IR 05000423/1985054
| ML20134A353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/17/1985 |
| From: | Kamal Manoly, Paulitz F, Reynolds S, Schaeffer M, Wiggins J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20134A351 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-85-54, NUDOCS 8511040366 | |
| Download: ML20134A353 (60) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. REGION I Report N /85-54 Docket No. 50-423 License No. CppR-113 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford. Connecticut 06101 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear power Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: September 9-20, 1985 Inspectors: # M <@"[ ^ I/ M I K. A. Manoly, Lead Rea6 tor Engineer date bd_ ce kt t S. D. Reynolds, Jr., Lead Reactor Engineer loln[K date h ~rgbu W $ 0 e &A?/N
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t F. P. Paulitz, Reactor neer ~date W -2 . GL-s /" u /u/s <
M. J. Schaeffer, Reactor Engineer 'da t'e Other Accompanying Inspectors: R. M. Campbell, NDE Technician R. W. Winters, Reactor Engineer C. H. Woodard, Reactor Engineer
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Approved by: b = -
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. C Wiggin(u hief, Materials and date rocesses Section, DRS Ins Inspectionduringjptember 9-20,_1985_(Report 50;pection 423785;Summary:
N Areas Inspected:
c As-built inspection of piping, ducting, supports, electrical power, instrumentation and controls of selected safety-related systems by seven region-based inspectors and a supervisor. The inspection covered the following systems: charging, quench spray, recirculation spray, residual heat removal, control room emergency ventilation, control room pressurization and ac/dc power distribution. Additionally, the licensee's structural steel re-verification program and licensee actions on previous NRC inspection items were reviewe The inspection involved 375 man-hours.
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Results: No violations were identified. The inspectors determined that the
! systems selected were constructed substantially in conformance to their FSAR descriptions. However, two concerns were identified regarding the design capacity of the control room pressurization system air storage bottles and the quality of workmanship for their installatio PDH ADOCK 050004'23 G PDN
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! DETAILS ;
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' Scope and Purpose of the Inspection l This as-built team inspection was conducted by region-based reactor engineers to verify that selected systems were constructed substantially '
, in conformance to the description contained in the Final Safety Analysis [
i Report (FSAR) and in NRC's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and to verify ;
l that the systems selected met their functional requirements. The inspec-I tion included examination of fluid systems, HVAC systems, ac and de power <
systems and instrumentation and controls systems. In general, the systems '
. selected were determined based on the results of the Millstone 3, plant- !
l specific Probabilistic Safety Stud Extensive system walkdowns were per-l formed, during which independent dimensional measurements were made.
l Various project specifications, operating procedures and design calcula-tions were reviewed. Further, independent calculations and a field test
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L of instrumentation cable terminations were performe .0 Persons Contacted l Stone & Webster Engineering Company (SWCC) l
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- R. Rudis, EA Program Manager
- J. LaMarca, Electrical Engineer i
- Scanlon, Lead Engineer
- J. Knechting, Assistant Project Engineer W. Vos Senior Engineer FQC
- M. Matthews, Assistant Superintendent, FQC R. Ackley, Project Engineer J. Capozzoli, Jr., Supervisor, Construction Services G. Price.. Facilities Equipment Specialist R. Smith, N-S Program r G. Turner, Resident QC Manager ;
Northeast Nuclear _ Energy Company (NUSCO/NNEco)
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! *R. McGuinness, Licensing Supervisor l- *K Gray, Jr., CQA Staff Assistant
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- V. Papadopoli, CQA Supervisor !
i *P. Quinlan, Project Engineer l *L. Nadeau, Assistant Project Engineer -
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- M. Hess, Plant Engineer
- J. Crockett, MP3 Superintendent -
G. Olsen, I&C Cngineer !
5. Orefice, Project Engineer i B. Nichols, Project Engineer !
l M. Pearson, Operations Assistant j
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)
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- T. Rebelowski,' Senior Resident Inspector R. Summers, Project Engineer
- Denotes individuals present at exit meeting, i
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Thrcughout the course of the inspection other licensee and SWEC l engineers and technical personn61 were also contacted, i 3.0 Mechanical Systems t
l 2.1 General ,
I i L The scope of inspection in the area of mechanical systems covered piping, !
the heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) system and their respective supports. The specific systems which were inspected in the piping area included: I
- Quench Spray System f
I * Rectreulation Spray System :
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- Residual Heat Removal System
- Charging /High-Head Safety Injection System I l The inspection in the HVAC area focused on the Control Room Habitability l System ,
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l The objective of this inspection was to verify, by sampling review, that [
l the above systems were designed and fabricated such that they were capable ,
i of performing their intended functions as specified in the Final Safety !
l Analysis Report (FSAR) and whether the as-built configurations were in conformance with the FSAR, the SER and system specifications and .
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drawing !
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f 3.2 Piping Systems l The inspection in this area included piping components, equipment and i l supports. A review of the licensing documents was performed to insure i l that, for those selected systems, FSAR commitments were correctly translated into specification procedures and drawings. A cross review was also performed of the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&lD's)
l and support detail drawings to verify their consistency and agreement
! with the as-built installations. The verification was performed either by
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visual inspection or by independent measurements on accessible components ,
and support l i
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The criteria used for the assessment of piping components and supports were those described in the installation specifications for these compon-ents. The inspection attributes included verification of the following:
a linear and angular measurements related to piping runs and support locations;
- branch connection types and locations;
- fittings types and locations;
- . piping bend and elbow radii;
- support mark numbers, functions, and locations; e proper flow direction marks on valves;
- correct sequential location of valves on piping runs; and, e
proper identification and orientation of valves and Limitorque operator The inspection attributes for equipment (pumps, heat exchangers, etc.)
included verification of the following:
- manufacturer specification and purchase orders; e name plate data consistency with FSAR requirements and manufacturer's data (capacity, type, rated head, horse power);
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- heat exchanger component class (tube side and shell side).
The inspection attributes for pipe supports included verification of the following:
- as-butit configuration against support detail drawing (BZ series)
including dimensions of members;
- connection to the proper structure; e sizes and quality of welds on hangers, including welded attachments to piping;
- baseplate dimensions and location of structural attachment to baseplates;
- baseplate bolt (concrete expansion or Richmond insert) tightness, edge distance and the bolt mark identification for Hilti bolts;
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restraint bleed holes open and free of foreign material;
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- load setting of spring hangers;
- grouting of floor mounted baseplates and gap sizes for wall mounted plates; and, a
pipe routing and support locations such that movements of piping due to vibration, thermal expansion, etc., would not likely cause contact with other pipes, supports, equipment or component . Quench Spray System (QSS)
The QSS is one of two containment heat removal systems. Its function is to remove heat from the containment atmosphere to limit, reduce, and maintain at acceptably low levels the containment pressure and temperature following a LOCA or secondary system pipe ruptur The QSS consists of two redundant 100's capacity trains, each containing a quench spray pump, a chemical injection system, and riser pipes leading to two common 360' quench spray header Accessible segments of train "A" of the QSS were selected for purpose of as-built verification during this inspectio The walkdown of piping components and supports was conducted from the outlet of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), to the quench spray pump (3QSS*P3A) at eleva-tion 21'-6" in the Engineering Safety Features (ESF) building, to the con-tainment building where the riser piping leads to the spray header Detailed inspection was conducted on the accessible portions of the system which are located primarily in the ESF building and at the lower portion of the riser piping in the containment buildin At the time of the inspection, the entire segment of piping, from the containment penetration up to and including the spray headers, had a completed ASME N-5 data report certification. The piping segment in the ESF building was not yet certified. Detailed documentation of the piping
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components and supports inspected in this system is provided in Attachment 2A to this repor . Recirculation Sp g _ System (RSS)
The RSS is the second of the containment heat removal systems. It is
- designed to further enhance the depressurization of the containment and to maintain at subatmospheric pressure in the long term. The RSS consists of two parallel, redundant 100*4 capacity trains, each containing two containment recirculation pumps with dedicated heat exchangers, and rfser piping leading to two common 360' recirculation spray headers. The four redundant 50*4 capacity recirculation spray subsystems take suction
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from the containment sump; the recirculation spray water flows through i recirculation coolers where it is cooled by the service water. The rated flow for each recirculation pump is about 3000 gp >
l The status of the RSS piping completion was similar to that of the QS (
l At the time of the inspection, the ASME N-5 data report certification was complete for the entire piping portion inside the containment.
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l Accessible segments of train "B" of the RSS piping were selected for the
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purpose of as-built verification during this inspectio The walkdown ;
l was conducted from the ESF building penetration at elevation (-) 32'-3",
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where the system takes suction from the containment sump, to the recir-culation pump (P18), to the containment recirculation cooler (ElB) Inside the ESF building, and to the containment penetration where the riser piping leads to the spray header Detailed documentation of the piping components, equipment, and supports inspected in this system is provided in Attachment 28 to this repor . ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(RHS)
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! A walkdown verification of a piping segment in the RHS system inside the l ESF building, at elevation 21'-6", was conducted during this inspection.
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Though verification of piping installations in this system was not l
planned as part of the piping as-built verification; nevertheless, it was
, performed to provide a detailed verification of an accessible piping l segment (pLI No. C.1-RHS-4) which had a completed ASME N-5 certifica-tio Details of the piping components and supports verified during this walkdown are provided in Attachment 2C to this repor . Charging /High Head Safety Injection System This system is part of the ECCS and provides high pressure borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) through the charging pumps to the reactor coolant cold legs.
l The system utilizes redundant charging pumps discharging to a single Ifne to the cold legs. The walkdown included the accessible portions of the system from the RWST to the reactor coolant cold legs utilizing the applicable piping location isometric drawings (PLI's). Detailed inspec-
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tions were made of ten supports of various configurations. Charging pump l name plate data was verified to be in accordance with FSAR requirement Detailed documentation of the piping components, equipment and supports inspected is provided in Attachment 2D to this report.
