IR 05000275/2016003
| ML16301A393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/2016 |
| From: | Jeremy Groom NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Halpin E Pacific Gas & Electric Co |
| Jeremy Groom | |
| References | |
| EA-16-104 IR 2016003 | |
| Download: ML16301A393 (46) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ber 27, 2016
SUBJECT:
DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2016003 AND 05000323/2016003
Dear Mr. Halpin:
On September 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2. On October 5, 2016, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. J. Nimick, Senior Director of Nuclear Services, and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection. However, as discussed in Section 4OA5 of this report, the inspectors identified an additional example of the previous Severity Level IV non-cited violation documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2015002 and 05000323/2015002. This violation involved the licensees failure to maintain fire protection records complete and accurate in all material respects as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of information. Because the additional example occurred during the same time period as the original violation, was caused by the same licensee employee, the significance is similar to the previous violation, and because your corrective actions address the cause of the violation, including this additional example, no new enforcement action is issued in this report.
If you contest the violation or significance of the non-cited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jeremy R. Groom, Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 License Nos. DPR-80 and DPR-82
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000275/2016003 and 05000323/2016003 w/ Attachments:
1. Supplemental Information 2. Request for Information for O
REGION IV==
Docket: 05000275; 05000323 License: DPR-80; DPR-82 Report: 05000275/2016003; 05000323/2016003 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Facility: Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: 7 1/2 miles NW of Avila Beach Avila Beach, CA Dates: July 1 through September 30, 2016 Inspectors: C. Newport, Senior Resident Inspector J. Reynoso, Acting Senior Resident Inspector R. Alexander, Sr. Project Engineer J. Choate, Acting Resident Inspector C. Peabody, Senior Resident Inspector E. Uribe, Acting Resident Inspector L. Carson II, Sr. Health Physicist C. Osterholtz, Senior Operations Engineer G. George, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Money, Health Physicist J. ODonnell, CHP, Health Physicist M. Phalen, Sr. Health Physicist Approved Jeremy R. Groom By: Chief, Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000275/2016003, 05000323/2016003; 07/01/2016 - 09/30/2016; Diablo Canyon Power
Plant; Integrated Inspection Report.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between July 1 and September 30, 2016, by the resident inspectors at Diablo Canyon Power Plant and inspectors from the NRCs Region IV office. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas.
Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process.
No findings were identified.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 operated at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at full power. On August 4, 2016, Unit 2 reduced power to 70 percent reactor power due to a misaligned control rod. Following realignment of the control rod, Unit 2 was returned to full power on August 5, 2016, and operated at or near full power for the remainder of this inspection period.
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Summer Readiness for Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems
a. Inspection Scope
On July 21, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations off-site and alternate-ac power systems. The inspectors inspected the material condition of these systems, including transformers and other switchyard equipment to verify that plant features and procedures were appropriate for operation and continued availability of off-site and alternate-ac power systems. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders and open condition reports for these systems. The inspectors walked down the switchyard to observe the material condition of equipment providing off-site power sources. The inspectors assessed corrective actions for identified degraded conditions and verified that the licensee had considered the degraded conditions in its risk evaluations and had established appropriate compensatory measures.
The inspectors verified that the licensees procedures included appropriate measures to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of the off-site and alternate-ac power systems.
These activities constituted one sample of summer readiness of off-site and alternate-ac power systems, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Readiness for Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
On September 30, 2016, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather procedures for ocean high swells and circulating water intake management during the storm season and evaluated the licensees implementation of these procedures. The inspectors verified that prior to onset of the storm season, the licensee had corrected weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous storm season related to auxiliary saltwater, component cooling water, and intake systems.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and design information to ensure the circulating water systems would remain functional when challenged by debris loading due to high ocean swells. The inspectors verified that operator actions described in the licensees procedures were adequate to maintain readiness of these systems. The inspectors walked down portions of these systems to verify the physical condition of the circulating water system.
These activities constituted one sample of readiness for seasonal adverse weather, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walk-Down
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems:
- July 7, 2016, Unit 2, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump 2-1
- August 9, 2016, Unit 2, motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump 2-2
- August 16, 2016, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator 1-2
- September 1, 2016, Unit 2, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump 2-1 The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted four partial system walk-down samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on five plant areas important to safety:
- July 6, 2016, Units 1 and 2, fire area RA-3; in the auxiliary building 73 foot elevation
- July 26, 2016, Unit 1, fire area RA-7; auxiliary building fire areas located on the 100 foot elevation
- August 11, 2016, Units 1 and 2, fire areas TB-7, 3-BB, and 3-H-1; turbine building, and auxiliary building areas from 64 foot elevation to 115 foot elevations
- August 18, 2016, Unit 2, fire areas 5A-1, 5A-2, and 5A-3; 480Vac switchgear rooms, auxiliary building 100 foot elevation
- August 18, 2016, Unit 2, fire areas 6A-1, 6A-2, and 6A-3; 120Vdc switchgear and battery rooms, auxiliary building 115 foot elevation For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted five quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee programs to verify heat exchanger performance and operability for the following heat exchangers and safety-related structure:
- emergency diesel generator 1-2 cooling system
- safety injection lube oil cooler 1-1
- intake structure The inspectors verified whether testing, inspection, maintenance, and chemistry control programs are adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. The inspectors verified that the periodic testing and monitoring methods, as outlined in commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, utilized proper industry heat exchanger guidance. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensees chemistry program ensured that biological fouling was properly controlled between tests. The inspectors reviewed previous maintenance records of the heat exchangers to verify that the licensees heat exchanger inspections adequately addressed structural integrity and cleanliness of their tubes. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constituted completion of three triennial heat sink inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On August 24, 2016, the inspectors observed simulator training for an operating crew.
The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators critique of their performance. The inspectors also assessed the modeling and performance of the simulator during the simulator training scenario.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
- September 11, 2016, Units 1 and 2, 230 kV switchyard outage
- September 30, 2016, Unit 2, 500 kV line hot wash In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators adherence to plant procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department policies.
These activities constituted completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Review of Requalification Examination Results
a. Inspection Scope
The licensed operator requalification program involves two training cycles that are conducted over a two-year period. In the first cycle, the annual cycle, the operators are administered an operating test consisting of job performance measures and simulator scenarios. In the second part of the training cycle, the biennial cycle, operators are administered an operating test and a comprehensive written examination. For this annual inspection requirement the licensee was in the first part of the training cycle.
The inspector reviewed the results of the operating tests for both units to satisfy the annual requirements.
On August 8, 2016, the licensee informed the inspector of the following results combining both units:
- 13 of 13 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test
- 73 of 73 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test
- 72 of 73 licensed operators passed the job performance measure portion of the operating test One individual senior reactor operator failed the job performance measure portion of the operating test, was remediated, retested, and passed the retake examination.
These activities constituted completion of one annual licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):
- August 15-18, 2016, inadequate disconnect connection on 230 kV switchyard circuit switcher 211-1, Notification 50864563
- September 16, 2016, Units 1 and 2, auxiliary saltwater vault rooms ventilation snorkel corrosion technical evaluation, Notification 50866092 The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of two maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk:
- July 25, 2016, 4 kV Vital Bus F, elevated risk during undervoltage relay calibration
- September 11, 2016, Units 1 and 2, elevated risk during 230 kV switchyard outage
- September 21, 2016, Units 1 and 2, elevated risk during 500 kV tower hot wash
- September 26, 2016, Unit 1, elevated risk during startup transformer 1-1 load tap changer control relay change-out The inspectors verified that these risk assessment were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments.
The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected SSCs.
These activities constituted completion of four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed seven operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming SSCs:
- July 12, 2016, operability determination of emergency diesel generator 1-1 jacket cooling water leak discovered during maintenance, Notification 50862106
- July 13, 2016, operability determination of emergency diesel generators 2-2 and 2-3 potential cap screw failures discovered during maintenance, Notification 50652094
- August 16-17, 2016, operability determination of Unit 1, train B, engineered safeguards feature slave relay K634 failure, Notification 50866135
- August 20, 2016, operability determination of Unit 2 main steam isolation bypass valve FCV-23 failure to stroke, Notification 50861913
- August 22, 2016, operability determination of emergency diesel generator 1-2, lube oil leak from cylinder 1L during routine surveillance test, Notification 50867914
- August 25-26, 2016, operability determination of Unit 1, control room air conditioner inadequate thermal overload/4 kV coordination, Notification 50868945
- September 9, 2016, Units 1 and 2, operability determination of operator work around conditions to compensate for degraded or non-conforming conditions The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC.
The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
These activities constituted completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, which included one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
On September 29, 2016, the inspectors reviewed a permanent modification to the Units 1 and 2 safety injection check valve test headers.
The inspectors reviewed the design and implementation of the modification. The inspectors verified that work activities involved in implementing the modification did not adversely impact operator actions that may be required in response to an emergency or other unplanned event. The inspectors verified that post-modification testing was adequate to establish the operability of the SSC as modified.
These activities constituted completion of one sample of permanent modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant SSCs:
- July 12, 2016, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator 1-1, post maintenance test, Work Order 64164765
- July 22, 2016, Unit 1, emergency diesel generator 1-2, post maintenance test, Work Order 64165082
- August 31, 2016, Unit 2, travelling screen 2-7 drive and chain assembly replacement, Work Order 60083123
- September 16, 2016, Unit 2, emergency diesel generator 2-1 starting air valve 2-21P-41 replacement, Work Order 60088870
- September 19, 2016, Unit 2, auxiliary salt water pump 2-1 stuffing box packing stud hole installation, Work Order 60093902
- September 28, 2016, Unit 1, auxiliary feedwater supply level control valve, LCV-115, positioner control replacement, Work Order 60093787 The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constituted completion of six post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed four risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their safety functions:
Reactor coolant system leak detection tests:
- September 23, 2016, Unit 1, reactor coolant system leak detection system test during period of an elevated leak rate, per procedure STP R-10C Other surveillance tests:
- July 21, 2016, Unit 2, solid state protection system testing, per procedure STP I-38-B
- September 13, 2016, Unit 1, protection set IV, rack 16 channel operational test, per procedure STP I-36-S4R16
- September 20, 2016, Unit 1, solid state protection system slave relay testing, per procedure STP M-16N The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constituted completion of four surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors observed two separate emergency preparedness drills to verify the adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance:
- On August 24, 2016, the inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the technical support center, and attended the post-drill critique.
- On September 21, 2016, the inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the technical support center, the emergency operations facility, and the simulator, and attended the post-drill critiques.
The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constituted completion of two emergency preparedness drill observation samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and operability of the radiation monitoring equipment used by the licensee to monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment. This evaluation included equipment used to monitor radiological conditions related to normal plant operations, anticipated operational occurrences, and conditions resulting from postulated accidents. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various portions of the plant, and reviewed licensee performance associated with radiation monitoring instrumentation, as described below:
- The inspectors performed walk downs and observations of selected plant radiation monitoring equipment and instrumentation, including portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small article monitors. The inspectors assessed material condition and operability, evaluated positioning of instruments relative to the radiation sources or areas they were intended to monitor, and verified performance of source checks and calibrations.
- The inspectors evaluated the calibration and testing program, including laboratory instrumentation, whole body counters, post-accident monitoring instrumentation, portal monitors, personnel contamination monitors, small article monitors, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, electronic dosimetry, air samplers, and continuous air monitors.
- The inspectors assessed problem identification and resolution for radiation monitoring instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed audits, self-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of the three required samples of radiation monitoring instrumentation, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.05.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS6 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether the licensee maintained gaseous and liquid effluent processing systems and properly mitigated, monitored, and evaluated radiological discharges with respect to public exposure. The inspectors verified that abnormal radioactive gaseous or liquid discharges and conditions, when effluent radiation monitors are out-of-service, were controlled in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified that the licensees quality control program ensured radioactive effluent sampling and analysis adequately quantified and evaluated discharges of radioactive materials. The inspectors verified the adequacy of public dose projections resulting from radioactive effluent discharges. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
- During walk downs and observations of selected portions of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent equipment, the inspectors evaluated routine processing and discharge of effluents, including sample collection and analysis.
The inspectors observed equipment configuration and flow paths of selected gaseous and liquid discharge system components, effluent monitoring systems, filtered ventilation system material condition, and significant changes to effluent release points.
- Calibration and testing program for process and effluent monitors, including National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) traceability of sources, primary and secondary calibration data, channel calibrations, set-point determination bases, and surveillance test results.
- Sampling and analysis controls used to ensure representative sampling and appropriate compensatory sampling. Reviews included results of the inter-laboratory comparison program,
- Instrumentation and equipment, including effluent flow measuring instruments, air cleaning systems, and post-accident effluent monitoring instruments.
- Dose calculations for effluent releases. The inspectors reviewed a selection of radioactive liquid and gaseous waste discharge permits and abnormal gaseous or liquid tank discharges, and verified the projected doses were accurate. The inspectors also reviewed 10 CFR Part 61 analyses and methods used to determine which isotopes were included in the source term. The inspectors reviewed land use census results, offsite dose calculation manual changes, and significant changes in reported dose values from previous years.
- Problem identification and resolution for radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment. The inspectors reviewed audits, self-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of the six required samples of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent treatment program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.06.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated whether the licensees radiological environmental monitoring program quantified the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validated the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program. The inspectors also verified that the licensee continued to implement the voluntary Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)/Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.
The inspectors reviewed or observed the following items:
- The inspectors observed selected air sampling and dosimeter monitoring stations, sampler station modifications, and the collection and preparation of environmental samples. The inspectors reviewed calibration and maintenance records for selected air samplers, composite water samplers, and environmental sample radiation measurement instrumentation, and inter-laboratory comparison program results. The inspectors reviewed selected events documented in the annual environmental monitoring report and significant changes made by the licensee to the offsite dose calculation manual as the result of changes to the land census. The inspectors evaluated the operability, calibration, and maintenance of meteorological instruments and assessed the meteorological dispersion and deposition factors. The inspectors verified the licensee had implemented a sampling and monitoring program sufficient to detect leakage from SSCs with credible mechanism for licensed material to reach ground water and reviewed changes to the licensees written program for identifying and controlling contaminated spills/leaks to groundwater.
- Groundwater protection initiative implementation, including assessment of groundwater monitoring results, identified leakage or spill events and entries made into 10 CFR 50.75(g) records, licensee evaluations of the extent of the contamination and the radiological source term, and reports of events associated with spills, leaks, and groundwater monitoring results.
- Problem identification and resolution for the radiological environmental monitoring program. The inspectors reviewed audits, self-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of the three required samples of radiological environmental monitoring program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.07.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS8 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage,
and Transportation (71124.08)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the licensees programs for processing, handling, storage, and transportation of radioactive material. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed the following items:
- Radioactive material storage, including waste storage areas including container labeling/marking and monitoring containers for deformation or signs of waste decomposition.
- Radioactive waste system, including walk-downs of the accessible portions of the radioactive waste processing systems and handling equipment. The inspectors also reviewed or observed changes made to the radioactive waste processing systems, methods for dewatering and waste stabilization, waste stream mixing methodology, and waste processing equipment that was not operational or abandoned in place.
- Waste characterization and classification, including radio-chemical sample analysis results for radioactive waste streams and use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides, and processes for waste classification including use of scaling factors and 10 CFR Part 61 analyses.
- Shipment preparation, including packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checking, driver instructing, and preparation of the disposal manifests.
- Shipping records for Low Specific Activity (LSA) I, II, III; Surface Contaminated Objects (SCO) I, II; Type A; or Type B radioactive material or radioactive waste shipments.
- Problem identification and resolution for radioactive solid waste processing and radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation. The inspectors reviewed audits, self-assessments, and corrective action program documents to verify problems were being identified and properly addressed for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of the six required samples of radioactive solid waste processing, and radioactive material handling, storage, and transportation program, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.08.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Heat Removal Systems (MS08)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 2015 through June 2016 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for heat removal systems, Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Residual Heat Removal Systems (MS09)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 2015 through June 2016 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for residual heat removal systems, Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Cooling Water Support Systems (MS10)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees mitigating system performance index data for the period of July 2015 through June 2016 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for cooling water support systems, Units 1 and 2, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
Routine Review
a. Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a follow-up review of a licensee identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of information, documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2015002 and 05000323/2015002 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15219A599). This non-cited violation, identified by the licensee, involved the deliberate falsification of fire protection transient combustible walkdown records, required to be performed by the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 and 2 Operating License, Conditions 2.C.(5) and 2.C.(4), respectively.
