ML14069A344

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Issuance of Amendments to Incorporate the Schedule for Degraded Grid Voltage Modification
ML14069A344
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 05/13/2014
From: Shawn Williams
Plant Licensing Branch II
To: Pierce C
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
Williams S, NRR/DORL, 415-1009
References
TAC MF0468, TAC MF0469
Download: ML14069A344 (19)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

  • tlay. 13, . ?014 ..*.***

Mr. C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. 0. Box 1295 I Bin- 038 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO INCORPORATE THE SCHEDULE FOR DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE MODIFICATION (TAG NOS. MF0468 AND MF0469)

Dear Mr. Pierce:

By letter dated December 21, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated May 21, 2013, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposed to revise the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Facility Operating Licenses, to include a schedule to implement degraded voltage modifications. The modifications would include automatic actions and thus eliminate the need for manual actions in the event of a degraded grid voltage condition.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 194 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-2, Unit 1, and Amendment No. 190 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8, Unit 2.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

If you have any questions, please call me at 301-415-1009.

Sincerely, Shawn A. Williams, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 194 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 190 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 194 Renewed License No. NPF-2

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Renewed Facility Operating Licenses No. NPF-2, filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), dated December 21, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated May 21, 2013, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act}, and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and {ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

  • D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense. and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2:c.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-2, is hereby amended to read as follows: .

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 194, are hereby incorporated in the renewed facility operating license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

)

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 13, 2014

UNITED STATES 1

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY, INC.

ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-364 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. i 90 Renewed License No. NPF-8

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment to the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, Renewed Facility Operating Licenses No. NPF-8, filed by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (the licensee), dated December 21, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated May 21, 2013, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 2

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 190, are hereby incorporated in the renewed facility operating license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Robert J. Pascarelli, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 13 , 2 0 14

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 194 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 DOCKET NO. 50-348 AND ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 190 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the following pages of the Renewed Facility Operating License and Appendix "A" Technical Specifications (TSs) with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove License Page: NPF-2, page 4 NPF-2, page 4 TS Page: NPF-2, Appendix C, Page 2 NPF-2, Appendix C, Page 2 License Page: NPF-8, page 3 NPF-8, page 3 TS Page: NPF-8, Appendix C, Page 2 NPF-8, Appendix C, Page 2

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.194, are hereby incorporated in the renewed lieense.

Soutliern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications. J (3) Additional Conditions The matters specified in the following conditions shall be completed to the satisfaction of the Commission within the stated time periods following the issuance of the renewed license or within the operational restrictions indicated.

The removal of these conditions shall be made by an amendment to the renewed license supported by a favorable evaluation by the Commission.

a. Southern Nuclear shall not operate the reactor in Operational Modes 1 and 2 with less than three reactor coolant pumps in operation.
b. Deleted per Amendment 13
c. Deleted per Amendment 2
d. Deleted per Amendment 2
e. Deleted per Amendment 152 Deleted per Amendment 2
f. Deleted per Amendment 158
g. Southern Nuclear shall maintain a secondary water chemistry monitoring program to inhibit steam generator tube degradation.

This program shall include: f .

1) Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical parameters and control points for these parameters;
2) Identification of the procedures used to quantify parameters that are critical to control points; *
3) Identification of process sampling points;
4) A procedure for the recording and management of data; Farley - Unit 1 Renewed License No. NPF-2 Amendment No. 194

APPENDIX C ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 Amendment Condition Completion 1\lumber Additional Condition Date*

146 The schedule for performing new and revised Concurrent with Surveillance Requirements (SRs) shall be as the implementation of follows: the Improved Technical

1. For SRs that are new in this amendment the Specifications.

first performance is due at the end of the first surveillance interval that begins on the date of implementation of this amendment.

. 2. For SRs that existed prior to this amendment whose intervals of performance are being reduced, the first reduced surveillance interval begins upon completion of the first surveillance performed after implementation of this amendment.