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3. Findings
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The inspectors concluded that general workmanship in this area was good, dowever, as a result of the as-built verification of the piping systems, i the following specific findings were noted for which licensee corrective l actions were in progress at the end of the inspection:
f Some information was found to be either missing or incorrect on PLI ;
drawings for the QSS, RSS and RHS systems. The types of information l included orientation of piping restraints; reference angles between i piping and equipment; and piping bend radii. The inspector deter- t mined that this information had either been incorrectly recorded during licensee walkdowns or had yet to be added to the PLI's because 1 of in process E&DCR's. None of the missing information was deemed to have a significant effect on the adequacy of the piping installation ;
or on the licensee's stress reconciliation effor l Some of the measurements shown on PLI drawings differed slightly from I those measured by the as-built inspection team. Examples of these ,
differences are shown in Attachment 2. In no case did the dimensional discrepancies exceed the limits of the construction criteria for the systems. Further, though the difference in measure-
ments exceeded the accuracy limits for the PLI walkdown program :
(Specification M968), the inspector deemed the magnitude of devia- !
tions to have been inconsequential. The inspector noted that the i limits contained in M968 were very conservative with regard to the !
impact of dimensional tolerance deviations on actual piping stress I levels and support load , The flow direction marking was found to be missing on check valve No. 3QSS*V4. The licensee indicated that this observation was identified during SWEC's PLI walkdown of isometric drawing N CI-QSS-25. This item was also noted on QC inspection report IR-P5A03827 and was subsequently resolved by N&D 13271 which required a UT examination of the subject valve and the similar valvo on the "B" train. The examination revealed that both valves were installed in the correct orientation,
, The spectacle flango, 30SS*FLS-1A, was found to be installed with a blank in the direction of flow on tho QS$ piping inside the contain-ment. Upon notifying the Itcensoo of this findings, the spectacle flanges were added to the station system operating proceduro OP3309-1 and OP3309-2 for the Quench Spray Syste According to the proco-duro, the spectacle flanges would be part of the valvo line-up shoots for the QS$ system. The licenseo further indicated that an evalua-tion was being performed to identify other spectacle flanges in safety related piping systems for their ind usion in the applicable valve line-up procedure . !
No violations were identified in this area, t
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3.3 Control Room Habitability HVAC Systems 3. Scope The inspection of the control room habitability HVAC systems consisted of a walkdown examination of ducts, filters, valves, dampers, fans, supports and components in the control room normal and emergency HVAC systems and in the control room pressurization system. Accessible areas from the air inlet on the control building roof, through the inlet tornado dampers and the normal ventilation path to control room, and, throuch the emergency path through the filters to the control room were examined. The walkdown continued from the control room exhaust back through the tornado dampers to the roof. Inspection was made of the "A" train of redundant subsystems except where there was much greater accessibility to identical I
components in the "B" train.
l The inspector also verified that the outside air isolation valves were l manually operable from within the control room envelope, as described in I the FSAR and SER, in the event normal remote operation was not possible.
. Further, a review was made of the FSAR and SER to insure that licensing commit-I ments were properly translated into procedures, specifications and draw-ings. The P&l0 drawings were utilized for the walkdown along with specific SWEC duct support detail drawings for verification of as-butit configurations.
l 3. Inspection Critoria l The criteria utilized for inspection of the duct work, components, and supports was as described in the applicable installation specifications listed in Attachment 1. The specific inspection attributes for the walk-down included verificattun of the follnwing:
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huctinspection l * proper size and location of duct work;
- 1ack of excessive sheet metal deformation; l
l * acceptable weld profiles;
- proper location and installation of flow, radiation and chlorine sensing devices; l * completeness of bolted flange connections;
- access door location and operation; e cleanliness of insido duct surfaces; an * proper installation of turning vanes.
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Damper, valve and fan inspection
- acceptable weld profiles;
- ' marking and tagging;
location as required by EB drawings; and,
installation of supplemental hardware such as air operated valves solenoids, limit switches, et Supports
location and completeness for all supports; e
dimensions, weld sizes and weld profiles;
- proper marking and tagging; and,
- proper attachment to embedmont plate Air Tank _ Storage _ System Inspection a
location and orientation of air bottles and associated piping;
marking and tagging of system components;
- air tank pressure indication hardware;
- flow direction of valves; and
- installation details in the air tank support system
, 3. Findings 3.3. Findings Relative to Suppor_ts Ducts d tping and Compo s ts Tn tFo HVAC_syqcm e The inspectors concluded that general field workmanship was goo The walkdown inspection vortflod the adequacy of the system installation with a few minor observations.
l Visual Inspection showed that not all shaf t attachments (e.g. for limit ( switches, damper operator, weights, etc.) woro wolded to the shaft. The i inspector questioned the ability of the installation to withstand solsmic
' loads. Further rovtow cf detail drawings and discussions with the Itcon-soo showd that the non wolded soismic attachments had full-drilled holo /
. pin type connections which were sufficient to meet seismic requirements, i
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Debris from insulation was found on the turning vanes at the air condi-( tioner exhaust / control room inlet duct work. The licensee demonstrated l that an inspection for debris would be made prior to system startup.
- Poor weld quality of the intermittent GMAW-S structural fillet welds on '
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the outside of vendor supplied filter train "A" led the inspectors to i question the quality of the critical inside seal weld The licensee removed covers to permit visual inspection of these important seal weld The inspector visually examined the accessible seal welds and reviewed the l penetrant inspection records for these welds. These welds were subse-quently determined to be fully acceptabl .3. Finding Relative to the Control Room Pressurization System The inspector reviewed, in detail, the control room pressurization
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system. This system is designed to provide air to maintain a posi-l tive pressure in the control room during the first hour after the start of a loss of coolant accident. The air is stored in two l redundant trains of pressurized air bottles (4 in train A and 5 in l train B). The system, including the air bottle supports, was not l initially classified as Seismic Category 1, but was engineered i considering the effects of seismic load Review of the FSAR and the l Millstone 3 SER indicated that the licensee had subsequently com-mitted to reclassify the system as Seismic Category 1 and initiated l E&DCR T-R-02761 on January 16, 1985 to effect this system upgrade, i
The E&DCR addressed those tests and inspections necessary to cate-gorize the system as Seismic Category 1 and Quality Assurance Class The FSAR and SER indicated that the air bottles were designed to ASME Section VI!! requirements and the piping and valves to ANSI B31.1
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criteria; those facts were verified based on review of field markings and of drawing The 9 air storage bottles were found to be installed in 3 vertical groups of 3 eorizontally mounted bottles. The air storage bottle support system consisted of an encircling box-like modular mounting framo placed on an 8" x 6" L shaped structural angle acting as a cantilever at each end of each bottle. The L sections were attached i to steel embedment plates with 3/8" all around fillet welds. Each mounting frame was to be bolted to two welded studs on the embedmont plate and also to two locations on its cantilever bea P
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Review of SWEC Drawing 12179-EX-233A-1 for the air bottle support ,
system showed the SWEC design of the embedmont plate and attached !
cantilever support beams. The licensee stated that the fabrication l
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l of the embedment plates by Thames Valley Steel (TVS) was in accor-dance with SWEC specification C993 which covers embedments fabricated
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- to AWS D1.1 and QA Category I requirements. The encircling box
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mounting frame and the air storage bottles were purchased from Steel as commercial catalogue items with a requirement that the air bottles be "U" stamped as required by ASME SC VIII. The air storage I bottle details were shown on US Steel drawing 4X14773 which indicated I the required ASME Code data. The mounting frame details were shown on US Steel drawing 4MP1679 which indicated that the frame was designed and built to commercial standards and not specifically to l
ASME, AISC or AWS D1.1 requirement The material utilized for the frame was AISI 1020 hot rolled bar stock (which nominally meets the requirements of A36 for the thickness utilized). The licensee's
- approach to upgrading the pressurized air storage tank supports was to analyze the design of the mounting frame, the mounting frame attachment to angle supports, the angle support welds to embedment plates and the concrete embedments, invoking seismic and structural design code rules. This was shown in SWEC calculation number 35 The inspector reviewed this calculation and determined that it did, in fact, account for seismic loading condition In technical discussions with SWEC and the licensee, the inspector questioned what actions were being taken to insure that a source of i
oil free air would be provided to recharge air storage tanks and to l Insure that the air delivered to the control room during system actuation would be of sufficiently low dew point to preclude line freezing on depressurization of the tanks. The licensee indicated that the system operating procedure was being revised to cover the air quality and moisture content concern Visual inspection of the air storage tank system indicated that the flow arrows on manual valves V682, V683, and V690 in the charging line of the air storage tanks appeared opposite to the assumed flow direction. Further review and discussions with the licensee showed that the valves were purposely installed in this orientation to achieve greater leak tightness for the air storage tank syste Additionally, relating to the air bottle support system the inspector found that;
- portions of the angle to embedmont plate welds were not observ-able due to coverage of these welds by the mounting frames or (in three cases) by concrete
- two apparent undersized fillet wolds on the bolt ear to ring
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- bolts were missing at several bolted connections of the
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mounting frame to the support angle;
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washers were missing from a number of bolted connections; and,
the nut was missing from the top embedment plate stud to mounting frame attachment on tank BHVC-TKI Also, based on a review of E&DCR T-R-02761 the inspector noted that a 100% visual inspection of the air storage tank mounting frames and supports was required but had not yet been conducted. However, the acceptance criteria for this inspection appeared to require more definitio Because of the deficiencies identified in the air storage tank installation and because the licensee's QC inspection was not completed, the inspector could not verify that the installation would meet Seismic Category 1 requirements. Therefore, the acceptability of the syst2m installation is considered unresolved pending:
the licensee's correction of the installation deficiencies noted above;
the licensee's establishment of adequate acceptance criteria for the QC inspection of the installation; and,
- completion of the QC inspection (50-423/85-54-01).
