IR 05000400/2014005
| ML15027A507 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 01/27/2015 |
| From: | Hopper G NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Waldrep B Duke Energy Progress |
| References | |
| IR 2014005 | |
| Download: ML15027A507 (27) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ary 27, 2015
SUBJECT:
SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2014005
Dear Mr. Waldrep:
On December 31, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on January 20, 2015, with you and other members of your staff.
One NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris facility.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris facility. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
George T. Hopper, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2014005 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63 Report No.: 05000400/2014005 Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.
Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: October 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014 Inspectors: J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector P. Lessard, Resident Inspector J. Rivera, Health Physicist (Section 2RS8)
Approved by: George T. Hopper, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000400/2014005; October 1, 2014, through December 31, 2014; Duke Energy Progress,
Inc., Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional inspector. There was one NRC-identified finding documented in this report. The significance of inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White,
Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP) dated June 2, 2011. The cross-cutting aspects were determined using IMC 0310, Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated January 28, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 5.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, for the licensees inadequate implementation of procedure OPS-NGGC-1301, Equipment Clearance, when they failed to identify required compensatory measures for a clearance to support installation of a plant modification. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition with no compensatory measures for internal flooding.
The licensee entered this into the corrective action program (CAP) as Action Request (AR)
- 696331 and AR #726784 and took immediate corrective actions to restore the sump pumps to their design configuration.
The licensees failure to adequately implement Procedure, OPS-NGGC-1301, Equipment Clearance, Section 9.8, step 3 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, if an internal flood had occurred in the Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank (DFOST) building during this period, it could have resulted in both trains of the safety-related fuel oil transfer pumps being inoperable. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance Attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A,
Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Question, Section B, and Exhibit 4, the finding was determined to require a detailed risk evaluation because the loss of this equipment during an internal flooding initiating event would degrade two or more trains of a multi-train system that supports a risk significant system or function. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior risk analyst in accordance with the guidance of NRC IMC 0609 Appendix A, using the Shearon Harris Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model. The major analysis assumptions included: A 28-hour exposure period, the finding was modelled as a non-recoverable common cause failure to run of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), pipe failures of fire protection piping was assumed to result in EDG inoperability and pipe failure data was taken from Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Pipe Failure
Frequencies for Internal Flooding PRAs, Revision 1. The dominant sequence was a station blackout with auxiliary feedwater system failure and no recovery of the EDGs or offsite power leading to loss of core heat removal and core damage. The risk was mitigated by the short exposure period and the low probability of pipe ruptures resulting in EDG inoperability.
The analysis determined that the finding led to an increase of core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a Green finding of very low safety significance. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Challenge the Unknown, as described in the area of Human Performance because the licensee allowed the clearance order (CO) to be hung in the plant without properly evaluating and managing the associated risk through the use of compensatory measures (H.11). (Section 1R15)
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period, with the following exception: On November 16, 2014, power was reduced to 75 percent and then restored to RTP for turbine valve testing.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Seasonal Extreme Weather Conditions
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the stations adverse weather procedures written for extreme low temperatures. The inspectors verified that weather-related equipment deficiencies identified during the previous year had been placed into the work control process and/or corrected before the onset of seasonal extremes. The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of adverse weather preparation procedures and compensatory measures before the onset of and during seasonal extreme weather conditions. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The inspectors evaluated the following risk-significant systems:
- Service Water System
- Instrument/Service Air System
- Safety Injection System
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial Walkdown The inspectors verified that critical portions of the selected systems were correctly aligned by performing partial walkdowns. The inspectors selected systems for assessment because they were a redundant or backup system or train, were important for mitigating risk for the current plant conditions, had been recently realigned, or were a single-train system. The inspectors determined the correct system lineup by reviewing plant procedures and drawings. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
The inspectors selected the following systems or trains to inspect:
- The A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system while the B RHR system was inoperable for planned maintenance on October 16, 2014
- The fire protection system in the DFOST building on October 23, 2014
- The A EDG system and A switchgear room while the B EDG system was inoperable for planned maintenance on October 28, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
Quarterly Inspection The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of selected fire plans by comparing them to the defined hazards and defense-in-depth features specified in the fire protection program.
