IR 05000412/1986099
| ML20214N235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214N201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-86-99, NUDOCS 8706020108 | |
| Download: ML20214N235 (41) | |
Text
- - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
_
______ _ __- ____- ______ ____ _____-_________________________
_ _ _ _ _ _
-______
.
'
.
ENCLOSURE _2 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE REPORT 50-412/86-99 DUQUESNE LIGili COMPANY DEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 (Pre-Operational Testing Phase)
ASSESSMENT PERIOD:
APRIL 1, 1986 - FEBRUARY 28, 1987
00ARD MEETING DATE:
APRIL 22, 1987
,
!
l i
!
'
1170602010l! 070020 P Dit ADOCK 0500041.7
P Dit i
i
[
-
-.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
\\
!
-
1
s
!
SUMMARY AND RESULTS A.
Overall Summary Continued improvement in the overall level of performance was demonstrated during this assessment period.
Several licensee initiatives have been generally effective in addressing or anticipating problems.
These in-itiatives included the Design Endorsement Program for design verification, the Operational Readiness Review Team for assuring necessary procedures and programs are in place for license receipt, and the Quality Concerns Program for aggressively soliciting potential employee concerns.
High levels of management involvement in day to day activities was evident.
Weekly onsite meetings were attended by the Chairman of the Board thereby demonstrating the active involvement of senior corporate management.
Overall construction activities were found to be well managed with evi-dence of good construction quality levels in installed hardware.
However, the QA program appeared to be somewhat limited as a management tool due to the scope and priority of its activities.
The preoperational test program was considered to be a notable strength.
Housekeeping was generally good with the maintenance and preservation of turned over hardware also a strength.
The licensee made good progress in the area of operational readiness although some added involvement by NRC was necessary to obtain timely security program development.
In summary, during this assessment period, the licensee demonstrated good ability to coordinate and manage the many related, complex activities that occur at this stage in project life.
B.
Background Duquesne Light Company was issued a Construction Permit (CPPR-105) to build Beaver Valley, Unit 2, (Docket No. 50-412) on May 3, 1974.
During this SALP period, the licensee was granted an extension of CPPR-105 until December 31, 1987.
The Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) is a 2660 MWt Westinghouse PWR with three loops; the Architect / Engineer (A/E) is Stone and Webster. At the end of this assessment period, fuel load was sched-uled for May, 1987.
Construction was estimated by the licensee to be more than 98 percent complete as of February 28, 1987, as compared to 93.6 percent complete at the end of the last assessment period (March 31,1986).
1.
Licensee Activities In general, the work force increased during the assessment period.
On February 28, 1987, there were about 4,900 construction workers, compared to about 2,800 on March 31, 1986; an increase of approxi-mately 70L Total second and third shift activity more than doubled from 600 to 1300 during this period. Weekend activity increased as site activities shifted to a seven day work week.
The licensee
-.
-
.
.
.
_ _.
.
=..
_
'
.
g
.
,
Beaver Valley Unit 2
4 integrated the Quality Assurance and Quality Control organizations together with an overall staffing increase from 450 to almost 500, an increase of about 10 percent.
Stone and Webster supervisory, engineering and administrative personnel assigned on site also in-
' -
creased, from about 680 to 730 people.
During this assessment period, site activities shifted from con-l'
struction oriented to the support of preoperational testing and the completion of major milestone activities.
In this regard, major
<
testing progressed through the period with the completion of the reactor coolant system hydrostatic test in April, 1986; Hot Func-tional Testing in December, 1986; the Structural Integrity Test (SIT) and the Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CIRLT) in.
February,1987; and Engineered Safety Features testing throughout
..
!
the current period.
Additionally, 9 of the 16 plant buildings were
completed and turned over to the control of the plant staff. The remaining buildings are the largest and involve the bulk of the
!
safety-related equipment: reactor containment, auxiliary building,
!
main steam and cable vault, safeguards building, service building, i
control building, and turbine building.
As of February 28, 1987, 466 of the 476 subsystems had been turned
!
over and accepted by the Duquesne Light Company-Startup Group for proof testing.
The remaining construction work not yet substanti -
'
ally complete includes insulation, safety-related cable fire wrap, i
l cable tray covers, activities supporting the remaining preopera-tional testing, building turnover, and design modification rework.
.
Preservice inspection, ASME Code stamping, and security system com-
!
ponent work were also continuing.
Other licensee activities during this SALP period included operator licensing, emergency preparedness, and operational readiness plan-
!
ning and program reviews.
New fuel was received on site in Septem-ber, 1986.
The Unit 2 core was placed in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool
,
j, with controlled access security provided by the Unit 1 security I
force via an amendment to the Unit 1 security plan.
Preparations
were being made at the end of the assessment period to conduct the loss of offsite power test (planned for April 2, 1987) and to im-
>
plement security for the Unit 2 site (planned for April 15,1987).
,
On March 16, 1987, shortly af ter the close of the SALP period, the
'
licensee elected to replace the ball type Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) with a more standard valve type.
The licensee moved back the scheduled fuel load date at that time from April 30 to May i
21, 1987.
'
.
!
t
-. - -. -.. _,,.
._._.m.
. _,.. m,.,_.__,, _ _ - - - _
m
-,..,-,,,_~__rm
,.,, _., _, _ _ _ _
__.,,____,m.;
.
.
.
'
Beaver Valley Unit 2
2.
Inspection Activities One NRC resident inspector was assigned to Unit 2 for the entire assessment period. A new senior resident inspector was assigned i
to Unit 2 in August, 1986, to fill the vacancy created by the trans-fer of the previous senior resident inspector at the end of the previous period.
Also, the NRC-senior resident inspector assigned to Unit 1 devoted part of his inspection effort to the test program activities at Unit 2.
A total of 53 inspections were performed in-volving 5115 hours0.0592 days <br />1.421 hours <br />0.00846 weeks <br />0.00195 months <br /> (or 5580 hours0.0646 days <br />1.55 hours <br />0.00923 weeks <br />0.00212 months <br /> on an annualized basis) of in-spection as listed in Table 1.
NRC specialist inspections conducted during this assessment period are categorized below by the functional areas of this report.
Resident and specialist inspections are listed separately.
A distribution of inspection hours, by functional area, is shown in Table 2.
Enforcement data, resulting from these inspection activities, are summarized in Table 3.
,
7 i
%
'\\
._ ______ - _ - ____ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _.
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
C.
Facility Performance Analysis Summary CATEGORY CATEGORY J
LAST THIS PERIOD PERIOD 4/1/85 4/1/86 RECENT FUNCTIONAL AREA 3/31/86 2/28/87 TREND *
Construction
Containment and Other Safety Related
--
Structures
Piping System and Supports
--
Safety Related Components
--
--
Support Systems
Electrical Power ~ Supply and
--
Distribution
Instrumentation and Control Systems
--
' Preoperational Testing
1 Fire Protection & Housekeeping N/A
Operational Readiness N/A
Improving
Licensing
1 Assurance of Quality ** -
2 J
- Trend during the last quarter of the current assessment period.
- This report also discusses " Assurance of Quality" as a separate functional area.
