IR 05000335/2002002

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IR 05000335-02-002, IR 05000389-02-002, on 06/29/02 for Florida Power & Light Company, St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2. Resident Integrated Inspection Report
ML022170545
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/2002
From: Wert L
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To: Stall J
Florida Power & Light Co
References
IR-02-002
Download: ML022170545 (24)
v • d • e


Text

uly 29, 2002

SUBJECT:

ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-335/02-02 AND 50-389/02-02

Dear Mr. Stall:

On, June 29, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on July 3, 2002, with Mr. R. Rose and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA Son Ninh for/

Leonard D. Wert, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos. DPR-67, NPF-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-335/02-02, 50-389/02-02 w/Attachment - Supplemental Inspection

REGION II==

Docket Nos: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos: DPR-67, NPF-16 Report No: 50-335/02-02, 50-389/02-02 Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company (FPL)

Facility: St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2 Location: 6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957 Dates: March 31 through June 29, 2002 Inspectors: T. Ross, Senior Resident Inspector D. Lanyi, Resident Inspector K. Bates, Project Engineer (Section 4OA3.1)

B. Crowley, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R12.2)

S. Rudisail, Project Engineer (Sections 1R01 and 1R06)

R. Reyes, Resident Inspector Turkey Point Approved by: Leonard Wert, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000335-02-02, IR 05000389-02-02 on 03/31-6/29/2002, Florida Power & Light Company, St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2. Resident Integrated Inspection Report.

This inspection was conducted by the resident inspectors and three region based inspectors.

No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings None B. Licensee Identified Violations None

Report Details Summary of Plant Status Both units operated at essentially full power for the entire report period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity (Reactor - R)

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

.1 Annual Baseline Inspection a. Inspection Scope During the week of June 24, the inspectors verified the licensee actions in accordance with administrative procedure ADM-04.01, Hurricane Season Preparation. This verification included physical walkdowns of the licensees property and discussions with appropriate licensee personnel. The inspectors verified that systems, structures, and components (SSCs) vulnerable to high winds and potential flooding were in a condition to remain operable during a hurricane or tropical storm within the vicinity of the site. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR, Chapter 3),

Individual Plant Examination of External Events, and Technical Specifications (TS).

Additionally, selected areas and equipment were walked down to verify that the licensee had adequately implemented the requirements of ADM-04.01. The inspectors also reviewed Administrative Procedure (AP) - 0005753, Severe Weather Preparations. The following areas were examined:

  • 1A and 1B Component Cooling Water (CCW) System
  • 2A and 2B CCW System b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Equipment Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted partial alignment verifications of the safety related systems listed below to review the operability of required redundant trains or backup systems while the other trains were inoperable or out of service. These inspections included reviews of plant lineup procedures, operating procedures, and piping and instrumentation drawings which were compared with observed equipment configurations

to identify any discrepancies that could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.

.2 Complete Equipment Walkdown a. Inspection Scope During the week of May 24, the inspectors completed a detailed alignment verification of the Unit 2 Intake Cooling Water (ICW) System using licensee procedures and applicable plant drawings. The inspectors also reviewed all outstanding modifications, open and recently closed work orders, all recent applicable Condition Reports (CRs) and any outstanding Temporary System Alterations (TSA) or Plant Manager Action Items (PMAIs) that could affect system alignment and operability. The inspectors specifically examined the following aspects:

  • System configuration, alignment and valve position
  • Component and system leakage
  • Electrical power availability
  • Labeling, lubrication, and cooling of major system components
  • Hangers and support installation and functionality
  • Affect of any auxiliary equipment or housekeeping on system performance Furthermore, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee was identifying and documenting equipment alignment problems at an appropriate threshold in their corrective action program.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Routine Inspections a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the fire areas and/or witnessed associated activities listed below to verify whether they conformed with AP-1800022, Fire Protection Plan.

The inspectors specifically examined any transient combustibles in the areas and any ongoing hot work or other potential ignition sources. The inspectors also assessed

whether the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment and features were in accordance with the Fire Protection Plan. Furthermore, the inspectors evaluated the use of any compensatory measures being performed per the licensees procedures and Fire Protection Plan.

