IR 05000206/1978013
| ML13323A562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1978 |
| From: | Canter H, Horn A, Woessner J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323A561 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-78-13, NUDOCS 7812070296 | |
| Download: ML13323A562 (6) | |
Text
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
Report No. 50-206/78-13 Docket No. 50-206 License N DPR-13 Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at:
San Onofre Inspection Conducted: 9/21-24/78, 9/25-28/78, 10/12-13/78 & 10/16-18/78 Inspectors: up essner, Reactor Inspector Datg/Signed H. Canter, Reactor Inspector Date Signed A. Hornr /eaet6 or,spector Date Signed L. Miller, Re to Inspector Signed hn n
eactor Inspector (Intern)
ate Signed Approved By:
Th,
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J. L. Crews, Chief, Re ctor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Summary:
Inspection September 21 to October 18, 1978 (Report No. 50-206/78-13)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection of ILRT; local leak rate tests; refueling preparations and operations; maintenance activities; and, LER' The inspection involved 163 inspector-hours onsite by five NRC inspector Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie IEVFom7o-N 29(
IE:V Form 219 (2)A
DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted a. Principal SCE Employees Contacted
- J..Curran, Nuclear Plant Manager
- R. Brunet, Plant Superintendent, Unit 1
- B. Curtis, Supervising Engineer
- P. Penseyres, Nuclear Engineer
- G. McDonald, QA/QC Supervisor
- J. Dunn, Project QA Supervisor
- F. Ricks, Station Engineer The inspector also interviewed several other licensee employees, including members of the engineering staff, watch engineers, control operators, and maintenance personne *Denotes attendance at exit conferenc b. Westinghouse Employees Contacted J. Sinclair, Jr., Refueling Coordinator 2. Containment Integrated Leak Rate Test (CILRT)
The inspectors witnessed selected portions of the CILRT. The test was conducted at full pressure (Pa=49.4 psig and La=0.12 wt%/day). The licensee commenced pumping up to test pressure on September 20, 1978. On arrival at the site on September 21, a licensee representative informed the inspectors that there were problems in stabilizing the leak rate, apparently due to the fact that the secondary sides of the steam generators were draine The licensee began refilling the secondary side of the steam generators which had been drained in anticipation of eddy current examinations to be conducted the following week. A discussion with licensee personnel revealed a possible correlation between the high leak rate and empty steam generators. Refilling the steam generators restored the plant configuration to a status similar to previous CILRTs at San Onofre Unit At 8:00 p.m., September 22, the licensee commenced taking data for the test. Through the night and early morning, a consistant leak rate had been established. The test run was completed about 8:00 p.m., September 23, with the pump back verification test being completed around 1:00 a.m. the following da The licensee's preliminary result for the Type A test was a mass point leak rate which was less than the acceptance criteria allowed. The acceptance criteria at the 95% upper confidence level was 0.09%/24 hours. The IE inspector's independent cal culations for the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test period (8:00 p.m., September 22 to 8:00 p.m., September 23) was a mass point leak rate of about
.044%/24 hour No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Penetration Test Review The inspector examined the Containment Penetration Leak Rate Testing Procedure, S-V-1.12 (Rev. 7), and the latest test re sults for consistency with regulatory and technical specifica tion requirements. A computer output of the 9/18/78 penetration leak rate test results indicated the total penetration leakage to be 115.80% of allowable. This limit was apparently exceeded when the inner hot-leg recirculation isolation check-valve leakage was found to be 37.33% of allowable. The outside isol ation valve in this series valved line (penetration 31)
indicated a leakage of 0.54% of allowabl Further evaluation of this item by the licensee indicated that, in fact, the results had not exceeded allowable limits, but that the computer program which was used to calculate the leakages was in error. As a consequence, the licensee initiated a com plete review of the Penetration Leak Rate Testing procedure and the computer program. Changes to these documents were initiated to clarify the various areas of conflict by the end of this inspectio No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Preparations for Refueling The inspectors examined the following refueling related procedures for their completeness, technical adequacy, and proper approval Maintenance Procedure S-I-1.1, Site Handling and Storage of New Fuel Assemblies and RCC Assemblies