3. For SRs that existed prior to this amendment that have modified acceptance criteria, the first performance is due at the end of the first surveillance interval that began on the date the surveillance was last performed prior to the implementation of this amendment.
4. For SRs that existed prior to this amendment whose intervals of performance are being extended, the first extended surveillance interval begins upon completion of the last surveillance performed prior to implementation of this amendment.

SNC shall implement the Degraded Voltage Unit 1 2018 Spring modifications to eliminate the manual actions in .Outage, U1 R28 lieu of automatic degraded voltage protection to assure adequate voltage to safety-related equipment during design basis events.

~2-Amendment No. 194

(2) Alabama Power Company, pursuant to Section 103 of the Act and 10 CFR Part 50, "Licensing of Production and Utilization Facflitles," to possess but not operate the facility at the designated location in Houston County, Alabama in accordance with the procedures and limitations set forth in this renewed license.

(3) Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Part 70, to receive, possess and use at any time special nuclear material as reactor fuel, in accordance with the limitations for storage and amounts required for reactor operation, as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report, as supplemented and amended; *

(4) Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required; (5) Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (6) Southern Nuclear, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30,40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.

C. This renewed license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level l

Southern Nuclear is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 2775 megawatts thermal.

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.1 9.0 . are hereby incorporated in the renewed license.

Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

Farley- Un~t 2 Renewed License No. NPF-8 Amendment No.190

  • APPENDIXC ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 Amendment Condition Completion Number Additional Condition Date 137 The schedule for performing new and revised Concurrent with the Surveillance Requirements (SRs) shall be as implementation of follows: the Improved I

Technical

1. For SRs that are new in this amendment Specifications.

I the first performance is due at the end of the first surveillance interval that begins on the date of implementation of this amendment.

2. For SRs that existed prior to this amendment whose intervals of performance are being reduced, the first reduced surveillance interval begins upon completion of the first surveillance performed after implementation of this amendment.

,3. For SRs that existed prior to this I amendment that have modified acceptance criteria, the first performance is due at the end of the first surveillance interval that began on the date the surveillance was last performed prior to the implementation of this amendment.

4. For SRs that existed prior to this amendment whose intervals of performance are being extended, the first extended surveillance interval begins upon completion of the last surveillance performed prior to implementation of this amendment.

'SNC shall implement the Degraded Voltage , Unit 2 2017 Fall modifications to eliminate the* manual actions in Outage, U2R25

lieu of automatic degraded voltage protection to

'assure adequate voltage to safety-related

equipment during design basis events.

Amendment No. 190

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 194 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-2 AND AMENDMENT NO. 190 TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-8 SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC.

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-348 AND 50-364

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated December 21, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML12356A470), as supplemented by letter dated May 21, 2013, (ADAMS Accession No. ML13144A081) Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposed to revise the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs},

NPF-2 and NPF-8, respectively, to include a schedule to implement degraded voltage modifications.

The proposed License Amendment Request (LAR) would revise the FOLs, Appendix C, to specify an implementation date of Spring 2018 outage for Unit 1 and Fall 2017 outage for Unit 2 for a redesign of the current degraded voltage scheme that would eliminate the use of manual actions in the event of a degraded grid voltage condition. The modifications will include automatic degraded voltage protection to ensure adequate voltage is available to safety-related loads so they remain operable during a degraded voltage condition.

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Degraded voltage protection assures adequate voltage to safety-related equipment during a degraded voltage condition. SNC's project plan includes proposed modifications to degraded voltage, possible replacement of the Loss of Offsite Power (LOSP) relays, and installation of new cabinets to house the relays.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff used the following regulatory requirements and guidance documents during its review of the LAR:

Enclosure 3

The FNP Updated Safety Analyses Report (USAR) Section 8.1.4, states that the offsite power system and the onsite power system conform to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 50 (1 0 CFR 50), General Design Criterion (GDC) 17 and 18.

GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems," requires, in part, that an onsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The onsite electric power supplies and the onsite electric distribution system shall have sufficient independence, redundancy, and testability to perform their safety functions assuming a single

. failure. In addition, this criterion requires provisions to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining supplies as a result of the loss of power from the unit, the transmission network, or the onsite electric power supplies.

GDC 18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems," requires that electric power systems important to safety be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing to demonstrate operability and functional performance.

The 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) "Protection Systems," that requires nuclear power plants with construction permits issued after January 1, 1971, but before May 13, 1999, to have protection systems that meet the requirements stated in either Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," or IEEE Standard 603-1991, "Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.32, "Criteria for Safety-Related Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Plants," describes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the Commission's regulations with regard to design, operation and testing of electric power systems in nuclear power plants.

Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) Part 50, "General Design Criteria (GDC)," Criterion 19--Control Room. "A control room shall be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents .... Equipment at appropriate locations outside the control room shall be provided (1) with a design capability for prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, including necessary instrumentation and controls to maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown, and (2) with a potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor through the use of suitable procedures."

10 CFR 50.120, "Training and qualification of nuclear power plant personnel" NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition": Chapter 13 addresses "Conduct of Operation", specific sub-chapters considered in this review were Chapters 13.2.1, "Reactor Operator Requalification Program; Reactor Operator Training", and 13.5.2.1, "Operating and Emergency Operating Procedures".

Chapter 18, provides review guidance for "Human Factors Engineering".

NUREG-1764,"Guidance for the Review of Changes to Human Actions"

GL 82-33, "Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737- Requirements for Emergency Response Capability" NUREG-0700, "Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines" Revision 2 NUREG-0711, "Human Factors Engineering Program Review Model," Revision 2 IN 97-78, "Crediting Operator Actions in Piace of Automatic Actions and Modifications of Operator Actions, Including Response Times".

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 Electrical The staff reviewed the licensee's proposed schedule for degraded voltage modifications to improve plant voltage profile during degraded grid conditions and interim measures to support plant operation until the completion of the modifications as described in Attachment 1 of the proposed LAR.

Staff Assessment As stated in the USAR, the offsite and onsite power systems at the FNP Units 1 and 2 are designed to comply with the requirements of GDCs 17 and 18, respectively. The onsite AC power system for FNP consists of five diesel generators (DGs) with 1-2A and 1C assigned to the load group train A, while DGs 1B, 2B, and 2C are assigned to the load group train B. DG 2C is dedicated to station blackout (SBO) events. The five DGs have two different ratings, DGs 1-2A, 1B, and 2B are rated at 4075 kilo Watt (kW) and DGs 1C and 2C are rated at 2850kW. Four of the DGs 1-2A, 1C, 1B, and 2B are dedicated for use during design basis events and DG 2C is dedicated as the alternate ac (AAC) power source for use during a SBO event. DG 1C with a rating of 2850kW does not have enough capacity to support accident loads required for safe shutdown of the plants. Thus this DG is selected to power the safety busses of the non-accident unit.

The FNP USAR states that the existing offsite power system consists of two physically independent sources of power for each unit. There are four startup auxiliary transformers, two for each unit, that are connected to the transmission system through four separate 230 kilo Volt (kV) oil-static cables. These transformers provide a source of power for startup, shutdown, and operational requirements for both units. Under normal operating conditions, these startup transformers supply power to 4160V buses A, B, C, D, and E for Unit 1 and D and E only for Unit 2 along with 4160V emergency buses F, G, H, J, K, and L. Busses K and L are considered extensions of busses F and G. The 4160V emergency buses F, H, and K of each unit and their associated emergency loads are designated as load group train A and the corresponding 4160V emergency buses G, J, and L of each unit and their associated emergency loads are designated as load group train B.