  • Unit 1 Fire Alarm Panel Switchover
  • Unit 1 Mechanical and Piping Penetration Room
  • Unit 2 Fire Alarm Control Panel Failure
  • Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater/Steam Trestle Area
  • Unit 1 CCW Area
  • Unit 1 Safeguards Equipment Room
  • 1B Vital Switchgear Room
  • Unit 1 Main Control Room b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Annual Inspection On May 7, the inspectors observed a fire brigade drill in the 1B Switchgear Room to evaluate the readiness of the licensees personnel to prevent and fight fires in accordance with Administrative Procedure AP-1800023, Fire Fighting Strategies.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures a. Inspection Scope During the week of June 24, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR (Chapters 2 and 3),

and conducted walkdowns of risk significant areas for both units to verify that flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and the risk analysis assumptions. Plant areas containing risk significant systems or components which were susceptible to either internal or external flooding were examined to evaluate the condition of flood protection equipment. Off-Normal Procedure ONP-24.01, Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) Flooding, was reviewed to verify that operator actions to mitigate an internal flooding event could reasonably be used to achieve the desired conditions. The following areas were examined:

  • 1A and 1B CCW System
  • 2A and 2B CCW System

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance a. Inspection Scope On June 17 and 18, the inspectors observed the cleaning and return to service of the 2B CCW Heat Exchanger. The inspectors examined the before and after physical conditions of the heat exchanger, and independently verified the location and number of plugged tubes. The total number of plugged tubes was within analyzed limits. Upon restoration, the inspectors examined heat exchanger flows, pressures, and temperatures to determine whether they were within expected ranges per Operating Procedures OP 2-0310020, Component Cooling Water - Normal Operation and OP 2-00125A, Surveillance Data Sheets.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification a. Inspection Scope During the week of May 21, the inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator simulator training for actions taken during a loss of all feedwater flow. The inspectors specifically evaluated the following attributes related to operating crew performance:

  • Clarity and formality of communication
  • Ability to take timely action to safely control the unit
  • Prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms
  • Correct use and implementation of procedures, specifically the use of Annunciator Response Procedures and Emergency Operating Procedures
  • Control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions
  • Oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions, regulatory reporting requirements, and emergency plan actions and notifications
  • Effectiveness of the post training critique b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

.1 Routine Inspection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected a sample of equipment performance problems listed below, and assessed the effectiveness of licensee efforts in accordance with ADM-17.08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, The Maintenance Rule. Inspectors reviews focused on maintenance rule scoping, characterization of failed systems or components, risk significance, determination of a(1) and (a)(2) classifications, and the appropriateness of performance criteria for systems or components classified as (a)(2), or goals and corrective actions for those classified as (a)(1). The inspectors also evaluated whether equipment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and being dispositioned appropriately.

  • CR 02-0758 2B Main Feedwater Isolation Valve Failure and Extended Unavailability
  • CR 02-0602 2B Charging Pump Failure
  • CR 02-0704 1B High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump Breaker Failure
  • CR 02-0976 Unit 2 Safeguards Room Exhaust Fan (HVE-9A) Functional Failure Due To Damper D-15 Failure
  • CR 02-1236 Unit 2 Reactor Auxiliary Building Supply Fan (HVS-4B) Failures

& 02-1433 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Periodic Evaluation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees Maintenance Rule periodic assessment,

"St. Lucie Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment," dated August 31, 2001. The report was issued to satisfy paragraph (a)(3) of 10 CFR 50.65, and covered the period March 2000 through August 2001 for both units. The inspection was to determine the effectiveness of the assessment and if it was issued in accordance with the time requirement of the Maintenance Rule. It included evaluation of: balancing reliability and unavailability, (a)(1) activities, (a)(2) activities, and use of industry operating experience.

To verify compliance with 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors reviewed selected work history (work orders and condition reports) and maintenance rule activities covered by the assessment period for the following risk significant systems: CCW, HPSI, and AFW.

