IR 05000206/1978015
| ML13323A577 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 01/18/1979 |
| From: | Canter H, Faulkenberry B, Miller L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-78-15, NUDOCS 7903020265 | |
| Download: ML13323A577 (11) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-206/78-15 50-206 DPR-13 Docket N License No...
Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at:
San Onofre Inspection Conducted:
December 26-29, 1978 Inspectors:
cmZC-( \\
0 Canter Reactor Inspector Ddte Signed L. F. M ler, Reactor Inspector U
ate Signed
. P. Haist R ct Inspector ate Signed.
Jo ston, Reactor Inspector (Intern)
/Date Signed Approved By:
-7
_
B. H. Faulkenberry, Chief,>eactor Project Date Signed SSection 2, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Summary:
Support Branch Inspection on December 26-29, 1978 (Report No. 50-206/78-15)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of Q.A. surveillance; review of plant operations; startup testing following outage; welding; NDE; LER followup; noncompliance followup; inspector identified item followup; and independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 106 inspector-hours by four NRC inspector Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie $
IE:V Form 219 (2)
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted
- R. Brunet, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1
- H. Ray, Manager, Quality Assurance
- B. Curtis, Supervising Engineer
- P. Penseyres, Nuclear Engineer
- J. Dunn, SONGS 1 Plant Q.A. Supervisor
- W. Malay, Quality Assurance Engineer
- J. Mortensen, SCE Chemical-Radiation
- G. Beetz, Maintenance Foreman
- F. Ricks, Nuclear Engineer
- J. Sargent, Supervisor, Plant Instrumentation H. Key, Chemical-Radiation Protection Foreman (acting)
D. Shepard, SCE Metallurgist W. Gould, SCE Engineer T. Timmons, Q.A. Engineer The inspectors also interviewed several other licensee employees including members of the engineering staff, watch engineers, operating foreman, and maintenance personne *Denotes those at exit intervie. Q.A. Program Annual Review The changes to the licensee's Q.A. program that were made during 1978 were reviewed for.conformance with the program description as contained in the licensee's application, as amended. During this review, discussions were held with the personnel responsible for implementing the change Procedures for implementing the Q.A. program change dated September 19, 1978, which addressed the 10 CFR 21 requirements, were verified to be developed and implemente (See IE Report No. 50-206/77-19, Paragraph 4.)
The inspectors noted that the Q.A. Manual and Q.A. Program Topical Report require the plant engineer to review and evaluate safety related test results. The operations organization had not been aware of this procedural requirement and a Q.A. department Corrective Action Request (CAR) No. P-120 was issued on this subject as a result of Q.A. Audit 501-22-7 The operating staff's response to the CAR was to recommend a change to the Q.A. Manual and Topical Report which would require these reviews and evaluations to be in accordance with current standard operating practices at San Onofre, and in accordance with that which is specified in ANS1-N18.7-1976 and NUREG 75/087. This manual change is underway and will be completed in January 197 The method for communication of program and procedure changes between the operations and Q.A. organizations was not defined. A licensee representative committed to correcting this problem. (See exit interview - Paragraph 12)(01. 78-15-01)
3. Records The inspector verified by examination of the following records that the program for the control, storage, retention, and retrieval of records and documents was in conformance with the technical specifi cation a. Axial Offset Calibration Data for the Last Refueling Outage b. Incore Flux Map S1C6FO43(8-78)
c. T-Average Recorder Chart for August 1978 d. 1977 Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test Report e. Control Rod Exercising Sheets for January 1974 f. Maintenance Records on the Installation of Control Room Containment.Pressure Instruments PIS 511, 512, 513 g. S-3-3.12 h. P & ID 568782-18 P & ID 568767-19 S-I-1.13, Revision 3 k. Electrolyte Level Sheets for Pilot Cells or 125 V Battery for June 197 The inspector found some improvement, over the 1977 review, in the area of transferring quality-related records to the Document Control Center. Also, a concern documented in IE Report 50-206/77-14, Paragraph 5, with respect to storage of recorder charts, has been alleviated. The T-average recorder chart examined at this time was appropriately labeled and filed. Cross-referencing between com ponent name or surveillance test name and record location is still
-3 inadequate to.produce some of the requested records in less than several hours. Timely records retrieval is highly dependent on using people that are knowledgeable of the system terminolog This item and the referenced IE report were discussed at the exit meeting and both are considered close The records of various parameters of reactor operations, including core thermocouples and incore flux measurements, were examined to ensure that licensee personnel could detect long-term equipment degradation or adverse trends. Also, up-to-date copies of plant drawings on two modified systems were verified to exis No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Training The inspector examined training and retraining programs required for persons working at the licensee's facility. These programs consisted of both formal training as well as on-the-job training provided by the responsible group supervisors. The formal training included:
