IR 05000361/1978019

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IE Insp Repts 50-361/78-19 & 50-362/78-15 on 781101-30.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Piping Installation,Piping Post Weld Heat Treatment,Receiving Insp, Reactor Pressure Vessel & Internals Protection
ML13309A605
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 12/28/1978
From: Haynes R, Pate R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML13309A604 List:
References
50-361-78-19, 50-362-78-15, NUDOCS 7902010350
Download: ML13309A605 (6)


Text

U. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

50-361/78-19 Report No. 50-362/78-15 Docket No. 50-361, 50-362 License No, CPPR-97, CPPR-98 Safeguards Group Licensee:

Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800 - 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Fadility Name:

San Onofre Units 2 and 3 Inspection at:

Construction Site, San Diego County, California Inspection conducted:

November 1-30, 1978 Inspectors:

__

.J,-- J. Pat, Resident Reactor Inspector Date Signed Date Signed Date Signed Approved By-

___________2________

SR. C. Hayns, Chief, Project Section, Reactor Date Signed Construction and Engineering Support Branch Summary:

Inspection on November 1-30, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-361/78-19 and 50 362/78-15)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspections by the resident inspector of construction activities including:

piping installation, piping post weld heat treat, receiving inspection, reactor pressure vessel and internals protection, followup of licensee actions on previous inspection findings and general work in progress. The inspection in volved 70 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC inspecto Results:

Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie RV Form 219 79020 1'035

DETAILS Individuals Contacted a. Southern California Edison Company (SCE)

.*+H. B. Ray, Manager, Quality Assurance

  • +D. B. Schone, Lead Engineering Site Representative
  • +P. A. Croy, Site QA/QC Supervisor
  • +L. L. Segler, Project QA Supervisor
  • +L. D. Hamlin, Project Manager J. J. Pataleo, QA Engineer

+W. F. Rossfeld, QA Engineer M. Rodin, QA Engineer R. Frick, QA Engineer F. Pimentel, QA Engineer

+H. S. Leasure, Chief, Contract Construction Management b. Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel)

  • +C. A. Blum, Quality Control Manager
  • +R. H. Cutler, Project Field Engineer
  • +J. E. Geiger, Project Field QA Supervisor
  • +J. R. Caldwell, Project QA Supervisor
  • +J. E. Bashore, Division QA Manager B. M. McCullough, Field Construction Manager

+R. W. Welcher, Project QA Engineer In addition, construction craftsmen, engineers and foremen were contacted during the inspection *Denotes attendees at management meeting on 11/3/7 +Denotes attendees at management meeting on 11/17/7. Construction Status The licensee reported that site construction work is 63% complete as of November 30, 1978. The licensee's project management personnel estimate that the construction effort is split 60%/40% between Units 2 and. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The inspector examined those corrective actions taken by the licensee on the previously noted enforcement or unresolved item (Closed) Unresolved (50-362/78-10): The cover for the Unit 3 north steam generator nozzle was not in place and no work was in progres The cover was replaced after the primary discharge side of the steam generator was inspected. The tube sheet was sealed, the walls draped and the bottom covered. No adverse condition existed. A corrective action request (CAR) was initiated by Bechte The disposition on the CAR concluded that this was an isolated occurrence and no changes to the procedures were necessary. As no other occurrences were identified, the inspector found the disposition satisfactor (Closed) Unresolved (50-362/78-13/03): The work platform hand rails in Unit 3 reactor pressure vessel were made of wood that had not been treated with fire retardant chemical SCE advised that they did not have a commitment to use only fire retarded wood in the reactor pressure vesse However, they have been using mostly fire retarded material for scaf folding and work platforms to reduce the dangers of a fir SCE concluded that the presence of nonfire retarded wood for handrails did not create a substantial fire hazard. The inspector agreed with the SCE positio c. (Closed) Unresolved (50-361/78-08, 50-361/78-12):

NRC in spectors have identified arc strikes on safety-related piping on two different occasions. The first occurrence appeared to be due to inadequate protection of the pipe being welded and other nearby safety-related pipes. The second occurrence appeared to be due to welders working on nearby nonsafety related.wor Both of these areas were addressed by revision of procedures (WPP/QCI 201 and 202) to require more caution when welding near safety-related work and to require disposition of arc strikes on nonconformance reports. Bechtel provided training to the lower construction management personnel and the crafts men on each of the procedures separately. The inspector verified that both the construction management and the crafts men received training on the changes to WPP/QCI 20 The inspector examined approximately 10 primary system welds and approximately 20 secondary system welds in Units 2 and 3 during the past month and no arc strikes were observe (Closed) Noncompliance (50-361/78-13): Cable tie-down brackets in solid bottom trays were improperly installed and not iden tified during the subsequent inspection by Q SCE took corrective action to insure all QC inspection personnel were aware of the discrepancy and to insure that all work was completed in compliance with the specifications. Emphasis was placed on the importance of complete adherence to the specifi cations and drawing in the ongoing training program. The action taken appeared to be adequat (Closed) Noncompliance (50-361/78-13): The final inspection of a cable tray was performed prior to the connection of the grounding strap. A bolt in a structural connection was removed and not replaced during the grounding strap installatio SCE revised procedure WPP/QCI 602 to provide additional clarifi cation on how to perform rework on completed items. Also a Field Change Request (FCE) was initiated to clarify the acceptable method of installing cable tray grounding straps which precludes the use of structural member The inspector reviewed the change to WPP/QCI 602 and found it to be satisfactory. Also the inspector verified that. the changes were covered in a training session attended by the affected construction personne f. (Closed) Noncompliance (50-362/78-10): Reinforcing bars were found to be less than 1/2" from the placement forms subsequent to the QC inspections. This would not have provided the minimum cover specified in ACI-31 A "stop work" was issued by SCE QA to prevent the concrete placement until the discrepancies were corrected. All the cognizant inspection personnel were given additional instruc tion to assure that all work is completed in accordance with the specifications and drawings prior to acceptance by the QC inspector. The disposition and corrective action taken by the licensee was satisfactor During a subsequent inspection (Report 50-361/78-14), the inspector verified that the reinforcing bars had been properly placed for a refueling water tank building wall and had been inspected in accordance with the specification and drawin. Piping Storage (50-361/78-17/03)

The pipe storage area north of Unit 2 was observed several times during the general area tours in the past month. No occurrences of improper pipe storage were identified. Bechtel management personnel advised that periodic inspection of the onsite storage areas had been initiated. Also, the inspector noted that new cribbing had been made available for the pipe storage area north of Unit 2. The inspector had no additional question. Reactor Pressure Vessel Protection (50-362/78-13/03)

The inspector verified that the procedures for protection of the reactor pressure vessels for Units 2 and 3 (WPP/QCI 009, Revision 5 and 505, Revision 0) were being implemented. All the openings were covered including the safety-injection nozzle that had previously been used for air eductors to provide ventilating air inside the RPV. Access control was being maintained. The inspector had no additional question. Routine Receiving Test Program During a previous inspection (50-361/78-05), the NRC inspector noted that there was no specific sampling technique for selecting bolts to be inspected by the receiving inspector. Subsequent to the inspection, the inspector was advised that the method used for sample selection consisted of dumping the container of bolts and then taking the sample while the bolts are still scattered. This method would insure a random sample and was satisfactory to the NRC inspecto. Routine Inspections The following construction activities were observed:

a. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundry and Safety-Related Pipin Pipe storage

,Pipe handling Post weld heat treat

.Pipe installation and fitup b. Reactor Vessel Protection

<Openings covered Access control

-5 c. Reactor Vessel Internals Access controlled Protective covers in place No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified during the above observation. Plant Tour The inspector toured both Units 2 and 3 several times each week during this inspection report period. Particular attention was directed to observing work in progress and availability of super vision and quality control inspectors at the work areas, housekeeping and preservation of equipmen No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Management Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on November 3, and 17, 1978 The scope of the in spections and inspector's findings as noted in this report were discussed. The licensee representatives had no additional comments.