IR 05000387/2020002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000387/2020002 and 05000388/2020002

ML20224A179
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	08/11/2020
From:	Jon Greives Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Berryman B Susquehanna
Greives J
References
IR 2020002
Download: ML20224A179 (27)

Text

August 11, 2020

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 -

INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2020002 AND 05000388/2020002

Dear Mr. Berryman:

On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. On July 30, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Kevin Cimorelli and other members of your staff.

The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, X /RA/

Signed by: Jonathan E. Greives Jonathan E. Greives, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000387 and 05000388 License Nos. NPF-14 and NPF-22

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000387 and 05000388 License Numbers: NPF-14 and NPF-22 Report Numbers: 05000387/2020002 and 05000388/2020002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0040 Licensee: Susquehanna Nuclear, LLC Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Berwick, PA Inspection Dates: April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020 Inspectors: E. Dipaolo, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Kulp, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Micewski, Senior Resident Inspector R. Rolph, Resident Inspector M. Rossi, Senior Resident Inspector, Acting Approved By: Jonathan E. Greives, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station,

Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Turbine trip stop and control valve closure scram inoperable during plant start up Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.11] - 71111.22 Systems NCV 05000387/2020002-01 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown NRC inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," when control room operators raised reactor power above 25 percent while the reactor protection system (RPS) scram bypass function was inoperable, as indicated by the turbine control fast closure and stop valve trip bypass alarm being annunciated contrary to procedure GO-100-002, "Plant Startup, Heatup, and Power Operations."

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000388/2020-001-00 LER 2020-001-00 for 71153 Closed Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Rising Main Condenser Backpressure

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 began the inspection period shutdown for a planned refueling outage. Following the completion of refueling and maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor startup on April 23, 2020. On April 25, 2020, while at 16 percent power, operators returned the unit to Mode 5 following a malfunction of the electrohydraulic control unit system. Operators commenced plant startup operations on April 30, 2020. On May 3, 2020, the unit experienced an automatic scram from 76 percent power due to a failure of a current transformer, which resulted in a main turbine trip. Operators commenced startup operations on May 9, 2020, and reached approximately 77 percent on May 14, 2020, when they reduced power to 57 percent for a rod pattern adjustment. The station achieved 81 percent power on May 16, 2020, when operators lowered power to 57 percent for a rod pattern adjustment, and commenced power ascension on the same day. The unit was at 97 percent on May 20, 2020, when operators lowered power to 58 percent for a rod pattern adjustment, returning to 94 percent power the following day. On June 17, 2020, power was reduced from 100 percent to 57 percent power due to a feedwater heater extraction steam isolation, and the unit was returned to 100 percent power the following day. The station remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at 99 percent power. The station had been requested by grid operator on November 21, 2019, to reduce power to approximately 98 percent maximum facility output, during a planned distribution line outage. This request was lifted on June 15, 2020. On April 1, 2020, operators lowered power to 69 percent at the request of the grid operator for planned line work, and returned to full power the following day. On April 15, 2020, operators lowered power to 70 percent for retrieval of a foreign material from the cooling tower basin, and the unit was returned to full power the same day. On May 25, 2020, operators lowered power to 70 percent for water box cleaning, returning the unit to full power the same day. On June 20, 2020, operators lowered power to 63 percent for a rod sequence exchange, returning to full power the same day. On June 21, 2020, operators lowered power to 72 percent to repair a leak on the electrohydraulic control system. While performing this repair, an additional component failure required operators to lower power to 17 percent on June 25, 2020. Operators commenced power ascension the same day. On June 27, 2020, operators lowered power from 84 percent to 64 percent for a rod pattern adjustment, returning the unit to full power the same day. On June 30, 2020, operators lowered power to 83 percent for a rod pattern adjustment and returned to full power the same day.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the summer readiness of the offsite primary and backup alternating current systems and for the unit main condensers on May 11, 2020.

Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending severe weather anticipated strong winds and thunderstorms on April 9, 2020.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 1, division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) and core spray during division 1 outage on April 1, 2020

(2) Spent fuel pool cooling system on April 15, 2020

(3) Unit 1, containment instrument gas (CIG) system during 'B' CIG compressor maintenance on June 1, 2020

(4) Unit Common, 'D' emergency diesel generator (EDG) and 'B' loop emergency service water (ESW) during 'B' EDG repair and testing on June 9, 2020

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 1 'B' loop core spray system on April 15, 2020.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Unit 1, drywell general area (fire zone 1-4F) on April 1, 2020

(2) Unit 1, main steam tunnel area (fire zone 1-4G) on April 9, 2020

(3) Unit 1, spent fuel pool cooling heat exchanger and pump room (fire zone 1-5D) on April 15, 2020

(4) Unit 1, equipment space elevation 683', (fire zone 1-3C) on April 21, 2020

(5) Unit 2, control structure upper relay room elevation 754', (fire zone 0-27A) on May 26, 2020

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Unit 2, remote shutdown panel on May 28, 2020

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) heat exchanger 1A inspection on April 22, 2020

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding

Activities (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from April 6, 2020 to April 10, 2020:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

1. ASME IWL General Visual (VT3) inspection of Drywell Exterior Concrete Surfaces in Zones 13, 14, 15, 16 (VT-20-014)2. Radiographic Test on Reactor Water Cleanup Pipe Weld (DBB122-1 FW-4A)

(BOP-RT-20-001) in conjunction with EC 2269140 Install Stainless Steel Piping for DBB122-1 Downstream of FEG332N040

3. Liquid Penetrant Test on Radiographic Test on Reactor Water Cleanup Pipe

Weld (DBB122-1 FW-4A) (BOP-PT-20-22) in conjunction with EC 2269140 Install Stainless Steel Piping for DBB122-1 Downstream of FEG332N040 4. Magnetic Particle Examination of Residual Heat Removal Piping Lugs (GBB1151-HW-5A, B, C and D) (MT-20-001, 002, 003 and 004)5. Ultrasonic Examination of the H4 Core Shroud Weld (CNF-SSES1-2)6. In-vessel Visual Inspection Enhanced Visual Test (EVT-1) of N2H Jet Pump Riser Welds RS-1A and RS-2 (1-AUG9.1340 and 1-AUG9.1341)7. Ultrasonic Examination of the A and B Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) upstream weld VNBB212-FW-A4 and B4 (UT-20-020 and UT-20-005)8. Replacement of Reactor Water Cleanup System Carbon Steel Piping with Flow Accelerated Corrosion Resistant Stainless Steel Piping (EC 2269140)

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Control Room during Unit 1 reactor startup following a refueling outage on April 23, 2020.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated simulator training on May 18, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1) Unit 1, CIG system reliability and corrective actions for CIG header loss of pressure on April 16, 2020 (CR 2020-05868)

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;

(1) Unit 2, yellow risk during division 1 ESW pipe replacement on April 3, 2020

(2) Unit 2, protected equipment during 1B210 outage on April 3, 2020

(3) Unit 1, yellow shutdown risk during common RHR piping suction maintenance on April 15, 2020

(4) Unit 2, yellow risk during automatic depressurization system (ADS) level calibrations and testing on April 28, 2020

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 1, broken pivot stud on high pressure containment isolation (HPCI) turbine fulcrum bracket spring mount identified on March 31, 2020

(2) Unit Common, A and B phase breaker stabs misaligned on feeder to motor operated valve for RHRSW/RHR crosstie valve on April 28, 2020

(3) Unit 1, functionality determination on refueling hoist lowering without command on April 30, 2020

(4) Unit 1, 125V direct current engineered safeguards system (ESS) distribution panel breaker failed as found short and long time delay testing on May 5, 2020

(5) Unit 1, RHR pressure relief valve failed as found testing May 12, 2020

(6) Unit Common, 'E' EDG failed to fully sequence during testing on June 17, 2020

(7) Unit 1, suppression pool vacuum breaker support not torqued to specification June 29, 2020

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change (EC) 1958923 Unit 1, ESW Loop 'A' supply and return piping replacement, on April 15, 2020

(2) Design Equivalent Change (DEC) 2247720, Feedwater Check Valve Replacement Graphite Cover Gasket, on April 20, 2020

(3) Removal of CT-7 from Main Transformer 1X102 on May 4, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (10 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:

(1) Unit Common, division 1 ESW buried piping replacement on April 6, 2020

(2) Unit 1, 1X210 ESS transformer replacement on April 6, 2020

(3) Unit 1, RHRSW Loop 'A' after scheduled maintenance on April 6, 2020

(4) Unit 1, 'A' loop RHR after valve work on April 8, 2020

(5) Unit 1, 'B' loop RHRSW after valve replacement on April 13, 2020

(6) Unit 1, 'B' loop RHR after valve maintenance on April 13, 2020

(7) Unit 1, suppression pool vacuum breaker on April 13, 2020

(8) Unit 1, hydrostatic leak testing following system restoration on April 19, 2020

(9) Unit 1, electro-hydraulic control system after repairing speed control system on May 1, 2020

(10) Unit 1, 'B' RHRSW pump after lift setting adjustment on May 13, 2020

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated Unit 1 refueling outage 21 activities from March 23, 2020 to May 14, 2020.