a. Industrial Safety b. Radiological Health and Safety c. Fire Protection and Firefighting d. Emergency Plan Security f. Quality Assurance The inspector verified through an examination of employee training records for the past year and discussions with licensee represent atives, that employees have been provided formal training in these areas on an annual basis and that appropriate records of on-the-job training were being maintained. In addition, female employees were provided with instruction concerning prenatal radiation exposure No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Calibration The calibration requirements and procedures for the following measurements were discussed with licensee representatives and examined separatel a. Boric Acid Concentration b. Condensate Storage Tank Level c. Containment Sphere Pressure d. Diesel Generator Day Tank Level e. Demineralized Water Integrated Flow f. Boric Acid Integrated Flow g. Battery Voltag h. Battery Gravity i. Reactor Coolant Specific Activity Boric Acid Tank Leve Procedures used to perform these calibrations were found to have been reviewed and approved and to contain acceptance values and detailed instructions for calibratio Based on discussions with licensee representatives, the technical content of the procedures for performing calibration for Items a, h, and i were examine The calibration records for the measurements identified above were examined for the calibrations done in the most recent refueling shutdown. The traceability to certified equipment of the accuracy of the calibrating devices used by the licensee was verified in these case No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Surveillance The licensee's procedures for performing, documenting and reviewing surveillance tests required by the technical specifications were reviewed. Specifically, the following procedures were examined:
a. Control Rod Exercising and Boric Acid Flow Path Verification (S-3-3.12)
b. Reactor Plant Instrumentation Testing (S-II-1.1)
(1) Reactor Coolant Temperatures (2) Steam Generator Level Test and Flow Mismatch
-5 c. Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operation and Testing (S-2-13)
d. Containment Sphere Pressure Test (S-II-1.1)
e. Battery Maintenance, Weekly Tests, (S-I-1.18)
Surveillance tests a and c above were witnessed by the inspector and discussed with the licensee. In addition, a sample of several recent test results for each of the six tests was examine No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Review of Plant Operations a. Shift Logs and Operating Records Representative samples of logs and records for October and November 1978 were examined and discussed with licensee personne b. Tour of Facility A tour of the facility was conducted during which the follow ing conditions were observed:
(1) Monitoring of instrumentation was found to be in accord ance with licensee requirement (2) Radiation controls were properly establishe (3) No significant fluid or steam leaks were observe (4) No abnormal pipe vibrations were observe (5) The control room was manned in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and the facility tech nical specifications. The control operator appeared knowledgeable as to the reasons for actuation annunciator (6) Housekeeping appeared adequate. No fire hazards were observed. A drip bucket which was used to collect fluid leaks from a potentially radioactive source had a hole in the bottom of it, but the area beneath the bucket was an established epoxied clean-up area. A licensee repre sentative stated that the problem will be remedie c. Post Refueling Review A review of facility records confirmed that systems disturbed during the refueling outage were returned to service in accordance with approved procedure Signatures on the critical rod position calculation form prior to startup in dicated proper authorization for rod withdrawal; the calcu lation correlated to the actual rod position upon achieving criticality. Required surveillance tests were performed in accordance with the facility technical specification No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Startup Testing/Refueling The shutdown and startup packages for the past refueling outage were examined to verify that core physics testing was performed in accordance with technical specification requirements. Pro cedures covering the following areas were examined for technical adequacy and procedural requirements:
a. Core Thermal Power b. Reactor Shutdown Margin c. Isothermal Temperature Coefficient d. Control Rod Worth e. Axial Offset Results of the testing in the above areas were found to correlate with previous results and the Reload Safety Evaluation. No re activity anomalies were disclosed in the course of-the testing that would indicate a significant difference from predicted result No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Licensee Event Followup The circumstances and corrective actions described in Licensee Event Reports (LER) submitted since the previous inspection were verified. The report of each event had been submitted to the NRC Regional Office within the required time interva The LER's examined and comments on this examination by the inspector follows:
-7 a. (Open) LER 78-11 - Failure of Safety-Related Snubbers:
The LER states that the degraded condition of the snubbers, which consisted of damaged threads on the piston rod and rod lock nut resulting in partial disengagement of the piston from the piston rod, was caused by operating transients, including water.hammer, which occurred early in plant lif At the exit meeting, a licensee representative stated that the degradation of the snubbers may not have resulted from th above described cause. The licensee stated that they currently are not sure what caused the degradation; however, in conjunction with the ITT Grinnel Corporation, they are actively investigating the proble In accordance with telephone conversations held on November 30, 1978, the licensee at the exit meeting stated that during the next cold shutdown period they will disassemble for internal examination at least 22 snubbers including the nine that were identified in LER 78-11 (01 78-15-02).