3. Review of Design Calculations Regarding the Control Room Pressurization System-The inspector independently calculated the capacity of the control room pressurization system to determine if one of the two redundant subsystems
. could maintain the control room envelope at 1/8 in wg pressure for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in the face of a 230 cfm outleakage rate. The A train was selected for consideration because it has one less air bottle train than the other train. The details of this calculation are shown in Calculation No. I attached to this report. The calculation relied on data provided by: 1)
the Itcensee for control room envelope free volume (226612 ft 3) and for the volume of air in each of the nine tanks (23.27 ft3 ); 2) Section 6.4 of the SCR for the 230 cfm leakrate; and 3) Technical Specification 4.7. for the minimum control room air pressur The results of the calculation did not clearly demonstrate that the four air bottle train could perform the system's intended function; therefore full redundancy between the two subsystems was not shown. The inspector then requested and reviewed SWEC calculation P(B)-0990, revision D, which considered the capability of the redundant system train. The results of P(B)-0990 indicated that 4 air bottles were sufficient to handle 54 minutes of outleakage from the control roo The inspector discussed the results of the above calculations with repre-sentatives of SWEC and the license The inspector was informed by SWEC that the control room leak rate was currently projected to be on the
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order of 120 cfm (instead of 230 cfm) based on additional analysis. With this lower leak rate, the four bottle train would be expected to provide store than 60. minutes of service. Further, the licensee informed the inspector that the results of an actual leak rate measurement which would be performed during the preoperational test program would serve as the basis for judging the adequacy of the system desig ,
In response to the , orcerns the inspector identified in this area, the licensee also prov ded an internal memorandum dated September 19, 1985 which indicated that the 230 cfm leak rate specification was no longer applicable and had t>een removed from the FSAR prior to revision 13. The inspector commented that the NRC SER still mentioned the 230 cfm limit and that the licensee should clarify the need for a leak rate limit with NR The inspector informed the licensee that the adequacy of the design of the control room pressurization system would be considered unresolved pending:
(1) clarification by the licensee of the control room envelope's design leak rate requirement and agreement from NRR in this leak rate; (2) the licensee's completion of the control room envelope leak rate test; and, (3) the licensee's subsequent analysis of the actual leak rate to verify system operabilit (50-423/85-54-02)
4.0 Electrical Systems 4.1 General The objective of this phase of the inspection was to examine the instal-lation of selected portions of the Class IE ac and de power systems and to verify the as-built conditions agreed with FSAR and SER descriptions and project specification requirements. The portion of the ac system selected for inspection were those associated with the A quench spray and charging pump In the dc area, aspects of the batteries, battery chargers, inverters and the DC distribution system were examine .2 AC Power Systems 4. Cabling, Raceway and Separation The inspector conducted a field walkdown of the power feeds from 4160V
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emergency switchgear 3 ENS *SWG-A bus 34C to the motors of quench spray pump 3QSS*P3A and charging pump 3CHS*P3A. The inspector observed workmanship and the as-built conditions of the cable, conduit and cable trays, noting in particular the following attributes:
cable and raceway identification and proper color coding;
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raceway hardware properly installed;
- cable tie downs where appropriate; and a general conditions such as cleanlines The governing specification for acceptance in this area was the E350
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specificatio . Findings The inspector determined that the identification of cabling and trays was as required by the specificatio The color of the cable (orange) cor-responded to the correct channel designation. The inspector also noted appropriate tray grounding throughout the runs and verified that the cable routing agreed with the computer generated cable pull tickets. Several instances were noted of dirt and debris in open ventilated trays, however the inspector judged the cleanliness of the trays to be consistent with what would be expected during the current phase of construction. In fact, the inspector noted that, for those portions of the trays that had covers installed, the trays had been cleaned prior to the cover installatio While inspecting for electrical separation, the inspector noted instances along the run of cables where the required separation had not been met between IE and non-1E trays, (i.e. separations were found less than 3 feet horizontal and 5 feet vertical). In addition, the required barriers /-
wrapping were not yet installed. Similar conditions were also noted to exist between other trays in the same location In response to a concern for the above condition raised by the inspector, representatives of SWEC discussed its program for assuring proper electrical separation. The program was described in NEAM 128 and implemented through FCP 355. The program involved engineering walkdowns and drawing reviews, on a per building basis, which would identify separation problems and track the correction of these problems. The program was intended to resolve the separation problems prior to building turnover. The inspector concluded that the program appeared sound and capable of achieving its desired results. The inspector also noted a program status which indicated that the walkdowns and reviews in the areas in which the majority of the separation problems identified by the inspector (i.e., in the Control Building and cable tunnel) had not yet been complete To verify the implementation of the program, the inspector examined two additional areas where the separation program had been completed; the Emergency Diesel Generator building and the Intake Structure. Based on the results of the review of these areas, the inspector concluded that the program was being implemented satisfactorily.
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The inspector had no further question .
4. Calculation of Available Voltage at Selected Loads The inspector selected the train A quench spray pump and charging pump as representative safety loads to determine that the voltage available at these' motors would be adequate for motor starting and running under the worst case normal voltage conditions. In conducting this evaluation the inspector reviewed the following:
a cables type, size, length and impedance;
circuit breakers type, size and ratings;
pump motors size, starting and running currents; and, a
worst case voltage conditions at the emergency busse The inspector reviewed those Stone and Webster calculations and voltage profile studies which were used as a basis for the design and protective relay settings. The inspector found that the voltage profile study and changes made in equipment relay safety settings, and operating procedures provided assurance that cable size and rating and the voltage at the emergency switchboard 34C and 34D were sufficient to start and operate the quench spray and charging pumps under all rated and degraded voltage conditions projecte The inspector also conducted a walkdown of the 4160 volt power cable runs from the emergency switchboard to the train A quench spray and charging pumps to verify approximate cable length, pull routing, cable type and size, marking, support and spacin No discrepancies were discovere Using handbook cable impedance, the inspector performed the independent voltage calculation shown in Calculation 2 to determine the voltage drops from the emergency switchboards to the train A quench spray and charging pumps. Cable impedances, motor starting and running currents, and the calculated voltage drops were found to be consistent with the data used by SWEC in the desig No discrepancies were discovere .3 DC Power System The inspector verified that the direct current distribution system was in conformance with FSAR and SER commitments. Verification included checks to show that the Class IE dc power system installation had met the electrical independence and separation requirements between redundant trains and channel _ _ . _
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4. Batteries, Battery Chargers, Inverters, and DC Distribution The inspector examined the four Class IE batteries, 3BYS* BAT-1, 3BYS* CAT-2, 3BYS* BAT-3, and 3BYS* BAT-4, verifying that:
a they were procured in accordance with E259;
the battery interconnecting linkages were clean and free of corrosion, and the terminals were coated with no-oxide lubricant; a they were installed in locked rooms and the keys to the rooms were
. controlled in accordance with approved administrative procedures;
the rooms were well illuminated and the lighting system consisted of explosion proof fixtures;
the room ventilation system appeared to be operating properly;
the rooms were identified in accordance with the approved engineering drawings; and,
each room was monitored by an operable H detection modul The inspector found that each battery room was very clean. The lead-
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calcium cell jars were found to have been wiped down, making electrolyte level easily visible. The battery racks were mounted in accordance with approved engineering drawings. The racks were painted and the inspector could see no signs of pitting or corrosion from electrolyte spillage. In-addition, the inspector reviewed the weekly battery surveillance proce-dures and assured that the batteries were being maintained in accordance with these procedures. No violations were identified during the tour of the battery rooms and during the review of the surveillance procedure The inspector examined battery chargers 3BYS*CHGR-1, 3BYS*CHGR-2, 38YS*CHGR-3 and 3BYS*CHGR-4, including two spare chargers, 3BYS*CHGR-7 and 3BYS*CHGR-8. These battery chargers receive power from the correct 480 VAC motor control centers and maintain their batteries on a constant float charg Static inverters 3VBA*INV-1, 3VBA*INV-2, 3VBA*INV-3, and 3VBA*INV-4, were also observed and were found to be powered from 125 VDC distribution switchboards 3BYS*PNL-1, 38YS*PNL-2, 38YS*PNL-3 and 3BYS*PNL-4, as required, and to be supplying power to the correct four 120 VAC vital bus panel The battery chargers, static inverters and dc distribution switchboards were examined by the inspector for the following attributes:
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equipment procurement in accordance with specifications E260, E622 and E262;
proper color coding and identification;
proper functioning of the filtration and ventilation system;
proper calibration labels on ammeters, voltmeters and frequency meters;
sizing of circuit breakers, relays and switches in accordance with
. approved engineering drawings;
correct size and type _and proper termination of field run and vendor furnished power, control, and instrumentation cables;
evidence of leaky capacitors or dirty printed circuit boards; and, e
cable minimum bend radius not exceede Of the attributes inspected, the inspector found no problems. The workmanship was found to be of high quality and field run and vendor cables were found properly terminated in accordance with E350. Circuit breakers were sized in accordance with the. approved engineering drawing No violations were identifie . Battery Alarms and Instrumentation The inspector verified that the following alarms and indicating instruments would function in accordance with the description provided in section 8.3.2.2 of the SER:
Battery Float Charge (Ammeter);
Battery Circuit Output Current (Ammeter);
- DC Bus Voltage (Voltmeter); * Battery Discharge (Alarm;)
- OC Bus Overvoltage (Alarm;)
- Battery Disconnect Open (Alarm;)
Battery Charger Disconnect Open (Alarm;) and, j
Battery Charger Failure (Alarm).