Although this topic is assessed in the other functional areas as one of the evaluation criteria, discussion of this area separately provides a. synopsis.
For example, quality assurance effectiveness has been assessed on a day-to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an integral aspect of specialist inspections.
Although quality work is the responsibility of every employee, one of the man-agement tools to measure this effectiveness is reliance on quality assurance inspections and audits.
These and other major factors that influence quality, such as involvement of first-line supervision, safety committees and worker attitudes, are discussed in each area.
.
- - - _.
.
..
._.
_._-
,
..
_
. _ _ _
__
-
.
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSES A.
Construction (1455 hours0.0168 days <br />0.404 hours <br />0.00241 weeks <br />5.536275e-4 months <br />, 28.5%)
1.
Analysis During the previous SALP assessment period, the following functional areas were evaluated and assessed separately:
Containment and Other Safety-Related Structures (Category 1); Piping Systems and Supports (Category 2); Safety-Related Components (Category 1); Support Sys-tems (Category 2); Electrical Power Supply and Distribution (Cate-gory 2); and Instrumentation and Control Systems (Category 1).
The summary for these functional areas noted major improvements in the areas of piping and supports, instrumentation and control systems, but continuing problems were noted in the area of support systems.
More attention to detail and the conduct of independent overviews and more aggressive self-identification of problems were solicited.
It was also noted that positive steps had been taken in the way of licensee initiatives, organizational realignment and tracking pro-grams which were successful in addressing certain previous program-matic NRC concerns.
The licensee completed review of electrical separation issues and established an electrical plan to achieve identified corrective actions, but plan implementation had just begun.
During this assessment period, all construction disciplines have been combined under this one functional area.
The bulk of the re-maining construction activities during this assessment period was in the areas of electrical distribution, instrumentation and con-trols, and re-work.
Licensee management, including technical, administrative and QA/QC, was highly involved in the implementation of the project electrical plan to correct electrical cable separation deficiencies. Work-related programs and procedures were well planned and executed.
Long term concerns with electrical cable separation and unsupported cables were being addressed by special programs.
These programs were technically adequate and generally timely, although some slip-pages did occur.
The management's weekly update meeting showed active participation.
The management's Design Endorsement Program has proven effective in achieving verification of design.
The pro-gram has uncovered weaknesses early and obtained effective correc-tive actions.
Management support to resolve construction deficien-cies and unresolved items was also evident.
Personnel involved in electrical construction activities were knowl-edgeable of regulatory requirements and technical requirements such as that for Raychem heat shrinkable tubing installation which was found to be a problem at several other sites.
The training records of craft personnel documented the details of the indoctrination and
e
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
periodic retraining received by the personnel.
Evidence of good training was notable in the quality of work performed by personnel in the electrical area.
With respect to instrumentation and controls, the prompt and effec-tive disposition of instrumentation deficiencies indicated licensee attention to proper resolution of technical issues.
In addition, the receipt inspection of instruments was thorough and instrument storage areas were clean and well organized.
Staffing of the NDE contractor for the preservice examination of piping was very good.
During the early part of this assessment period, the licensee did not have an American Society for Non-destructive Testing certified Level III NDE specialist on their PSI /ISI staff.
As a result, the utility did not have the ability to independently verify the NDE contractor's data evaluation.
The licensee recognized this weakness and expanded the PSI /ISI staff to include a certified licensee individual.
A high level of PSI activity took place during this period and the technical evaluation of the potential flaws that were identified was significantly im-proved by the increased expertise of the PSI /ISI staff.
One inspection during the SALP period used the NRC Mobile Nonde-structive Examination (NDE) Laboratory to conduct an independent measurements inspection.
Selected structural supports, fuel racks and preservice inspection weldments were inspected, which duplicated examinations required of the licensee by regulations and codes, and the results were evaluated.
Other confirmatory examinations, in-cluding those of structural concrete, were designed to verify con-formance with material specifications and the results were compared to quality assurance records.
Some deficiencies were identified
"
but the overall assessment was that the licensee's quality of con-struction was good and that the licensee's inspection program ade-quately verified the conformance of installed hardware with NRC regulations and required industry codes and standards.
The licensee conducted the containment Structural Integrity Test (SIT).
Specifically, NRC observed that management planning, proce-dure development, prerequisite identification, test performance, data gathering, QA surveillance and record keeping for the SIT was excellent.
The conduct of the test was observed to be well managed.
Coordinated and well planned teams of competent engineering person-nel performed the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> test and the test itself provided a direct verification of the quality of containment construction.
No defi-ciencies were identified in the performance of the structure itself.
The performance of the licensee's QA organization in supporting construction related activities was uneven.
Aggressive QC involvement was evident in inspecting work in progress such as wrapping cables, instrument receipt inspections, and preservice
O
..
Beaver Valley Unit 2
inspection.
Discussions with QC inspectors revealed hig1 dedi-cation and interest in assuring a quality product.
However, NRC identified examples of three different types of hardware defic-iencies in the field which were found to have been accepted by QC inspectors due to QC' inspection procedures with inadequate guidance.
Rigid sway strut installation, safety-related cable storage and HVAC seismic support bolting were found that did not meet requirements.. These hardware deficiencies indicated an apparent weakness in the process which produces inspection plans for accepting safety related hardware.
In summary, overall construction completion activities were well managed.
Numerous NRC field observati;9c, including independent examinations and preoperational test results to date, all demon-strate that the construction / inspection process has generally worked as designed and has produced a well constructed plant.
Thus, de-spite some problems with lack of sufficient detail concerning ac-ceptance criteria in QC inspection plans, there continues to be much evidence of good construction quality levels in installed hardware.
2.
Conclusion Category 1.
3.
Board Recommendation None.
,
_
_ _ _ _
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
..
.
-Beaver Valley Unit 2
B.
Preoperational Testing (1841 hours0.0213 days <br />0.511 hours <br />0.00304 weeks <br />7.005005e-4 months <br />, 35.9%)
1.
Analysis During the previous assessment period, this functional area was as-signed a Category 2 rating.
The licensee was in the process of re-organizing from the construction phase to the preoperational phase.
l Minor weaknesses were identified in the finalization of organiza-tions, division of responsibilities, development of support group interfaces, absence of program description, and management oversight of program development.
Improvements were made such that by the end of the previous assessment period, the overall preoperational testing program was considered capable of assuring that all required testing and performance requirements were met.
There were 17 specialist inspections and routine resident-coverage of this area during this assessment period.
Much of this inspection effort was devoted to reviewing test procedures, witnessing test performance and reviewing test results.
Procedure review was directed at management review, test controls, acceptance criteria, system restoration, test data gathering methodology and test ob-jective clarity.
Major test milestones received extensive inspec-tion coverage as did certain key Engineered Safety Features (ESFs)
such as the Reactor Protection System, the ESF actuation system,-
the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system, ECCS and the emergency diesel generators.
The progress of these selected ESFs was closely moni-tored as they were construction proof tested.
The licensee achieved considerable success in completing several major testing milestones including the Reactor Coolant system (RCS)
hydro, Hot Functional Testing (HFT), the containment structural in-tegrity test and the containment integrated leak rate test.
