'Mtches RPS switches on lurblne throttle vatves M1in steam ~ne 11di11ion monitors Turbine Building ventilation radiation monitors Main &team Hne piping Up to MS*V-146 and the first stop valves Standby Service Water Pump Houses Diesel Genetato, Building Table 9 Safe Operation & Shutdown Rooms/Areas Room/Area RW 467' Radwute Control Room (RHR flush to RW tanks)
RW 467 Vital Island (RHR-V-9 disconnect)
RB 422' B RHR PI.MTip Rm (local pump temper*bJres)
RB 45'4' B RHR Pump Rm (operate RHR*V--65B)
Modes Applicability tnab~~ to conlrot e key u fety rundion rrom OU!llde the Conlrol
- ~
HS6.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I G11eoua releHe IMPEDING 1cce11 to eqlipmenl necea.arv for normal plant operations, cooldown or ehutdown HAS, 1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Release of a to)(ic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gas into i.QY. Table 9 rooms or areas ANO Entry Into the room or area is prohibited or IMPEDED (Note 5)
Conlrol Room ev1cuatio" re,ulting in tranaler of plant control lo allemale loc1Uo"8 HA6.1 j 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I An event has resulted in plant control being transferred from An event has resulted in plant control being transferred the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel or from the Control Room to the Remote Shutdown Panel or Alternate Remote Shutdown Panel An:emate Remote Shutdo\\Nl1 Panel Other conditions existlr,g which In the Judgment of lhe Emergency Director warrant declaration of Gel'lllral Emergency HG7.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4
[ 5 I DEF I Other conditions exist which, In the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events a,e in progress or have occurred which invotve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting 'Mth potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.
Releases can be reasonably expected to e)(ceed EPA Protective Action Guideline e)(posure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
ANO Control of ill of the follOINing key safety functions Is Q21 reestablished within 15 min. {Note 1 )*
Reactivity (Modes 1 and 2 only)
RPV water level RCS heat removal Other condition, ulstir,g which In the judgmerit of the Emergency DirectorwarrentdedarallonofSlteAreaEmergency HS7.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Other conditions exist which, In the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred IM'lich invotve adual or likely major fa ilures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious ads, (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or, (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection ol the public.
Any rel eases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the SITE BOUNDARY.
.___1 __.II..__ _2 __.II..__ _3 __.I.._I _4 __,II.._ _5 __,I I DEF Power Operations Startup Hot Shutdown Cold ShutdD'NT1 Refueling Oefueled Other conditlona e1dstlng which in the Judgmnnt ol lhe EmergencyOireclorwarrantdeclarationof *nAlert HA7.1 ! 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Other conditions exist which, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security even! that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.
ENERGY NORTHWEST 100 mremi1lr (gamma+ neutron) on the side of the overpack, excluding inlet and outlet duds Con.rmed SECURITY CONDITION or lhre1I HU1.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I (1) A SECURITY CONDITION that does~ Involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the Security Sergeant or Security lieutenant OR (2) Notification of a credible security threat directed at the site OR (3) A validated notification from the NRC providing information ol an aircraft threat Seiamlc eve GT OBE levels HU2.1 I 1 j 2 I 3 I 4 I 5
\\ DEF I Seismic event G Operating Basis Earthquake (QBE) as indicated by H13. 851.S1.5-1 (OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE I :,CCEEDED) activated HUJ.1 I 1 j 2 I J
)
4 j 5 j DEF )
(1) A tornado stri~e within the PROTECTED AREA OR (2) Volcanic ash r llout requiring plant shutdown HUJ.2 I 1 H 2 I 3 I
- I 5 I DEF I
~:~e~~:
1
~°:n:a~o1r:i,:;~,~~:ria:a~ ;10~~:~do~ :u:~~n;~o SYSTEM compo ent needed for !he current operating mode HUJ,J DEF (1) Movement of ersonnel within the PROTECTED AREA is IMPEDED due to an orfsite event involving hazardous materials (e.g., an offsite chemical spill, 618-11 event or to)(ic gas release)
OR (2) A hazardous event that resuhs in Otl-Site conditions sufficient to prohibit the plant staff from accessing the site via personal vehicles (Note 7)
FIREpolenll*"ydegradingthelevel or u letyoflhepl1nt HU4.1 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I A FIRE is nm exti,guished within 15 min. of.any: of the follOINing FIRE detedion indications (Note 1):
- Report from the field (i.e., visual observation)
- ReceiJ;i of multiple (more than 1) fire alarms or indications
- Field verificatioo of a single fire alarm ANO The FIRE is loca~ed within ~
Table 5 area HU4.2 I 1 j 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Receipt of a single lire alarm (i.e., !!Q other indications of a FIRE)
ANO The fire alarm is,xlicaling a FIRE within am Table 5 area AND The e)(istence of fl FIRE is nQ! verified within 30 min. of alarm receipt (Note 1)
HU4.3 I 1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 j DEF I (1) A FIRE within the ISFSl or plant PROTECTED AREA !lQ1 e)(!1ngui&hed 'Mlhin 60 min. of the initial report, alarm or indication (Note 1)
OR (2) A FIRE within the ISFSI or plant PROTECTED AREA that requires firefighting support by an offsite fire response agency to e)C\\Jnguish I
Othef condlllo"e exitr.tlng which In lhe Judgment ol !he Eme,vency Director warrant declaration of I UE HU7.1 I 1 j 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I DEF I Other conditions e)(ist 'Nhich, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, indicate that events are in progress or have occurred v.t',ich Indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety ol the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are ell:pected uniess further degradation of SAFETY SYSTEMS occu s.
13.1.1 Rev. 50 CLASSIFYING THE EMERGENCY 6/2712024 ALL CONDITIONS l