ML18005A232

LER 87-058-01:on 871009,RCS Leakage Exceeded Tech Specs Limits When Valves in RCS Head Vent Sys Spuriously Opened During Testing.Caused by Inadvertent Opening of Down Stream Valves.Personnel Briefed on Design of valves.W/871209 Ltr

ML18005A232
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	12/09/1987
From:	Howe A, Watson R CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
HO-870566-(O), LER-87-058, LER-87-58, NUDOCS 8712110140
Download: ML18005A232 (11)

Text

.i%CELERATED DISt'RIBUTION SYSTEM DEMONSTRATION REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:8712110140'OC.DATE: 87/12/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HOWE,A. Carolina Power & Light Co.

WATSON,R.A. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 87-058-01:on 871009,excessive RCS leakage due to valve failure RCS head vent sys during testing.

W/8 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR +ENCL TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

+ SIZE:

9 NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 LA 1 1 PD2-1 PD 1 1 A BUCKLEY,B 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DSP/NAS 1 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAB 2 2 AEOD/DSP/TPAB 1 1 ARM/DCTS/DAB 1 1 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DEST/ADS 1 ' 0 NRR/DEST/CEB 1 1 NRR/DES T/ELB 1 NRR/DEST/ICSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MEB 1 1 NRR/DEST/MTB 1 1 NRR/DEST/PSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/RSB 1 1 NRR/DEST/SGB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/HFB 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/QAB 1 1 NRR/DOEA/EAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RAB 1 1 NRR/DREP/RPB 2 2 1 1 NRR/PMAS/ILRB 1 1 REG F LE 02 1 1 RES DEPY GI 1 1

.~~ORD, J 1 1 RES/DE/EI B 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH,M 5 5 FORD BLDG HOY,A 1 1 H ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC HARRIS,J 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 A

TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 46 ENCL 45

NRC Form 368 UA. NUCLKAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (843)

APPROVED OMB NO. 31504104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXPIAES: 8/31/SS FACILITYNAME (I) DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA E 3 SHEA 0 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 OF TITLE (4)

EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE DUE TO VALVE FAILURE. RCS HEAD VENT SY T M D EVENT DATE IS)

I TESTING LKR NUMBER (e) REPORT DATE (7) OTHEA FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

MONTH OAY YEAR YEAA SEOVENTIAL REVISION FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI NVMEER NVMEER MONTH DAY YEAR 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 098 7 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFA (): ICIIeclr one or more of the follorflop) (11 MODE (6) 20A02(el 20.405(c) 60.73(e'l(2) (vill)

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER ANDREW HOWE SENIOR ENGINEER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE AREA CODE 9 19 362 -27 19 COMPLETK ONE LINK FOA EACH COMPONENT FAILURE OESCAIBEO IN THIS REPORT (13l CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. EPORTABLE MANUFAC. EPOATABLE TUAER TO NPADS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUAER TO NPADS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT KXPKCTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTS'O SUBMISSION PATE (IS)

YES Ilfyer, complete EXPECTED SIIBIPISSION DATEI NO ABsTRAGT ILlmlt to 1400 rpeceL I.e., epproxlmerely fifteen tlnplecpece typcvwlrren lintel (I el ABSTRACT:

On October 9, 1987, with the plant in Mode 1 at 91K power, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leakage exceeding Technical Specification limits occurred when both in series isolation valves in the RCS head vent system spuriously opened during testing, creating an open flowpath from the reactor vessel head into the containment atmosphere and into the Pressurizer Relief Tank. The downstream valves spuriously opened due to the pressure transient induced when the upstream valves were opened for testing. This event occurred five separate times during the course of testing, with one event resulting in the discharge of 198 gallons of primary coolant.

Plant operations personnel were briefed on the behavior of the valves and on the safety significance of the event. The plant entered a scheduled outage the next day, during which modifications were made to the head vent system, and procedure revisions were made, in accordance with vendor recommendations. These changes were made following a thorough investigation of the event which revealed that previous similar events had occurred in the industry, at other CPSL plants, and at the Harris Plant. The reasons why such information was not considered in the Harris Plant design, and why prompt corrective actions had not been taken previously, were investigated and appropriate action was taken to resolve these problems.