The FNP USAR states that the normal offsite power system operating voltage range for Units 1 and 2 is maintained within 101.6 percent to 104.5 percent of 230 kV. Analytical studies have been performed by FNP to demonstrate that this range can be maintained when at least one unit is on

line for system voltage support. A minimum voltage of 101.6 percent is necessary for satisfactory operation of some non-safety related loads when supplied from the offsite power system. The USAR further states that system voltages for worst case single contingencies are expected to remain at or above 100 percent of 230 kV. This includes the contingency that assumes one

) Farley unit is experiencing loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) and the other unit is tripped. The value of 100 percent assures acceptable terminal voltages, with margin, for safe shutdown equipment to perform its safety function. Therefore, continued unit operation is acceptable in the unlikely event that system voltage is found to be less than 101.6 percent, but above 100 percent.

Following a July 1976 event at Millstone involving a degraded voltage condition, the NRC staff developed generic positions on power systems for operating reactors. *Since degradation of the offsite power system can lead to or cause the failure of redundant Class 1E safety-related electrical equipment, the NRC required that licensees install degraded voltage protection as described in NRC letter dated June 2, 1977, "Statement of Staff Positions Relative to Emergency Power Systems for Operating Reactors" (ADAMS Legacy No. 4007002656). The letter states that "the voltage monitors shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits have been exceeded." The letter further states that "the voltage monitors shall be designed to satisfy the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." This automatic feature ensures the adequacy of the offsite power system and the onsite distribution system and ensures that the electrical system has sufficient capacity and capability to automatically start and operate all required safety loads.

Contrary to the June 2, 1977 letter, an NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) for FNP (ADAMS Legacy No. 951211 0043) accepted manual operator actions to compensate for degraded grid conditions. A Component Design Bases Inspection completed on December 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML113530575) identified the discrepancy between the June 2, 1977 letter and the current design of FNP Units 1 and 2.

The licensee stated that the LAR is a result of discussions between SNC and the NRC concerning degraded voltage protection scheme at the SNC Edwin I. Hatch plant since FNP has a similar issues. By letter dated September 29, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No; ML112730194) staff issued its final response to an SNC Backfit Appeal regarding the Edwin I. Hatch plant. Below is an excerpt:

Further, the staff concludes that the NRC change in position, from that in the 1995 SER, regarding the acceptability of relying on manual operator action to demonstrate compliance with the applicable provisions of GDC-17 and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2),

constitutes backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.1 09(a)(1 ). The backfitting action is necessary for compliance with GDC-17 and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) and is consistent with applicable guidance and practices in effect at the time that the NRC staff erroneously approved the use of manual actions responding to degraded grid voltage condition in 1995.

Although SNC has been in compliance with its 1995 license amendment approving SNC's degraded voltage protection system configuration, SNC also has been in violation of GDC-17 and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2) due to the NRC'S erroneous approval of the 1995

license amendment 1

By letter dated December 21, 2012, (ADAMS Accession Number ML12356A472), SNC, submitted a separate LAR for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 with a schedule for implementation of plant modifications to correct the identified deficiencies.

In response to the inspection findings at FNP, the licensee initiated corrective actions to modify the plant to bring it in compliance with the stated regulations. The implementation schedule SNC provided, by letter dated December 21, 2012, states that both Units will have automatic protection schemes installed by the spring 2018 refueling outage.

In view of the extended schedule for implementation of the modifications, by letter dated March 22, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13031A626), the NRC staff requested additional information with respect to consequences of degraded voltage conditions and compensatory )

actions that are in place for protection of safety significant equipment. By letter dated May 21, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13144A081 ), FNP provided responses to the staff's questions. The staff's RAis and FNP responses are described below.