Any future recommended snubber design changes, descriptions of failure mechanisms, and additional testing requirements will depend upon the results of the current evaluation being per formed by ITT Grinnel and the results of the internal inspections performed during cold shutdow b. (Open) LER 78-12 - Class 2 Pipe Cracks: In correspondence to the NRC Regional Office dated November 21, 1978, the licensee reported cracks in portions of the reactor coolant pump seal water return line and an elbow fitting in the charging pump discharge line. The cracks were discovered during inservice inspection pressure tests on class 2 components while the unit was in the cold shutdown condition. The licensee attributed the cracks to chloride induced stress corrosio Limits for the safe operation of the facility as prescribed in the technical specification were not exceeded for the even The report had been submitted to the NRC Regional Office within the required time interva The circumstances surrounding the event were examined. The inspector visually examined the location of the failures, the failed seal water return piping, test samples taken from the scheduled 10 seal water return piping, andthe cracked schedule 160 charging pump discharge elbow. The licensee's metallog raphic analysis of the schedule 10 stainless steel piping indicates that the failure mechanism is transgranular stress
-8 corrosion cracking originating from the outside surface of the pipe and induced by the chloride-rich environment of gravel which surrounded the piping. The quantitative analysis of the chloride environment was not available for the inspector's review. The licensee had not performed a metallographic analysis on the schedule 160 elbow crack because the crack could not be found by liquid penetrant testing after the elbow was removed. The licensee agreed to further testing of the schedule 160 charging pump discharge elbow to the extent necessary to confirm the failure mechanis The corrective action described in the LER was examined. The inspector visually examined the replacement piping and conditions in the pipe trench. The chloride retaining gravel has been removed from the trench and the covers will be replaced to protect the piping from the salt air. The trench is equipped with a drain into an adjacent tunne The licensee believes that these corrective actions are appropriate and that the environment in the trench will duplicate the environment in an adjacent pipe tunnel in which there have been no pipe crack problems. The licensee is replacing all carbon steel pipe supports in the trench with stainless stee The inspector noted some apparent asbestos insulation on nonsafety-related sample lines and questioned the possibility of chloride leachin The licensee agreed to evaluate the effect of any such insula tion on all safety-related stainless steel lines in the trenc At the request of the inspector, the licensee reviewed the other lines in the trench and identified two other safety related stainless steel lines. The licensee will perform liquid penetrant examinations on these lines for detection of cracks. The licensee stated that there is no other stainless steel piping located in the same high chloride environmen The licensee is now reviewing and evaluating the function of all schedule 10 stainless steel piping located in the plan The inspector reviewed procedures and quality records associ ated with the installation and testing of the replacement pipin This matter is considered to be an open item pending the satisfactory review of the following items during a subsequent inspection; (1) chloride analysis report for environment surrounding area of pipe cracks (01 78-15-03), (2) results of failure analysis review of the schedule 160 charging pump discharge line elbow (01 78-15-04), (3) licensee's evaluation of chloride leaching potential of asbestos insulation located in the pipe trench (01 78-15-05), (4) results of surface
-9 examinations of safety-related pipes located in the pipe trench (01 78-15-06), and (5) results of licensee's review and evaluation of usage of schedule 10 stainless steel safety related piping in the plant (01 78-15-07).
10. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings The circumstances and corrective action described in the licensee's responses to the items of noncompliance listed below were verifie The corrective measures taken to avoid further items of noncom pliance were effected within the committed time periods described in the replie a. (Closed) Noncompliance (50-206/77-11): Procurement documents for the purchase of repair. parts for the boric acid transfer pumps were not reviewed by the Q.A. organization. The repair parts were not identified as safety related such that a sub sequent Q.A. procurement document review was not tendere The inspector verified that the corrective actions described in the licensee's correspondence of September 9, 1977 were completed as state b. (Closed) Deviation (50-206/78-09): A fire barrier installed between two cable trays in the 480V switchgear room was partially removed to facilitate pulling of new security system cabling. The inspector examined various memoranda and pro cedures to verify that the corrective actions described in the licensee's correspondence of September 6, 1978 were complete as state (Closed) Followup items (50-206/77-14): The inspector identified problems with respect to records management. A licensee representative committed at the exit interview in the referenced report to investigatemethods to expedite the transfer of quality related records to the Document Control Center and to improve the retrievability of records by im proving the indexing and/or cross-referencing of records and their locatio Some improvement has been noticed in this are (See Para graph 3.)
The licensee relies on adequately trained and knowledgeable personnel for proper operation of their records management syste The licensee is sensitive to proper operation of their system and is.changing the system continuall.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is re quired in order to-ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviation Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraph. Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 29, 197 The inspectors summarized the purpose and the scope of the inspection and the finding A licensee representative stated that measures will be in effect by the end of January, 1979 for a system of communicating and imple menting changes to programs and procedures between the operations and the Q.A. organization (See Paragraph 2.) (01 78-15-01)
A licensee representative stated that during the next cold shut down, an inspection program on safety-related snubbers will be performed. This program will entail an internal inspection for damage similar to the problem reported in LER 78-11 of at least 22 snubbers (including nine snubbers which were repaired during the last refueling outage). The licensee will inform Region V of the results of the internal inspection prior to startup following the cold shutdow (See Paragraph 9.a) (01 78-15-02)
Licensee representatives stated that they will follow up on the unresolved items listed in Paragraph 9.b. One representative stated that a metallurgical examination of an elbow in the charging pump discharge line which was reported as leaking in LER 78-12 will be performed. This should be completed by the end of January, 197 (01 78-15-03 to 07)