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The inspector additionally verified that procedures were in place to direct the control room operators' response to annunciating alarm The alarm circuitry was verified by the inspector to be consistent with SWEC drawings EE-1BB-9, EE-1BC-8 and ESK-7V No violations were identifie . Cable Routing and Separation The inspector randomly selected a number of cables associated with the dc power distribution system and physically verified that the routing, color coding, cable size, type, separation, and routing were in accordance with the cable schedule EC-1, dated August 29, 198 The cables selected and the associated routing were:
Cable N From To 38YSNOL604 3BYS* BAT-1 3BYS* BAT-1 3BYSN0L602 3BYS* BAT-1 38YS*PNL-1 3BYSNOL610 3BYS*CHGR-1 3BYS*PNL-1 3BYSN0L611 38YS*CHGR-1 3BYS*PNL-1 3BYSN0L630 3BYS*PNL-1 3VBA*INV-1 The orange train cables listed above were found to be routed in accordance with the associated cable pull tickets and were found properly terminate Separation, both between the raceways and inside of equipment, was main-tained as stated in the FSA No violations were identifie .0 Instrumentation and Control 5.1 Scope Selected safety instrumentation and control systems were inspected for conformance with applicable regulatory requirements and with the licensee FSAR commitments. Visual observations of the installed systems were made to confirm that they were designed and installed in accordance with the licensee design and construction document The safety instrumentation and control systems selected for this inspection were as follows:
Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Loop 3RCS*PT445, Channel 1 (low pressure input to the two of four logic for safety injection);
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Containment Pressure Instrument Loop 3LMS*PT936, Channel 2 (high-1 input to the two of three' logic for safety injection);
Containment Pressure Instrument Loop 3LMS*PT937, Channel 1 (high-3 input to the two of four logic for containment depressurization and phase B isolation);
Radiation Detection Instrument Loop 3HVC*RIY16A and u (high radiation input to one of one logic for control building isolation)
Chlorine Detection Instrument Loop 3HVC-AIT17A and B (high chlorine input to one of one logic for control building isolation)
High Head Sa#ety Injection System controls including charging pump 3CHS*P3A, refueling water storage tank supply to charging pumps valve 3CHS*LCV1120, and charging to cold leg injection block valve 3SIH*MV 8801A;
Quench Spray System controls including Quench Spray Pump 3QSS*P3A Quench Spray Pump Isolation Valve 3QSS*MOV34A
Control Room Isolation control including control room ventilation i~n let air isolation valves 3HVC*A0V25 and 3HVC*A0V26, control room ventilation outlet air isolation valves 3HVC*A0V22 and 3HVC*A0V23, control room ventilation outlet air isolation valve 3HVC*A0V20 and 3HVC*A0V21 and 3HVC*AOD27A and 3HVC*A00278; and
Control Room Pressurization Controls including air storage tank i outlet valves 3HVC*S0V74A and 3HVC*S0V74 .2 Criteria l 5. Instruments and Impulse Lines L The visual inspection during the walkdown of the instrument and impulse lines included checks for the following technical requirements:
a tubing and fitting cleanliness was level "C" per Spec. 2280.000-691;
tubing and instrument identification was as required;
minimum slope, bend radius and separation requirements were maintained;
tubing defects and damage were within allowable levels;
instrument lines connected to process fluids equal to or greater than 200 degrees F had no bends within six inches of the source piping;
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instrument line isolation valves were located outside of tha shield wall; and
tubing restraints (guides) and anchors were located in accordance with the drawing dimensions and no tubing was located in walkway . Cable, Cable Termination and Raceway-The visual inspection during the walkdown of the cables, cable termina-tions and raceway included checks for the following technical require-ments:
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safety related instrument and control cables were identified at each terminating end and at each 15 feet;
.there-was no visual damage to the cables;
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the conductors were connected to the terminal point and terminal block as shown on the wiring diagram;
the conductor terminations were made in accordance with the~ licensee visual acceptance criteria;
the cables were supported in the vertical direction by Kellem's grips;
redundant cables and raceways were separated as specified in Appendix C of Specification for Electrical Installation E35 *
raceways were identified as required; and a
cables were-installed in their respective raceways in accordance with the cable schedule, 5. Controls The elementary diagrams and field installations were reviewed to check for the following technical requirements:
redundant components were properly identified;
the. functional requirements for the controls were achieved;
resetting of a protective system actuation, at the system level, would not cause a component action;
there was a system bypass status alarm;
the valve motor thermal overload protection was bypassed by an accident signal; and
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the valve torque switch was bypassed for ninety percent travel in the safe directio .3 Documentction
. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in Attachment In addition, the applicable outstanding Engineering and Design Change Reports were reviewe .4 Visual Inspection Details
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The inspector performed the walkdown of the following safety systems and components using the visual criteria listed in paragraph . Instrument Impulse Lines 5.4. Reactor Coolant Pressure SIS Input The reactor coolant pressurizer pressure instrument impulse line, 3RCS*LT459-H(ZR), was visually inspected from the pressurizer process piping to instrument 3RPS*PT445, 5.4. Containment Pressure SIS Input The containment pressure impulse line, 3LMS-750-27-Z(A-1), was visually inspected from inside the containment through penetration number 13 to the auxiliary building, then through Containment Isolation Valve, 3LMS*MOV40A(AO), to instrument 3LMS*PT937(AR).
5.4. Containment Pressure, Containment Depressurization and Containment Isolation Input The containment pressure impulse line, 3LMS*750-28-2(B-), was visually inspected from the containment through penetration number 68 to the auxiliary building, then through Containment Isolation Valve, 3LMS*MOV40B(BP), to instrument 3LMS*PT936(BW).
5. Instrument Cables 5.4. Reactor Coolant Pressure SIS Input The reactor coolant pressurizer pressure instrument cable, 3RCSIRX821, was visually inspected from instrument 3RPS*PT445 through the electrical raceways to the electrical penetration inside the containment. 'This circuit was continued by cable 3RCSIRX820 from the electrical penetration, outside the containment, through the electrical raceways to the Reactor Protection Cabinet, 3RPS*RAKSET 1, which is located outside of the control roo ,
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5.4. Containment Pressure SIS Input The containment pressure instrument cable, 3LMSRX800, was visually inspected from instrument 3LMS*PT937 through the electrical raceways to the Reactor Protection Cabinet 3RPS*RAKSET .4. Containment Pressure Containment Depressurization and Containment Isolation Input The containment pressure instrument cable, 3LMSWX800, was visually inspected from instrument 3LMS*PT936 through the electrical raceway to the Reactor Protection Cabinet, 3RPS*RAKSET 2, which is also located outside of the control roo . Control Cables 5.4. Charging Pump The charging pump 3CHS*P3A control cable, 3CES30C101, was visually inspected from the control and inoication devices that were located on the main control board, 3CES*MCB-MB3,.through the electrical raceways to termination cabinet, 3CES*TB-MB30, located outside of the control roo The circuit continued from the termination cabinet with control cable, 3CHSAOC350, through the electrical raceway to switchgear 3 ENS *SWG-A, located at the lower level of the control building. The circuit continued from the switchgear with control cable 3CHSAOC351, through the electrical raceways, to the Diesel Generator Sequence Panel, 3RPS*PNL -
ESCA, located next to the control roo .4. Charging Pump Suction Valve The charging pump suction valve 3CHS*LCV1120 control cable, 3CES30104, was visually inrpected from the control and indication devices that were located on main control board, 3CES*MCB-MB3, through the electrical raceways to termination cabinet 3CES*TB-MB30. The circuit continued from the termination cabinet with control cable 3CHSDOC004 through the electrical raceways to the transfer panel, 3CES*PNL TSA, located in the switchgear room. The circuit continued from the transfer panel with control cable, 3CHSDOC001, through the electrical raceways to the motor control center, 3EHS* MMC-3A1, which was also located in the switchgear roo .4. Safety Injection Valve The charging to cold leg injection block valve, 3SIH*MV 8801A, control cable, 3CES30C109, was visually inspected from the control and indication devices located on main control board 3CES*MCB-MB3 through the electrical raceways to termination cabinet 3CES*TB-MB30. The circuit continued from
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the termination cabinet with control cable 3SIHAOC031 through the raceway to motor control center 3EHS*MCC3A1. The circuit also continued from the termination cabinet with control cable 3SIHAOC032 through the electrical raceways to Solid State Protection Panel 3PRSRAK0TA1, located next to the control roo . Equipment The following equipment was visually inspected to confirm their location, identification, and to verify the. condition of instruments or control cables entering the electrical raceway system:
control building air storage tank outlet valves 3HVS*SOV74A&B; '
a control building radiation detectors 3HVC*RIY16A&B;
Control building chlorine detectors 3HVC-AIT17A&B; and,
Control room inlet air isolation valves 3HVC*A0V25&2 .5 Findings The inspector found that the state of workmanship in the area was generally good and that the instrumentation and control systems inspected conformed to the criteria of paragraph 5.2 with the following exceptions:
The pitch of the containment pressure impulse line 3LMS*PT937 starting three and one half inches from valve *V41(A-) to restraint guide EK-514004 H001, 6-G-2 was in the downward direction instead of in the upward directio * There were eleven auxiliary and time delay relays located in reactor protection system auxiliary panel, 3RPS*RAK0TXA, which were not identified and one time delay relay 69X-circuit 3HVCA24(-0), was identified incorrectl Similar conditions of devices not identified were also found to exist in panel 3RPS*RAXOTX In response to.these findings, the licensee has agreed to correct the slope of impulse line 3LMS*PT937 and to evaluate the need to more clearly identify all components in panels 3RPS*RAK0TXA & Regarding the Control Room HVAC system, the inspector found that the chlorine detection probes had not yet been inserted into the control room air inlet piping. However, the inspector verified that provisions had been made in the piping for these probes. The licensee stated that the reason these probes were not inserted, at this time, was the material used in the-probes was effective only for six weeks. These probes would be inserted prior to making the system operabl . - - _ _ _ . . _- - .. _ - - -.-. . .
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The inspector also confirmed that the licensee had revised the Control Building Isolation System control logic to appropriately address the
. concern, identified in the SER section 7.3.3.8, that the radiation, chlorine and containment pressure actuation inputs be capable of being reset individually without affecting the operability of the other actuation signal No violations were observed during this inspectio .6 Independent Verification At the request of the inspector, the licensee conducted a wire termination tensile strength test in accordance with the minimum requirements speci-fied in UL-486. The test was witnessed by the inspector. The conductor terminations tested were for wire sizes 16, 14, 12 and 10 AWG. The ter-minations were made by the licensee such that they met the established visual acceptance criteria. The terminations for each wire size included acceptable terminations with the rear crimp set at each of the three settings available on the crimping tool. Also, two terminations were made for each wire size which would have been rejected using the licensee's
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visual criteria; these also had the back crimp set at three different settings. A total of 36 wire terminations were thus teste Each termi-nation exceeded the UL-486 tensile strength requirement by at least twenty five percent without failure.
i 6.0 Civil / Structural 6.1 General The scope of inspection in the civil / structural area focused on the as-built load verification program for Category I structural steel. The licensee's program for this activity was undertaken to verify, through sampling inspection and evaluation, the adequacy of the original struc-tural steel design and its conformance to the FSAR requirements. This verification process, when completed, would also determine whether the estimated " envelope" loads used for the original design of Category I structural steel were sufficient to account for the final support loads resulting from piping, equipment, HVAC, conduit, cable trays, and other miscellaneous attachment The objective of the inspection of this activity was to provide an assess-ment of the licensee's program by evaluation of the following:
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a the adequacy of the licensee's sampling plan and its implementation in providing a representative sample of Category I structural steel framing with varied load characteristic *
theaccuracyofthedatatrandbittalscontainingbuildingsteel attachment locations and corresponding load *
the approach for the analysis and its conformance to the acceptance criteria establishe .