4712110140 871209 PDR ADOCK 05000400 S

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NRC SoNA ESSA UA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 19021 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)'TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 2150&104 EXPIRESI 8/SI/88 "

SACILITY NAME Ill OOCKET NUMSER I21 LER NUMSER 101 PAOE IS)

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT YEAR &>jI SEOUENTIAL NUM II ~ P REVISION lI:4 NUM 4 II UNIT ONE 0 5 0 0 0 8 7 058 1 0 20F 0 9 TEXT /4 Ileee 4Pece lI Ieew'INE we a/IV/ene/NRC SenII 2/EIAS/ IITI DESCRIPTION:

On October 9, 1987, the plant was in Mode 1 at 91% power. Operations Surveillance Test (OST) 1043, Reactor Coolant System Vent Path Operability, Mas scheduled to be performed. This test procedure, required by the In-

'Service Inspection (ISI) Program to be performed once per 92 days, strokes and times the valves in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Head Venting System (EIIS:AB). The system flow drawing is shown in Attachment A. Testing was being conducted on some of the valves more frequently than each 92 days as required by the ISI,.Program due to increases in the valve stroke times in previous testing.

Testing commenced- at approximat'ely 0500, when valve 1RC-904, (EIIS:AB:VTV)

(Manufacturer: Target Rock, Model No.'79Q-017) vent path to containment atmosphere, was satisfactorily cycled. The next valve tested was 1RC-900 (EIIS:AB:VTV), one of two vent valves from the reactor vessel head. When this valve was opened, valve 1RC-904 was observed to spuriously open. This created an open path from the RCS to the containment atmosphere, so the operator immediately closed 1RC-900. Valve 1RC-904 reclosed immediately when 1RC-900 was closed. RCS pressure was observed to decrease slightly, by one or two psig, but no change in pressurizer level was noted.

Valve 1RC-900 was reopened at 0503 to obtain a closure time; on this attempt, 1RC"904 opened again, as did valve 1RC-905 (EIIS:AB:VTV), the vent path to the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) (EIIS:AB:VTV). When the operator attempted to reclose 1RC-900, it did not respond. All three valves remained open until their control switches were simultaneously placed in PULL TO LOCK position, interrupting power to the solenoid; after several seconds, 1RC-900 closed, followed by 1RC-904 and 1RC"905. During this evolution, a leakage path existed from the RCS vessel head into the PRT and to containment atmosphere.

Pressurizer level decreased approximately 3% and pressure dropped to 2210 psig5 Plant personnel were unsure as to whether the observed problem was specific to valve 1RC-900 or was generic to al.l the valves in the head vent system. It was believed that the valves could be relied on to reclose when their control switches were placed in PULL TO LOCK. Also, a scheduled outage would commence the next day, and there would be no further opportunity to obtain data prior to shutdown. Since such data would be needed to support any repairs, and since the valves could be. reclosed if the event were to reoccur, limiting RCS leakage to a few seconds, the decision was made to resume testing to obtain this data.

Three additional openings of the valves were performed. Valve 1RC-900 was opened at 0516, valve 1RC-901 at 0519, and valve 1RC-902 at 0521. In each case, the downstream valves 1RC-904 and 1RC-905 opened, creating a leakage path from the RCS.

NIIC SOIIM 5444 *U.S.GPO:1980W024 SSS/4SS I9451

NRC fons 3$ 8A US. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 10831 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {I.ER) TEXT'CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/58 fACILITYNAME 111 OOCKET NUMSER 11) LER NUMSER 151 PACE 13)

YEAR SEOVENTIAL REVISION gQ NVM ER NVM ER SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT ONE 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 7 0 5 8 0 1 0 3 QF0 9 TEXT //I moro Ooooo lo roooiied, Irw //I/oso/HRC Form 3///IAS / IITI DESCRIPTION (continued)

An .

estimate of RCS leakage concluded that the limits of Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 (Identified leakage less than 10 'pm) were exceeded, with the majority of the leakage occurring at 0503, when 1RC-900 was opened the second time. A total of 198 gallons of coolant was lost, with 120 gallons discharging into the PRT, and the remainder entering the containment. At 0610, an unusual event was declared in accordance with the plant emergency plan due to exceeding the Technical Specification limits.

