IR 05000454/1985053

Insp Rept 50-454/85-53 on 851203-31.Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Approved Procedures Re Protection of Flange Faces of Disassembled Valves

ML20137J556
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	01/13/1986
From:	Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20137J537	List: IR 05000454/1985053 ML20137J532 ML20137J544
References
50-454-85-53, NUDOCS 8601230085
Download: ML20137J556 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 911SSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-454/85053(DRP)

Docket No. 50-454 License No. NPF-37 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1 Inspection at: Byron Station, Byron, IL Inspection Conducted: December 3-31, 1985 Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, J P. G. Brochman J. A. Malloy L

Approved By: W'

W. L. ' rney, C 'e ///.3/f6 Reactor Projects ection 1A Fate /

Inspection Summary Inspection on December 3-31, 1985 (Report No. 50-454/85053(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident inspectors of licensee action on previous inspection findings; operations summary; LERs; surveillance; maintenance; operational safety and ESF walkdown; cold weather preparation; Region III requests; reactor events; commissioner's tour; management meetings and other activities. The inspection consisted of 137 inspector-hours onsite by three NRC inspectors including 30 inspector-hours during off-shift Results: Of the eight areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in seven areas; in the remaining area one violation was identified:

(failure to follow approved procedures - Paragraph 7). This violation is of minor significance and had minimal potential to affect the public health and safet PDR ADOCK 05000454 O PM

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Commonwealth Edison Company

1. K. Graesser, Division Vice President, Nuclear Stations

1. R. Querio, Station Manager

• 1. R. Pleniewicz, Production Superintendent

• 1. R. Ward, Services Superintendent

• 1. W. Burkamper, Quality Assurance Supervisor (Operations)

• 1. A. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor

1. J. VanLaere, Rad-Chem Supervisor

1. E. Zittle, Compliance Staff

• A. Britton, Quality Assurance Inspector

• F. Hornbeak, Technical Staff Supervisor

• Schwartz, Assistant Superintendent (Maintenance)

• T. Joyce, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services

• J. Langan, Compliance Staff

• K. Yates, Nuclear Safety The inspector also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio # Denoted those present during the Management Meeting on December 18, 198 .

• Denotes those present during the Exit Interview on December 31, 198 . Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701 and 92702) (Closed) Violation (454/85030-01(DRP)): Operation of the RWST heating pump with RWST temperature greater than 52 F and operating the RWST heating pump with the high temperature trip defeated. The inspector reviewed the licensee's response and verified that the RWST heating pump operating procedure had been revised to allow the pump to be operated in manual and that appropriate precautions and limitations were provided. The inspector also reviewed the licensee's procedure to secure heating equipment when high ambient temperatures are present and verified that the RWST heating pump was included. The licensee has initiated action to modify the pump controller circuitry to provide a high temperature cutoff with the pump operated in manual and intends to install this modification prior to the end of the first refueling outage. Accomplishment of this task is being tracked by " Action Item Record" AIR 6-85-331 and caution cards have been placed on the control switch as an interim measure. Based on these actions the inspector has no further concern . .- _ .

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' (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/85030-02(DRP)): Questions on LER 454/85060, "RWST Overheating". -The inspector reviewed Revision 1 to this LER and verified that information was provided regarding ,

whether the error was cognitive, the safety consequences relating to the reactivity control system, corrective actions, and whether an approved procedure was followed. Based on this review the inspector a has no further questions on this LER. This LER is also discussed in

Paragraph 4.a of this repor (Closed) Unresolved Item (454/85039-03): Commonality between l Deviation Reports 6-1-85-267 and 6-1-85-290. The inspector reviewed l the licensee investigation of DVR 6-1-85-290 which stated that the i diesel airbox tripped on a spurious tachometer signal. A review of

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annunciator records indicated that the airbox had not tripped prior to the attempted start. The licensee tested the diesel after this occurrence and it was successfully started and the tachometer problem could not be repeated. There have been no previous incidents of spurious tachometer signals. Based on a review of this investigation the inspector has no further concern . Summary of Operations The unit remained shutdown for a planned maintenance outage till 0048 on December 18, 1985, when the unit was taken critical and tied to the grid at 0611 on the same day. The unit operated at power levels up to 92%

i until 1311 on December 27, 1985, when the reactor tripped on a turbine trip (see Paragraph 10.c). The unit was made critical at 2056 on the same day and was tied to the grid at 0521 on December 28, 1985 and returned to 92% powe . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712 and 92700) (Closed) LER (454/85060-LL): An in-office review was conducted for i the following LER to determine that the reporting requirements were I fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and i corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in l accordance with Technical Specification LER N Title ,

454/85060-01 RWST Temperature Above 100*F Due to Personnel Error (Closed) LER (454/85095-LL): Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records the following LER was reviewed to determine that the reporting-requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was '

accomplished and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

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LER N Title 454/85095 Inadvertent ESF Actuation of 1A Diesel Generator During Testing Due to Procedure Error No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the ESFAS Slave Relays K616 and K623 and Shutdown Bank Rod Insertion Limit and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved prncedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accompliehed using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;

! radiological controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls were implemented. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety l

related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

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Repair of Safety Injection Pump ISI01PB

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Troubleshooting of Control Rod Insertion Limit Low Alarms Following completion of maintenance on the Safety Injection Pump and the Control Rod Insertion Limit Low Alarms the inspector verified that these ,

systems had been returned to service properl i

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No violations or deviations were identifie . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of December. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the containment, auxiliary, turbine and radwaste buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibration and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc During a tour of the containment 412' elevation the inspectors observed that a normally removed, Radioactive Effluent (RE) drain system spoolpiece was lying on the floor with no protective actions taken to prevent damage to its flange faces. This normally removed spoolpiece is installed between valves 1SI8955B and 1RE9164B and is used during maintenance to drain the Safety Injection Accumulators to the Radioactive Effluent drain system. The inspectors did observe that blank flanges were installed on the RE piping where the spoolpiece would be installe CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V states, in part: " Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance to these instructions, procedures, or drawings. . ."

Byron Maintenance Procedure, BMP 3100-8, " Mechanical Closure Procedure" implements these requirements and Paragraph F.2.f requires that flange faces of disassembled mechanical joints are to be protecte The failure to protect the flange faces of the spool piece is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V (454/85053-01(DRP)).

Subsequent to the exit interview, the licensee took corrective actions to protect the spoolpiece and to stow it in an acceptable manne Additionally, a review was conducted to determine if similar problems existed with other pieces of plant equipment. No other discrepancies were identified. Based on these corrective actions the inspectors have l no further concerns in this area and this violation is considered close The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the month of December, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Combustible Gas Control and Boric Acid Reactivity Control Systems to l

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verify operabilit The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in accordance with the requirements established under technical specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedure . Cold Weather Preparations (71714)

The inspectors verified that systems susceptible to freezing had been inspected by the licensee. The inspectors reviewed surveillance 805-XFT-1, completed on December 7,1985, to verify that equipment susceptible to freezing had been inspected to ensure that heat tracing and space heaters circuits had been energized. The inspector reviewed work request 815234 which repaired MCC13422 Cubicle D2, " Condensate Storage Tank Heater" breaker and verified that the breaker had been tested prior to being placed in operatio During the review of surveillance procedure 805-XFT-1 the inspectors identified that some of the equipment had not been checked until December 7, contrary to the procedure which states, " equipment will be checked between September 15 and October 15 each year." The inspectors identified this concern to the licensee and the licensee responded that this concern had been identified in Quality Assurance Surveillance Report QA5-06-85-057. Review of the QA surveillance report by the inspectors revealed that QA had identified this concern and QA had concluded that due to difficulties in detecting heating changes in the warmer September through October months some equipment could not be checked until the colder weather months. The licensee has committed to revising the procedure prior to the next surveillanc Subsequent to the exit interview, further review of surveillance 805-XFT-1 identified that the annual security diesel surveillance had not been complete Discussions with mechanical maintenance personnel indicated that the security diesel surveillance had not yet been scheduled. Pending completion and review of the security diesel surveillance, this is considered an unresolved item (454/85053-02(DRP)).

9. Response to Region III Requests (92701)

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The inspectors followed up on a Region III request to review the ( licensee's administrative controls regarding the use of licensed reactor l operators as control room supervisors. The inspector reviewed Byron Administrative Procedures BAP 300-22, " Conduct of Operations" and BAP 300-23, " Operating Shift Turnover and Relief After Fuel Load" and verified that a supervisor with a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license will be present in the control room at all times and that the Station Control Room Supervisor can only be relieved by a licensed SRO. The inspector interviewed SR0s and Operating Department Managers to verify their understanding of BAP requirements. Based on these reviews the

! inspector has no further concerns on this matter.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702)

, General The inspector performed onsite followup activities for events which occurred during December 1985. This followup included reviews of operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, Licensee Event Reports (where available) and interviews with licensee personne For each event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the

functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, reviewed licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license conditions and the nature of the event. Additionally the inspector verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of equipment malfunctions and/or personnel error and had taken

appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restar Details of the events and licensee corrective actions developed through

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i inspector followup are provided in Paragraphs b through c belo ' Safety Injection (SI) on Low Steamline Pressure on December 12, 1985 l

While in Mode 5, a SI on Low Steamline Pressure occurred. A licensed operator was performing Byron Operating Surveillance 180S 3.1.1-20, " Train A Solid State Protection System (SSPS)

Bimonthly Surveillance". Step F.45 requires that the " INPUT ERROR INHIBIT" switch be placed in the " INHIBIT" position, however,-the

operator place the " MULTIPLEXER TEST" switch in the " INHIBIT"

! position. These switches are adjacent to each other on the SSPS logic panel. When the " MODE SELECTOR" switch was next placed in i "0PERATE" position before the manual block switches for " Low

. Steamline Pressure SI" were placed in the block position; the valid

! Low Steamline Pressure signal was not inhibited, as the logic memory I circuits had not yet been reset; consequently an SI occurre Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure rose approximately 125 psig to a peak pressure of 225 psig with the RCS in a solid water conditio All ESF equipment required to be operable in Mode 5 started as

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required and a Phase A containment isolation was initiated. The pressurizer PORVs did not ope The licensee's investigation of this event is still continuing and

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this event will be reviewed in a subsequent report after the LER is

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issue Reactor Trip on a Turbine Trip on December 27, 1985 While in Mode 1 with reactor power at 92% the reactor tripped on a turbine trip. The turbine tripped on Hi-Hi Level in the 1B steam

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generator (SG). The turbine trip caused a reactor trip since reactor power was greater than Permissive P-7 (10%). Instrument mechanics were performing maintenance on.1B SG steam flow channel 522 and placed it in test. This induced a perturbation in feedwater flow channel 520 which caused the Feedwater Regulating Valve (FRV)

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to go full ope SG level rose rapidly and even though the operator took manual control of the FRV and shut it he was unable to prevent the turbine trip on Hi-Hi SG leve All systems functioned normally following the tri The steam flow and feedwater flow provide two separate channels each into the FRV control circuit and each have a control switch to allow selection of the opposite channel when one channel is inoperabl The operator had selected to correct steam flow channel, but no instructions were provided regarding the feedwater flow channe The licensee's investigation of this event is still continuing and evaluations of the procedure's adequacy and control circuit design is still in progress and this event will be reviewed in a subsequent report when the LER is issue No violations or deviations were identifie . Commissioner's Tour on December 5,1985 NRC Commissioner James K. Asselstine and Technical Assistant John Austin accompanied by Region III Deputy Regional Administrator A. B. Davis, W. L. Forney, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 1A, and the Residant Inspector staff toured Byron Unit 1 and met with licensee station and corporate management. Licensee corporate overview, strengths, weaknesses, plant experience, and performance were discussed during the meetin . Management Meetings (30702)

On December 18, 1985, Messrs. R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1, L. R. Greger, Chief, Facilities Radiation Protection Section and the NRC resident inspector staff met with licensee management and supervisory personnel denoted in Paragraph 1 of this report. These meetings were held to assess overall facility status, plant operations and to discuss agenda items which had developed since issuance of the operating licens . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph . Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on December 31, 1985. The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the finding The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes as proprietar .

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