ML20214N215
| ML20214N215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 05/20/1987 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20214N201 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-85-98, NUDOCS 8706020101 | |
| Download: ML20214N215 (56) | |
See also: IR 05000334/1985098
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ENCLOSURE 1
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE
REPORT 50-334/85-98
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 1
ASSESSMENT PERIOD: OCTOBER 1, 1985 - MARCH 15, 1987
BOARD MEETING DATES: APRIL 23-24, 1987
?DR * 870520
0 U$000K05000334
PDR.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
P,a!Le
I. INTRODUCTION......................................................... 1
A. Purpose and 0verview............................................ 1
B. SALP Board and Attendees........................................ 1
II. CRITERIA............................................. ............... -2
III. SUMMARY OF RESULTS................................................... 4
A. Overall Summary................................................. 3
B. Background...................................................... 3
C. Facili ty. Performance Analysis Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
D. Plant Shutdowns and Trips................... ................... 7
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS................................................. 8
A. Plant 0perations................................................ 8
B. '
Radiological Controls........................................... 11
C. Maintenance..................................................... 15
D. Surveillance.................................................... 18
E. Fire Protection and Housekeeping................................ 22
F. Emergency Preparedness.......................................... 25
G. Security and Safeguards......................................... 27
H. Refueling and Outage Management................................. 30
I. Licensing Activities............................................ 33
J. Training and Qualification Effectiveness........................ 35
K. Engineering Support............................................. 37
L. Assurance of Quality............................................ 39
V. SUPPORTING DATA AND SUMMARIES........................................ 42
A. Investigation and Allegation Review............................. 4E
B. Escalated Enforcement Action.................................... 42
C. Licensee Conferences Held During Appraisal Period............... 42
D. Confirmatory Action Letters..................................... 42
E. Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs)......................... 42
F. Licensing Activities............................................ 43
TABLES
Table 1 - Inspection Report Activities
Table 2 - Inspection Hours Summary
- Table 3 - Enforcement Activities
! Table 4 - Tabular _ Listing of LERs by Functional Area
Table 5 - LER Summary
ATTACHfiENT
Attachment 1 - Total Number of Shutdowns and Trir,s Per Year Since Startup
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose and Overview
The Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) is an integrated
NRC staff effort to collect the-available observations and data on a
periodic basis and to evaluate licensee performance based upon this in-
formation. The SALP program is supplemental to normal regulatory pro-
cesses used to ensure compliance with NRC rules and regulations. The
SALP program is intended to be sufficiently diagnostic to provide a
rational basis for allocating NRC resources and to provide meaningful
guidance to the licensee management to promote quality and safety of
plant operation.
An NRC SALP Board, composed of the staff members listed below, met on
April 23, 1987, to review the collection of performance observations and
data to assess the licensee performance in accoroance with the guidance
in NRC Manual Chapter 0516, " Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perform-
ance". A summary of the guidance and-evaluation criteria is provided
in Section II of this report.
This report is the SALP Board's assessment of the licensee's safety per-
formance at Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 for the period October
1, 1985 through March 15, 1987.
B. SALP Board and Attendees
Chairman
W. Kane, Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP)
Members
W. Johnston, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS)
S. Collins, Deputy Director, DRP (Part Time)
L. Bettenhausen, Deputy Director, DRS (Part Time)
J. Stolz, Director, Directorate I-4, NRR (Part Time)
E. Wenzinger, Chief, Projects Branch No. 3, DRP
M. Shanbaky, Acting Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Radir b g cal
Protection Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeg.rards (DRSS)
(Part Time)
L. Tripp, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3A, DRP
P. Tam, Licensing Project Manager, NRR (Part Time)
W. Troskoski, Senior Resident Inspector
Other Attendees (non-voting)
J. Beall, Senior Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley Unit 2
S. Pindale, Resident Inspector, Beaver Valley Unit 1 (Part Time)
W. Lazarus, Chief, Emergency Preparedness Section, DRSS (Part Time)
G. Smith, Safeguards Specialist, QRSS (Part Time)
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 2
II. CRITERIA
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Licensee performance is assessed in-selected functional areas, depending on
whether the facility is in a construction, preoperational or operating phase.
Each functional area normally represents areas significant to nuclear safety
and the environment, and are normal programmatic areas. Special areas may
be added to highlight significant observations.
One or more of the following evaluation criteria were used to assess each
functional area.
1. Management involvement and control in assuring quality.
2. Approach to resolution of technical issues from a safety standpoint.
3. Responsiveness to NRC initiatives.
4. Enforcement history.
5. Operational events (including response to, analysis of, and corrective
actions for).
6. Staffing (including management).
Based upon the SALP Board assessment, each functional area evaluated is clas-
sified into one of three performance categories. The definitions of these
performance categories are:
Category 1. Licensee management attention and involvement are aggressive and
oriented toward nuclear safety; licensee resources are ample and effectively
used so that a high level of performance with respect to operational safety
is being achieved. Reduced NRC attention may be appropriate.
Category 2. Licensee management attention and involvement are evident and
are concerned with nuclear safety; licensee resources are adequate and rea-
sonably effective so that satisfactory performance with respect to operational
safety is being achieved. NRC attention should be maintained at normal levels.
Category 3. Licensee management attention or involvement is acceptable and
considers nuclear safety, but weaknesses are evident; licensee resources ap-
peer to be strained or not effectively used so that minimally satisfactory
performance with respect to operational safety is being achieved. Both NRC
and licensee attention should be increased.
The SALP Board may have determined to include an appraisal of the performance
trend of a functional area. Normally, this performance trend is only used
where both a definite trend of performance is discernible to the Board and
the Board believes that continuation of the trend may result in a change of
performance level. Improving (declining) trend is defined as: Licensee per-
formance was determined to be improving (declining) near the close of the
assessment period.
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III. SU R RY'AND RESULTS
A. -Overall Summary
As with all facilities in the status of Beaver Valley 1 and 2, the main
focus of management attention has been on the unit in the final stages
of construction and preoperational testing. Despite the drain on licen-
see resources, good performance was generally maintained for the operat-
ing unit. Of particular significance was the small number of personnel
errors which demonstrated good attitudes and proper attention to detail
by workers and first line supervisors. Continued strong performance was
observed in the. Security and Emergency. Preparedness functional areas with-
some improvements noted in recovery from refueling outages.
This assessment noted lingering problems with components such as feedwater
control valves, the inverter for Vital Bus No. 3, and balance of' plant
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equipment which had'not previously received appropriate corporate man-
agement attention and engineering support. By the end of the. assessment
period, more comprehensive actions appeared to be planned in each of.
these cases. It was concluded that although the quality assurance pro-
gram was in compliance with regulatory requirements, it was not being
effecti.vely.used as a management tool to identify potential problems be-
fore they occur, improve overall performance, and provide added assurance
that-quality is being achieved. Significant slippage was noted in the
licensing area; it appeared to be due to reassignment of key personnel
to Unit 2 startup activities and decreased licensee attention to this
activity for Unit 1.
B. Background l
1. Licensee Activities
This assessment period started with Beaver Valley Unit 1 operating
mid-way through the fifth fuel cycle. From October 1, 1985, until
the start of the Fifth Refueling Outage on May 16, 1986, the station
operated at power except for three reactor trips, one manual shut-
down and five instances of power reductions or holds due to equip-
ment problems. Two of the reactor trips (October 4, 1985 and
February 10, 1986) involved the failure of Vital Bus III which
caused a malfunction in the feedwater control system that led to
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a steam generator level trip. The third reactor trip occurred on
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October 25, 1985, during performance of a reactor protection system
(RPS) instrumentation surveillance test and was due to a combination
of procedure deficiency and technician error. The manual reactor
shutdown of November 1,1985, and all power reductions or holds were
! due to balance of plant feedwater component problems; most notably
i the feedwater control .alves.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 4
The Fifth Refueling Outage lasted about 14 weeks and included major
maintenance, modification and test activities such as: reactor
vessel 10 year in-service inspection (ISI), containment integrated
leak rate test (CILRT), steam generator tube inspection and plugging,
main turbine maintenance, snubber and valve testing. Refueling
activities confirmed the first instance of fuel damage at BV-1 due
to baffle jetting (6 fuel rods in one assembly). A spare assembly
was reconstituted with seven stainless steel rods and placed m the
damaged assembly's location as an interim fix. Results of the
multi-frequency eddy-current testing identified the existence of
steam generator cold leg tube thinning. About 50 tubes were
hydraulically expanded against the lower support plates as a joint
experiment with Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, in an attempt to
arrest the thinning phenomena.
Plant startup from the outage was delayed several days as the reac-
tor coolant system (RCS) had to be cooled down from Mode 3 due to
a leaking pressurizer safety valve flange and to effect an emergency
modification to the containment hydrogen recombiner (HR) system.
The HR blowers had been replaced during the outage with new envi-
ronmentally upgraded models that did not have the reserve capacity
to overcome line resistances offered by the swing check valves.
Additional manual valves were installed outside containment to pro-
vide equivalent protection.
From the Fifth Refueling Outage startup through the end of this
assessment period, the station experienced four additional trips.
The first occurred with the plant in Mode 2 during initial startup
after a failure in the rod control system dropped four rod cluster
control assemblies (RCCAs) and operators manually tripped the reac-
tor in accordance with emergency procedures. The other three trips
occurred from full power and were due to: an instrument technician
error and procedure human factors deficiency during performance of
a reactor trip breaker (RTB) surveillance test on September 3, 1986;
operator error and procedure deficiency during performance of a
turbine pedestal test on January 11, 1987; and, a malfunction in
the turbine overspeed control system due to random component failure
on February 7, 1987. The plant was also manually shut down two
other times and power reduced to 25% for feedwater system problems
that included feedwater control valve (FCV) repair and rewelding
of 3/4" vent and drain lines adjacent to the high vibration area
of the FCVs.
During the last several months of this period, the station was in
the final stages of preparation for integrating operation of Units
1 and 2. Major activities included plans for expanding the site's
security boundaries, removing the walls separating the two control
rooms and integrating the various support groups.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 5
2. Inspection Activities
One NRC senior resident inspector was assigned to Beaver Valley
Power Station, Unit 1 for the entire assessment period and a resi-
dent inspector (trainee) was assigned for 12 months. The total NRC
inspection effort for the period was 3445 hours0.0399 days <br />0.957 hours <br />0.0057 weeks <br />0.00131 months <br /> (2362 annualized
resident and region-based) with a distribution in the various func-
tional areas as shown in Table 2.
An NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection Team observed the annual
emergency exercise on November 20, 1986, in which Region I partici-
pated.
Other NRC team inspections were conducted for Equipment Qualifica-
tion, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R, Fire Protection, actions relative
to the Salem ATWS generic requirements (NRC Generic Letter 83-28)
and added coverage of the station's Fifth Refueling Outage recovery.
This report also discusses " Training and Qualification Effectiveness"
and " Assurance of Quality" as separate functional areas. Although
these topics, in themselves, are assessed in the other functional
areas through their use as criteria, the two areas provide _a synop-
sis. For example, quality assurance effectiveness has been assessed
on a day-to-day basis by resident inspectors and as an integral
aspect of specialist inspections. Although quality work is the
responsibility of every employee, one of the management tools to
mea,ure this effectiveness is reliance on quality assurance inspec-
tions and audits. Other major factors that influence quality, such
as' involvement of first-line supervision, safety committees, and
work attitudes, are discussed in each area.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 6
C. Facility Performance Analysis Summary
FUNCTIONAL AREA LAST THIS RECENT
PERIOD PERIOD TREND
1. Plant Operations 2 2
2. Radiological Controls 2 2
3. Maintenance 1 2
4. Surveillance 2 2
5. Fire Protection and
Housekeeping 1 2
6. Emergency Preparedness 1 1
7. Security & Safeguards 1 1
8. Refueling and Outage
Management 3 2
9. Licensing Activities 1 2 Declining
10. Training and Qualifi-
cation Effectiveness *
2
11. Engineering Support *
2
12. Assurance of Quality *
2
- These are functional areas which were not assessed in previous assessments, but
are treated as separate functional areas in this assessment.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 7 l
D. Unplanned Shutdowns, Plant Trips and Forced Outages i
Date/ Functional
Power Level Description Root Cause Area
10/14/85 Feedwater control system malfunc- Repetitive Assurance
45% tion upon loss of Vital Bus III component failure, of Quality
10/25/85 RCS flow transmitter spike during Technician error Maintenance
100% post-maintenance testing compounded by an
error in a procedure.
11/2/85 Manual shutdown to repair feed- Design Engineering
100% water control valves due to
damage resulting from high
vibration.
2/10/86 Feedwater control system malfunc- Repetitive Assurance
100% tion upon loss of Vital Bus III component failure of Quality
8/26/86 Manual trip in response to 4 Random component
below 5% dropped control rods. failure.
9/3/86 Reactor Trip Breaker Shunt Trip Technician error Surveillance
100% during surveillance testing. compounded by
inadequate switch
labeling.
9/12/86 Manual shutdown to repair two Design Engineering
100% feedwater water control valves
due to damage resulting from
high vibration.
l 10/27/86 Manual shutdown to repair leaking Design Engineering
i 100% weld on 3/4" feedwater vent line
l located near the high vibration
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area of the feedwater control
valves.
1/11/87 Reactor trip - turbine trip ini- Inadequate proce- Surveillance
100% tiated by " low auto-stop oil procedure.
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pressure" during surveillance
test.
2/7/87 Reactor trip - turbine trip due Random component
i 100% to =purious actuation of the tur- failure.
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i troller.
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Beaver Valley' Unit 1 '8
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IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
A. . Plant Operations (1029 hours0.0119 days <br />0.286 hours <br />0.0017 weeks <br />3.915345e-4 months <br />, 29.7%)
1. Analysis
The previous assessment noted that the overall conduct of operations
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during non-outage. conditions was considered satisfactory; a Category
2 rating was assigned. Problems occurred during the recovery period
j of major refueling outages as management and personnel resources
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were being directed toward support of Unit 2 startup. .The overall
staff experience level at BV-1 was considered relatively low due
to the need to ensure an adequate staff of licensed operators with
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commercial experience for BV-2. \
). This assessment is based on routine inspections performed by'the-
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resident. inspectors and a team inspection of operations during the
last refueling outage.
The past concerns either were not repeated or had minimal impact s
- during this current assessment. However, the success of station
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management in assuring quality and resolving technical issues aris-
ing from operational events has been mixed, though adequate re-
sources were generally allotted. During the previous assessment,
- .there were three reactor. trips from low power due to steam' generator
.(SG) level control problems during.startup. Because of control
system modifications, improved procedures and operator _ training,
there were no low power trips due to SG level _ control problems for
, the last 18 months. The previous assessment saw one SI-reactor trip
c due to the failure of Vital Bus No. 3. -This assessment saw two full
). power reactor trips due to the recurrent failure of this same busi
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and operator action prevented trips for two other failures. The
majority of the manual shutdowns and major power. reductions'has
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continued to be due to. problems on the secondary side. .Previously,
these problems were mostly related to condenser tube';eakage (the
condensers were retubed) and balance of plant (B0P) pumps'for the
! last assessment period, totalling:about 12 separate events. This
i cu'rrent' period saw improvement with about 9 such events relating
to B0P pumps and the feedwater control valves (FCV). Though the
- FCVs have undergone several modifications, an effective engineering
i solution is still pending as discussed in Section K, Engineering
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j~ Support.
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Experience with the primary side was much better. Corporate and
. station management have not hesitated to take whatever actions
necessary, including ordering plant shutdown, to ensure that safety
- issues are addressed in a timely and technically conservative manner.
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Startup from the Fifth Refueling Outage was delayed several days
as the plant was cooled down to investigate and repair the source
of a primary system leak that was within technical specification
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 9
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limits. Extensive. measures were taken to retrieve secondary system
loose parts that could subsequently degrade steam generator tubes.
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When SG cold leg tube thinning was found, the station joined with
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the NSSS vendor to investigate this phenomena and conduct a tube
, expansion experiment to arrest the thinning. After one fuel assem-
(: bly experienced baffle jetting damage and a near-term fix imple-
i ;s mented (stainless steel rods), plans were developed to perform an
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upflow cooling modification, scheduled for the Sixth Refueling
Outage. >
The various station safety committies continue to function well.
The Offsite Review Committee (0RC), composed of the more senior
corporate personnel, and its varic'ps subcomcittees is an effective
and aggressive organization. The'0RC has served as a management
tool in upgrading plant performance through assignment of tasks to
, resolve selected safety issues that require extensive, allocation
of resources and coordination among station groups. It has been
,s able to provide the study oversight of plant problems and' activities
s because all of the Nuclear Group personnel, including senior man-
agement, are located on site. . Special meetings are often held.
The Onsite Safety Committee (OSC) is staffed by more junior person-
nel to limit the time ~ de.nards on the senior staff. Despite this
lower level of, emphasis, there have been no problems readily attri-
butable to it.
The Station's problem identificatioh system is generally sound.
The Unit Off Normal Reports (U0NRs) were deliberately set up with
a low thres' hold for identifying a wide range of problems and anoma-
lies. It can provide an effective method for trending events and
ensuring an appropriate level of review and corrective action.
Though significant events;are evaluated and reported when necessary
and within the regulatory 3time constraints, the lower tier UONRs
were often backlogged for several months before completion. This
indicates that overview of this system has not been aggressively
coordinated and managed. Hpwever, final root cause analysis and
long term corrective actions have been sound and technically ade-
quate with two notable exceptions. Problems with the_FCVs and Vital
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7 Bus No. 3 inverter have persisted; they are discussed in more detail
in' Section L, As'turance of Quality.
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Within the last year, the station has set up a trip reduction pro-
( g gram in conjunction with other Westinghouse NSSS plants. Advisory
in nature, its full' poteipial is still unknown. The Operations
i Assessment Group is assigned oversight responsibilities.
Preparation of ' operator candidates for taking the NRC administered
exams was a problem in 1986 in that 9 of 16 Senior Reactor Operators
(SR0s)'and 5 of 17 Reactor Operators (R0s) candidates failed various
portions of tbt exams. This is discussed in more detail in Section
J, Training ard Qualification Effectiveness.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 10
Staffing levels remained stable and operator performance showed an
improving trend over the last assessment period. No trips were due
to inadequate operator performance. Several automatic trips were
avoided due to operator knowledge of recent events or the specific
field location of components. Over this 18 month period, there were
several problems associated with personnel failing to pay attention
to detail: cycling a safety injection valve and leaving it out of
position during reactor shutdown; startup of both low head safety
injection (LHSI) pumps with the suction valves closed for about 10
seconds (another operator immediately identified it) during its
annual test; an unlocked Nuclear Shift Supervisor (NSS) key cabinet;
and failure to act in a more aggressive manner when a power operated
relief valve (PORV) was leaking 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after it lifted as evi-
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denced by elevated tail pipe temperatures. Once identified, post-
tive corrective actions were taken, consistent with station policy.
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No major vio?ations occurred. The attitude of the operators, first
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line supervision and station managerrent toward safety remained
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positive. A notable strength has been the number of licensed per-
sonnel found in the management organization and various support
groups. However, although there currently is a large number of
licensed personnel within the organization, it is not clear what
long term plans are being made to bring new candidates into the
training pipeline.
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Plant operations performance has been sound and generally consistent.
Current licensed personnel are well trained in an INP0-accredited
program and use of a plant-specific simulator. The overall level
of professionalism is good and appears to be improving. First line
supervision is active in planning and controlling significant plant
evolutions. Though several plant configuration control problems
occurred, the overall program is sound and receives additional
management attention. Despite the increased demands of the Unit
2 project, management involvement is evident. Improved performance
was observed in this area during this assessment period. No sig-
nificant problem areas are evident.
2. Conclusions
Category 2.
3. Board Recommendations
None.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 11
B. Radiological Controls (384 hours0.00444 days <br />0.107 hours <br />6.349206e-4 weeks <br />1.46112e-4 months <br />, 11.1%)
{
1. Analysis
The previous Category 2 rating in this area was based principally I
on a decline in the radiological controls program due to uncertain-
ties as to the functions and responsibilities resulting from or-
ganizational changes during the period. Although no major program-
matic weaknesses were identified, minor problems were identified
that were indicative of a need for improvements in two program areas:
(1) the evalaution/ corrective action system, and (2) management
oversight of radiological control activities,
a. Radiation Protection
During this assessment period, there were indications of in-
creased management attention in the program. Adequate controls
over individual external and internal exposures were exercised.
Organizational changes caused problems during the last assess-
ment period. During the current period, the radiological con-
trols organization remained stable, and radiological control
personnel seemed more confident in their functions and re-
sponsibilities. Late in the assessment period, the upward
reporting channel for the radiological control organization
was changed from Nuclear Services to Operations. In light of
the past problems when organizational changes were made, the
licensee should closely monitor the impact of this latest
change.
Indications of increased plant management attention and con-
trols included a short-term requirement that line supervisors
perform radiological protection surveillances. Radiological
protection management instituted a new system to allow tracking
the status of daily surveillance items. Although the new sys-
tem constituted a good initiative to increase management over-
sight, it was not formalized to achieve its full potential as
an effective management tool in that it did not provide for
trending, evaluation, and correction of radiological deficien-
cies. It also did not allow for direct input by organizations
other than the radiological controls group.
In the ALARA area, the licensee's three year running average
for collective person-rem continued to decline through the end
of calendar year 1986 (398 person-rem). This performance is
fairly close to the three year running averige for all PWRs
(444; a 10 percent difference). However, the licensce's three-
year running average is heavily weighed by the atypically low
60 person-rem in 1985, a non-outage year. The annual person-
rem total for 1986 (627, an outage year) slightly exceeded the
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 12
goal of 570. This was apparently due to the fact that it was
a 10 year ISI outage and that unforeseen outage work had to i
be performed. This overall performance was close to the in- !
dustry average. Concerns in this area included no aggressive
oversight and coordination of ALARA activities, due to the fact
that there was no assigned full-time staff in charge of imple-
mentation of the program and that there was low attendance at
the Nuclear Group ALARA Review Committee meetings. (This com-
mittee has the responsibility to review the status of program l
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implementation.)
Adequate controls over individual external and internal ex-
posures were exercised resulting in individual exposures being
maintained below the applicable administrative limits. For
the outage during this assessment period, a computerized indi-
vidual and RWP-dose tracking program was implemented and up-
dated daily. This represented a significant improvement in
the personnel exposure tracking area over the previous manual
methods. Numerous other microcomputer-run programs are now
used in the respiratory protection, radwaste shipping, instru-
ment status, and procedure maintenance areas. Heightened em-
phasis on work to increase the degree of computerization in
the area of personnel exposure records contributed to increased
efficiency and improved record retrieval and accuracy. These
findings indicated that the licensee has made progress in
automating the cumbersome manual system of records and reports.
Minor and infrequent violations were identified. One of the
two violations in this area involved failures to issue termina-
tion exposure records to contractor personnel within the pre-
scribed time limits and was a repeat violation. The other
violation concerned an instance in which administrative control
of keys to high radiation areas was lacking. The NRC had pre-
viously expressed concern about the administrative control of
these keys and the lack of a procedure for key issuance, in-
l ventory, and accounting. This weakness continued during this
SALP period. There were also inadequacies in the air sampling
program during the outage, which caused the loss of airborne
survey information for some significant radiological operations.
The licensee has initiated significant steps to upgrade radio-
logical control equipment and instrumentation f e combined Unit
1 and 2 operations. Four automatic whole-body friskers, two
high-throughput whole-body counters and two new gamma spectro-
meters, with one dedicated to radiological control purposes,
have been ordered. Four new portal monitors are in place at
the proposed common site security access point but are not yet
operational.
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Beaver Valley Unit 1 13
b. Radioactive Waste Management and Effluent Controls
There was one inspection of the licensee's transportation ac-
tivities during this assessment period. Several problems were
identified resulting from inadequate quality assurance and
quality control activities. The licensee had changed their
Process Control Program (PCP) which established operating and
test parameters to ensure a stabilized waste product. The
revised PCP was implemented prior to review and approval by
appropriate management levels as required. Second, the licen-
see had used a vendor procedure for dewatering which had not
been reviewed since 1983. The maximum allowed review period
is two years. Third, a shipment of two drums of radwaste was
sent offsite with puncture holes, and represented a situation
where the licensee failed to perform appropriate inspection
of the shipment. During the last assessment period, an NRC
inspection determined that quality assurance activities related
to verifying waste characterization in transportation activi-
ties needed improvement. While the licensee has responded in
a timely manner to all the specific NRC identified problems,
the number of problems indicate there had been inadequate
self-identification of problems and weaknesses in this area.
There were no inspections in the Effluent Controls area during
this assessment period. However, the licensee submitted the
results of their ventilation line loss study initiated in 1983
as a result of an NRC unresolved item. Preliminary review in-
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dicated a comprehensive study which received ongoing management
support. NRC's evaluation of the licensee's analysis of the
data showed some incongruities concerning application of cor-
rection factors. The licensee provided additional information
at NRC's request near the end of this period. In addition,
there was an unplanned minor release of radioactive liquid
effluent as a result of improper operation of an isolation
valve. This release was significant enough to constitute a
violation of Technical Specifications. A citation was written
in the operations area for improper valve operation.
In summary, the licensee has initiated increased management atten-
tion to certain areas while other areas need improvement. Instru-
mentation and equipment are being upgraded. The radiological con-
trols program and ALARA continue to be adequate. Quality assurance
and quality control in the area of transportation require increased
management oversight.
.
- , . - . . - ,..-...e w -- - . , ,
- . . - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ ---_
.
..
Beaver Valley Unit 1 14
2. Conclusions
Category 2
3. Board Recommendations
None.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
_ . - . _ - -- . -
...
I
.
Beaver Valley. Unit 1 15
,
'
C. -Maintenance and Modification (400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />, 11.5%)
- 1. Analysis
.
- ~
No major programmatic problems were evident during the last SALP
and the licensee's performance was-judged to be relatively consist-
ent. . A Category 1' rating was assigned. One weakness.noted was the
~
E
'
number of secondary side component problems that were responsible ,
'for 8 of-the 15 reactor shutdowns and 13 major power reductions.
,
'
'There'were also indications that corporate support should be
_ directed toward both parts procurement and improving coordination
between multiple plant groups to shorten the length of time compon-
ents were out of service' for corrective maintenance or modification.
v . .
!~ This assessment is based on specialist inspections of the' mechanical
, and maintenance areas, a maintenance program review, a team inspec-
'
-tion of actions impleniented in response to Generic Letter 83-28, .
and observations of ongoing activities by the resident-inspectors.
A general improvement trend was evident-throughout this assessment
-
period concerning the impact of secondary side mechanical problems
on the reactor protection system, though two causally linked event.
chains remained active since the last SALP. The first involved
-
repetitive failures of the Vital Bus No. 3 inverter and the second-
,
concerned continued high vibration problems due to the -feedwater
!- control valve design. This adverse trend was considered to primar-
'
ily be the result of ineffective engineering resolution of long
! standing problems and is further discussed in Section.K, Engineering
Support.-
r
- Together, the above problems, cach persisting for several years,
l demonstrate a management determination to make existing plant
equipment function despite an adverse impact on plant reliability
and unnecessary safety system challenges. However, for other prob-
lems where a root-cause could be identified, sound solutions were
implemented in a timely manner. Many of the power reductions during
the previous assessment period were due to main condensor tube leaks.
A retubing modification and addition of an increased capacity steam
generator blowdown system (during the Fourth Refueling Outage)
enhanced secondary chemistry and eliminated this' major source of
down time. ,
Procedures and policies were rarely violated by maintenance person-
nel. Fcr the two reactor trips that occurred due to technician-
error, procedure human factors deficiencies were a contributing
l
cause. The 18 month calibration procedure for low RCS loop flow
I is not normally performed at power and consequently, did not contain
appropriate caution steps for the transmitter post-maintenance test.
- . - , . - . , - - - . . - - - , - . , - a ..... - - . - , - . . . . . - - . - - . . . . - -
.
.
9
-Beaver Valley Unit 1 16
The other trip that occurred during the.RTB shunt test was partially
due to the lack of distinctive labeling. Each event was promptly
addressed through the station's corrective action system.
Two region-based specialist inspections identified a weakness in
complying with administrative requirements for complete Maintenance
Work Request documentation. Examples were found where some MWRs
were not completely filled out with all the desired information.
Also, the required post-maintenance testing or reasons for not per-
forming a test were not always clearly identified on the MWR. Once
these concerns were raised, the station was responsive to re-evalu-
ating the MWR system and revising it to better serve their needs,
including trending component failures between systems.
Staffing levels were maintained fairly constant, despite Unit 2
mobilization efforts and the reassignment of a number of mechanics
outside their original positions and the introduction of personnel
from outside the station due to a company-wide reorganization re-
sulting from the shutdown of a fossil fuel plant.
Portions of the maintenance tri.ining program have already been
accredited by INPO, and the remaining areas are awaiting the INP0
site visit. Though the program implements a minimum job training
concept, neither the training nor maintenance departments maintain
a list of personnel qualified to perform certain jobs, although this
is a long term goal. Instead, personnel-are chosen on an as-avail-
able basis by supervisors familiar with the individuals' qualifica-
tions. Though this practice is generally satisfactory (especially
in I&C where a first class and second class technician often work
together with well-written and proven procedures), there have been
some historical problems in the mechanical area. For example, since
1976, the two main feedwater pumps have experienced 22 separate
problems for which the corrective action included replacing or re-
building the pump seals (an evolution that requires that reactor
power be limited to 65% with one pump out of service). A balance
of plant trending program could have more quickly focused management
attention in this area.
The day to day corrective and preventive maintenance of safety re-
lated components was consistently observed to have received adequate
pre planning and supervisory oversight. Plan of the day meetings
in the morning proviJe a strong coordinating tool for controlling
plant maintenance activities and ensuring adequate support from all
station groups. A Plant Managers meeting with representatives of
the various departments is routinely held at the end of each day
to review the status of the major maintenance items.
Use of proper procedures, clearances and interface with the Radcon
and QC Departments was routinely noted in the field. No program-
matic problems were evident in the conduct of work.
1
.
..
Beaver' Valley Unit 1 17
In summary, licensee and contractor activities associated with pre-
ventive and corrective maintenance have generally been well con-
trolled. Procedures used during routine evolutions were generally
well written although one trip was due to a defective procedure.
Training appears adequate as the station just completed a self-
evaluation of.the mechanical and electrical areas which is required
by INP0 accreditation. There has been increased attention in the
balance of. plant components although the maintenance program is
basically informal and based on past plant experience. Program
strengths included good adherence to procedures and equipment
clearances, job pre planning, and QC involvement. Improvements in
documentation MWR completeness and post-maintenance testing speci-
ficity were noted during this assessment.
2. Conclusions
Category 2.
. 3. Board Recommendations
None.
,
---.v. - , ..--._,-.,-,c. ,,-e, . , , - - , . , , . - - - - . .
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 18
D. Surveillance (610 hours0.00706 days <br />0.169 hours <br />0.00101 weeks <br />2.32105e-4 months <br />, 17.6%)
1. Analysis
The licensee's performance during the last half of the previous
assessment period was excellent, with no new significant problems
identified. For the whole period, a Category 2 rating was assigned.
Programs controlling test scheduling, procedure development, data
review and approval appeared to be functioning well. Conduct of
testing was generally sound across all departments involved with
the BV surveillance program. Areas where the licensee's performance
was generally satisfactory, but could be improved, included better
and (2) conduct of 18 month Operational Surveillance Tests (OSTs)
performed during each refueling outage by the Operations Department.
This assessment is based on four specialist inspections of the ISI
program, containment integrity, and core physics testing. The
resident inspectors and an inspection team provided input regarding
routine and outage-related testing.
In general terms, the various test programs that management had
previously set up to administratively control surveillance testing
continued to function well. Test scheduling and performance showed
consistent evidence of prior planning by all groups involved. The
individual procedures were found to be explicit and generally pro-
vide for good control of activities.
One programmatic area still requiring further plant management r -
tention is the set up of system alignments for performance of th(
18 month OSTs. The NRC team inspection of the recovery period of
the Fifth Refueling Outage found that this previously identified
weakness had not yet been fully corrected because of the continued
reliance on adherence to plant configuration control procedures
during high activity periods and the number of deviations from those
control procedures identified by the team. Conversely, the 18 month
Beaver Valley Tests (BVTs) (performed by the Plant Performance and
Testing Group) and Maintenance Surveillance Procedures (MSPs) (per-
, forfm. by various maintenance and support groups) were found to ex-
plicitly control alignments for both pre-test and as-left conditions.
Two NRC inspections of the BV 10-Year ISI Program found stronger
evidence of the licensee's efforts to update and control the program.
Department coordinators were directly involved in the oversight of
contractor activities. Their efforts resulted in adequate control
over ISI program documents and inspection acti v ities.
Management commitment toward addressing safety issues from a tech-
nically sound safety standpoint was also evident in the use of
advanced equipment and concepts during the refueling outage inspec- ,
!
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 19
tion activities. These included application of the B&W Automated
Reactor Inspection System for contact ultrasonic examination of the
reactor vessel, and the Automated Data Acquisition System for data
analysis. Also, the MIZ 18 multi-frequency eddy-current system was
utilized for steam generator tube inspections. The licensee also
took the initiative in implementing an experimental steam generator
tube modification in an attempt to arrest the cold leg tube thinning
phenomena.
A special inspection to assess the BV-1 containment. integrity found
good management controls over station programs to assure the func-
tion and availability of appropriate systems. A subsequent inspec-
tion of the in progress Type A Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test
found it technically adequate and well controlled. The station has
dedicated ample resources to assure the operability of this import-
ant fission product barrier.
Strong oversight of the startup physics testing program was apparent.
The Cycle 6 startup physics tests were performed in accordance with
approved test procedures by highly qualified personnel. Test re-
sults were properly evaluated and documented. Also, the safety
evaluations performed to support the Cycle 6 startup (such as Cycle
6 core reload, steam generator tube plugging, and insertion of re-
constituted fuel assemblies) were well prepared and technically
sound.
The Test and Plant Performance Group's staffing was found ample.
Interviews with cognizant personnel determined reactor engineers
were very knowledgeable in their assigned areas. Quality Control
personnel were observed providing surveillance coverage during Cycle
6 startup testing and zero power physics testing. Additional man-
agement control in this area was evidenced by the completion of an
administrative plant procedure audit by Quality Assurance prior to
the Cycle 6 startup.
The first level review of tests has not always taken a critical look
at the test results. Data needs to be analyzed not only for meeting
specified acceptance criteria, but also reasonableness early in the
review process to determine whether or not the surveillance test
intent has been successfully accomplished. For example, the BVT
measuring total RCS flow for DNB parameters was signed off as being
acceptable despite the fact that two loops indicated individual flow
rates less than that assumed in the core design. Aggressive resolu-
, tion of the apparent anomaly was not pursued until questioning by
the NRC. Also, the 18 month OST measuring accumulator check valve
leakage was considered satisfactory despite the fact that data were
contradictory in that measured back leakage was greater through two
check valves in sories as opposed to the single check valve align-
t
!
r 1
a
Beaver Valley Unit 1 20
ment. Another example included the routine review and acceptance
of an erroneous remote shutdown panel instrument indication that
had failed low.
Greater engineering technical assistance is needed during the modi-
fication process to assure adequate development of surveillance test
acceptance criteria. Examples include the use of Rosemount RTDs
as replacement components in the reactor protection system without
considering possible efforts on the time delay constants specified
in the TSs. Also, the PORV stroke time for use in the low-tempera-
ture overpressure protection system was not defined in the test
program, resulting in one valve being outside the limit assumed in
the SER.
Plant experience indicates that greater consideration and caution
needs to be exercised during the initial performance of new tests
and the conduct of tests in other than normal conditions. During
this assessment period, two reactor trips from full power occurred
partially due to technician error and partially due to procedure
human factors inadequacies during an RCS loop flow calibration not
normally run while operating, and the reactor trip breaker shunt
relay tests on components which had just been modified. Unusual
alignments also contributed to a safety injection while in cold
shutdown during performance of an 18 month emergency diesel genera-
tor test in coincidence with an off-normal solid state protection
system setup.
Operator error during surveillance testing was responsible for two
events during the Fifth Refueling Outage. A motor operated safety
injection valve was left open after stroking for a surveillance test
resulting in reactor vessel overfill. Also, both low head safety
injection pumps suction valves were inadvertently left closed for
a short period of time during performance of the full flow SI test.
The two surveillance tests that were missed during this assessment
period had no programmatic link. The fuel pool cooling pump test
requirement was misinterpreted during the outage and the missed low
setpoint power range monitor trip channel check was due to an in-
adequate startup check list that was not revised to reflect a tech-
nical specification amendment issued about two years ago.
Early in this assessment period, a general weakness in the fire
protection surveillance area was identified. Four LERs and two
Level IV Violations were generated due to inoperable smoke detectors,
filter bank spray nozzles and detection system, and inadequate post-
modification testing of the Backup Indicating Panel (BIP). This
area is discussed in greater detail in Section E, Fire Protection.
_ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
__ _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 21
The various surveillance programs previously established continued
to function well. Routine monthly surveillance tests were effective
in identifying equipment problems. Improved controls were found
in the ISI program and strong programs were found in all physics
testing and integrated leak rate testing. Test acceptance criteria
were generally well defined with the exception of the DNB reactor
coolant loop flow measurement and the absence of the low temperature 1
overpressure protection PORV stroke time assumed in the safety
evaluation report. The plant staff was responsive to these concerns,
once raised. One remaining weakness is the area of pre-test system
alignment for the 18-month operational surveillance tests.
To summarize, the surveillance programs generally functioned well.
- owever, the potential high level of performance was not obtained
due to concerns related to review of test data for reasonableness,
several missed surveillance tests and the continued need to
strengthen th 18 month OST system alignment methodology. Though
good programs are in place, better implementation at the line
supervisor level and a strong technical involvement in developing
new test acceptance criteria is necessary to realize further im-
provements and prevent recurrences of past problems.
2. Conclusions
Category 2.
,
3. Board Recommendations
None.
!
l
'
t
.
_ - _ - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ - _ - - . - . - _ _ _ - - - _ _ - .
o
a
Beaver Valley Unit 1 22
E. Fire Protection and Housekeeping (231 hours0.00267 days <br />0.0642 hours <br />3.819444e-4 weeks <br />8.78955e-5 months <br />, 6.7%)
1. Analysis
In the last assessment, it was concluded that the licensee's fire
prevention program had been effective in minimizing fire hazards
and maintaining a high state of readiness to handle challenges
through a well trained and equipped staff. Housekeeping was con-
sidered satisfactory. A Category 1 rating was assigned.
This section assesses the licensee's overall performance in fire
protection, including: prevention, detection, ability to respond
to any fire with appropriate onsite and supplemental offsite forces,
engineering and hardware features to limit its spread, and the
ability of the station to deal with its operational consequences
(safe shutdown). This assessment is based on a team inspection of
Appendix R commitments, and review of onsite activities by the
resident inspector.
Management involvement is strongly evident in the areas of preven-
tion (there were no fires), and ensuring adequate resources to re-
spond to any fire. The onsite fire brigade is well staffed; each
shift drills once per month. Additionally, offsite forces are
readily available through the Mutual Fire Assistance Program. Ex-
tensive pre planning is demonstrated during the yearly drills with
offsite agencies. Onsite fire fighting equipment is modern and
maintained in good working order through inclusion in the plant's
surveillance program.
A team inspection of Appendix R requirements found excellent review
of the issues, prior planning and management involvement at all
levels. The station analysis to show compliance with the cost-fire
safe shutdown requirements was noteworthy, particularly in the areas
of associated circuit analysis. An alternate safe shutdown proce-
dure for use in the event of a control room or other design basis
fire, were found to be very thorough, detailed, and practical. A
satisfactory walk-through of these procedure exhibited the effec-
tiveness of operator training and a good working knowledge in this
area. Human factors considerations were generally good; only minor
concerns were identified regarding the adequacy of emergency light-
ing in some areas. Previous actions taken to address the oil col-
lection system for the reactor coolant pumps and the safe shutdown
capability issues were found adequate.
Several hardware and instrumentation deficiencies became evident
in this assessment period. Some had existed for several years and
were due in part to inadequate engineering support to the fire pro-
tection issue addressed by Generic Letter 81-12 and 10 CFR 50, Ap-
pendix R. QA audits were ineffective in early identification of
this weakness.
- - -.
.-
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 23
A 1985 QA audit, performed in response to IE Information Notice 83-69
found several missing fire dampers that isolated various ventilation
ducts that traversed adjacent fire zones. Inspections of other fire
dampers, resulting from a deficiency identified prior to this as-
sessment period, found that the automatic closure feature for 6
dampers in the cable spreading room were not reconnected after a
1981 modification. No post-modification test had been performed.
Expanded damper testing subsequently identified an operability
problem due to inadequate lubrication after initial installation.
Together, these hardware problems demonstrate an apparent insensi-
tivity to the fire protection issue earlier in the Beaver Valley
project history, at a time when resources were severely stressed
due to the TMI action item modifications. After completion of the
work, the statiun failed to adequately look back at the issues to
self identify deficiencies in a more timely manner.
Analysis of LER 86-05 found that the initial root cause investiga-
tion and corrective actions for the blocked main filter bank spray
nozzles, to be inadequate. Appropriate attention was focused on
this issue after the NRC identified the concern. This indicates
that the plant problem identification systems still lack a strong
sensitivity toward fire protection.
Instrumentation problems included inoperability of a portion of the
' Backup Indicati:g Panel (BIP) due to inadequate post modification
testing. Keys necessary to operate BIP functions were found not
to fit the locks after the system had been installed for one full
fuel cycle (although master keys were available). The NRC Appendix
R inspection also found that emergency lighting in safe shutdown
access routes required additional work. Together, these problems
would have hindered, but not prevented, the operators efforts to
bring the plant to cold shutdown from outside the control room.
Other instrumentation problems included the unintentional (and un-
knowing) de-energization of the river water intake structure smoke
detectors, and an inoperable smoke detector in the emergency diesel
generator room that was not identified over an extended period of
time due to inadequate vendor performed surveillance testing.
Together, the above problems (scme of which pre-dated Appendix R) ,
show that the station lacked a comprehensive overview of this area '
, during its inception, especially engineering support to define the
post-modification test acceptance criteria. The various station
groups did not develop a cohesive overview of this area and QA
failed to identify this weakness. Though resources are adequate
and either redundant systems were available or analysis showed that
the protection function would have been met, additional management
attention is warranted to ensure that the design, modification, and
plant maintenance functions do not subsequently degrade this area.
j
l
.-
.
- Beaver Valley Unit 1 24
Housekeeping has generally been satisfactory. A plant improvement
program has been underway since the last refueling outage resulting l
in a general upgrade of plant appearance. New emphasis has been
placed on maintaining the material condition of the plant by the
operations staff. '
2. Conclusions
Category 2.
3. Board Recommendations
None.
_ - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - _ - - - - - . . - - - - - - - - - - . -
,
O
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 25
F. Emergency Preparedness (154 hours0.00178 days <br />0.0428 hours <br />2.546296e-4 weeks <br />5.8597e-5 months <br />, 4.4%)
1. Analysis
During the previous assessment period, the licensee was rated a
Category 1. During this assessment period, there was one inspection
of emergency preparedness activities which included observation of
the annual full participation emergency exercise.
The licensee's execution and participation in the exercise demon-
strated thorough planning and a strong commitment to emergency pre-
paredness. Emergency response personnel were observed to be knowl-
edgeable in their duties and in use of plant EP Implementing Proce-
dures, a reflection of a high level of training and a strong commit-
ment to emergency preparedness. Only minor deficiencies were iden-
tified in the exercise concerning: operation of the Post Accident
Sampling System (PASS); activation of the Technical Support Center
(TSC); offsite notifications; and use of IP 4.1 "Offsite Protective
. Actions".
t
The licensee conducted a good critique of the exercise, highlighting
areas for improvement and committing to taking appropriate correc-
tive action where necessary.
The licensee has ample full-time onsite and corporate staff who are
assigned to maintain the emergency preparedness program. The Train-
ing Department staff is also actively involved in the program. It
obtains feedback from the emergency preparedness group regarding
deficient exercise performance or other programmatic areas and in-
tegrates corrections into emergency response training.
Emergency response facilities (ERF) are dedicated and have been well
maintained throughout the period. These include the Emergency
Operations Facility, Technical Support Center, Radiological Opera-
tions Center, Operations Support Center, and Emergency News Center.
An outstanding rapport is maintained with offsite officials in a
very difficult situation of coordinating with three states, several
local governments and two FEMA regions. A strong commitment by the
licensee to train and inform both offsite officials and the general
public has been made and implemented.
In summary, the licensee has maintained a high level of emergency
preparedness both onsite and offsite. Personnel have displayed an
excellent attitude toward maintaining a high level of emergency
preparedness. Overall management involvement in emergency prepared-
ness activities has been effective as evidenced by timely respon-
siveness to NRC initiatives.
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _
_ - - _ - .
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 26
)
l 2. Conclusions
- --
Category 1.
3. Board Recommendations
None.
3
_
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 27
G. Security and Safeguards (146 hours0.00169 days <br />0.0406 hours <br />2.414021e-4 weeks <br />5.5553e-5 months <br />, 4.1%)
1. Analysis
During the last assessment period, no programmatic weaknesses were
identified. The only significant performance problem involved
access badging issues; there has been no recurrence. A Category
1 rating was assigned.
During this assessment period, the licensee's overall performance
remained essentially consistent with the previous assessment period.
Program strengths that remained apparent during this period were:
licensee oversite of the security contractor; clear and concise
program implementing procedures; effective training; adequate staff-
ing; and high morale. Toward the end of the period, preparation
for bringing the Unit 2 project (construction was about 98% complete)
under the Beaver Valley Security Program lagged sufficiently behind
schedule to place the security program and hardware installation
on critical path. This lack of progress toward completion of
various security systems has since been corrected in response to
NRC's concerns by applying significant construction and support
group resources toward completing the necessary work.
Licensee's management involvement, support and oversight of the
security program remained evident and resulted in highly successful
implementation of the program during this assessment period. Man-
agement oversight of the contract security force was adequate to
provide the licensee with necessary and current knowledge regarding
program implementation.
Program implementing procedures and instructions were updated, when
required, to provide the security force with current, clear and
concise directions. The effectiveness of the procedures and in-
structions, and also the training program,'is apparent by the small
number of personnel errors during the period. This is especially
significant since there was a change in the security force contrac-
tor about two-thirds of the way through the period.
In October 1986, the security service contractor was changed. All
the original security force supervisors and about half of the guards
and watchmen were retained by the new contractor. The remainder
of the new guard force was made up of industrial security personnel
previously employed at Beaver Valley Unit 2. The new Unit 1 secur-
ity force members were provided classroom and on-the-job training
by experienced Unit 1 personnel prior to assuming their new posts.
Although a QA audit of records prior to contractor changeout did
not occur until prompting by NRC, comprehensive planning for this
evolution took place. Licensee management, on its initiative, met
with Region I personnel to describe the plans for the changeover.
_
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 ~ 28
The changeover was accomplished without any problems or decrease
in security effectiveness. This is further indication of the at-
tention management affords to the plant security program.
The turnover rate in the contractor security force remains low and
staffing appears adequate, as indicated by the limited use of over-
time. Contractor supervisory and administrative staffing appears
adequate for the current work load. The licensee's proprietary
security force staff currently consists of three full-time positions
for Units 1 and 2. The accumulated total experience of the licen-
see's staff was recently significantly reduced due to personnel
turnover. It remains to be seen whether the licensee's current
staff can effectively provide the necessary cversight and control
of the contract security force for a two unit site, especially con-
sidering the problems inherent with the startup of the new systems
and equipment.
The training program is administered by four, full-time, experienced
instructors. Lesson plans have been developed, are current, and
reflect the commitments in the NRC-approved security program plans.
Training facilities are professional and instructional aids are ex-
tensively utilized. All security related facilities, e.g. , guard
house, alarm stations and office areas, are well maintained, orderly
and clean. Licensee oversight of the training facilities and
security program is provided and is evidence of the licensee's in-
tent to maintain an effective and professional security force. Mem-
bers of the security force were found to be very knowledgeable of
their duties and responsibilities when performance tested by NRC
personnel.
The licensee submitted seven security event reports under 10 CFR
73.71(c) during this assessment period. A continuation of a series
of badging problems that started in the previous assessment period
was responsible for two reports. Management involvement in enforc-
ing station policy and a change in security procedures eliminated
further recurrence. Other reports involved strikes by craft workers
at Unit 2 that resulted in picket lines around both units (twice),
and a bomb threat received at Unit 2 but, because of its non-spect-
fic nature, a search was conducted at both si:'s with negative re-
sults. Another event involved a degraded vital area barrier due
to a lack of communications between maintenance and security. The
last event involved an electrical breaker that had been found
t + oed. A thorough investigation by the licensee disclosed that
i d been tripped by a member of the security force out of curi-
%. j. All events were properly handled and compensatory measures
were initiated when required. The event reports were clear, concise
and adequate for NRC analysis. The quality of the event reports
is indicative of proper management review.
.
. *
Beaver Valley Unit 1 29
The licensee's program and procedures for the cnntrol and accounting
-
of special nuclear material at Unit 1 were reviewed and found to
., be adequate and generally well implemented.
During the assessment period, the licensee submitted a revision to
the Security Plan and a revision to the Training and Qualification
Plan in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p) and re-
sponded to the Miscellaneous Amendments to 10 CFR 73.55, codified
by NRC in August, 1986. The revisions to the Security and Training
and Qualification Plans were technically adequate. The licensee's
response to the Miscellaneous Amendments is currently under review.
In summary, the 1icensee has sustained its previous performance
level in the area of security during this assessment period. A
problem with the identification badging process carried over from
the previous assessment period but was effectively corrected early
in this period. The matter could have received closer management
attention to resolve it more expeditiously. During the next assess-
ment period, close management attention and monitoring will be re-
quired to determine if the licensee's small proprietary staff can
effectively continue to provide the necessary oversight and control
of the contract security force when the Unit 2 security program is
combined with the Unit 1 program. It is evident by the licensee's
performance during this period that efforts to maintain a high
quality security program are continuing.
2. Conclusions
Category 1.
3. Board Recommendations
None.
. - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 30
H. Refueling and Outage Management (262 hours0.00303 days <br />0.0728 hours <br />4.332011e-4 weeks <br />9.9691e-5 months <br />, 7.6%)
1. Analysis
The previous assessment noted that a series of problems occurred
within a relatively short time span during recovery from the Fourth
Refueling Outage that resulted in a Category 3 rating. Though
operational in nature, they were perceived to be due to inadequate ,
management control over the system restoration and outage recovery I
activities. As similar problems occurred during the same time span !
while recovering from the Third Refueling Outage, but were notice-
ably lacking during minor outages and routine cperations, it was
concluded that the normally effective management control system
broke down due to the station's perceived need to place the plant
l back on line to meet a scheduled deadline. Other indicators of
degraded management effectiveness included: (1) control room con-
gestion and (2) a lack of supervisory attention to major plant
evolutions. A contributing factor to some of these problems was
the cumbersome startup procedure methodology used. Within the last
SALP period, the licensee made major efforts beyon+1 those formally
committed to, to upgrade their administrative controls. These
efforts were effective in a two week outage but were not fully
'
tested during a major outage recovery.
During this assessment period, there were several reactor trips and
unplanned shutdowns, each of a relatively short duration. From mid-
May until the end of August,1986, the plant was shut down for the
Fifth Refueling Outage and received extensive attention through an
NRC team inspection. Several weaknesses identified in the previous
SALP were still apparent with the refueling outage OSTs that in-
cluded: (1) specific acceptance criteria was found to be ambiguous
in several tests, (2) pre-test requirements to have "all valves in
designated NSA positions as determined by control room logs or flow
diagrams" was an inappropriate practice as many instances were
identified where control room logs and flow diagrams contained dis-
crepancies from actual alignments. This concern is formally ad-
dressed in Section D, Surveillance.
The actual outage recovery received extensive backshift coverage
and focused on the conduct of control room activities, plant con-
figuration control and completion of startup prerequisites. The
attitude of Operations personnel was positive, cooperative and pro-
fessional. The reactor operators, for the most part, enforced the
station's policy on limiting access to the controlled area. Good
involvement by the Nuclear Shift Operations Foreman (an SRO) in both
routine evolutions and outage testing occurred. The STA was often
involved in performing calculations and tracking followup of startup
open items. The station's commitment in response to previously
expressed NRC concerns, particularly during outages, to keep control
room noise levels to a minimum was manifested by the addition of
.- _ ____ ____
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _
..
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 31
carpeting to muffle background noise. The equipment clearance desk
was moved outside of the control room during the outage, thus mini-
mizing personnel access. Station management was evident throughout
this entire period and unlike the last several refueling outages,
the recovery was handled in a more disciplined fashion that lessened
the " push to startup" problems previously observed.
Commitments in this area made in response to concerns expressed in
the last SALP generally led to overall success. The concept of
developing an outage logic diagram of required safety functions and
hardening those flow paths by use of equipment caution tags was
effective during the outage. Other changes which included the
development of a low level incident reporting system, a system
manager program, reactor trip reduction program, and prescriptive
requirements for review criteria relating to tagging and log reviews
were also beneficial. Though plant configuration control appeared
to have improved to the point where there were none of the signifi-
cant deficiencies previously observed, some general weaknesses still
remain. The "NSA Deviation Review Log" which is intended to ensure
that final system alignments contain no unacceptable deviations has
little value because instances were identified where the walkdown
for some systems was not completed until over 30 days after initi-
ation. Operations personnel had difficulty in maintaining the con-
trol room status boards up-to-date because valve lineups were often
changed several times through equipment clearance work and ongoing
outage testing after the initial walkdowns were started. The NRC
team inspection concluded that weaknesses still existed in that some
system lineups were started while significant work remained, control
room drawings could not be maintained current to reflect actual
system alignment, the system of deviations as currently practiced
is an administrative burden on supervisory personnel and the clear-
ance system though generally effective, is inefficient.
In summary, the previous outage recovery problems were successfully
avoided during this recovery through the intensive use of manpower
and extensive supervisory overview. The plant configuration prob-
lems that did occur had little impact on plant safety. This is in-
dicative of the high priority that DLC management has placed on the
outage recovery process that went beyond the commitments made to
the NRC. However, the fact that several minor problems still oc-
curred such as initially running both LHSI pumps with their suction
valves closed for several seconds (due to inexplicit 18 month OST
system lineup instructions and operator error) and a valve was
stroke tested and left open, indicate that further improvements
centered on refinement of the plant configuration control system
and continued emphasis on operator attention to detail are still
necessary.
_ - _ _ _ .
.
.-
Beaver Valley Unit 1 32
2. Conclusions
Category 2.
3. Board Recommendations
None.
- - --_-__ _-- -______-_ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ -
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 33
I. Licensing
1. Analysis
In the last assessment, it was concluded this area was staffed by
qualified technical personnel who adequately understood technical
issues with good timely handling of ongoing issues. A Category 1
rating was assigned.
The licensee's corporate management demonstrated a gradual decline
in involvement and control over licensing issues during this assess-
ment period. Corporate management chose to reassign personnel from
the licensing organization of Unit 1 to Unit 2, thus creating a
drain of talent and a marked decrease in aggressiveness to resolve
issues. For example, the need for an amendment to remove fuel rod
weight limits was identified early in 1986, but the change request
was not submitted until considerably later, requiring the staff to
take expedited action to issue an amendment. A second example in-
volves the modification of the hydrogen recombiner blowers. Ap-
parently, insufficient engineering work was done for this modifica-
tion, resulting in the need to request an emergency technical speci-
fication change. The staff took the route of " discretionary en-
forcement" and allowed the plant to restart with the stipulation
that the technical specification be expeditiously reviewed. By the
end of the assessment period and seven months after the initial
submittal, the licensee had yet to provide the revised version to
the staff for review. A third example late in the period involved
removal of the Unit 1/2 control room partition. Apparently, the
design work was not started early enough and was not substantially
complete when the first technical specification changes were re-
quested. This resulted in the staff having to review documents that
were constantly being revised. Greater discipline must be restored
to the licensing process.
Notwithstanding the above, the interaction of the licensee with NRC
staf' has usually resulted in clear understanding of safety issues.
Sour; technical approaches were usually taken by the licensee's
tech.dcal staff toward resolution of the majority of issues handled
during this assessment period. Conservatism was usually exhibited,
with sound technical judgement provided for most deviations from
staff guidance. The "no significant hazards" analysis provided by
the licensee were usually adequate.
The communications between the licensee and NRC staff have been
generally beneficial to both in the processing of licensing actions
and minimizing the need for additional information. On several
issues, multiple delays and document submittals still did not result
in resolution. The licensee lacked aggressiveness in pursuing close-
out of open issues and providing requested followup information for
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
. c
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 34
i
such items as SPDS design information and the effect of Rosemount
RDTs on various reactor trip time constants. Very often the late-
ness is blamed on lack of support by other organizations.
Early in this period, the staff requested all licensees to provide
information on implementation status of generic requirements. The
licensee's response was long overdue when it finally arrived. NRR
management was most concerned about the licensee's late response.
In summary, the licensee's previous high level of performance has
slipped due to the reassignment of personnel in support of Unit 2
startup activities. Though still generally satisfactory, management
appears to have lost the initiative in the licensing area and has
adopted a reactionary mode of operation as evidenced by the submit-
tal of TS changes prior to the completion of design work and num-
erous late submittals of what should have been routinely handled
information. The staff is not aware of any systematic efforts by
the licensee to provide additional oversight of licensing issues
to preclude such problems from occurring.
2. Conclusions
Category 2, Declining.
3. Board Reconnendations
Licensee: DLC needs to independently determine why the significant
decline in performance has occurred in this functiona area.
NRC: None.
.
.
Beaver Val 1ey_ Unit 1 35
J. Training and Qualification Effectiveness
1. Analysis
This functional area was not addressed separately in prior assess-
ments. Attributes of this area have been discussed in other appro-
priate areas and here provides a synopsis of the effectiveness of
the training and qualification programs.
The licensed operator training program produced two groups of can-
didates in 1986 that were not as well prepared for the NRC license
examinations as previous classes. From both groups, 9 of 16 SR0
and 5 of 17 R0 candidates failed various portions of their written
and simulator exams. The wide variation observed in the candidate
performance on the NRC exams as well as a high number of failures
on a facility administered pre-examination (10), is indicative of
either weakened program effectiveness and/or poor candidate selec-
tion. The testing of a large number of candidates for Unit 1 in
1986, which presently has 102 licensed operators, appears to have
been driven by management desire to dual license individuals on both
units. This lack of thorough preparation and effectiveness in
screening candidates was indicative of poor corporate management
oversight.
The requalification program appears effective. Administrative con-
trols were appropriate and program management was exemplary. No
reactor trips occurred during the past 18 months due to licensed
operator error or training deficiencies. There was a notable ab-
sence of trips on steam generator level at low power due in part
to training emphasis in this area. Operator response to plant
transients during this period was considered appropriate and in-
dicative of good training and excellent plant knowledge. Also,
training pertaining to new regulatory issues, such as the require-
ments of the Appendix R for cold shutdown from outside the control
room, was strong.
A site specific simulator was in use throughout this period. It
was effectively utilized in developing and running various EPP
scenarios as well as validating the new emergency operating proce-
dures. The simulator was also used to dry run various temporary
operating procedures and to enhance operator performance prior to
special evolutions. There was a good working relationship between
the operations and training departments.
Non-licensed operator training was adequate. The general employee
retraining program provides an annual refresher course to station
personnel that is tailored to include issues of current interest.
I
__. _ - . - , . _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 36
Technician and mechanic training was sound. There were two reactor
trips due to technician error, the same number as in the last as-
sessment, but training was not considered a primary factor in either.
There were no major or repetitive problems during this assessment
period due to inadequate training.
Licensed operator, non-licensed operator, and license retraining
programs were accredited by INP0 in December 1985. INP0 also ac-
credited the STA, radiation technician, chemistry, and I&C programs
in March 1986 shortly after the end of this assessment period. The
station has completed the self-evaluation reports and is currently
awaiting an INP0 site visit to complete accreditation of the me-
chanical, electrical, test staff, and manager areas.
A strong commitment to training was evident in many other areas.
This was evident by the efforts in emergency planning that include
not only extensive training of DLC personnel, but also a strong
commitment to train and inform both offsite officials and the
general public. In the area of security, the training and qualifi-
cation program made a positive contribution to the continued good
performance despite a change in contractor organizations. An active
program was also evident in the ISI and non-destructive examination
fields. The overall good performance of radiation technicians and
lack of any significant events due to technician error also reflects
a satisfactory program.
In summary, ample resources have been devoted to training at Beaver
Valley. All groups are involved and programs are satisfactory.
Good effectiveness was achieved as evidenced by strong worker per-
formance, low personnel error rates, and in particular, a low number
of reactor trips where personnel error was a contributing factor.
The relatively poor performance of licensee candidates in 1986 was
not indicative of past performance and appears to reflect decreased
management oversight of this area.
2. Conclusion
Category 2.
3. Board Recommendation
Licensee: Review program for scrcening licensed operator candidates
before putting them up for NRC exams.
NRC: None.
,
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 37
K. Engineering Support (208 hours0.00241 days <br />0.0578 hours <br />3.439153e-4 weeks <br />7.9144e-5 months <br />, 6.0%)
,
1. Analysis
This is a special section that has not been addressed as a separate
functional area in the last several assessments. It is based on
observations made during routine resident and several specialist
team inspections of areas that required significant engineering in-
put. This assessment focuses on the ability of the Nuclear Engi-
neering and Records Unit (NERU) to support the station design change
and modification process, its effective use in resolving special
station problems, and its ability to adequately address new regula-
tory initiatives.
Several strengths are apparent. Over the past several years, all
engineering services that impact the station have been brought under
the NERU. The unit is located in the Emergency Response Center,
within easy access to the station. NERU is an active participant
in o'itage planning meetings and routine plan of the day meetings.
During this assessment period, there has been increased emphasis
on providing engineering support in the field (such as during the
charging pump modifications) to investigate problems. However, the
response time required to answer station requests still appears to
be somewhat excessive. (In addition to completing design work for
the Sixth Refueling Outage modifications and working toward comple-
tion of a long overdue records update, significant efforts have been
directed toward the Unit 2 project transition program.) In response
to industry group initiative, the design change and modification
process is being upgraded in that the responsible design engineer
now performs a pre modification team walkdown to evaluate construct-
ability, maintenance and operability requirements.
NERU was not effectively used in the past to resolve long standing
problems at the station. There appears to have been a reluctance
to provide more timely assistance while the maintenance groups were
involved in protracted troubleshooting. Examples include a long
history of feedwater control valve problems that have persisted
since initial plant startup, and a number of failures of Vital Bus
No. 3 for which a root cause could not be determined. These short-
comings appear to have been recognized by management as evidenced
by the initiation of a feedwater reliability analysis program and
appropriate modifications planned for the next refueling outage.
For new regulatory requirements, such as fire protection, environ-
mental qualification of components, and motor-operated valve analy-
sis and testing (M0 VATS), the overview provided by NERU was not
vigorous. There were numerous design and installation problems
associated with fire protection early in that program that have just
been recently identified and wo'rked out. An early audit of the
environmental qualification document packages found poor record
-- _
- _ - _ _ - - . _ - - _.
-_ . _ . --_ - ._
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 38
management indicative of a lack of program oversight. There has
been a tendency to place new regulatory issues such as M0 VATS on
a low priority because of other ongoing tasks.
As another example of lack of vigorous followup, a design change
to the hydrogen recombiner blowers during the last outage resulted
in its failure to meet the technical specification flow rates and
required additional modification to the piping. Yet, the capacity
of the new blowers was questioned during the design process about
one year prior to installation, but not resolved.
In total, the above items suggest that engineering support has not
always been timely. Until relatively recently, the station has not
been able to provide appropriate engineering expertise in a more
expeditious time frame due to other priorities. However, the over-
all quality of the majority of engineering work completed has been
generally satisfactory. Significant effort has been directed toward
the Unit 2 project, and is expected to continue through the next
assessment period.
2. Conclusion
Category 2.
3. Board Recommendation
Licensee: None.
NRC: Perform a team inspection of the engineering support
activity after the Units 1 and 2 engineering organizations
are combined.
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 39
L. Assurance of Quality
1. Analysis
During this assessment period, management involvement and control
in assuring quality is being considered as a separate functional
area for the first time and continues to be one evaluation criterion
for each functional area. The various aspects of Quality Assurance
Program requirements have been considered and discussed as a integ-
ral part of each functional area and the respective inspection hours
are included in each one. Consequently, this discussion is a
synopsis of the assessments relating to quality work conducted in
other areas. However, it is not solely an assessment of the QA/QC
departments.
Significant resources have been dedicated to the assurance of qual-
ity, as measured by the number of personnel committed to the QA,
QA Surveillance and QC groups as well as implementation of the
double verification of alignment requirement for all station groups.
A strong commitment to this concept was evident by management ac-
tions with regard to recovery from the fifth Refueling Outage, and
conservative approaches taken to response to identified problems
(fuel baffle jetting, steam generator tube thinning, secondary side
loose parts control and containment integrity).
Throughout this assessment period, there was evidence that work in ,
the plant was being performed well at the mechanic-operator-techni- l
cian level through to first line supervision. There was a strong
QC presence at the work site. . Of particular note was the small
number of trips that occurred due to operator or mechanic error.
This was indicative of good morale, training, procedures, and
supervision.
The station has made a significant commitment to training that
appears effective. This has been partly responsible for the sus-
tained good performance in security and emergency planning as well
as the good operator performance record.
Although QA was in compliance with rules and regulations pertaining
to the QA program, it does not appear to be used as a management
tool to assure that new rules or regulations are met prior to their
required implementation date and NRC inspections. When QA was used
as such, for example the pre-inspection audit of the Environmental
Qualification Program at NRC urging, potential deficiencies and
violations were identified and corrected. Following this QA audit,
the NRC team inspection found a solid EQ program in place. Examples
where such a preventive review did not take place and would have
been helpful were implementation of the 10 CFR 61, Transportation,
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 40
and various fire protection requirements. In general terms, QA has
not made a significant contribution to identifying safety or major
program problems such as discussed elsewhere in this assessment.
A second weakness until recently, has been the lack of a quality
program for balance of plant equipment which has caused a signifi-
cant fraction of plant trips and unplanned shutdowns. Within the
last two years, a substantial number of surveillance tests have been
developed to monitor component or system performance for any adverse
trends. An informal balance of plant preventive maintenance program
aimed at increasing the reliability of major components is slowly
evolving, based in large part on plant experience.
Management oversight has generally been effective, considering the
increased demands the Unit 2 project placed on limited resources.
Several major areas where it appeared that management failed to
resolve problems in a timely manner or preclude their developing
included the Vital Bus No. 3 inverter problems, continued feedwater
control valve vibration difficulties, the decline in the performance
of the Licensing Group and the failure to assure that candidates
were ready to take the NRC license examiantions. With the above
exceptions, it appears that management involvement is assuring
quality was satisfactory.
Management and the Offsite and Onsite Safety Review Committees have
provided effective reviews of the modification process safety
evaluations. A low level incident report system has been in place
for the past several years. High visibility items or significant
events quickly work their way through the system for evaluation of
reportability and significance. However, the effectiveness of this
low threshold trending system has been limited by the length of time
required to complete the review process (some items not closed out
after nine months although important issues were generally acted
upon quickly). Because both ORC subcommittees and the OSC are part
of the review chain, the inordinate amount of time some of those
items remain open is indicative of a lack of strong management over-
sight and direction.
In summary, during this assessment period, the attitude toward
quality by the workers and first line supervision was found to be
solid throughout all plant groups. Station supervision routinely
gets out into the plant and keeps well informed of major activities
and developing trends. Strong QC involvement is evident in safety
related maintenance and is increasing in the balance of plant.
However, QA was not effectively used as a management tool to provide
further assurance that quality was being achieved. Corporate man-
agement and engineering support was not timely in resolving some
complex, long-standing technical issues that adversely affected
plant operations.
,
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 41
2. Conclusion
Category 2.
3. Board Recommendation
Licensee: DLC should reassess the scope and charter for the quality
assurance function to determine how QA can more effec-
tively be used as a management tool to identify potential
problems before they occur, improve overall performance,
and provide added assurance that quality is being achieved.
NRC: None.
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 42
V. Supporting Data and Summaries
A. Investigations and Allegations Review
There were three allegations received during this SALP period. One was
referred to NRR for technical review and found not to be a safety concern.
A second allegation involved three separate concerns raised by a con-
tractor Health Physics technician after employment termination. A rou-
tine Radcon inspection partially substantiated some of the concerns re-
lating to weak breathing air sampling methods though no noncompliances
were identified. The last allegation concerned a lack of control of
security keys and a vague reference to drug problems with security and
contractor personnel. Each of these concerns was evaluated by NRC but
none were substantiated.
B. Escalated Enforcement Action
1. Civil Penalties. None
2. Orders. None
C. Licensee Conferences Held During Appraisal Period
An enforcement conference concerning a security issue was held on the
Region I office on December 19, 1985.
Region I management met with DLC management to discuss SALP report 85-99
on December 19, 1985.
D. Confirmation of Action Letters
,
None
E. Review of Licensing Event Reports (LERs)
1. Tabular Listing
Type of Event
a. Personnel Errors 8
b. Design / Manufacturing /Const/Insta11ation 1
c. External Cause 1
d. Defective Procedure 5
e. Component Failure 5
x. Other _1
Total 21
.- . . - - .-. - - - - . - - . - - . - .-- - - . - -
.
L
r
.*
! Beaver Valley Unit 1 43
2. Causal Analysis
The following set of common mode events were identified:
t a. LERs 85-18 and 86-01 are events caused by the failure of the
i
vital bus III inverter. This is a continuation of three pre-
vious events since January 1985.
! b. LERs 85-19, 86-03, -04, -06, -07, -10, -12, -13, -14, and 87-03
are events that were due substantially to personnel error out-
side the control room (50% of the LERs). Seven occurred during
surveillance testing.
,
c. LERs 86-03, -04, -05, and -07 were related to fire protection
deficiencies in hardware or testing.
l F. Licensing Activities
1. NRR/ Licensee Meetings
December 19, 1985 Enforcement Conference
l
!
October 16, 1986 Counterpart Meeting for Westinghouse 3-Loop
) plant Personnel
January 5, 1987 Cross-training of Unit 1/ Unit 2 Operators
i
! 2. Site Visits / Meetings by NRR Personnel
November 22, 1985 Fire Protection Audit Exit Meeting -
l October 22, 1986 Site Tour regarding fire protection exemp-
tion request
February 11-13, 1986 Detailed Control Room Design Review
'
May 6, 1986 Site Tour and discussions of licensing
status, meeting with Resident Inspectors
July 9, 1986 Site four and SALP Meeting
l
September 30, 1986 Site Tour and discussion of licensing
status, meeting with Resident Inspectors
February 18, 1987 Site Tour and Meeting on Security
3. Commission Briefing
None
,
.
O
Beaver Valley Unit 1 44
4. Exemptions Granted
One on Fire Protection (fire doors)
5. Licensee Amendments Issued / Denied
No. 97 thru 107 were issued. None were denied.
6. Emergency Technical Specifications Issues
None
7. Orders Issued
None
of
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . .___________ _ __ __ __
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1
TABLE 1
INSPECTION REPORT ACTIVITIES
Report No. Inspector Hours Areas Inspected
85-22 Resident 64 Routine resident inspection.
85-23 Specialist 26 Safeguards Inspection.
85-24 Resident 117 Routine resident inspection.
85-25 Specialist 187 Special announced team inspection of 10
Team CFR 50, Appendix R. Fire Protection.
85-26 Resident- 5 Special inspection to review circumstances
Special and licensee action relative to apparent
violation of Physical Security Plan.
85-27 Resident 71 Routine resident inspection,
85-28 Specialist 75 Radiation protection program.
86-01 Resident 67 Routine resident inspection.
86-02 Examiners 0* Examination Report of Operator Licensing
Examinations.
86-03 Cancelled
86-04 Resident 141 Routine resident inspection.
86-05 Specialist 49 Transportation.
86-06 Resident 132 Routine resident inspection.
86-07 Resident 116 Routine resident inspection.
86-08 Specialist 176 Generic letter 83-28.
Team
86-09 Specialist 118 ISI Program and NDE.
86-10 Specialist 120 Radiation protection program during Refuel-
ing Outage.
86-11 Resident 175 Routine resident inspection, plus Chemistry
and Environmental Monitoring Programs.
- No inspection hours are credited to license examinations.
T1-1
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1
Report No. Inspector Hours Areas Inspected
86-12 Specialist 251 10 CFR 50.49, Qualification of Electrical
Team Equipment.
86-13 Specialist 83 Containment Integrity
86-14 Specialist 20 Nuclear Material Control and Accounting.
86-15 Resident 138 Routine resident inspection,
86-16 Examiners 0 Examination Report of Operating License
Examinations.
86-17 Specialist 69 ISI Inspection During SR.
86-18 Resident & 400 Routine resident inspection and Augmented
Augmented Team Team Inspection of Outage Recovery.
86-19 Specialist 31 Security.
86-20 Resident 131 Routine resident inspection.
86-21 Specialist 36 Electrical Modifications and Testing.
86-22 Specialist 37 Cycle 6 Startup Physics Testing Program.
Precritical Tests, Zero Power Physics Tests
and Power Ascension Tests.
86-23 Specialist 32 Maintenance Program and Procedures, Licen-
see actions on LERS and QA/QC Interfaces.
86-24 Resident 119 Routine resident inspection,
86-25 Specialist 8 In-Plant Radiation Protection.
86-26
86-27 Specialist 137 Emergency Preparedness Inspection and Ob-
Team servation of Licensee's Fu11 Scale Annual
Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
86-28 Resident 146 Routine resident inspection.
87-01 Cancelled
87-02 Resident 80 Routine resident inspection.
T1-2
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ __-____________________________ -_ _ _ _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1
Report No. Inspector Hours Areas Inspected
87-03 Specialist 32 Security
87-04 Specialist 30 Radiation Protection
,
87-05 Resident 115 Routine resident inspection.
t
I
l
I
l
l
!
>
t
r
T1-3 :
i
_ _ _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
I
O
Beaver Valley Unit 1
TABLE 2
INSPECTION HOUR SUMMARY
Annualized
Area Hours Hours % of Time
Operations 1029 706 29.7
Rad Protection 384 263 11.1
Maintenance 400 274 11.5
Surveillance 610 418 17.6
Fire Protection-HK 231 158 6.7
Emergency Prop. 154 106 4.4
Sec/ Safeguards 147 101 4.1
Outages 262 180 7.6
'
Licensing 0 0 0.0
Training 0 0 0.0
l Engineerin0 Support 208 143 6.0
+
Assurance of Quality 46 32 1.3
TOTALS: 3471 2381 100.0
- ,
,
1
i
'
'
l-
)
T2-1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
1
i
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1
'
TABLE 3
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
A. Violations Versus Functional Area by Severity Level
!
Functional No. of Violations in Each Severity Level
Area V IV III II I Total
1. Plant Operations 2 2
2. Radiological Controls 2 2 4
,
3. Maintenance 1 1 2
4. Surveillance 2 2
5. Fire Protection / Housekeeping 4 4
7. Security & Safeguards 1 1
8. Refueling & Outage Management
9. Licensing
10 Training and Qualification
Effectiveness
11. Engineering Support
12 Assurance of Quality __ __ __ __ __
TOTALS 3 12 15
I
i
i
i
l
T3-1
l
- --_ -_---------- -- - - - - -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.-
, .
Beaver Valley Unit 1
B. Summary
Inspection Severity
, _ Number Requirements Level Area Subject
85-22 10 CFR 20.408 V Radcon Failure to issue radworker
termination exposure reports.
Repetitive.
10 CFR 50, IV Radcon Unplanned & unauthorized
App. B release from Unit 1 to Unit
2 due to inadequate shared
system boundary isolation.
85-25 10 CFR 50, IV Fire Protec- Lack of emergency lighting
App. R, tion * units for safe shutdown
Sec. III-J access routes.
85-26 Security Plan IV Security Protected area access with-
out proper photo-identifi-
cation badge.
86-05 10 CFR 71.5 IV Radcon LSA drums shipped with holes.
(Transporta- No QC check of container
tion) integrity.
TS 6.8 V Radeon Procedure not reviewed on
l (Transporta- 2 year frequency,
tio j)
86-06 TS 4.3.3.5 IV Surveillance Shutdown Panel channel check
I failed to properly identify
l RHR temperatures as in-
TS 4.3.3.6.1 IV Fire Protec- EDG smoke detector survell-
l
'
tion lance test failed to iden-
tify inoperable channel &
control room alarm function.
l FSAR DEV N/A EDG day fuel oil tanks not
Table 8.1-1 constructed to seismic re-
quirements.
86-08 10 CFR 50.55a IV Fire Protec- R18 control wiring not
IEEE-279 tion * separated by a fire retard-
ant barrier of 6" min, air
space.
T3 2
1
L
- __. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1
Inspection Severity
Number Requirements Level Area Subject
86-08 TS 6.8.1 IV Maintenance Failure to adhere to ad-
(cont.) ministrative controls re-
garding completion of MWR
documentation,
86-11 10 CFR 50, IV Fire Protec- Failure to perform a com-
App. B and R tion * plete sensor to indicator
functional test of RCS cold
leg temp. & failure to
assure BIP transfer keys
functioned.
86-18 TS 6.12.2 IV Operations Failure to control access
to NSS key cabinet contain-
ing high rad area keys.
86-23 10 CFR 50, V Maintenance Failure to follow industrial
App. B safety practices during
battery MSP.
87-02 TS 4.3.1.1.1 IV Surveillance Missed Power Range Monitor
nuclear instrument channel
check during startup.
87/05 10 CFR 50, IV Operations Violation of plant config-
App. B uration control procedures,
resulting in minor gas
release to Primary Auxiliary
Building.
- It is recognized that these could also be included in an Appendix R, Engineering
or Assurance of Quality section.
T3-3
, _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _
O
O
Beaver Valley Unit 1
TABLE 4
TABULAR LISTING OF LERs BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
Area Number /Cause Code Total
6 g g g E 3
Plant Operations 2 1 0 0 4 0 7
Radiological Controls 0
Maintenance 1 1
Surveillance 4* 3* 1 1 9
Fire Protection / Housekeeping 1 1 2 4
Security and Safeguards 0
Refueling and Outage Control 0
Licensing
Training and Qualification
Effectiveness
Engineering Support
Assurance of Quality _ _ _ _ _ _
Total 8 1 1 5 5 1 21
- 0ne LER contained two events that occurred during one trip - startup evolution.
Cause Codes:
A - Personnel Error
B - Design, Manufacturing, Construction or Installation Error
.
C - External Cause
D - Defective Procedures
E - Component Failure
X - Other
T4-1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1
TABLE 5
LER SYNOPSIS
LER
Number Summary Description
85-17 Inoperable Rod Position Indication System due to computer failure.
85-18 Vital Bus III inverter input fuse failure causing reactor trip.
85-19 Reactor trip due to RCS loop flow instrumentation spikes.
85-20 Out-of-specification PRM nuclear instrumentation rate trip setting.
86-01 Vital Bus III inverter input fuse failure causing reactor trip.
86-02 MSSV left settings outside a110wable Ilmits.
86-03 Partially inoperable fire detection system in diesel Generator area.
86-04 Inadequate fire protection system surveillance test (CO2 flow through
nozzles).
86-05 Inoperable filter bank sprinkler nozzles.
86-06 Mis plu00ed steam generator U-tubes.
86-07 Inoperable fire suppression system smoke detectors.
86-08 Steam generator tube plu0ging.
86-09 failure to perform fuel pool pump survelliance test within ASME required
frequency.
86-10 Train B ESF actuation in Mode 5 due to operator error.
86-11 Hanual reactor trip when four control rods dropped.
86-12 Reactor Trip during RID shunt trip test due to personnel error.
86-13 Operation prohibited by technical specifications when emergency bus
undervoltage relay testing exceeded I hour.
87 01 Reactor trip during turbine pedestal surveillance test due to operator
error, failure to perform PRM low trip setpoint surveillance during
subsequent startup.
87-02 Reactor trip duo to EHC malfunction.
87-03 Inadvertent start of motor driven auxiliary feodwater pump.
T5-1
. _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ ____-____ - ___ _ -___ - ___________ _________________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
l'
.
Beaver Valley Unit 1 !
ATTACHMENT 1 i
'
TOTAL NUMBER OF SHUTDOWNS AND TRIPS PER YEAR SINCE STARTUP
'
No. of at Power No. of Unplanned
Year Reactor Trips Shutdowns ,
I
l
1976 43 15
'
1
i
1977 47 18
[
1978 25 7 !
1979 15 5
1980* 5 1 i
-
1981 11 1
! l
1982 9 4 i
) 1983 11 3
~
i 1984 5 5 ,
l
'-
1985 8 7
,
t 1986 3 2
'
1987** 2 0
, i
!
- The plant was shutdown for most of 1980 for major modifications.
(
l **As of 3/15/07. f
f
i
i
!
,
i
j I
! !
!
! !'
i
i !
I
i
l
f
4 :
- Al-1
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