The following documents were reviewed:

  • Procedure ADM-17.08, Implementation of 10 CFR 50.65, The Maintenance Rule Implementation
  • System and Component Engineering Guideline SCEG-008, Guideline for Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessments
  • St. Lucie Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, dated August 31, 2001
  • Thirty CRs associated with equipment problems for the CCW, AFW and HPSI systems (see Attachment)
  • Procedure ADM-17.2, Duties and Responsibilities of System and Component Engineering
  • Maintenance Rule Quarterly System Status and Health Trend Reports, including selected ADM-17.08 Figure 2 Structure, System, or Component Performance Indicator Forms - 1st Quarter of 2002; 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Quarter of 2001; and, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Quarter of 2000
  • Selected Expert Panel Meeting Minutes from 2000-05 through 2001-16
  • Selected ADM-17.08 Figure 4 Attachments - Goal Setting and Monitoring b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the following emergent and planned maintenance tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of licensee scheduling, configuration control, and management of online risk in accordance applicable program procedures such as ADM 17.16, Implementation of the Configuration Risk Management Program, and ADM 10.01, Critical Maintenance Management [CMM]. The inspectors also examined whether appropriate contingencies were taken to reduce risk and minimize unavailability, and that emergent work activities were properly planned per ADM-10.03, Work Week Management. The inspectors confirmed that problems with maintenance, risk assessments and emergent work were identified and appropriately addressed as part of the corrective action program.

  • 2B CCW CMM Outage, with multiple B train equipment out of service (OOS)
  • 1B2 Safety Injection Tank Drain/Refill, with 1A Charging pump and 1B Boric Acid Makeup (BAM) Tank and Pump OOS
  • 2A CCW Pump and 2A Charging Pump OSS
  • 1A EDG Testing with the 1B BAM Tank and AFW Cross-tie OSS b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Nonroutine Plant Evolutions And Events a. Inspection Scope On May 21, the inspectors observed operator performance during the conduct of OP-3200051, Determination of At Power Moderator Temperature Coefficient, an infrequent evolution on Unit 2. This evolution required considerable manipulation of control element assemblies by operators to maintain reactivity during turbine/reactor power transients. The inspectors evaluated Operations personnel performance in accordance with applicable procedures, training, and management expectations. The inspectors also examined plant parameters, strip charts, and operator logs; interviewed responsible reactor engineers, and operators and their supervision; and evaluated operator actions against applicable TS.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the interim disposition and operability determinations associated with the following CRs to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the SSC remained available to perform its safety function with no unrecognized increase in risk. Reviews of the UFSAR, applicable supporting documents and procedures, and interviews of plant personnel were performed to assess the adequacy of the interim CR disposition.

  • CR 02-0995 Unit 2 AFAS Channel A Trip on Multiple Inputs
  • CR 02-0786 Unit 2 Automatic Test Insertion Sequence Lamp for the Containment Pressure Safety Injection Actuation System Bistable
  • CR 02-0789 2B Startup Transformer Breaker Failure
  • CR 02-0827 2C AFW Pump Governor Exceeded Preventive Maintenance Frequency
  • CR 02-0704 1B HPSI Pump Start Failure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds a. Inspection Scope Unit 1 and 2 Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) Suction Relief Valves The inspectors reviewed the operator workaround (OWA) associated with previous repetitive lifting of the Unit 1 and 2 SDCS suction relief valves. This inspection was

primarily focused on evaluating and verifying the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors met with the Assistant Operations Supervisor and responsible design engineer to discuss the scope of lessons learned, and the specific corrective actions that were developed and implemented. The inspectors also reviewed the applicable procedure changes to OSP-100, Schedule of Periodic Test, Checks, and Calibrations, and NOP-03.05, Shutdown Cooling, for both units; and verified by reviewing OSP records, that the monthly SDCS train venting evolutions were being accomplished. The inspectors witnessed portions of an Unit 1 SDCS venting activities, and walked down the entire venting procedure on Unit 1 with an experienced senior nuclear plant operator.

Cumulative Effects The inspectors performed a semi-annual evaluation of the potential cumulative effects of all outstanding OWAs. At the time of the inspection, there were only 12 total OWAs for both units; only four of these involved safety-related equipment. The inspectors evaluated all outstanding OWAs for their cumulative effects, and discussed these potential effects with control room supervision and operators. The inspectors reviewed the minutes for the last two quarterly OWA Team meetings that periodically review individual and cumulative OWA status and repair priority, and assess overall risk. The inspectors also reviewed the current OOS logs and walked down the control rooms to verify OWAs were being identified and properly entered into the corrective action program.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) procedures and witnessed testing activities after maintenance of selected risk significant SSCs listed below. The following aspects were specifically inspected - (1) Effect of testing on the plant recognized and addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) Testing consistent with maintenance performed; (3) Acceptance criteria demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents (e.g., TS, UFSAR, etc.);

(4) Range, accuracy and calibration of test equipment; (5) Step by step compliance with test procedures, and applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) Control of installed jumpers or lifted leads; (7) Removal of test equipment; and, (8) Restoration of SSCs to operable status. The inspectors also reviewed problems associated with PMTs to ensure that they were correctly identified and appropriately entered into the corrective action program.

  • WO 31023593 Unit 2 Control Room Emergency Cleanup System Alterations
  • WO 32004148 Unit 2 Damper D-15 Repair b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and witnessed the conduct of the surveillance tests listed below in accordance with applicable operating procedures (OP), Instrumentation and Control Maintenance Procedure (IMP), operations surveillance procedures (OSP), and Instrumentation and Control procedures (ICP). Applicable test data was reviewed to verify whether it met TS, UFSAR, and/or licensee procedure requirements. The inspectors also verified that the testing effectively demonstrated the systems were operationally ready, capable of performing their intended safety functions, and that identified problems were entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

  • OP 1-0700050 1A AFW Pump Inservice Test
  • ICP 1-1220050 Unit 1 Nuclear Instrument Linear Power Range Safety Channel A Calibration
  • OP 1-2200050A 1A EDG Monthly Surveillance Test b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed TSA 1-01-009, Failed Differential Pressure Transmitter for the Regenerative Heat Exchanger. The inspectors evaluated this temporary modification and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation to ensure that (1) the modification did not adversely affect operability or availability of other systems and (2) the installation was consistent with applicable modification documents and conducted with adequate configuration control.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Mitigating Systems Cornerstone a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the following performance indicators (PI)

reported to the NRC in accordance with the criteria specified in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and ADM-25.02, NRC Performance Indicators:

1) Unit 1 and 2 HPSI Unavailability 2) Reactor Coolant System Leakage 3) Reactor Coolant System Activity The inspectors reviewed the PI data of both Units 1 and 2 for the previous four quarters.

Applicable operator logs, condition reports, Maintenance Rule history, and Licensee Events Reports were reviewed to verify the reported PI data was complete and accurate. Furthermore, the inspectors interviewed the responsible system engineers, engineering supervision, and licensing engineer.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems a. Inspection Scope During the course of a routine Plant Status review, the inspector queried the licensee on their implementation of TS Section 6.5.1, Facility Review Group (FRG). As part of this inquiry the inspectors reviewed ADM-11.2, Conduct of FRG; several FRG Appointment letters approved by the Plant General Manager (PGM) in 2002; and several recent months worth of FRG meeting minutes beginning with December 2001. Additionally, the inspectors interviewed the FRG Chairman, at that time, and FRG Secretary.

b. Findings The inspectors were concerned with the lack of consistency at FRG meetings, and the licensees use of multiple members for each discipline in lieu of designating alternates.

