ML18022B018

LER 97-014-00:on 970514,SI Occurred During Ssps Surveillance Testing.Caused by Inattention to Detail During Recent Rev to Surveillance Test Procedure Being Used.Revised Deficient Surveillance procedures.W/970613 Ltr

ML18022B018
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/13/1997
From:	Brooke Clark, Verrilli M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
HPN-97-129, LER-97-014, LER-97-14, NUDOCS 9706250446
Download: ML18022B018 (5)

Text

CATEGORY 1 REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9706250446 DOC.DATE: 97/06/13 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400 AUTH.NK41E AUTHOR AFFILIATION VERRILLI,M. Carolina Power & Light Co.

CLARK,B.H. Carolina Power & Light Co.

RECIP. NAMF. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-014-00:on 970514,SI occurred during SSPS surveillance testing. Caused by inattention to detail during recent rev to surveillance test procedure being used. Revised deficient

~

surveillance procedures.W/970613 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:

TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc. E NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400 G

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COP1ES ID CODE/NAME ITTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-1 PD 1 1 ROONEY,V 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 ILE CE ER 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 1 '

NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 FILE 01 1 1 D RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCEgJ H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 U

N NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EX'15-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25

Carolina Power & light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562 JUN 18 1997 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Serial: HNP-97-129 ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk 10CFR50.73 Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 97-014-00 Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a safety injection event caused during Solid State Protection System surveillance testing.

Sincerely, B. H. Clark Plant General Manager Harris Plant MV Enclosure c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior NRC Resident)

Mr. L. A. Reyes (NRC Regional Administrator, Region II)

Mr. V. Rooney (NRC - NRR Project Manager) 9706250446 970hi3 PDR ADQCK 05000400 8 PDR llllllllllllllllllllilllllllllillllllll P p

-. ~ v O=.l State Road 1134 New Hill NC

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150.0104 (4GSI EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REDDEST: 5LO HRS. REPORTED lESSDNS lSIRNEO ARE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSIHG PROCESS AHD FEO BACK TO DIDUSTRY.

FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE DIFORMATION ANO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (TS F33L US. NUClEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION, (See reverse for required number of WASHINGTON, DC 20555000(, AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3(50 digits/characters for each block) 010(i OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTOIL OC 20503.

FAcIUTY NAME ((I DOCKET NUMBER (2l PAGE (3I Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400 1 OF 3 TITLE (4)

Safety Injection during Solid State Protection System surveillance testing.

EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR MONTH BAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 5 14 97 97 014 00 6 13 97 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANTTO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 0( (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (9) 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a) (2)(i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 0% 20.2203(a) (2) (i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a) (2)(ii] 20.2203(a) (4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) X OTHER 20.2203(a) (2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2) (v) Specify In Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a) (2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (IocNde Ares Code)

Michael Verrilli Sr. Analyst - Licensing (919) 362-2303 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPROS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH OAY YEAR YES SUBMISSION (If yes, compIele EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). X No DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit lo 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single.spaced lypowrilten lines) (16)

On May 14, 1997, with the plant in mode 5 for refueling outage 7, a Safety Injection (SI) signal was generated, which caused SI system valves to automatically align and allow gravity forced flow from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the Reactor Coolant System. This occurred during surveillance testing on the Solid State Protection System (SSPS).

The cause of this event was inattention to detail during a recent revision to the surveillance test procedure being used.

This revision was approved approximately 3 weeks before the outage to incorporate testing that would verify the prope function of the individual inputs for the SSPS general warning circuitry. During the revision process, personnel that completed and reviewed the procedure revision did not realize that positioning a particular SSPS switch would remove the steam line low pressure SI signal blocking feature.

Corrective actions included revising the deficient surveillance procedures and counseling the individuals involved in the revision preparation, review, and approval process.

This condition is being reported per 10CFR50.73.a.2.iv as an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation. This report also satisfies the 90-Day Special Report requirement contained in Technical Specification 3.5.2 Action Statement b, for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuations that result in ECCS injection into the RCS. Though water was injected into the RCS via gravity feed from the RWST, this event did not include a plant cooldown and did not constitute an actuation cycle for the affected safety injection nozzles. Therefore, the SI nozzle usage factor did not increase from its previous value of 0.2.