1. With regard to a potential event of emergency safety features (ESF) actuation signal during degraded voltage conditions, the staff requested details on equipment that may (a) not have adequate voltage to operate, (b) trip due to automatic protection such as overload relay actuations, (c) trip but will require manual action to reset the protective device, and, (d) degrade and may not be able to perform its required function. The licensee's response states that based on the degraded voltage relay setting (3675V) that automc;J.tically separates the A and B train emergency buses from the grid, motors associated with Unit 2 'B' Train Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Radiation Monitor (RE0025B) and the Unit 1 and 2 (i.e. shared) 'B' Train Control Room Radiation Monitor (RE0035B) may not operate. These motors may trip and manual actions may be necessary to actuate the safety function of the associated equipment. The licensee response did not identify any time critical equipment required for mitigating the consequences of an event.
2. The NRC staff requested details on the grid contingencies that were evaluated to ensure the switchyard voltages remain above the voltages required for safe shutdown of the plant. In response, the licensee stated that over a five year period, the 230kV system voltage was within the desired range of 101 .6 to 104.5 percent of nominal during the vast majority of the time. In addition, the Southern Company Planning studies for current year and projected 5 years include analyses for bounding system load and generation with contingencies that include simulation of accident loads at one FNP unit and controlled shutdown of the other unit. The analyses also consider loss of the largest generating unit and loss of critical transmission elements. Transmission system operators associated with FNP also use a state estimator real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) tool to simulate system loading conditions, actual generation, and transmission line configuration 1 ADAMS Package Accession No. ML14104A894

data. The RTCA is updated every 10-20 minutes and if any next contingency condition could result in a post-contingency grid voltage less than the minimum voltage required by FNP, the plant operators are informed. The licensee has stated that the tools used for transmission system analyses, the RTCA, coupled with real time monitoring by plant operators has helped maintain the 230kV system voltage at or above the minimum requirements.

3. In response to a question about timely operator actions required for protection of safety related equipment, the licensee stated no operator actions are required since the overload relays would protect the only equipment (RE0025B and RE0035B) that may not have adequate voltages.
4. The NRC staff requested the licensee provide justification of the proposed schedule to complete the degraded grid voltage modifications, including explaining the need for implementing over two outages, rather than one outage. The licensee stated the proposed schedule is needed to support the time necessary to design the modifications, to develop the technical basis, to submit the amendment, and for NRC review and approval.

/ The licensee responded that implementing the modifications in one outage would require both safety related electrical 4kV buses to be removed from service and noted that limiting work to one train improves outage safety.

5. The NRC staff requested the licensee identify the compensatory actions and details of the consequences on accident analysis as a result of any delay in equipment restoration by the proposed manual actions. The compensatory actions are primarily manual operator actions contained in the licensees Degraded Grid procedures. The licensee stated that the consequences of a degraded grid condition concurrent with an accident condition at one unit requiring safe shut down of both units can be managed with minimal manual actions .. The equipment that may malfunction due to the inherent delay associated with manual actions is protected by overcurrent relays and can be restored in a timely manner.

The licensee did not identify any time critical mitigating components that may adversely impact an accident concurrent with degraded offsite power system.

6. The staff also reviewed the licensee's reasoning for the ability to monitor and predict offsite power system performance and the consequences of not automatically isolating plant safety busses during degraded voltage conditions below an acceptable level.

Conclusion Based on the licensee's responses in letter dated May 21, 2013, and summarized below that:

  • no time critical equipment is required to mitigate the consequences of an event; o no operator actions are required for protection of safety related equipment;
  • equipment that may malfunction due to the inherent delay associated with manual actions is protected by overcurrent relays and can be restored in a timely manner;
  • grid contingencies were evaluated to ensure the switchyard voltages remain above the voltages required for safe shutdown of the plant; *
  • the licensee has the ability to monitor and predict offsite power system performar:tce;
  • the proposed length of time requested to redesign the degraded voltage scheme and implement the degraded voltage plant modifications, The NRC staff finds the licensee's interim actions and evaluations acceptable to provide assurance of safety until the plant modifications are implemented to comply with the requirements of GDC 17 and 10 CFR 50.55a(h)(2). The proposed amendment to the license conditions in FNP FOL Appendix C is adequate to require the completion of the plant modification. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed license amendment acceptable.

3.2 Health Physics and Human Performance Description of Operator Action(s) and Assessed Safety Significance When bus voltage remains less than 3850 Volts (V) for greater,than one hour, Technical Specifications (TSs) 3.3.5, D, E, and F require operators to isolate the plant from the grid and

(

reduce power mode or shut down. In addition, operators are required to perform the following compensatory actions:

  • Manually reset the protective device for the 'B' Train Control Room Radiation Monitor (RE0035B) motor.
  • Manually reset the protective device for the 'B' Train Spent Fuel Pool V~ntilation Radiation Monitor (RE0025B) motor.

The two compensatory actions are considered "low risk" due to the fact that failure of these actions would not cause any serious consequence, i.e., even if no actions were taken, overload relays would protect RE0025B and RE0035B motors.

Human-System Interface Design Human-System Interface design, including the design of the Safety Parameter Display System will not be affected by the proposed LAR. Annunciators, alarms, controls, and displays are unchanged and operators are well-practiced in their use.

Procedure Design No changes are required to the Emergency Operating Procedures. Because the proposed interim actions are not new actions, the existing abnormal operating procedure (Procedure FNP-1/ 2-AOP-5.2) does not require any changes. The NRC staff finds the existing procedure acceptable based on its use during operator continuing training.

Training Program and Simulator Design Based on the fact that the proposed actions have a long history of successful implementation, and are included in operator continuing training, the NRC staff concludes that additional training is not necessary. Based on the above, the NRC staff finds that the training already provided is acceptable.

Conclusion Based on the statements provided by SNC, i.e., that appropriate administrative controls will be applied to procedu-res and training, and that both units have substantial in-house operating experience, the staff concludes that both the compensatory actions proposed in this LAR and the Technical Specification required actions are acceptable from the human performance point of view.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the State of Alabama official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined tha:t the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (78 FR 54289, September 3, 2013). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributors: G.S. Matharu, NRR/EEEB Roy Mathew, NRR/EEEB George Lapinsky, NRR/AHPB Date: May 13, 2014

May 13, 2014 Mr. C. R. Pierce Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

P. 0. Box 1295 I Bin - 038 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO INCORPORATE THE SCHEDULE FOR DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE MODIFICATION (TAC NOS. MF0468 AND MF0469)

Dear Mr. Pierce:

By letter dated December 21, 2012, as supplemented by letter dated May 21, 2013, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposed to revise the Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Facility Operating Licenses, to include a schedule to implement degraded voltage modifications. The modifications would include automatic actions and thus eliminate the need for manual actions in the event of a degraded grid voltage condition.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 194 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-2, Unit 1, and Amendment No. 190 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-8, Unit 2.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice.

If you have any questions, please call me at 301-415-1009.

Sincerely,

/RAJ Shawn A. Williams, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 11-1.

Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 194 to NPF-2
2. Amendment No. 190 to NPF-8
3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

Public LPL2-1 R/F RidsNrrDssStsb Resource RidsNrrPMSummer Resource RidsAcrs_AcnwMaiiCTR Resource RidsNrrLASFigueroa Resource RidsNrrDraApla Resource RidsNrrDoriDpr Resource RidsRgn2MaiiCenter Resource BGurjendra, NRR SWilliams, NRR RMathew, NRR Glapinsky, NRR ADAMS A ccess1on No.: ML14069A344 *8ly memo OFFICE LPL2-1/PM LPL2-1/LA DE/EPNB/BC* DRA/AHPB/BC OGC NAME SWilliams SFigueroa JZimmerman S.Weerakkody MYoung /NLO DATE 03/13/14 03/12/14 03/07/14 03/13/14 05/07/14 OFFICE LPL2-1/BC LPL2-1/PM NAME RPascarelli SWilliams DATE 05/12/14 05/13/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

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