Text

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000338/2017003 and 05000339/2017003
	ML17312B320
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	11/08/2017
From:	Masters A; NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Stoddard D; Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
	IR 2017003
	Download: ML17312B320 (39)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

November 8, 2017

Mr. Daniel G. Stoddard

President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Innsbrook Technical Center

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA 23060

SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000338/2017003 AND 05000339/2017003

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On September 30, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at your North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 18, 2017, the NRC

inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. L. Lane and other members of your

staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection.

However, NRC inspectors documented one licensee-identified violation, which was determined

to be of very low safety significance, in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a

non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30

days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001; with

copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United

States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident

Inspector at the North Anna Power Station.

D. Stoddard 2

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for

Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Anthony D. Masters, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 05000338, 05000339

License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7

Enclosure:

IR05000338/2017003 and 05000339/2017003

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc Distribution via ListServ

ML17312B320

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS

NAME S. Ninh BBishop GCroon GEatmon RCarrion RKellner

DATE 11/1/2017 10/30/2027 10/31/2017 10/30/2017 10/31/2017 10/30/2017

OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRP RIIDRP

NAME JRivera WPursley AMasters

DATE 10/30/17 11/1/2017 11/8/2017

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339

License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7

Report No: 05000338/2017003 and 05000339/2017003

Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2

Location: Mineral, Virginia 23117

Dates: July 1, 2017 through September 30, 2017

Inspectors: G. Croon, Senior Resident Inspector

G. Eatmon, Resident Inspector

R. Carrion, Senior Inspector (Sections 1R07 and 1R08)

R. Kellner, Senior Health Physicist (Sections 2RS1, 2RS7, 4OA1

and 4OA7)

J. Rivera, Health Physicist (Section 2RS8)

W. Pursley, Health Physicist (Section 2RS6)

Approved by: Anthony D. Masters, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000338/2017003, 05000339/2017003; July 1, 2017 - September 30, 2017; North Anna

Power Station, Units 1 and 2. Routine Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors, one regional

based inspector, and three health physicists. The significance of inspection findings are

indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated April 29, 2015. All violations of NRC

requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated

February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear

power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified.

A licensee-identified violation of very low safety significance has been reviewed by the

inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the

licensees corrective action program. This violation and its associated corrective action tracking

number are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP),

and operated at RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent RTP. On September 9, 2017,

the unit was taken offline for a planned refueling outage. The unit remained offline for the

remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather preparations for hot weather

operations, specified in 0-GOP-4.1, Hot Weather Operations, Rev. 36, 0-GOP-5.5,

EDG Hot Weather Operation, Rev.14, and the licensees corrective action program

(CAP) database for hot weather related issues. The inspectors walked down two risk-

significant systems/areas listed below to verify compliance with the procedural

requirements and to verify that the specified actions provided the necessary protection

for the structures, systems, or components.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a site-specific weather-related inspection due to anticipated

adverse weather conditions. On April 17, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the licensee

response to severe storm warnings, with tornado watch, and high wind warnings of 40

miles an hour for the area. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee adverse

weather response procedures, including 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Conditions,

Rev. 61, and site preparations including work activities that could impact the overall

maintenance risk assessments.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Offsite Power and Alternate AC Power

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that plant features and procedures for operation and continued

availability of offsite and alternative alternating current (AC) power systems were

appropriate. The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures affecting those areas,

and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the

nuclear power plant to verify that the appropriate information was exchanged when

issues arose that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors evaluated the

readiness of the offsite and alternative AC power systems by reviewing the licensees

procedures that address measures to monitor and maintain the availability and reliability

of the offsite and alternative AC power systems. The inspectors walked down one risk-

significant system/area listed below to verify compliance with the procedural

requirements and to verify that the specified actions provided the necessary protection

for the structures, systems, or components.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted four equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to

evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other

train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional

systems descriptions, UFSAR, system operating procedures, and Technical

Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions.

The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify the operability of a

redundant or backup system/train or a remaining operable system/train with a high risk

significance for the current plant configuration (considering out-of-service, inoperable, or

degraded condition); or a risk-significant system/train that was recently realigned

following an extended system outage, maintenance, modification or testing; or a risk-

significant single-train system. The inspector conducted the reviews to ensure that

critical components were properly aligned, and to identify any discrepancies which could

affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Unit 1, Quench spray system, train A

Unit 2, Quench spray system, train B

Unit 1, Recirculation spray system, train A

Unit 2, Control room ventilation system

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Quarterly Fire Protection Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted focused tours of the four areas listed below that are important

to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as

described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe

Shutdown) Program, Rev. 10, CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and

Flammable Materials, Rev. 8, and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe

Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Rev. 5. The

inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to: (1) licensee control of

transient combustibles and ignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational

status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and,

(3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Units 1 and 2, Service water pumphouse

Unit 2, Motor generator set house

Units 1 and 2, Turbine building fire fighting strategy

Unit 2, Containment

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

Triennial Review of Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected the Unit 2 B Component Cooling Heat Exchanger (2-CC-E-1B),

the Unit 2 D Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger (2-RS-E-1D), and the Unit 1 A Control

Room Chiller (1-HV-E-4A-2) based on their risk-significance in the licensees

probabilistic safety analysis, and their importance to safety-related mitigating system

support functions.

For the two heat exchangers and a control room chiller, the inspectors reviewed the

licensees inspection, maintenance, and monitoring of biotic fouling and macrofouling

programs to ensure that they were adequate. The inspectors also reviewed the

licensees inspection and cleaning activities to determine if they had established

acceptance criteria consistent with industry standards, and the as-found results were

recorded, evaluated, and appropriately dispositioned to maintain structural integrity.

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The inspectors reviewed the condition and operation of the Unit 2 B Component Cooling

Heat Exchanger, the Unit 2 D Recirculation Spray Heat Exchanger, and the Unit 1 A

Control Room Chiller to ensure they were consistent with design assumptions in heat

transfer calculations, as described in the final safety analysis report. This included

determining whether the number of plugged tubes was within pre-established limits

based on capacity and heat transfer assumptions for the Unit 2 B Component Cooling

Heat Exchanger, and the Unit 1 A Control Room Chiller. The inspectors also determined

that the licensee had established adequate controls and operational limits to prevent

heat exchanger degradation due to excessive flow-induced vibration during operation.

The inspectors determined whether the performance of ultimate heat sinks (UHS), and

their subcomponents such as piping, intake screens, pumps, valves, etc., was

appropriately evaluated by tests or other equivalent methods, to ensure availability and

accessibility to the in-plant cooling water systems.

The inspectors determined whether the licensees inspection of the UHS was thorough

and of sufficient detail to identify degradation of the impoundment protection, or loss of

structural integrity. This included determination of whether vegetation present along the

slopes was trimmed, maintained, and not adversely impacting the embankment. In

addition, the inspectors determined whether the licensee ensured sufficient reservoir

capacity by trending and removing debris in the UHS.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees inspection of the UHS to determine if it was

comprehensive and of significant depth to ensure sufficient reservoir capacity. This

included the review of licensees periodic monitoring and trending of sediment buildup

and heat transfer capability. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensees periodic

performance monitoring of the UHS structural integrity, to determine whether adjacent

non-seismic or nonsafety-related structures could degrade, or block safety-related flow

paths, during a severe weather or seismic event. The inspectors also performed

walkdowns of accessible portions of the UHS supply and return piping to look for

possible settlement, or movement and piping conditions that would indicate loss of

structural integrity.

The inspectors performed a system walkdown of the service water intake structure to

determine whether the licensees assessment on structural integrity and component

functionality was adequate. In addition, the inspectors determined whether service

water pump bay silt accumulation was monitored, trended, and maintained at an

acceptable level by the licensee, and that water level instruments were functional and

routinely monitored. The inspectors also determined whether the licensees ability to

ensure functionality during adverse weather conditions was adequate.