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCEEAR REGUUITORY COMMISSION I4BBI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME Ili DOCKET iBI NUMBER (6) PAGE I3)

SEOUENTIAL REVISION YEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~

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EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On May 14, 1997, the plant was in mode 5 for refueling outage 7. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was depressurized with one pressurizer safety valve removed and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in service for temperature control. At approximately 1417 hours0.0164 days <br />0.394 hours <br />0.00234 weeks <br />5.391685e-4 months <br />, Instrument & Control Technicians received approval and commenced the "18-month Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master Relay" Maintenance Surveillance Test (MST-I0072). This procedure requires one technician in the main control room and one at the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) test panel. At approximately 1427 hours0.0165 days <br />0.396 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.429735e-4 months <br />, the technician at the test panel performed step 7.1.5, Row 3a, which requires the positioning of SSPS Train A memory switch to position ¹1. Unknown to the technician at this time, taking the memory switch to position ¹1 removed the memory ground circuit continuity, which allowed the previously blocked SI signals to become unblocked. Since Pressurizer and Steam Generator pressures were below the SI signal setpoint and the circuits were now unblocked, an A-train SI signal was generated.

Operators in the main control room confirmed the following equipment realignment consistent with a Sl signal; (1)

"A" Emergency, Diesel Generator started and the "A" Emergency Safeguards Sequencer ran program "C", (2) "A" RHR pump started and ran in recirculation, (3) "A" Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump started and "A" ESW header realigned from normal to ESW alignment, (4) Safety Injection flow path valves (1SI-1, ISIS, and 1CS-291) opened, which aligned gravity flow from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the RCS.

At approximately 1429, operators secured the "A" RHR pump to prevent overheating the pump while in recirculation, and at 1430, SI valves 1SI-1 and ISIS were closed to secure gravity flow to the RCS. RCS standpipe level indicators showed a 2 inch increase in RCS level due to the SI gravity flow from the RWST.

At approximately 1457, the "A" EDG was secured and at 1500, the control room staff exited emergency and abnormal operating procedures and returned to normal Mode-5 operating procedures for system restoration and realignments.

CAUSE:

The cause of this event was personnel error (inattention to detail) on the part of plant personnel involved in a recent revision to the surveillance test procedure (MST-I0072) being used. This revision was approved approximately 3 weeks before the outage to incorporate testing that would verify the proper function of the individual inputs for the SSPS general warning circuitry. Personnel involved in preparing and reviewing the procedure revision did not realize that positioning the A-train memory switch to the ¹1 position would remove the steam line low pressure SI signal blocking feature.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The were no safety consequences associated with this event. The plant configuration that existed at the time of this event only allowed gravity flow from the RWST to the RCS. Operators promptly secured this flow, resulting in a level increase of approximately 2 inches. Components responded as required for the SI signal and following the event, systems were restored to their previous mode 5 alignments.

This condition is being reported per 10CFR50.73.a.2.iv as an unplanned Engineered Safety Feature actuation. This report also satisfies the 90-Day Special Report requirement contained in Technical Specification 3.5.2 Action Statement b, for Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuations that result in ECCS injection into the'RCS.

Though water was injected into the RCS via gravity feed from the RWST, this event did not include a plant cooldown and did not constitute an actuation cycle for the affected safety injection nozzles. Therefore, the SI nozzle usage factor did not increase from its previous value of 0.2.

l4 I

NRC FORM 366A US. NUCLEAR REGUlATORT COMMISSION (4.95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITT KAME ln DOCKET EER NUMBER IB) PAGE )3)

SEGUEKTIAt. REvtSION TEAR NUMBER NUMBER Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant ~

Unit //1 50400 3 OF 3 97 - 014 - . 00 TEXT IK enrt spsko a foooioC oso okfC)fsosl sofo'os of fff)C fokm 3BB4) )IT)

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:

LER ¹95-9 reported an unplanned ESF actuation during Auxiliary Feedwater System surveillance testing on October 5, 1997, which resulted in the Emergency Safeguards Sequencer actuating the SI program. 'he cause of this event was inadequate/incorrect procedure guidance. Corrective actions included correcting the deficient procedures and strengthening the procedure review and approval process, but did not prevent the personnel error that occurred during the procedure revision process that resulted in LER 97-14.

LER ¹95-11 reported a reactor trip and safety injection event which occurred during SSPS surveillance testing on November 5, 1995. This event however, was caused by a component failure when a blocking contact failed to maintain continuity. Therefore, the corrective actions for the November 1995 event would not be expected to prevent LER ¹97-14, which was caused by personnel error during a procedure revision.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. Surveillance test procedures MST-I0072 and MST-I0073 were initially placed on administrative hold, then were revised to correct the technical aspects which caused this event. This was completed on May 27, 1997.

2. The individuals that were involved in preparing, reviewing, and approving MST-I0072 and MST-I0073 were counseled on the need for altention to detail during procedure development/revisions. This was completed on May 27, 1997.