The inspectors reviewed fire protection records and licensee corrective action documents to ensure an adequate extent of condition evaluation was performed. The inspectors also reviewed transcripts of interviews conducted by the NRCs Office of Investigations.
b. Findings
The inspectors identified an additional example of the previous Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50.9, documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2015002 and 05000323/2015002. Title 10 CFR 50.9 requires, in part, that information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, between May 20 and June 10, 2014, fire protection records, required by License Condition 2.C.(5) for Unit 1 and 2.C.(4)for Unit 2, Fire Protection, were not complete and accurate in all material respects.
Specifically, the records of inspection of fire barrier and high energy line break (HELB)penetration seals completed using Procedure STP M-70A, Inspection of Fire Barrier and HELB Penetration Seals, Revision 8, were incomplete and inaccurate. These records were incomplete and inaccurate because a licensee employee falsified completion of fire penetration seal inspections in the cable spreading room on the 128 foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building.
The NRC determined this violation to be an additional example of the previously documented licensee identified, Severity Level IV, non-cited violation in NRC Inspection Report 05000275/2015002 and 05000323/2015002 since the violation occurred during the same time period as the original violation and the same licensee employee was responsible for deliberately falsifying the fire protection records.
The additional example of the violation was entered into the licensees correction action program as Notification 50865296. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee re-performed fire barrier and HELB penetration seals inspection in accordance with Procedure STP M-70A for seal inspections in the cable spreading room on the 128 foot elevation of the auxiliary building. No deficiencies were noted. (EA-16-104)
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On August 4, 2016, the inspectors conducted a technical debrief of the triennial inspection Procedure 71111.07, Heat Sink Performance inspection to T. Baldwin, Director of Site Services, and other members of the licensee staff.
On August 4, 2016, the inspectors discussed the final licensed operator requalification program annual cycle results via telephone with Mr. R. Fortier, Operations Examination Developer, and on August 8, 2016, formally exited with Mr. Fortier via e-mail.
On August 11, 2016, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results (Sections 2RS5, 2RS6, and 2RS7) to Mr. K. Johnston, Acting Station Director, and other members of the licensee staff.
On September 29, 2016, the inspector presented the radiation safety inspection results (Section 2RS8) to Mr. J. Welsch, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
On October 5, 2016, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Nimick, Senior Director, Nuclear Services, and other members of the licensee staff.
The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- J. Bailey, Supervisor, Systems Engineering
- T. Baldwin, Director, Nuclear Site Services
- D. Evans, Director, Security & Emergency Services
- R. Fortier, Operations Examination Developer
- P. Gerfen, Senior Director Plant Manager
- M. Ginn, Manager, Emergency Planning
- D. Gonzales, Supervisor, Inservice Inspection
- E. Halpin, Sr. Vice President, Chief Nuclear Officer Generation
- H. Hamzehee, Manager, Regulatory Services
- M. Hayes, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- A. Heffner, NRC Interface, Regulatory Services
- J. Hinds, Director, Quality Verification
- L. Hopson, Director Maintenance Services
- T. Irving, Manager, Radiation Protection
- K. Johnston, Director of Operations/ Acting Station Director
- J. Loya, Manager, Quality Verification
- M. McCoy, NRC Interface, Regulatory Services
- C. Miller, Systems Engineering
- J. Morris, Senior Advising Engineer
- C. Murry, Director Nuclear Work Management
- J. Nimick, Senior Director, Nuclear Services
- D. Overland, Assistant Director, Maintenance
- A. Peck, Director, Nuclear Engineering
- R. Rogers, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- A. Warwick, Supervisor, Emergency Planning
- J. Welsch, Site Vice President
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None