The inspectors reviewed condition reports related to the heat exchangers/coolers and

heat sink performance issues to determine whether the licensee had an appropriate

threshold for identifying issues, and to evaluate the effectiveness of the corrective

actions.

These inspection activities constituted four heat sink inspection samples as defined in

IP 71111.07-05. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

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b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities Unit 2 - Outage N2R25

a. Inspection Scope

Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities: From September 18,

through September 22, 2017, the inspectors conducted an onsite review of the

implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring

degradation of the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater systems, risk-

significant piping and components, and containment systems in Unit 2. The inspectors

activities included a review of non-destructive examinations (NDEs) to evaluate

compliance with the applicable edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers

(ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),Section XI (Code of Record: 2004

Edition with no Addenda; 4th Interval, 2nd Period, 3rd Outage), and to verify that

indications and defects (if present) were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned in

accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, acceptance

standards.

The inspectors directly observed the following NDEs mandated by the ASME Code to

evaluate compliance with the ASME Code Section XI and Section V requirements, and

if any indications and defects were detected, to evaluate if they were dispositioned in

accordance with the ASME Code, or an NRC-approved alternative requirement.

UT of Component 12050-WMKS-0102B / 16-WFPD-423 / 40, Elbow to Nozzle

UT of Component 12050-WMKS-0102A / 16-WFPD-424 / 75, Elbow to Nozzle

PT of Component 12050-WMKS-0111AP / 6-Sl-441 / 7, Valve to Pipe weld

PT of Component 12050-WMKS-0111AQ / 6-CH-603 / 8, Valve to Pipe weld

The inspectors observed some welding activities and reviewed the welding documents

for the activities referenced below in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and

the ASME Code. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the respective work orders,

including the weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, and

welder performance qualification records for the referenced welds.

02-RC-154-VALVE, Replace Valve IAW DC NA-17-00008, ASME Class 1, reviewed

Work Order (WO) 59103055303

02-CH-MOV-2267B-VALVE, Replace Valve, ASME Class 2, reviewed

WO 59102981224

02-CC-328-VALVE and Piping, Remove/Reinstall Valve and Piping, ASME Class 3,

reviewed WO 59103105688 and observed some of the welding activities

During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the

previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were

analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service. Therefore, no NRC review

was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

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Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities: For

the Unit 2 vessel head, a bare metal visual examination was not required during this

outage pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 as it had

been performed during the previous outage (March 2016 during refueling outage

N2R24). The inspectors also noted that the licensee had requested, and the NRC had

approved, Relief Request N2-I4-NDE-002, which extended the Code Case N-729-1

Item B4.40 volumetric/surface examination schedule for the reactor vessel closure head

nozzles and partial penetration welds from a ten-year to a fifteen-year period because

the currently installed head is constructed of alloy 690/152/52 material. This material

has exhibited much higher resistance to crack growth rates than the material of the

original reactor vessel upper head, i.e., alloy 600/182/82 material. (The licensee

replaced the original head in January 2003 after identifying extensive cracking in the

attachment welds for reactor vessel head penetrations.) Note that the requirements for

Item B4.40 of Code Case N-729-1 did not change for Item B4.40 of Code Case N-729-4.

The Relief Request allows the licensee to postpone the volumetric and surface

examinations until spring 2022, during scheduled outage N2R28 in the fifth ten-year ISI

inspection interval. These examinations were last conducted in spring 2007 during

N2R18.

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the

licensees boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to ensure

implementation with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05,

Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary, and applicable

industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite record

review of procedures and the results of the licensees containment walkdown inspections

performed during the current fall refueling outage (N2R25). The inspectors also

interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of

containment to evaluate compliance with licensees BACC program requirements, and

verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions such as boric acid leaks, were

properly identified and corrected, in accordance with the licensees BACC and corrective

action programs.

The inspectors reviewed the condition reports (CRs) and associated corrective actions

(CAs) listed in the Documents Reviewed Attachment related to boric acid leakage to

evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the

ASME Code Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

Identification and Resolution of Problems: The inspectors performed a review of a

sample of ISI-related problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the

corrective action program as CRs. The inspectors reviewed the CRs to confirm that the

licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated

corrective actions. The review also included the licensees consideration and

assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors

performed this review to ensure compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements. The corrective action documents

reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the report Attachment. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a licensed operator performance on August 3, 2017, during a

simulator scenario. The inspectors observed the following elements of crew

performance in terms of communications: (1) ability to take timely and proper actions;

(2) prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; (3) correct use and implementation of

procedures, including the alarm response procedures; (4) timely control board operation

and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and (5) oversight and direction

provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement

appropriate TS actions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Quarterly Control Room Operator Performance Observations

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted two observations of licensed

reactor operators actions and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with

the licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. These observations took place

during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. As part of this assessment, the

inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance: (1) operator

compliance and use of plant procedures including technical specifications; (2) control

board/in-plant component manipulations; (3) use and interpretation of plant instruments,

indicators and alarms; (4) documentation of activities; (5) management and supervision

of activities; and (6) communication between crew members.

The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance during the

following events:

2-OP-3.7, Unit Shutdown from Mode 1 to Mode 5 for Refueling

Unit 1 during reset of U1 generator automatic voltage regulator to AUTO after

experiencing oscillations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

For the four equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of

the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors

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performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office

reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The

inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance

Rule (10 CFR 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule

Program, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Fuel cooling pump, 1-FC-P-1B, motor in alert range for vibration

Charging pump, 1-CH-P-1A, in alert range of vibration

1-VG-RM-180, Gaseous Effluent Monitor Out of Service

1-SA-P-1A, 1A service air pump trip

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following:

(1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were

conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) appropriate and necessary steps taken to plan

and control the resulting emergent work activities upon identification of an unforeseen

situation; and (4) adequate identification and resolution of maintenance risk

assessments and emergent work problems. The inspectors reviewed these

maintenance activities to verify that the licensee was in compliance with the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety

monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the

corrective action program to verify that deficiencies in risk assessments were being

identified and properly resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Motor replacement of 1-FC-P-1B due to high vibration

2B slave relay PT, 2-PT-213.2A

Appendix R Alternate Shutdown/Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Fire Risk Equipment

(Technical Response Manual 7.5 for charging crosstie U1/U2)

U2 overpressure protection, 2-PT-44.4.1

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability and Functionality Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations (OD) and functionality

assessments, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as

appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued

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system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were

considered as compensatory measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if

involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and

(5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting

Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance with the SDP. No

samples of operator work arounds (OWA) were reviewed because there were no OWAs

existing for either unit during the calendar year 2016. The inspectors review included a

verification that ODs were made as specified by procedure OP-AA-102, Operability

Determination, Rev. 13. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Operability Determination, CA3063143, Degraded Non-Conforming Condition of SW

Traveling Screens due to Electrical Design Inadequacy Identified in CR 1074806

CA286656, 1-CC-P-1B Oil Sample has Visible Ferrous Particles

Feedwater ultrasonic flow meter

1-CH-P-1A operability in alert vibrations

Increased reactor coolant system leakage from U1 reactor coolant pump

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance test procedures and/or test activities,

listed below, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the

effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or

engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)

acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness

consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had

current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application; (5) tests were

performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or

leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing;

and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with

VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Rev. 14. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment.