These
tests were started and completed on or ahead of schedule.
Equipment l
problems were resolved and test sequences were adjusted such that-all major tests were accomplished successfully.
The achievements of the preoperational test program are attributed to a strong man-l agement commitment to the professional conduct of the test program.
i This commitment was demonstrated by the high degree of management l
involvement in test problems as evidenced by twice daily meetings for testing activities coordination and problems resolution; the marshalling of resources to resolve each problem; and the staffing of the Startup Group with highly competent engineers with signifi-cant experience in conducting preoperational testing at other sites.
Problem solving was aggressive, technically thorough, and oriented toward root cause determination.
Some problems were identified in drawing control and procedure, but these were few in number compared with the large number of documents reviewed.
No programmatic weaknesses were identified.
Systems and,
components generally performed as designed and test deficiencies
~
- _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
M Beaver Valley Unit 2
were carefully tracked and aggressively attacked via rework, re-analysis and retest.
Test data were found to be of high quality with a conservative threshold for identifying potential test defi-ciencies.
Test results were reviewed by the licensee in a thorough, well organized manner.
Of particular note was the licensee's approach to cold start testing of the AFW system.
Other units have experienced water hammer prob-lems during the startup of turbine-driven AFW pumps.
Beaver Valley Unit 2 has long piping runs associated with AFW but included seven drip pots in the steam supply line to prevent water hammer or water slugs in that line.
NRC questioned if there was adequate assurance that the drip pots would function as designed.
The licensee re-viewed the piping layout as represented in the detailed scale model on site and stationed test observers at appropriate locations to monitor piping response for water hammer during the tests.
The turbine cold start tests were performed during HFT and no water hammer events were observed.
The results give good confirmation of AFW system performance and demonstrated the licensee's respon-siveness to NRC concerns.
The licensee's QA Surveillance Group was actively and effectively involved in the overview and inspection of tests.
This involvement enabled the licensee to detect a weakness in the knowledge of some test personnel in the area of test program administrative controls and take appropriate corrective actions.
Overall, the licensee's preoperational testing program was a notable strength, with well controlled tests and highly professional problem solving.
2.
Conclusion Category 1.
3.
Board Recommendation Non.
1>
Beaver Valley Unit 2
C.
Fire Protection and Housekeeping (162 hours0.00188 days <br />0.045 hours <br />2.678571e-4 weeks <br />6.1641e-5 months <br />, 3.2%)
1.
Analysis This area was not evaluated separately during previous SALP periods, although some housekeeping concerns were raised as they impacted the acceptability of safety-related components (Storage of Safety-Related Components).
NRC inspections assessed the adequacy of the hardware installation and the readiness of the Fire Protection Program, particularly as it related to fuel receipt onsite.
Additionally, routine resident inspections have examined fireproof coating material applications, fire sealant installation, and cable separation and routing activi-ties.
Housekeeping, as appropriate to the status of the Unit 2 plant conditions during construction, testing and building turnover to the plant staff, were observed during routine plant inspection tours.
The licensee Fire Protection Program was found to be adequate for the onsite receipt of the initial core and its storage in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.
Licensee personnel were generally knowledgeable in fire protection requirements and the licensee's fire hazard an-alysis and implementing procedures were good.
Deficiencies were identified in the initial fire brigade training, triennial QA audit plans, and the socation of certain hose stations.
The licensee was responsive to the identified concerns and implemented effective corrective actions.
There were no significant fires onsite during the assessment period.
With respect to Appendix R, licensee management generally pursued fire protection issues to their proper resolution.
The licensee has made several modifications to achieve compliance with Appendix R separation requirements.
The licensee also demonstrated redundant means of achieving a plant safe shutdown in the event of a fire, including use of the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
During HFT, the licensee exercised both remote panels by physically controlling plant systems and hardware and achieving plant cooldown. Walkdowns have further demonstrated that the licensee's procedures were well planned and that adequate procedural training had been given to the operators.
With respect to housekeeping at Beaver Valley, Unit 2, acceptable levels of site cleanliness wree noted throughout the period.
The acceptability of site housekeeping appears to be dependent upon the status of plant activities; construction areas require continual licensee attention but generally exhibited good controls, buildings turned over to the plant staff appear to be maintained in good order, and other plant areas appeared to improve as the preoperational testing and turnover process progresse.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
Early in the period, metal shavings were introduced into the RCS after a steam generator nozzle dam was inadvertently left in the RCS and was shredded by one reactor coolant pump.
The licensee's recovery efforts were exceptionally thorough and included re-flush-ing the RCS, the RHR system and the CVCS seal injection lines, con-ducting nitrogen blows of the steam generator tubes, and performing a hand wipe-down of the inside walls of affected piping.
Licensee corrective actions were effective in preventing any recurrence of RCS cleanliness degradation.
The preservation of plant systems and equipment was enhanced by the licensee's practice of placing turned over equipment under the same surveillance and maintenance programs as will be used during plant operation.
Extensive use of cleanliness enclosures, equipment covers, and gauge shields was observed and is indicative of a high level of attention to the preservation and protection of installed components.
Substantial efforts were evident to clean up areas where construction was essentially complete, to complete painting activities, and to give turned over building a finished appearance.
In summary, the licensee was aggressively pursuing fire protection issues, related systems and hardware were being properly tested to demonstrate effectiveness, and the overall program status, including procedures and training, was good.
Housekeeping was found to be generally very good with the maintenance and preservation of turned over hardware a notable strength.
2.
Conclusion Category 2.
3.
Board Recommendation Non.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
D.
Operational Readiness (764 hours0.00884 days <br />0.212 hours <br />0.00126 weeks <br />2.90702e-4 months <br />, 14.9%)
1.
Analysis This functional area, not assessed previously, is used to evaluate licensees at the Near Term Operating License (NT0L) and low power stages on the facility's readiness to receive a fuel load license, conduct low power testing, and receive a full power license.
This functional area includes the consideration of Procedures and Staff-ing, Training and Qualification, Security, Radiological Controls and Chemistry, and Emergency Preparedness.
Assessment of each of these areas is discussed separately below, a.
Procedures and Staffing Excellent management oversight was evident in the procedure development process as evidenced by the overall quality of the construction proof and preoperational tests as well as the development of maintenance surveillance procedures for instru-ment channel functional and calibration tests that are used by the station during operation. The latest NSSS vendor test experience at recently licensed stations was factored into the procedure development process.
The Joint Test Group provided an effective multi-discipline review of test procedures for scope and acceptance criteria to ensure regulatory commitments were met.
No significant deficiencies indicative of program-matic problems were identified.
Adherence to administrative controls for procedure use was evident during testing.
All major preoperational tests con-tained mandatory QA hold points, and significant portions of most tests were witnessed by the QA Surveillance Group.
Their presence and findings early in the test program resulted in a rigorous enforcement of the Startup rianual administrative controls for test conduct.
Early in this assessment period, an NRC concern was identified relating to operations use of Temporary Operating Procedures (TOPS).