Airborne activity levels inside the containment increased from 1E-14 microcuries per cubic centimeter (uci/cc) to 1E"10 uci/cc following this event, and subsequently decreased to 1E-12 uci/cc within twelve hours.

CAUSE:

The valves insta1led in the vent system are Target Rock solenoid operated, one inch dual pilot,. energize to open valves, Model 79/-017. The design of these valves is such that the fluid pressure assists the valve stroke by directing process fluid pressure ta either side of the valve disc. When subjected to rapid increases in pressure upstream of the valve, a differential pressure across the disc can force the valve open, until the pressure above the seat increases as the space above the disc fills with fluid and pressurizes, and the spring recloses the valve. If the valve reaches the full open position in such a transient, with the control switch in the NEUTRAL position for testing, the control circuit will energize the solenoid, holding the valve open until the control switch is used to reclose the valve. Since the normal position of the control switch is PULL TO LOCK, which disables control power to the solenoid, the solenoid cannot energize, and the valve should eventually close without operator action.

In addition, these valves can spuriously open when subjected to small backpressures, such as exists when the RCS is depressurized and the PRT nitrogen pressure is 'resent. This phenomena was observed during preoperational testing prior to hot functional testing, during the initial RCS fill and venting (Procedure 1-2005-0-01, Reactor Coolant System Fill and Vent) on December 22, 1985.

A Target Rock vendor representative was brought on-site following this event (October 9, 1987) to assist in the investigation and corrective action.

Target Rock has advised that the unseating phenomena will not occur when the space above the valve disc is maintained full of fluid, or when the pressure transient is sufficiently slow to allow the pressure above the valve disc to equalize with the inlet pressure. Reorientation of the valves by approximately 180 degrees (i.e., upside down) will help ensure the space above the disc remains filled with fluid. In addition, the order in which the valves are cycled can enhance the capability to maintain the downstream valves fluid filled.

NRC PORM 3OOA ~ U S GPO'108~82O.538/455 IS83I

NRC Potm 244A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (842 l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 2150W104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 PACILITY NAME (I I DOCKET NUMEER (2l LER NUMSER (4( PACE I2(

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CAUSE (continued)

The potential for vent valve misoperation and subsequent creation of an RCS leakage path during testing was discussed with the NRC in 1986. CP&L submitted a relief request from testing these valves quarterly at power due to the potential for excessive RCS leakage should a valve fail. The alternative testing recommended was for testing at refueling. (Reference Relief Request R-16 to 'the ISI Program, submitted January 27, 1986.) CP&L did not further pursue this request based on discussions with NRR staff in August 1986, during which it was argued that Section 5.4.12.5.2.i of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) states that the system is designed to be tested during plant operation.

In summary the cause of this event was due to the combination of the following:

a. Operational characteristics o the valves which leads to inadvertent opening of the downstream valves, which was known by the vendor (Target Rock), was not made available to Shearon Harris.

b. Previous similar problems with these valves at the H. B. Robinson ~

Plant, which were subsequently corrected by inverting the valves was not incorporated into the Shearon Harris design.

C ~ Closure time of the valves which were on the order of 0.5 seconds at installation were increasing and in the case of RC-900 was in excess of 5 seconds.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

Similar operational problems with Target Rock valves were experienced at CP&L's Robinson Nuclear Project in 1980, and other similar experience with these valves was known to the vendor. The reasons'hy this information was not available to the Shearon Harris Project are not known. This information was not supplied by Target Rock in 1984, when the Shearon Harris Project requested verification and validation of the valve technical manual. A number of updates to the manual were received in 1985. A April 27, 1987 letter to Target Rock listed all purchase orders, indexed currently available information and requested verification of accuracy or that required information be supplied. Target Rock replied on June 1, 1987, that the information was current and accurate. Information pertaining to the valve unseating problems was not included.

Previous industry experience with this phenomena was not known to site engineering personnel. Currentl.y, the Operational Experience Feedback (OEF) system, run by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), functions to ensure dissemination of information of this nature among utilities. This program was not in place during the 1981 time period.

NRC SORM 544A (84LT) 4 U.S.GPO:18884-824 838/48S

NRC Sons 35EA 1343 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT HLER) TEXT CONTINUATION ', UA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

'PPRovEooMSNo.315o-olot EXPIRES: 5/31/ES fACILITYNAME Ill OOCKET KUMSER 12) LER NUMSER lel PACE 131 ~

YEAR 55OVENTIAL SEV IS ION NVMttII NVMttS SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT ONE TEXT ///more 5/Moo lt /oywne Ino R/t/oso///RC %%dns 35553/ 11TI 0500040087 0 8 0 105 QF0 9 PREVIOUS SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: (continued)

In February 1987, a similar event occurred during performance of the OST. In this event, the downstream valves were able to be immediately reclosed, and no indications of RCS inventory loss were noted. Position indication for one of the valves was lost during the test, so testing was suspended. Upon repairs to the indication circuit, testing was satisfactorily completed.

In resolving the February 1987 event, no specific problem with the valves or electric control circuits could be found by the maintenance workers. A Maintenance Feedback Request was generated to investigate the situation',

however, since the work request did not identify the safety significance of the problem, a low priority was assigned to the item.

The test procedure (OST) was satisfactorily completed on May 25, 1987 and August 25, 1987, with the plant at power, and no problems with spurious valve operation were reported.

stated event occurred during preoperational testing during fillabove, As an initial and vent of the RCS for hot functional testing. Since the event occurring during preoperational testing was of concern only during depressurized conditions, it was resolved by incorporating a precaution into the RCS fill and vent procedure (General Procedure GP"008) regarding the tendency of these valves to open when subjected to the backpressure normally present in the PRT while the RCS is depressurized. The JOINT TEST Group evaluation of this event concluded that there was no deficiency since the valves were designed to normally be pressurized on the top of the valve disc tending to keep the valves shut.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The performance of a routine surveillance test created an unexpected I.oss of reactor coolant. The head vent system was installed to meet the requirements

.of NUREG 0737, items II.B.1, to provide a capability to remove noncondensible gases from the RCS which could inhibit natural circulation cooldown. The design of the head vent system is such that any leakage through an open vent line will not exceed the capacity of a single charging pump. (Reference FSAR 5.4.12.5.1.)

The event occurred in Mode 1 at nearly full power, which is the most adverse conditions under which it could occur.

The event is reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) as a single condition causing inoperability of an RCS isolation boundary due to a design deficiency.

NRC SORM 555* *U.S.OPO:I teb0524 535/555 IE43l

~m NAC Form ESSA VA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (HQI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO. 3150WIOO EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITYNAME III DOCKET NUMSER ISI LER NUMSER ISI PACE IS)

YEAR ~4< SSOVSNTIAL egos RSVISION SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT NVM SII ~ . NVMSSN UNIT ONE OF 0 5 0 0 0 4 O O TEXT ///more spoce /o rPI/re@ lrso aarWono/HRC %%drm 88/AS/ 1171 CORRECTIVE ACTION:

1. Personnel have been briefed on the design of Target Rock valves, and the

~

significance of continuing an evolution which raises a safety concern.

This briefing was conducted prior to personnel assuming licensed duties for their shift. The Shift Foreman who was on duty during the event was counseled by plant management regarding the seriousness of the event. In addition, the Shift Foreman participated in the subsequent investigation of the event. s

2. The Operations Supervisor and Hanager-Operations were counseled by the Plant General Manager regarding the need to be sensitive to significant events and their implications to plant safety.

