IR 05000361/1978020

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
IE Insp Repts 50-361/78-20 & 50-362/78-16 on 781201-29.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Const Activities Including Piping Handling & Storage,Piping post-weld Heat Treatment,Reactor Pressure Vessel & Internals Protection
ML13309A608
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 01/24/1979
From: Haynes R, Pate R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML13309A607 List:
References
50-361-78-20, 50-362-78-16, NUDOCS 7903120491
Download: ML13309A608 (5)


Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

.50-361/78-20 Report No.50-362/78-16 Docket No.50-361, 50-362 License No, CPPR-97, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800 -

2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspecti on at: Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:

December 1-29, 1978 Inspectors:

R.J ate-, Residebt-ReactorI-nspector Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved By:

A.-

/,979 R. C. Hay

,

,Projects Section, Reactor Date Signed Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:

Inspections on December 1-29, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-361/78-20 and 50-362/78-16)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspections by the resident inspector of construction activities including:

piping handling and storage, piping post weld heat treatment, reactor pressure vessel and internals protection, followup of licensee actions on previous inspection findings and general work in progress. The inspection involved 74 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results: Of the five areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219(2)

7903 12 A del

DETAILS 1. Individuals Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)

H. B. Ray, Manager, Quality Assurance

+*R. R. Hart, Construction Superintendent D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative

+*P. A. Croy, Site QA/QC Supervisor

  • L. L. Seyler, Project QA Supervisor

+P. R. King, QA Engineer J. J. Pantaleo, QA Engineer

+W. F. Rossfeld, QA Engineer M. Rodin, QA Engineer R. Frick, QA Engineer F. Pimentel, QA Engineer

  • H. S. Leasure, Chief, Contract Construction Management b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)
  • J. Wilcox, Quality Assurance Manager

+*C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager

.*R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer

  • J. E. Geiger, Project Field QA Supervisor J. L. Ruud, Lead QA Engineer

+*J. R. Caldwell, Project QA Supervisor

+J. E. Bashore, Division QA Manager

+*R. W. Welcher, Project QA Engineer In addition, construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen were contacted during the inspection *Denotes attendees at management meeting on December 8, 197 +Denotes attendees at management meeting on December 15, 197.

Construction Status The licensee reported that site construction work is 63% complete as of December 27, 1978. The licensee's project management personnel estimate that the construction effort is split 60%/40% between Units 2 and. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined the corrective action taken by the licensee on the following outstanding item a. (Closed) Unresolved Item (50-361/78-13): Debris from nearby construction activity was spread over the High Pressure In jection (HPSI) system pump and moto The area was cleaned and new plastic sheeting was placed over the pump and motor. The area was observed on November 18 and 27, and on December 19, 1978 and found to be clean in accordance with the Zone IV criteria of the Housekeeping Procedure WPP/QCI 00 b. (Closed) Follow-up Item (50-361/78-17/02): The use of temporary pipe supports was observed during the plant tours on November 27 and December 19, 1978. The licensee's evaluation determined this practice to be acceptable with limitations placed on the use of schedule 10 pipe to support other pipe The inspector found no schedule 10 pipe being used to support other pipe The temporary supports examined appeared to be satisfactory for the present use. The inspector had no further questions in this are c. (Closed) Follow-up Item (50-361/78-12): During a previous inspection, the review of the Bechtel surveillance reports revealed that several containment wall concrete placements exceeded the maximum concrete placement temperature for place ments over six fee6 thick. The maximum temperature specifi8d in the FSAR was 55 F. Placement temperatures as high as 68 F were reported. The nonconformances were documented as non conformance reports (NCR's) as required by the licensee's QA program. The NCR's were dispositioned to accept as is. This disposition is consistent with the requirements of ACI-301 which specifies that mass concrete shall be a maximum of 70 F when deposited. Additional corrective action at this time is not applicable as all placements greater than six feet thick at SONGS Unit 2 and 3 have been completed. The-inspector had no further questions in this are.

Part 21 Reports Two Part 21 reports were reviewed with the license a. Conax Penetrations Conax reported that defects had been found in the Kulka terminal blocks used in the Conax penetration This potential problem was reviewed with SC The inspector was advised that

-3 only Westinghouse electrical penetrations were used at SONGS Units 2 and 3 and this item was therefore not applicable to these facilitie b. Exide Battery Exide reported that the battery racks supplied to SONGS Units 2 and 3 required modification to prevent the build-up of horizontal momentum during a seismic even This modification was discussed with SCE management personne The inspector was advised that SCE had an outstanding deficiency report for the seismic qualification report from Exide on the battery racks. The racks were on hold by Bechtel QC and will not be used until the required modification and seismic qualifi cation report is complete. Since the problem was properly controlled by the SCE QA programand the racks had not been released for installation, the licensee determined that this item is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e). Containment Purge Isolation Valves.50.55(e) Report The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken by the licensee regarding a reported design deficiency in the 42-inch diameter containment purge isolation valves. The measures selected to correct this deficiency included the design of a mini-purge system to preclude the need to operate the 42-inch valve (i.e., open to close) during a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) or Main Stream Line Break (MSLB) accident. The Drawing Change Notice (DCN) for the mini-purge system was reviewed and found to be in accordance with the Bechtel Project Quality Program Manual, Procedure No. The mini-purge system valves had been ordered to the same quality standards as.the 42-inch valves. The inspector was advised that the installation of the new valves would be consistent with the requirements for the larger valve. Post Weld Heat Treatment of Safety-Related Pipe (50-362/78-13/01)

Post weld heat treatment (PWHT) was observed on Units 2 and 3 safety-related pipin The inspector verified that the process was performed in accordance with Bechtel Procedure WPP/QCI 209 (advanced release). The QC inspector is now required to verify location of the thermocouple and placement of the heat source (quartz lamps).

As PWHT is a special process, the procedure qualification records were requested. The inspector was advised that there were no formal qualification records, but tests had been conducted which verify the effectiveness of the process. These test results were

-4 discussed with the inspector by a Bechtel welding engineer. How ever, no test records were available for NRC review. As a result of this meeting, the inspector requested the following information concerning this proces a. Objective evidence that the process controls assure that the pipe material and weld in -the area to be post weld heat treated is within the code required temperature rang b. Objective evidence that the process controls assure that harmful temperature gradients are not experienced during the heat treating operatio This item is considered to be unresolved pending review of the requested informatio. Routine Inspections The following construction activities were observed to ascertain compliance with the licensee's procedure a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety-Related Piping Pipe storage Pipe handling b. Reactor Vessel Protection

.

Openings covered

.

Access controlled, c. Reactor Vessel Internals Access controlled Protective covers in place No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the above observation. Plant Tour The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week during this inspection report period. Particular attention was directed to observing work in progress and availability of super vision and quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping and preservation of equipmen No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Management Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on December 8 and 15, 1978. The scope of the in spections and inspector's findings as noted in this report were discussed. The licensee representatives had no additional comments.