To address the inspectors concerns, the FRG Chairman initiated CR 02-0730 and a procedure change request (PCR) for ADM 11.12. The resultant corrective actions included a revision to ADM-11.12 that clarified the definition and use of alternate members, and on May 1, 2002, the PGM issued a new FRG Appointment letter to ensure FRG membership and participation fully met the intent of TS requirements

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-389/2001-003-00 and 003-01: Steam Generator Tube That Exceeded Plugging Criteria Remained In-service On December 7, 2001, during steam generator eddy current testing while the plant was shut down for refueling, the licensee identified that an error had been made during the previous refueling eddy current testing that allowed a defect in a steam generator tube (Tube 118/64) to remain in service during Cycle 12 operation. This condition did not meet the surveillance requirements of TS 4.4.5.0 which stated that each steam generator shall be demonstrated operable by performance of a required augmented inservice inspection program. TS 3.4.5 stated that each steam generator shall be operable, and to restore inoperable steam generator(s) prior to increasing Tave above 200 degrees F. Contrary to TS, St. Lucie Unit 2 Tave exceeded 200 degrees F for cycle 12 without establishing the operability of the steam generators by surveillance requirements.

The tube was subsequently in-situ pressure tested to demonstrate the structural integrity of the tube. Because the tube passed the pressure test with no identified leakage or burs and the degraded steam generator tube was capable of performing its intended safety function during Cycle 12 operation, the inspectors concluded that this issue constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with Section IV of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause and corrective actions to ensure that they appeared reasonable and no findings of significance were identified. The licensee documented the finding in condition reports CR 01-3055 and CR 02-411. This LER is closed.

.2 (Closed) LER 50-335/2001-006-00: Degraded EDG Radiator Lead to Operation of Facility Prohibited by Technical Specifications The circumstances and safety implications associated with this LER were previously reviewed by the inspectors. A licensee identified noncited violation for inadequate corrective actions was documented in Section 4OA7 of inspection report 50-335/2001-04. Although this event was reported, additional root cause analysis by the licensee concluded there was no firm evidence to determine that the 1B EDG was inoperable until the time of discovery (i.e., radiator tube rupture). Consequently, this event was not reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for facility operation prohibited by TS. This LER is closed.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Rose and other members of licensee management on July 3, 2002. Interim exits by regional inspectors were held on June 13 and 27, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.

Supplemental Information PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Bird, Protection Services Manager R. Coleman, Instrumentation and Controls Department Supervisor R. De La Espriella, Site Quality Manager B. Dunn, Site Engineering Manager W. Guldemond, Operations Manager R. Hughes, Systems & Component Engineering Manager D. Jernigan, Site Vice President R. McCullers, Health Physics Supervisor R. McDaniel, Fire Protection Supervisor D. Mohre, Maintenance Rule Administrator T. Patterson, Operations Manager J. Porter, Operations Support Engineering Manager A. Pell, Training Manager R. Rose, Plant General Manager A. Scales, Operations Supervisor J. Voorhees, Corrective Action Group Supervisor and Acting Licensing Manager Other licensee employees contacted include office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation, and corporate personnel.

NRC B. Moroney, NRR Project Manager ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Closed LER 50-389/2001-003-00 Steam Generator Tube That Exceeded Plugging Criteria and 003-01 Remained In-service (Section 4OA3.1)

LER 50-335/2001-006-00 Degraded EDG Radiator Lead to Operation of Facility Prohibited by Technical Specifications (Section 4OA3.2)

Attachment

The following condition reports (CRs), associated with equipment problems for the Component Cooling Water, Auxiliary Feedwater and High Pressure Safety Injection systems, were specifically reviewed. This review included a sample of completed corrective actions, root cause determinations, and Maintenance Rule Program (a)(1) determinations, goal setting and status.

CR 99-2545 CR 99-2569 CR 00-0444 CR 00-0723 CR 00-0956 CR 00-1079 CR 00-1102 CR 00-1297 CR 00-1422 CR 00-1484 CR 00-1513 CR 00-1539 CR 00-1743 CR 00-1979 CR 01-0139 CR 01-0229 CR 01-0401 CR 01-0524 CR 01-0643 CR 01-0687 CR 01-0702 CR 01-0711 CR 01-0713 CR 01-1065 CR 01-1293 CR 01-1631 CR 01-2397 CR 01-2472 CR 01-2475 CR 01-2563 Attachment

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