3. Test procedures for these valves have been revised to change the sequence by which the valves are tested to help ensure the valves remain filled with, fluid.

4. A thorough investigation of the event was conducted to determine the causes of the event, why previous similar experiences with these valves was not considered in. the plant design, and appropriate design and procedure changes to preclude recurrence.

5. A review of outstanding work items was .conducted to determine if other items existed which represented a challenge to safe plant operations, but were not given proper priority. No similar items were found.

6. The design of the vent system has been changed to reorient the block valves per the vendor recommendation (e.g. block valves inverted such that the disc cavity remains full at all times).

7. The technical manual for these valves has been appropriately updated.

8. A review of other applications of Target Rock valves in the plant is being conducted. While similar behavior is possible in the other applications, the consequences are acceptable, and have been determined not to present a safety concern.

9. Actions were initiated to request changes to the ISI Program and the Technical Specifications to permit testing of these valves during refueling outages.

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NRC fora 388A UA. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION I$83)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION AP/rROVEO OMS NO. 3160&ldd EXPIRES: 8/31/88 fACILITYNAME III OOCKET NUMSER ISI LER NUMSER ldl PACE ISl I

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10. During the subsequent outage (October 10 November 7) work was performed on the vent valves as follows'.

ao Valves 1RC-900 and 1RC-901 failed after several strokes. Valves were opened and inspected. The disc was found jammed in the valve, but could be removed with force. Upon removal no damage to the disc or valve could be found. Discs were replaced. Valve 1RC-900 operated satisfactorily. Valve 1RC-901 subsequently failed again, and again no damage could be found. The internals were replaced in 1RC-901 and subsequent operation was satisfactory.

b. Valves 1RC-904 'and 1RC-905 were inverted in the line to provide for submergence of the disc cavity.

C ~ Valve 1RC-904 leaked across the seat during post inverting testing. Valve was disassembled and the pilot stem was found to be galled. Damaged parts were replaced and the valves operated satisfactorily.

d. A check valve was installed in the line between valve 1RC-905 and the Piessurizer Relief tank (PRT) to prevent back flow from the PRT under conditions when the RCS is depressurized and the PRT has a slight pressure, ll. Subsequent to repairs all valves were tested satisfactorily at Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, conditions.

12. Subsequent to the 1980 event at the H. B. Robinson plant which was not made known to SHNPP the following actions have taken place which should preclude similar oversites in the future.'

~ An engineering Central Design Organization (CDO) has been formed in the corporate office with responsibility for configuration control for all CP6L nuclear plants. Thus, information from one project with applicability to another project will be screened by the same CDO group.

b. Each nuclear site has an active operational experience feedback (OEF) system which reviews events from a variety of sources such as INPO OEF System, Nuclear Network, Plant Incident Reports, other plant LERs, etc.

C ~ Significant LERs and Incident Reports from CP6L nuclear plants are distributed to the other nuclear plants for passible applicability.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION: (continued)

13. To ensure that important deficiencies get identified and appropriately pursued work lists are screened at a greater frequency. Each normal work day, a list of work tickets (deficiencies) identified in the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is provided to a number of management personnel for review. This includes the System Engineers, Maintenance Manager, Operations Manager, Technical Support Manager, and the Plant General Manager. Additionally, System Engineers frequently review backlogged work for their system to identify items of importance.

NIIC POIIM 3ddA eU.S.OPO:)988-042C 538/485 (9431

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CP~E Carolina Power 8 Light Company HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT P.O. Box 165 New Hill, NC 27562 DEC 09 )987 File Number'. SHF/10-13510C Letter Number: HO-870566 (0)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-058-01 Gentlemen'-

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. The original report fulfilled the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and was in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Revision 1 is being submitted as a supplemental report due to additional information concerning the event and corrective actions taken.

Very truly yours, z~~

R. A. Watson Vice President Harris Nuclear Project RAW:ddl Enclosure cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC RII)

Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)

Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC - SHNPP)