IR 05000338/2017002
| ML18362A246 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 12/28/2018 |
| From: | David Hardage NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Stoddard D Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO) |
| References | |
| IR 2017002 | |
| Download: ML18362A246 (22) | |
Text
UNITED STATES ecember 28, 2018
SUBJECT:
RE-ISSUE - NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2017002 AND 05000339/2017002
Dear Mr. Stoddard:
On August 1, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the subject inspection report for North Anna Power Station, Agencywide Document and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML17213A026. After the inspection report was issued, the NRC noted that some clarifying information, administrative in nature, was inadvertently omitted from the report. Additionally, duplicate information was removed. Accordingly, we have revised Inspection Report (IR) 05000338/2017002 and 05000339/2017002, to document the necessary changes. Please replace the original report with the report enclosed. This reissued report does not change any NRC position that has been communicated in the previously issued report.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. I apologize for any inconvenience this error may have caused. If you have any questions, please contact me at (404) 997-4663.
Sincerely,
/RA/
David H. Hardage, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 05000338, 05000339 License Nos.: NPF-4, NPF-7
Enclosure:
Re-issue - IR 05000338/2017002 and 05000339/2017002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION II==
Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 05000338/2017002 and 05000339/2017002 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: April 1, 2017, through June 30, 2017 Inspectors: G. Croon, Senior Resident Inspector S. Cuadrado de Jesus, Resident Inspector S. Sanchez, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP4, 1EP5 and 4OA5.1)
J. Hickman, Emergency Preparedness Inspector (Sections 1EP2, 1EP3, 1EP4, 1EP5 and 4OA5.1)
Approved by: Anthony D. Masters, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY
IR 05000338/2017002, 05000339/2017002; April 1, 2017 - June 30, 2017; North Anna Power
Station, Units 1 and 2. Routine Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified. The report also covered an announced inspection by two emergency preparedness inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 6.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP),and operated at RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent RTP, and operated at RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Seasonal Extreme Weather
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees adverse weather preparations for hot weather operations, specified in 0-GOP-4.1, Hot Weather Operations, Revision (Rev.) 36, 0-GOP-5.5, EDG Hot Weather Operation, Rev.14, and the licensees corrective action program (CAP) database for hot weather related issues. The inspectors walked down two risk-significant systems/areas listed below to verify compliance with the procedural requirements and to verify that the specified actions provided the necessary protection for the structures, systems, or components.
- Unit 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG) 1J and Unit 2 EDGs 2H and 2J
- Station blackout diesel
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a site-specific, weather-related inspection due to anticipated adverse weather conditions. On April 17, 2017, the inspectors reviewed the licensee response to severe storm warnings, with tornado watch, and high wind warnings of 40 miles an hour for the area. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed licensee adverse weather response procedures, including 0-AP-41, Severe Weather Conditions, Rev.
61, and site preparations including work activities that could impact the overall maintenance risk assessments.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted five equipment alignment partial walkdowns, listed below, to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify the operability of a redundant or backup system/train or a remaining operable system/train with a high risk significance for the current plant configuration (considering out-of-service, inoperable, or degraded condition); or a risk-significant system/train that was recently realigned following an extended system outage, maintenance, modification or testing; or a risk-significant single-train system. The inspector conducted the reviews to ensure that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Partial walkdown of Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump 1-FW-P-2 in pump room prior to the performance of periodic testing (1-PT-71.3Q. "1-FW-P-3B, B Motor-Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test") on the U1 motor-driven AFW pump 1-FW-P-3B
- Partial walkdown of Unit 1 station vacuum priming system (vacuum priming tank 1-VP-TK-1, vacuum priming pump 1-VP-P-1A and associated piping and valves)
- Partial walkdown for the alignment of the new fire protection pump/motor for 1-FP-P-1 and related valves and pipes in the fire pump room after its return to operable status (pump was out of service for more than one month)
- Partial walkdown Unit 2 AFW motor driven pumps during the performance of 2-PT-71.1Q.1 for U2 turbine driven AFW pump
- Partial walkdown of U1 boron injection tank (BIT) after its return to operable status (BIT heat tracing was found inoperable during 1-PT-59.4J on June 20, 2017)
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Quarterly Fire Protection Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted focused tours of the four areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensees implementation of fire protection requirements as described in fleet procedures CM-AA-FPA-100, Fire Protection/Appendix R (Fire Safe Shutdown) Program, Rev. 10, CM-AA-FPA-101, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Rev. 8, and CM-AA-FPA-102, Fire Protection and Fire Safe Shutdown Review and Preparation Process and Design Change Process, Rev. 5. The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to:
- (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition sources;
- (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and,
- (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 1-2, Diesel pump house room
- Unit 1, Emergency switchgear room
- Unit 1 Battery rooms 1-I, 1-II, 1-III, and 1-IV
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
.1 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed a licensed operator performance on June 29, 2017, during a simulator scenario. The scenario required classifications and notifications that were counted for NRC performance indicator (PI) input. The inspectors observed the following elements of crew performance in terms of communications:
- (1) ability to take timely and proper actions;
- (2) prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms;
- (3) correct use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures; (4)timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and
- (5) oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Control Room Operator Performance
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted three observations of licensed reactor operators actions and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee procedures and regulatory requirements. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. As part of this assessment, the inspectors observed the following elements of operator performance:
- (1) operator compliance and use of plant procedures including TS;
- (2) control board/in-plant component manipulations;
- (3) use and interpretation of plant instruments, indicators and alarms;
- (4) documentation of activities;
- (5) management and supervision of activities; and
- (6) communication between crew members.
The inspectors observed and assessed licensed operator performance during the following events:
- April 4, 2017, Observed U1 control room operators performance during 1-PT-17.1 "Control Room Operability," Rev. 37, performed as required by TS SR 3.1.4.2.
- April 19, 2017, Observed U1 control room operators performance during 1-PT-34.3, Turbine Valve Freedom Test, Rev. 42.
- June 30, 2017, Observed U1 control room operators performance during U1 main generator automatic voltage regulator (AVR) being placed back in service.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
For the four equipment issues listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the respective licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with licensee staff. The inspectors compared the licensees actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 50.65), and licensee procedure ER-AA-MRL-10, Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- U1 feedwater pump impeller failure
- U2 2-DB-BFP-1B back flow replacement
- U1 malfunction of the control card for BIT outlet normal heat trace
- U1 generator AVR fuse replacement
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the three activities listed below for the following:
- (1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted;
- (2) management of risk;
- (3) appropriate and necessary steps taken to plan and control the resulting emergent work activities upon identification of an unforeseen situation; and
- (4) adequate identification and resolution of maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems. The inspectors reviewed these maintenance activities to verify that the licensee was in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensees safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to verify that deficiencies in risk assessments were being identified and properly resolved.
- U1 fuel oil line replacement
- 1-PT-63.1B and 213.5J 1 QS-P-1B replacement
- Planned sampling of 2-QS-TK-2
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability and Functionality Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed three operability determinations (OD) and functionality assessments, listed below, affecting risk-significant mitigating systems, to assess, as appropriate:
- (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations;
- (2) whether continued system operability was warranted;
- (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensatory measures;
- (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and
- (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on TS Limiting Conditions for Operation and the risk significance in accordance with the Significance Determination Process. No samples of operator work arounds (OWA) were reviewed because there were no OWAs existing for either unit during the calendar year 2016. The inspectors review included a verification that ODs were made as specified by procedure OP-AA-102, Operability Determination, Rev. 13. Documents reviewed are listed in the
.
- Review of OD CR1070061, U1 1-RC-P-1C seal leak off
- Review of OD CA 3056296, 1-HV-AC-1 high vibrations
- Review of OD CA 3027519, 2-QS-MOV-202B high leak off
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
Permanent Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the completed permanent plant modification design change (DC), DC-NA-13-01199 A RSST Bus Cross Tie at Intake Control House. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of the installation, reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Review/Regulatory Screening, technical drawings, test plans and the modification package to assess the TS implications. The inspectors also verified that the permanent modification was in accordance with licensee design change process procedure.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six post-maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, listed below, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether:
- (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel;
- (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3)acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents;
- (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the application;
- (5) tests were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied;
- (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled;
- (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and
- (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing Program, Rev. 14. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- WO 59103115049, Install ground from 2-BY-BC-2-1 to 2-BY-BC-2C-1
- WO 95103087951, Motor Driven Fire Pump protection pump exercise
- WO 59110288087, U1 NI-36 Intermediate range channel II calibration
- CA 3034712, Engineering perform thermography walk-down of Switchyard
- WO 59103068268, AVR drawer #3 negative output sporadic
- WO 59103062300, Unit-2 Recirculation spray casing cooling chiller repairs
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedures, witnessed testing, or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
IST Pump or Valve Test:
- 1-PT-71.2Q, 1-FW-P-3A, A Motor-Driven AFW Pump and Valve Test, Rev. 43 Other Surveillance Tests:
- 2-PT-14.1, Unit 2 Charging Pump 2-CH-P-1A Operability Test, Rev. 55
- 2-PT-212.34H, Valve Inservice Inspection (2-QS-MOV-202A), Rev. 13
- 2-PT-212.34J, Valve Inservice Inspection (2-QS-MOV-202B), Rev. 16
- 1-PT-34.8.5.3, Containment Radiation Monitoring Instrument Calibration (RMS 165), Rev. 3
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP2 Alert and Notification System Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the licensees methods for testing and maintaining the alert and notification system in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 02, Alert and Notification System Evaluation. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR Part 50.47 (b) (5), and its related 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E requirements were used as reference criteria. The criteria contained in NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Rev. 1, were also used as a reference.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment and interviewed personnel responsible for system performance. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the alert and notification system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP3 Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees Emergency Response Organization (ERO)augmentation staffing requirements and process for notifying the ERO to ensure the readiness of key staff for responding to an event and timely facility activation. The qualification records of key position ERO personnel were reviewed to ensure all ERO qualifications were current. A sample of problems identified from augmentation drills or system tests performed since the last inspection was reviewed to assess the effectiveness of corrective actions. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, Attachment 03, Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System. The applicable planning standard, 10 CFR 50.47(b) (2), and its related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, requirements were used as reference criteria.
The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the ERO staffing and augmentation system on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
Since the last NRC inspection of this program area, one change was made to the Radiological Emergency Plan, one change was made to the emergency action levels, and several changes were made to the implementing procedures. The licensee determined that, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), the Plan continued to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. The inspectors reviewed these changes to evaluate for potential reductions in the effectiveness of the Plan. However, this review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and does not constitute formal NRC approval of the changes. Therefore, these changes remain subject to future NRC inspection in their entirety.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 04, Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes. The applicable planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), and its related requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E were used as reference criteria. The inspectors reviewed various documents that are listed in the Attachment to this report. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the emergency action level and emergency plan changes on an annual basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP5 Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions identified through the emergency preparedness program to determine the significance of the issues, the completeness and effectiveness of corrective actions, and to determine if issues were recurring. The licensees post-event after action reports, self-assessments, and audits were reviewed to assess the licensees ability to be self-critical, thus avoiding complacency and degradation of their emergency preparedness program. Inspectors reviewed the licensees 10 CFR 50.54(q) change process, personnel training, and selected screenings and evaluations to assess adequacy. The inspectors toured facilities and reviewed equipment and facility maintenance records to assess licensees adequacy in maintaining them. The inspectors evaluated the capabilities of selected radiation monitoring instrumentation to adequately support emergency action level declarations.
The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71114, 05, Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness. The applicable planning standards, related 10 CFR 50, Appendix E requirements, and 10 CFR 50.54(q) and (t)were used as reference criteria. The inspectors reviewed various documents which are listed in the Attachment. This inspection activity satisfied one inspection sample for the maintenance of emergency preparedness on a biennial basis.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation Emergency Preparedness (EP) Drill
a. Inspection Scope
On May 2, 2017, the inspectors reviewed and observed the performance of an emergency drill that involved a general area emergency where after an initiating event, loss of numerous safety related equipment led to a large break LOCA. The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classification, notifications, and the licensees identification and entrance of any problems into their corrective action program. This inspection evaluated the adequacy of the licensees conduct of the drill and performance critique. Exercise issues were captured by the licensee in their corrective action program as CRs. Requalification training deficiencies were captured within the operator training program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Units 1 and 2 PIs listed below to assess the accuracy and completeness of the submitted data and whether the performance indicators were calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Rev. 7. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71151, Performance Indicator Verification. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 data reported to the NRC for the period January 1, 2016, through March 31, 2017. Documents reviewed included applicable NRC inspection reports, licensee event reports, operator logs, station performance indicators, and related CRs. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- High Pressure Injection
- Cooling Water
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
- Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP)
- Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Readiness
- Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
As required by NRC Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily condition report (CR) summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team meetings.
.2 In-Depth Review:
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the following nuclear condition reports:
- CR 1065823, Boron Recovery Annunciator Test Button Broken, 4/19/2017
- CR 1064965, Received Plant Computer Trouble Annunciator, 4/10/2017 The inspectors evaluated the following attributes of the licensees actions:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner
- evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues
- consideration of extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences
- classification and prioritization of the problem
- identification of root and contributing causes of the problem
- identification of any additional condition reports
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified. In general, the inspectors verified that the licensee had identified problems at an appropriate threshold and entered them into the CAP database and had proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions.
.3 Semiannual Trend Review: Procedural Adherence
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed issues entered in the licensees corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors focused their review on adherence to procedural guidance, but also considered the results of inspector daily condition report screenings, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the 6-month period of January 2017 through June 2017, although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted.
The inspectors compared their results with the licensees analysis of trends.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action documents that were processed by the licensee to identify potential adverse trends in the condition of structures, systems, and/or components as evidenced by acceptance of long-standing non-conforming or degraded conditions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
Review of the Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Selected Records Review (Inspection Procedure 60855 and Inspection Procedure 60855.1)
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors reviewed the normal operation of the independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pad to assess the material condition of the casks, the installation of security equipment, and the performance of monitoring systems. The inspector reviewed procedure 0-OP-4.54, Transfer Cask/Dry Shielded Canister Transfer to ISFSI and Dry Shielded Canister Transfer Cask to Horizontal Storage Module, Rev. 9. The inspector reviewed records pertaining to each fuel assembly placed in casks which were most recently transferred to the ISFSI.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On July 12, 2017, the resident inspectors presented the quarterly inspection results to Mr. L. Lane and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the results of these inspections. The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- M. Becker, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning
- L. Lane, Site Vice President
- B. Gaspar, Manager, Nuclear Site Services
- R. Hanson, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Site Engineering
- L. Hilbert, Plant Manager
- J. Jenkins, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
- J. Leberstien, Technical Advisor, Licensing
- J. Plossl, Supervisor, Nuclear Station Procedures
- J. Schleser, Manager, Nuclear Organizational Effectiveness
- J. Slattery, Manager, Nuclear Operations
- W. Standley, Director, Nuclear Station Safety & Licensing
- D. Taylor, Manager, Station Licensing
- B. Thompson, Manager, Nuclear Training
- M. Whalen, Technical Advisor, Licensing
B. Miller - EP Specialist
D. Plogger - EP Specialist
T. Shalaski - EP Specialist
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
None