In evaluating the fire plans, the inspectors assessed the following items:
- control of transient combustibles and ignition sources
- fire detection systems
- water-based fire suppression systems
- gaseous fire suppression systems
- manual firefighting equipment and capability
- passive fire protection features
- compensatory measures and fire watches
- issues related to fire protection contained in the licensees CAP The inspectors toured the following fire areas to assess material condition and operational status of fire protection equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- A Switchgear and Battery Rooms and Non-Safety Battery Room
- B Switchgear and Battery Rooms and Alternate Control Panel Room
- Reactor Auxiliary Building, 286 Elevation, PIC Rooms A and B and Cable Vault
- A Train Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump Room
- B Train ESW Pump Room
- ESW Intake Screening Structure
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Annual Review
The inspectors verified the readiness and availability of the B EDG jacket water heat exchanger tube bundle following the replacement to perform its design function by reviewing replacement work packages, post maintenance test data and critical operating parameters data. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee had entered any significant heat exchanger performance problems into the CAP and that the licensees corrective actions were appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
The inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario administered to an operating crew conducted in accordance with the licensees accredited requalification training program. The scenario evaluated the operators ability to respond to a faulted steam generator with a failure of automatic main steam isolation and safety injection.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- licensed operator performance
- the ability of the licensee to administer the scenario and evaluate the operators
- the quality of the post-scenario critique
- simulator performance Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the main control room during a planned power reduction to 75 percent RTP for turbine valve testing on November 16, 2014.
The inspectors assessed the following:
- use of plant procedures
- control board manipulations
- communications between crew members
- use and interpretation of instruments, indications, and alarms
- use of human error prevention techniques
- documentation of activities
- management and supervision Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees treatment of the issues listed below to verify the licensee appropriately addressed equipment problems within the scope of the maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants). The inspectors reviewed procedures and records to evaluate the licensees identification, assessment, and characterization of the problems as well as their corrective actions for returning the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- AR #714535 A Essential Services Chilled Water (ESCW) Temperature Switch Replacement
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the maintenance activities listed below to verify that the licensee assessed and managed plant risk as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and licensee procedures. The inspectors assessed the adequacy of the licensees risk assessments and implementation of risk management actions. The inspectors also verified that the licensee was identifying and resolving problems with assessing and managing maintenance-related risk using the CAP. Additionally, for maintenance resulting from unforeseen situations, the inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees planning and control of emergent work activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Green risk condition while the A ESW system was inoperable due to a leak in the screen wash piping on October 4, 2014
- Green risk condition while spent fuel was being transferred between spent fuel pools on October 14, 2014
- Green risk condition after Temporary Air Compressor #1 unexpectedly tripped on October 19, 2014
- Green risk after Temporary Air Compressor #1 unexpectedly tripped on October 26, 2014
- Qualitative yellow risk while B feedwater regulatory value is in manual for scheduled testing on October 30, 2014
- Yellow risk during planned downpower to 75 percent for Main Turbine Valve Testing on November 16, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
a. Inspection Scope
.1 Quarterly Review of Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
The inspectors selected the operability determinations or functionality evaluations listed below for review based on the risk-significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of the determinations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the components or systems remained capable of performing their design functions. To verify whether components or systems were operable, the inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specification and UFSAR to the licensees evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations.
- AR #713326, Power Range Nuclear Instrument 41 High Voltage Power Supply Connector Failure
- AR #714671, Current on Pressurizer Heater Group B has Decreased
- AR #717550, Refrigerant Addition to the A ESCW Compressor
.2 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 05000400/2014004-01: Potential Impact of Sump
Pumps out of Service In Inspection Report 05000400/2014004, the inspectors identified an URI associated with a clearance order (CO) that resulted in all sump pumps in the EDG and DFOST buildings being nonfunctional. The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause evaluation performed under AR #696331 to determine if there was a performance deficiency and the adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the report against the requirements of the licensees CAP as delineated in AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. This URI is closed.
b. Findings
Introduction:
The NRC identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, for the licensees inadequate implementation of procedure OPS-NGGC-1301, Equipment Clearance, when they failed to identify required compensatory measures for a clearance to support installation of a plant modification. This resulted in an unanalyzed condition with no compensatory measures for internal flooding.
Description:
On June 26, 2014, to support installation associated with Engineering Change (EC) #91713, CO #309084 was implemented in the plant. This CO removed from service all sump pumps in the Diesel Generator Building (DGB) and DFOST Building. However, the design evaluation in the EC did not address the potential effects of isolating the sump pumps. Internal flooding calculation PRA-F-E-0009 Revision 1, DGB Flood Analysis, assumed two sump pumps were functional in the DGB. Similarly, PRA-F-E0010, DFOST Building Flood Analysis, assumed one sump pump was functional in the DFOST Building. The function of these sump pumps is to allow adequate time for operators to respond to an alarm initiated by the safety-related hi-hi level switches on the sumps. By isolating all sump pumps in both the DGB and DFOST Building, the CO inadvertently resulted in an unanalyzed condition with no compensatory measures for internal flooding. This condition existed for 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> until it was identified by the inspectors and reported to the control room.
OPS-NGGC-1301 is the procedure used by the licensee to place equipment under clearance to support maintenance and modification work in the plant. Section 9.8, step 3, directs the licensee to identify and implement any required compensatory measures as a result of the clearance. While performing this step, the licensee failed to identify that a compensatory measure was required to mitigate the impact of the CO to the internal flooding threat. During analysis of the issue, the licensee determined that there would have been no impact to safety-related equipment in the DGB. However, the licensee determined that both trains of the safety-related diesel generator fuel oil transfer pumps would have been made inoperable if an internal flood had occurred. During the affected period, no flooding event occurred in the plant.
Analysis:
The licensees failure to adequately implement procedure, OPS-NGGC-1301, Equipment Clearance, Section 9.8, step 3 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, if an internal flood had occurred in the DFOST building during this period, it could have resulted in both trains of the safety-related fuel oil transfer pumps being inoperable. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the Human Performance Attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Question, Section B, and Exhibit 4, the finding was determined to require a detailed risk evaluation because the loss of this equipment during an internal flooding initiating event would degrade two or more trains of a multi-train system that supports a risk significant system or function. A detailed risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior risk analyst in accordance with the guidance of NRC IMC 0609 Appendix A, using the Shearon Harris SPAR model.
The major analysis assumptions included: A 28-hour exposure period, the finding was modelled as a non-recoverable common cause failure to run of the EDGs, pipe failures of fire protection piping was assumed to result in EDG inoperability and pipe failure data was taken from EPRI Pipe Failure Frequencies for Internal Flooding PRAs, Revision 1.
The dominant sequence was a station blackout with auxiliary feedwater system failure and no recovery of the EDGs or offsite power leading to loss of core heat removal and core damage. The risk was mitigated by the short exposure period and the low probability of pipe ruptures resulting in EDG inoperability. The analysis determined that the finding led to an increase of core damage frequency of <1E-6/year, a Green finding of very low safety significance. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Challenge the Unknown, as described in the area of Human Performance because the licensee allowed the CO to be hung in the plant without properly evaluating and managing the associated risk through the use of compensatory measures (H.11).