These concerns related to completion of TOP documentation and adequacy of system alignment control.
The station was responsive in emphasizing procedure adherence and in using specifically marked up Operat-ing Manual (0M) valve lists as approved attachments to control system alignments.
Consequently, there were few problems that occurred later during testing related to operations procedure adherence.
The development of Operational Surveillance Tests (OSTs) also progressed well.
Once a system was turned over to the station, it was put on the routine surveillance schedule to maintain operability by performance of the OSTs that are to be used when the plant is license...
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
The commitment tracking system was found effective with regard to updating plant procedures.
As examples, as vendor manuals were revised for the reactor trip breakers, applicable MSPs were also updated in a timely fashion and new commitments re-lated to the low-temperature overpressure protection system were included in the next OM revision.
The staffing of the Unit 2 operating staff, I&C technicians and maintenance groups with Unit 1 personnel is considered a notable strength and has facilitated the testing, modification and maintenance of Unit 2 systems, b.
Training and Qualification The first of two sets of scheduled initial licensing examina-tions was administered about one month before the end of the SALP period.
The Beaver Valley simulator was not used due to the differences between the simulator and the Unit 2 Control Room.
All candidates for this exam were previously licensed on Unit 1 and had approximately three years experience.
Of the 19 candidates, 16 were issued licenses (84%) which indi-cates that the licensee's cross-training program has been effective.
Some weaknesses were noted among the candidates, but as a group, they performed well.
The training and experience level of the Unit 2 staff is very high.
Both the licensed and non-licensed operators were drawn from the Unit 1 operating staff with all of the initially licensed Unit 2 personnel having been previously licensed on Unit 1 and therefore, have significant levels of experience, as well as the benefit of Unit 1 training and Unit 2 cross-training.
The surveillance and maintenance activities were also conducted by personnel experienced with the very similar equipment at Unit 1.
c.
Security During this assessment period, tne licensee's performance was evaluated during the development of a physical protection pro-gram for Beaver Valley Unit 2 and the preparation for inte-gration of the Unit 2 program into a site (Units 1 and 2)
e security program.
Also assessed, was the licensee's perform-ance in developing and implementing a security program for the receipt and on site storage of special nuclear material (new fuel).
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
The licensee's program and procedures to control and account for special nuclear material at Unit 2 were found to be ade-quate as was the licensee's plan for the protection of the new fuel.
However, one violation of that plan was identified when the licensee failed to assure the integrity of the controlled access area used for new fuel storage.
The licensee's overall security organization was severely stressed during the last half of the SALP period.
A new security force contractor took over site security shortly after the Unit 1 security responsibilities had been expanded by the need to establish a controlled access area at Unit 2 for the protection of the new fuel.
The site Director of Security resigned during the period and the licensee promoted from within such that the three member licensee security oversight staff suffered a sharp reduction in cumulative nuclear plant security experience.
Additional challenges occurred in the last quarter of the SALP period as the licensee needed to pre-pare and submit Security Plan changes, install and test new systems, and train and qualify many additional guard force members.
The impact of these challenges was especially severe due to the manning level and changes to the licensee's secur-ity oversight staff.
The increase in scope associated with adding a second unit to the security plan indicates that the oversight staff will continue to be severely challenged, especially considering the problems inherent with the startup of new systems and equipment.
The initial NRC preoperational program review found that in-stallation of necessary security systems, equipment and hard-ware was not complete. While sone portions of most systens were installed, none were at a stage where preoperational testing could be accomplished.
The review also disclosed that the licensee had not submitted to the NRC for approval a security plan that integrated the Unit 2 security program with the Unit 1 program.
The complexity of combining both units under one security program apparently had not been fully under-stood by the licensee.
Deficiencies in hardware, communica-tions and planning contributed to the situation along with under-estimation by the licensee of the work and rework re-quired for installation of the security systems and equipment.
Subsequently, the allocation of substantial resources by the licensee to expedite security system completion was evident including priority attention to security system installation, removal of entire buildings near security fencing and emplacing of macadam surfacing and camera tower.-
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
The classroom portion of the guard force training and qualifi-cation process was adequately defined, training modules have been developed and were being implemented for the additional guard force members needed for Unit 2.
Practical training, however, was being hampered due to the new systems and equip-ment not yet installed.
Close management attention to this aspect of the training program will be required to ensure that all members of the guardforce receive adequate training.
In sumraary, late in the assessment period, the licensee initi-ated actions following NRC expressed concerns to provide high level management attention to, and escalated the priority of, the planning and implementation of the Unit 2 security program.
Continued management attention will be necessary in order to minimize the potential for the security program to impact on the licensee's readiness to receive an operating license, d.
Radiological Controls and Chemistry During this SALP period, the licensee's performance was evalu-ated during the development of preoperational test procedures, organizational changes and dual unit programs.
There were four inspections conducted by regionally-based inspectors in this
-
area; two in radiation protection and two in effluent controls and chemistry programs.
Resident inspectors performed routine reviews of the program area throughout the assessment period.
Generally, the progress, details, and quality of the licensee's radiological controls program were within the expected norms for the development and completion milestones during the cur-rent preoperational phase of the project. There is evidence of prior planning, assignment and tracking of self-identified open items and priorities for operational readiness.
The Operational Readiness Review Team had a member of the radio-logical controls organization who assured proper attention to such matters.
The licensee adequately completed developing the preoperational test procedures for the effluent monitors, process sample stations, and radioactive waste systems.
Liquid and process sampling system pre-operational testing was in progress, and was adequate to date.
Notably, the licensee has order several types of new high quality equipment to facilitate dual-unit operation, such as sensitive automated friskers and state-of-the-art whole-body-counters.
Also, numerous physical barriers for potential high radiation areas, in addition to those already identified in the original ALARA design review, are being installed.
These items are considered indicative of the licensee's intent to build a high quality program based on a conservative radiation protection philosoph _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _.
._ _ _ - _ _ _ -
_ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
..
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
'
'
The licensee has established an organizational structure to support combined Unit 1 and 2 operations; permanent staffing of these organizations was almost complete and site specific
.
-manuals for both chemistry and effluent controls were close
'
to completion.
Unit 2 staff qualification will be completed after the manuals are issued.
The licensee's efforts in this area were indicative of advanced planning to ensure an ade-quately qualified staff is available to support Unit 2 opera-tions.
,
In summary, an on-site organization to support combined opera-l tion of Units 1 and 2 has been established.
Advanced planning to identify and track items based on plant differences and on program areas to be upgraded was evident.
Adequate progress was noted in the development of the radiological controls pro-i gram with respect to the overall completion of the project.
Licensee plans to make major capital purchases of upgraded equipment, to improve the overall quality of procedures, and
to improve exposure controls by adding additional physical l
access control to various radiation areas were noted.
e.
During this SALP period, emergency preparedness assessment was limited to those aspects needed to support fuel load at Beaver
!
Valley Unit 2.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 received its operating license in 1976 and has been in operation since that time.
,
i The two units will have the same emergency response facilities, the same low population zone and emergency planning zone, and similar procedures.