-3 Station Order S-E-104, Receiving, Inventory, and Shipment of Fuel Operating Instruction S-3-3.22, Preparation for Reactor Refueling Operating Instruction S-3-3.23, Reactor Refueling Control Room Check-Off List Westinghouse Refueling Procedure FP-SCE-R6 The inspectors observed that the appendices to the refueling procedures contained the test procedures for checking the refueling equipment interlocks and limit switches, but that no references to these appen dices were made in the main body of the procedure. Thus, there was no assurance that these tests would be completed prior to fuel move ment. The licensee concurred with this observation and issued a procedure change on September 30 to include references to the appro priate appendices. The equipment affected by this change were the manipulator crane, the fuel transfer system, and the fuel handling equipmen The inspectors verified through observation and record review that the new fuel for cycle VII had been received, stored, and inspected in accordance with the licensees's procedure No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Refueling Activities Prior to actual movement of fuel, the inspectors verified that surveillance testing requirements of the technical specifications and refueling procedures had been completed. These included the source range nuclear instruments, manipulator crane, fuel transfer system, fuel handling equipment, radiation monitors, and communication systems. During the fuel movement, the inspectors verified that technical specification and refueling procedure requirements were being met. These requirements included monitor ing the following parameters:
core neutron flux; vessel water level, boron concentration and temperature; spent fuel pool tem perature and boron concentration; CVCS operation; and, Auxiliary Coolant System operatio Twenty-one inspector-hours of the refueling operations were witnessed. The activities appeared to be performed according to the procedures. Fuel accountability was maintained with status III
-4 boards and check sheets. Core internals, the vessel head, and vessel studs and nuts were stored to prevent damage. House keeping appeared satisfactory. The qualifications and license requirements of the persons directing the operations, both on the refueling deck and in the control room, were in accordance with the technical specfications, refueling procedures, and 10 CF No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie.
Review of Plant Operations The procedures and plans for several maintenance projects were inspecte Items were discussed with licensee representatives to determine whether or not the following systems will be returned to an operating status prior to plant startup:
West Feedwater Pump (Motor Inspection)
Pressurizer Heater Bank D (Power Supply Mod.)
Boric Acid System (Piping Replacement)
Bent Rod Control Cluster (Temporary Storage and Handling)
LVDT Cable Replacement Documentation of the completion of this maintenance was required by the licensee. The completed documents are required by the licensee to be reviewed by a cognizant supervisor (project engineer, watch engineer, foreman, etc.).
Preoperational testing of those portions of the systems affected by this maintenance was planned as a step in either individual maintenance procedures, pre-startup check-off lists, or valve lineup check-off lists. None of the maintenance plans inspected appeared to modify the facility or startup testing progra No items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie. Refueling Outage Maintenance The inspectors reviewed major maintenance items scheduled during the refueling to ascertain whether they were performed in accordance with approved procedures by qualified personnel. Among those items examined were administrative approvals for returning the system to service, QA inspection/audit of work, testing, provisions for jumper ing or removing and installing leads required for maintenance or testing, responsibility for reporting deficiencies and provisions for returning system to normal following completion of wor Activities inspected were:
-5 Replacement of flow straighteners in the feed water syste Inspection of the "C" reactor coolant pump seal Completion of work on reactor overpressure mitigating syste Inspection of hydraulic snubber Included in the review, the inspectors witnessed the testing of one hydraulic snubber. Another snubber, 1-735-SW-1, was found to be void of hydraulic fluid. The licensee removed the snubber for functional testing. The results of this test will be followed up at a later date (78-13-5).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were note. Licensee Event Followup The circumstances and corrective actions described in the following Licensee Event Reports (LER) were examined. The cause of each event was identified with the details clearly reported to facility management and reviewed by.the Onsite Review Committe Limits for the safe operation of the facility as prescribed in the technical specifications were not exceeded for the events describe Corrective action was verified by direct observation where possible, and by a review of facility procedures and records. The report of each event had been submitted to the NRC Regional Office within the required time interva The status of the LERs were as follows:
LER 78-09: The corrective action described in the licensee's correspondence of August 29, 1978, was verified to be complet Item close LER 78-10:
The corrective action described in the licensee's correspondence of September 14, 1978, was verified to be complete. Item close.
Exit Meetings The inspectors met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on September 24 and 28, and October 13 and 18, 197 The inspectors summarized the purpose and scope of the inspections and the findings. No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.