Main Control Room Chiller 4B

Fire Protection Pumps - Annual Testing for 1-FP-P-2, Diesel-Driven Fire Pump, after

maintenance

SR102 Shunt Breaker Spare replacement and oil leak repair

2-RS-MR02 casing cooler chiller failure and repair

1-RM-CNUT-193, N-16 signal converter replacement

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

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1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the six surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures,

witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the

scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional

and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors

also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or

components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety

functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

IST Pump or Valve Test:

1-PT-71.3Q, 1-FW-P-3B, B Motor-Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test, Revision 53

RCS Leakage:

1-GOP-52.2A, Identifying Increased RCS Leakage, Rev 01

Containment Isolation Valve:

2-PT-57.5A, Leak Rate Test of 2-SI-P-1A and Associated Piping and Inservice

Inspection for 2-SI-6, Rev 21

2-PT-57.5B, Leak Rate Test of 2-SI-P-1B and Associated Piping and Inservice

Inspection for 2-SI-29, Rev 21

Other Surveillance Tests:

2-PT-17.1, Control Rod Operability, Revision 41

2-PT-83.12H, 2H Diesel Generator Test (Start by ESF Actuation) Followed by 24-

hour Run and Hot Restart Test, Revision 29

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY (RS)

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (Seven Inspection Samples

Completed)

a. Inspection Scope

Hazard Assessment and Instructions to Workers: During facility tours, the inspectors

directly observed radiological postings and container labeling for areas established

within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) of the Unit 2 (U2) Reactor Building, Unit 1

(U1) and U2 Auxiliary Buildings, and radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and

storage locations. The inspectors independently measured radiation dose rates or

directly observed conduct of licensee radiation surveys for selected RCA areas. The

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inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for airborne

radioactivity, gamma surveys with a range of dose rate gradients, surveys for alpha-

emitters and other hard-to-detect radionuclides, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks.

The inspectors also discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to

changing radiological conditions since the last inspection. The inspectors attended pre-

job briefings and reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) details to assess

communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to

workers.

Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of material and

personnel being released from the RCA using small article monitor, personnel

contamination monitor, and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors discussed

equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance with licensee staff.

The inspectors also reviewed records of leak tests on selected sealed sources and

discussed nationally tracked source transactions with licensee staff.

Hazard Control: The inspectors evaluated access controls and barrier effectiveness for

selected High Radiation Area (HRA), Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA), and Very

High Radiation Area (VHRA) locations and discussed changes to procedural guidance

for LHRA and VHRA controls with Radiation Protection (RP) supervisors. The

inspectors reviewed implementation of controls for the storage of irradiated material

within the spent fuel pool. Established radiological controls, including airborne controls

and electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm setpoints, were evaluated for selected U2 Refueling

Outage 25 (2R25) tasks including lncore Flux Thimble modifications, Reactor Vessel

Head disassembly/assembly, and Valve Maintenance. In addition, the inspectors

reviewed licensee controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly as a

result of plant shutdown and refueling operations. The inspectors also reviewed the use

of personnel dosimetry including extremity dosimetry and multi-badging in high dose rate

gradients.

Radiation Worker Performance and RP Technician Proficiency: Occupational workers

adherence to selected RWPs and RP technician proficiency in providing job coverage

were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff. Jobs

observed included incore flux thimble cutting, refueling, and various outage maintenance

tasks in high radiation and contaminated areas. The inspectors also evaluated worker

responses to dose and dose rate alarms during selected work activities.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and assessed

Corrective Action Program (CAP) documents associated with radiological hazard

assessment and control. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and

resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors also

reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Inspection Criteria: Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the

requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) U2 Chapters 11 and 12,

TS Section 5.7, 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20, and approved licensee procedures. Licensee

programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA were evaluated

against 10 CFR Part 20 and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated

Material. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment..

14

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment (Six Inspection Samples

Completed)

a. Inspection Scope:

Radioactive Effluent Treatment Systems: The inspectors walked-down selected

components of the gaseous and liquid radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and

effluent discharge systems. To the extent practical, the inspectors observed and

evaluated the material condition of in-place waste processing equipment for indications

of degradation or leakage that could constitute a possible release pathway to the

environment. Inspected components included radwaste processing equipment in the

clarifier building, turbine building, auxiliary building and associated piping and valves.

The inspectors interviewed licensee staff regarding equipment configuration and effluent

monitor operation. The inspectors also walked down and reviewed surveillance test

records for the A and B trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System Pump Room

Exhaust Air Cleanup System (ECCS PREACS) ventilation system filters.

Effluent Sampling and Discharge: The inspectors observed the collection and

processing of liquid effluent samples from high capacity steam generator blowdown

proportional tanks in the turbine building and from the clarifier proportional tanks in the

waste disposal building and observed gaseous effluent sampling on the 291 elevation of

the auxiliary building. Technician proficiency in collecting, processing, and preparing the

applicable release permits was evaluated. The inspectors reviewed recent liquid and

gaseous release permits including pre-release sampling results, effluent monitor alarm

setpoints, and public dose calculations. For RM-111 (Clarifier Hold-Up Tank Outlet

Liquid Effluent Monitor), RM-187 (Process Vent Gaseous Effluent Monitor), RM-188

(Plant Vent A Gaseous Effluent Monitor) and RM-121 (U1 Condensate Air Ejector

Gaseous Effluent Monitor), the inspectors reviewed calibration and functional test

records and evaluated traceability of radioactive calibration sources to National Institute

of Standards and Technology (NIST) standards. The inspectors also evaluated the

licensees capability to collect high-range post-accident effluent samples from these

monitoring systems if applicable. The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee

staff methodology for determining vent and stack flow rates and compared current vent

flows to design values in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

The inspectors reviewed the 2015 and 2016 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release

Reports to evaluate reported doses to the public, review any anomalous events, and to

review ODCM changes. The inspectors reviewed compensatory sampling data for time

periods when selected radiation monitors were out of service. The inspectors reviewed

the results of interlaboratory cross-checks for laboratory instruments used to analyze

effluent samples. The inspectors also reviewed licensee effluent source term

characterizations and changes to effluent release points. In addition, the inspectors

evaluated recent land use census results.

15

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected

CAP documents associated with gaseous and liquid effluent processing and release

activities including licensee sponsored assessments. The inspectors evaluated the

licensees ability to identify and resolve issues.

Inspection Criteria: Radwaste system operation and effluent processing activities were

evaluated against requirements and guidance documented in the following: 10 CFR Part

20; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix I; ODCM; UFSAR Chapters 9 and 11; Regulatory Guide

(RG) 1.21, Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and

Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-

Cooled Nuclear Power Plants; RG 1.109, Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from

Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10

CFR Part 50 Appendix I; and TS Section 5, Administrative Requirements Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (Three Inspection Samples

Completed)

a. Inspection Scope

REMP Implementation: The inspectors reviewed the (2015 and 2016) Annual

Radiological Environmental Operating Reports and the (2015 and 2016) Annual

Radioactive Effluent Release Reports. Selected environmental measurements were

reviewed for consistency with licensee effluent data, evaluated for radionuclide

concentration trends, and compared with detection level sensitivity requirements as

described in the ODCM. The inspectors assessed the licensees response to any

missed or anomalous environmental samples. The inspectors also reviewed the results

of interlaboratory cross-checks for laboratory instruments used to analyze environmental

samples. Any changes to the ODCM, Land Use Census, or environmental program

processes were discussed with licensee staff.

The inspectors observed routine collection of airborne particulate and iodine air samples

and verified placement of environmental dosimeters and surface water sampling

equipment at selected locations as required by the licensees ODCM. The inspectors

noted the material condition of the continuous air samplers, water samplers, and

environmental dosimeters. The inspectors also reviewed calibration and maintenance

records for the selected the environmental sampling equipment.

Meteorological Monitoring Program: The inspectors observed the physical condition of

the meteorological tower and its instrumentation and discussed equipment operability

and maintenance history with licensee staff. The inspectors evaluated transmission of

locally generated meteorological data to other licensee groups such as emergency

operations personnel and main control room operators. Calibration records for the

meteorological measurements of wind speed, wind direction, and temperature were

reviewed. The inspectors also reviewed meteorological measurement data recovery for

2015 and 2016.

