IR 05000454/1985021

Insp Rept 50-454/85-21 on 850502-0603.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Perform Tech Spec Surveillances When Required

ML20127D228
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	06/17/1985
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127D202	List: IR 05000454/1985021 IR 05000502/2006003 ML20127D200 ML20127D237
References
50-454-85-21, NUDOCS 8506240164
Download: ML20127D228 (9)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0tHISSION

REGION III

Report No: 50-454/85021(DRP)

Docket No: 50-454 License No: NPF-37 Licensee: Comonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1 Inspection At: Byron Station, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: May 2-June 3, 1985 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J P. G. Brochman Approved By: L e Reactor Projectt-S ction 1A 6/n/cff Date~

Inspection Summary Inspection on May 2-June 3, 1985 (Report No. 50-454/85021(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of surveillance; maintenance; operational safety; ESF system walkdown; startup testing; LERs; event followup; response to Headquarters request; management meetings and other activities. The inspection consisted of 119 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors including 28 inspector-hours during off-shift Results: Of the nine areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified in seven areas; one item of noncompliance was identified in the remaining area (failure to perform Technical Specification Surveillances when required - Paragraph C.c). The noncompliance cites two instances of missed surveillances which were required by Technical Specifications; however, when the valve surveillance was performed the valves functioned properly, and when the required chemistry samples were taken and analyzed the results were satisfactory; therefore, these instances did not result in public health and safety problem .

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

1. T. Maiman, Manager of Projects

1. V. I. Schlosser, Project Manager

• 1. R. E. Querio, Station Superintendent

1. R. Pleniewicz, Assistant Superintendent, <

L. A. Sues, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance

• 1. R. 'C. Ward, Assistant Superintendent, Administration & Support Services W. Burkamper, QA Supervisor (Operations)

1. D. Elias, Project Engineer, Byron /Braidwood T. P. Joyce, Operating Engineer

• 1. D. E. St. Clair, Technical Staff Supervisor

• 1. A. J. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor J. J. Pausche, Regulatory Group Leader

• 1. W. D. Pirnat, Licensing Group Leader P. M. Anthony, Compliance Group

• A. D. Britton, QA Inspector

1. K. Yates, Byron On-Site Nuclear Safety

• 1. J. Langan, Byron Compliance Group

1. C. Bersak, Byron Compliance Group

• 1. J. R. VanLaere, Rad-Chem Supervisor C. Pankhurst, Foreman Electrician R. Groves, Technical Staff Primary F. Willich, Quality Assurance Inspector J. Bart1eman, Technical Staff Primary

• M. Snow, Compliance Group The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio # Denotes those present during the management meeting on May 28, 198 * Denotes those present during the exit interview on June 3,198 . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance testing on the Residual Heat Removal Pumps and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with technical specifications l and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the ;

individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . _ - - - _ ._- _

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a Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification !

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedure and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Diesel Generator Jacket Water Heater, Trouble Shooting and Repair Following completion of maintenance on the Diesel Generator Systems, the inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service properl No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features Walkdown (71707 & 71710)

The inspector observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs-and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of May. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertair d that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, turbine and rad-waste buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibration and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspector, by observation and direct interviews, verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla _ _ _ _-_ __ _ __- _ _ _ _ __

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The inspector observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of May, the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Residual Heat Removal System to verify operabilit These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in accordance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedure No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)

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The inspector witnessed performance of portions of the following startup test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, test data was properly recorded and performance of licensee personnel conducting the test demonstrated an understanding of assigned duties and responsibilitie .20.44 Computer Verification-Thermal Output 2.28.30c Pipe Vibration (Power Ascension 75% Power)

2.34.31 Calibration of Steam and Feedwater Flow 2.47.31 Power Coefficient Determination 2.63.31b Reactor Coolant System Flow Measurement (75% Power)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712 & 92700) (Closed) LERs (454/84012-01-LL; 454/84012-02-LL; 454/85004-LL; 454/85010-LL; 454/65037-LL; 454/85041-LL; 454/85043-LL; 454/85048-LL;454/85049-LL): An in-office review was conducted for the following LERs to determine that the reporting requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification LER N Title 454/84012-01 Non ESF Bus 243 Down Powered Resulting in De-Energizing Several Radiation Monitors 454/84012-02 Non ESF Bus 243 Down Powered Resulting in De-Energizing Several Radiation Monitors 454/85004 Loss of Component Cooling (CC) Surge Tank Level 454/85010 Power Failure on 0PR32J Resulting in 0A VC Actuation

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LER N Title 454/85037 Auto Start of 08 VC M/U Fan 454/85041 Control Room Ventilation Actuated to the Makeup Mode 454/85043 Fire Watches Prevented Due to Aux Building Access Restrictions 454/85048 Auto Start of 0A VC M/U Fan 454/85049 Auto Start of 0A VC M/U Fan No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified, (Closed) LERS (454/85006-LL; 454/85007-01-LL; 454/85008-LL; 454/85027-01-LL; 454/85028-LL; 454/85034-LL; 454/85046-LL; 454/85047-LL): Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records the following LERs were reviewed to determine that the reporting requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specification LER N Title 454/85006 Venting of Unit 1 Containment 454/85007-01 Control Room Ventilation Isolation 454/85008 1A Steam Generator Low Low Level 454/85027-01 Failure of MSIV to Close on MS Isolation Signal 454/85028 Reactor Trip During Turbine Valve Surveillance 454/85034 Manual Safety Injection 454/85046 Reactor Trip on Lo-Lo Steam Generator Level 454/E5047 Excessive Unidentified RCS Leakage No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie (llosed) LERs (454/85044-LL; 454/85045-LL):

of failure to perform Technical Specification surveillances whenThese LERs are exa require _ _ _ _ _ - .

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(1) LER 454/85044 described an event on April 3, 1985, while in Mode 1. Technical Specification Surveillance 4.6.3.1 requires that containment isolation valves be demonstrated operable by a cycling test and verification of isolation time. On April 1, 1985, maintenance personnel performed adjustments on the close limit switch on containment isolation valve IPR 06 Following this adjustment the valve was stroked to verify correct light indication but the isolation time surveillance was not performed. On April 3, 1985, licensee personnel discovered the oversight, LC0 was entered, and the surveillance was performe Failure to perform a Technical Specification Surveillance within the required time interval is an example of an item of noncompliance (454/85021-01a(DRP)).

(2) LER 454/85045 described an event on April 10, 1985, while in Mode 3. Technical Specification Surveillance 4.4.8 requires that reactor coolant be within the prescribed limits by performing the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.4- Following a reactor trip from 28% thermal power the reactor coolant sample, required by Table 4.4-4, step 4-b, should have been drawn and analyzed between two and six hours following the reactor trip. The required sample was however, not collected until 7.75 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> after the reactor tri The missed sample was discovered by a counting room technician reviewing surveillances, the shift engineer was notified, and a sample was collected and analyzed with no reactor coolant limits being exceede Failure to collect and analyze Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements reactor coolant sample within the Table 4.4-4, step 4-b time requirements is an example of an item of noncompliance (454/85021-01b(DRp)).

7. Response to Headquarters Requests (92704)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to Information Notice 83-75 in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/67, item 03.02a and forwarded this information to the regional office. Completion of this Temporary Instruction will be documented in a subsequent repor . Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) General The inspector performed onsite followup activities for events which occurred during May 198 This followup included reviews of operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, Licensee Event Reports (where available) and interviews with licensee personne For each event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, reviewed

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licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions and the nature of the event. Additionally, the inspector verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel error and had taken appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restart. Detafis of the events and licensee corrective actions developed through inspector followup are provided in Paragraphs b-e belo Reactor Trip From Turbine Trip Above P-7 on May 21,1985 (LER 454/85051)

While in Mode 1 with the reactor at 6% power licensed personnel were performing main turbine generator synchronization checks prior to synchronizing the main turbine generator to the grid. The procedure requires the main turbine to be tripped, relatched and governor control valves (GVs) repositioned from the turbine tripped position of 0% to the turbine run up position of 120%. Turbine speed control for this evolution is selected to the stop throttles valves pilots (TVs) with the GVs fully open. Normally following the turbine trip, the GVs are imediately returned to the fully open position and turbine speed restored to approximately 90% on TVs. At 1700 RPM turbine speed control is shifted from TVs to GVs for synchronization and turbine loadin Just prior to this event a high pressure steam leak had been discovered at the packing gland of a gage isolation valve on top of the high pressure steam chest on the main turbine. Senior licensed operators resolved to isolate the steam leak after the turbine trip and prior to reopening the GV The main turbine was tripped and the steam leak was isolated, the turbine was relatched however, the control room operator did not immediately reopen the GVs. During the time the GVs remained shut, for steam leak isolation, the main turbine continued to decrease speed to approximately 1300 RPM. Following the steam leak isolation, the control room operator reopened the GVs. The reference demand signal to the TVs called for 1680 RPM. The combination of the C-8 interlock, turbine trip (resets at 1700 RPM changeover) and the increased steam demand resulted in a P-13 signal (turbine at 10% power) causing a P-7 Reactor Trip (reactor power below 10%).