'
Unit I has maintained a SALP Category I rating in the last three SALPs due to DLC's commitment to excellence in the area of emergency planning.
This commitment has been consistently j
demonstrated through the dedication of adequate resources, extensive training and drilling of personnel, and exceptionally i
.
effective interface with all local government agencies.
The i
same EPP group responsible for this good performance has re-
!
sponsibilities for BV-2.
The operations staff at Unit 2 has at least one year operating experience with Unit 1, including
'
participation in past site drills.
Site specific procedure development and training was progressing on schedule.
,
In summary, a strong management commitment to this functional
!
area has been evident at Unit 1, and all indications point to a continued commitment as Unit 2 is integrated into the emer-
i gency plans.
1
!
l
!
__
. _. _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _ _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _____ _ _._._._, _.
. _. _. _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _ - _ _
_
_ _ _.
_
___._
.
i
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
f.
Overall Summary The overall assessment is that the licensee made good progress
,
during the period in finishing construction and testing acti-vities and achieving a good level of operational readiness.
-
The status of procedure and operating manual development, staffing and qualification, and radiological controls and chemistry was consistent with the licensee's announced schedule.
Strengths noted in these-areas include the quality of proce-
.,
dures, the experience of the staff, and a conservative radi-ation protection philosophy.
Unit 2 is expected to benefit from the same strong management commitment to excellence in
'
the emergency preparedness that Unit I has received.
Some deficiencies were noted in the progress of security program
,
development and system installation, but the high level of
,
management attention and resource allocation observed late in i
!
the period indicates that this area probably will not impact i
overall readiness for operation.
2.
Conclusion:
I Category 2, Improving.
1
-
3.
Board Recommendation
!
,
Licensee: Assess the current manning level of the security oversight
staff in light of the increased scope and responsibilities associated with a dual unit site security program.
,
NRC:
None.
-
h
!
i l
i i
i
. _ _ - _.. -,
.,, _ -. _, _. -. _ _ _,. _ _ _ _ _,. _,.,, _, _ _ _, _ _ _,. _. _ _,.., _ _ _ _ _ _ _., _,. -. _ _ _ _ _, _
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
E.
Licensing Activities 1.
Analysis
,
This area was assigned a Category 1 rating, improving, in the last SALP assessment.
An overall strong performance was noted with good performance in resolving several majcr issues, increased respon-siveness and cooperativeness with the NRC staff, and aggressive approach in resolving issues.
"
Throughout the review process during this assessment period, DLC's activities generally exhibited evidence of prior planning and as-signment of priorities.
This was shown by the licensee's approach to resolving numerous open and confirmatory items identified in the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
Generally, DLC management assigned the necessary technical people to develop complete, high
'
quality responses.
DLC has performed an Engineering Assurance pro-gram (EAP) using outside contractors, in-house DLC engineering per-sonnel and Stone and Webster (SWEC) engineering personnel which was reviewed by the NRC.
As a result of the applicant's cooperation, the NRC was able to conclude that the EAP audit provided significant additional confidence that the design of Unit 2 is in accordance with design commitments and regulatory requirements.
DLC's management demonstrated awareness of the licensing issues by
'
virtue of DLC's experience in the industry, technical expertise, and active participation in owners groups.
The licensee, in cases
i where generic questions arise, has made use of industry owners groups to develop acceptable resolution to licensing issues, e.g.,
resolution of Salem ATWS issues.
The licensee's management also consistently exercised firm control over its design contractor's
,
activities and maintained good communication between the contractor, his own staff, and the NRC staff.
Strong licensee management involvement at the Senior Vice President level, who is stationed at the site and is responsible for managing the design, construction, startup, operation and maintenance of Unit 2, has produced positive results.
Also, the DLC Regulatory Affairs and Engineering staffs are both located at the site.
As a result, in regard to licensing activities, there has been evidence of a close working relationship between the two staffs.
The licensee continued to use a tracking system for resolution of t
licensing issues.
The tracking system included all SER outstanding and confirmatory issues, proposed license conditions, and TMI NUREG-
,
0737 issues.
In addition, any other major issues requiring resolu-tion (i.e., design and FSAR changes that require revisions to the staff's safety evaluations) are also included.
This tracking system
,
has been very helpful in tracking and resolving the remaining lic-
!
'
ensing issues.
-
a r
- _ -, -
-
. _ - _ _, _,
. -, -
- _. - _, _ _ -,, _ _ - - - _ - _ _
_,,. _
.
.-n_-.
..
~.,. _ _ _,.
_
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
Beaver Valley Unit 2 is the lead plant in application of leak-before-break assumption to high energy lines inside containmelt.
The lic-ensee held frequent meetings with the staff on this is ue and demon-strated good technical understanding and a cooperative attitude in these meetings.
As a result, the staff was able to fully complete this first of a kind review and provide the bases for authorizing (in SSER 4) a deletion of unnecessary pipe supports inside the con-tainment building.
Open and effective communication exists between the NRC and DLC's licensing staffs.
Effective dialog between both staffs usually promotes prompt and technically sound responses to NRC initiatives.
The licensee has open dialogs with the Project Manager on a daily basis.
Conference calls with the staff are promptly established and included appropriate engineering, plant and/or contractor per-sonnel.
DLC staff demonstrated a good working knowledge of applicable regu-lations, guides, standards and generic issues pertaining to their plant.
This was evidenced by their positive attitude and respon-siveness to the NRC staff in addressing unresolved SER issues.
DLC staff has always been prepared to meet with the NRC staff in a short time frame to obtain the necessary understanding of NRC information needs and has been successful, by preparedness and aggressiveness, in expediting SER issue resolution in a timely manner.
During meetings, the licensee demonstrated a thorough understanding of the technical issues and effectively used the services of its architect-engineer, SWEC, and other contractors as needed.
DLC's promptness was especially demonstrated during its frequent meetings with the staff.
The licensee kept the NRR project management generally in-formed regarding plant completeness status and major milestones.
However, some licensee delays in transmitting requested information had the potential to impact the staff's review schedule.
In summary, overall strong performance was observed in the func-tional area of Licensing Activities.
The licensee's steady per-formance during the current rating period, specifically, good per-formance in resolving several major issues, continued responsiveness and cooperativeness with the staff, and aggressive approach in re-solving issues are the main factors in this assessment.
2.
Conclusion Category 1.
3.
Board Recommendation Non.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
F.
Assurance of Quality (893 hours0.0103 days <br />0.248 hours <br />0.00148 weeks <br />3.397865e-4 months <br />, 17.5%)
1.
Analysis During the previous SALP period, this functional area was assigned a Category 2 rating.
Management changes and programs were initiated which significantly strengthened the overall project by establishing a strong management team and by providing program tools to control the resolution of problems.
A weakness was noted in the direction of the licensee's programs in that they tended to be reactive rather than aggressively identifying weaknesses in "frontend" activities which would help reduce the number of recurrent deficiencies.
During this assessment period, the earlier management changes and programs were major factors in enabling the licensee to successfully accomplish major test milestones, such as HFT, SIT and ILRT, on schedule.