16

Ground Water Protection: The inspectors reviewed the licensees continued

implementation of the industrys Ground Water Protection Initiative (Nuclear Energy

Institute (NEI) 07-07) and discussed any changes to the program. The inspectors

discussed program guidance for dealing with spills, leaks, and unexpected discharges

with licensee staff and reviewed recent monitoring well results and any voluntary

communications. The inspectors also reviewed recent entries into the 10 CFR 50.75(g)

decommissioning file. The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensees program

for monitoring of structures, systems, and components with the potential to release

radioactive material to the environment. Potential effluent release points due to onsite

surface water bodies were also evaluated.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed CAP documents in the

areas of radiological environmental monitoring and meteorological tower maintenance.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues. The

inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Inspection Criteria: The inspectors evaluated REMP implementation and meteorological

monitoring against the requirements and guidance contained in: 10 CFR Part 20;

Appendices E and I to 10 CFR Part 50; TS Section 5.0; Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

(North Anna); UFSAR Chapter 11; RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological

Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment;

Branch Technical Position, An Acceptable Radiological Environmental Monitoring

Program - 1979; Safety Guide 23 Onsite Meteorological Programs; NEI 07-07,

Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document; and approved

licensee procedures Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS8 Radiological Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling,

Storage, and Transportation (Six Inspection Samples Completed)

a. Inspection Scope

Radioactive Material: The inspectors walked down indoor and outdoor areas inside the

protected area as well as radioactive material storage warehouses and the steam

generator storage facility outside of the protected area (PA). During the walk-downs, the

inspectors observed the physical condition and labeling of storage containers and the

radiological postings for satellite radioactive material storage areas. The inspectors also

reviewed the licensees radwaste procedures for routine surveys and waste storage.

Radioactive Waste System Walkdown, Characterization and Classification: The

inspectors walked down accessible sections of the liquid and solid radwaste systems to

assess material condition and conformance of equipment with system design diagrams.

This included portions of the radwaste processing building. The inspectors discussed

the function of radwaste components with the radwaste operator. The inspectors

discussed possible changes to the radwaste processing systems with radwaste staff.

The processes for the dewatering of resins, spent resin tank recirculation, resin

sampling, and transfer of resins from the processing pads to the shipping casks and

temporary storage casks were reviewed and discussed with resin processing contractor.

17

The inspectors reviewed the 2016 Radioactive Effluent Release Report and the most

recent radionuclide characterization and classification for the dry active waste and

primary resin waste streams. The inspectors evaluated analyses for hard-to-detect

nuclides, reviewed the use of scaling factors, and examined quality assurance

comparison results between licensee waste stream characterizations and outside

laboratory data. The inspectors also evaluated how changes to plant operational

parameters were taken into account in waste characterization.

Shipment Preparation and Records: There were no outgoing radioactive material

shipments available for observation during the week of the inspection. The inspectors

observed the radiological survey of an incoming limited quantity shipment. The

inspectors reviewed four shipping records for consistency with licensee procedures and

compliance with NRC and Department of Transportation regulations. This included

review of emergency response information, waste classification, radiation survey results,

information on the waste manifest, and the authorization of the receiving licensee to

receive shipments. Training records for selected individuals currently qualified to ship

radioactive material were reviewed for compliance with 49 CFR Part 172 Subpart H.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed CAP documents in the

areas of radwaste/shipping. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify

and resolve the issues. The inspectors also reviewed recent self-assessment results.

Inspection Criteria: Radioactive material and waste storage activities were reviewed

against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. Radwaste processing activities and

equipment configuration were reviewed for compliance with the licensees Process

Control Program. Waste stream characterization analyses were reviewed against

regulations detailed in 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 61, and guidance provided in the

Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification (1983). Transportation program

implementation was reviewed against regulations detailed in 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR

Part 71 (which requires licensees to comply with Department of Transportation

regulations in 49 CFR Parts 107, 171-180, and 390-397), as well as the guidance

provided in NUREG-1608. Training activities were assessed against 49 CFR Part 172

Subpart H. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (Four Inspection Samples Completed)

.1 Reactor Safety

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by

the licensee, for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant

records compiled between June 2016 to June 2017 to verify the accuracy and

completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI

data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory

18

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors

verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.

In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to

verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI

data. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

safety system functional failure (MS05)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

reactor coolant system specific activity (BI01)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Radiation Safety

a. Inspection Scope

Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone: (OR01) The inspectors reviewed the

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness PI results for the Occupational Radiation

Safety Cornerstone from April 2016 through July 2017. For the assessment period, the

inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs and CAP documents related to controls for exposure

significant areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone: (PR01) The inspectors reviewed the Radiological

Control Effluent Release Occurrences PI results for the Public Radiation Safety

Cornerstone from April 2016 through July 2017. For the assessment period, the

inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and

gaseous release permits and CAP documents related to Radiological Effluent Technical

Specifications/ODCM issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural

guidance for collecting and documenting PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of

Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human

performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items

19

entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily CR

report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

.2 Semiannual Trend Review: Procedural Adherence

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensees procedural adequacy. The

inspectors, through document review and interviews with licensee, reviewed the

establishment and effectiveness of a licensee program in addressing procedural

adequacy in operations and maintenance activities.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 18, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the quarterly inspection results

to Mr. L. Lane and other members of the staff. The licensee acknowledged the results of

these inspections. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained by the

inspectors or documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the

licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC

Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation.

TS 5.4.1 requires, that Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and

maintained covering the following activities: a. The applicable procedures

recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A,

February 1978. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Appendix A, identifies Access control to

radiation areas, including a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) system as one of the areas

requiring procedural controls. Additionally, procedure VPAP-2101, Radiation Protection

Program, Revision 35, Attachment 1, RCA Work Practices, identifies what workers

should know prior to entering the RCA (minimum requirements). Attachment 1 states, in

part, All workers entering the RCA are required to: 1) Notify RP prior to entering the

RCA. Contrary to the above requirements, on September 15, 2017, two maintenance

workers entered U2 Containment, a posted High Radiation Area (HRA), while signed in

on an incorrect RWP, and without checking in at the Health Physics Shift Supervisor

window prior to entering containment. The workers signed in on the RWP they had used

earlier in the day which did not allow entry into a HRA. The containment building had

been posted as a HRA in preparation for lifting the reactor head while the workers were

out of containment. HP personnel in the remote monitoring facility identified that the

individuals were on an incorrect RWP, informed HP personnel in containment, and the

workers exited containment prior to the head lift. This finding was of very low safety

20

significance (Green) because there was no substantial potential for overexposure and

the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. The immediate corrective

actions were documented in CR 1078223. Corrective actions included a human

performance review, coaching of the individuals by RP Management, and distribution of

a site-wide message discussing the incident and reminding site personnel to remain

aware of radiological safety.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel:

M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning

R. Galbraith, ISI/NDE Supervisor

A. Garcia-Santiago, Auxiliary System Programs Engineer II

J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Site Services

R. Hanson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services

E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Site Engineering

L. Hilbert, Plant Manager

J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

L. Lane, Site Vice President

K. LeBarron, Nuclear Technical Specialist III

J. Leberstien, Technical Advisor, Licensing

D. McGinnis, Technical Specialist II

R. Page, Licensing Engineer

J. Plossl, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures

J. Schleser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness

R. Simmons, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry

J. Slattery, Manager, Nuclear Operations

W. Standley, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing

D. Taylor, Manager, Station Licensing

B. Thompson, Manager, Nuclear Training

B.J Thompson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection Technical Services

M. Whalen, Technical Advisor, Licensing

J. Collins - Corporate Director, Emergency Preparedness (EP)

B. Miller - EP Specialist

D. Plogger - EP Specialist

T. Shalaski - EP Specialist

N. Turner, EP Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

None

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

1-OP-7.4A, Valve Checkoff - Quench Spray System, Revision 10.

CR1041263 BACC 1-QS-P-1A at shaft seal

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

2-FS-C-1, Loss Prevention Fire Strategy, Containment - Unit 2, Revision 4

2-PT-105.4.1, Loss Prevention Periodic Test, Fire Protection - Hose Station Flow Test,

Revision 3

1-FS-SW-1, Loss Prevention Fire Strategy, Service Water Pump House Units 1 and 2,

Revision 2

0-PT-105.3, Loss Prevention Periodic Test, Hose House Inspection, Revision 5

CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Revision 13

0-PT-105.1.1, Loss Prevention Period Test, Fire Door Inspection - Turbine Building, Control

Room, and Office Area, Revision 10

0-FS-TB-1, Loss Prevention Fire Strategy, Turbine Building Fire Fighting Strategy, Revision 2

2-FS-MG-1, Firefighting Strategy, Motor Generator Set House Unit 2, Dated May 28, 1992

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

0-AP-12, Abnormal Procedure, Loss of Service Water, Revision 40

0-EPM-2303-01, Inspection of Service Water Cathodic Protection System, Revision 12

0-EPM-2303-02, Corrosion Survey of Service Water Cathodic Protection System, Revision 0

0-OP-49.1, Operating Procedure, Service Water System Normal Operation, Revision 20

0-OP-49.6, Operating Procedure, Service Water System Throttling Alignment, Revision 24

0-PT-75.7, Engineering Periodic Test, Service Water Reservoir - Ground Water Level,

Revision 7

0-PT-75.8, Engineering Periodic Test, Service Water Reservoir Loss Monitoring Procedure,

Revision 5

0-PT-75.24A, Service Water MIC Leakage Inspection - Units 1 and 2, Revision 9

0-PT-75.12, Engineering Periodic Test, Visual Inspection of the Service Water Reservoir Dike

and Toe, Revision 7

0-PT-75.15, Engineering Periodic Test, Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water System Testing

Requirements Coordination, Revision 6

0-PT-75.22, Engineering Periodic Test, Service Water System Reservoir Sludge Depth

Measurement, Revision 7

0-PT-115, Engineering Periodic Test, Survey of Settlement Monitoring Points, Revision 13

1-PT-75.6, Engineering Periodic Test, Service Water System Flow Balance, Revision 24-MR1

2-PT-75.6, Engineering Periodic Test, Service Water System Flow Balance, Revision 23

ER-AA-AMP-101, Implementation of Activities Performed by License Renewal Aging

Management Coordinators, Revision 7

ER-AA-BPM-10, Underground Piping and Tank Integrity Program Description, Revision 7

ER-AA-BPM-101, Underground Piping and Tank Integrity Program, Revision 10

ER-AA-HTX-10, Heat Exchanger Program, Revision 6

3

ER-NA-INS-101, Main Dam Annual Inspection, Revision 2

ER-NA-SYS-320, Generic Letter 89-13 Program, Revision 2

CH-32.939, Service Water Chemical Addition System: Operation, Revision 14

CH-32.940, Service Water System: Aqua Shade Addition, Revision 2

CHAP-0105, Auxiliary Cooling Water System Chemistry Control Program (North Anna),

Revision 26

VPAP-0811, Service Water System Inspection and Maintenance Program, Revision 6

Corrective Action Documents

CR 0580154, Service Water flow indication on 'B' supply header is indicating high

CR 1010758, Extension shaft material for SW Spray Array MOVs (and Bypass MOVs) do not

support torque requirement

CR 1010761, Unable to confirm material removed from the "B" SW header

CR 1010918, Through-Wall Leak in the 1B2 Spray Array Piping

CR 1010927, Through-Wall Leak identified on the 2A2 Spray Array

CR 1010934, 2A2 SW spray array surging

CR 1010936, 2-SW-MOV-222A Internal Inspection Findings

CR 1011052, Mop head fibers lodged in 2" continuous drains

CR 1050193, 2-SW-354 has a MIC leak at the pipe weld

CR 1071375, Weld Repairs identified on 10 Tee off of 24-WS-102-151-Q3

Work Orders (WOs)

WO 59102243628, Control Room Chiller Equipment Performance Test (1-HV-E-4A)

WO 59102493734, Inspection and Cleaning of 01-HV-E-4A-2-HTEXCH

WO 59102498132, CC Heat Exchanger Tube Cleaning/Plugging 02-CC-E-1B HTEXCH

WO 59102888926, Annual Corrosion Survey of Service Water Cathodic Protection System per

0-EPM-2303-02

WO 59102999245, Eddy Current Testing of 01-RS-E-1B-HTEXCH

WO 59102999267, Perform Eddy Current Testing I As-Found Tubesheet Inspection of

01-RS-E-1 D-HTEXCH

Other Documents

ASME Code Cases N-729-1 and N-729-4

Ultrasonic Examination Report UT-17-038 of 12050-WMKS-0102B / 16-WFPD-423 / 40, Elbow

to Nozzle

Ultrasonic Examination Report UT-17-037 of 12050-WMKS-0102A / 16-WFPD-424 / 75, Elbow

to Nozzle

Calibration Certificate digital thermometer, Serial Number 1079BGCY

Certificate of Calibration (Certificate #172330SRAM1) for light meter, serial number OSRAM-1

Certificate of Certification for Ultra Gel II, Batch# 12J066

Certification for Magnaflux Spotcheck, SKC-S, Batch #: 16H07K

Certification for Magnaflux Penetrate, SKC-S, Batch #: 16H07K

Certificate of Certification, Spotcheck Penetrant, SKL-SP2, Batch# 15J02K

Certificate of Certification, Spotcheck Developer, SKD-S2, Batch# 14K04K

Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial Number OlCXBJ

Krautkramer Transducer Certificate of Conformity for Serial Number OlCXBN

NDE Personnel Certification Records for J. Block, T. Coburn, and C. Popp

Relief Request N2-I4-NDE-002

Report Number L-17-012, Ultrasonic Instrument Linearity for Olympus Model EPOCH 600,

Serial Number 150864802

8

Self-Assessment Report (SAR) 000486, Nuclear Welding Program Formal Fleet Self-

Assessment

SAR 002257, Inservice Inspection/Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Program Formal Self-

Assessment

SAR 002813, Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (BACCP) Self Assessment

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator

Performance

Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Cycle 17-6, Segment 1B, Revision 5

Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Cycle 17-6, Segment 1C, Revision 4

2-OP-3.7, Unit Shutdown from Mode 1 to Mode 5 for Refueling, Revision 48

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

1-PT-97.1B, Operations Periodic Test, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling Pump (1-FC-P-1B) Test,

Revision 17

Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited Loss Control Manual, January 2017 Edition

North Anna Narrative Logs regarding 1-FC-P-1B dated January 1, 2017-August 2, 2017

Vibration Trend for 1-FC-P-1B from June 24, 2008 to August 2, 2017

Corrective Action Documents

CR 1073731, 1-FC-P-1B Vibration Data in Alert Range

Work Order

WO59103007607

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

NUMARC 93-01, Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at

Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 4A

1-Log-14, Non-Routine Surveillance Log, Initiate the following Maintenance Rule(a)(4) Fire RMA

Defense-in-Depth Measures for TR 7.5

WM-AA-301, Operational Risk Assessment, Revision 14

1-AP-27, Malfunction of Spent Fuel Pit System, Revision 26

Work Order

WO59103098001

WO59102932957

WO59103101877

WO59102933066

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

OD CA 3063143 - Degraded Non-Conforming Condition of SW Traveling Screens due to

Electrical Design Inadequacy Identified in CR1074806

CR1074806,Reduced Margin due to Temperature Derating of SWPH MCC Bucket

Transformers/Fuses

Operation Department Shift Orders for August 25, 2017

OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Revision 15

9

1-AR-J-H6, SW Screens 1A-1B No Rotation, SW Screens Hi P, Revision 3

ME-0305, Service Water Pump NPSH, Revision 0

CR554449, 1-CC-P-1B Outboard Pump Bearing Oil Sample Discoloration

CA286656, Track and document oil sample results for 1-CC-P-1B

Engineering Log Entry for 7/25/2017, 1-CC-P-1B Oil Sample has Visible Ferrous Particulates