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To achieve this objective, the inspector performed a review of the various procedures utilized in providing the technical direction, the basis for the sampling inspection, the structural design criteria being implemented and the draft technical report provided after the completion of the first phase of evaluation. These procedures and criteria are identified in Attachment 1 to.this repor In. addition to the review of documents, the inspector met with cognizant licensee engineers and contractors who are involved in carrying out this program. Further, the inspector performed a sampling verification of the two major activities performed by the licensee's contractor The verification involved the walkdown of building steel samples and a review of the design evaluation effort provided for the qualification of these selected sample ~
6.2 Building Steel Verification Program The licensee program for carrying out this effort has been based on a sampling evaluation of Category I structural steel framings from five areas which were selected to provide a representative-sample with varied load characteristics. The evaluation included member and connection stresse The criteria utilized by the licensee for the sampling plan have been outlined in SWEC's procedure QAD-7.1 The sample consisted of a total of 243 beams and 25 columns from a total plant population of approximately 6700 category I structural steel members. The sample selection was intended to be biased towards the worst-case configurations, with regard to density of loading and type of attachments. The acceptance criteria for the sampling plan were related to the number of samples which fail the evaluation. If the results indicated six or more rejections, then the sample was considered as failin The. samples were selected from the following areas:
Engineered Safety Features Building (Elevation 21'-6");
Main Steam Valve Building (Elevation 61' - 10");
,* Engineered Safety Features Building (Elevation 24' - 6");
Control Building (Elevation 47' - 6"); and,
Containment Structure (Annulus Pipe Rack).
The collection of data required for performing the steel verification was the responsibility of SWE This involved the walkdown of the selected samples for the identification of support attachments to building steel and the development of current loads induced by these attachment _-
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The verification effort involved in this activity has been performed by Teledyne Engineering. The criteria used for performing the evaluation were provided in SWECs procedure for structural design in addition to the AISC manual of steel construction and the AISC procedure for torsional analysis of steel member Phase I of the sample evaluation was a screening operation based on the use of the following assumptions:
- use of a single envelope of worst case loads to account for all load combinations;
- use of an allowable stress of 1.0S for envelope loads including SSE;
- use of bounding analysis for groups of identical connections;
- use of absolute sum of resultant stresses from dynamic loads induced by attachment on a member;
- use of absolute sum of resultant stresses from attachment loads other than seismic; and,
- increase of the "significant loads" by a factor of 1.15 to account for minor loads from non-significant attachment The significant attachments included the following:
- large bore piping systems;
- cable tray supports;
- duct supports;
- eccentrically-loaded small bore piping and instrumentation supports; and
- direct attachments of non-ASME small bore, conduit and instrument lines;
- nonseismic standard supports for small bore piping; and, a conduit, small bore and instrumentation supports determined as non-significant by engineering judgemen Phase II of the evaluation was performed on those elements which did not pass the first level screening revie In this phase, the evaluation was based on more detailed analysis and less conservative assumption .
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The NRC inspection of this activity involved the selection.of two members from each of the five areas evaluated, which were determined to be stressed close to or at allowable stresses. A detailed walkdown inspec-tion was conducted to verify the data transmittals for those selected members. Finally, a review of the sample evaluation was performed to determine the adequacy of the attachment load magnitudes and application in addition to-the analysis performed. Documentation of the structural steel samples reviewed during the inspection is provided in attachment 2F-to this repor .3 Findings As a result of the inspector's review of the licensee's structural steel verification program, the following findings were identified and discussed with licensee and SWEC representatives: The licensee's data collection was based on information regarding attachment locations and loads transmitted to building steel which was current when the effort took place. The inspector identified attachments which were either not considered in the Teledyne analysis or were recently added to structural steel member These attach-ments were identified in the following locations:
the control building (Area 4), beam No. S20AG4;
the ESF building (Area 2), beam No. T7G2G1;
- the ESF building (Area 1), beam No. T2G20K;
- The ESF building (Area 1), beam No. T4G30 Though the evaluation of these members in the Teledyne report had utilized conservative assumptions, the evaluation had found these members to be stressed near or at the allowable limits. The inspector concluded that further verification would be required to insure the design adequacy of these and other members to which support attachments had been installed after the completion of data collection effort by SWE . SWEC's data transmittals reviewed by the inspector did not identify whether all support attachment loads were provided for transmittal to Teledyne or whether only those considered significant were pro-vide Further, the Teledyne draft report did not clearly identify the basis for qualification of all members evaluated (i.e. whether the qualification was based on consideration of all attachments loads or on the basis of significant attachments with the 15% increase to account for non-significant attachments)
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28 The detailed analysis performed by Teledyne for the evaluation of those control building beams (Area 4) selected by the inspector was not available for revie . The licensee's acceptance criteria for the sampling plan did not identify the statistical confidence level which would have been achieved based on the comparison of the number of samples considered failures to the total sample size and the total populatio Based on the above four items, acceptability of the licensee's structural steel verification program is considered unresolved pending the licensee's evaluation and NRC review (423/85-54-03).
7.0 Follow-up on Outstanding Inspection Findings 7.1 (Closed) Unresolved Item (423/83-17-01)
This item was concerned with the generic approach to the analysis of piping systems which was based on nominal values of piping fitting thickness. When this item was reviewed in inspection No. 50-423/85-32, the licensee had agreed to provide the results of the evaluation of the diesel generator exhaust piping for NRC revie The inspector reviewed the results of the licensee's evaluation of the piping syste Computer analyses were performed utilizing wall thicknesses of elbows of 1.5, 2.0 and 3.0 times the nominal value to quantify the effect of heavy wall fittings on the exhaust piping stresse The effect was determined to be insignificant due to the overall flexibility of the piping system and the presence of expansion joint Thus, the thermal loading did not have any noticeable effect on the qualification of this piping syste The licensee response was considered sufficient to close this unresolved ite .2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (423/84-04-10)
This item was related to the lack of specific evaluation for local stresses at web attachments of structural steel introduced by piping or conduit hanger supports. The inspector reviewed the generic procedure developed by SWEC for the evaluation of web attachments (Calculation N SE0-58.01 and S80.2). The development of the generic approach was based on finite element analysis utilizing various sizes and locations of attachments to webs of structural steel w-shapes. The evaluation addressed out-of planenormal attachment loads and bending moments acting on web .
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Implementation of the above procedure in the evaluation of support attachments to w-shapes started in October 1984. Since the evaluation of all category 1 piping and tubing supports had started in April 1984, in conjunction with the stress reconciliation effort, the inspector conducted a review of sample evaluation packages which were performed prior to the issuance of Calculations S80.1 and 80.2. Evaluation of local stresses induced by web attachments was based on engineering judgement. The methodology utilized in the evaluation was based on considering an effec-tive width of w-shape webs to b3 equal to the smaller of 25tw (tw = web thickness) or twice the attachment width. This methodology was considered conservative. The licensee's response was considered adequate to close this unresolved ite .0 Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is necessary to determine whether they constitute violations or deviations or are acceptable. Unresolved items are discussed in paragraphs 3.3.3, 3. and .0 Attachments and Calculations Attachment No. 1 is a list of specific documents reviewe Attachment No. 2 is a list of specific piping components and supports examined during the course of this inspectio Calculation No. 1 is an independent NRC calculation to determine if the control room air pressurization system capacity was in accordance with FSAR, SER and Technical Specification requirement Calculation No. 2 is an NRC independent calculation to determine that the voltage drops between the power sources and the quench spray and charging-pumps were within allowable limit . Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph I at the conclusion of the inspection. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection and the need for licensee attention to address those issues remaining unresolved. No written material was given to the licensee during the course of this inspectic ._ .. . - - _ - . - . - . .-. - --. - . - - - - - . _ - - . - -
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High Pressure Safety Injection System
Document Number Type
Field Fabrication & 2280-000-968 Specification Erection of Power Piping Chemical and Volume Control 12179-FSK-26-2J Flow Diagrams High Pressure Safety Injection 12179-FSK-27-2A Flow Diagrams t Low Pressure Safety Injection 12179-EM-112C-3 Piping Diagram
. High Pressure Safety Injeciton 12179-EM-113A-3 Piping Diagram Safety Injection System 12179-CI-SIL-152A Piping Isometrics
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12179-CI-CHS-504 i
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12179-CI-CHS-30 Safety Injection System 12179-CI-CHS-33 Piping Isomecrics
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i 12179-CI-CHS-507
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4 12179-CI-SIH-4
- Safety Injection System 12179-CI-SIH-3 Piping Isometrics
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12179-CI-SIH-501 Safety Injection System 12179-CP-407023 Piping Isometrics
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12179-CI-SIH-141A
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12179-CP-407310 Safety Injection System 12179-CP-408046 Piping Isometrics
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BZ-748-135-1 Piping Details
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BZ-748-133-2
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Safety Injection System BZ-748-11-5 "
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BZ-748-127-4
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BZ-748-155-2 Piping Details
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BZ-748-153-4 Safety Injection System BZ-74B-10-4 _ "
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! BZ-74B-147-2
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l BZ-748-184-5 Piping Details Safety Injection System BZ-748-13-2 "
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Documents Reviewed Quench Spray System Document Number Type Quench Spray & Hydrogen 12179-EM-115A-3 P&IC'
Recombiner Drilled in Expansion Type 2199.142-924 Specification Concrete Anchors Field Fabrication & 2280.000 - 968 Specification Erection of Piping Quench Spray Pumps 2214.602 - 040 Specification Quench Spray System
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12179-CI-QSS-1 Piping Isometrics
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12179-CI-QSS-6
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12179-CI-QSS-2 Quench Spray System 12179-CI-QSS-25 Piping Isometrics
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BZ-798-40-3 Piping Details
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BZ-798-42
Quench Spray System BZ-798-42-2 Piping Details
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BZ-798-225-4
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BZ-79B-41 Quench Spray System BZ-798-39-3 Piping Details
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BZ-79A-43-1
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BZ-798-39 Quench Spray System BZ-79B-69-3 Piping Details BZ-79B-37-4 Control Drawing ~12179.CI-KHS-4 Piping Isometric
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Documents Reviewed Containment Recirculation Spray System Document Number Type Field Fabrication & Erection of 2280.000.968 Specification Power Piping:
Containment Recirculation Pumps 2214.802-044 Specification Containment Recirculation Coclers 2214.803-020 Specification Control Drawings 12179-CI-RSS-16T Piping Isometrics
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12179-CI-RSS-21
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12179-CI-RSS-4 Control Drawings 12179-RSS-502B Piping Details
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BZ-79B-112-2
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Documents Reviewed Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Document Number Type HVAC System 2170-430-M565 R-8 Specification HVAC/ DUCT Fabrication 12179-132C Specification Emorgency Ventilation 12179-EB-39C-13 P&ID System
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12179-EB-390-15
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12179-EM-1518-3 Emergency Ventilation 12179-EM-151A-3 P&ID System
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12179-EB-392-11
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12179-EB-39M-9 Emergency Ventilation 12179-EB-39J-9 P&ID
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12179-FSK-22-9A Flow Diagrams
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12179-FSK-22-9B-R-11 Emergency Ventilation 12179-FSK-22-9G-R-7 Flow Diagrams Control Room Emergency P(B) - 0990 Rev. O Calculation Pressurization System Unit 3 Control Room UR (B) 262 - 2 Calculation Doses Due to Inleakage of Containment & ESF Leakage fror Unit 3 LOCA Toxic Chemical ENVR-W264 Rev. O Calculation Analysis; Control Room Pressurization:
Chlorine Support for Air Storage #357 Calculation Bottles 3 HVC TKIA thru 1H, IJ
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Documents Reviewed AC & DC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Document Number Type Voltage Profile Calculation #132 E Calculation Switchgear Circuit Breaker GEH-1802 GE Procedure M-26 Control Storage Batteries E259 Rev. 1 Specification Static Battery Chargers E260 Rev. 2 Specification DC Distribution Panelboards E262 Rev. 1 Specification
& Panels Static switches, Inverters E622 Rev. 1 Specification
& Regulating Transformers -
Single phase Station Battery Surveillance SP 3712 N Draft B Specification Testing Digital Isolator Circuits 12179-ESK-7VZ Drawing 0&P One Line Diagram for 125 VDC/ 12179-EE-1BA-10 Rev. 10 Drawing 125 VAC Distrib. System One line Diagram for Battery 12179-EF-1BB-9 Rev. 9 Drawing 301A-1/301A-2 One line Diagram for Battery 12179-EE-1BC-8 Rev. 8 Drawing 3018-1/301B-2 SWEC Separation Project NEAM 128 Rev. 2 Procedure Procedure SWEC Field Const. Procedure #355 Rev. 1 Procedure Physical Separation for Elec Cable & Raceway
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l Documents Reviewed Instrumentation and Controls Document Number Type Electrical Installation 2400.003-350 Rev. 8 Specification Instrumentation 2472.800-943 Rev. 10 "
Installation Piping, and Tubing Aux Relay Rack Panel 3 RPS Rakotax 12179-EE-25CL-2 Rev. 2 Front View 12179-ESK-4YA-1 SH1 R3 Outline 12179-ESK-4YA-2 SH2 R3 Outline 12179-ESK-4YA-3 SH3 R7 Material List 12179-ESK-4YA-4 SH4 R7 Material List 12179-ESK-4YA-5 SHS R2 Material List Loop Diagram 3 RCS-445 12179-FSK 25-1E Pressurizer Pressure Rev. 9 Loop Diagram 3 LMS-937 12179-FSK-33-1 Containment Pressure Rev. 6 Loop Diagram 3 LMS-936 12179-FSK-33-1 Containment Pressure Rev. 1 Instr. Loop Calibration 3 RCS-455A Rev. 1 Pressurizer Pressure Report (LCR) 3 LMS-937 Rev. 1 Containment Pressure 3 LMS-936 Rev. 1 Containment Pressure Pressurizer Pressure 3 RCS LT459(ZR) Isometric Drawings
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3 RCS PT455(ZR)
Containment Structure 12179-EK-501176, Pev. 3 Isometric Drawings
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12179-EK-501178, Rev. 2 " "
" " " "
12179-EK-501097 Sheet 1 Rev. 2 Containment Structure 12179-EK-501097 Sheet 2 Isometric Drawings Rev. 4 Containment Pressure 3LMS*PT937 (AR) Isometric Drawings Auxiliary Building 12179-EK-514004 Rev. 2 Isometric Drawings
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Documents Reviewed Instrumentation and Controls Document Number Type Containment Pressure 3LMS*PT 936 (BW) Isometric Drawings Containment Pressure 3LMS*PT 24A (BP) Isometric Drawings Auxiliary Building 12179-EK-514003 Rev. 2 Isometric Drawings Containment Structure 12179-EK-1C Sh 3 Rev. 7 Instrument Piping Drawings Containment Vacuum & 12179-EK-14 Rev. 4 Instrument Piping Leakage Monitoring Drawings Multiple Instru. Liquid 12179-SK-16P-71 Rev. 5 Instrumentation Design Service Inst. below Tap Pressure above 150 PSI Pressure Instruments - 12179-16P-65 Rev. 5 Instrumentation Design Air or Dry Gas Inst Above Tap 150 PSI or below Control Switch Contact 12179-ESK-3E Rev. 11 Elementary Diagram Diagram 4.16 KV Charging Pump 3CHS*P3A 12179-ESK-5CS Rev. 10 Elementary Diagram 4.16 KV Quench Spray 12179-ESK-5DG Rev. 10 Elementary Diagram Pump 3QSS*P3A " "
12179-ESK-6LS Rev. 7 480VMC Quench Spray Isolation Valve 3QSS*M0V34A 480 VMC Charging Pump 12179-ESK-6MV Rev. 6 Elementary Diagram to Reactor Cold Leg Isolation Valve 3SIH*8801A 480 VMC Refueling Water 12179-ESK-6PM Rev. 7 Elementary Diagram Storage Tank to Charging Pump Valve 3CHS*LCV 1120 Control Bldg. Isolation 12179-ESK-7TA Rev. 8 Elementary Diagram (Train A) SH1 Control Bldg. Isolation 12179-ESK-7TB Rev. 7 Elementary Diagram (Train A) Sh2
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Documents Reviewed Instrumentation and Controls Document Number Type Control Bldg. Isolation 12179-ESK-7TC Rev. 8 Elementary Diagram (Train B) Sh1 Control Bldg. Isolation 12179-ESK-7TD Rev. 7 Elementary Diagram (Train B) Sh2 Control Room Outlet Air 12179-ESK-7PB Rev. 6 Elementary Diagram Isolation Valves 3HVC*
A0V20&21 Control Room Outlet Air 12179-ESK-7PC Rev 6 Elementary Diagram
'
Isolation Valves 3HVC*
A0V 22&23 Control Room Outlet Air 12179-ESK-7PD Rev. 6 Elementary Diagram Isolation Valves 3HVC*
A0V 25&26 Control Poom Makeup Air 12179-ESK-7PK Rev. 5 Elementary Diagram
'
Damper 3HCV*A00 27A &
27B Air Storage Outlet 12179-ESK-7PL Rev. 5 Elementary Diagram Valves 3HVC*S0V74A & 74B Reactor Trip Breaker 12179-ESK-11A Rev. 7 Elementary Diagram 3RPS*ACB-RTA Main Control Board 12179-EE-3AGK Rev. 3 Wiring Diagrams 3CES*MCB-MB3 Termination Cabinet 12179-EE-3DZ Rev. 6 Wiring Diagrams 3 CES*TB-MB30 '
F Termination Cabinet 12179-EE-3DR Rev. 6 Wiring Diagrams 3 CES*TM-MB20 Process CAB Prot Set 1 12179-EE-3HA Rev. 4 Wiring Diagrams Process CAB Prot Set 2 12179-EE-3HB Rev. 3 Wiring Diagrams Eng Safeguard Seg Panel 12179-EE-3TM Rev. 10 Wiring Diagrams
! 3 RPS PNL ESCA SH 1 i
l l
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Documents Reviewed Instrumentation and Controls Document Number Tm Transfer Switch PNL 3CES 12179-EE-3UG Rev. 2 Wiring Diagrams PNL TSA SH7 Emergency Switchgear A 12179-EE-88G Rev. 11 Wiring Diagrams SH7 480V MC 3EHS*ACC-3Al 12179-EE-9FE Rev. 4 Wiring Diagrams Cable Schedule EC-1 12179-EE-59A Wiring Diagrams Issue 87
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Documents Reviewed l -
- Structural Steel Verification Program
) Document Number Type i
~
,
Sampling Inspection QAD-7.11 Quality Assurance Directive (Generic Procedure)
Steel Load Verification NETM 57, Rev. O Technical Procedure ,
Steel Load Verification TR-6288-1(Draft) Technical Report
,
,
Structural Design Criteria NETM-34, Rev. 1 Design Criteria
.
AISC Torsional Analysis AISC Journal, 2nd Technical Paper j of Steel Members 1982/Vol. 19, No. 2 Web Attachment Generic 12179-SEe-58 Generic Calculations Torsional Analysis of Steel 12179-SEe-58 Generic Calculations Members for Allowable i Moments with 1&2 Stiffener
- Plates
! Local Stress Check on 12179-SEe-BZ-107C.17 Design Calculations W12X40 Due to
'
- 3-CCP-1-PSR-034 i
l Local Stress Check of 12179-SEe-BZ-79 Design Calculations l j W24X55 Due to l
! CP379707-H003 l
!
Local Stress Check of 12179-SEe-BZ-2 Design Calculations l
. W24X94 & W36X230 l for 3-MSS-5-PSSP423
.
'
Local Stress Check of 12179-SEe-BZ-2 Design Calculations l W36X194 for l i 3-MSS-5-PSSP424
j Local Stress Check on 12179-SE#-BZ-107B.4 Design Calculation i
W8X20 for 3-CCP-1-PSST 136 !
i
,
- Local Stress Check on a 12179-SE#-BZ-107B.7 Design Calculation f i W14X211 from -
l 3-CDS-1-PSA-138 i
\ I i
!
e --m--w--em---nw--.-.m ,- -rs-,, -----e ea y a -, ,-e ----.------r-- ,,m-_-armn ,- were---ee---.- _m, en-ws,--,-v &-w w
. , -
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Documents Reviewed Structural Steel Verification Program Document Number Type Local Stress Check on 12179-SE#-BZ-107 Design Calculation W18X77 and W18X85 from 3-CCP-1-PSST 156 Local Stress Check on 12179-SEc-BZ-107 Design Calcc ation W8X20 for 3-CCP-1-PSST 136 Local Stress Check on a 12179-SE#-BZ-107 Design Calculation W14X211 from 3-CDS-1-PSA 138 Local Stress Check on 12179-SEo-BZ-107 Design Calculation W27X84 & W27X94 Due to 3-CDS-1-PSA 270
.
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ATTACHMENT 2A QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM LOOP A ITEM ID N PLI N DWG N Comments Valve 3QSS*V42 C.I.-QSS-1 Valve 3QSS*V933 C.I.-QSS-1 Support PSST 074/- C.I.-QSS-1 l' 5 " dimension should Strut PSST 180 be 5 " between these supports. Drafting ~
error - IR P5A02426 Valve 3QSS*V945 C.I.-QSS-1 Support PSSI 081 C.I.-QSS-1 Stru:
-Support PSST 075 C.I.-QSS-1 BZ-79B-225-2 Detailed Inspection Strut Support PSR 076 C.I.-QSS-1 BZ-798-39 Detailed Inspection
^
Support PSR 077 C.I.-QSS-1 8Z-798-40-3 Detailed Inspection ,
Support PSST 078 C.I.-QSS-1 Should be l'- 1" upstream of trunio Drawing to be changed IR PSA02426 Support PSR 079 C.I.-QSS-1 BZ-798-41 Detailed Inspection Support PSSH'080 C.I.-QSS-1 Drawing dimension from elbow is l'-8 1/8".
Should be l'-10".
Drawing to be changed IR PSA02426 Valve 30SS*V51 C.I.-QSS-1 Valve 3QSS*V2 C.I.-QSS-6 Support PSST 115 C.I.-QSS-6 BZ-798-69-3 Detailed inspection
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ATTACHMENT 2A QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM LOOP A ITEM ID N PLI N DWG N Comments Support- PSR 116 C.I.-QSS-6 Support PSR 117 C.I.-QSS-6 Valve 3QSS*V951 C.I.-QSS-2 Valve MOV*34A C.I.-QSS- Support PSST 083 C.I.-QSS-2 BZ-798-42 Detailed Inspection Valve SQSS*V950 C.I.-QSS-25 Check Valve 3QSS*V4 C.I.-QSS-25 No flow direction indicated on valv Correct installation was verified by ultrasonic test N&D 13,271 Valve 3QSS*V975 C.I.-QSS-25 Support PSR 030 C.I.-QSS-25 Flange FLS1A C.I.-QSS-25 Blank part of spec-tacle flange in system. To be removed during system line u per OP3309-1, - Support PSR 031 C.I.-QSS-25 Support PSR 032 C.I.-QSS-25 BZ-79A-38-3 Detailed Inspection Support PSR 033 C.I.-QSS-25
'
Support PSR 073 C.I.-QSS-1 BZ-798-37-4 Detailed Inspection Support PSA 034 C.I.-QSS-25 Support PSR 035 C.I.-QSS-25 ~;
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d
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ATTACHMENT 2A-
-'
QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM LOOP A ITEM ID N PLI N DWG N Comments
' Support PSR 036 C.I.-QSS-25 BZ-79A-42-2 Detailed Inspection Support. PSR 037 C.I.-QSS-25 BZ-79A-43-1 Detailed Inspection
. Support. PSR 038 C.I.-QSS-25 -BZ-79A-42-2 . Detailed Inspection
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Attachment 2B Containment Recirculation System
>
Loop P B ITEM ID N PLI N DWG N Comments Valve .V27 C.I.-RSS-16T Support PSR 167A C.I.-RSS-21T Direction of restraint
'
not on drawing Support PSR 167 C.I.-RSS-21T Support PSST 166 C.I.-RSS-21T Support PSR 165 C.I.-RSS-21T Support PSST 164 C.I.-RSS-21T-Support PSR 163 C.I.-RSS-21T
. Support PSSH 161 C.I.-RSS-21 BZ-798-112-2 Detailed Inspection Support PSR 158 C.I.-RSS-21 BZ-798-109-2 Detailed Inspection Support PSST 160 C.I.-RSS-21 BZ-79B-111-2 Detailed Inspectio '
Direction of restraint
~
'
not on drawing Support PSSP:416 C.I.-RSS-21 BZ-798-141-3 Detailed Inspection Support: PSA 012 C.I.-RSS-5028 Support PSR 013 C.I.-RSS-5028 BZ-79A-19-1 Detailed Inspection Support PSR 014 C.I.-RSS-502B Support- PSR 015 C.I.-RSS-502B
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Attachment 2C ,
Residual Heat Removal System ITEM ID N PLI N DWG N Comments Support PSR 024 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSR 023 C.I.-RHS-4 Valve V4 C.I.-RHS-4 Dimension from valve to downstream elbow taken to outside of pipe not center line of elbo Support PSR 009 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSSH 010 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSSP 450 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSR 011 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSSH 012 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSST 022 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSR 064 C.I.-RHS-4 Support PSR 066 C.I.-RHS-4 Valve V966 C.I.-RHS-4
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Attachment 2D Charging /High Head Safety Injection System Item- ID N P&ID OWG N Comments Valve 3SIL-VI- C.I.-SIL-152A Valve V709 C.I.-CHS-504 MV8468A L
LSupport PSR 320 C.I.-CHS-504 BZ-748-135-1 Detailed Inspection Valve V43 C.I.-CHS-504 Support PSST 340 C.I.-CHS-504 BZ-748-155-2 Detailed Inspection Support PSST 332 C.I.-CHS-504 BZ-74B-147-2 Detailed Inspection Support PSST 319 C.I.-CHS-504 Support PSST 318 C.I.-CHS-504 BZ-748-133-2 Detailed Inspection
- Support PSSH-338 C.I.-CHS-30 BZ-74B-153-4 Detailed Inspection Support PSR 339 C.I.-CHS-30 Valve V276 C.I.-CHS-30 Support PSSP 465 C.I.-CHS-30 Support PSSH 010 C.I.-CHS-33 BZ-74B-184-5 Detailed Inspection Valve V46 C.I.-CHS-33 Valve V272 C.I.-CHS-33 Support PSSP 400 C.I.-CHS-33
'
-
Suppor PSR 011 C.I.-CHS-33 BZ-748-11-5 Detailed Inspection
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. . . - -. = .. - . - - . . . ._
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Attachment 2D
Charging /High Head Safety Injection System
,
Item ID N P&ID DWG N Comments Support- 'PSSH 116 C.I.-CHS-33 Support PSR 009 C.I.-CHS-33 BZ-74B-10-4 Detailed Inspection Support PSR 011 C.I.-CHS-507 i Valve V51 C.I.-CHS-507 Valve MV8438A C.I.-CHS-507 V702 Support PSR 013 C.I.-CHS-507 BZ-748-13-2 Detailed Inspection
!
Valve V285 C.I.-CHS-507 Valve MV 8438C C.I.-CHS-507
- Support PSA 312 C.I.-CHS-507 BZ-748-127-4 Detailed Inspection Support PSR 109 C.I.-SIH-4 Support PSA 108 C.I.-SIH-4
}
Valve V53 C.I.-SIH-4 Valve V54 C.I.-SIH-4 f
Support PSR 624 C.I.-SIH-4 Support PSR 014 C.I.-SIH-3 Valve MV8801A C.I.-SIH-3
Support PSR 014 C.I.-SIH-3 Valve V4 C.I.-SIH-3-MM8801B Support .PSR 015 C.I.-SIH-3
i
_ _ _ -, -- , , _ , _ _- . ; _ _ . . ~ . . _ _ . . , . - . _ _ _ . - _ . _ _ _ _
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4:
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Attachment 2D
- Charging /High Head Safety Injection System i
Item 10 N P&ID DWG N Comments
!
Valve V834/V835 C.I.-SIH-3 Valve V905/V906 C.I.-SIH-3
_
Support PSR 017 C.I.-SIH-3 Support PSR 018 C.I.-SIH-3 I Valve V903/V904 C.I.-SIH-3
"
Valve V990 C.I.-SIH-501
'
-Valve V883 C.I.-SIH-501
'
Check VS C.I.-SIH-501 Valve
!
Valve V898 C.I.-SIH-501
,
Supports PSSP 905 C.I.-SIH-501 PSR 333 Support VPSIR 1100 C.I.-SIH-501 Support PSR'648 C.I.-SIH-501 Valve V887 C.I.-SIH-501 Support PSR 334 C.I.-SIH-501
- Valve V68 CP 407023-Valve V67 CP 407023 Valve V6 CP 407023 Support PSR 647 CP 407023 Support PSR 339 CP 407023 Support PSR 340 C.I.-SIH-141A Support . PSST 531 CP 407310
+
.- ~. ~ . . _ . _ ,. . _ - . _ _ _ . , _ _ . _ . - _ . , . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ , . . _ , . . . _ _ , _ _ _ . _ . , - ,
.,
0-l
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Attachment 2D Charging /High Head Safety Injection System Item ID N P&ID DWG N Comments Support PSR 532 CP 407310 Support PSR 533 CP 407310 Support PSR 534 CP 407310 Support PSR 535 CP 407310 Support PSSP 162 CP 408046 PSSP 165 Support PSR 1112 CP 408046 Chack V29 CP 408046 Valve Support PSSP 1109 CP 408046 Support PSSP 11LD CP 408046 Support PSST 161 CP 408046
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Attachment 2E Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Item 10 N p&ID DWG No. Comments Damper 1134 12179-EM-1518-2
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Switch FS 116B
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Damper 1135 Fan FN 6 12179-EM-151B-2
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Damper DMPT 7A
"
Damper DMPT 7B Valve V75 12179-EM-1518-2 (A0V 21)
"
Valve V74'
(A0V 20)
Support DSA 391 12179-EB-39C-13
"
Support DSR 341
"
Support DSR-393 Support DSA-394 12179-EB-39C-13
"
. Support DSA-219
"
Damper DMPF-15 Support DSR-238 12179-EB-39C-13
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Support DSA-237
"
Support DSA-255 Damper DMP-90 12179-EB-39C-13
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Support DSA-195
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Attachment 2E Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Item ID N P&ID DWG No. Comments
"
Support DSA-151 Support DSR-194 12179-EB-39C-13 Support "
DSR-196 Support "
DSR-152 Support DSA-276 12179-EB-39C-13 Support DSA-277 "
Support DSA-103 "
Support DSA-102 12179-EB-39C-13 Support DSA-257 "
Support DSA-258 "
Support DSA-267 12179-EB-39C-13 Support DSA-266 "
Support "
DSA-274 Support DSA-083 12179-EB-39C-13 Support DSA-084 "
"
Support DSR-100 Support DSR-099 12179-EB-39C-13 Support DSA-083 "
Support DSA-082 "
Damper DMP-83 12179-EB-39C-13
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Attachment 2E Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Item ID N P&ID DWG N Comments Damper DMP-86 12179-EB-39C-13
"
DMP-88 Damper DMP-89 12179-EB-39C-13 Switch RE 16A 12179-EB-39L-11 Switch RE 168 12179-EB-39L-11 Valve A0V-25 12179-EB-390-15
"
Valve A0V-26
"
Damper DMPT 5A Damper DMPT 5B 12179-EB-390-15 Support PSA 003 "
Support DSA 933 "
BZ 539G-58-3 Detailed Inspection Support DSA 932 12179-EB-390-15 BZ 539G-58-3 Detailed Inspection Support DSA 828 "
Support "
DSA 827 Support DSA 824 12179-EB-39D-15 Support DSA 823 "
Support DSA 822 "
Support DSA 821 12179-EB-390-15
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Attachment 2E Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Item ID N P&ID DWG N Comments
"
Support DSA 826
"
Support DSA 951 Support DSA 950 "
Valve A0D 134 12179-EB-390-13
"
Fan FN 4 Support DSR-872 12179-EB-390-13
"
Support DSR-701 Support DSR-704 "
Support DSA-705 12179-EB-390-13 Support' DSA-703 "
Support DSR-706 "
Support DSA-707 12179-EB-390-13
"
Damper DMPT 7A
"
Damper DMPT 7B Fan FN 6 12179-EB-390-13
"
Valve A0V 20 Support PSA 003 "
Fan FN 1A 12179-EB-390-13
"
Fan FN 18 Support DSA-851 "
BZ-539G-83-2 Detailed Inspection Support DSR-852 12179-EB-390-13
.