Enforcement:
TS 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, requires, in part, that written procedures be implemented covering activities referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978, including safety-related activities carried out during operation of the reactor plant. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Apendix A, Section 9.e(1)requires, in part, that the general procedures for the control of maintenance, repair, replacement, and modification work, should include the method for obtaining permission and clearance for operation personnel to work and for logging such work. The licensee procedure used to implement this requirement is OPS-NGGC-1301, Equipment Clearance. Procedure OPS-NGGC-1301, Section 9.8, step 3, directs the licensee to identify and implement any required compensatory measures as a result of the clearance.
Contrary to this requirement, on June 26, 2014, the licensee did not identify or implement compensatory measures when the DGB and DFOST Building sump pumps were removed from service when the clearance was implemented, which resulted in an unanalyzed condition for 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br />. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to remove the CO and restore the sump pumps to their design configuration. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.
The violation was entered into the licensees CAP as AR #696331 and AR #726784 and is designated as NCV 05000400/2014005-01, Failure to Adequately Implement the Equipment Clearance Procedure.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified that the plant modification listed below did not affect the safety functions of important safety systems. The inspectors confirmed the modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant structures, systems and components. The inspectors also verified modifications performed during plant configurations involving increased risk did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated whether system functionality and availability, configuration control, post-installation test activities, and changes to documents, such as drawings, procedures, and operator training materials, complied with licensee standards and NRC requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with modifications. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
- Engineering Change (EC) #98079, Temporary Air Compressors
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the maintenance activities listed below to verify the work performed was completed correctly and the test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.
- WO #13442565, Weld Leak on A ESCW Chiller Service Water Piping on October 8, 2014
- OST-1021, Daily Surveillance Requirements Daily Interval Mode 1, 2 on October 14, 2014
- OST-1092, B RHR Pump operability Quarterly Interval on October 14, 2014
- WO #13461727, HAIC-1118B (Hydrogen Recombiner Outlet) not Passing Channel Check on November 22, 2014
- WO #13462442, Power and Output LEDs not Lit on Card 1PIC-01-0522 on December 3, 2014
- WO #13398350, Train B SSPS Logic and Master Relay Staggered Test after Bypass Breaker Replacement on December 4, 2014
- WO #13470238, EDG A Jacket Water Keep Warm Pump Tripped on December 23, 2014 The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness.
- Effects of testing on the plant were adequately addressed.
- Test instrumentation was appropriate.
- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
- Equipment was returned to its operational status following testing.
- Test documentation was properly evaluated.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with post-maintenance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the surveillance tests listed below and either observed the test or reviewed test results to verify testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met technical specification and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors evaluated the test activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
Routine Surveillance Tests
- OST-1124, B 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Contact Check Modes 1-6 on October 16, 2014
- MST-I0355, Containment Leak Detection System Radiation Monitor REM-01LT-3502ASA Calibration on November 5, 2014
- OPT-1512, Essential Chilled Water Turbopak Units, Quarterly Inspection/Checks, Modes 1-6 on November 17, 2014
- OST-1013, A EDG Operability Test Monthly Interval Modes 1-6 on November 25, 2014 Containment Isolation Valve
- OST-1214, Emergency Service Water System Operability Train A Quarterly Interval All Modes on October 24, 2014 In-Service Tests (IST)
- OST-1090, A Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System IST, Quarterly Interval, All Modes on October 3, 2014 Reactor Coolant System Leak Detection
- OST-1026, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Evaluation, Computer Calculation, Daily Interval, Modes 1-2-3-4 on November 5, 2014
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
2RS8 Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and
Transportation (71124.08 - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
Waste Processing and Characterization: During inspector walkdowns, accessible sections of the liquid and solid radwaste processing systems were assessed for material condition and conformance with system design diagrams. Inspected equipment included radwaste storage tanks, resin transfer piping, and abandoned radwaste processing equipment in the Waste Processing Building. The inspector discussed component function, processing system changes, and radwaste program implementation with licensee staff.
The 2013 Radioactive Effluent Report was reviewed and radionuclide characterizations for selected waste streams were discussed with radwaste staff. For the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Primary Resin, Dry Active Waste (DAW), and Tri-Nuke Filters waste streams, the inspector evaluated analyses for hard-to-detect nuclides, reviewed the use of scaling factors, and examined quality assurance comparison results between licensee waste stream characterizations and outside laboratory data. Waste stream mixing and concentrations averaging methodology for resin and filter waste streams were evaluated and discussed with radwaste staff. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees procedural guidance for monitoring changes in waste stream isotopic mixtures.
Radioactive Material Storage: During walk-downs of indoor and outdoor radioactive material storage areas, the inspector observed the physical condition and labeling of storage containers and the posting of Radioactive Material Areas. The inspector also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for storage and monitoring of radioactive material.
Transportation: The inspector directly observed characterization radiological surveys of two DAW sea-land containers in preparation for shipment on a later date. The inspector also directly observed preparation activities for a shipment of a containment spray motor, a limited quantity shipment. The inspector noted package markings, observed dose rate measurements, and interviewed shipping technicians regarding Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. Selected shipping records were reviewed for consistency with licensee procedures and compliance with NRC and DOT regulations.
The inspector reviewed emergency response information, DOT shipping package classification, waste classification, and radiation survey results.
Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspector reviewed ARs in the areas of shipping and radwaste processing. The inspector evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the identified issues. The inspector also reviewed recent self-assessment results.
Radwaste processing, radioactive material handling, and transportation activities were reviewed against the requirements contained in the licensees Process Control Program, FSAR Chapter 11, 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 61, 10 CFR Part 71, and 49 CFR Parts 172-178. Licensee activities were also evaluated against guidance provided in the Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification (1983) and NUREG-1608.
Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the report Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a sample of the performance indicator (PI) data, submitted by the licensee, for the Unit 1 PIs listed below. The inspectors reviewed plant records compiled between October 2013 and September 2014 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the data reported for the station. The inspectors verified that the PI data complied with guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, and licensee procedures. The inspectors verified the accuracy of reported data that were used to calculate the value of each PI.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related corrective action documents to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with PI data. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Residual Heat Removal System
- Cooling Water Systems
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Routine Review
The inspectors screened items entered into the licensees CAP in order to identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up. The inspectors reviewed condition reports, attended screening meetings, or accessed the licensees computerized corrective action database.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of July 2015 through December 2015, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
.3 Annual Followup of Selected Issues
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of condition report AR #715519, Chiller Capacity Verification. The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Operator Work-Around Annual Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a detailed review of the licensees operator work-around, operator burden, and control room deficiency lists for the station in effect on October 24, 2014, to verify that the licensee identified operator workarounds at an appropriate threshold and entered them in the CAP. The inspectors verified that the licensee identified the full extent of issues, performed appropriate evaluations, and planned appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed compensatory actions and their cumulative effects on plant operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Report Review
In accordance with Executive Director of Operations Procedure 0220, Coordination with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, the inspectors reviewed the most recent INPO evaluation and accreditation reports dated March 28, 2014, to determine if those reports identified safety or training issues not previously identified by NRC evaluations.
The report contained no safety issues that were not already known by the NRC.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On October 30, 2014, the inspector discussed the results of the inspection with licensee staff. The inspectors noted that no proprietary information had been reviewed.
On January 20, 2015, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Benjamin C. Waldrep and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection period.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- D. Corlett, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
- J. Dufner, Plant Manager
- D. Griffith, Manager, Nuclear Training
- L. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Chemistry
- S. OConnor, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- M. Parker, Manager, Nuclear Radiation Protection
- T. Slake, Director, Nuclear Plant Security
- J. Warner, Manager, Work Management
- B. Waldrep, Site Vice President
- F. Womack, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
NRC personnel
- G. Hopper, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000400/2014005-01 NCV Failure to Adequately Implement the Equipment Clearance Procedure (Section 1R15)
Closed
- 05000400/2014004-01 URI Potential Impact of Sump Pumps out of Service (Section 1R15)