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 2, division 2 core spray flow verification on April 17, 2020

(2) Unit 1, turbine trip bypass logic from start up on May 10, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, 'A' loop RHR flow surveillance on June 4, 2020

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, main steam isolation valve as-found leak rate testing on April 27, 2020

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, hardened containment vent valve local leak rate testing on April 7, 2020

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated:

(1) Observation of training evolution and Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification -

Anticipated Transient without a Scram (ATWS) and radiological release (simulator training) on May 18,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

(1) Reactor Water Clean Up Heat Exchanger Room Piping Replacement under radiation work permit (RWP) 20201126. This work involved high dose rates and high contamination controls.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) ===

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 1 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 2 (January 1, 2019- December 31, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed Susquehannas corrective action program (CAP) for trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Condition Report (CR) CR-2019-03732, Multiple Unit 2 Control Rods Failed to Settle After Reset from Planned Scram on March 23, 2019, due to Control Rod Friction

===71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Followup (IP Section 03.01)

Unplanned plant transient from 100 percent to 64 percent reactor power due to 104C feedwater heater level control valve failure and extraction steam isolation on June 16, 2020 Event Report (IP Section 03.02) ===

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 2020-001-00, Manual scram due to rising condenser back pressure (ADAMS Accession No. ML20098F706). The inspectors determined that the cause of the condition described in the LER was not reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and therefore was not reasonably preventable. No performance deficiency nor violation of NRC requirements was identified.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Turbine trip stop and control valve closure scram inoperable during plant start up Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.11] - 71111.22 Systems NCV 05000387/2020002-01 Challenge the Open/Closed Unknown NRC inspectors identified a Green finding and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," when control room operators raised reactor power above 25 percent while the reactor protection system (RPS) scram bypass function was inoperable, as indicated by the turbine control fast closure and stop valve trip bypass alarm being annunciated contrary to procedure GO-100-002, "Plant Startup, Heatup, and Power Operations."

Description:

The turbine stop valve and control valve closure inputs are two of the reactor scram signals generated by the RPS in the event of a turbine trip at reactor thermal power (RTP) >26%. Turbine stop valve closure inputs to the RPS come from position switches mounted on the four turbine stop valves. Each switch opens before the valve is more than 10% closed to provide the earliest positive indication of closure. Either of the two channels associated with one stop valve can signal valve closure. The logic is arranged so that closure of three or more valves initiates a scram. Turbine control valve fast closure inputs to the RPS come from oil line pressure switches on each of four fast acting control valve hydraulic mechanisms. These hydraulic mechanisms are part of the turbine control and are used to affect fast closure of the turbine control valves. These pressure switches provide signals to the RPS. If hydraulic oil line pressure is lost, a turbine control valve fast closure scram is initiated.

Diversity of trip initiation for increases in reactor vessel pressure due to termination of steam flow by turbine stop valve or control valve closure is provided by reactor vessel high pressure trip signals. A closure of the turbine stop valves or control valves at steady state conditions would result in an increase in reactor vessel pressure. If a scram was not initiated from these closures, a scram would occur from high reactor vessel pressure. Reactor vessel high pressure is an independent variable for this condition and provides diverse protective action.

The turbine stop valve and control valve closure scram is an anticipatory trip to prevent a rapid power increase resultant from increased reactor pressure.

The turbine stop valve closure scram and turbine control valve fast closure scram are automatically bypassed during low power operation. TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1.1 allows the trip to be bypassed during lower power operations to prevent inadvertent scram signals, e.g. plant start up. Closure of these turbine valves below a low initial power level does not threaten the integrity of any radioactive material release barrier.

Turbine stop valve closure and turbine control valve fast closure trip bypass is affected by four pressure switches associated with the turbine first stage. Any one channel in a bypass state produces a control room annunciation. The switches are arranged so that no single failure can prevent a turbine stop valve closure scram or turbine control valve fast closure scram. In addition, this bypass automatically clears as power is raised above the setpoint for the pressure switches, but per plant TSs this bypass must clear when greater than or equal to 26% of RTP.

Susquehanna's procedure GO-100-002, Revision 113, "Plant Startup, Heatup, and Power Operation," defines actions required at various RTP levels during startup. In the notes to Step 5.74 it is stated that the bypass clears at approximately 22% RTP, and Step 5.77 specifies actions required at or before reaching 25% RTP, including, but not limited to, ensuring that the stop and control valve bypass annunciators have cleared, and to record the power at which this occurs. Alarm Response Procedure AR-103-001, Revision 58, specifies control room operator actions. In section 2, "Operator Actions" for annunciator E03, "Turbine control fast closure and stop valve trip bypass," step 4 specifies that operators "ensure alarm clears prior to 26% RTP."

On May 2, 2020, operators performed GO-100-002, and the bypass signal cleared at 20.8%

RTP. This value is consistent with prior start ups, and the approximate target value established by Instrumentation and Control (I&C) procedure IC-158-002, "Calibration of Turbine First Stage Pressure Channels PSH-C72-1N003A, B, C, D, (Turbine Valve Closure Scram and EOC/RPT Bypass)."

On May 9, 2020, while performing procedure GO-100-002, Revision 113, "Plant Startup, Heatup, and Power Operation," operators were in the process of plant start up. The plant was steady for a period of approximately 10 minutes at 24.1% RTP with the turbine stop valve and control valve closure RPS scram still in bypass. Operators noted this condition and decided to proceed with power maneuvers. Operators then withdrew additional control rods and the plant stabilized at 28.5% RTP. During this time, the RPS scram bypass signal did not clear, and control room operators entered LCO 3.3.1.1 for RPS trip capability, and evaluated the applicability of LCO 3.3.4.1, EOC/RPT. It was later determined that LCO 3.3.4.1 did not require entry into action statements since the reactor was operating within the specified limits.

The station promptly downpowered to approximately 23%, exiting the condition of applicability, and the station investigated why the scram bypass did not clear. Upon investigation, the station identified that a 1-inch line had severed, resulting in the K9A and K9B relays of the turbine trip logic not sensing sufficient pressure to disable the bypass. The bypass logic uses two divisions (A and B), which are fed by the four relays (A&C for division A, B&D for division B). Under normal conditions, with the bypass disabled, a trip on either channel within a division results in a scram signal from that division. The normal scram logic is either A or C concurrent with either B or D. With both the A and B relays unable to clear the bypass, only one channel in each division was enabled, that is, a scram signal from both C and D would be required to scram the reactor on a stop or control valve closure signal at

>26% RTP.

Corrective Actions: The unit was promptly maneuvered to below 26% RTP, repaired the severed steam line, and identified a corrective action to modify the GO-100-002 procedure to preclude recurrence.

Corrective Action References: CR-2020-07186, CR-2020-07187, CR-2020-07351

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The failure to implement station procedures on May 9, 2020, was a performance deficiency because it was within Susquehanna's ability to reasonable foresee and correct and should have been prevented.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This determination was informed by IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 2.f, because the performance deficiency was not administrative in nature and adversely impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. Specifically, due to operators failing to execute procedural steps as written, power exceeded the allowed value (26% RTP) while the RPS logic function was degraded due to loss of multiple channels on two RPS functions.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. This finding was determined to be Green because it did not affect an RPS trip signal and the function of the redundant or diverse methods of reactor shutdown, it did not involve unintentional positive reactivity changes, and it did not result in mismanagement of reactivity by operators.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Step 5.77 of the GO-100-002 procedure specifies actions required to be completed at less than or equal to 25% RTP. Step 4 of AR-103-001 specifies that operators ensure the turbine trip bypass annunciator clears prior to 26% RTP. On May 9, 2020, operators did note that while stable at 24.1% RTP, the bypass alarm had not cleared. Previous startups indicated this alarm cleared at approximately 21% RTP, including a startup performed on May 2, 2020. Rather than suspend reactivity manipulations and perform an investigation, operators proceeded with withdrawing control rods while expecting the alarm to clear between 24% and 26% RTP. If operators had halted plant maneuvers to investigate and address the cause when not receiving an expected response, the station would not have entered into the condition of applicability with the stop and control valve RPS scram function inoperable.

Enforcement:

Violation: Susquehanna's TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," specifies, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained as described in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, which includes, but is not limited to general plant operating procedures, start-up procedures, and procedures for abnormal, off normal, or alarm conditions.

Susquehanna procedure GO-100-002, Revision 113, "Plant Startup, Heatup, and Power Operation," defines actions required at various RTP levels during startup. Step 5.77 requires that when reactor power is =25%, the licensee shall ensure, in part, that when the turbine control valve fast closure and stop valve trip bypass annunciator clears, the percent of core thermal power is recorded. The stated acceptance criteria is =26%.

Susquehanna procedure AR-103-001, Revision 58, specifies control room operator actions for the turbine control valve fast closure and stop valve trip bypass annunciator alarm.

Step 2.4 specifies that operators shall ensure the alarm clears prior to 26% RTP.

Contrary to the above, on May 9, 2020, Susquehanna failed to implement procedures as described in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, pertaining to plant start up and alarm conditions. Specifically, during plant startup, while at 24.1% RTP, the turbine stop valve and control valve closure trip bypass alarm remained annunciated. However, rather than ensuring that the annunciator cleared, the licensee resumed power ascension to 28.5%

RTP.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Multiple Unit 2 Control Rods Failed to Settle After Reset from 71152 Planned Scram on March 23, 2019 due to Control Rod Friction The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Susquehannas actions following the failure of multiple controls rods to settle on Unit 2 after resetting the scram signal following a planned reactor scram on March 23, 2019, in preparation for a refueling outage. The licensee documented the issue in CR-2019-03732. The licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation on the issue which included an extent-of-condition on Unit 1. Similar failures of control rods to settle were experienced on Unit 1 on March 28, 2020, following a planned reactor scram for a refueling outage (CR-2020-04294). The inspectors reviewed the cause analysis, technical evaluations performed, and the corrective actions taken and planned. The inspectors assessed Susquehannas problem identification threshold, prioritization of the issue, apparent cause analysis, use of operating experience, and timeliness of corrective actions.

The inspectors observed that Susquehannas apparent cause evaluation for the issue provided a thorough and detailed evaluation of the event. The direct cause for the control rods failing to settle following scram reset was determined to be due to fuel channel deformation causing friction between the fuel channel and the associated control rod. Fuel channel bowing resulting in channel-to-control rod friction is a known phenomenon in boiling water reactors. The evaluation included a detailed technical review of factors that affect fuel channel deformation including comparisons of unit fuel cycles and between Units 1 and 2.

The apparent cause was due to Susquehannas channel management program threshold not properly predicting channel deformation for the fuel cycles. A change in channel supply vendors (Veridiam to Kobe Steel Limited) for some fuel cycles resulted in unpredicted fuel channel bowing magnitude in the channels manufactured by Kobe Steel Limited. The channel manufacturers utilized different manufacturing techniques that apparently resulted in a change in predicted fuel channel bowing.

The inspectors observed that Susquehanna appropriately evaluated the issue, performed a thorough review of operating experience, and performed or planned timely corrective actions. The inspectors verified that Susquehanna implemented corrective actions to resolve control rod friction issues due to Kobe Steel Limited channels during subsequent fuel cycles, to the extent practicable. For Unit 2 Cycle 20, which began operation in the Spring of 2019, the licensee revised the core design to place most of the effected fuel bundles in un-rodded pseudo-cells in the core periphery. Four fuel bundles were loaded in rodded core locations.

However, the fuel bundles were orientated to result in channel bowing away from the control rod. For Unit 1 Cycle 22, which began operation in the Spring of 2020, the effected fuel bundles placed in un-rodded pseudo-cells. Susquehanna planned actions to work with the fuel vendor to better understand Kobe Steel Limited fuel channel bowing rates and to determine further channel management and friction monitoring thresholds.

Observation: Semi-annual trend review 71152 The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues to identify trends that might indicate the existence of more significant safety concerns. As part of this review, the inspectors included repetitive or closely related issues documented by Susquehanna in the CAP database, trend reports, site performance indicators, major equipment problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed how Susquehannas CAP evaluated and responded to individual issues identified by the NRC inspectors during routine plant walkdowns and daily CR reviews.

Negative Human Performance Trend The inspectors noted a marked increase in the number of human performance errors spanning the first two quarters of 2020. Specifically, the station documented 233 CRs with the Human Performance trend code in the first two quarters of 2019 and has documented 430 CRs with the Human Performance trend code in the first two quarters of 2020. While the station did lower its threshold for applying human performance trend codes to CRs, inspectors determined that this likely did not account for the entire increase and that the potential adverse trend warranted monitoring. Susquehanna recognized this adverse trend, specifically procedure use and adherence, as documented in CR-2020-03025. Inspectors noted several examples of the procedural adherence attribute of this issue.

• The inspectors reviewed the circumstances and corrective actions related to component damage caused by use of improper tools, as documented in CR-2020-02590. On February 19, 2020, station personnel identified damage to the 1P105 vacuum pump motor shaft due to the use of a pipe wrench for manual shaft rotation.

Upon review of the work instructions REWL S5049, it is clearly stated that this activity is to be completed with a strap wrench. Station corrective actions included a prompt investigation, additional oversight of preventive maintenance activities, and communicating station expectations to operations personnel for performing maintenance activities. The inspectors determined that the damage incurred was the result of a minor performance deficiency for failing to meet the requirements of the work instructions in REWL S5049, which specify the correct tools.

• The inspectors reviewed the circumstances and corrective actions related to component mispositioning, as documented in CR-2020-04283. On March 27, 2020, while performing SM-054-001, plant operators opened the incorrect link for testing.

This mispositioned component revealed itself when operators proceeded through the test and the plant response was not as expected. Station corrective actions included a status control investigation and a crew clock reset for the human performance error.

The inspectors determined that this mispositioning was a minor performance deficiency for failing to meet the requirements of testing procedure SM-054-001, and a minor violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures. This violation was determined to be minor because it did not adversely affect the cornerstone objective for mitigating systems, since the error was discovered during the process of testing.

• The inspectors reviewed the circumstances and corrective actions related to foreign material exclusion and control, as documented in CR-2020-05548. On April 12, 2020, while disconnecting temporary piping sections associated with draining the Unit 1 cooling tower basin for the refueling outage, a section of piping fell into the Unit 2 cooling tower spillway, requiring a downpower to facilitate retrieval. Station corrective actions included revision of the maintenance activity to prevent recurrence. The inspectors determined that this event was a minor performance deficiency for failure to meet maintenance procedure ME-142-001.

• The inspectors reviewed the circumstances and corrective actions related to improper component alignment, as documented in CR-2020-06465. On April 24, 2020, while attempting a plant start up, Unit 1 operators received an electrohydraulic control (EHC) malfunction alarm and subsequent control valve oscillations. Upon further investigation is was discovered that the speed probe in the EHC system was not correctly installed, resulting in a gap in the probe which exceeded allowable tolerances. Station corrective actions included adding independent verification to EHC work instructions and assessed for additional training requirements. The inspectors determined this was a minor performance deficiency for operators failing to correctly install the speed probe according to work instructions because it did not adversely affect the initiating events cornerstone objective.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On July 30, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Kevin Cimorelli and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.01 Corrective Action CR-2020-05349 NRC resident identified safety concern with new baffles 04/09/2020

Documents stored at CT basin

Resulting from

Inspection

71111.04 Corrective Action CR-2020-05801 NRC identified housekeeping issues 04/15/2020

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings E106231 SSES Unit 1 Containment Instrument Gas Revision 27

71111.05 Fire Plans FP-013-161 Unit 2 Upper Relay Room El. 754 Revision 7

FP-113-100 Drywell (I-400, I-516, I-607) Fire Zone 1-4F Elev. 704 Revision 3

through 807

FP-113-112 Equipment Area (I-202, I-204, I-205) Fire Zones 1-3C-N,S,W, Revision 5

El. 683

FP-113-119 Revision 7

71111.07A Miscellaneous MT-GM-025, Heat Exchanger Inspection Report 04/01/2020

B

MT-GM-031, Heat Exchanger/Immersed Component Coating Inspection 04/04/2020

B Record

Report from The Eddy Current Inspection Results 04/08/2020

Merrick Group

Inc.

71111.08G Corrective Action CR-2020-05450

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

71111.12 Corrective Action CR 2020-05868 Both Containment Instrument Gas Compressors Placed in 04/16/2020

Documents Service and Unable to Pressurize Header

CR 2020-06279 Received BIS AR-250-001 (D01) Containment Instrument 04/22/2020

Gas System. SV-22643 Open, 150# ADS is Aligned to N2

Bottles

71111.15 Corrective Action CR 2017-11564 U1 HPCI injection on Auto Rx Scram due to I&C Jumper 06/08/2017

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents Installation Causing EHC Failure

CR 2020-04531 1S211 HPCI Turbine Broken Pivot Stud on Fulcrum Bracket 03/31/20

Spring Mount

CR-2020-04219 E EDG tripped unexpectedly during an operability run 03/26/2020

CR-2020-04694 EC-1s failed as found testing 04/01/2020

CR-2020-04704 Unit 1 Refuel Platform hoist motion with no request 04/01/2020

CR-2020-04808 Refuel Platform hoist lowered without command 04/02/2020

CR-2020-04895 RHR PSV failed lift test 04/04/2020

CR-2020-09243 Torque wrench out of tolerance 06/29/2020

Procedures AOP-081-001 Fuel Handling Abnormal Operating Procedure Revision 4

NDAP-QA-0703 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Revision 33

ON-FUEL-001 Fuel Handling System Malfunction Revision 3

Work Orders 1829094

WO 2330912 Repair broken pivot stud on 1S211 governor control valve Revision 0

linkage

71111.18 Corrective Action 2018-12056 400 dpm Leak from 141F010B, FW LINE B CKV TO RX 08/18/18

Documents 2019-03992 241F010A Feedwater Check Valve Hinge Pin Cover to Valve 03/26/19

Body has Larger Than Expected Gap

AR-2020-07085 Review EC for impact to training materials 05/06/2020

AR-2020-07086 Review EC2339590 for potential impact to simulator 05/06/2020

AR-2020-07099 Evaluate restoring computer point to display equivalent 05/07/2020

winding temperature

Engineering EC 2339590 Commercial Change Package to Remove CT7 from 1X102

Changes

Miscellaneous White Paper from Sargent and Lundy Engineering, Revision 1

Bimetallic Weld Recommendations

EC 1958923 Unit 1 ESW Loop A Sply & Rtn Piping Replacement 07/18/2017

Procedures IP-ENG-001 Standard Design Process Revision 1

MIP 2277 Mechanical Installation Instructions for Engineering Change 07/18/2017

1958923

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

SIP 1210 Site Installation Procedure for Engineering Change 1958923 07/18/2017

Work Orders PCWO 1982016

PCWO 2258356

WO 2202472 141F010B 'B' Feedwater Line Check Valve Soft Seat 04/20/20

Inspection & Replacement

71111.19 Corrective Action CR-2020-05274 Minor leakage from Div 1 RHR 04/08/2020

Documents

Drawings SE-100-002 Revision 10

Procedures SO-100-023 ASME Class I Boundary System Leakage Revision 7

Work Orders PCWO 2333292

PCWO 2334133

RTSV 1518182

RTSV 2317401

RTSV 2318764

RTSV 2321478

RTSV 2329557

71111.22 Corrective Action CR-2020-07186 Turbine valve closure bypass locked in above 26% power 05/09/2020

Documents CR-2020-07351 Enhancement to plant startup procedure 05/13/2020

Engineering EC-083-1011 Turbine Valve Closure Scram Bypass Setpoint Calculation Revision 2

Changes

Procedures GO-100-002 Plant Startup Procedure Revision 113

Work Orders RTPM 2169047 Turbine trip pressure switch calibration

RTSV 2196429

RTSV 2332711

71124.01 Corrective Action CR-2020-03814 Problem Statement: Anomalies from air sample in RX 2 779 03/16/2020

Documents RWCU hold pump room

Pertinent Facts: Air sample results had 0.9 DA

C.

immediate Actions: all work stopped in room, posted room as

Air borne radiation area, RPM notified, WCC, Control room.

RWP remarks log, and esoms per RP-122

CR-2020-04446 Problem Statement: Whole Body Count performed on 03/30/2020

individual arriving on site for dosimetry indicated the

presence of Cs-137.

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Pertinent Facts: An individual arrived on site to receive

dosimetry and was initially not able to pass the GEM5 portal

monitor. Subsequently, a whole body count indicated the

presence of natural radon decay progeny/possible Cobalt 60,

as well as Cesium 137. A second count with shoes, hoodie,

and hat removed indicated very low Cs-137 activity of 3.2

nanocuries. (MDA: 2.77 nanocuries, 5 minute

count) The individual was able to pass the GEM5

subsequently. Although the individual was able to pass the

GEM5, a final baseline whole body count was performed with

the individual wearing only clean scrubs. The count was

negative for the presence of any radioisotopes

aside from natural Potassium 40, indicating that some

contamination was present on the individual's removed

clothing. RP individually tested each article of clothing in the

small article monitor at Unit 2 and was able to clear all but

the individual's pants, which are now confiscated in

accordance with NDAP-QA-0627 . Follow up counting of the

pants with the gamma spec system was performed,

confirming the presence of Co-60 and Cs-137.

The individual stated that they did not have any issues

passing through portals previous to this at other facilities and

that he had not been whole body counted previously. The

individual was cooperative throughout the investigation.

CR-2020-04814 A worker was observed to put a plastic page protector from a 04/02/2020

work package into the front hand pocket of their hooded

sweatshirt. This was reported to an RP technician who talked

to the worker when they were signing out. It was identified

that they had placed the work package in their pocket when

exiting. The worker was coached on why not to do this and

why the package needs to be monitored in a TEM. They did

not seem to understand the standard clearly and were

receptive to the coaching.

CR-2020-05555 Problem Statement: > 50,000 ccpm distributed contamination 04/12/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

on the tip of the nose of a BHI individual working on the

feedwater 39A in the wing slab.

Pertinent Facts: Individual received feedwater 39A check

valve disc and attempted to mechanically remove the pin.

Individual adjusted safety glasses while in the area

performing work.

Immediate Actions: WBC, PCR form, CR, Coaching.

Recommendation: Discuss with work group and conduct

stand down and/or coaching (group).

Corrective Action AR-2020-05861 Problem Statement: An observation was given by the RP 04/16/2020

Documents NRC Inspector during the 2020 NRC Inspection 01 - Rad

Resulting from Hazard-Exposure Control that implementing an electronic

Inspection respirator issuance log could improve the process and

program.

Pertinent Facts: The current paper log is directly from HP-TP-

761 Attachment B, Susquehanna should develop and

implement an electronic respirator issuance log to take the

place of a paper log for better efficiency and record keeping.

Immediate Actions: Discussed this observation with the RP

NRC Inspector and documented this AR for tracking.

CR-2020-05815 Problem Statement: NRC is conducting an RP baseline 04/15/2020

inspection. No issues of concern have been identified. Three

observations are noted for review:

1) Inspector noted that Form HP-TP-723-1 has a section

header labeled "DAC-h," but believed the calc was for DAC

rather than DAC-h.

2) Radiological survey review by inspector observes good

notations indicating location of air samples and HEPA hoses.

3) Inspector has reviewed RWP entries and corresponding

respirator issuance logs and has noted minimal

discrepancies where RWP sign-in occurred without a

corresponding respirator issuance noted. This can occur if an

individual has signed onto a task, but does not end up

making an entry necessitating respirator issuance or from an

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

individual signing onto the wrong task at the kiosk. Inspector

observes that implementation of electronic issuance process

could improve the process and program.

Recommendations

1) Form HP-TP-723-1 is used to calculate DAC-h, but the

tech basis may need to be reviewed and provided to the

inspector to demonstrate the mathematical calculation that

has gone into the conversion factors in the formula.

2) Communicate observation to department.

3) Implement electronic respirator issuance to enhance data

storage and retrieval.

CR-2020-05863 Pertinent Facts: NRC RP baseline inspector reviewed HP 04/16/2020

Tech Basis94-005, "Dose Assessment and Tracking" for

applicability of confirmatory vs. required monitoring. While

the document specifies individuals are not expected to

received in excess of 10% of an annual limit of intake, the

inspector observed that the document does not validate the

aforementioned assumption.

Immediate Actions: Generated CR

Recommendation: Revise and update HP Tech Basis 94-

005.

CR-2020-05864 NRC RP baseline inspector reviewed HP Tech Basis94-005, 04/16/2020

"Dose Assessment and Tracking." Inspector's observation is

to review the SSES definition of "restricted area" in HP Tech

Basis94-005 to ensure it is not excluding any areas that

would qualify as a restricted area as defined in 10 CFR 20.

TB 94-005 provides a definition from 10 CFR 20, but also

states, "at SSES, this area will be defined as the area within

the inner security fence."

Actions taken: Generated CR for tracking

Recommendation: Review HP Tech basis94-005 and revise

as necessary concurrently with review based on CR-2020-

05864.

Procedures HP-TP-223 Internal Dose Investigations and Evaluations 14

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

HP-TP-510 Survey Decontamination and Dose Calculation Techniques 24

for Radioactive Contamination of the Skin or Clothing

HP-TP-720 Airborne Concentration Sampling and Evaluation 44

Radiation Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 03/29/2020

Surveys Exchanger Room @ 1030

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 03/30/2020

Exchanger Room @ 2105

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 03/30/2020

Exchanger Room @ 2300

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 03/29/2020

Exchanger Room (Reverse) @ 1030

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/01/2020

Exchanger Room @ 1650

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/02/2020

Exchanger Room @ 1730

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/03/2020

Exchanger Room @ 2100

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/03/2020

Exchanger Room @ 1230

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/03/2020

Exchanger Room @ 2030

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/04/2020

Exchanger Room @ 1320

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/04/2020

Exchanger Room @ 1000

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/04/2020

Exchanger Room @ 2300

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/05/2020

Exchanger Room @ 1230

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/06/2020

Exchanger Room @ 0900

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/09/2020

Exchanger Room @ 2100

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/10/2020

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Exchanger Room (During Radiography) @ 2030

Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' Reactor Water Cleanup Heat 04/10/2020

Exchanger Room (During Radiography) @ 2330

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/03/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room @ 0521

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/03/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room @ 0030

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/03/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room @ 2340

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/02/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (Cut Out @1720

Pipe)

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/04/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (Cut Pipe) @ 1305

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/04/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (Weld Pipe) @ 1620

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/04/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (Cut Pipe) @ 1210

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/04/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (Prep Pipe) @ 2240

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/07/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (FAC Pipe @ 2340

Welding)

General Area Air Sample - Unit 1 Reactor Building 749' 04/08/2020

Reactor Water Cleanup Heat Exchanger Room (Welding) @ 1130

Radiation Work 20201120 RWCU COMPLEX AND BWRT ROOM: GENERAL WORK, 0

Permits (RWPs) INSPECTIONS & NON-RWCU SYSTEM VALVE

BREACHES

201121 RWCU HOLD PUMP ROOM ACTIVITIES 0

201126 FAC PIPING REPLACEMENTS IN RWCU PENT & REGEN 0

HX ROOMS

201320 SCAFFOLDING WORK IN THE DW 0

201351 CRD REBUILD ROOM: CRD EXCHANGE 0

201352 UNDERVESSEL PREP WORK: (TO INCLUDE SHOOT OUT 0

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

STEEL REMOVAL/REPLACEMENT,UN-COUPLING AND

PIP REMOVAL)

201353 CRD EXCHANGE: UNDERVESSEL WORK. 0

201360 UNDERVESSEL WORK-TIE UP NI'S/LPRM CABLE, 0

TEST/STROKE SRM'S & IRM'S/PIPS/TIP TUBING

REMOVAL&REPLACEMENT/REPLACE LPRM

CABLES/LPRM, SRM, IRM, DRY TUBE REPLACEMENTS &

SUPPOR

T.

201361 UNDERVESSEL ACTIVITIES(CABLE WORK, 0

CONNECTORS, ETC.)

201373 SNUBBER WORK IN DRYWELL 0

71152 Calculations EC-FUEL-1804 Bases and Recommendations for the Monitoring and 4

Mitigation of Control Cell Friction for Zircaloy-4 Channels

Corrective Action CR-1176421

Documents CR-2019-00612

CR-2019-03732

CR-2019-12574

CR-2020-04294

Engineering AR-2019-05552

Evaluations AR-2019-06063

NQNFE-B-NA- Statistical Analysis of U2C19 Assembly Exposure and 0

047 Fluence Data for Channel Bow Correlation

PL-NF-15-001 Susquehanna Unit 1 Cycle 20 Reload Risk Assessment 07/02/2015

Procedures LS-120 Issue Identification and Screening Process 11

LS-125 Corrective Action Program 12

NFP-QA-005 Reload Design and Analysis Process 15

NR-202 Core Reload Design 21

RE-0TP-203 Core Distortion Testing 1

TP-055-015 Insert Stall Testing 6

71153 Procedures ON-FWHTG-102 Off-Normal FW Heating Revision 2

24