.
Attachment 2E Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Item ID N P&ID DWG N Comments Support DSR-853 12179-EB-390-13 Support DSR-846 "
Support DSA-870 "
Support DSA-847 12179-EB-390-13 Support DSA-848 "
Support DSR-849 "
Support DSA-865 12179-EB-390-13 Support DSA-868 "
Support DSR-867 "
Support DSA-872 12179-EB-390-13 Support DSA-878 "
Support DSA-874 "
"
"
Damper DMP 15 Damper DMP 16 12179-EB-390-13 Support DSA 946 "
Support DSA 947 "
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ATTACHMENT 2E Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Item ID N P&ID DWG N Comments Support DSA 882 12179-EB-39C-13
" "
DSA 885
"
DSA 879 "
BZ-539G-68-3 Detailed Inspection Support DSR 875 12179-EB-39C-13
" "
DSA 876
"
DSA 880 "
BZ-539G-68-3 Detailed Inspection Air Tank 3HVC-TKIA 12179-EB-39J-9 Pressuri- thru "
zation 3HVC-TKIJ Units Fan FN 1A 12179-EB-39M-9
"
" "
DMPB 6A
"
DMP 27 12179-EB-39M-9
"
Fan DMP 25 Damper Switch FS 38A 12179-EB-39M-9 Support DSA 001 12179-EB-39C-13 BZ-5390-5-3 Detailed Inspection Support DSR 002 " " " "
Support DSA 003 12179-EB-39C-13- BZ-5390-5-3 Detailed Inspection Support DSR 010 "
BZ-5390-7-5 " "
Support DSA 011 12179-EB-39C-13 BZ-5390-8-2 Detailed Inspection Air Storage . 4MP1679 Vendor Drawing /-
Tank Mounting 4X14773 R-3 Detail Inspection Frames Filter Train "A" 12179-EM-151A-3 Filter Train "B" 12179-EM-151A-3-Valve
"
V682 12179-EB-39J-9 Detailed Inspection
" "
V683 Valve
"
V689 12179-EB-39J-9 Detailed Inspection
" "
V690 Air 12179-EX-233A-1 Detailed Inspection Bottle Mounting Frames
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ATTACHMENT 2F Sampling Verification of Category I Standard Steel Area # Location Elevation Member N Member Size or ID 1 l ESF Bld l 21' - 6" lT2G24K l W24 x 131 l l l l 1 l
" "
l 21' - 6" [T4G34H l W24 x 131 I I I l 2 l ESF Bld l 24' - 6" lT7G2G1 l W12 x 45 I I I I 2 l
" "
l 24' - 6" lS11T74E l W8 x 31 I I l l 3 l M.S.V.81dg. l 61' - 0" lT3G19G l W12 x 30 l l l l
" "
3 l l Gl' - 0" lG10G#EJ l W30 x 173 I I I I 4 l Control Bld ' - 6" lS40AG4 l W24 x 68 I I I I 4 l
" "
l 47' - 6" lS20AG4 l W24 x 68 l l l l 5 lContnmt. Bldg.l (-) 4' - 5" l427 l Rack No. 2J l(Annulus Rack)l l l l l l l 5 lContnmt. B1dg.l (-) l' - 5" l631 l Rack No. 19 l(Annulus Rack)l
!
0 i
Calculation 1
'
l Calculation for Verification of Control Room Pressurization System Purpose: To verify that four (4) bottles of compressed air in the control room pressurization system will provide air to keep the control room pressurized for about one (1) hou Method: The final pressure in the control room will be calculated assuming minimum air pressure in the bottles and the design basis leakrate out of the room m o c.P m -
M st. mws L cu '
. [J A M Lt *
'
)---
Mam (<.ima v_ccu co wicos-NW6E*' S NC A.'Irn L .4 3 21lLL)"~~ VcLene , a.a n s1 ht3
\ttem93.06p3 ( 2 v m 0 >- U ( js,,.y o f_ T'Recsew= Ye"wg ~ s n rn Assumptions I*
I (1) Ideal Gas Laws Apply: PV = NRT (2) Adiabatic Expansion: RT = constant (3) Assume final air bottle pressure = final Main Control Room (MCR) pressure Calculations Total Amount of Air initially in the bottles and in the MCR = Total Amount finally in bottles and MCR + Total Leakag (N bottles + N control room), = (N bottles + N control room)7 + N leak (Pbottles j V bottles) + (Perj Vcr) = (P bottles f V bottles) + (Perf Vcr)+
(Pleak Vieak)
Perf = (2214.7) (93.08) + (14.7) (226612) - 14.7 (13800)
(93.08 + 226612)
= 14.7 psia Where: N bottles = Amount of Air in bottles N control room = Amount of Air in MCR N leak = Amount of Air which leaked out of MCR P bottles = Pressure in the air bottles V bottles = Volume of the air bottles PCR = Pressure in the control room VCR = Volume of the control room envelope Pleak/Vleak = Pressure / Volume of the air leakage i = initial f = final
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O Alternately, assume the volume in the air flash must be able to makeup exactly for that air volume lost due to leakage. Therefore, assuming 2200 psig initially in the bottles and completely loss-less piping:
N flasks = N leakage Where: Nflasks = Amount of air in the air bottles PUB B
= (P leakage V leakage) Nieakage = Amount of air leakage RT RT PB /YB = Pressure / Volume of bottles Pleakage/Vleakage = Pressure / Volume of leak (2214.7) (4) (23.27) = (14.7) (230 ft 3/ min. x 60 min /hr) (x hrs)
x = (2214.7) (4) (23.27) hr (14.7) (230) (60)
= 1.016 hr Licensee analysis, using more realistic assumptions which considered air losses in the piping system, indicated the available time was 54 minutes. Therefore, it is not clear that the system will satisfy design requirement For Five Bottles:
Perf = (2214.7) (116.35) + (14.7) (226612) - 14.7 (13800)
(116.35 + 226612)
= 14.9+ psia = .2 psig OK Or:
xhr=P8 d B (Pleakage) (Vleakage) (60 min /hr)
) 2 0)
= 1.27 hr OK
a e
o Calculation 2 Voltage at Motor Terminal of QSS and Charging Pump Querch Pump Pump Data: ' KV, 4 500 hp, 0.88pf (running), 93% efficient,1775 rpm; 66 amperes full load running current; 396 amperes locked rotor current, 0.31pf (locked rotor)
Power Cable: 4/0 stranded aluminium 905 feet long Impendance From General Electric Wire and Cable Selection and Technical Guide, Table 73 and 78 R = 0.08361 ohms per 1000 ft and 25 C -
= 0.08361 x 905 0.0757 ohms 166D Xr = 0.0411 ohms per 1000 ft at 60 Hz (Worst Case)
= 0.0411 x 905 0.0363 ohms 1665 Z = sqrt (R2 + Xr2 )
= 0.084 YBd5 R=0. 07574L
>
. W w 15 N' A Nwg )Q: O,OFG3fL
- 3% A hdalbefr YmQ MOToc. ,
Voltage Drops: Running V = IZ = (66) (0.084) = 5.54V = about 6V Locked Rotor V = IZ = (396) (0.084) = 33.26V = about 34V Voltage at Motor Terminals Nominal 4160 - 6 volts drop running = 4154 running 4160 - 34 volts drop starting = 4126 starting Degraded Grid 3900 - 6 volt drop running = 3894 running 3900.- 84 volts drop starting = 3866 starting The voltage drops shown above do not appear excessive for motor starting or runnin * ,
'.*
o Charging Pump Pump Data: 4KV, 600 hp, 91% efficiency, 76 amperes full load running, 0.91pf; 518 amperes locked rotor current, 0.28 pf, 1774 rp Power Cable: 4/0 Stranded Aluminium, 605 feet long Impendance From General Electric Wire and Cable Selection and Technical Guide, Tables 73 and 78 R = 0.08361 x 605 = 0.0506 ohms 1000 Xr = 0.0411 x 605 = 0.0249 ohms 1000 Z = sqrt (R2 + Xr2 )
= 0.056 Vg3 C
R: 0 0506 L2-
Y .
W W
- 9 b: O. OJWZ = Sl O }*0uA A Vy
\ HrTon l Voltage Drops: Running V = IZ = (76) (.056) = 5 volts Locked Rotor V = IZ = (518) (.056) = 29 volts Voltage at Motor Terminals:
Nominal 4160 - 5 volts drop = 4155 volts running 4160 - 29 volts drop = 4131 volts starting Degraded Grid 3900 - 5 volts drop = 3895 volts running
,
3900 - 30 volts drop = 3870 volts starting The voltage drops shown above do not appear excessive for motor starting or running.