Twice daily meetings of first and second level supervi-sors ensured that potential schedule problems were promptly identi-fled and elevated to the attention of management. Weekly on-site meetings involving senior corporate management assured the timely allocation of resources to address potential problems.
The weekly briefings, which were attended by the Chairman of the Board, demon-strated the active involvement of senior corporate management in completing the project. The result has been a smooth and integrated organizational response to complete construction, conduct major tests and make necessary changes.
The licensee formed an Operational Readiness Review Team (ORRT),
headed by the Unit 1 Plant Manager on a full time basis.
The ORRT was observed to be aggressively involved in examining all elements of operational readiness to assure that the programs and procedures required for an operating license are in place.
The startup acti-vities were being conducted in accordance with the Station Startup Manual which is similar to the Unit 1 station administrative proce-dures.
This approach and the heading of the ORRT by the Unit 1 plant manager, designated to be manager of both units after license issuance, helped achieve a smooth operational transition.
Early in the project (before 1979), the licensee selected a new and essentially untried ball-type MSIV design which offered certain potential advantages (e.g, no valve slam).
Factory acceptance testing (1981-82) was fairly extensive, but was performed at ambient temperatures, not steam system operating temperatures.
During this assessment period, the only other utility which had also selected the ball-type MISVs encountered severe problems with these valves.
The licensee created the MSIV Modification and Test Program which was a good initiative to assure quality even though it was reactive in that it was in response to problems identified at another site.
The program was also anticipatory in nature in that it included extensive contingency planning, including identifying the best
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
availablo replacement valves, verifying stress analysis compatibil-ity, and procuring critical valve components.
Just after the close of the SALP period, the other utility abandoned their ball type MSIVs leaving Beaver Valley Unit 2 in a potentially untenable posi-tion with respect to the previously joint MSIV qualification testing program.
Due to the excellent previous pre planning, the licensee was able to elect to replace the Beaver Valley Unit 2 MSIVs with minimal schedular impact.
Another program, the Quality Concerns Program, aggressively soli-cited and pursued the questions and potential concerns of employees.
All outgoing employees were interviewed and a hotline number was published site-wide with assurances of confidentiality.
Each con-cern was assigned a tracking number and program participants were provided with written letters documenting item resolution.
This program is considered to be a major factor in the very low incidence of allegations during this period.
A positive attitude was displayed by onsite workers.
Effective first line supervision was evident during NRC work observations.
The staffing level for QC personnel was high; they were aggressively involved in ongoing construction and testing activities.
Good records have allowed the licensee to resolve areas of potential concern and provide documented evidence of quality.
An overemphasis on paper by QA was identified during the period as some audits concentrated heavily on documentation completeness rather than assessirg the technical adequacy of the area audited.
Weaknesses were identified in the acceptance of rigid sway struts, the storage of cable, the installation of seismic supports, and the resolution of professional differences internal to the QA organi-zation.
The QA overemphasis on paper was clearly demonstrated in the licensee's actions concerning PT indications on safety related welds and piping.
The indications were identified in April, 1986, by PSI personnel taking ASME XI baseline data who concluded that the indications were acceptable under ASME XI, but did not meet the more restrictive ASME III (N-stamp) construction acceptance criteria inspected against two to four years earlier.
No actions were taken until December 1986 because licensee representatives questioned the jurisdiction of ASME XI inspectors to make findings under ASME III instead of addressing the technical validity of the findings.
The NRC had to request that the licensee address the technical signifi-cance of the identified weld deficiencies.
The welds were rein-spected and repaired as necessary in January,1987.
The delay in resolution was the apparent result of the QA organization's over-emphasis on " paper" and ineffectiveness in resolving internal dis-agreements.
l
. _ _ _
_
..___ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
e a
Beaver Valley Unit 2
In summary, good engineering, quality construction, aggressive QC, and thorough preoperational testing programs have provided good assurance that a high level of quality has been achieved.
The ag-gressive involvement of the site staff and all levels of management have been exceptionally effective in anticipating, identifying, and resolving potential problems and gives additional confidence that a high level of quality is being achieved.
However, there was little evidence of the use of QA as a management tool in that QA was not used for assessment, to make improvement recommendations, to identify problem root causes, or to trend and identify developing potential problems.
2.
Conclusion i
Category 2.
3.
Board Recommendation None.
i
_ _ _ _ _
_
_ _ _
________ ________ _____ ____________-
_-_
e
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2
V.
SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES A.
Investigation Activities Three allegations were received during the evaluation period. One con-cerned alleged drug abuse, another involved alleged QC inspector harass-ment, and the third involved alleged conflict of interest.
Licensee and NRC investigation and followup activities concluded that none of the allegations were substaniated.
B.
Escalated Enforcement Action No escalated enforcement actions took place during the evaluation period; however, Violation 86-29-01, concerning improper reporting under 10 CFR 50.55(e) was subsequently issued as Severity Level III with no Civil Penalty.
C.
Management Conferences July 9,1986 - A special, announced management meeting at NRC's request to discuss the results of the Region I SALP board convened to assess licensee performance from April 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986.
December 15, 1986 - A special, announced management meeting at the lic-ensee's initiative to discuss the modification and testing program in-tended to correct problems experienced with the ball type main steam isolation valves.
,
January 5, 1987 - A special, announced management meeting at NRC's re-quest to discuss the status of the Operations Training Program, and the cross-training program for Unit 1/2 oparators.
February 18, 1987 - A special, announced management meeting at NRC's re-quest to discuss the status of security grogram development, and the potential impact on fuel load.
D.
Construction Deficiency Reports (CDRs)
Seventeen CDRs were submitted by the licensee during the assessment period.
Nine of the deficiencies were the result of design or fabrica-tion errors.
Four CDRs were caused by personnel error.
Three of the deficiencies were associated with vendor supplied hardware.
One CDR resulted onsite due to installation of insufficient bolts on a seismic support.
Construction deficiency reports are listed in Table 4.
E.
Licensing Activities During the SALP period, numerous meetings and site visits took place and many documents were issued by the NRC.
The following major licensing actions took place during the period:
. _ _ _
-_ _-.
.
-
--
-
,_
- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i
.
v Beaver Valley Unit 2
May 28, 1986 SER Supplement 1 issued.
July 7, 1986 Engineering Assurance Program determined to be acceptable substitute for IDVP or IDI.
August 25, 1986 SER Supplement 2 issued.
September 30, 1986 Seismic Qualification Review Team and Pump and Valve Operability Review Team onsite audits begin.
November 6, 1986 First draft to Technical Specifications transmitted.
November 18, 1986 Environmental Qualification Review Team onsite audit begins.
November 25, 1986 Construction Permit (CPPR-105) extended to December
31, 1987.
December 1, 1986 SER Supplement 3 issued.
Detailed chronologies of licensing activities are documented in SER Supplemants 2 - 4, Appendix A.
I j
l
!
!
!
i I
i
,
.-_
. -. - _. _.., _, _. _, _ _, _
_
-. _
_ - _., _ _ _.. _ _. _ _ _ _.., - _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _... _ _.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
e Beaver Valley Unit 2 TABLE 1 INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES INSPECTION AREAS REPORT NO.