As corrective action the licensee has initiated a procedure change to match the reference demand speed with the actual turbine speed prior to reopening the governors. This action will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection after the LER is issued.

I Reactor Trip From Turbine Trip Above P-7 on May 22,1985 (LER 454/85052)

While in Mode 1 with the reactor at 50% power the reactor tripped from a turbine trip. The initiating event was determined to be a leak in a temporary cooling water hose to a temporary air compressor

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i set up for the Unit 2 structural integrity tes The ruptured cooling water hose sprayed water on the insulator for phase C of the Unit 2 Station Auxiliary Transformer (SAT). The SAT tripped on a fault. The fault was sensed in the switchyard and caused the Unit 1 Main Power Transformer (MPT) to trip. The Unit 1 MPT tripped on neutral over current sensors for the IW secondary winding The licensee's corrective action included trouble shooting the Unit 1 MPT failure and determined that relay PR17C sensing the IW secondary current was set at a turns ratio of approximately 50% of the required value. Following adjustment to PR17C, satisfactory analysis of transformer oil and gas samples, satisfactory meggering of the primary and secondary windings of the Unit 1 MPT und satisfactory verification of the Unit 1 MPT bus duct condition, the system has been restored to servic This event will be reviewed in a subsequent inspection after the LER is issue Reactor Trip Due to Low Lube Oil Reservoir on May 24, 1985 (LER 454/85054)

While in Mode 1 with reactor power at 50% the reactor tripped from a turbine tri The cause of the turbine trip was a loss of auto stop oil pressure which resulted from a loss of turbine lube oil reservoir leve Licensee personnel observed the turbine lube oil reservoir level low and decreasing and a licensee supervisor was dispatched to evaluate the situation. Upon arriving at the turbine lube oil reservoir, oil was observed spilling out from an upper hatch covering the oil return line strainer compartment. Licensee personnel attempted to remove the clogged strainers but were unable to lift either strainer from the cavity. Level continued to drop, the main turbine oil pump cavitated and at less than 45 psig auto stop oil pressure the turbine trippe Investigation by the licensee determined that removal and cleaning surveillances had, until approximately 21 days prior to this incident, been performed by vendor personnel. The vendor, having completed an evaluation and performance acceptance program turned the system over to the licensee for operational control. The cognizant licensee personnel apparently failed to incorporate this surveillance into the routine program and the strainers became clogged as the result of not being inspected and cleaned on a periodic basis for approximately 21 day The licensee's corrective actions include a surveillance on a shift-

, by-shift basis and the completion of an evaluation and performance acceptance progra Final review and closure of this issue will be accomplished in a subsequent inspection after the LER is issued.

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.. Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level (LER 454/85053)

While in Mode 1 with reactor power at 13% the reactor tripped on low-low steam generator level in steam generator IA when feedwater isolation valve IFW009A went shut. Licensee attempted to reduce steam load by reducing main turbine output but was unable to maintain steam generator level with IFWOO9A shu Licensee investigation determined that IFWOO9A went shut when the 120 VAC ESF bus 114 failed and de-energized water hammer prevention relay P516DX in coincidence with de-energized relay P515CX which was determined to have a blown fus Corrective action taken by the licensee included repair of the failed 120 VAC ESF bus 114 and replacement of the blown fuse to P515C Final review and closure of this incident will be accomplished in a subsequent inspection after the LER is issued. Management Meetings (30702)

On May 28, 1985, Messrs. R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, W. L. Forney, Chief, Reactor Projects Section IA, and the NRC resident inspector office staff met with licensee management and supervisory personnel denoted in Paragraph 1 of this report. These meetings were held to assess overall facility status, plant operations, and to discuss agenda items which had developed since issuance of the operating license. At this meeting the licensee presented a Conduct of Operations Improvement Program (COIP) in response to notification by Region III in the May 1, 1985, management meeting, of the potential category 3 rating in the SALP Functional Area of Operational Performanc The COIP is included as an enclosure to this report.

1 Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection on June 3, 1985. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar