ML19318H981
| ML19318H981 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 07/08/1978 |
| From: | Baskin K SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO. |
| To: | Goller K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-48143, NUDOCS 8810270462 | |
| Download: ML19318H981 (20) | |
Text
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Southern California Edison Company
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P.O.BOXB00 2244 W ALNUT GROVE AVENUE ROSEME AD. C ALIFORNI A 01770 K.P.BASKIN TELEPHONE 213-572-1401 ossame s. es ea naveos e neses s ais e N
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Attention: Mr. Karl R. Goller
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Assistant Director for Operation Reactors Division of Operating Reactors
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U. S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Docket No. 50-206, Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 Fire Protection Program Review San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 By letter dated Maren 16, 1978, you requested additional information (Enclosure 1 to your letter) to complete your review of the fire protection program at San Onofre Unit 1 submitted by i
our letter dated March 16, 1977.
In addition, your letter (1) forwarded NRC staff positions (Enclosure 2 to your letter) on specific concerns resulting from your review of the fire hazards analysis included in our fire protection program submit-tal, and (2) indicated that in order to resolve your concerns you require that we either accept the NRC staff positions, or propose alternatives, or provide bases that satisfies the concerns, submitted herewith are forty copies of the report entitled "Supplement 1, Fire Protection Program Review, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, May, 1978."
The report contains the additional information requested by Enclosure 1 of your March 16, 1978 letter and responses to each of the NRC staff positions identified in Enclosure 2 to that letter.
If you have any questions, or desire further information concerning the enclosed report or our previously submitted fire protection program, please contact me.
Very truly yours, F
8810270462 780709 n
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i SUPPLEMENT 1 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM REVIEW-
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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 MAY, 1978
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NRC QUESTIONS AND STAFF POSITIONS RESPONDED TO-(k
' Listed below are specific items addressed in Supplement 1 to
Fire Protection Program Review, San_Onofre Nuclear Generating l
Station, Unit 1,"
submitted by letter dated March 16, 1977, in Docket:No. 50-206, which respond to a request' for.
j additional information and either accepts, or proposes i
alternatives, or provides bases that satisfy the concerns i
of the staff positions contained in the Commission's letter i
to the Applicants dated March 16, 1978, in Docket No.
t 50-206.
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 1.
Describe the consequences of a fire rasulting from the failure of the Hp supply line routed to the Chemical And Volume Control System.
- 2. Describe the minimum physical separation between redundant electrical cables for systems required for hot and cold i
shutdown where they are routed in. the same fire area.
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- 3. Describe the radiological consequences of an unmitigated fire in radwaste areas (e.g., involving dried radivactive filter sludge or other dry radioactive materials).
Indicate if the consequences of fires result in a release exceeding those previously calculated ic-cccidents l
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involving radwaste systems.
STAFF POSITIONS i
PF. 1 Shutdown Power Source Staff Concern:
In order to provide continued l
operation of the required shutdown equipment in the event of a fire in the 4160-V switchgear room, switchgear ? will be provided with a power source l
not associa.ed with the 4160-V switchgear.
Since the cable sp eading area is located in the 4160-V switchgear rdom, fire related damage could affect the availability of. offsite power.
The capability 1
to safely shutdown following a fire should be 1
operable from offsite or onsite power'sources.
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Staff Position:
The shutdown power source for switchgear 2 should be independent of fire related damage in the 4160-V switchgear room and operable from both onsite and offside sources.
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NRC QUESTIONS.AND STAFF POSITIONS'RESPONDED TO
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PF. 2 Smoke.Detection.Systems Tests'
.Staff Concern:
The type and -location off Lonization smoke detectors.may not-provide prompt detection'tf-
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fires in areas where theytare used.
Ventilation._iir i
flow.patterns or. detector.sensitivity may prevent :
effective fire detection.
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I Staff.Position:
In situ tests should be conducted'
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1 with'a-suitable.smoke'generation device to verify that the products of combustion from a fire would be~-
f amptly detected:by installed smoke_detectors and that ventilation1 air flow ;pattern in the' area do not' significantly reduce or prevent detection response-Bench tests.should be conducted to verify that smo'-
detectors.will provide'prompt response and have-l adequate sensitivity to tae products of combustion
'I for-the combustibles in.-the area where smoke detectors
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If any fire detection systems'are found to oe inadequate,. appropriate modifications-should:be made to;provide.adequate detection system, i
per formanc e.
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PF. 3 Supervision of Fire Doors i
Staff Concern:
Fire doors have to be.closed to k
provide an effective barrier against-the spread of fires.between different areas'as well as to'contain suppression agents for total flooding suppression l
systems.
f Staff Position:
Appropriate administrative.controls l
should be provided to assure the effectiveness of i
fire doors protecting safety-related'areasLas.
follows:
1.
Fire doors should be inspected semi-annually to verify that self-closing mechanisms and latches r
are in good working order.
l 2.
Routine supervision of fire doors should consist of one of the following:
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- a. Electrical supervision of the closed position with alarms at a central location,
- b. Locked closed doors should be inspected
'I weekly to verify that the doors are in the l
closed position.
The fire brigade commander should have ready access to keys for all locked doors.
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NRC QUESTIONS AND STAFF POSITIONS RESPONDF TO j
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Automatic release mechanism doors'should be
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- d. Unsupervised and unlocked' self-closing fire.
1 doors should be:inspected daily to verify that they are in:the closed position.
- 3. Areas protected by automatic tetal. flooding l
gas suppression systems should.have electrically, i
supervised self-closing fire doors.
Automatic 3
release mechanism fire doors should not be used j
i in such areas.
PF. 4 Emerg ency - Li ghting Staff Concern:
Hard wired emergency lighting j
may be damaged 'as a result of fire.
j Staff Position:
Fixed emergency'lighting should be provided consisting of.seal bea.a units with' l
v individual eight-hour minimum battery.power.supplies.
These units should be provided in all safety-related i
areas and areas where fires could result in the l
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release of radioactive materials.
In addition allt access and egress routes from these areas should be
-l provided with this type'of emergency lighting.
PF. 5 Air Breathing Apparatus:
a Staff Concern:
Sufficient air breathing apparatus
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should be available to support the fire brigade and l
emergency control personnel for a period of six hours.
j Staff Position:
The air breathing apparatus used by the fire brigade and emergency control personnel (i.e., the complement of air breathing apparatus, l
i spare bottles, and recharge capability) should be sufficient to meet the needs of'seven people for a period of six hours at a usage rate of three air bottles per hour per person.
t PF. 6 Smoke Detection:
Control Room Air Supply Staff Concern:
Smoke from fires external to the control room could be introduced into the'makeup air supply to the control room.
Area smoke detection in the control room does not provide an effective means l
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Staff Position:
Smoke detection should be provided in the makeup air supply to the control room.
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1 NRC QUESTIONS AND STAFF POSITIONS RESPONDED TO
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PF. 7 Portable Smoke Venting Equipment Staff Concern:
Ventilation systems may not be effective to vent smoke to permit fire fighting Fire dampers could be closed which would access.
prevent the use of normal ventilation systems.
Staff Position:
Portable smoke ejectors should be provided for fire brigade use.
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'l RESPONSES TO~SPECIFIC ITEMS 0F INTEREST i
ITEM 1 j
Describe the consequences of_ a fire resulting from the l
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' failure of the Hp supply line routed; to the chemical. and volume control system.
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RESPONSE
l In the Fire Hazards'Analysis for Area No. 10 of Referense 1 j
(Section 4.5, page-4-52), a planned design modification is-i identified which involves the installation of an excess flow check valve in'the hydrogen supply line near the hydrogen-i bank which will -stop hydrogen flow in case of a line break 1
anywhere in the Hp_system.
The maximum amount of hydror l
available for combustion under these conditions is the i
amount which is contained in the line downstream of the j
Thishasbeencalculatedto-beapproximagely i
d check valve.
3 at ambient conditions.
Combustion cf 11.3 ft i
11.3 ft of hydrogen can provide 3670 Btu of heat.
Hydrogen diffuses j
quickly in air (on the order of five minutes in still air i
combustion for the pipe tunnel).
Therefore, in the worst case,.
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would not be localized at the bre ak,. but would proceed as a rapid flame front within an enclo sed area, particularly l
within the pipe tunnel or volume c ontrol~ tank room.
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It should be noted that the diffusio.' of 11.3 ft3 of l
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hydrogen within the pipe tunnel or volume control tank area would result (even without leakage to other areas) in hydrogen concentrations an order of magnitude too low to j
support combustion or flame propagation.
j All fire areas associated with the hydrogen line were j
considered for fire effects on safety related cables and equipment.
Only the volume control tank room and the pipe i
tunnel were determiaed to have reasonable probability for
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concern with respect to fire damage to safety related cables and equipment.
All other areas were either open or too large for the buildup of the required concentrations of l
hydrogen for a fire.
This is due to the large diffusion rate of hydrogen in air.
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The volume control tank room is large enough (4400 ft3) j that even if the hydrogen were to ir,nite before completely j
0 diffusing, the temperature rise (50 F) and pressure rise (1.5 psi maximum) are too low to cause damage to the tank.
The pipe tunnel has a slightly larger volume (4800 ft3,)
is open at one end and has two manholes.
The maximum
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temperature and pressure increases are expected to be 500F
-s and 1.4 psi, r espe ctiv ely.
Due to the open ended nature of
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the pipe tunnel, neither pressure nor temperature poses a threat to safety related cable.
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Describe the minimum physical'se;aration.between redundant-l electrical cables for systems required for hot and cold r
shutdown where they are routed.in the same fire area.
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RESPONSE
i The systems required for hot and cold shutdown are identified in Tables 5-1 through 5-4 (pages 5-10 through 5-16) of.
Reference.1.
Section. 6.2.3 (page 6-7)Tof Reference 1 recommended cable reroutine required to ensure~that redundant components required for r are shutdown have protection from cable damage due to a si sgle fire -in a)common fire zone.
By letter dated December 20, 1977, a report entitled, "Separation and LOCA Enviconment Assessment of San Onofre Unit 1 Emergency Core Cooling Systems," by NUS Corporation dated December, 1977 (NUS-1854) was transmitted to the NRC.
That report contained the results of an evaluation of the 4
separation of the ECCS and supporting subsystems.
The results were presented in Section 5 of the report and a summary of the separation evaluation was presented in Appendix I of the report.
The report recommended cable rercuting for some components in order to comply with the separation criteria provided in Regulatory Guide 1 75.
The design of final modifications resulting - from Reference 1 and the report "Separation and LOCA'Environment Assessment
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of San Onofre Unit 1.Emergency Core Cooling Systems" will include appropriate criteria for physical separation.
Accordingly, the minimum physical separation between redundant electrical cables for all systems required for hot j
and cold shutdown, as identified in Reference 1, where they are routed in the same fire area will be accomplished as j
part of the desiEn effort involving the rerouting of electrical cn Le.
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l RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST ITEM 3 Describe the radio1~ogical consequences of an unmitigated fire in radwaste areas (e.g., involving dried radioactive filter sludges or other dry radioactive materials.)
Indicate if the consequences of fires result in a release exceeding those previously calculated for accidents involving radwaste systems.
RESPONSE
The radiological consequences of an unmitigated fire in the radwaste system involving stored, dry radwaste have been calculated.
The calculated doses to an adult located at the site boundary for the most limiting isotope would be as follows:
Type Of Dose 0-2 Hour EAB Dose immersion Dose Total Body 0.48 millirem Skin 0.03 millirem Inhalation Dose To Lung 0.2 rem j
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The above dose consequences were calculated based on the following assumptions:
1.
The postulated fire released in one puff to the atmosphere an average of 6 months inventory of dry radwaste based on most recent 5 years of cperation.
The inventory
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burns regardless of packaging or actual storage location.
Based on shipment records for this time period, the amount of dry radwaste shipped offsite at any one time, assumed to be the total in storage at that time, was 1ess than the average of 6 months inventory assumed in the calculation.
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2.
The 0-2 hour whole body gamma and beta skin immersion doses at the EAB were based on Regulatory Guide 1.4 equations for receptors immersed in a radioactive cloud.
3 The primary constituent nuclides of dry radwaste are Co 58, Co 60, cs 134 and Cs 137 Calculations were based on entire inventories of each of these nuclides and the most limiting of these conditions was used.
4.
The 0-2 hour atmospheric dispersion factor (X/Q) at the EAB of 1 34 x 10-4 sec/m3 was based on the results
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of the Onshore Tracer Tests conducted at San Onofre.
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RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST 1
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5.
The 2-hour inhalation doses were based on equation 13, page 1.109-13, of Section 3.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.109 6.
The 0-8 hour adult breathing rate of 3.47 x 10-4 m3 see was based on Regulatory Guide 1. .
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The immersion dose calculated above is well below the 0.4 rem calculated by the NRC for a hypothetical rupture of a radwaste gas decay tank as reported in the NRC safety evaluation in support of Amendment No. 25 to Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13 dated April 1,
1977.
A com-parison of the inhalation dose resulting from the above calculation (e.g.,
as a result of an unmitigated fire involving stored, dry radwaste) to that previously calculated for accidents insolving the radwaste systems is not possible since such accidents do not result in any inhalation dose consequences.
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- i RESPONSES-TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST' I
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ITEM PF. 1 Shutdown Power Source
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Staff Concern:
In~order to provide'continued j
operation of the required shutdown equipment in i
the event of a fire in the 4160-V_ switchgear
- i room, switchgear 2 will be.provided with a power source not associated with the 4160-V switchgear.
l Since the cable.spreading area is located in_the l
4160-V switchgear room, fire related damage could.affect the availability of offsite power.
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The capability to safely shutdoun following a
-fire should be operable from offsite or onsite'
' l power sources.
Staff Position:
The shutdown power source i
for switchgear 2 should be independint of fire related damage in' the 4160-V switchgear j
room and operable from both onsite and offsite l
sources.
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RESPONSE
1 As indicated in Section 5.1 (page 5-1) of Reference 1,.the criteria used in the safe shutdown evaluation were based'on Reference 2 and are as follows:
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A cold shutdown could be conducted with a fire in any fire area.
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Fire shall not be considered to occur simultaneously with other accidents, events or phenomena such as a design-basis accident or loss of offsite power.
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3 Fire shall not be considered to initiate simultaneously in more than one fire area or zone.
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At least two physically separate and electrically isolated areas are available to perform each required function.
1 In order to meet the criteria identified above, Section l
5.4.4.3 (page 5-9) of Reference 1 recommended that station l
service transformer 2 be provided with an alternate power source that is separate and independent_from the 4160-V switchgear room.
The design objective of the recommended l
modification is to provide an 'alternate means of supplying 2
power to operate 480-V equipment required for shutdown in the event of a fire in the 4160-V switchgear room.
In j
addition to-providing an alternate power source to station service transformer 2, other methods-(e.g., installing a new l
station service transformer, etc.) are being evaluated to n
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RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC-ITEMS'0F INTEREST i
meet thedesign objective.. '480-V equipmentl required for l
shutdown will then be capable' of deriving.their power from
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offsite power sources through the 4160-V switchgear or directly from the offsite power sourcec separate and independent from the 4160-V switchgen. room.
Therefore,-
fire related damage in the;4160-V switchgear room cannot affect the. availability of offsite power to supply 480-V shutdown equipment..
'he planned fire protection modifica-i tions to this area w ;s:.provide for the prompt det'ection of l
a fire by the use of '.onization smoke detectors 'and fire j
suppression will be promptly and automatically initiated in j
the form of a gaseous fire suppression rystem.
Following installation of the alternate means of supplying j
offsite power to 480-V shutdown equipment to provide diversity with the present capability of-supplying 480-V power and the prompt fire suppression action to be initiated, the criteria l
set forth in Reference 2 will be met in the event of a single fire in the 4160-V switchgear room.
Postulating complete loss of the 4160-V switchgear room -from a single l
fire coincident with loss of offsite power is highly' unlikely.
Therefore, the capability to safely shut down following a single fire in the 4160-V switchgear room will only be i
provided from offsite power.
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RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC'ITEMS OF INTEREST j
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ITEM PF. 2 Smoke Detection Systems Te l ~s
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Staff Concern:: The type and location of ioniza-tion smoke detectors may not provide prompt detection of fires:in areas where they are 'ised.:
Venti) =tion air flow patterns or. detector '
sensitivity may prevent effective fire.detet on.
Staff Position: 1[n situ tests should be conducted' with a su4table smoke generation~device to' verify. t:hn the products of combustion ~ from a' fire' wouI 4. Se promptly ' detected by installed -
smoke detectors and that ventilation air flow l
patterns in the area-do not significantly reduce
.l or prevent detection response.
Bench-tests should be conducted to.verify that smoke detectors '
will provide prompt response and: have adequate l
sensitivity to the 'products of combustion for the combustibles in the area where smoke'detectors are installed.
If any fire detection'systems
'l are found to be inadequate,'appropriate modifica-tions should be made to provide adequate detection' system performance.
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RESPONSE
l In situ tests will be performed in areas where smoke detectors exist or will be installed.
These~tests will=take into account the ventilation air flow patterns in the area and i
will include the use of a suitable 'smoke generation' device.
Bench tests to ensure adequa*.e sensitivity will be.performed
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on smoke detectors which exist or will be installed.
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.RESPONSES-TO SPECIFIC '1TEMS Ofr INTEREST
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ITEM PF.3 ' Supervision. of; Fire Door's -
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I Staff.Concern:
Fire doors have to'be closed-to'
.provide.an effective barrier:against the spread i
of fires between differentlareaslas well'as to
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contain suppression agents for total. flooding j
suppression systems.-
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.Staff'Position:
Appropriate administrative-l controls should be~provided to assure the i
effectiveness of fire doors protecting "safety l
related areas.es follows:
j 1.
Fire doors.should be inspected semi-annually.
to verify that self-closing mechanisms and
-latches are in good working-order..
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2.
Routine supervision of fire1doors~should consist of onef or the following:-
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a.
22ectrical supervision of the closed position.with alarms at a cen'oral location.
4 b.
Locked closed doors should be inspected weekly to verify that the doors are in the
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closed position.
The fire brigade commander j
should-have ready access-to keys for all j
locked doors.
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Automatic release mechanism doors should be 1
inspected monthly to verify that-doorways l
are free of obstructions.
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d.
Unsupervised and unlocked self-closing fire doors should be inspected daily to verify i
that they are in the closed position.
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- 3. - Areas protected by automatic total flooding gas I
suppression systems should have electrically supervised self-closing fire doors. _Automatic release mechanism fire doors should not be used in such areas.
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RESPONSE
l Appropriate administrative controls'will assure the effective-
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ness' of frire doors protecting safety-related areas 'as follows:
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Semi-annual inspections of fire doors to verify; l
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,that self-closing mechanisms and. latches are in good working order will tur incorporated into the station preventative maintenance program.
l 2.a.
Several fire doors, which are also security doors, have electrical supervision of the closed position with alarms in the Central Alarm Ftation._
2.b.
The fire brigade commander has ready access to keys for all locked, closed fire doors.
To assure that the doors remain closed, permanently affixed signs will be.
installed stating that the doors provide fire barriers i
i and must remain locked.- In addition, the.doors will-be checked to verify closure during the monthly fire-inspections.
2.c.
Automatic release mechanism doors will be inspected j
during the monthly fire inspections to verify absence' of obstructions.
2.d.
Unsupervised and unlocked self-closing fire doors are located in station areas which are continuously
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utilized by operating personnel.
To provide the greatest assurance that these doors remain closed, l
permanently affixed signs will be installed stating l
that the doors provide fire barriers and must not be i
blocked open.
In addition, the doors will.be checked l
to verify closure during the monthly fire inspections.
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Chapter 2, paragrph 2222, of Title 12A, Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems - Halon 1301,-of Volume 1 1977 of the National Fire-Protection Association (NFPA) Codes and Standards states that "to prevent fire from spreading through openings to adjacent hazards or work areas and to make up for leakage to the agent, openings shall be compensated for with automatic closures, screening nozzles or P
additional agent, and shall be arranged to operate simultaneously with system discharge."
Chapter-1, paragraph 1-43, of Title 80, Fire Doors and Windows, l
of Volume 7 1977 of the NFPA Codes and Standards-defines "automatic closing doors as '.nose which are normally open, but will close at the time of fire."
Accordingly, as required by the NFPA Codes and Standards,-
i areas protected by automatic flooding gas suppression systems will be provided with ' automatic release mechanism fire doors.
PF.3-2
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RESP0fzSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS OF INTEREST ITEM PF.4 Emergency Lighting Staff Concern:
Hard wired emergency lighting may be damaged as a result of fire.
Staff Position:
Fixed emergency lighting should be provided consisting of sehl beam units with individual eight-hour minimum battery power-supplies.
These units should be provided in all safety-related areas and areas where fires could result in the release of radioactive materials.
.In addition, all access and egress routes from these areas should be provided with this type of emergency lighting.
RESPONSE
As described in Section 3.2.4.1 (page 3-15) of Reference 1, the fixed emergency lighting has two separate sources of power (120-V and 125-V DC bus).
Because of the vulnerability of the feeder cables to a common fire, administratively controlled hand lanterns will be provided.
Since a postulated single fire would be isolated in a.single specific area,
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installation of fixed seal beam emergency lighting with individual eight-hour minimum battery power supplies in all safety-related areas unaffected by the postulated fire is not warranted from an emergency standpoint.
Furthermore, the fixed seal beam emergency lighting in the safety-related area affected by the postulated fire is also vulnerable to damage as a result of the postulated fire.
Accordingly, the administratively :ontrolled hand lanterns to be provided would be less vulnera31e to damage by the fire and would be more effective (i.e., readily available, better directed lighting on specific areas, etc.) for fire fighting and ingress purposes in all safety-related areas.
The concern with respect to egress from a fire area is addressed in Section 3 1.9 (page 3-5) of Reference 1.
Standard lighted fire escape markers will be placed in the administration/control building to facilitate personnel ev acu a tion.
Markers will not be placed in the remainder of the station because the station areas are generally out of doors, means of escape are visibly apparent, and the station
,is not open to the general public, but only to trained personnel who are familiar with the station layout.
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REFERENCES 1.
"Fire Protection Program Review, San Orofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1, March, 1977", submitted to the NRC by letter dated March 16, 1977 in Docket No. 50-206.
i 2.
Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A.
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-i RESPONSES T0 SPECIFIC ITEMS OF'INTEREST-l l
ITEM PF.5 Air Breathing Apparatus
'i Staff Concern:
Sufficient air breathing apparatus should be=available to support the fire brigade and emergency control personne1' for a period of. six hours. _
Staff Position:
The air breathing apparatus usedLby the fire brigade and emergency control personnel i
(i.e', the complement of air-breathing apparatus, a
spare botles, and recharge capabilit'y) should be j
sufficient to meet the needs of.seven peopleLfor a period of six hours at a usage rate of 'three air bottles per hour per person.
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RESPONSE
The fire brigade consists of three people.
The three_members' of the fire brigade r e assigned fire fighting responJibilities and would require air breathing apparatus.-
i The existing emergency air breathing equipment consists of four full-faced positive-pressure breathing masks.
There is enough; spare air in two regular bottles_and two'large bottles for a-l total of 12 refills.
In'addition to the Tour sets of integral
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air breathing equipment described above, the station is equipped i
with three sets of MSA Supplied Air Systems.
Each of these sets has a 6-part manifold which can supply air to six-masks.
This system can support a total of 18 people' for fighting a fire.
l Each airline respirator.can accommodate up to 150 feet of rubber hose.
This system utilizes the station compressed air system.
i The coupling of these two systems would satisfy fire fighting requirements.
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i ITEM PF.6.Smoke Detection:
Control Room Air Supply j
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Staff Concern:
Smoke from fires external to the?
1 control room could-be introduced~into theEmakeup air supply to?the control room..Area smoke1 j
detection~in the control room does not provide an 1
effective means to identify such'a'problem..
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Staff Position: 'Smoke detection should be pro-3 vided in the makeup air. supply to the control-l room.
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RESPONSE
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In order for smoke.to be introduced. into the makeup air 4
supply to-the control'room, there would have to be.a fire in another area of the plant.
Thessmoke'detectors which i
are included in.these other areas would detect the fire.
Also, because of the high air flow to.the control room,; the smoke from' a fire in some other area would probably reach the.
control room before any in-duct smoke detectors would be-i activated.
The capability also'exists to shut the dampers i
to the makeup air supply duct from ' the watch engineer's j
office adjacent to.the control room.
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RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ITEMS 0F INTEREST l
(...
i ITEM PF.7 Portable-Smoke,Venting Equipment Staff Concerni Ventilation ~ systems may not be effective to vent.smoke to permit'fire.fighting
(
!access.
Fire-dampers could be~ cl( 3 'd which l
lation systems.
would prevent the use of normal vc i
Sr.aff Position:; Portable smoke ej.
's should be provided for fire brigade use.
RESPONSE
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As described in SectionL3.2.3.1: (page:-3-13) of Reference 1,.
portable exhaust-blowers will be available to exhaust smoke-3 from the pipe tunnel; the.only area determined to-require
'l such equipment.
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- PF.7-1