Work Order

WO59103098137

WO05910312409

Corrective Action Documents

CR 1073832

CR 3062123

CR 1079324

CR 1000423

Section 1R19: Post Maintenance Testing

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

0-PT-100.2, Fire Protection Pumps - Annual Test, Revision 26

CR1075127, Tagged 1FP-P-2 for pump replacement

CR1075979, 1-FP-P-2 New Pump high vibrations on return to service

1-PT-77.11B.1, Control Room Chiller 1-HV-E-4B IST Comprehensive Pump and Valve Test,

Revision 12-OTO1

Work Order

WO59102873252

WO59103085096

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manual

1-PT-71.3Q, 1-FW-3B, B Motor-Driven AFW Pump, and Valve Test, Revision 53

CR1073791, 2-PT-71.3Q.1 test results need engineering evaluation

2-PT-17.1, Control Rod Operability, Revision 41

2-AP-1.2, Dropped Rod, Revision 18

2-AR-A-H1, Rod Bank A Lo/lo-lo Limit, Revision 1

2-AR-A-H2, Rod Bank B Lo/lo-lo Limit, Revision 1

2-AR-A-H3, Rod Bank C Lo/lo-lo Limit, Revision 3

2-AR-A-H4, Rod Bank D Lo/lo-lo Limit, Revision 3

2-PT-82.4A, 2H Diesel Generator Test (Start by ESF Actuation), Revision 75

2-PT-82.4B, 2J Diesel Generator Test (Start by ESF Actuation), Revision 72

2-PT-82.2A, 2H Diesel Generator Test (Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power), Revision 74

2-PT-82.2A, 2J Diesel Generator Test (Simulated Loss of Off-Site Power), Revision 76

2-PT-83.12H, 2H Diesel Generator Test (Start by ESF Actuation) followed by 24-hour Run and

Hot Restart Test, Revision 29

2-PT-142.10A.1, Valve Inservice Inspection Associated with 2-EG-TK-2HA for 2-EB-15 Check

Valve, Revision 3

2-PT-142.10A.2, Valve Inservice Inspection Associated with 2-EG-TK-2HB for 2-EB-61 Check

Valve, Revision 3

Procedure 2-PT-36.7.1, Engineered Safety Features and Containment Isolation Valve

10

Response Time, Rev 23

Procedure 2-PT-57.5A, Leak Rate Test of 2-SI-P-1A and Associated Piping and Inservice

Inspection for 2-SI-6, Rev 21

Procedure 2-PT-57.5B, Leak Rate Test of 2-SI-P-1B and Associated Piping and Inservice

Inspection for 2-SI-29, Rev 21

Procedure 2-PT-213.5J, Valve Inservice Inspection (2-QS-MOV-201B), Rev 10

Work Order

WO59102098166

WO59080458701

WO59101762949

WO59060120201

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

HP-1032.080, Controlled Area and Unrestricted Area Radiological Surveys, Rev. 9

HP-1032.110, Dose Rate Trending, Rev. 1

HP-1032.131, Initial Movement of Irradiated Fuel Assemblies to and From the Reactor Vessel,

Rev. 0

HP-1032.140, Guidance/Actions to Take When Licensed Material is Detected at Exposure

Control, Rev. 0

HP-1032.202, Radiological Informational Posting, Rev. 0

North Anna Power Station Outage ALARA Guide, Unit Two Refueling Outage September 2017

RP-AA-101, Radiological Protection Organization and Administration, Rev. 3

RP-AA-109, Radiological Survey Program, Rev. 0

RP-AA-201, Access Controls for High and Very High Radiation Areas, Rev. 8

RP-AA-202, Radiological Posting, Rev. 10

RP-AA-222, Radiation Surveys, Rev. 3

RP-AA-223, Contamination Surveys, Rev. 4

RP-AA-224, Airborne Radioactivity Surveys, Rev. 3

RP-AA-225, Unrestricted Release of Material, Rev. 6

RP-AA-226, Alpha Monitoring, Rev. 5

RP-AA-230, Personnel Contamination Monitoring and Decontamination, Rev. 11

RP-AA-240, Discrete Radioactive Particle Control, Rev. 2

RP-AA-270, Providing HP Coverage During Work, Rev. 2

RP-AA-271, Use of Remote Monitoring, Rev. 2

RP-AA-275, Radiological Risk Assessment Process, Rev. 3

VPAP-2101, Radiation Protection Program, Rev. 35

Records and Data

Air Sample Analysis: 259' A Gas Stripper, Routine Gas & Particulate, Filename: 13-Jul-17-

400030 and 13-Jul-17-400031, 7/13/2017 and Filename: 10-Aug-17-400017 and 400020,

8/10/2017; 259' B Gas Stripper, Routine Gas & Particulate, Filename: 13-Jul-17-400032

and 13-Jul-17-400032, 7/13/2017 and Filename: 10-Aug-17-400018 and 400019, 8/10/2017;

Unit 1 Quench Spray Pump House and Main Steam, Routine Particulate, Filename: and 01-

Aug-17-400028, 8/1/2017 and Filename: 05-Sep-17-400001, 9/5/2017; Hot Lab, Routine

Particulate, Filename: 06-Jul-17-400003, 7/6/2017 and Filename: 03-Aug-17-400001,

8/3/2017

11

List, Location of Locked High Radiation Areas (LHRAs) and Very High Radiation Areas

(VHRAs) [including areas with the potential to become a LHRA during routine operations or

outages], 8/29/2017

List, Non-Fuel Items Stored in the NAPS Spent Fuel Pool [based on Assembly Information

Reports, Fig File: N2EOC25.fig, 8/24/2017 and 8/30/2017], 8/30/2017

List, 2017 Non-Outage RWP [including dose and dose rate alarms by task], 7/26/2017

List, 2017 Unit 2 Outage RWPs [including dose and dose rate alarms by task], 9/6/2017

Non-Outage Radiological Surveys: Decon Building 251' Spent Resin Hold-up Tank Area,

1/5/2015; Aux Building, 274' VCT Cubes, 2/10/2016; U2 Containment, 216' lncore access

(keyway), 4/5/2016; U1 Containment, 216' lncore access (keyway), 9/16/2016; U2 Reactor

Cavity, 4/4/2017; Unit 2 Unit 1 and Unit 2 Equipment Hatch Platforms, Perform PT-60.1B

and Alarm Checks, 4/16/2017; Unit 2 Personnel Hatch, Security Alarm Checks, 6/25/2017;

Unit 1 Personnel Hatch, Security Alarm Checks, 6/25/2017; Demin Alley, Resin Transfer,

6/28/2017; Waste Solids Area, 6/29/2017; Decon Building, 251', 6/29/2017; Aux Building,

259' Gas Strippers, 7/13/2017 and 8/10/2017; Aux Building, 244' Gas Strippers, 7/13/2017

and 8/10/2017; Unit 1 Quench Spray Pump House and Main Steam 272, 8/1/2017 and

9/5/2017; U1 & U2 Charging Pump Cubicles, 7/31/2017 and 9/4/2017; Health Physics

Office, Count Room, and Chemistry Office/Lab, 7/6/2017 and 8/3/2017

NSTS Annual Inventory Reconciliation Report, for License Number NPF-4, Confirmation of

Annual Inventory Reconciliation, 1/20/2017

Outage Radiological Surveys: U2 Reactor Cavity, Initial Cavity Dose Rate Survey, 9/10/2017;

U2 Reactor Cavity, Initial Cavity Contamination Survey, 9/10/2017; U2 Containment, 241'

"B" Loop Room 2-PT-46.21, 9/10/2017; U2 Containment, 231' RHR and Excess Letdown

HX Platform, 9/10/2017; U2 Containment, Top of Pressurizer, 9/10/2017; U2 Reactor Head,

Dose Rate and Contamination Survey, 9/11/2017; U2 Containment, Top of Pressurizer

Removal of 2-RC-SV-2115B, 9/12/2017; U2 Reactor Cavity, Reactor Head Lift, 9/15/2017;

U2 Containment, 241' During Head Lift & Move To Lower Containment, 9/15/2017; U2

Containment, 262' During Head Lift & Move To Lower Containment, 9/15/2017; U2

Containment, 216' Reactor Head on Head Stand in Lower Containment, 9/15/2017; U2

Containment, 291' Refuel Floor Post Head Lift, 9/15/2017; U2 Reactor Cavity, Upper

Internals Lift & Move, 9/16/2017; U2 Containment, 291', 9/18/2017; U2 Reactor Cavity,

Remove and Cut 11 Thimbles, 9/19/2017; U2 Containment 262' "B" Cubicle, Open & Inspect

2-CH-340, 9/21/2017;

Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 17-2002, Maintenance activities within the Unit 2 Circulating

Water Tunnel, Rev 0

Radioactive Source Master Listing (NAPS) [radioactive source inventory], 8/21/2017

RWP 17-2201, lncore Drive unit 5 and 10 path maintenance, Rev. 0

RWP 17-2215, Valve Maintenance in Locked High Radiation Areas, Rev. 0

RWP 17-2251, Disassemble and reassemble Reactor Vessel Head, Rev. 0

RWP 17-2266, Perform DCP 15-00088, lncore Flux Thimble modifications, Rev. 0

Site-Wide Communication, U2 RFO RP Update, Radiological Postings, 9/22/2017

Spreadsheet, North Anna Power Station Radiological Survey Schedule Check Sheet [Survey

Frequency], August 2017

Corrective Action Documents

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 33

PI-AA-300, Cause Evaluation, Rev. 14

Nuclear Oversight Audit Report, Audit 16-04 RP, PCP, Chemistry & Millstone Refueling,

5/26/2016

Self-Assessment, PIR Number 1019510, Exit Monitor Reliability, 4/15/2016

Self-Assessment, PIR Number 1057549, Radiological Work Control Program Review, 3/14/2017

12

Self-Assessment Results Measurement Review, PIR1019510 - Exit Monitor Reliability

CR 1032511

CR 1032902

CR 1032903

CR 1034024

CR 1034627

CR 1034930

CR 1039806

CR 1043768

CR 1061774

CR 1067020

CR 1074424

CR 1078100

CR 1078223

CR 1078811

Section 2RS6: Liquid and Gaseous Effluents

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

HP-3010-020, Radioactive Liquid Waste Release Permits, Rev. 5

HP-3010-021, Radioactive Liquid Waste Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 23

HP-3010-031, Radioactive Gaseous Waste Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 40

HP-3010-032, Radioactive Gaseous Waste Accountability and Dose Calculations, Rev. 15

HP-3010.040, Radiation Monitoring System Setpoint Determination, Rev. 26

VPAP-2103N, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (North Anna), Rev. 27

0-HSP-LQC-001, Confirmatory Measurements Using Blind Samples, Rev. 0

0-PT-37.1, Radiation Monitoring Equipment Source Check, Rev. 08

Records and Data

Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 2015 and 2016

Certificate Detalonnage (Calibration Certificate), MGP Instruments, S/N 6012 and 6054,

10/19/2000

Certificate of Conformance, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, S/N 01-315 and 01-317,

05/12/1989

Certificate of Conformance, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, S/N 02-691 and 02-754,

07/01/1989

Eckert & Ziegler Radiochemistry Cross Check Program for 2015, 2016 and the 1st Quarter 2017

Gaseous Release Permit# G-20170801-277-B, BRT Vent, 08/07/2017

Gaseous Release Permit# G-20170801-276-B, Aux Bldg Roof Fans, 08/07/2017

Gaseous Release Permit# G-20170801-283-C, Unit 1 CAE, 08/07/2017

Gaseous Release Permit # G-20160223-072-B, Process Vent, 02/23/2016

Liquid Release Permit # L-20170728-064-C, Clarifier, 07/28/2017

Liquid Release Permit # L-20170701-066-C, Unit 1 HCBD, 07/01/2017

Liquid Release Permit # L-20170701-067-C, Unit 2 HCBD, 07/01/2017

List, Effluent Radiation Monitors Out of Service for Greater than 24 Hours since 06/01/2015

North Anna Power Station Equipment Reliability List for System Radiation Monitoring, Updated

08/26/2014

Nuclide Distribution Report, 10CFR61 Waste Stream Analyses for Multiple Waste Streams,

2016

Radioactive Sealed Source Certificate and Test Report, QSA Global, S/N 8788GS, 03/13/2001

Unplanned Gaseous Release Record, ID 16-AGR-01, U2 RWST Gas Space, 01/20/2016

13

Unplanned Gaseous Release Record, ID 16-AGR-02, Process Vent Hi Hi Alarm, 02/23/2016

Work Order (WO) 5910201495932, U1 RM-178 Process Vent Normal Range, 01/23/2014

WO 59102473155, U1 SW-RM-130, Discharge Tunnel Effluent Radiation Monitor Calibration,

08/05/2015

WO 59102488682, LW-RM-110 Clarifier Hold Up Tank Inlet Monitor Calibration, 06/17/2014

WO 59102721714, 0-PT-77.4A, Laboratory Analysis- 1-HV-FL-3A ECCS PREACS, completed

07/09/2015

WO 59102735956, Condenser Air Ejector In-Line Radio Gas Monitor (2-SV-RM-221) Channel

Calibration, 12/04/2015

WO 591029166517, Condenser Air Ejector In-Line Radio Gas Monitor (2-SV-RM-221) Channel

Calibration, 06/06/2017

WO 59102739309, 0-PT-38.3.4, Calibration 1-HV-F-1212A, Vent A Flow, 12/10/2015

WO 59102784040, 0-PT-77.4B, Laboratory Analysis- 1-HV-FL-3B ECCS PREACS, completed

02/28/2016

WO 59102807780, 0-PT-77.14A, In Place Filter Test 1-HV-FL-3A ECCS PREACS, completed

08/24/2016

WO 59102825717, 0-PT-37.1, Radiation Monitoring Equipment Source Check, 08-05-2015

WO 59102882205, Vent Stack A Normal and High Range Effluent Radiation Monitor (VG-RM-

179) Channel Calibration, 01/18/2017

WO 59102882688, 0-PT-77.14B, In Place Filter Test 1-HV-FL-3B ECCS PREACS, completed

02/16/2017

WO 59102888990, LW-RM-111 Clarifier Hold Up Tank Outlet Monitor Calibration, 09/04/2015

WO 59102892494, LW-RM-111 Clarifier Hold Up Tank Outlet Monitor Calibration, 08/18/2016

WO 59102904056, LW-RM-110 Clarifier Hold Up Tank Inlet Monitor Calibration, 03/15/2017

WO 59102917391, 0-PT-38.3.4, Calibration 1-HV-F-1212A, Vent A Flow, 06/13/2017

0-PT-487.10, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, Land Use Census, 10/15/2015

0-PT-487.10, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, Land Use Census, 10/19/2016

Corrective Action Documents

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 33

Self-Assessment PIR1003232, Radioactive Effluent Control Program, 11/20/2015

CR 1043795

CR 1005452

CR 1024639

CR 1073079

CR 1010910

CR 582501

CR 1033833

CR 1072741

Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

HP-1033.620, Portable Air Samplers Calibration and Operation, Rev. 9

HP-3051.010, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 29

HP-3051.020, Ground Water Protection Program, Rev. 9

RP-AA-502, Groundwater Protection Program, Rev. 5

RP-AA-111-1012, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Review, Rev. 1