HOURS INSPECTED
,
86-07 Resident Licensee action on previous inspection findings, pre-
!
214 Hours operational test program implementation, RCS cold hydrostatic test, Emergency Diesel Generator and High Head Safety Injection Pump proof testing, and QC program implementation.
86-08 Specialist RCS cold hydrostatic test; including review of the 76 Hours test procedure, prerequisites, preparation; test witnessing; and coordination between contractor and licensee QA personnel.
Also, followup on previous inspection findings.
86-09 Specialist Engineering Assurance Program technical audit pre-240 Hours paration in the areas of mechanical systems, mechani-l cal components, civil / structural, electric power,
and instruments and control.
86-10 Specialist Installation of electrical system and components.
35 Hours 86-11 Specialist Review of preoperational test procedures and results, 35 Hours QA/QC interfaces, design of AFW turbine driven pump steam admission line design for water hammer poten-tial, "C" RCP problems and licensee action on pre-
vious inspection findings.
86-12 Resident Licensee action on previous inspection findings, pre-158 Hours operational test program implementation, RCS cold hydrostatic test evaluation and system restoration, and Emergency Diesel Generator exhaust hood insula-tion failures.
!
86-13 Specialist Independent measurements inspection using the NRC 376 Hours Mobile Nondestructive Examination Laboratory on selected structural supports, fuel racks, and pre-
service inspection 'veldments.
'
86-14 Specialist Nonradiological chemistry program including training, 58 Hours requalification, and analytical procedures evaluation.
i T1-1
,
-
_ _ _. - _ _ - - _ -
-. _, _
.. _ _ - - -,. _ _,.. - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ -. - _ _. -.
-, -
, _ _ _ _ _ ___ _ - _________--_______________
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ ___-_____
__ _
-
-
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 2 INSPECTION AREAS REPORT NO.
HOURS INSPECTED 86-15 Resident Licensee action on previous inspection findings, pre-208 Hours operational test program implementation, proof test-ing of AFW pumps, operational testing of station bat-teries, progress of electrical separation programs, and followup on electrical support allegations.
86-16 Specialist Nuclear material control and accounting including:
81 Hours organization, operation, shipping, receiving, stor-age, internal control, inventory, document control, and management.
86-17 Specialist Engineering Assurance Program technical audit.
240 Hours 86-18 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation procedures, 31 Hours test results for cold hydrostatic test, QA/QC inter-face, proof-testing for manual and motor operated valves, and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
86-19 Specialist Reactor vessel installation and associated procedures 42 Hours and QA recorcs.
Also, installation, modification and QC of safety related mechanical equipment.
86-20 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, proce-40 Hours dures, QA/QC interface, containment instrument air compressor testing, resolution and status of main control board changes, and licensee actions on pre-vious inspection findings.
86-21 Resident Licensee actions on previous inspection findings, 219 Hours preoperational test program implementation, new fuel receipt, Physical Security Plan implementation for protection of the new fuel, licensee response to bomb threats, preoperational test procedure review, and solid state protection system proof testing.
86-22 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, test 71 Hours witnessing, QA/QC interface, installation and re-moval of temporary strainers, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-23 Specialist Engineering Assurance Program technical audit.
160 Hours 86-24 Specialist Operational readiness in the areas of operations, 52 Hours maintenance, and QA.
T1-2
_
.
o Beaver Valley Unit 2 INSPECTION AREAS REPORT NO.
HOURS INSPECTED 86-25 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, proce-33 Hours dures, results, QA/QC interface, MSIVs, new fuel receipt and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
86-26 Specialist Preservice Inspection Program and data, 36 Hours j
86-27 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, proce-46 Hours dures, QA/ QC interface, MSIV testing, test witness-ing and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-28 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, proce-l 70 Hours dures, test witnessing, QA/QC interface, MSIV testing, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-29 Specialist Activities involving instrumentation, control and 39 Hours electrical systems and components and licensee ac-tion on previous inspection findings.
!
86-30 Specialist Instrument and instrument cable installation, work l
39 Hours observation and document review.
86-31 Resident Licensee action on previous inspection findings, new 287 Hours fuel receipt, security, potential for High Energy l
Line Break in the Safeguards Building, rigid sway strut functional interference, preoperational test program implementation including testing of AFW, emergency diesel generator (EDG), SSPS, and reactor trip breakers.
86-32 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, proce-50 Hours dures, test witnessing, QA/QC interface, AFW and MSIV proof testing, and licensee action on previous in-spection findings.
86-33 Specialist MSIV ball valve operability and ring setting problems.
37 Hours 86-34 Specialist Radiation protection program, preoperational activi-52 Hours ties and new fuel receipt, handling and control program.
86-35 Cancelled 86-36 Specialist QA Program for preoperational testing and licensee 73 Hours response to Generic Letter 83-28, Salem ATWS Event.
T1-3
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
.
e Beaver Valley Unit 2 INSPECTION AREAS REPORT NO.
HOURS INSPECTED 86-37-Specialist Preservice inspection activities and procedures, and 32 Hours nondestructive examination activities and records.
86-38 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, proce-50 Hours dures, test witnessing, results, QA/QC interface,-
MSIV test facility, EDG history, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-39 Resident Licensee action on previous inspection findings, new 150 Hours fuel receipt, Hot Functional Testing, potential fail-ures of multiple ECCS pumps, TMI Action Plan Require-ments, AFW and MSIV testing.
86-40 Specialist Preoperational Test program implementation, Hot 83 Hours Functional Testing, QA/QC interface, MSIV testing and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-41 Specialist Installation and rework of electrical power cables 36 Hours and related documentation, calculations and verifi-cations of voltage levels during transients, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-42 Specialist Operational readiness in the areas of procedure pre-31 Hours parations and staffing for operations, maintenance and instrumentation and controls.
86-43 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, test 186 Hours witnessing during HFT, QA/QC interface, MSIV latch testing, and licensee action on previous inspection findings.
86-44 Resident Licensee actions on previous inspection findings, 372 Hours Hot Functional Testing, AFW and RPS system testing, regenerative heat exchanger weld indications, pre-service inspection activities, MSIVs, firewrap of HVAC ductwork, radiation monitoring system reviews, TMI Action Plan Requirements, and preoperational test program implementation.
86-45 Specialist Process monitoring and radioactive waste system pre-82 Hours operational testing and organization, staffing and procedure development with respect to chemistry and effluent controls.
T1-4
.
O Beaver Valley Unit 2 INSPECTION AREAS REPORT NO.
HOURS INSPECTED 86-46 Specialist Electrical splices and terminations utilizing heat 26 Hours shrink tubing to determine conformance to 10 CFR 50.49 and IE Notice 86-53, " Improper Installation of Heat Shrinkable Tubing," and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
86-47 Specialist Licensee action on previous inspection findings, 61 Hours electrical separation rework activities, and storage and protection of safety related electrical cables.
87-01 Specialist Operational readiness in the areas of procedure 74 Hours preparation, staffing and implementation for opera-tions, maintenance and instrumentation and controls.
87-02 Resident Licensee action on previous inspection findings, pre-461 Hours operational test program implementation, containment structural acceptance test and integrated leak rate test, security, RPS testing, TMI Action Plan Require-ments, control room wall removal, CO actuation of
fire dampers, HVAC equipment seismic supports, EDG testing, and charging pump test deficiency resolution.
87-03 Specialist QA Program, receiving inspection, storage and hand-158 Hours ling, design change and modification program, OSC, and non-licensed training.
87-04 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, procedure 67 Hours review, initial startup test program status, QA/QC interface and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
87-05 Specialist Preoperational testing of security systems and review 38 Hours of status for security implementation, 87-06 Operator License Exams *
87-07 Cancelled 87-08 Specialist Management meeting in Region I Office to discuss 8 Hours Unit 1/2 operator cross-training.
- This report documented the NRC administration of exams and involved no NRC in-spection hours.
T1-5
. =
. _ _.. -
-.
%
'
Beaver Valley Unit 2 INSPECTION AREAS REPORT NO.
HOURS INSPECTED 87-09 Specialist Operational radiation protection program; organiza-38 Hours tion and management controls, external exposure and personnel dosimetry, internal exposure control and assessment and control of radioactive materials.
87-10 Specialist Preoperational test program implementation, QA/QC 62 Hours interface, operational readiness and licensee actions on previous inspection findings.
87-11 Specialist Fire protection piping installation and program im-
<
31 Hours plementation.
87-12 Specialist Containment Integrated Leak Rate testing and struc-66 Hours tural acceptance test.
87-13 Specialist Activities associated with radiography of the Re-33 Hours generative Heat Exchanger welds and reporting of PSI identified deficiencies.
87-14 Inspection conducted during next SALP period.
87-15 Specialist QA Program effectiveness in areas of document control, 32 Hours records and preoperational readiness.
f T1-6
-
.-
.
...
.
-
.
__.
..
.
.
...
r--
e.
.
o Beaver Valley Unit 2 TABLE 2 INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY (4/1/86 - 2/28/87)
ACTUAL AREA HOURS ANNUALIZED
% OF TIME 1.
Construction 1455 1587 28.5 2.
Preoperational Testing 1841 2008 35.9 3.
Fire Protection and Housekeeping 162 177 3.2 4.
Operational Readiness 764 833 14.9 5.
Assurance of Quality 893 974 17.5 6.
Licensing
0 0.0 TOTALS 5115 5579 100.0 T2-1
e O
Beaver Valley Unit 2 TABLE 3 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY A.
Violations Versus Functional Area By Severity Level Functional No. of Violations in Each Severity Level Area Dev.
V IV III II I
TOTAL 1.
Construction
-
-
-
-
-
2.
Preoperational Testing
1
-
-
-
3.
Fire Protection
& Housekeeping -
-
-
-
-
-
-
4.
Operational Readiness
-
-
-
-
-
5.
Assurance of Quality
-
-
-
-
-
6.
Licensing
-
-
-
-
-
TOTALS
2
1
0
T3-1
_
- _ -
e
!
Beaver Valley Unit 2 B.
Summary Inspection Severity Functional Brief
!
Ncmber Requirements Level Area Description 86-13-01 10 CFR 50.55A IV
NRC identified indica-
' tion on previously accepted steam genera-tor supports that had not been dispositioned.
!
86-13-02 10 CFR 50, IV
NRC identified unac-App. B, ceptable linear indi-Criterion V cations on spent fuel
~
storage racks.
86-21-01 Special Nuclear V
Degraded security bar-Materials License rier providing access
,
SNM-1954 to Fuel Building.
86-28-01 10 CFR 50, IV
Changes made to systems
App. B.,
were not properly re-Criterion V flected in preop tests.
86-28-02 10 CFR 50, V
Test personnel failed App. B, to check prerequisites Criterion XI prior to resuming testing.
86-29-01 10 CFR 50.55(e)
III
Late reporting and inadequate corrective action for defective circuit cards.
86-31-04 10 CFR 50, IV
Inadequate acceptance
'
App. B criteria to determine Criterion V adequacy of sway strut paddle / bracket clear-ances.
-,
86-32-02 BVPS-2 FSAR Dev.
Preoperational test 14.2.12.15.1 did not determine available net positive
,
suction head for re-circulation spray pumps.
,
T3-2
_ _ _ _ _,_.... _., _, _,
_. - _, _ _.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _. _. _.. _..._
_ _.
-
e O
Beaver Valley Unit 2 Inspection Severity Functional Brief Number Requirements Level Area Description 86-46-01 10 CFR 50, IV
Cable damage at a App. B, splice junction by the Criterion V sharp edges of a stainless steel motor housing base plate.
86-47-01 10 CFR 50, IV
Inadequate outside App. 8, storage of safety Criterion XIII related cable reels.
86-47-02 10 CFR 50, IV
Inadequate QC inspec-App. B, tion procedure for the Criterion X equipment storage program.
87-02-02 10 CFR 50, IV
Inadequate QC inspec-App. B, tion of HVAC equipment Criterion X supports.
T3-3
e o
Beaver Valley Unit 2 TABLE 4 CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY REPORTS (APRIL 1, 1986 - FEBRUARY 28, 1987)
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 Cause CDR Number Deficiency Code 86-00-05 Structural Failure of pipe insulation on the Diesel B
Generator exhaust nozzles and insulation.
86-00-06 Failure of an ITE/Telemecanique molded case circuit E
breaker for a motor control center to reset after a trip.
86-00-07 Diesel Generator fuel rack boost vent piping deficiency.
B 86-00-08
"C" reactor coolant pump damage by foreign material in A
RCS during hydrostatic testing.
86-00-09 Failure of NAMCO limit switches to activate.
E 86-00-10 American Warming fire dampers missing springs resulting E
in a damper failure to close.
86-00-11 Priority raise feature of steam generator steam dump B
valves.
86-00-12 Commercial grade terminal blocks installed instead of A
nuclear grade terminal blocks.
86-00-13 Failure of Westinghouse 7300 NLP, NSC, and NRA printed E
circuit cards.
86-00-14 Corrections to Design basis flood calculations resulted A
in identification of Class IE components which could be submerged.
86-00-15 Identification that Auxiliary Relay Racks were not B
qualified to Class 1E requirements.
86-00-16
-
Main Steam Line Braks may produce environments greater A
than E.Q. limits 86-00-17 Identification of Defective welds in the Regenerative B
heat exchanger.
T4-1
- __
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
...
_ - _ _ _
__
_
F o O
Beaver Valley Unit 2 Cause CDR Number Deficiency Code 87-00-01 Potential accelerated thermal aging of cables in close B
proximity to hot pipi,ng.
87-00-02 HVAC control circuit logic errors.
B 87-00-03 MSIV unlatching force deficiercies.
B 87-00-04 Deficiencies in EDG HVAC fan sL,, ports.
F Cause Codes A - Personnel Error B - Design / Fabrication Error C - External Cause D - Defective Procedure E - Component Failure F - Site Construction Error l
l l
T4-2
.-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _