ML18012A808

LER 97-013-00:on 970508,entry Into Mode-6 Without Operable Components,Resulting in TS 3.0.4 Violation Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Personnel Involved counseled.W/970609 Ltr

ML18012A808
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/09/1997
From:	Brooke Clark, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HNP-97-116, LER-97-013, LER-97-13, NUDOCS 9706190208
Download: ML18012A808 (5)

Text

CATEGORY 1 REUUI,ATO INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION OSTEM (RIDE)

'CCESSION NBR:9706190208 DOC.DATE: 97/06/09 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Ca.olina Power s Light Co.

CIARK,B.H. Carolina Powe" s Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-013-00:on 97050S,entry into Mode-6 without operable components, resulting in TS 3.0.4 violation occurred. Caused by personnel error. Personnel involved counseled.W/970609 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 G

RECIPIENT RECIPIENT COPIES 0 ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 ROONEYFV 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 FILE CENT 1 1 PDR'OPIES NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB 1

1 1

1 B

NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1

1 1

1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RGN2 FILE 01 1 1 D RES/DET/EIB 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POOREFW ~ 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PZ EASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN SD-5(EX'3.5-2083) TO ELZiMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LZSTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED'.

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQt. RED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25

Carolina Power 8 Light Company Harris NucIear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUN 0 9 199~

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-97-116 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-013-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a violation of Technical Specifications related to entry into mode-6 (refueling operations) without the required components operable.

Sincerely, B. H. Clark Plant General Manager Harris Plant 'J 7>>

MV /~>> r Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. V. Rooney (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 9706190208 970609 PDR ADQCK 05000400 S III!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

.' PDR v'U<i.)

State Road 1134 New Hill NC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 H-95)

EXPIRES 04I30/96 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INfORMATION COllECTION REOUEST: 50Al HRS. REPORTED lESSONS lEARNEO ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) U(CORPORATED U(TO THE UCENSING PROCESS ANO FEO BACK TO U(OUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE UIFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT G F33L US. NUCIEAR REGULATORY COMM)SSION.

(See reverse for required number of WASHINGTON, OC 20555000l. ANO TO THE PAPERWORK REOUCT)ON PROJECT l3)50.

digits/characters for each block) 0104L Off)CE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, OC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMBE)I (2) PAGE (3)

Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF2 TITLE (4)

Entry into Mode-6 without required operable components, resulting in Technical Specification 3.0.4.violation.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED {6)

FACILITYNAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH SEOUENTIAL REVISION OAY YEAR MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACILITY NAME 8 97 97 013 00 97 DOCKET NUMBE'R 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR SUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one o r more) (11)

MODE {9) D 20.2201 {b) 20.2203{a)(2) (v) X 50 /3(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii)

POWER 20.2203(a) {1) 20.2203(a)(3) (i) 50.73(a) (2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 0% 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a) (3)(n) 50.73(a) (2) (iii) 73. 71 20.2203(a) {2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a) (2) {iv) OTHER 20.2203(a) (2) {iii) 50.36(c) (1) 50.73(a) (2) (v) Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 3GGA 20.2203{a) (2) (iv) 50.36(c) (2) 50.73{a) (2) (vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Unetvde Aiea Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DES CRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT REPORTABLE REPORTABLE MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS TO NPROS

, 4>.P,.e.e

";gji."<j~ .:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION

{Ifyes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single spaced typewrinen lines) (16)

On May 8, 1997, at approximately 0718 hours0.00831 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.73199e-4 months <br />, mode-6 was entered when the first fuel assembly was reloaded into the reactor vessel during refueling outage 7. Just prior to entering mode-6 at 0644 hours0.00745 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.45042e-4 months <br />, a feeder breaker tripped which de-energized the SIII Instrument Bus. Operations personnel in the main control room reviewed plant conditions per the abnormal operating procedure (AOP-024) for the de-energized SIII Instrument Bus and determined that there was no adverse impact on commencing fuel movement and entering mode-6.

Operations personnel were aware that with the SIII Inverter Bus de-energized, the heaters for the R-2A Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit would not be available which results in a 7-day LCO per the action statement of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6. However, the operators did not realize the impact on Technical Specification 3.0.4, which prevents entry into an operational mode while relying on the provisions of a TS action statement.

Therefore, entry into mode-6 with the SIII Instrument Bus and the R-2A Unit inoperable constituted a violation of TS 3.0.4 and is reportable per 10CFR50.73.a.2.i.

This event was caused by personnel error on the part of Operations personnel in the main control room when the requirements of TS 3.0.4 were not identified. This event occurred early in the shift and the on-coming crew did not take adequate time to thoroughly evaluate plant conditions and the impact of the de-energized SIII Instrument Bus prior to allowing fuel movement and entry into mode-6. Corrective actions included counseling the involved personnel. Training for other Operations personnel will also be conducted.

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l496)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME II) OOCKET LER NUMBER )6) PAGE C))

SEOUEN'r)AL REVlslON YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit N1 50 400 2 OF 2 07 - 013 - 00 TEXT /II more spooo rs roqoiod, oso oddiraool oopms ol ldRC &rm 36QI )IT)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On May 8, 1997, with the plant preparing for core reload during refueling outage 7, the IDP-1A-SIII feeder breaker tripped at approximately 0644 hours0.00745 days <br />0.179 hours <br />0.00106 weeks <br />2.45042e-4 months <br />. This breaker trip de-energized the SIII Instrument Bus and as a result, Operations personnel in the main control room initiated the appropriate abnormal operating procedure (AOP-024, Loss of Uninteruptible Power Supply). The control room staff realized that with the SIII Inverter Bus de-energized, the heaters for the R-2A Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit would not be available which results in a 7-day LCO per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.6.

After reviewing plant conditions, the control room staff concluded that there were no restrictions that applied and allowed fuel movement to commence. At approximately 0718 hours0.00831 days <br />0.199 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.73199e-4 months <br /> the first fuel assembly was reloaded into the reactor vessel, placing the plant in Mode-6.

Upon further review of this condition, at approximately 0815 hours0.00943 days <br />0.226 hours <br />0.00135 weeks <br />3.101075e-4 months <br />, Operations personnel realized that the mode change limitations of TS 3.0.4 had been violated by entering mode-6 with the R-2A unit inoperable. Even though TS 3.0.4 was violated, a decision was made at this time that Technical Specifications requirements did not prevent continued fuel movement.

At approximately 1557 hours0.018 days <br />0.433 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.924385e-4 months <br />, following discussions with the Plant Management and the NRC Resident Inspector, fuel movement was suspended until the SIII Instrument Bus could be re-energized. This decision was made to ensure that the proper level of safety required for entry into mode-6 was restored prior to additional fuel assemblies being reloaded into the reactor vessel.

At approximately 2110 hours0.0244 days <br />0.586 hours <br />0.00349 weeks <br />8.02855e-4 months <br />, the SIII Instrument bus was re-energized. Operations personnel performed an additional review of plant conditions and at 2140 hours0.0248 days <br />0.594 hours <br />0.00354 weeks <br />8.1427e-4 months <br />, re-commenced fuel movement.

CAUSE:

This event was caused by personnel error on the part of Operations personnel in the main control room because the requirements of TS 3.0.4 were not identified. This event occurred early in the shift and the on-coming crew did not take adequate time to thoroughly evaluate plant conditions and the impact of the de-energized SIII Instrument Bus, prior to allowing fuel movement and entry into mode-6.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The were no safety consequences associated with this event. This is based on an engineering evaluation (ESR )1)97-00489), which concluded that the R-2A Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit was capable of performing its safety function with it's associated heaters unavailable. The purpose of the R2-A heater is to maintain relative humidity (RH) in the filtration train at or below 70% as required by Regulatory Guide 1.52. This ensures proper operation of the unit's charcoal absorber bed. Relative humidity in the control room is maintained at or below 50% by a moisture controller (MC-7832) during normal and emergency conditions. The R2-A unit recirculates approximately 3700 cfm of air within the control room envelope at a RH of 50% or less. As part of the pressurization of the control room to prevent the infiltration of contaminants, a maximum of 315 cfm of outside air is drawn in through the R2-A filtration unit. Assuming a worst case RH of 100% for the outside air and the associated mixing of the two trains of air, calculations demonstrate that. even without the heaters the RH would be approximately 54%, which is well below the design requirement of 70%.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

There have been no previous HNP LERs submitted due to entry into mode-6 with inoperable components, thus resulting in a violation of TS 3.0.4.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. Operations personnel involved in this event have been counseled. This was completed on May 9, 1997.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED:

1. This event will be reviewed with other appropriate personnel in the form of real-time-training by June 30, 1997.

Operations management will review this event with operators during the next licensed operator re-qualification training session. This will be completed by July 30, 1997.

RM A I4 )

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