IR 05000361/1978016

IE Inspec Rept 50-361/78-16 on 781030-1103 During Which No Items of Noncompliance Were Noted.Major Areas Inspected Incl:Reactor Internals & Miscellaneous Open Items from Previous Inspecs

ML13309A602
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	11/17/1978
From:	Albert W, Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML13309A601	List: IR 05000361/1978016 ML13309A600
References
50-361-78-16, NUDOCS 7812280246
Download: ML13309A602 (6)

Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report N /78-16 Docket N License N CPPR-97 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:

San Onofre Unit 2 Inspection at:

Site Inspection Co uc d:

October 30 -

ovember 3, 1978 Inspect W. be

, Reactor Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:

_________

_______

V7/;'/7, R. C. Hayneg, Chief, Project Section, Reactor Date Siged Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:

Inspection on October 30-November 3, 1978 (Report No. 50-361/78-16)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of installation activities for the reactor internals and miscellaneous open items from previous inspections. The inspection involved 32 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results: Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie IE:V Form 219 (2)

DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)

• P. A. Croy, Site QA/QC Supervisor

• H. B. Ray, Manager, Quality Assurance W. F. Rossfeld, QA Engineer b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

• J. R. Caldwell, Project QA Supervisor T. Peterson, Nuclear Field Engineer C. Smith, Supervisor, Nuclear Field Enginnering 0. Shuck, BRCS Coordinator R. Koogle, Welding Field Engineer

• J. E. Geiger, Project Field QA Supervisor K. Ellingwood, Nuclear Field Engineer C. Combustion Engineering (CE)

S..Salwach, Site Representative

• Attendees at exit intervie. Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined corrective action or disposition of the following unresolved or open items:

a. (Closed) Open Item (50-361/77-01 and 77-04): Potential for Sea Water Contamination of Primary System Component For corrosion protection during shipping, the fabricator filled the steam generator with nitrogen gas to provide an inert environment. Because the steam generators had arrived with no nitrogen pressure on three of the four sides, the question of possible sea water intrusion during ocean barge shipment had been raised by the NRC. The gen erators were provided with a regulated flow of nitrogen to maintain the inert atmosphere during shipping, howeve Also, it.was reported that barge shipment had weathered a heavy storm. The licensee took swipe samples from internal

-2 surfaces as well as samples from small moisture pools found in the steam generators and performed chemical analyses of these sample None of the test results indicated sea water contamination of internal surface Visual inspections of the internals were performed by site personnel from SCE, Bechtel and CE; CE will make a further visual examination of the internals of the two steam gener ators and.pressurizer in early 1979 using factory (Chattanooga)

personne This additional visual inspection is being per formed because:

(1) Some soot like material was observed on a few tubes of the north steam generator of Unit (2) A flashlight needs to be recovered that was dropped into the south steam generator of Unit (3) A further effort to locate lost tube guides will be made although the problem was dispositioned to "accept as is."

Ref. 50.55(e) report from SCE dated Dec. 30, 1976, forwarding CE Report CENC 1378 of Dec. 10, 197 The inspector found that the actions taken or planned are satisfactory and had no further question b. (Closed) Open Item (50-361/77-10): Constructor did not appear to have a sufficiently definitive procedure for review of subcontractor's procedures when contract was let by site procurement organizatio This item arose when the inspector found that the rigging subcontractor was working from annotated procedures. At that time, it was ascertained that the procedures had been adequately reviewed by the constructor but that a defini tive system for such review did not exis (Normally, such reviews are handled through the constructor's engineering offices in Norwalk.)

Subsequently, the WPP/QCI System at Bechtel provided for satisfactory controls, including controls over on-the-spot changes, to rigging methods. No control was provided for similar procedures in the event other contracts are let in the future for work on safety related equipment. Since rigging controls were now established and, since few, if any, similar contracts are anticipated, the inspector had no further questions at this tim c. (Open) Open 50.55(e) Item (50-361/77-09): Revised maximum LOCA flooding level in containmen In a final report dated November 24, 1977, the licensee discussed air ducts and valve operators to be relocated as a result of the revised maximum LOCA flooding leve The inspector, in-examining the area of concern for valve relocation, found that much electrical equipment remains to be installed in the area. Consequently, this item will be examined further during a subsequent inspectio : Reactor Internals Installation-Procedures, Observations and Records a. Procedures The installation of reactor internals was controlled by Construction Inspection Data Reports (CIDRs) developed by Bechte These documents were reviewed and the inspector verified that the CIDRs had been accepted by the nuclear steam system supplie The CIDRs represented the top procedure document for the specific activity since no WPP/QCI had been developed which related to core internals installation (see exit interview).

Selected items in the NSSS requirements document (CEND 1061)

were sampled for inclusion in the Bechtel CIDR Of the six items sampled, adequate provisions for implementation were contained in the procedure Procedures had been developed so that only one entrapment procedure was involved. This procedure (still to be accom plished) involved a 12-14 hour measurement of alignment between core support plate and fuel element alignment (hold down)

plate. The internal fit of the reactor head is to be measured by access through the hot leg and does not involve entrapmen Procedures appeared to adequately provide for the installation of those structures described in Section 3.9.5.1 of the FSA The installation of surveillance specimen capsules is not planned until after hot functional test and this work is not included in the current set of procedure Observations The inspector observed measurement work underway, finished flexure weld of core barrel to lower support plate, cleanli ness and cleanliness zone controls and storage condition Personnel directing the work possessed experience in the activit The inspector discussed the methods for review of data by CE Windsor Engineering and studied methods for use of dummy alignment key, measurement for core barrel snubber shims and fit of reactor hea Problems with meeting a levelness cri teria of 0.005 inches/foot when raising or lowering components had been traced to the crane hook bearings. The hook for Unit 2 had to be rebuilt by the manufacturer, PACECO, and similar rebuilding will be required for the Unit 3 polar crane hoo The use of load cells for controlling crane lifting weights within 5 % of required forces was verifie It was reported that as a result of problems at another CE facility, the interference fit for the core barrel to the alignment key will be increased above the presently specified 2 1/2 mil value. The actual change had not been received onsit No items of noncompliance or deviations were found, nor did the inspector find any indication that the rotation of the internals 1800, with respect to the reactor vessel, had re sulted in any significant problem c. Records Existing measurement records for core barrel to core stops, upper internals flange to vessel flange and shroud verticality were examined. Records of the flexure weld and shroud dowel seal welds.were examined along with completed ASME N-5 form Qualifications of welders were verifie QA audit and surveillance reports by SCE and Bechtel of vessel internals installation activities were examine No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspector discussed hi findings with L. D. Hamlin, H. 8. Ray and others as noted in Paragraph 1, above. He stated that the absence of a WPP/QCI for core internals work seemed inconsistent with normal prac tices although he had found that the work appeared to be ade quately controlled. The licensee noted that the specific, noncontinuous nature of the activity appeared to lend itself to the use of the CIDR only, but said the matter would be examined before core internals work on Unit 3.