VPAP-2103N, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (North Anna), Rev. 27

0-GEP-14, Spent Fuel Pool Telltale Drain Evaluation, Rev. 2

0-ICP-MM-MIS-001B, Backup Meteorological Tower Instrumentation Calibration, Rev. 3

14

0-ICP-MM-MIS-001P, Primary Meteorological Tower Instrumentation Calibration, Rev. 6

0-PT-440, Monitoring Normally Non-Radioactive systems for Radioactive Contamination, Rev. 9

Records and Data

Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report (AREOR), North Anna Power Station for

2015 and 2016, April 2015 and 2016

Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (ARERR), North Anna Power Station for 2015 and

2016, April 2015 and 2016

Environmental Sample Log [REMP Sampling Schedule] for August 2017

Memorandum with Attachment, North Anna Meteorological Data [Joint Frequency Distributions

and Data Recovery Percentage] for 2014, 2015, and 2016, 1/14/2015, 3/10/2016, and

2/17/2017

Radiological Decommissioning Record, Spill below 2-QS-41 at U-2 RWST, Sample ID# 25-

SEP-15-400033, CR1011040, 9/25/2015

Radiological Decommissioning Record, NaOH Spill, Sample ID# 16-MAR-16-400072,

CR1030721, 3/16/2016

Radiological Decommissioning Record, Spill below 2-QS-38, Sample ID# 29-MAR-16-400021,

CR1032085, 3/29/2016

Radiological Decommissioning Record, Spill below 1-QS-24 at U-1 RWST, Sample ID# 20-FEB-

17-400020, CR1060475, 2/20/2017

REMP Air Sampler Certificate of Calibration: Kit# 15, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 14,

10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 13, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 12, 10/21/2015, and

10/19/2016; Kit# 11, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 10, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 9,

10/27/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 8, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 7, 10/21/2015, and

10/19/2016; Kit# 6, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 5, 10/21/2015, 10/19/2016; Kit# 4,

10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 3, 10/21/2015, and 10/19/2016; Kit# 2, 10/27/2015, and

10/20/2016; Kit# 1, 10/21/2015, and 10/20/2016

Spreadsheets, Direct Radiation Measurements - Sector Quarterly TLD Results [REMP TLDs],

for 2015, 2016, and 1st Quarter 2017

Sample Collection/Receipt Sheet [REMP Air Sample Data for Vendor], 8/8/2017

Vendor Laboratory Cross Check Performance Summary for 2015 and 2016, [including Eckert &

Zeigler Analytics, Inc, DOE's Mixed Analyte Performance Evaluation Program (MAPEP), and

Environmental Resource Associates, (ERA)], Data from 2015 and 2016 AREOR

Work Order (WO) 59102985187, 0-PT-40.1, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration,

12/20/2016

WO 59102932630, 01-MM-TWR-PRI-UNIT, Annual Tower Inspection [Primary Meteorological

Tower], 5/17/2017

WO 59103043600, 0-PT-40.1, Meteorological Monitoring System Calibration, 6/12/2017

0-GEP-14, Spent Fuel Pool Telltale Drain Evaluation [Inspection by Engineering], 12/8/2016 and

6/8/2017

2012 Priority Index Spreadsheet, North Anna Power Station Unit 1 [ranking of Structure,

System, and Component risk to groundwater]

2012 Priority Index Spreadsheet, North Anna Power Station Unit 2 [ranking of Structure,

System, and Component risk to groundwater]

Corrective Action Documents

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 33

Audit 15-10: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program,

Environmental Protection Plan, 12/16/2015

PIR1019508, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Review, North Anna Power

Station, Q4 2014 to Q4 2015, 5/26/2016

15

CR 582528

CR 1002672

CR 1005525

CR 1012719

CR 1021114

CR 1023150

CR 1038101

CR 1055473

CR 1063665

CR 1065819

CR 1071212

Section 2RS8: Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation

Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals

2-MOP-20.2, Resin Discharge and Addition to 2-CH-I-2, Cation Bed

Demineralizer, Rev. 16

HP-1072.020, Sampling, Analyzing, and Classifying Solid Radioactive Waste,

Rev. 11

HP-1071.021, Storing Radioactive Material Outside the Protected Area, Rev. 21

HP-1071.040, Packaging and Shipment of Radioactive Material, Rev. 17

HP-1072.080, Radioactive Waste Transfer to Erwin Resin Solutions, Rev. 9

PI-AA-200, Corrective Action, Rev. 33

RP-AA-232, Radioactive Material Control, Rev. 9

VPAP 2104, Dominion Station Administrative Procedure, Radioactive Waste Process Control

Program (PCP), Rev. 8

Records and Data

HP-1071.021, Attachment 3, Radioactive Material Inventory Record for Storage Locations

Outside the Protected Area, 3/15/17 and 6/12/17

Radiological Survey, Decontamination Building, 217 Elevation, Waste Solidification Area,

9/17/17

Radiological Survey, 17-RHR-31 Nut Runner from SPS, 9/19/17

Radioactive Waste Packaging, Transportation, and Disposal Training (PowerPoint Slides),

HPTCTP-16-Cycle-02-LP-1 (TIR 14586 - Rev. 1)

RP-AA-232, Attachment 2, Container Inspection Checklist, 5/15/17 and 8/7/17

Shipping Records and Radwaste Data

Shipment No. 15-ERS-01, Primary Resin, 3/6/15

Shipment No. 16-DUR-24, DAW / Oil, 3/24/16

Shipment No. 17-DUR-02, Dewatered Blended Resin, 3/3/17

Shipment No. 17-1032, U1 Demin Liquid Sample, 9/21/17

10 CFR Part 61 Waste Stream Analyses: U1 DAW, 10/6/16; U2 DAW, 4/5/16; SRHT, 9/20/16

Corrective Action Documents

CR 1003460

CR 1028592

CR 1033755

CR 1036591

CR 1042776

CR 1063026

16

CR 1068352

NUPIC Audit / Survey No. 23931, Energy Solutions, 6/15/15

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures and Guidance Documents

HP-3010.022, Radioactive Liquid Waste Accountability and Dose Calculations, Rev. 6

HP-3010.032, Radioactive Gaseous Waste Accountability and Dose Calculations, Rev. 15

LI-AA-500, NRC/INPO/WANO Performance Indicator and MOR Reporting, Rev. 2

PI-AA-100-1000, Performance Indicators, Rev. 5

RP-AA-111, Monitoring and Improving Radiological Performance, Rev. 2

RP-AA-112, Radiation Safety Performance Indicator Reporting, Rev. 4

VPAP-2802, Notifications and Reports, Rev. 43

Records and Data

RP-AA-124, Attachment 6, Electronic Dosimeter Dose/Dose Rate Alarm Log, 07/11/2017

Abnormal Gaseous Release, 16-AGR-01, 1/20/2016

Abnormal Gaseous Release, 16-AGR-02, 2/23/2016

Gaseous Release Permit [Gas Permit Post-Release Data], G-20160120-033-B, 1/20/2016

Gaseous Release Permit [Gas Permit Post-Release Data], G-20160223-072-B, 2/23/2016

Gaseous Effluents Cumulative Dose Summary, January through June 2017, 7/11/2017

NAPS NRC Performance Indicator, April 2016 through July 2017, various dates

Report, OpenEMS, Gas Status Summary Reports, January through June 2017 [summation of

all gaseous releases, including off-site dose summaries], 07/18/2017

Report, OpenEMS, Liquid Status Summary Reports, January through June 2017 [summation of

all liquid releases, including off-site dose summaries], 07/18/2017

Corrective Action Documents

CR 1033397

CR 1034627

CR 1043607

CR 1064034

ML17312B320

Text

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